Thayer Maritime Security and Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea

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Maritime Security and the Role of Naval

Diplomacy in the South China Sea Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper toThe Maritime Institute of Malaysia Conference

on the South China Sea: Recent Developments and

Implications for Peaceful Dispute ResolutionRoyal Chulan Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

December 12-13, 2011



2

Maritime Security and the

Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer1

Introduction

This paper considers three broad issues: the strategic outlook for Southeast Asia, current naval

activities, and opportunities for further cooperation among the region’s navies.

Part 1 considers eight major trends that currently shape the regional security environment: the

global economic and financial crisis, China’s military modernisation, United States re‐

engagement, increased regional arms procurements, the heightened importance of themaritime domain, the increasing salience of transnational security issues, the persistence of

‘everyday security challenges’, and the evolution of the regional security architecture.

In part 2, current naval activities are discussed under five headings: Chinese naval activities;

U.S. naval activities; regional naval activities; anti‐piracy operations; and confidence building

measures related to the South China Sea.

In part 3 paper looks at the future prospects for further naval cooperation with a focus on the

roles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The paper concludes with a proposal for a Code of Conduct for Southeast Asian’s Maritime

Domain.

Strategic Outlook for Southeast Asia

Eight major trends are currently shaping the security environment in Southeast Asia.2 These are

discussed in turn.

1. Global financial and economic crisis. The global financial crisis is the single most important

driver of inter‐state dynamics in Asia‐Pacific region. The global financial crisis has accelerated

the power shift from North America and Europe to East Asia. The most dramatic manifestation

of this power shift has been to reinforce China’s rise as a major power in all dimensions of

national power. China now has an enhanced global and regional leadership role through the

Group of Twenty and ASEAN Plus Three (APT). China has used its new position to press for strengthened supervisory and regulatory

1Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. E‐

mail: [email protected].

2These are drawn from Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, ASPI Strategy Report

( Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010), 7‐12.



3 arrangements over international financial institutions and greater influence for newly emerging

economies in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. China’s leadership on these

issues has found widespread support in the region. China’s challenge to the regional order

established under United States leadership after the Second World War will continue to

generate tensions that will be transmitted to Southeast Asia. The dynamics of Sino–American

relations will have a continuing major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia.

The global financial crisis has driven home to Southeast Asia its interdependence and

vulnerability to global forces. It also triggered a regional power shift that contributed to the rise

of Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam as major regional players. Both countries emerged

from the global financial crisis in a strengthened position due to their domestic recovery

programs and maintenance of internal stability. Indonesia and Vietnam can be expected to play

an increasingly important role in shaping Southeast Asia’s security environment.

2. China’s military modernization. There is a direct link between China’s phenomenal economic

growth and rising defence budgets to support the modernisation and transformation of its

military forces. This has both strategic and regional implications. China’s People’s Liberation

Army Navy (PLAN) is developing roles and missions that will permit it to project power beyond

its territorial sphere of interest into the Western Pacific and South China Sea. Admiral Mike

Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that the strategic intent behind

China’s development of new capabilities seemed to be ‘very focused on the United States Navy

and our bases that are in that part of the world’.

In sum, China’s military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, has

created a security dilemma for regional states. China’s efforts to safeguard its security by

developing what it considers a reasonable force structure to deter the United States has

created insecurity in several neighbouring states due to China’s lack of transparency.

3. United States stepped‐up engagement . There can be no doubt that the global financial crisishas dented the authority of the United States and undermined the attraction of its free market

capitalist economy as a model of development. In February 2009, Dennis Blair, then Director of

U.S. National Intelligence, observed in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence that the global financial crisis ‘has worsened questioning of US stewardship of the

global economy and international financial structure’ and damaged America’s reputation for

world leadership.

In broad strategic terms the global financial crisis has forced a reduction of U.S. defence

spending in acquisition accounts, procurement, and research and development that are vital if

the United States is to maintain its commanding technological superiority. Despite the

declaration by U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta that the defence budget for the Asia‐Pacific will not be affected, in the long‐term the United States will have fewer resources to

shape strategic developments in the Asia–Pacific, including Southeast Asia. In the coming

decades, the United States will rely even more heavily on its allies and strategic partners to

cooperate to ensure regional security.

The change in power relativities between China and the United States has prompted some

strategic analysts to write about the possible erosion of US power and loss of US strategic



4 primacy. The United States has responded by beefing up its military muscle and renewing its

political engagement with the region. Over the next several decades, the United States will

retain its role as the world’s leading country in all measures of national power and it will also

remain the prime maritime power in the Asia–Pacific and Southeast Asia.

The global financial crisis occurred during a transition period in U.S. politics. The Obama

Administration has brought renewed energy to US engagement with Southeast Asia. As U.S.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exclaimed in a January 2010 speech to the East‐West Center,

‘the United States is back in Asia’. Secretary Clinton included Indonesia on her first trip to the

Asia–Pacific. She has attended consecutive ARF meetings since taking office and at her first

meeting launched the Lower Mekong Initiative. The United States has acceded to the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation, appointed a resident ambassador to ASEAN and joined the East Asia

Summit. The Obama Administration has also promoted free trade agreements with selected

regional states, such as Vietnam, under the Trans‐Pacific Partnership program. More

significantly, President Obama has attended all three ASEAN‐U.S leaders’ meetings.

More recently the Obama Administration has signaled a step up in its engagement in Southeast

Asia once it draws down its commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. As Secretary of State Clinton

has noted on several occasions the United States will ‘pivot’ to the Asia‐Pacific region. In sum,

stepped‐up US engagement will play a major role in influencing the security environment in

Southeast Asia.

4. Increased arms procurements. As noted above, China’s defence modernisation and

transformation has generated a security dilemma for regional states. ASEAN states have been

circumspect in public statements but their concerns can be discerned in the significant rise in

defence expenditures and the kinds of weapon systems and platforms that they have acquired.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘[arms] deliveries to South

East Asia nearly doubled in 2005–2009 compared to 2000–2004. Deliveries to Malaysia

increased by 722 percent in 2005–2009 compared to 2000–2004, for Singapore by 146 percent

and for Indonesia by 84 percent’.3

Southeast Asia’s arms procurements go beyond force

modernisation and include the introduction of new capabilities that can be operated at

extended ranges. In other words, Southeast Asia’s arms buying spree, although largely intended

for defensive purposes, may have a destabilising impact on regional security.

5. Heightened importance of the maritime domain. The maritime domain will continue to grow

in importance in the coming decade as Southeast Asia and East Asia continue to recover from

the global financial crisis and resume economic growth. This will underscore the geo‐strategic

importance of the sea domain stretching from the Gulf of Arabia and the Indian Ocean through

archipelagic Southeast Asia and the South China Sea to the Western Pacific for commerce and

the transport of energy resources.

There are both positive and negative features of this trend. On the one hand, all nations in the

Asia–Pacific will have a vital common interest in maintaining the security of trade routes on

which their economic prosperity and national security depend. This will be the case especially

3P. Holtom et al., “Trends in arms transfers, 2009,” SIPRI Fact Sheet , March 2010, 4.



