Thayer Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Southeast Asian Responses

8/3/2019 Thayer Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Southeast Asian Responses

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ChinaASEANandtheSouthChinaSea:

ChineseAssertivenessandSoutheastAsianResponses

CarlyleA.Thayer

Paper to international conference on

Major and Policy Issues in the South China Sea:

European and American Perspectives

cosponsored by

Institute of European and American Studies and

Centre for AsiaPacific Studies, Academia SinicaTaipei, Taiwan

October 69, 2011


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ChinaASEANandtheSouthChinaSea:ChineseAssertivenessandSoutheastAsianResponses

CarlyleA.Thayer*

Introduction

During the firsthalfof 2011China embarkedonpattern of aggressively asserting its

sovereigntyclaimsintheSouthChinaSeabytargetingthecommercialoperationsofoil

explorationshipsinwatersclaimedbythePhilippinesandVietnam.Chinasactionsnot

only raised regional tensions but alsoprovoked the Philippines to alignmore closely

with theUnited States and take steps to beef up its capacity for territorial defence.

Vietnamrespondedbycalculateddisplaysofresolvetodefendnationalsovereignty.

DuringthesecondhalfoftheyeartensionsovertheSouthChinaSeabegantosubside.

China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) finally agreed to

guidelinestoimplementthe2002DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChina

Sea (DOC).China also initiated a roundofdiplomacywith the Philippinesby inviting

PresidentBenignoAquinoIIItoBeijing.VietnamsentaspecialenvoytoChinaandboth

sidesexchangedaflurryofhighleveldelegations.TheSecretaryGeneraloftheVietnam

CommunistPartyisexpectedtovisitChinalaterthisyear.

Thispaperreviewspoliticalandmilitarydevelopments relatedtotheSouthChinaSea

duringthefirstninemonthsof2011.Itisorganisedintoeightparts.Partonediscusses

Chineseassertivenessdirectedat thePhilippines inthe firsthalfof theyear.Part two

reviews the responses by the Philippines. Part three discusses Chinese assertiveness

directed at Vietnam during the first half of the year. Part four reviews Vietnams

responses.PartfiveconsiderstheadoptionofguidelinesfortheDeclarationonConduct

ofParties

in

the

South

China

Sea.

Part

six

analyses

relations

between

China

and

the

*CarlyleA.ThayerisEmeritusProfessorintheSchoolofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,TheUniversityof

New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, ACT 2600 Australia. Email:

[email protected] .


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Philippines in thepostDOCGuidelinesperiod.Part seven analyses relationsbetween

ChinaandVietnaminthesameperiod.Parteightofferssomeconcludingobservations.

1.ChineseassertivenessandthePhilippines(JanuaryJune)

Accordingto

the

Philippines

Department

of

Foreign

Affairs,

China

increased

its

presence

and activities in the Spratly Islands in the fourth quarter of 2010.1 This increased

presence led to six incursions intowaters claimed by the Philippines in the first five

monthsof2011.2 ChineseactionsledthePhilippinestoofficiallydeclareitswatersthe

WestPhilippineSea.Thissectionreviewstheseincidentsandthediplomaticresponses

bythePhilippines.

Major

Incidents

of

Chinese

Assertiveness

Threemajor incidentsstandout.On25February,threePhilippinesfishingvessels,F/V

JaimeDLS,F/VMamaLydiaDLSandF/VMaricris12,wereoperating inthewatersoffJacksonAtoll one hundred and forty nauticalmileswest of Palawan. According to a

reportpreparedbytheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),thefishingvesselswere

approachedbyaJianghuVClassmissilefrigate,Dongguan560,whichbroadcastoverits

marinebandradio,ThisisChineseWarship560.YouareintheChineseterritory.Leave

the

area

immediately.

Then

the

frigate

repeatedly

broadcast,

I

will

shoot

you.

3

As

the

fishingvesselsbegantowithdraw,theChinesefrigatefiredthreeshotsthatlanded0.3

nauticalmiles(556meters)fromF/VMaricris12.TheF/VMaricris12lefttheareabut

then returned threedays later to recover itsanchor that itcut in itshastydeparture.

TheF/VMaricris12spottedthreeChinesefishingvesselsexploitingmarineresourcesinthearea.ThePhilippinegovernmentreportedlydidnotfileaprotestwiththeChinese

Embassyover this incident.4TheChineseAmbassador to thePhilippines, Liu Jianchao

1MaxDeLeonandEstrellaTorres,BusinessstepsintoendSpratlysrow,ABSCBNNews,3June2011.

2JerryE.EsplanadaandTaraQuismundo,AbidebyUNpact,Chinatold,PhilippineDailyInquirer,3June2011. ThePhilippineshasnotofficially released its list.Governmentofficials initially referred to sixor

sevenincidentsandcurrentlytheyclaimnineincidents.

3TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,3June2011.

4AureaCalica,PHLtotakeChineseincursionstotheUnitedNations,ThePhilippineStar,4June2011.


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laterdeniedthatanyChinesevesselhadfiredonFilipinofishermen.5

The secondmajor incident took place on 2Marchwhen two Chinesewhitepainted

patrolboats,No.71andNo.75,orderedMVVeritasVoyager,aForumEnergyPlcsurveyvessel

operating

in

the

Reed

Bank

area

off

Palawan

Island,

to

leave

and

twice

manoeuvred close in what appeared a threat to ram theMV Veritas Voyager.6 Thesurvey shipwasFrenchowned and registered in Singapore. Itwas forced to suspend

operationsandleavethearea.

ThePhilippinesrespondedbydispatchingtwoOV10aircrafttoinvestigate.TheChinese

boatsdepartedwithout further incident.ForeignAffairsUndersecretaryErlindaBasilio

lodgedaprotestwithChineseChargedAffairs,BaiTian,on4March.Accordingtoone

reportthenoteraisedfourpointstoprovethatReedBankisnotpartofthedisputed

areabyprojectingeightyfivenauticalmilesfromthebasepointinthenorthernpartof

PalawanandnotfromtheKalayaan IslandGroup(KIG).Chinaquestionedthisduringa

meetingwiththePhilippines,butdidnotreplyinadiplomaticnote.7

After the incident, thePhilippinesannounceda temporaryhalt toseismic testingand

orderedthePhilippineNavyandPhilippinesCoastGuardtoescortthesurveyshipwhen

testingresumed.

8

Later,

President

Aquino

instructed

the

Philippine

Coast

Guard

to

providesecurityforoilandgasexplorationactivitiesintheKIG.9

5JimGomez,Chinawarnsneighbors:StopoilsearchinSpratlys,AssociatedPress,9June2011.

6BritishBroadcastingNews(BBC)News,AsiaPacific,PhilippineshaltstestsafterChinapatrolchallenge,

8March2011;NicholasHeathandDanielTenKate,VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassedPetroVietnam

Survey Ship, Bloomberg Businessweek, 9 June 2011; Aurea Calica, Palace in no hurry to file China

protest, The Philippine Star, 21May 2011 and Tessa Jamandre, China fired at Filipino fishermen inJackson

atoll,

ABS

CBN

News,

3June

2011.

The

Sampaguita

gasfield

in

the

Reed

Bank

is

estimated

to

containbetween3.4trilliontotwentytrillioncubicfeetofnaturalgas;CarpsamongtheSpratlys,TheEconomist,10March2011,onlineedition.

7TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,3June2011

8AgenceFrancePresse (AFP), China stakes claimondisputed islandsafter spats,9March2011and

AureaCalica,PalaceinnohurrytofileChinaprotest,ThePhilippineStar,21May2011.9CoastGuardtosecureoilexplorationinKalayaanislandgroup,GMANewsTV,19April2011.TheKIG

containsninegeologicalfeatures:Balagtas(IrvingReef),Kota(Loaita),Lawak(Nanshan),Likas(WestYork),


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The thirdmajor incident tookplace on 24Maywhen Filipino fishermenwitnessed a

China Maritime Surveillance vessel and Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships

unloadingsteelposts,buildingmaterialsandabuoynearLikasandPatag islands,near

Iroquois ReefAmy Douglas Bank one hundred nautical miles off Palawan.10

The

fishermenreportedtheirsightingtotheAFPthenextday.NavyHeadquartersinManila

orderedashiptoverifythesightingbutbadweatherdelayeditsarrivaluntil29Mayby

whichtimetheChineseshipshaddeparted.Localfishermenremovedthesteelpollsand

handedthemovertoauthorities.

TheAFP reported this incidenton27May, fourdays later theDepartmentofForeign

AffairssummonedtheChineseChargedAffairestoseekaclarificationoftheincident.

On1June

the

Philippines

conveyed

serious

concerns

in

aNote

Verbale

to

the

Chinese

Embassy.Thenotestated,Theseshipsreportedlyunloadedbuildingmaterials,erected

anundeterminednumberofposts,andplacedabuoynearthebreakeroftheIroquois

Bank.11

TheChineseEmbassyresponded,ThereportedincursionofChineseships is

not trueItsonlyChinasmarine research ship conductingnormalmaritime research

activities in the SouthChina Sea.12

Speakingon aTV forum that sameday,Defense

SecretaryVoltaireGazminobserved,Itsalarming inthesensethatthe intrusionsare

increasing.They

are

staking

claim

on

the

areas

where

we

do

not

have

apresence.

They

Pagasa (Thitu),,Panata (Lankiam),Parola (NortheastCay),Patag Island (Flat Island isalsoconsidereda

partoftheSpratlys)andRizal(CommodoreReef).

10 Jun Pasaylo, China surveillance ships roam Phlwaters, The Philippine Star, 1 June 2011; Simone

Orendain,PhilippinesSeeksAnswersAboutLatestSouthChinaSeaIncident,VoiceofAmericaNews,1

June 2011; Katherine Evangelista, Philippinesmilitary to act with diplomacy over Spratlys dispute

defense chief, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 June 2011; Johana Paola d. Poblete, Philippines preparingissuesforUNaboutChinaintrusions,BusinessWorld,2June2011reports;ChinadeniesinvasionofSouthChinaSea,ABSCNNews,2June2011;AFP,PhilippinesgovtproteststoChinaoveroilplans in

SouthChina

Sea,

TheChinaPost,2June2011andJerryE.EsplanadaandTarraQuismundo,AbidebyUN

pact,Chinatold,PhilippineDailyInquirer,3June2011.11

QuotedbyGMANews,DFAconveysprotesttoBeijingoverChinesevessels,GMANewsTV,4 June

2011.Seealso:PiaLeeBrago,ChinaBuildinginPHLWaters;DFASummonedEnvoy,ThePhilippineStar,2June2011.TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,3June

2011reportednoNoteVerbalewasgiventotheChineseChargedAffairesatthe31Maymeeting.