5 for the East Asian economies that depend on sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that pass

through Southeast Asia for trade and for the import of vital energy resources.

The heightened importance of the maritime domain raises the possibility of increased

multilateral cooperation to guarantee maritime security. On the other hand, vital SLOCs pass

through the South China Sea, where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and

Brunei have conflicting sovereignty claims. It is noticeable that the current military

modernisation and transformation programs contain elements of a naval arms race embedded

in competitive rather than cooperative maritime strategies.

6. Increasing salience of transnational issues. All ASEAN states stress the salience of non‐

traditional security issues as a major factor shaping the regional security environment. Because

non‐traditional security issues are transnational in nature and beyond the ability of any state to

resolve, they are more amenable to multilateral cooperative security approaches. It is

unsurprising, then, that Southeast Asian states have given priority to security cooperation to

address non‐traditional threats.

It is debatable whether each and every non‐traditional issue should be ‘securitised’ and treatedas a threat to national security. Submissions to the ARF’s Annual Security Outlook 2009, for

example, identified twelve non‐traditional security threats: terrorism, piracy, transnational

crime, small arms and light weapons smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking, people

smuggling, illegal migration, illegal logging, illegal fishing, avian influenza and swine flu, and

climate change.

The extent to which the armed forces, as distinct from law enforcement, customs, immigration

and public health officials, should be involved in addressing non‑traditional issues is a matter of

debate within individual countries. But it is clear from evolving trends that armed forces will be

increasingly involved in addressing these security challenges, especially in responding to large‐

scale natural disasters, terrorism, and piracy and armed robbery at sea.7. Persistence of ‘everyday domestic security challenges’ . At least seven of Southeast Asia’s

eleven states are affected by domestic security challenges of varying orders of magnitude in

which violence has been used to advance the interests of a particular group or non‐state actor.

In recent years, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam have all experienced sporadic outbreaks

of sectarian or ethnic violence. At the other end of the scale, Thailand, Myanmar and the

Philippines continue to experience political instability and ethno‐nationalist insurgency, ethnic

conflict, and communist insurgency and armed separatism, respectively. Cambodia and

Thailand were embroiled in an unseemly low‐level conflict over disputed land surrounding a

temple complex on their border.

These ‘everyday domestic security challenges’ will persist over the next decade. The ongoingconflicts in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines, and the unstable domestic political

situation in Myanmar, if unaddressed, all have the potential to spill over and affect the security

of neighbouring states. Human rights abuses and violations of religious freedom in states

experiencing domestic strife raise the question of whether humanitarian intervention might be

invoked if a state fails to meet its obligation to protect its citizens.

8. Evolution of the Region’s Security Architecture. From the very inception of the ARF, ASEAN



6 has insisted on being in the ‘driver’s seat’. Seventeen years after its foundation, the ARF

remains a security dialogue forum that primarily advances confidence‐building measures

(CBMs) on the basis of consensus and ‘at a pace comfortable to all’ its members. This has led to

the initiation of ad hoc efforts, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, to counter possible

proliferation‐related trafficking, and the Shangri‐La Dialogue to discuss specific security

challenges.

Southeast Asia lacks an overarching security body to effectively address the range of current

and emerging security challenges. In order to maintain its centrality ASEAN has set for itself the

goal of creating an ASEAN Community by 2015 based on three pillars, one of which is the

Political Security Community pillar. In 2010 the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) held

the first meeting with its eight dialogue partners. The ADMM Plus will meet next in 2013 and

then annually thereafter. The recent expansion of the East Asia Summit to include the Russian

Federation and the United States may emerge to fill this role. This development may result in

tensions between ASEAN’s assertion of its centrality and the leadership role played by major

powers.

Current Naval Activities

Chinese Naval Activities

In 2007 commercial satellite imagery confirmed that China was constructing a major naval base

near Sanya on Hainan Island. The piers and docks at Yulin Naval Base berthed several major

surface combatants and a single nuclear submarine. Further construction was underway to

accommodate larger surface combatants including assault ships and eventually aircraft carriers.

At the same time, China has extended an airfield on Woody Island in the Paracel islands,

consolidated its facilities at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago, and maintains a

continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef off the west coast of the Philippines.

In sum, China is developing an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims over the

South China Sea and protect its vital SLOCs through the Malacca and Singapore Straits as well as

the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea from these bases with a

considerably shortened logistics tail.4 By extension, China will also have the capacity to interdict

the same SLOCs on which Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are dependent.

Other construction indicates that the Yulin Naval Base will have strategic implications for the

balance of power in the region. Portions of the base are being built underground to provide

facilities that cannot be easily monitored. Satellite imagery has confirmed the presence of a

Chinese Type 094 Jin‐class submarine since late 2007. The Type‐094 submarine is a second‐

generation nuclear vessel and represents China’s most lethal naval strike weapon. Up until now

4On June 18, 2009, General Zhang Li, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,

recommended that China send larger surface combatants to the South China Sea and construct an air and sea port

on Mischief Reef in order to control the Spratlys and bypass the Malacca Straits; L. C. Russell Hsiao, “PLA General

Advises Building Bases in the South China Sea,” China Brief [The Jamestown Foundation], 9(13), June 24, 2009, 1‐2.



7 all nuclear submarines were under the command of China’s Northern Fleet; this marks the first

permanent deployment to China’s Southern Fleet.

An analysis of construction activities indicate Yulin Naval Base will be capable of housing

nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. When these

facilities are completed they will provide China with the potential capability to station a

substantial proportion of its submarine‐based nuclear deterrent capabilities there.

China’s most modern strategic nuclear submarine is not yet fully operational but when it is the

submarine is expected to carry twelve Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. This class of submarine

will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiple warheads.

Chinese nuclear subs will be able to patrol and fire from concealed positions in deep waters off

Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operational skills. According to the U.S.

Defense Department five more Chinese ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN)5 are

expected to become operational in coming years. It is this geo‐strategic aspect in particular that

explains the interest by the U.S. Navy in conducting military surveys in waters off Hainan. 6

China‐U.S. Relations. Relations between China and the United States in the Asia‐Pacific havebeen shaped by China’s responses to the Obama Administration’s continuation of arms sales to

Taiwan, U.S. naval exercises in East Asia and U.S. military activities in China’s Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ), including the waters off Hainan Island. In March 2010, for example, U.S.

and South Korea conducted naval exercises following the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy

frigate Cheonan. Four months later thousands of military personnel, hundreds of aircraft, F‐22

stealth fighter‐bombers, the USS George Washington and three US Navy destroyers

participated in military exercises with South Korea in the Sea of Japan.

In January 2010, in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, China suspended high‐level military‐

to‐military relations with the United States, including the bilateral Military Maritime

Consultative Agreement, for ten months. China also conducted four high profile naval exercisesto showcase the growing prowess of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

Chinese Naval Exercises. Between April and July 2010, the PLAN conducted three large‐scale

maritime exercises and in November the PLAN held a fourth. The first exercise was held in early

April. This exercise involved the long‐range deployment of sixteen warships from the PLAN

drawn from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets. As the combined fleet sailed down

the China coast it conducted live firing and anti‐submarine warfare exercises and defended

itself against simulated attacks launched from the mainland. The PLAN warships sailed past

Okinawa through the Bashi Channel, conducted live firing exercises north of the Philippines

before steaming toward the Malacca Straits. Up until this exercise China’s South Sea Fleet was

the only fleet to operate in the South China Sea.The South Sea Fleet is currently being modernised with the deployment for the first time of a

Jin‐class nuclear submarine and amphibious landing craft to Yulin Naval Base on Hainan island.