12GMANews,DFA:StrongerseacodetopreventrepeatofMischiefReef,GMANewsTV,2June2011

andChinadeniesincursionintoWestPhilippineSea,ThePhilippineStar,3June2011.


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wanttohoisttheirflagsotheycanclaimthearea.13

ForeignAffairsSecretaryAlbertdel

RosariochargedthatanynewconstructionbyChina inthevicinityoftheuninhabited

IroquoisBank is a clear violationof the 2002Associationof SoutheastAsianNations

(ASEAN)ChinaDeclarationontheConductofParties(DOC)intheSouthChinaSea.14

Theotherthreeincidentswererelativelyminorincomparison:

Incidenton 6May: a Chinesemarine vesselwith a flat bedwas sighted inAbadSantos(Bombay)Shoal.

15

Incidenton11May:theAFPclaimedthattwoChinesejetfightersallegedlyflewintoPhilippinesairspacenearPalawan.

16

Incidenton21May:ChineseMarineSurveillanceshipNo.75andSalvage/ResearchShipNo.707wereobservedheadingtowardSouthernBank.

17

ChinaLaunchesMegaDrillingPlatform

Inaddition totheabove incidents, inMarch2011China launchedamegaoilandgas

drillingplatformtobeusedbytheChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation(CNOOC)in

theSouthChinaSea.TherigfreesChinaofdependenceonforeignownedcontractors

fordeep

sea

drilling.

The

rig

is

capable

of

exploring

waters

up

to

3,000

metres

in

depth,

a capability that neither the Philippines nor Vietnam possesses.18

Chinese sources

indicatedthattherigwouldbeginoperations intheSouthChinaSea later intheyear

13 Dona Z. Pazzibugan, Chinese intrusions in PHclaimed parts of Spratlys alarming, says Gazmin,

PhilippinesDailyInquirer,2June201114

PiaLeeBrago,ChinaBuildinginPHLWaters;DFASummonedEnvoy,ThePhilippineStar,2June2011.15

TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,3June2011.

16

This

initial

report

was

never

confirmed

and

appears

the

least

substantiated

of

the

six

incidents

of

reportedChineseincursions.ChinesejetsintrudedintoPHspaceAFP,PhilippineDailyInquirer,20May2011;TwounidentifiedaircraftseenoverSpratlysAFP,GMANewsTV,21May2011;AFPvalidates

Kalayaanislandsaircraftsightingincident,PhilippineInformationAgencyPressRelease,23May2011and

JimGomez,China,PhilippineswarnrivalsonSpratlys,TheChinaPost,24May2011.17

TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,3June2011.

18MichaelRichardson,Chinabringsout thebig rig inenergy race,TheAustralianFinancialReview,1

June2010andMichaelRichardson,Chinastepsupdrilling,intimidationTheJapanTimes,1June2011.


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and therebyenableChina toestablishamajorpresence in thearea.On27May, the

PhilippinesDepartmentofForeignAffairs(DFA)summonedChineseofficialstoconvey

itsconcernabout theplanned locationof themega rig.Philippinesofficialsasked the

Chinesediplomatstheexactplannedlocationofthenewoilrigandstatedthatitshould

notbeplacedinPhilippineterritoryorwaters.19

SubmissiontotheUnitedNations

On5April,thePhilippineMissiontotheUnitedNationssubmittedaletterinresponse

toChinasNotesVerbalesof7May2009(CML/17/2009andCML/18/2009)restatingthe

Philippinesclaim tosovereigntyover theKalayaan IslandGroup,adjacentwatersand

geologicalfeatures(relevantwaters,seabedandsubsoil).20

Chinarespondedon14April

withaNote

Verbale

to

the

United

Nations

that

accused

the

Philippines

of

invading

and

occupying some islands and reefs of Chinas Nansha Islands... The Republic of the

Philippinesoccupationofsome islandsand reefsofChinasNansha islandsaswellas

other related acts constitutes an infringementuponChinas territorial sovereignty.21

TheChineseNoteVerbalealsoarguedthatonthebasisofdomesticlegislationChinas

Nansha Islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] and

ContinentalShelf.22

2.ResponsesbythePhilippinestoChineseAssertiveness(JanuaryJune)

In addition to the diplomatic protests lodgedwith China discussed above, President

AquinorespondedtoChineseassertivenessbyallocatingincreasedfundstomodernise

19PiaLeeBrago,ChinaBuildinginPHLWaters;DFASummonedEnvoy,ThePhilippineStar,2June2011.

20 PhilippineMission to theUnitedNations, letter to the SecretaryGeneralof heUnitedNations,11

00494,No.000228,NewYork,5April2011.Seealso:AFP,PhilippinesprotestsChinasSpratlysclaimat

UN,13April2011;TessaJamandre,PHLprotestsChinesemapclaimingSpratlyIslands,GMANewsTV,

13April

2011

and

Jerry

E.

Esplanada,

PH

runs

to

UN

to

protest

Chinas

9

dash

line

Spratlys

claims,

PhilippineDailyInquirer,15April2011.21

QuotedbyTessaJamandre,ChinaaccusesPHofinvasion,ABCCBNNews,19April2011andTeresa

Cerojano,BeijingcountersManilasUNprotest,saysPhilippines started to invadeSpratlys in1970s,

AssociatedPress,19April2011.

22 The Chinese Note Verbale specifically mentioned the Law of the Peoples Republic of China on

TerritorialSeaandContiguousZone(1992),theLawontheExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinental

ShelfofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(1998)aswellasthe1982UNConventiononLawoftheSea.


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theArmed Force of the Philippines, lobbying hisASEAN colleagues to form a united

frontbehindaSouthChinaSeaCodeofConductasthebestwaytoapproachrelations

with China, increasing defence cooperation with the United States and continued

diplomaticpressureonChina.

ForceModernizationforTerritorialDefence

In2011thePhilippinesdefenceandmilitaryagenciesbegandrawingupanewdefence

strategy in response to developments in the South China Sea. The new strategy is

focusedonbothinternalsecurityoperationsandexternalterritorialdefence.AFPchief

GeneralEduardoObansaidthemilitarywasplanningtosetupacoastwatchsystemon

thewesternseaboard in thenext two to threeyears tomonitorandsecuremaritime

bordersand

natural

resources.23

On28March,GeneralObanannouncedthatthePhilippineshadincreasedairandnaval

patrols intheSouthChinaSeaandhadplanstoupgradeRancudoAirFieldonPagAsa

(Thitu)islandandrepairbarracks.24

TheAFPwasallocatedUS$183millioninfundsfrom

theUS$1billionCapabilityUpgradeProgramtopurchasetwooffshorefastpatrolboats,

longrangemaritimeaircraft, surveillanceandcommunicationequipment includingair

defenceandcoastalradarstobetterprotectitsterritory.25

PresidentAquinohadearlier

releasedUS$255milliontothearmedforces.

In May, a Philippine navy study recommended the acquisition of submarines as a

deterrentagainstfuturepotentialconflicts.26

InAugust2011,thePhilippinesacquired

theU.S.CoastGuardCutterUSCGCHamilton.TheHamilton,renamedBRPGregoriodel

23ChinadeniesincursionintoWestPhilippineSea,ThePhilippinesStar,3June2011.

24JaimeLaude,AFPtomaintainpresenceinSpratlys,ThePhilippineStar,29March2011.

25JonGrevatt,PhilippinestoinvestUSD183millionindefenceofSpratlyIslands,JanesDefenceWeekly,

30 March 2011; Reuters, Philippines steps up presence in South China Sea, 28 March 2011 and

AssociatedPress,PhilippinestobolsterwatchindisputedSpratlys,BloombergBusinessweek,28March

2011.

26KatherineEvangelista, Philippineseye submarines toboostnavy,PhilippineDaily Inquirer,17May

2001.TheprospectofthePhilippinesacquiringsubmarinesisremote.


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Pilar, isexpected topatroldisputedwaters in the SouthChina Sea.27

The Philippines

expects to takedeliveryof a secondU.S.CoastGuardCutter and threenewTaiwan

manufactured MultiPurpose Attack Craft in 2012.28

The Philippines also hopes to

purchasesixjetfighters.

InJune itwasreportedthatthePhilippinesEmbassy inWashingtonwas inthemarket

for excess defence equipment from the US under its Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

program includingoneormorepatrol ships.29

ThePhilippines alsoannounced anew

U.S. training program for its naval forces to enable them to better carry out their

missionofprovidingsecurityforoilexplorationactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea.30

Lobbying

ASEAN

Members

On 8March, PresidentAquino paid an official visit to Indonesiawhere hemetwith

President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono. At ajoint press conference after their talks,

PresidentAquinoexpressedhissupportforIndonesiasleadershiproleasASEANChair.

President Yudhoyono said Indonesia as ASEAN Chairwould bring the Spratly Islands

issue to the forthcomingASEANSummitandEastAsiaSummit.PresidentYudhoyono

expressed his hope that the South China Sea could become a zone of possible

economiccooperation.PresidentAquinoreplied,Withregardtojointexploration[in

thearea], that isan ideathathasbeenproposeda fewdecadespastbutperhapswe

shouldcontinuethetalkswithotherclaimantcountries.Thereisnoroomforunilateral

actioninthatparticularregion.31

27PhilippinessettodeploynewpatrolshiptoKalayaanIslands,ManilaBulletin,14April2011andAFP,

PhilippinestoboostsSpratlypatrols,ChannelNewsAsia,15April2011.TheUSCGCHamilton,aWeather

High Endurance Cutter, was renamed the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and will be the largest ship in thePhilippinenavy;MarichuA.Villanueva,KeepingPhlNavyafloat,ThePhilippineStar,16May2011.28

Reuters,Philippinessayswillspend$255minonmilitaryhelicopters,boats,13April2011andAgenceFrancePresse,PhilippineshopesseadisputewithChinashouldease,September3,2011.