5SSBN is the designation used by the U.S. Navy for a nuclear‐powered ballistic nuclear missile‐carrying submarine.

The SS refers to a submersible ship, the B stands for ballistic missile, and the N denotes nuclear powered.

6Mark Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,” China Security , 5(2), Spring 2009, 24.



8 Yulin already houses surface combatants and conventional submarines. China is expected to

deploy more nuclear submarines to Yulin. According to one naval analyst:

This exercise showed that the PLAN was acquiring a much higher level of operational flexibility in the

simultaneous deployment of underwater, surface and air assets, as well as possessing the confidence to sail

over longer distances than before in order to shore up Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.7

The second exercise was held in early July in response to a combined United States‐Republic of

Korea naval exercise in the Yellow Sea. This exercise involved ten ships including two

Sovremenny ‐class destroyers, two Kilo‐class submarines and Type 022 Houbei ‐class fast missile

attack craft armed with YJ‐82 long range anti‐ship missiles from the East Sea Fleet’s 16th

Fast

Attack Flotilla. The exercise involved ‘wolf pack’ tactics in simulated attacks on enemy fleet

formations, such as a carrier task group. PLAN warships also conducted anti‐submarine

exercises, while land‐based aircraft conducted simulated bombing raids.

The third naval exercise, the largest of its kind, was conducted in late July and once again

involved a combined fleet from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets. At least a dozen

warships took part including all four Sovremenny destroyers from the East Sea Fleet, as well as

the most modern ships in the PLAN order of battle such as the Type 051C Luzhou, Type 052B

Luyang I, Type 052C Luyang II, Type 054A Jiangkai II, and Kilo‐class submarines. JH‐7/7A fighter

bombers provided air cover. This exercise was notable for the Chinese media coverage of live

missile firings and the presence of senior commanders from the Central Military Commission

and the PLA Chief of Staff, General Chen Bingde.8

On November 2, 2010 the PLA Marine Corps held the fourth major exercise, Jiaolong 2010, in

the South China Sea. This exercise involved more than 100 ships, submarines and aircraft and

1,800 marines. According to military analyst Li Jie, the exercises were conducted partly in

response to the intervention of unnamed countries in recent times ‘so it’s time to oppose those

interventions with power politics’.9

More recently, on November 23, 2011, China announced that it would conduct naval exercises

in the Western Pacific. Japanese defence sources reported that six ships ‐ an intelligence

collector, three guided missile frigates and two supply ships – passed through the waters

between Okinawa and Miyako islands on 22‐23 November.10

7Gary Li, “Deployments, Drills and Diplomacy: Chna’s Three‐Pronged Naval Strategy,” draft September 2010.

8 “PLA Navy Conducts live‐ammunition training in South China Sea,” Xinhua, July 29, 2010 and “China conducts

naval drill in South China Sea,” Agence France‐Presse, July 30, 2010. In August 2010, a Chinese submersible vessel

planted a Chinese flag at bottom of South China Sea to demonstrate sovereignty.

9Michael Wines, “China Stages Naval Exercises,” The New York Times, November 3, 2010.

10Xinhua, “China announces naval drills amid South China Sea tensions,” The Economic Times, November 23, 2011;

Cameron Stewart, “China raises tension with Pacific war games,” The Australian, November 25, 2011; and Wu

Zhong, “China’s navy delivers Thanksgiving spoiler,” Asia Ties Online, November 29, 2011.



9 These five PLAN exercises were viewed as a demonstration by China that it was now capable of

deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. 11 The implications are clear: China is

developing the capacity to sustain larger naval deployments in the Spratly archipelago and

further south for longer periods.

Chinese Naval Diplomacy .12 In October 2003, China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation. China and ASEAN issued a joint declaration establishing a strategic partnership.

The joint declaration was the first formal agreement of this type between China and a regional

organization, as well as a first for ASEAN itself. The joint declaration was wide‐ranging and

included a provision for the initiation of a new security dialogue as well as general cooperation

in political matters.13

In July 2004, at China’s suggestion, ASEAN and China raised their relationship to one of

‘enhanced strategic relations’. This took the form of a five‐year Plan of Action (2005–2010) that

set out the following objectives:

• Promote mutual confidence and trust in defense and military fields with a view to maintaining peace and

stability in the region;

• Conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defense issues;

• Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training;

• Consider observing each other’s military exercises and explore the possibility of conducting bilateral or

multilateral joint military exercises; and

• Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.14

Between February 1999 and December 2000, China negotiated long‐term cooperative

framework arrangements with all ten ASEAN members. Seven of China’s agreements included a

clause on security cooperation (Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines,

and Laos). Between 2001‐2009, China and nine ASEAN states conducted 21 naval goodwill (Laos

is landlocked). Chinese warships visited Vietnam (on three occasions), Singapore and Thailand(twice each) and Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In turn, China

11The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs north–south from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu

Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain extends further east of China’s coast and

includes a line running north‐south from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and

Indonesia. The first second island chain embraces an area 1,800 nautical miles from China’s coast and includes

most of the East China Sea and East Asian SLOCs.

12This section is based on Carlyle A. Thayer, “China and Southeast Asia: A Shifting Zone of Interaction,” in James

Clad, Sean M. McDonald and Bruce Vaughn, eds., The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization. Center for Strategic Research, Institute of National Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.: National

Defense University Press, 2011. 235‐261.

13“Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the

People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” October 8, 2003,

http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm.

14“Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration of ASEAN‐China Strategic Partnership for Peace and

Prosperity,” October 8, 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/16805.htm.



10 hosted port visits from Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (twice each), and Indonesia, the

Philippines and Vietnam.

As early as 2002, China invited the Philippines to participate in a naval exercise. This suggestion

was reiterated in May 2005 at the first China‐Philippines defense and security dialogue. China

proposed that the Philippines conduct joint maritime security exercises with the PLAN focusing

on search and rescue. As of May 2010 Manila has not taken up the offer.

In June 2005, China proposed extending PLAN port visits to include bilateral exercises. Thailand

responded by suggesting it would prefer to participate in a multilateral exercise that included

other ASEAN states. Nevertheless, in December that year the Royal Thai Navy conducted its

first combined exercise with the PLAN involving search and rescue and escort. In late 2006,

China approached individual ASEAN states with a suggestion first made to Thailand for

combined multilateral naval exercise. In April 2007, defense circles reported that this proposal

was under ‘active consideration’.

In April 2006, China and Vietnam commenced biannual joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin.