29MichaelLimUbac,PhilippinesshopsforUSmilitarygear,PhilippineDailyInquirer,5June2011.

30ShirleyEscalante,Philippines increasesecurity foroilexploration,AustraliaNetworkNews,28April

2011.

31QuotedbyAdiantoP.Simamora,SBY,AquinoagreeontalksoverSpratlys,TheJakartaPost,9March

2011.


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On1 June,PresidentAquinopaidanofficialvisittoBruneiDarussalam fordiscussions

with Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah. According to Presidential Communications Operations

SecretaryHerminioColomaJr.,thetwoleadersexpressedtheirdesiretomaintainpeace

andstability intheSouthChinaSeathroughamultilateraldialogueamongtheASEAN

countries,claimantcountriesandChina.ClomaquotedtheSultanasstatingitsbestto

havegoodrelationswithChina.32

President Aquino told the reporters covering his visit: We govern ourselves there

[Spratly Islands/KIG]. InsteadofonecountryhasabilateralagreementwithChinaand

theotherhasadifferentbilateralagreementwithChina.Letscometogetherasabody.

Whydowehave to fightor increaseallof these tensionswhen itprofitsnobody?33

Aquinoalso

renewed

his

call

for

the

immediate

adoption

of

the

implementing

guidelines

on the DOC.34

The following day, 12 June, EduardoMalaya, a spokesperson for the

DepartmentofForeignAffairs,calledforamorebindingCodeofConductofPartiesin

theSouthChinaSeainresponsetoChineseintrusionsintoPhilippinewaters.

During his state visit to Brunei President Aquino revealed that the Philippines was

preparing to filea complaint to theUnitedNations in response toChinese intrusions

into its territory.According toAquino, We are completing thedataon about six to

seveninstancessinceFebruary.Wewillpresentitto[China]andthenbringthesetothe

appropriatebody,whichnormallyistheUnitedNations.35

TheAquinoAdministrationis

supportingtwo legislativemeasures inresponsetoChinasassertiveness intheSpratly

Islands. TheHouseofRepresentativeisdrawingupthePhilippineMaritimeZonesbillto

32 Regina Bengco, Peace in Spratlys is all they want, Malaya.Com, 2 June 2011; Shirley Escalante,

Philippines,BruneipushfordialoguetosettleSpratleyIslandsdispute,AustraliaNetworkNews,3June

2011andChinadeniesincursionintoWestPhilippineSea,ThePhilippineStar,2June2011.33

Johanna Paola d. Poblete, Philippines preparing issues for UN about China intrusions. BusinessWorld,2June2011.

34Adoptionofterritorialguidelinesurged,ManilaBulletin,2June2011.

35JohanaPaolad.Poblete,PhilippinespreparingissuesforUNaboutChinaintrusions,BusinessWorld,

2June2011;AmitaO.Legaspi,PalacepreparesSpratlys incursionsreport,GMANewsTV,3June2011

and JimGomez, PhilippinesplansnewUNprotestasChinadeniesaggressiveacts inSpratly Islands,

AssociatedPress,3June2011.


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delineate the Philippines maritime zones, while the Senate is considering the

ArchipelagicSeaLanesbill.36

ReaffirmingU.S.Ties/DiplomaticPressureonChina

On14

May,

President

Aquino

and

several

members

of

his

Cabinet

flew

out

to

the

USS

CarlVinsonaircraftcarrierintheSouthChinaSeaasitheadedtowardsthePhilippines.TheaircraftcarriermadearoutineportcallandgoodwillvisitaccompaniedbytheUSS

Bunker Hill, USS Shiloh and USS Gridley.37 In fact the visit by the carrier was areaffirmation of the alliance relationship on the eve of a visit by Chinas Defence

MinisterGeneralLiangGuanglie.

GeneralLiangpaidanofficialvisittothePhilippinesfrom2125Mayfordiscussionswith

his counterpartDefenseSecretaryVoltaireGazmin.The twoministersagreed tohold

regular discussions to promote trust and confidence and find common ground on

territorialdisputes in the Spratly Islands.Ajoint statementdeclared, bothministers

expressedhope that the implementingguidelinesof the2002DeclarationofConduct

wouldsoonbefinalizedandagreedupon,thatresponsiblebehaviorofallpartiesinthe

SouthChinaSea issuewouldhelpkeep the area stablewhileallpartieswork for the

peaceful resolution Both ministers recognized that unilateral actions which could

causealarmshouldbeavoided.38

WhenDefenceMinisterLiangmetwithPresidentAquinoSouthChinaSea issueswere

discussed ingeneral,but the latter refrained fromdirectlymentioning theReedBank

incident and the reported intrusion of Chinese aircraft into Philippine air space.39

36GMANews,DFA:StrongerseacodetopreventrepeatofMischiefReef,GMANewsTV,2June2011.

37ChristineO.Avendano,DonaPazzibuganand JeromeAning, Palace seesno terrorbacklashagainst

Aquinovisit

to

ship,PhilippineDailyInquirer,16May2011.

38QuotedbyChina,PHagreetoholdregulartalksonSpratlys,ABSCBNNews,23May2011;Christine

O.AvendanoandDonaZ.Pazzibugan,PeacefulSpratlysresolutionreaffirmed,PhilippinesDailyInquirer,24May2011; SimoneOrendain, Philippines,China SupportDiscussiononSouthChinaSea,Voiceof

AmericaNews,24May2011;JimGomez,China,PhilippineswarnrivalsonSpratlys,TheChinaPost,24May2011and JimGomez,China,PhilippinesdefensechiefsdiscussSpratlys,AssociatedPress,4 June

2011.

39WillardCheng,Philippines,ChinaOKSouthChinaSeadialogue,ABSCBNNews,23May2011.


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PresidentAquinotoldGeneralLiangthatmoremaritime incidents indisputedareasof

theSouthChinaSeacouldsparkaregionalarmsrace.40 Immediatelyafterthedefence

ministersmetSunYi,DeputyChiefofPoliticalSectionattheChineseEmbassyinManila,

announcedthatChinalookedforwardtoanaccelerateddialoguewiththePhilippines

toresolvethedisputeintheSouthChinaSea.Itsabilateralissue.Werepeatedlysaid

thatandwebelieveitsabilateralissue,SunYistated.41

AllthemajorincidentsofChineseassertivenessagainstthePhilippinesoccurredpriorto

theannualmeetingoftheShangriLaDialogueheldinSingaporefrom35June.Defence

Ministers raised South China Sea territorial disputes in all plenary sessions at the

meeting.Inlightofrecentministerialdiscussions,DefenseSecretaryGazmin,reportedly

watereddown

comments

on

the

South

China

Sea

in

his

draft

text

before

delivery.42

His

addressbeganbydeclaringthat,maritimesecurityisoneofourforemostconcerns.In

anobviousreferencetothe2MarchReedBankincidentGazminstatedthattheactions

byotherstatesmakethePhilippinesworryandconcerned.Theseactionsnecessarily

createinsecuritynotonlytothegovernmentbutmoredisturbinglytoordinarycitizens

whodependonthemaritimeenvironmentfortheirlivelihood.Hethengavedetailsof

recentincidentsinvolvingChinesevesselswithoutmentioningChinabyname.43

On 4 June, the DFA issued a statement revealing it had lodged a protest with the

Chinese Embassy two days earlier over the increasing presence and activities of

Chinesevessels includingnavalassets in theWestPhilippinesSea (SouthChinaSea).

Thenotestated,TheseactionsofChinesevesselshamper thenormaland legitimate

40AFP, Philippineswarnsof arms race in SouthChina Sea,May 24,2011 andWilliam B.Depasupil,

PhilippinesWarnsofArmsRaceinSouthChinaSea,ManilaTimes,25May2011.41

PiaLeeBrago,ChinawelcomesdialoguetoendNanshadispute,ThePhilippineStar,25May2011.42

ConfidentialsourcewhospokewithSecretaryGazminattheShangriLaDialogue.

43VoltaireGazmin,RespondingtoNewMaritimeSecurityThreats,The10

thIISSAsianSecuritySummit

theShangriLaDialogue,5June2011.


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fishing activitiesof the Filipino fishermen in the area andundermines thepeace and

stabilityoftheregion.44

Chinarespondedon7 JunewithastatementbyForeignMinistryspokesperson,Hong

Lei:Chinese

vessels

were

cruising

and

carrying

out

scientific

studies

in

waters

under

Chinas jurisdiction and their activities were in line with the law China asks the

Philippineside tostopharmingChinassovereigntyandmaritime rightsand interests,

whichleadstounilateralactionsthatexpandandcomplicateSouthChinaSeadisputes.

ThePhilippinesshouldstoppublishing irresponsiblestatementsthatdonotmatchthe

facts.45

Liu Jianchao,ChineseAmbassador to thePhilippines, responded tocomplaintsby the

Philippinesgovernment for the first timewhenhemetwith reporters inManilaon9

June.The ambassador stated thatChinahadnot yet started todrill foroil in Spratly

Islands.Werecallingonotherpartiestostopsearchingforthepossibilityofexploiting

resources intheseareaswhereChinahas itsclaims.46

Inresponsetoaquestionhow

Chinawould react ifcountrieswentaheadandcontinued toexplorewithoutBeijings

permission,theambassadorsaidChinawouldusediplomaticmeanstoassertitsrights.

Wewill never use force unlesswe are attacked, he said. Liang also confirmed to

reporters that Chinese forces took action to keep the exploration vessel from Reed

Bank.Thatspartofourexerciseofjurisdiction.Itsnotharassment,heclaimed.47

ZoneofPeace,Freedom,FriendshipandCooperation

InresponsetoChineseassertiveness,PresidentAquinolaunchedanewinitiativecalling

for the South China Sea to become a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and

44 Statement of theDepartment of Foreign AffairsOn the Presence of Chinese Vessels In theWest

PhilippineSea(SouthChinaSea),4June2011.

45QuotedbyXinhua,ChinarejectsPhilippinesaccusationonSouthChinaSa issue,7June2011;AFP,

ChinasaysPhilippinesharmingitsmaritimerights,ABSCBNNews,7June2011;Reuters,Chinascolds

Philippinesoverdisputedwaters,8June2011.




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14

Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). Aquino explained what is our is ours, and with what is

disputed,we canwork towardsjoint cooperation.48 Hedirected theDepartmentof

ForeignAffairs topromote theZOPFF/C concept through sustained consultations and

dialogue.

According to theDFA, theZOPFF/Cprovidesa framework for separating thedisputed

territorialfeaturesthatmaybeconsideredforcollaborativeactivitiesfromnondisputed

waters intheWestPhilippinesSea (SouthChinaSea) inaccordancewith international

lawingeneralandUNCLOSinparticular.49

AdisputedareacouldbeturnedintoaJoint

Cooperation Area forjoint development and the establishment ofmarine protected

areaforbiodiversityconservation.Areasnot indispute,suchasReedBankthat lieson

thePhilippines

continental

shelf,

can

be

developed

exclusively

by

the

Philippines

or

withtheassistanceofforeigninvestorsinvitedtoparticipateinitsdevelopment.

3.ChineseassertivenessandVietnam(JanuaryJune)

During the firsthalfof2011,ChineseassertivenessdirectedagainstVietnam included

the impositionofanannualfishingbanand,moresignificantly,Chinasunprecedented

action in interfering in the commercial activities of oil exploration vessels operating

withinVietnamsExclusiveEconomicZones.

ChinasAnnualUnilateralFishingBan

On 11 May, the Haikou Municipal Government, Hainan province, issued an

announcement imposingChinas annualunilateral fishingban in the SouthChina Sea

from16May1Augustostensiblytoprotectdwindlingfishstocksduringthespawning

season.Vietnamimmediatelyissuedaverbalprotest:Chinasunilateralexecutionofa

fishingban in theEast Sea isaviolationofVietnams sovereigntyover theHoangSa

[Paracel]archipelago,

as

well

as

the

countrys

sovereignty

and

jurisdiction

over

its

exclusive economic zone and continental shelf50

Vietnam also protested the

48QuotedinARulesBasedRegimeinTheSouthChinaSeaBy:AlbertF.DelRosario,SecretaryofForeign

Affairs,PublicInformationServiceUnit,7June2011.

49AmitaO.Legaspi,PalacepreparesSpratlysincursionsreport,GMANewsTV,3June2011.

50VietnamopposesChinasfishingbaninEastSea,VoiceofVietnamNews,14May2011.


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15

deploymentofaChineseFisheryAdministrationVessel,Leizhou44261,topatrolinthe

watersaroundtheParacel Islandsfrom525May.Vietnamaccusedthepatrolboatof

causingdifficulties fornormal fishingactivitiesconducedbyVietnamese fishermen in

theirtraditionalfishinggroundandmakingthesituationatseamorecomplicated.51

VietnameselocalauthoritiesreportedthearrivalofChinesefishingboatsinVietnamese

watersingreaternumbersthatinthepast.TheheadofPhuYenProvinceBorderGuard

Headquarters stated that, every day between one hundred and twenty and one

hundredandfiftyfishingboatsofChinawereoperatedwithinwatersfromDaNangCity

totheTruongSa[Spratly]ArchipelagoPreviouslyChinesefishingboatshaveviolated

our waters, but this was the first time there were so many boats.52

The numbers

reportedlyrose

to

two

hundred

on

some

occasions.

Vietnamese

fishermen

formed

groupsoffivetotenboatsforprotectionfromlargerChinesecraftthatsometimesused

weapons to intimidate them. The Vietnamese government is currently considering a

proposal by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to build ten fishery

patrolboatsatatotalcostestimatedatUS$102million.

AlthoughVietnamese fishermenvowed todefythebantheVietnamesepresshasnot

reportedanymajorincidentsofharassmentordetention.53

Thereweretwoexceptions.

On1 June, itwas reported thatChinesemilitaryvessels threatened touse theirguns

againstaVietnamesefishingboatoperatinginwatersneartheSpratlyarchipelago.54

A

moreseriousincidenttookplaceonJuly5whenarmedChinesenavaltroopsreportedly

beattheskipperofaVietnamesefishingboat,threatenedthecrew,andthenforcedthe

boattoleavecontestedwatersneartheParacelIslands.55

51ChineseShipViolatesVietnamsSovereignty,VietnamNewsAgency,13May2011.

52 Chinese fishingboats violateVietnamwaters;govtmullspatrolboats,ThanhNienNews,29May

2011.

53DeutschePresseAgentur,VietnamdefiantonfirstdayofChinesefishingban,16May2011.

54AnDienandMinhHung,EastSeaundercurrents,ThanhNienNews,10June2011.

55Vietnam:Chinesesoldiersattackfishermen,AssociatedPress,13July2011


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16

AccostingVietnameseCommercialExplorationVessels

On 26 May, three China Maritime Surveillance ships accosted the Binh Minh 02, aVietnameseseismicsurveyshipoperatinginBlock148,inanincidentthatlastedthree

hours.ChinaMaritimeSurveillance shipNo.84cutacable towing seismicmonitoring

equipment.56

The next day Vietnam lodged a diplomatic protest with Chinas

AmbassadorclaimingthattheactionsoftheChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsviolated

international lawandVietnams sovereignty.57

Vietnamalso sought compensation for

thedamagecaused.TheBinhMinh02returnedtoportforrepairsandresumed itsoilexplorationactivitiesaccompaniedbyanescortofeightships.

58

Somenewsmediaerroneously reported that thiswas the first instance inwhich the

Chinesehad

cut

the

cable

of

aVietnamese

exploration

vessel.

According

to

Do

Van

Hau,

a senior PetroVietnam official, When we conduct seismic survey and drilling

operations,the[China]haveaeroplanesflyingovertosurveyouractivities,theyharass

uswith their vessels, and in extreme cases they cut our [exploration] cables.59

The

VietnamesepressreportedthatwhenVietnameseconducedcontinentalshelfsurveysin

2008, Chinese vessels also cut Vietnamese ships survey cables and further

obstructedVietNamfromconductingoilandgasexplorationintheEastSea60

56PetroViet,BaoCaoSuCoTauTrungQuocCatCapThuDiaChanCuaTauBinhMinh02VaoLuc5H58

Ngay 26/05/2011, and Reuters, Vietnam says Chinese boats harassed oil exploration ship, 27May

2011.Theincidenttookplace116nauticalmilesofftheDaiLanhCapeonthecoastofPhuYenprovinceat

12degrees4825northlatitudeand111degrees2648eastlongitude.

57VNcondemnsChineseintrusion,VietnamNewsAgency,28May2011.

58DeutschePresseAgentur,Vietnamstandsground inseadispute,surveyship takesupwork,6 June

2011;Agence

France

Presse,

Vietnam

complains

to

China

as

sea

tensions

rise,

9June

2011

and

Nicholas

HeathandDanielTenKate,VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassedPetroVietnamSurveyShip,Bloomberg

Businessweek,9June2011.

59BenBlandandKathrinHille, VietnamandChinaoil clashes intensify,TheFinancialTimes,27May

2011.

60National,worldsecurityclosely linked:minister,VietNamNews,7 June2011.Vietnamesesources

toldtheauthorthereasonVietnamdidnotprotestthe2008incidentwasbecausetheVietnamesesurvey

vesselwasoperatingbeyondVietnamsEEZ.


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17

ChinarespondedtoVietnamsproteston28Maywiththefollowingstatement:What

relevantChinesedepartmentsdidwascompletelynormalmarinelawenforcementand

surveillanceactivitiesinChinasjurisdictionalarea.61

Vietnamretortedon29May:

thearea

where

Vietnam

conducted

exploration

activities

situates

entirely

in

the

exclusive

economic

zoneand thetwohundrednauticalmilecontinental shelfofVietnam inaccordancewith the1982

UnitedNationsConventiononLawoftheSea.Itisneitheradisputedareanorisitanareamanaged

byChina.Chinahasdeliberatelymisledthepublicintothinkingthatitisadisputedarea.62

China responded in kind: the law enforcement activities by Chinese maritime

surveillanceshipsagainstVietnamsillegallyoperatingshipsarecompletelyjustified.We

urgeVietnamtoimmediatelystopinfringementactivitiesandrefrainfromcreatingnew

troubles.63

On9June,accordingtoVietnamsMinistryofForeignAffairs,asecondpremeditated

and carefully calculated incident occurred when Chinese fishing boat No. 62226

equippedwithacablecuttingdevicesnaredthecableoftheViking IIseismicsurveyship operating in survey Block 13603 in the vicinity of Vanguard Bank (Tu Chinh).

64

VikingIIisregisteredinNorwayandwasoperatingundercharterwithPetroVietnam.65TwoChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsandotherChinesefishingcraftcametoassistthe

distressed fishingboat.AccordingtoNguyenPhuongNga,theofficialForeignMinistry

spokesperson,Chinassystematicactswereaimedatturninganundisputedregioninto

one of dispute, to carry out its ambition to make Chinas ninedash line claim a

reality.66

61QuotedinReuters,ChinareprimandsVietnamoveroffshoreoilexploration,28May2011.

62VietnamdemandsChinastopsovereigntyviolations,ThanhNienNews,29May2011.

63QuotedbyHuyDuong,ThePhilippinesandVietnamattheCrossroad,ManilaTimes,9June2011.

64IanTimberlake,SeaspatraisesChinaVietnamtensions,AgenceFrancePresse,9June2011.Talisman

EnergyInc.aCanadiancompanybasedinCalgaryannouncedinApril2011thatitwouldconductamajor

seismicprogram inthisarea;NicholasHeathandDanielTenKate,VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassed

PetroVietnamSurveyShip,BloombergBusinessweek,9June2011.

65Reuters,VietnamaccusesChinaofharassinganotherboat,9June2011.

66QuotedbyUnitedPressInternational,Vietnamallegeshighseasinterference,10June2011.


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18

EarliertheViking IIhadbeen involved inseparate incidentson29Mayand31May inwhich Chinese boats the Fei ShengNo. 16 andVesselNo. B12549 attempted toapproachitsreardeckandinterferewithitsoperations.SecurityescortswiththeViking

IIsuccessfullyblockedtheirapproaches.67

ChineseauthoritiesclaimedthattheVikingIIincidentoccurredwhenarmedVietnameseships chased Chinese fishing boats from the Wanan (Vanguard) Bank. One of the

ChineseboatsbecameentangledinthecableoftheVikingIIshipoperatinginthesamearea.TheChineseboatwasdragged formore thananhourbefore theentanglednet

couldbecut.According to theChineseForeignMinistryspokesperson,HongLei,The

Vietnamese shipput the livesand safetyofheChinese fishermen in seriousdanger.