This was a first for the Chinese navy. By June 2010, a total of eleven joint naval patrols had beenconducted in the Gulf of Tonkin.15 After a gap of seventeen years, PLAN vessels resumed

goodwill port visits to Vietnam in November 2008, December 2009 and October 2010. Vietnam

made its first port call to China in June 2009 and its second in June 2011.16

China and the South China Sea. During the first half of 2011, China began to aggressively assert

its jurisdiction over the South China Sea. According to the Philippines Department of Foreign

Affairs, China increased its presence and activities in the Spratly Islands in the fourth quarter of

2010.17 This increased presence led to six incursions into waters claimed by the Philippines in

the first five months of 2011.18 In one incursion, on February 25, a Chinese PLAN frigate fired

warning shots in the direction of Filipino fishing boats. On March 2, Chinese civilian vessels

threatened to ram a Filipino oil exploration boat forcing it to cease commercial operations andflee the area. With respect to Vietnam, Chinese state‐owned vessels twice cut the cables of oil

exploration boats conducing seismic surveys in Vietnam’s EEZ. These incidents occurred on

May 26 and June 9.

In light of these two incidents, and immediately following China’s announcement that it would

be conducting routine naval exercises in the Western Pacific,19

Vietnam responded by

15Margie Mason, “Vietnam and China hold joint naval patrol amid spat,” Associated Press, June 21, 2011 and

Agence France Presse, “China, Vietnam hold joint sea patrols near disputed Spratlys,” June 23, 2011.

16“Vietnamese naval ships on friendly visit to China,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 22, 2011; “China, Vietnam

engage in Joint naval patrols,” People’s Daily Online, June 22, 2011 and “Vietnamese naval ships wrap up visit to

China,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 27, 2011.

17Max De Leon and Estrella Torres, “Business steps in to end Spratlys row,” ABS‐CBN News, June 3, 2011.

18Jerry E. Esplanada and Tara Quismundo, “Abide by UN pact, China told,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 3, 2011.

The Philippines has not officially released its list. Government officials initially referred to six or seven incidents and

currently they claim nine incidents.

19Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, “China says to hold ‘routine’ navy drills in western Pacific,” Reuters, June 9,

2011.



11 conducting live firing exercises on June 13 in the waters near Hon Ong Island located

approximately forty kilometres off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam.

In October 2011 Vietnam’s party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong made an official visit to

China to meet with General Secretary Hu Jintao to discuss the South China Sea issue among

other bilateral issues. At the end of Trong’s visit the two leaders issued a Joint Statement that

included stepped up defence cooperation. The statement read:

Fourthly, to promote in‐depth cooperation between the two armies, increase contact between high‐ranking

army leaders of the two countries; continue to organise good strategic dialogues at deputy ministerial level;

accelerate the establishment of a direct telephone line between the two defence ministries; increase

cooperation in personnel training and exchanges between junior officers; conduct trial joint patrols along the

land border at a convenient time; continue to hold joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; increase

cooperation in such fields as mutual visits by the two countries’ naval ships.20

Hu and Trong also witnessed the signing of the Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the

Settlement of Sea Issues Between Vietnam and China. The Agreement committed both parties

‘to seek mutually acceptable fundamental and lasting solutions to sea‐related disputes’. In the

interim, the two sides ‘shall actively discuss provisional and temporary measures withoutaffecting each side’s positions and policies, including the active consideration and discussion on

cooperation for mutual development [hop tac cung phat trien]…’. Specifically, the two parties

would speed up negotiations to demarcate the waters forming the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin

‘and actively discuss cooperation for mutual development in these waters’ (emphasis added).

The Agreement also specified ‘if the disputes involve other countries, the consultations shall

include all other parties concerned.’

U.S. Naval Activities

The United States responded to China’s naval build‐up and development of anti‐access/area

denial capabilities by strengthening its posture on Guam, stepping up weapons and equipment

sales to the Philippines, basing Combat Littoral Ships in Singapore,21

and negotiating new

arrangements with Australia giving the U.S. greater access to defence facilities near Darwin,.

Currently, Obama Administration officials are outlining a new U.S. strategy to pivot military

forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to East Asia in coming years. The new Defense Secretary, Leon

Panetta, has indicated that the Asia‐Pacific will be largely quarantined from defence budget

cuts.

In response to China’s development of a large submarine force, the US has deployed thirty‐one

of its fifty‐three fast attack submarines to the Pacific and stepped up its anti‐submarine warfare

program. Eighteen of the U.S. subs are home‐ported in Pearl Harbor; the others are based in

Guam.22 The United States has also deployed three Ohio‐class nuclear submarines to the Asia–

Pacific Indian Ocean region. Each has been modified to carry 154 conventional Tomahawk

cruise missiles. In late June‐early July 2010, in a calculated demonstration of naval power, the

20“Tuyen bo chung hai nuoc Viet Nam va Trung Quoc,” Vietnam News Agency, October 15, 2011, point 4(iv).

21Craig Whitlock, “Navy’s next stop in Asia will set China on edge,” Checkpoint Washington, November 18, 2011

22Oyaol Ngirainki, “Guam Gets New Sub Buildings,” NavyTimes, July 21, 2010.



12 USS Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously appeared in Diego Garcia

(Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the Philippines), respectively.23 The United

States has stationed the fifth‐generation Raptor aircraft in Hawaii. Finally, the United States is

developing an air‐sea battle concept to counter China’s development of area‐denial/anti‐access

capabilities. The air‐sea battle concept is being drawn up to enable the United States to prevail

in conflicts where area‐denial/anti‐access capabilities are well developed.

United States‐China Relations. In June 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates aroused

Chinese ire with his remarks to the 9th

Shangri‐La Dialogue in Singapore. After announcing his

acceptance of an invitation to attend the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus in Hanoi,24

Gates

then called for ‘open, transparent, and equal access to the global common’, including the

maritime commons, ‘for security, for trade and commerce, and free passage’. He then

pointedly directed his remarks to the South China Sea:

In this respect, the South China Sea is an area of growing concern. This sea is not only vital to those directly

bordering it, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia. Our policy is clear: it is essential

that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic development be maintained. We do

not take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinderfreedom of navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate US corporations or those of any nation engaged

in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful,

multilateral efforts consistent with customary international law. The 2002 Declaration of Conduct [sic] was an

important step in this direction and we hope that concrete implementation of this agreement will continue.25

Secretary Gates and China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie held a bilateral meeting on the

eve of the inaugural ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi on October 11th. Minister Liang invited

Secretary Gates to visit Beijing early in 2011 thus ending the freeze on high‐level defence

contacts imposed in January 2010 in reaction to the sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan. China’s

position was signaled earlier when, on September 30, 2010, Major General Qian Lihua told

visiting U.S. Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer that regular dialogue and

exchanges on military safety at sea and other issues would be resumed.26

China and the US the held talks on maritime security in Hawaii from October 14‐15. These

discussions were aimed at improving security on the high seas when naval forces operated in

close proximity to each other.27 The results of this discussion were reported to the bilateral

Defense Consultative Talks held from December 9‐10 in Washington. This resumption of

23“U.S. Posts Pictures of Nuclear Sub in ‘Show of Force’,” The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Mark Thompson, “U.S.

Missiles Deployed Near China Send a Message,” Time Magazine, July 8, 2010.

24Apparently the United States was the first of eight invited dialogue partners to accept.

25

Dr. Robert M. Gates. Secretary of Defence, United States, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia‐Pacific,” presentation to the First Plenary Session, The 9

thIISS Asian Security Summit, The Shangri‐La Dialogue,

Singapore, June 5, 2010. IISS is an acronym for International Institute of Strategic Studies.

26Audrey McAvoy, “US, China hold maritime security talks in Hawaii,” The Jakarta Post , October 16, 2010.

27Audrey McAvoy, “US, China hold maritime security talks in Hawaii,” The Jakarta Post , October 16, 2010. China

was represented by Rear Admiral Liao Shining and the U.S. was represented by Major General Randolph Alles,

USMC.



13 bilateral military relations paralleled an upswing in political relations when President, Hu Jintao,

would visit the United States in the early 2011.

The upswing in U.S.‐China relations was reflected at the 2011 Shangri‐la Dialogue. Secretary

Gates did not specifically mention the South China Sea. However, he stated the well‐known

position that the U.S. had a ‘national interest in freedom of navigation…’. He also stressed the

importance of customary international law as a guide for ‘the appropriate use of the maritime

domain, and rights of access to it’.28

China’s Defence Minister put on record his country’s

commitment ‘to maintaining peace and stability in South China Sea’. He noted that, ‘at present,

the general situation in the South China Sea remains stable.29

In September 2011, the Obama Administration announced arms sales to Taiwan totaling $5.85

billion. This decision was a carefully calibrated one. The U.S. chose to provide funding to

upgrade Taiwan’s F‐16 fighter jets but not provide more modern aircraft. Unlike the previous

year, these arms sales did not precipitate a suspension in military relations. On December 7, the

U.S. and China held defence talks in Beijing at deputy minister level. China’s representative,

General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of Staff, declared that the talks demonstrated ‘both

countries are being sincere about maintaining military exchanges. Hopefully both sides will

make the best of this opportunity to expand common ground, keep risks under control and

avoid misjudgment’.30

United States Naval Diplomacy . The United States conducts two major theatre engagement

programs in Southeast Asia: Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and

Multinational Planning Assistance Team (MPAT).

The CARAT program involves U.S.‐led annual bilateral training exercises conducted serially in

Southeast Asia. CARAT was inaugurated in 1994. Seven ASEAN members participate: Brunei,

Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The purpose of CARAT

is ‘to strengthen relationships and enhance the operational readiness of the participatingforces’. For example, the US–Indonesian leg of CARAT involves, inter alia, symposiums on

aviation operations; legal, law enforcement and surface operations; and afloat exercises.

In 2000, as a result of instability in East Timor and influenced by conflict in the Balkans, U.S.

Pacific Command (PACOM) initiated discussions with selected states in the Asia–Pacific to

establish MPAT to create the capacity to deploy quickly a multinational force headquarters to

support the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) in times of

emergencies. MPAT successfully developed a set of standard operating procedures that have

been accepted by its thirty participants, including international and non‐government

organisations. PACOM regularly conducts multinational command post exercises. The value of

the MPAT program was demonstrated in December 2004, when an earthquake off the coast of 28

Robert M. Gates, “Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia‐Pacific,” The 10th

IISS Asian Security Summit the

Shangri‐La Dialogue, June 4, 2011.

29Liang Guanglie, “China’s International Security Cooperation,” The 10

thIISS Asian Security Summit the Shangri‐La

Dialogue, June5, 2011.

30Agence France Presse, “U.S., China Hold Military Talks,” December 7, 2011.



14 Sumatra triggered a devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The United States, India, Japan

and Australia quickly assumed the lead role in relief efforts along with other contributing

countries.

The United States also had conducted two ‘naval activities’ with Vietnam, the first in 2010 and

the second the following year. Both were conducted in the port of Da Nang. The second naval

exchange activity included a community relations project (medical and dental services), and

training in search and rescue, damage control, and dive and salvage.31

No formal naval

exercises (i.e. combat training) were conducted.

Regional Naval Activities

China’s rapid military modernization, coupled with its assertive behaviour in the South China

Sea, led several Southeast Asian states to undertake force modernization programs of their

own aimed at developing anti‐access/area‐denial capabilities directed against China. This

section will review developments in the Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhere in the region.

The Philippines. In 1995 the Philippines passed into law The Armed Forces Modernization Actwith the aim of modernizing the AFP in fifteen years with a total fund of Pesos 331 billion. The

Philippines Congress failed to follow through and the AFP was starved of funds.

In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness in its EEZ and Kalayaan Island Group, the

Philippines drew up a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations and

external territorial defence. The Aquino Administration allocated P11 billion to support force

modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Of this figure P8 billion will come

from the proceeds of the Malampaya Natural Gas and Power Project and the remaining P3

billion will come from the AFP’s current modernisation funds.32 Starting in 2012, the

government will implement a five‐year modernization program totalling P40 billion (or P8

billion annually).

In March 2011, AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Oban announced plans to upgrade Rancudo

Air Field on Pag‐Asa island.33 Two months later a Philippine navy study recommended the

acquisition of submarines as a ‘deterrent against future potential conflicts’.34 In September

2011, immediately after President Benigno Aquino’s state visit to Beijing, he announced that

4.95 billion pesos (US $118 million) would be allocated to top up the defence budget.35

These

funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel, six helicopters and other military

31U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City, Public Affairs Section, Press Advisory, July 1, 2011 and Agence France

Presse, “US Navy says no S. China link to Vietnam visit,” June 24, 2011.

32Alexis Romero, “Submarine for Navy? Noy bares AFP shop list,” The Philippine Star , August 24, 2011.

33Jaime Laude, “AFP to maintain presence in Spratlys,” The Philippine Star , March 29, 2011.

34Katherine Evangelista, “Philippines eye submarines to boost navy,” Philippine Daily Inquirer , May 17, 2001. The

prospect of the Philippines acquiring submarines is very unlikely.

35Agence France‐Presse, “Philippines Ups Spending To Guard South China Sea,” September 7, 2011.



15 equipment in order to secure the Malampaya project located in disputed waters off the coast

of Palawan.

The Philippines has taken delivery of a former U.S. Coast Guard Weather Endurance Cutter

(rechristened Gregario del Pilar ) and will assign it to operate from Palawan in Western

Command with the mission of protecting the Philippines’ EEZ. The ship will be fitted with more

modern radar systems and consideration is being given to equip it with anti‐ship missiles. The

Philippines also expects to take delivery of three new Taiwan‐manufactured Multi‐Purpose

Attack Craft and procure two additional U.S. Coast Guard Cutters.36

In September 2011, during President Aquino’s visit to Tokyo, he and Prime Minister Noda

agreed to strengthen maritime security ties by holding frequent high‐level defence discussions

and by stepping up cooperation between their Coast Guards and ‘defence‐related authorities’.