VietnameseForeign

Ministry

officials

lodged

aprotest

with

Chinese

Embassy

on

the

afternoonoftheincidentandannouncedthattheVietnamNationalOilandGasGroup

wouldbeseekingcompensationfordamages.68

A thirdcablecutting incident reportedlyoccurred in JunebutVietnamdecidednot to

publicisethematter.69

4.VietnamsresponsetoChineseAssertiveness.

Duringthe

first

six

months

of

2011,

China

and

Vietnam

held

four

high

level

meetings.

The firsttwooccurredpriortorenewedChineseassertiveness intheSouthChinaSea.

ThelattertwomeetingswereheldundertheshadowofincreasingtensionsintheSouth

China Sea. Chinese assertiveness impacted on Vietnamese domestic politics and

resulted inastiffeningofthegovernmentspublicstance inresponsetoelitepressure

includingpublicdemonstrationsbystudentsandprominentintellectuals.

67AnDienandMinhHung,EastSeaundercurrents,ThanhNienNews,10June 2011.

68 Ian Timberlake, Sea spat raises ChinaVietnam tensions, Agence France Presse, 9 June 2011 and

Reuters,ChinaaccusesVietnaminescalatingseatensions,10June2011.

69CarlyleA. Thayer, SouthChinaSea:ThirdCableCutting Incident?, ThayerConsultancyBackground

Briefing,July1,2011.AvailableatScribd.com.


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19

SpecialEnvoytoChinaandOtherHighLevelMeetings

In February 2011, immediately after Eleventh National Congress of the Vietnam

CommunistParty,thenewSecretaryGeneral,NguyenPhuTrong,dispatchedaspecial

envoy,HoangBinhQuan, toBeijing.QuanmetwithHu Jintao,PresidentandGeneral

SecretaryoftheChineseCommunistParty,andbriefedhimontheoutcomeoftheparty

congress.Quan alsoextended an invitation toHu andotherChineseparty and state

leaderstovisitVietnam.Inreturn,HuextendedaninvitationtoSecretaryGeneralTrong

tovisitChina.70

IndeferencetoChina,andinlightofChineseassertivenessintheSouth

ChinaSea,TrongreportedlywillvisitBeijingfirstlaterthisyear.

In April, Senior Lieutenant General Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of Chinas Central

MilitaryCommission,

visited

Hanoi

at

the

invitation

of

General

Phung

Quang

Thanh,

MinisterofNationalDefence.Lt.Gen.GuowasalsoreceivedbyPrimeMinisterNguyen

Tan Dung and party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. Prime Minister Dung

proposedthetwosidestalkandseekfundamentalandlonglastingmeasuresthatboth

sides are able to accept for the East Sea [SouthChina Sea] issue71

Thejointpress

communiquissuedaftertheconclusionofGuosvisitoutlinedanumberofcooperative

military activities, including increasing the scope ofjoint naval patrols in theGulf of

Tonkin,but

no

mention

was

made

of

the

South

China

Sea.72

ImmediatelyafterGeneralGuosvisit,Vietnamhostedameetingof theheadsof the

governmentdelegationsonboundarynegotiationsbetweenChinaandVietnam(1819

April). Thesediscussionswereheld atdeputyminister level.Chinas ForeignMinistry

reported that the two viceministerspledged, toproperlyhandlemaritimedisputes

through friendly consultations and explore solutionswith a positive and constructive

70ChinesepresidentvowstofurthertieswithVietnam,Xinhua,18February2011andChinasHuJintao

invitesNguyenPhoTrong,VoiceofVietnamNews,19February2011.

71PartyLeadersMeetingwithChineseGeneral,VietnamNewsAgency,14April2011.

72LiQiong,China,VietnamIssueJointPressCommuniquonCMCViceChairmanGuoBoxiongsVisitto

Vietnam,Xinhua,17April2011.


20/35

20

attitude.73AVietnamese spokesperson revealed thatthe two sidesagreed theywill

sign an agreement on the fundamental guidelines to settle themaritime issues but

negotiationsarestillcontinuingandnodatehasbeensettosigntheagreement.74

Thefourth

high

level

meeting

took

place

in

Singapore

in

June

on

the

sidelines

of

the

Shangrila Dialogue. In his address at a plenary session, Vietnams DefenceMinister

spoke indetailabout the legalbasis foractivitiesat sea to facilitatecooperation for

development and deter actions that risk our common interests, regionally and

nationally.

Thanhs sidelinemeetingwithDefenceMinister LiangGuanglie tookplace under the

shadow of the 26 May Binh Minh 02 cablecutting incident. Thanh expressed theconcern of Vietnamese party and state leaders over what he termed a pressing

incidentandthenofferedtheconciliatorycommentthatSometime,regrettablecases

happen which are beyond the expectation of both sides.75

Thanh concluded his

remarkswiththesewords,Wetrulyexpectnorepetitionofsimilar incidents.76

Liang

replied thatChinadidnotwanta similar incident tooccur in the future.Henoted in

particular that the Peoples Liberation Army was not involved in the incident.

Nonetheless,fourdayslaterasecondcablecuttingincidentoccurred.

VietnamStiffensPublicDiplomacy

On9 June,PrimeMinisterNguyenTanDungrespondedtogrowingdomesticpressure

bymakinganunusuallystrongstatementindefenceofnationalsovereignty.Dungsaid:

73VietnamesePrimeMinisterNguyenTanDungMeetswithChineseViceForeignMinisterZhangZhijun,

MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,20April2011.

74QuotedinAgenceFrancePresse,Vietnam,Chinavowtoworkondisputedseapact,21April2011and

DeutschePresse

Agentur,

Vietnam

and

China

pledge

to

settle

South

China

Sea

disputes,

20

April

2011.

75 East Sea incident a pressing issue:VietnameseDefenseMinister, ThanhNienNews, 4 June2011.

Chinese newsmedia distortedMinister Thanhs remarks by reporting that he agreed to resolve heir

differencesovertheSouthChinaSeathroughbilateralefforts,andthatnothirdpartyshouldbeallowed

tointerfereinsucheffortsorusetheissuetoharmthebilateralrelations,see:ChineseDMMeetswith

VietnameseCounterpartinSingapore,Xinhua,4June2011.

76 PhungQuang Thanh, Responding toNewMaritime Security Threats, The 10

th IISS Asian Security

SummittheShangriLaDialogue,5June2011.


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21

Wecontinuetoaffirmstronglyandtomanifestthestrongestdeterminationofallthe

Party, of all the people and of all the army in protecting Vietnamese sovereignty in

maritime zones of the country. Dung also reaffirmed the incontestable maritime

sovereigntyofVietnam towards the twoarchipelagos, theParacelandSpratlys.77

On

the same day, President Nguyen Minh Triet, visiting Co To island off Quang Ninh

provincenear theChinaborder, stated thatVietnamwasdetermined toprotect its

islandsandwearereadytosacrificeeverythingtoprotectourhomeland,ourseaand

islandsovereignty.78

LiveFiringExercises

On9June,

aftertheChineseAmbassadortothePhilippinescalledonVietnamandthe

Philippinesto

cease

oil

exploration

in

the

South

China

Sea.

Shortly

after

China

announced it would be conducting routine naval exercises in the Western Pacific,79

Vietnam responded by publicly announcing a livefire exercise. Vietnams Northern

MaritimeSafetyCorporationissuedanoticethattwolivefiringexerciseswouldbeheld

on13 June in thewatersnearHonOng Island.Theexerciseswould last fora totalof

nine hours. The notice further declared, All vessels are to refrain from engaging in

activities in the area during the livefire period.80

Hon Ong Island is located

approximatelyforty

kilometres

off

Quang

Nam

province

in

central

Vietnam.

VietnamsForeignMinistry characterized the livefiringexercisesas a routineannual

training activity of the Vietnam navy in the area where the Vietnam navy regularly

conductstraining[activities]thatareprogrammedandplannedannuallyforunitsofthe

77 Interview with Thanh Nien quoted by Agence France Presse, Vietnam PM says sea sovereignty

incontestable, 9 June 2011 andDeutsche PresseAgentur, Vietnams top leaders add fire to SouthChinaSeadisputes,9June2011.

78DeutchePresseAgentur,VietnamstopleadersaddfiretoSouthChinaSeadispute,9June2011.

79 Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, China says to hold routine navy drills in western Pacific,

Reuters,9June2011.

80BaoDamAnToanHangHaiMienBac(NorthernMaritimeSafetyCorporation),Veviecbandanthat

trenvungbienQuangNam,So107/TBHHCT.BDATHHMB,9June2011,http://www.vmsnorth.vn.


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22

VietnamPeoplesNavy.81

Vietnamdidnotspecifyhowmanyshipswouldbeinvolved.

The firstphaseof theexercise involved coastal artillerywhile the secondpartof the

exercise involved missile corvettes firing their deck gun. Confidential Vietnamese

militarysourcesreportthatantishipmissileswerealsofiredfromSukhoijetaircraft.On

11 June, theGlobal Times, an Englishlanguage newspaper published by the ChineseCommunistParty,editorializedthatVietnamsconductofalivefiringexerciseswasthe

lowestformofnationalismtocreateanewenmitybetweenthepeopleofthetwocountries.Hanoi

seemstobelookingtodissipatedomesticpressureandbuckupmoraleathome,whileatthesame

timefurtherdrawingintheconcernofinternationalsocietyovertheSouthChinaSeadispute.82

The editorial stated that China has never sought to politically blackmail smaller

countries.ButwhenasmallcountryturnsthataroundandtriestoblackmailChina,the

Chinesepeople

will

on

the

one

hand

feel

rather

angry,

while

on

the

other

hand

find

it

quite amusing. In conclusion, the editorial opined If Vietnam insists on making

trouble, thinking that themore trouble itmakes, themorebenefits itgains, thenwe

truly wish to remind those in Vietnam who determine policy to please read your

history.

RisingAntiChinaNationalisminVietnam

Chinas

new

wave

of

aggressive

assertiveness

provoked

a

patriotic

response

among

studentsandawidersectionoftheVietnamesecommunity.UsingFacebookandother

socialnetworkingsitestheymountedaseriesofantiChinademonstrationsonSundays

over a twelve week period. The demonstrations commenced on 5 June when an

estimatedthreehundredVietnamesegatheredneartheChineseEmbassy inHanoi.On

thesamedayacrowdestimatedatnearly1,000toseveralthousandgatheredinHo

81QuotedbyJohnRuwitch,Vietnamwelcomesinternationalhelpasseadisputeescalates,Reuters,11

June2011.Seealso:MargieMason,VietnamplanslivefiredrillafterChinadispute,AssociatedPress,10

June2011;AgenceFrancePresse,Vietnamtohold livefiredrillasChinariftgrows,10June2011and

DeutschePresseAgentur,NavyofficialsayslivefiredrillswellinsideVietnamsterritory,11June2011.

82QuotedbyAssociatedPress,ChineCommunistPartynewspapercautionsVietnam,11June2011.


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23

ChiMinhCity.83

Onthefollowingweekend,12June,twohundreddemonstratorstook

tothestreetsofHanoiwhileanotherthreehundredmarched inHoChiMinhCity ina

repeat of the previous weekends protests.84

The protestors held placards reading

DownwithChina,TheSpratlysandParacelsbelongtoVietnamandStopViolating

VietnamsTerritory.OnSunday19Juneanotherpeacefuldemonstrationswasheld in

HanoiwhilepoliceinterventionpreventedathirddemonstrationfrombeingheldinHo

ChiMinhCity.

Duringearly June, growingenmitybetweennationalists inChina andVietnam spilled

over into cyberspace. According to Nguyen Minh Duc, director of the Bach Khoa

Internetwork Security Centre, more than two hundred Vietnamese websites were

subjectto

cyber

attacks.

Among

the

sites

affected

were

those

of

the

ministries

of

Agriculture and Rural Development and Foreign Affairs where hackers succeeded in

postingChineseflagsandslogans.85

SecondSpecialEnvoytoChina

InmidyeartherewerediplomaticsignsthatChinaandVietnamweremovingtocontain

tensionsarisingfromtheirterritorialdispute intheSouthChinaSea.Forexample,the

navies

of

both

countries

conducted

their

eleventh

routine

joint

patrol

in

the

Gulf

of

83Chineseaggression intheSouthChinaSeapersists,saysVietnamForeignMinister,IBTimes,9June

2011; Reuters, Vietnam accuses China of harassing another boat, 9 June 2011 and Ian Timberlake,

FacebookeffectstirsVietnamChinatensions,AgenceFrancePresse,10June2011

84DeutschePresseAgentur,VietnamesedemonstrateagainstChinaasseadisputesheatsup,12June

2011;Reuters,VietnamallowssecondantiChinaprotest inHanoi,12 June2011andAgenceFrancePresse, Protesters rally ahead ofVietnam fire drills, The Standard, 13 June 2011. SomeVietnameseuniversitieswarnedtheirstudentsnottotakepartinantiChinademonstrations.AnoticeattheIndustrial

University inHoChiMinhCity, forexample, threatened toexpel studentswho tookpart inantiChina

demonstrations; see: JohnRuwitch, Vietnam allows second antiChina protest inHanoi, Reuters, 12

June2011.

85AFP,VietnamcomplainstoChinaasseatensionsrise,9June2011andIanTimberlake,Vietnamto

holdlivefiredrillasChinariftgrows,10June2011.


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24

Tonkinon June1920.86

After thepatrolwas concluded, theVietnamese shipspaida

visittoZhanjiang,Guangdong,VietnamssecondeverportcalltoChina.87

After the secondweekend of antiChina demonstrations,Vietnam dispatched deputy

foreignminister

Ho

Xuan

Son

as

aspecial

envoy

to

Beijing

to

hold

talks

on

the

South

ChinaSeawithhis counterpartZhang Zhijun. Significantly,Sonwas receivedby State

CouncilorDaiBingguo.AccordingtoajointpressreleaseissuedbyVietnamsMinistryof

ForeignAffairsonJune25th:

Thetwosidesemphasizedthenecessitytoactively implementthecommonperceptionsof

the two countries leaders,peacefully solving the two countriesdisputes at sea through

negotiationand friendlyconsultation;employingeffectivemeasuresandworking together

tomaintainpeaceandstabilityintheEastSea[sic].

They also laid stress on the need to steer public opinions along the correct direction,

avoidingcommentsanddeedsthatharmthefriendshipandtrustofthepeopleofthetwo

countries.

The two sides agreed to speed up the tempo of negotiations so as to early sign an

Agreementonbasicprinciplesguidingthesettlementofsea issuesbetweenVietnamand

China,andboostthe implementationoftheDeclarationonConductofParties intheEast

Sea[sic](DOC)andfollowupactivitiessothatsubstantialprogresswillsoonbeachieved.88

5. AdoptionofGuidelinesfortheDeclarationonConductofPartiesinthe

SouthChinaSea

In2004,

two

years

after

negotiating

the

Declaration

on

Conduct

of

Parties

in

the

South

ChinaSea,theASEANChinaSeniorOfficialsMeetingdecidedtoestablishtheASEAN

ChinatheJointWorkingGroup(JWC)toImplementtheDOC.TheJointWorkingGroup

held itsfirstmeeting inManilafromAugust45,2005.TheTermsofReferenceforthe

86MargieMason,VietnamandChinaholdjointnavalpatrolamidspat,AssociatedPress,June21,2011

andAgenceFrancePresse,China,VietnamholdjointseapatrolsneardisputedSpratlys,June23,2011.

87VietnamesenavalshipsonfriendlyvisittoChina,QuanDoiNhanDanOnline,June22,2011;China,

VietnamengageinJointnavalpatrols,PeoplesDailyOnline,June22,2011andVietnamesenavalshipswrapupvisittoChina,QuanDoiNhanDanOnline,June27,2011.88

SocialistRepublicofVietnam,MinistryofForeignAffairs,VietNamChinajointpressrelease,June26,

2011. http://www.mofa.vn/en. See also: EdwardWong, China and Vietnam Agree to Talks on South

China SeaDispute, TheNew York Times, June 26, 2011; Brian Spegele, China Announces PactwithVietnamonDisputesSea,TheWallStreetJournal,June26,2011;DanMartin,China,VietnamvowtocoolS.ChinaSea tensions,AgenceFrancePresse, June27,2011;andQinZhongwei, China,Vietnam

agreeontalkstosolveseadispute,ChinaDaily,June27,2011.


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25

JointWorkingGroup specified that the JWGwas tomeet twice a year to formulate

recommendationsinfourareas:

GuidelinesandtheactionplanfortheimplementationoftheDOC SpecificcooperativeactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea A registerof experts and eminentpersonswhomayprovide technical inputs,

nonbindingandprofessional viewsorpolicy recommendations to theASEAN

ChinaJWG

Theconveningofworkshops,astheneedarises89ASEANtableddraftguidelinesfordiscussion.Itimmediatelybecameapparentthatpoint

two was a major sticking point. Point two stated, ASEAN will continue its current

practiceof

consulting

among

themselves

before

meeting

with

China.

China

objected

and insisted that outstanding disputes should be resolved by consultations among

relevant parties and not with ASEAN. The Joint Working Group did not make any

progressforthenextsixyears.

Chineseassertiveness inpushing itssovereigntyclaims intheSouthChinaSea in2009

and 2010 provoked an international backlash. South China Sea disputes featured

prominently at the ASEAN Regional Forum in midyear and at the inaugural ASEAN

Defense Ministers Meeting Plus in October 2010. China was out maneuvered

diplomaticallyandsoughttolimitfurtherdamagebyagreeingtorevivetheheretofore

moribundASEANChinaJointWorkingGrouptoImplementtheDeclarationonConduct

ofParties. InDecember2010 the fifthmeetingwas convened inKunmingChina.The

sixth ASEANChina Joint Working Group met in Medan, Indonesia from April 1820,

2011.AtbothmeetingsitbecameclearthatprogresswashostagetoChinasinsistence

that territorial and sovereignty claims could only be settled bilaterally by the states

concerned.Chinaspecificallyobjectedtoaclause inthedraftguidelines,drawnupby

89 Terms of Reference of the ASEANChina Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the

DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea,availableat:http://www.asean.org/16886htm.

AccessedMay20,2011.


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26

ASEAN, thatmentioned ASEAN members would gather first towork out a common

positionbeforemeetingwithChina.

In July2011ASEAN SeniorOfficialsquietlydropped theoffending clause andoffered

drasticallyrevised

draft

guidelines

to

their

ministers

for

approval.90

On

July

20,

2011,

theASEANandChineseforeignministersfinallyreachedagreementonTheGuidelines

for the Implementation of the DOC. These guidelines consist of eight brief points

preceded by a threeparagraph preamble. The preamble identifies the DOC as a

milestonedocument signedbetween theASEANMemberStatesandChina, implying

this isnotanagreementbetweenASEANasagroupandChina.Second,thepreamble

statesthattheeffectiveimplementationoftheDOCwillcontributetothedeepeningof

theASEAN

China

Strategic

Partnership

for

Peace

and

Prosperity.

This

is

an

inducement

forChina to takeconcreteaction.Finally, thepreamblenotes thatGuidelinesare to

guidetheimplementationofpossiblejointcooperativeactivities,measuresandprojects

asprovided for intheDOC.This formulationclearly indicates that theGuidelinesare

tentativeandnothingisbinding.

Theeightsubstantivepointsareasfollows:

1.The

implementation

of

the

DOC

should

be

carried

out

in

astep

by

step

approachinlinewiththeprovisionsoftheDOC.

2.ThePartiestotheDOCwillcontinuetopromotedialogueandconsultationsin

accordancewiththespiritoftheDOC.

3.TheimplementationofactivitiesorprojectsasprovidedforintheDOCshould

beclearlyidentified.

4. The participation in the activities or projects should be carried out on a

voluntarybasis.

5. Initial activities to be undertaken under the ambit of the DOC should be

confidencebuilding

measures.

6.ThedecisiontoimplementconcretemeasuresoractivitiesoftheDOCshould

90 As of this writing the guidelines have not been released. According to a confidential source who

attended theASEAN relatedmeetings in Bali, the new guidelines state, The parties to theDOCwill

continuetopromotedialogueandconsultationsinaccordancewiththespiritoftheDOC.Privateemail

received22July2011.


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27

be based on consensus among parties concerned, and lead to the eventual

realizationofaCodeofConduct.

7. Inthe implementationoftheagreedprojectsundertheDOC,theservicesof

theExpertsandEminentPersons,ifdeemednecessary,willbesoughttoprovide

specificinputsontheprojectsconcerned.91

8.Progressoftheimplementationoftheagreedactivitiesandprojectsunderthe

DOCshallbereportedannuallytotheASEANChinaMinisterialMeeting(PMC).

TheforeignministersalsoagreedtoconvenetheseventhmeetingoftheASEANChina

JointWorkingGrouplaterintheyearinChina.

ImmediatelyaftertheGuidelineswereadopted,thePhilippinesForeignSecretaryAlbert

delRosarionotedthattheywouldneedmoreteethtomakethemeffective.According

to Rosario, The necessary elements to make the guidelines succeed are still

incomplete.Werelookingfortheparticipantstobehonorable.Beyondthattheresnot

much room forus toexact consequences formisbehavior.Thisviewwasechoedby

BarryWain,aveterancommentator,Hardheadedstrategists inSoutheastAsiaknow

thatadoptingtheimplementingguidelinesishardlyaconstraintonChinasincreasingly

aggressivebehaviorintheSouthChinaSea.TherealrestraintonChinaisthepresence

oftheU.S.NavyandtheneedtohavestableU.S.Chinarelations.92

6.Chinas

Relations

with

the

Philippines

post

DOC

Guidelines

ChinaHostsStateVisitbyPresidentAquino

AfterPresidentAquinoassumedofficehereceivedaninvitationtopayanofficialstate

visittoChina.Hisvisitwasreportedlypostponedononeormoreoccasionsbecauseof

risingtensionsoverterritorialdisputes intheSouthChinaSea.AfterASEANandChina

adoptedtheGuidelineson theDOC thePhilippinesdispatched its foreignsecretaryto

Beijingtoorganisethestatevisits.PresidentAquinopaidanofficialvisittoBeijingfrom

August30

September

3at

the

invitation

of

President

Hu

Jintao.

The

joint

statement

issued at the conclusion of bilateral talks indicated that economic issues featured

91TheGuidelinesfortheImplementationoftheDocappearedontheASEANSecretariatwebsiteunder

ExternalRelations,China,CooperationontheSouthChinaSea.Theyhavesincebeenremoved.

92BarryWain,ASouthChinaSeaCharade,TheWallStreetJournal,21August2011.


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28

prominently.Forexample,itwaslaterreportedthatAquinohasgarneredUS$1.3billion

in new investments.93 Thejoint statement alsomade the following reference to the

SouthChinaSeanearthebottomofthelistoftopicsdiscussed(point15of17points):

Bothleaders

exchanged

views

on

the

maritime

disputes

and

agreed

not

to

let

the

maritime

disputes

affectthebroaderpictureoffriendshipandcooperationbetweenthetwocountries.Thetwoleaders

reiterated their commitment to addressing the disputes through peaceful dialogue, to maintain

continued regionalpeace, security, stability and an environment conducive to economicprogress.

BothleadersreaffirmedtheircommitmentstorespectandabidebytheDeclarationontheConduct

ofPartiesintheSouthChinaSeasignedbyChinaandtheASEANmembercountriesin2002.94

PushforBindingCodeofConduct

On Aquinos return to Manila he revealed that President Hu Jintao supported an

implementing agreement for a South China Sea Code of Conduct. According to

Aquino,this

was

very

significant,

because

before

it

was

just

ageneral

statement

of

principles. Now theres a desire to really put in the implementing rules and

regulations.95

Nevertheless,PresidentAquinohascontinuedtopressforamultilateral

SouthChinaSeaCodeofConductandagreementondemarcatingtheprecisemaritime

areasindispute. OnSeptember16th,forexample,ontheeveofanofficialvisittoJapan

scheduled for 25th

28th

September, PresidentAquino stated in an interviewwith the

Japanesemediathat,Therearelotofclaimantstothedisputedareas,soforit[codeof

conduct]to

be

binding

it

has

to

be

in

an

multilateral

basis

[sic].

96

Press

reports

indicated President Aquino would raise the South China Sea code of conduct in his

discussion with Prime Minister Nado in late September. Japans Ambassador to the

93Aquinobackfrom5dayUSvisit,Malaya,September23,2011.ManoloB.Jara,Aquinobringshome

$13bwordofChinainvestments,TheGulfToday,September5,2011reports,AquinosaidtheChinesegoodieshebroughthomeconsistedof$1.28billionworthofnew investments,$3.8billion inassured

investmentsand$7.9billionfrombusinessmenwhoshowedinterestininvestinginthePhilippines.

94 JointStatementof thePhilippinesandChina,Beijing,September1,2011 reprinted in InquirerGlobal

Nation,September7,2011.

95QuotedinBloombergNews,ChinaWantsBindingS.ChinaCode:Aquino,August31,2011;seealso:

Barbara Mae Dacanay, China and Philippines agree to peace over South China Sea, Gulf News,September2,2011.

96Reuters,AquinowantsmultilateralsolutiontoSouthChinaSeadisputes,InterAkysyon,September17,

2011.


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29

Philippines, Toshinao Urabe, was also quoted at this time as stating that Japan

supportedastrongercodeofconduct.97

FurtherMilitaryModernisation

Significantly,immediately

after

Aquinos

state

visit

to

Beijing,

the

Philippines

announced

onSeptember7th

that4.95billionpesos(US$118million)wouldbeallocatedtotopup

thedefencebudget.98

Thesefundswouldbeusedtopurchaseanavalpatrolvessel,six

helicoptersandothermilitaryequipmentinordertosecuretheMalampayaNaturalGas

andPowerProjectlocatedfiftymilesoffthecoastofPalawaninwatersalsoclaimedby

China.

ZoneofPeace,Freedom,FriendshipandCooperation

InJuly,atthe44th

ASEANMinisterialMeeting,theForeignSecretaryofthePhilippines

presentedhiscounterpartswithaproposal toadoptanagreemententitled,Zoneof

Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation in the South China Sea. Theministers

tooknoteof thisproposaland referred it toameetingofASEANSeniorOfficialsand

legalexperts forconsideration.99

Inpreparation for theASEANLegalExpertsMeeting,

the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) drew up a proposal to create

enclavesfordisputedmaritimeterritory intheSouthChinaSea inordertoseparate

these areas from nondisputed maritime territory. According to the DFA proposal,

(E)nclavingwillliterallyoperationalizetheshelvingofterritorialdisputesandpavethe

wayforeffectiveandmeaningfulcooperationamongtheclaimantcountriesintheWest

PhilippineSea(or)SouthChinaSea.100

97JapanstepsinoSouthChinaSeaterritorialfeud,IndianExpress,September20,2011;andJapancalls

forSouthChinaSeacodeofconduct,TheEconomicTimes,September21,2011.98

AgenceFrancePresse,PhilippinesUpsSpendingToGuardSouthChinaSea,September7,2011.

99BeaCupin,ASEAN,ChinaagreetoheedguidelinescoveringSpratlys,GMANews,July20,2011and

BrianPadden,ASEANMaritimeSpecialistsDiscussGuidelinestoResolveS.ChinaSeaDispute,Voiceof

America,September22,2011.

100Quoted inELR/VS, DFA topropose enclavingofdisputedareas inSouthChinaSea,GMANews,

September21,2011andELR/VS, VPBinaypushesforDFAproposalonSpratlys,GMANew,September

22,2011.


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ASEANmaritimeandlegalexpertsconvenedinManilaonSeptember22nd.Theirfindings

willbepassedtoASEANSeniorOfficialswhointurnwillmakerecommendationstotheir

ministerspriortotheconveningofthe19th

ASEANSummitinBaliinNovember.

7.Chinas

Reltions

with

Vietnam

post

DOC

Guidelines

AntiChinaProtestsEnd

DespitethereferenceinthejointpressreleasetosteeringpublicopinionissuedbyHo

XuanSonandZhangZhijunonJune25th,Vietnameseauthoritiespermittedtwofurther

demonstrationstotakeplaceonJune26andJuly3.Each involvednearly100persons

whogatheredoutsidetheChineseEmbassy inHanoi.Onthefollowingweekends,July

10and July17, thepolice forcibly intervenedanddetainedadozenpersons including

journalistswhen

they

gathered

outside

the

Chinese

Embassy.

On

the

eighth

weekend,

July24,theprotestersgatheredatHoanKiem lakeandwerepermitted tomarchand

displayantiChinabanners.Noprotests tookplaceonSunday, July31.Organisersand

theirsupportersmet incoffeeshopstoplanstrategyonwhatturnedouttobeacold

andrainyday.

AntiChina protestswere resumed on theweekends of August 7 and August 14. An

estimated

100

persons

took

part

in

each.

On

August

18,

the

Hanoi

Peoples

Committee

issuedadirectivebanningpublicprotests.Whenacrowdofupto50personsgathered

atHoanKiem lakeonAugust21 thepolicemoved in todisperse them.Fifteenwere

detained.101Nofurtherpublicprotestshavebeenreported.

BilateralDiscussionsContinue

InAugust,ChinaandVietnamheldtheseventhroundofbilateraldiscussionsaimedat

reachingasettlementoftheirmaritimedisputes.Theoriginsofthesetalksdatesbackto

December2008

when

China

and

Vietnam

agreed

to

give

priority

given

to

developing

a

set of fundamental guiding principles as a framework for settlingmaritime issues.

101Vietnam issuesultimatum toantiChinaprotesters,DeutschePresseAgentur,18August2001and

Marianne Brown, Vietnam Security ForcesDetain AntiChina Protesters,Voice ofAmericaNews, 21

August2011


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31

Theseconfidentialdiscussionsbegan inearly2010and fivesessionswereheldduring

theyear.

AccordingtoVietnameseForeignMinistrysources,VietnamandChinaagreedtosettle

theirdifferences

through

peaceful

negotiation

and

refrain

from

any

action

to

complicatethesituation,violenceorthreatofuseofviolence.102

Significantly,Vietnam

andChina agreed tobilateraldiscussionsonmaters thatdidnot affect thirdparties,

suchasthewatersatthemouthoftheGulfofTonkin. Vietnamwantedtoincludethe

ParacelIslandsinbilateraldiscussionbutChinarefused.VietnamandChinaalsodiffered

onthequestionofmultilateralnegotiations.AccordingtoVietnam:

Issues thatare related toother countriesandparties like theSpratly Islandscannotbe settledby

Vietnamand

China;

they

require

the

participation

of

other

concerned

parties.

For

issues

that

are

not

onlyrelatedtocountriesthatbordertheEastSeasuchasmaritimesafetyandsecurity,theymustbe

negotiatedandsettledbyallcountriesthatsharethiscommoninterest.103

ChinaandVietnamhavesinceheldtwofurtherroundsofworkingleveldiscussions.At

the seventhandmost recent roundonAugust1st,aVietnamese spokespersonnoted

that the two sides reachedpreliminary consensuson some principles and that the

eighthroundofdiscussionwouldbeheldlaterintheyear.104

2ndDefence

Security

Strategic

Dialogue

OnAugust28th,ChinaandVietnamheldtheir2ndDefenceSecurityStrategicDialogue

atdeputyministerlevelinBeijing.Lt.GeneralMaXiaotian,vicechairofthePLAGeneral

StaffhostedhisVietnamesecounterpart,Lt.GeneralNguyenChiVinh,deputyminister

of national defence. The two generals agreed to step up the exchange of military

delegations,openahot linebetweenthe twodefenceministries,andexpandmilitary

training.Lt.GeneralManotedthatthesovereigntydisputeintheSouthChinaSeawas

the

most

difficult

and

sensitive

issue

in

bilateral

relations.

Lt.

General

Vinh

responded

102AnswerfromVietnamMinistryofForeignAffairsSpokespersonNguyenPhuongNgatoQuestionsby

GregTorodeSouthChinaMorningPost,December20010;see:GregTorodeandMinnieChan,ChinarefusestoyieldonParacels,SundayMorningPost[HongKong],12December2010.103

Ibid.

104 Vietnam, China agree to resolve sea dispute through peaceful means, VietnamNews Agency, 3

August2011.


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by stating Vietnams readiness to cooperate formutual developmentwith China in

reallydisputedareasinaccordwith international lawandthemutual interestofboth

sides.GeneralVinhalso stressed that therewere threeclosely relatedaspects to the

EastSea issue: thedeclarationof sovereigntyby concerned countries, solving issues

related to the ties between Vietnam and China, and solving issues at multilateral

forums.105

5th

MeetingoftheJointSteeringCommittee

On September 6th

China andVietnamheld the fifth annualmeetingof theirbilateral

Joint Steering Committee in Hanoi. China was represented by State Councilor Dai

BingguowhometwithhiscounterpartDeputyPrimeMinisterNguyenThienNhan.The

JointSteering

Committee

oversees

all

aspects

of

their

bilateral

relations.

The

two

interlocutors, interalia,discussedconflicting territorialclaims in theSouthChinaSea.

Accordingtothefinalcommuniqu:

Theybelieve it is critical toproperly solve themarine issues inorder tomaintain thegeneral

situation of friendly cooperationbetween China andVietnam. They reiterate to abide by the

consensusreachedbetweenleadersofthetwocountries,internationallawsandthespiritofthe

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, solve the marine disputes

peacefully through negotiations and friendly consultations and take effective measures to

safeguardpeaceandstabilityofSouthChinaSea.Theywillacceleratetheprocessofnegotiations

andseek

fundamental

and

long

term

solutions

acceptable

to

both

sides.

They

agree

to

strengthennegotiationson themarine issues and sign the agreement on the basicprinciples

guidingthesettlementofmarine issuesbetweenChinaandVietnamatanearlydate.Theywill

boostthe implementationoftheDeclarationontheConductofParties intheSouthChinaSea

andfollowupworkandtrytoachievesubstantialprogresssoon.

GeneralPoliticalDepartmentChiefVisitsBeijing

From 1419 September, China hosted a visit byGeneralNgo Xuan Lich, head of the

VPAs General Political Department and member of the Central Military Party

Committee.106

GeneralLichhelddiscussionswithhiscounterpart,LiJinai,whoisalsoa

memberof

Chnas

Central

Military

Commission.

Their

meeting

focused

on

developing

ties between the twomilitaries. SignificantlyGeneral Lichwas also received by Vice

105Vietnam,Chinaholdseconddefence,securitydialogue,VietnamNewsAgency,August31,2011.

106DoancanbochinhtriquansucapcaonuoctathamTrungQuoc,VietnamTV,September18,2011

and Zhous Feng, Chinese defence official holds talks with Vietnamese counterpart, PLA Daily,September16,2011.


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President Xi Jiping, the chairman of the Central Military Commission107

and heir

apparenttothepostofstatepresidentontheretirementofHuJintaoin2013.

8.ConcludingObservations

Inthe

early

to

mid

1990s,

when

China

began

to

occupy

rocks

in

the

Spratlys

including

thecelebratedMischiefReef,securityanalystsdescribedChinesestrategyascreeping

assertiveness and talk and take. The eventsduring the firsthalf of 2011 are best

describedasaggressiveassertiveness.ChinaappearstobepayingbackVietnamfor its

role in internationalizing the South China Sea when it was Chair of ASEAN. Chinese

actions in the Reed Bank area appear designed to expose ambiguities in the U.S.

PhilippinesMutual Security Treatyoverwhetherornot theKalayaan IslandGroup is

coveredby

this

treaty.

ChinasaggressiveassertionofsovereigntyovertheSouthChinaSeainthefirsthalfof

2001hasraisedthesecuritystakesforSoutheastAsianstatesandallmaritimepowers

thatsailthrough itswaters.Thispaperhasdrawnattentiontothreeserious incidents

involving Chinese state vessels (including one PLAN warship) and Filipino vessels

operatingwiththePhilippinesExclusiveEconomicZone.Thispaperhasalsodiscussed

Chinese actions directed against Vietnam, including the imposition of an annual

unilateral fishing ban, and deliberate interference by Chinese state vessels in

commercial marine activities conducted within Vietnams Exclusive Economic Zone.

Chinese aggressive assertiveness in the South China Sea has now become an

internationalissuethatmustbeaddressedmultilaterallybyallconcernedstakeholders.

International diplomatic pressure has resulted in the adoption of Guidelines to

implement the DOC. Although these guidelines represent a considerable retreat by

ASEAN

they

offer

grounds

for

cautious

optimism

that

tensions

in

the

South

China

Sea

will abate as the countries concerned adopt positive confidence building and other

107Phochu tichTrungQuoctiepdoanquansucapcaoVietNam,ThanhNienOnline,September18,

2011; Chinese vicepresident eyes enhanced relationswith Vietnam, Xinhua,Beijing, September 16,

2011 and China, Vietnam pledge to enhance ties amid row in S China sea, Press Trust of India,

September17,2011.


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34

cooperativemeasures.ThereiseventhepossibilitythattheDOCmaybeupgradedinto

aCodeofConduct.

Dampeningtensionsmaybethefirststeptowardsalongtermsettlementbutlowering

tensionsare

not

sufficient

to

bring

about

aresolution

of

unresolved

sovereignty

claims.

Attheheartofthematter istheninedashlineushapedmapthatChinasubmittedto

theUnitedNationsCommissionontheLimitsofContinentalShelf in2009.Ontheface

ofitChinasmaplaysclaimstovirtuallyalloftheSouthChinaSeaoverwhichitclaims

indisputable sovereignty. China must now bring its claims into accord with

international law and specifyjustwhat it is claiming.Does China consider the South

ChinaSeaterritorialwaters?OrisChinajustclaimingalloftherocksandfeaturesand

surroundingwaters

within

the

nine

dash

lines

and

not

just

the

waters

surrounding

the

nine features and rocks that it presently occupies? And, if so, is China claiming that

theserocksareinfactislandsandthusentitledtoatwohundrednauticalmileEEZ?Ifso

this is a legal fiction. Islandsmustbe able to sustainhumanhabitation andhave an

economic function. Rocks,whichdo notmeet these criteria, cannot claim an EEZ or

continentalshelf.

Chinasninedashmarkscutdeeply intotheEEZsthathavebeendeclaredbyVietnam

and thePhilippinesTheseEEZsarebased firmly in international law.Bothstateshave

drawnstraightbaselinesaroundtheircoastsandthenextendedtheirclaimfromthese

baselines seaward out to two hundred nautical miles. Under the United Nations

Conventionon Lawof theSea littoral stateshave sovereigntyover thesewaters and

continentalshelvesintermsofexploitationofnaturalresourcessuchasfisheriesandoil

andgasdepositsontheoceanfloor.

Chinese assertiveness has provoked what must be considered a counterproductive

reaction from Beijings perspective. The Aquino Administration is now committed to

modernizingitsarmedforcesforterritorialdefenceofitsmaritmedomain.Thisgoalhas

driven the Philippines to revive defencesecurity cooperationwith theUnited States

underaegisoftheir1951MutualSecurityTreaty.Vietnam,whiletentativelysteppingup

defence cooperation with the United State, has meanwhile embarked on a robust


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35

program of force modernization including Kiloclass submarines, Su30 multirolejet

fighters, Gephardclass guided missile frigates, and a variety of modern antiship

missiles. It is inthe interestoftheUnitedStatesand itsalliesaswellas Indiatoassist

bothnationsincapacitybuildingintheareaofmaritimesecurity.

ASEAN and the international community, both of which rely on transit through the

South China Sea,must continue to diplomatically confront China over its aggressive

assertiveness. They should bring collective diplomatic pressure to bear on China to

desistfromprovocativeassertionsofjurisdictionintheEEZsofSouthChinaSealittoral

states.DiplomaticpressureshouldalsobebroughttobearonChinaandotherclaimant

statestofaithfullyimplementtheguidelinestoimplementtheDOC.

ASEANmember

states

and

the

international

community

should

support

Indonesia,

in

its

role asASEAN Chair, in its efforts to engage China in upgrading theDOC to amore

formal (andbinding?)CodeofConduct. IfChina isnot forthcoming,ASEANmembers

themselvesshoulddrawupaTreatyonaCodeofConductintheSouthChinaSea,and

after ratification, open it to accession by nonmember states along the lines of the

ASEANTreatyofAmityandCooperationandtheSoutheastAsianNuclearFreeWeapons

ZoneTreaty.

Documents

Thayer Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: Southeast Asian Responses