Prime Minister Noda agreed to increase the involvement of Japan’s Coast Guard in training

their Filipino counterparts.37

At present Philippines officials have floated a ‘wish list’ of new equipment including: coastal

radar, long‐range patrol aircraft, strategic sea lift vessels, off‐shore patrol boats, navalhelicopters, air defence radar, six jet trainers, surface attack aircraft, anti‐ship missiles, and a

submarine.38

Following a visit by South Korea’s President Lee Myung‐bak to Manila in

November 2011, President Aquino announced that the Philippines would purchase military

equipment form Seoul. The Department of National Defense was reported to be drawing up a

list including aircraft, helicopters, boats and other military equipment.

Vietnam. In contrast to the Philippines, Vietnam has embarked on a more robust program of

modernizing its armed forces. In 2009, Vietnam announced it would procure six conventional

diesel powered Kilo‐class submarines from Russia. This year it took delivery of four Su‐30MK2

multi‐role jet fighters, two Gephard ‐class guided missile frigates, its second Bastion land‐based

anti‐ship ballistic missile system, and two Svetlyak class missile Patrol Boats.39

Vietnam officiallylaunched its first indigenously built gunship this year.40 In October, during President Truong Tan

Sang’s visit to New Delhi, he requested Indian assistance in four areas: submarine training,

conversion training for pilots to fly Sukhoi‐30s, transfer of medium sized patrol boats, and

modernisaton of port facilities at Nha Trang.41

The local media reported that India was

36Reuters, “Philippines says will spend $255 min on military helicopters, boats,” April 13, 2011 and Agence France

Presse, “Philippines hopes sea dispute with China should ease,” September 3, 2011.

37Yore Koh, “Tokyo and Manila Strengthen Defense Ties with an Eye Toward China,” The Wall Street Journal ,

September 28, 2011.

38 Alexis Romero, “Submarine for Navy? Noy bares AFP shop list,” The Philippine Star , August 24, 2011.

39“Russia exports aircraft to Vietnam,” The Voice of Russia, June 22, 2011; BBC, “Hai quan Viet Nam nhan tau chien

Nga,” August 24, 2011; “Russia delivers second coastal missile system to Vietnam,” Interfax‐AVN military news

agency, October 11, 2011; and BBC, “Nga giao tiep hai tau tuan tra cho VN,” October 25, 2011.

40BBC, “Viet Nam tu dong tau chien,” October 3, 2011.

41Sandeep Dikshit, “Vietnam’s plea put South Block in a predicament,” The Hindu, November 9, 2011.



16 prepared to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.42 That same month, while on a

tour of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung expressed interest in purchasing four

Sigma‐class corvettes.43 Vietnam will take delivery of six conventional Kilo‐class submarines in

2014 and currently has on order sixteen more Su‐30MK2 jet fighters.44

In October 2011, the Defence Ministers of Japan and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of

Understanding on the enhancement of defence cooperation. The MOU includes provisions for

regular defence talks at deputy minister level, mutual ministerial visits, and exchanges between

the Japan Self‐Defense Force and the Vietnam People’s Army. According to Japanese officials,

the two ministers discussed maritime incidents involving China’s obstruction of maritime

activities. The MOU was designed in part ‘to keep in check China’s growing assertiveness in he

South China Sea and East China Sea’.45

In November 2011, Vietnam announced a $3.3 billion defence budget for 2012, a reported rise

of 35% over 2010.46 According to IHS Jane’s Vietnam’s annual naval procurement budget has

increased by 150% since 2008 to US $276 million in 2011. The budget is projected to rise to

$400 million by 2015.47

Regional . According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia ‘have

become especially disturbing, with undeniable signs of action‐reaction dynamics’, and

Northeast Asia in particular is witnessing an ‘emerging naval arms race’.48

In Southeast Asia the

conventional submarine has been the new hallmark of naval acquisitions. Defence analysts

estimate that 86 submarines will be added to the fleets in the Asia‐Pacific by 2020 of which 30

will be Chinese.49 This prospect has led Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the

United States to step up investment in their anti‐submarine warfare capabilities. Security

analysts warn that the proliferation of submarine fleets may be destabilizing in times of

tensions and crises due to the complexities of command and control.

Vietnam’s purchase of Kilo‐class submarines is part of a regional trend in naval modernisation.China has the largest submarine fleet (more than sixty) and most extensive plans to expand its

42“India to sell BrahMos missile to Vietnam,” The Asian Age, September 20, 2011 and Robert Johnson, “India is

Preparing To Sell BahMos Supersonic Cruise Missiles to Vietnam,” Business Insider , September 20, 2011.

43BBC, “VN dam phan mua 4 tau chien cua Ha Lan,” October 18, 2011.

44“Russia to supply Vietnam six submarines in 2014,” Thanh Nien News, July 3, 2011.

45Kyodo, “Japan, Vietam sign memo on defense cooperation enhancement,” Mainichi , October 25, 2011.

46Trefor Moss, “Chinese Aftershock,” The Diplomat , November 26, 2011.

47Agence France Presse, “China tensions stoke Vietnam naval ambitions,” The Economic Times, November 14,

2011.

48Desmond Ball, “Asia’s Naval Arms Race,” Paper presented to the 25

thAsia‐Pacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia,

Kuala Lumpur, May 29‐June 1, 2011.

49IHS Jane’s quoted by Sabine Pirone, “China’s Pacific Push Spurs U.S. Spending on Anti‐Sub Warfare,” Business

Week , November 25, 2011.



17 numbers including the Type 095 nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094 (JIN‐class)

nuclear‐powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China is expected to base both attack and

ballistic missile submarines at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island.

Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, is now considering

replacing them with newer South Korean models. Indonesia reportedly will boost defence

spending by 35% in 2012.50

Singapore has upgraded its submarine fleet to include two Archer‐class submarines. The first of

which, the RSS Archer , was commissioned in December 2011.51 Singapore reportedly is also in

the market for four or five P‐3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft.52

Malaysia has acquired two Scorpene‐class submarines. Both the Singaporean and Malaysian

submarines are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems.

Thailand is currently considering acquiring its own conventional submarines.

Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper set out plans to construct twelve new conventional

submarines. Recently, it was reported that ‘visiting U.S. Navy officials have repeatedly raisedthe issue of the lack of availability of Australia’s troubled Collins‐class submarines, as well as the

lack of progress on Australia’s planned new class of submarines’. This pressure has prompted

the Gillard Government to place the matter before Cabinet.53

Regional force modernization has and will continue to result in the introduction of increased

numbers of warships equipped with new technologies and weapons systems. A recent review

of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introduction of new

capabilities such as ‘stand‐off precision‐strike, long‐range airborne and undersea attack,

stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it comes to

greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks’.

54

This review concludes that ‘new types of armamentspromise to significantly upgrade and modernize the manner of war fighting in the region… [and]

fundamentally change the concept and conduct of warfare’.55

Finally, new developments in military technology will see the introduction of more

sophisticated aerial and undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence gathering,

reconnaissance, surveillance and strike. Mark Valencia has drawn particular attention to Large

50Step Vaessen, “Indonesia to increase military spending,” Al Jazeera.net, November 7, 2011.

51Jermyn Chow, “RSS Archer submarine now operational,” The Straits Times, December 3, 2011.

52 Craig Hoyle, “Singapore interested in ex‐US Navy P‐3s,” Flight Global , December 15, 2011.

53John Kerin, “Gillard bows to US on submarines,” The Australian Financial Review , November 24, 2011.

54Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 31(1), April 2010, 63‐64.

55Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary

Southeast Asia, 31(1), April 2010, 64.



18 Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance Systems

and Modular Floating Bases that can be deployed in the EEZs of target states. According to

Valencia:

The situation is presently beyond international control. Thus continued intrusive probes are likely to generate

frustration and resentment that may translate into the forcible halting of such ‘intrusions’ when and if

detected. The scale and scope of maritime and airborne intelligence collection activities are likely to continueto expand rapidly in many countries, involving levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented in peacetime.

They will not only become more intensive; they will generally be more intrusive. Indeed stepped up drone

missions may even be considered a prelude to impending warfare. They will generate tensions and more

frequent crises; they will produce defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less

stability in the most affected regions, especially in Asia.56

According to Vice Admiral Scott Swift, Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet, his prime concern is not

the outbreak of a major conflict but ‘any tactical trigger with strategic implications… I do have

concerns about a specific brushup that could result in a tactical miscalculation…’.57 In sum,

regional sea lanes are set to become more ‘crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed

strife’.58

Anti‐Piracy Operations

There are no observable threats by state actors to the safety of the large number of commercial

vessels that ply Southeast Asian waters. The main threat to the safety of navigation comes from

piracy.59 Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the littoral states along the maritime passageway

through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, have conducted coordinated anti‐piracy patrols

since July 2005. In September 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore joined once again to

launch coordinated air patrols over the Malacca Strait, known as Eyes in the Sky.60

An

agreement on standard operating procedures and a cooperative air surveillance and

intelligence exchange group was agreed in 2006. Two years later, Thailand joined the scheme.

In 2004, Japan successfully initiated the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy

56Mark J. Valencia, “The South China Sea, Military Activities and the Law of the Sea,” Paper presented to the

International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American

Perspectives, co‐sponsored by the Institute of European and American Studies and the Center for Asia‐Pacific

Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 7‐8, 2011 and Mark Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth

and Consequences,” China Security , 5(2), Spring 2009, 26.

57Quoted by Stephen Coates, “US Pacific commander warns of tactical errors,” The China Post, November 10,

2011. Admiral Smith also noted that he expected diplomacy to prevail in the event of a brushup and ‘compromise

to prevail’.

58

Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo‐Pacific Asia (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2011), 3 and Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked

Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(1), 2011,

15‐17.

59Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia, RSIS Policy Paper (Singapore: S.

Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, April 2009), 17‐20.

60Joshua H. Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey , 46(4), July/August 2006, 571‐572.



19 and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP was the first government‐to‐

government agreement to enhance maritime security in regional waters. All the ASEAN

maritime states became charter members as well as Japan, China, South Korea, India,

Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The major functional component of ReCAAP is the Information

Sharing Centre based in Singapore that serves as a clearinghouse for information exchange and

operational cooperation in responding to incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea.

As a result of these efforts piracy attacks fell from a peak of 75 in 2000 to 38 in 2004, 10 in 2005

and a handful thereafter. Of particular concern is the rise of piracy in the South China Sea. The

International Maritime Bureau reported 13 cases of piracy in 2009, 30 in 2010 and 41 by July

2011.61 A different set of figures gathered by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

reveals that incidents of piracy and armed robbery increased from 406 in 2009 to 489 in 2010.

There were 214 incident in the first quarter of 2011 alone. The IMO’s figures also highlighted

the increase in piracy in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the threat of piracy in Southeast

Asia appears contained and is well below the levels of piracy off the coast of Somalia. 62

Confidence Building Measures in the South China Sea

Following the Mischief Reef affair in 1995, ASEAN sought to negotiate a Code of Conduct (COC)

for the South China Sea with China. China resisted ASEAN diplomatic pressure to agree to a

formal legally‐binding agreement. The result was the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the

South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002. The DOC listed five cooperative activities which may

be characterized as the first confidence building measures (CBMs) for the South China Sea.

Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to

intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence

between and among them, including:

a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;

b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;

c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined militaryexercise; and

d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.

6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or

undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following:

a. marine environmental protection;

b. marine scientific research;

c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;

d. search and rescue operation; and

e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed

robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.

Two years and a half years after negotiating the DOC, the ASEAN‐China Senior Officials Meeting

decided to establish the ASEAN‐China the Joint Working Group (JWC) to Implement the DOC.

61Brittany Damora and Evan Jendrick, “Brace for a surge in Southeast Asian piracy,” The Japan Times, July 6, 2001.

62Mary George, “Can a Limited Purpose Maritime and Air Defence Identification Zone be Established over the

South China Sea?,” Paper presented to 3rd

International Workshop on the South China Sea, co‐sponsored by the

Vietnam Lawyers’ Association and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, November 3‐5, 2011, 3‐6.





21

Table 1

Comparison of the Final DOC Guidelines with Text of Original Draft

Point Final Wording (2011) Original Draft (2005)

1 The implementation of the DOC should be

carried out in a step‐by‐step approach in line

with the provisions of the DOC.

The implementation of the DOC should be

carried out in a step‐by‐step approach in

line with the provisions of the DOC.

2 The Parties to the DOC will continue to

promote dialogue and consultations in

accordance with the spirit of the DOC.

ASEAN will continue its current practice of

consulting among themselves before

meeting with China.

3 The implementation of activities or projects

as provided for in the DOC should be clearly

identified.

The implementation of the DOC should be

based on activities or projects clearly

indentified.

4 The participation in the activities or projects

should be carried out on a voluntary basis.

The participation in the activities or

projects should be carried out on a

voluntary basis.

5 Initial activities to be undertaken under the

ambit of the DOC should be confidence‐

building measures.

Initial activities to be undertaken under

the ambit of the DOC should be

confidence‐building measures.

6 The decision to implement concrete

measures or activities of the DOC should be

based on consensus among parties

concerned, and lead to the eventual

realization of a Code of Conduct.

The decision to implement concrete

measures or activities of the DOC should

be based on consensus among parties

concerned and lead to the eventual

realization of a COC.

7 In the implementation of the agreed projects

under the DOC, the services of the Experts

and Eminent Persons, if deemed necessary,

will be sought to provide specific inputs on

the projects concerned.

In the implementation of the agreed

projects under the DOC, the service of the

experts and eminent persons if deemed

necessary will be to provide specific inputs

on the project concerned.

8 Progress of the implementation of the agreed

activities and projects under the DOC shall be

reported annually to the ASEAN‐China

Ministerial Meeting (PMC)

Not in original draft guidelines

Other regional CBMs involve bilateral agreements between Vietnam and its neighbours ‐

Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia—to conduct coordinated patrols along their maritime

borders to protect fishermen from piracy and armed robbery. In addition, hotlines have been

set up between naval commands to deal with incidents involving the arrest of fishermen caught

poaching. Vietnam and Indonesia are currently discussing Indonesian participation.



22 Opportunities for Cooperation Among the Region’s Navies

Since 2002, when ASEAN issued its first declaration of concern on the South China Sea,

confidence building measures have been conspicuous by their absence. There has been much

discussion of CBMs but little practical implementation in the South China Sea. However

heightened interest by regional states in maritime security in general, and interest in

implementing the DOC and possibly a more binding COC in particular, have put CBMs back on

centre stage. Currently there are a variety of groups working under the auspices of ASEAN and

the ASEAN Regional Forum charged with maritime security and South China Sea issues.

ASEAN. In May 2006, ASEAN Defence Ministers met for the first time and began the process of

institutionalizing defence cooperation on a regional basis. The ASEAN Defence Ministers are

members of the ASEAN Political Security Council established under ASEAN’s Charter.

ASEAN established the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) in 2010 under the terms of the ASEAN

Political Security Community (APCS) Blueprint.64 The second meeting of the AMF was held in

Thailand in August 2011 and proposed expanding its membership to include dialogue partners

in a separate meeting. The AMF is focused on a comprehensive approach to maritime issuesand has so far not dealt with South China Sea issues in detail.

65

The ADMM brought under its umbrella separate meetings of the ASEAN service chiefs (army,

navy and air and military intelligence) that had been meeting informally outside the official

ASEAN framework. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would

cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries. The prospects of practical cooperation among

ASEAN navies do not appear good. At the most recent ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM‐5) in

Vietnam in 2011 there was disagreement over a number of issues including the formal name of

the meeting, how often it should meet, conducting joint patrols, and a proposal for an ASEAN

communications protocol when navy ships passed each other at sea. 66

In November 2011, ASEAN Senior Officials began discussions on what activities and projects to

include in a code of conduct. Once agreement is reached, the draft COC will be presented to

China ‘to determine what, when, where and how the project would be carried out’, according

to an Indonesian official.67

The terms of reference for the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security were

only approved in October 2011. This group will report its deliberations to the ADMM Plus

Senior Officials Meeting. But the second meeting of the ADMM Plus will not take place until

2013.

64 “Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement,” May 20, 2010, Point 3.

65“Chair’s Statement of the 19

thASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011,” Points 14‐17 (Maritime Cooperation).

66For general reports see: Joyce Pangco, “Vietnam asks Asean navies to unite amid China forays,” Manila Standard

Today , November 24, 2011 and Viet Nam News Service, “ASEAN navy chiefs advance co‐operation,” Maritime

Security.Asia, July 28, 2011.

67Antara, “ASEAN ready to discuss continuation of doc with China,” November 14, 2011.



23 The ASEAN‐China Joint Working Group to Implement the DOC is about to commence its work in

January 2012.68

ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF Inter‐Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security’s Work Plan on

Maritime Security was approved at the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2011.69 It focuses

on information sharing, capacity building, and training rather than practical activities such as

South China Sea CBMs.

By way of conclusion this paper argues that the dogged focus by ASEAN on CBMs in the South

China Sea – particularly CBMs between ASEAN member states and China to address territorial

disputes in the South China Sea – is misplaced because it divides ASEAN states into two

categories, claimants and non‐claimants. This approach allows China to play on differences

among ASEAN members and drag out discussions on a COC. In addition, there are territorial and

maritime boundary disputes among ASEAN members: Vietnam and the Philippines, Cambodia‐

Thailand (Gulf of Thailand), and Indonesia and its neighbours.

ASEAN should get its own house in order first if it wants to promote regional autonomy and

ASEAN’s centrality in the region’s security architecture.The main priority for ASEAN should be to adopt a Code of Conduct for Southeast Asian’s

Maritime Domain in order to reinforce ASEAN’s unity and cohesion as it strives to transform

itself into ASEAN Community by 2015. The 2011 East Asia Summit discussed maritime security

issues raising the possibility that major powers would assert a leadership role should ASEAN

falter.

Regional maritime disputes involve both claims to sovereignty over islands and features and

sovereign rights over resources in the sea and continental shelf. The purpose of a Southeast

Asia regional code of conduct is to provide a framework for state behaviour pending the

settlement of disputes over sovereignty and sovereign rights. An agreement to a code of

conduct should be without prejudice to claims to sovereignty and sovereign rights.

Who should be included in a regional code of conduct? What area should it cover?

The regional code of conduct should include all ten ASEAN members of the Association and

cover Southeast Asia’s maritime domain ‐ not just the South China Sea ‐ in a manner analogous

to the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (1971), Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976)

and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (1995).

The security of the maritime domain in Southeast Asia is indivisible for all members, whether

coastal, littoral or landlocked states.

68Antonio Siegfrid O. Alegado, “ASEAN, China to set ground rules on sea issues in January,” Business World ,

November 29, 2011.

69ASEAN Regional Forum, “Draft Outline of a Work Plan on Maritime Security: A Template for Discussion,” 2

ndARF

ISM on Maritime Security, Auckland, March 29‐31, 2010; “Co‐Chairs’ Summary of the Third ARF Inter‐Sessional

Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 14‐15 February 2011”; and “44th

AM/PMC/18th

ARF, Indonesia 2011,

Chair’s Statement, 18th

ASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali, Indonesia,” Point 41.



24 Coverage of the entire Southeast Asian maritime domain would make all of ASEAN’s members

stakeholders in the code of conduct, including Cambodia and Myanmar.70 This would overcome

the present division of ASEAN states into the four claimant states and the six non‐claimant

states with respect to just the South China Sea.

All signatories to the code of conduct should renounce the threat of and use of force to:

• settle their disputes over sovereignty and sovereign rights,

• disrupt good order at sea including safety of navigation and over flight.

All ASEAN states should bring their maritime claims into line with international law, with

particular attention to eliminating excessive baselines and clearly distinguishing islands from

rocks. The expertise of an independent panel of technical and legal experts could be called

assist in determining base lines and the classification of islands and rocks.

All signatories should commit themselves to a resolution of maritime disputes within a mutually

agreed time frame through negotiations or other mutually agreed methods. If, at the expiration

of the agreed time frame, no resolution of maritime disputes is reached, the states involvedshould agree to a settlement based on arbitration by an appropriate international court or

tribunal (International Tribunal on Law of the Sea or International Court of Justice) or other

agreed procedure.

All parties to the Southeast Asia Maritime Code of Conduct should commit themselves to

demilitarising the features (islands and rocks) that they physically occupy, including the

prohibition of deploying specified types of weapon systems such as land based anti‐ship

missiles.

For purposes of security, including protection against piracy and armed criminals, police or

coast guard personnel may be stationed on occupied features.

A maritime code of conduct should also contain provisions for all parties to cooperate in:

marine scientific research, marine pollution, fisheries management, search and rescue, anti‐

piracy and other agreed areas.

A regional code of conduct should set up a body to oversee its implementation and to handle

complaints and disputes that may arise. Such a body should be included in the ASEAN Political‐

Security Community Council.

Once ASEAN states have agreed to a Code of Conduct on Southeast Asia’s Maritime Domain

they should call on their dialogue partners (and other stakeholders) to agree to abide by its

provisions.

70Cambodia and Myanmar were the only two members of ASEAN to remain silent when maritime security/South

China Sea issues were raised at the November 2011 East Asia Summit leaders retreat.

Documents

Thayer Maritime Security and Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea