Thayer Vietnamese/English Versions of Da Nang Conference Paper

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The Paracel Islands Dispute: Geo-‐Strategic Issues and the Role of International Law

in Promoting Cooperation Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper presented to international conference on Paracel-Spratly Archipelagoes: Historical Truth

co-sponsored by University of Da Nang and Pham Van Dong University

Da Nang, Vietnam June 19-21, 2014

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The Paracel Islands Dispute: Geo-‐Strategic Issues and the Role of International Law in Promoting Cooperation

Carlyle A. Thayer

Background

The Paracel Isands (Hoang Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha in Chinese) are a group of

approximately thirty features (small islands, rocks, reefs and sandbanks) lying at the

northern end of the semi-‐enclosed South China Sea. The Paracel archipelago consists of

two groups, the Amphitrite group in the northeast and the Crescent group in the

southwest. The total land area is estimated at roughly eight square kilometres

embracing a maritime zone of 15,000 square kilometres.

China’s unilateral move in early May in placing the M/V Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HYSY 981)

mega drilling rig in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) raises complex historical,

political and legal issues regarding competing claims to sovereignty. For example, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) asserts:

Xisha Islands are an inherent part of China’s territory over which there is no dispute.

China was the first to discover, develop, exploit and exercise jurisdiction over the Xisha Islands. During the Northern Song Dynasty (960-‐1126 AD) the Chinese government already established jurisdiction over the Xisha and sent naval forces to patrol the waters there. In 1909, Commander Li Zhun of the Guandong naval force of the Qing Dynasty led a military inspection mission to the Xisha Islands and reasserted China’s sovereignty by hoisting the flag and fiving a salvo on the Yongxing [Woody] Island.1

China’s official account raises questions about the concepts of effective jurisdiction and

sovereignty. Until the colonial era the Paracel Islands were uninhabited. They had no

real economic value except as a transient fishing ground and a source of guano used in

fertilizers. China’s contact with these islands was intermittent and not continuous.

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position,” June 8, 2014.

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The modern day concept of sovereignty evolved after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648

(or the Treaty of Westphalia) and only applied to independent states. Mohan Malik

argues, for example:

In pre-‐modern Asia, empires were characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of suzerainty prevailed… In other words, China’s claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and delimited stands in sharp contrast with the stance that China’s maritime boundaries were always clearly defined and delimited. Herein lies a basic contradiction in the Chinese stand on land and maritime boundaries which is untenable. Actually, it is the mid-‐twentieth-‐century attempts to convert the undefined frontiers of ancient civilizations and kingdoms enjoying suzerainty into clearly defined, delimited, and demarcated boundaries of modern nation-‐states exercising sovereignty that lie at the center of China’s territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. Put simply, sovereignty is a post-‐imperial notion ascribed to nation-‐states, not ancient empires.2

UNCLOS does not accept historical claims or historical justifications as the prime

determinants in determining sovereignty over maritime features and waters. Neither

does modern international law accept historical discovery of islands, the proximity of

maritime features to a land mass,3 or the inclusion of maritime features on state-‐issued

maps as sufficient evidence to support a claim to sovereignty. International law requires

a state claiming sovereignty to demonstrate continuous occupation and administration.

Sam Bateman set off a lively debate when, in a recent RSIS Commentary, he argued

“despite much global commentary suggesting that Vietnam has a case to support its

sovereignty claim, closer analysis of the history of the dispute suggests otherwise.”

If we turn from ancient history to the seventeenth and eighteen centuries, it becomes

clear that Vietnam has considerable ground for its claims over the Paracels.4 In the

seventeenth century the Nguyen Lords commissioned officers from the Royal Court to

raise crews for between five and eighteen boats forming the Hoang Sa Flotilla (Doi

2 Mohan Malik, “Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims,” World Affairs Journal, May/June 2013; http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/historical-‐fiction-‐china’s-‐south-‐china-‐sea-‐claims. 3 Sam Bateman, “New Tensions in the South China Sea: Whose Sovereignty over Paracels?,” RSIS Commentaries, No. 88/2014, May 14, 2014. 4 Bo Ngoai Giao (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Uy Ban Bien Gioi Quoc Gia (National Boundary Commission), Chu Quyen cua Viet Nam Doi Voi Hai Quan Dao Hoang Sa va Truong Sa [Vietnam’s Sovereignty over the Two Archipelagoes Hoang Sa and Truong Sa] Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Tri Thuc, 2013.

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Hoang Sa, sometimes translated as Hoang Sa Brigade). The Hoang Sa Flotilla spent

approximately five months in the Paracel Islands carrying out fishing, mapping, surveys

and recovering the cargo from merchant ships that had run aground.

The Emperors of the Nguyen Dynasty continued to maintain the Hoang Sa Flotilla.

Emperor Gia Long formally took possession of the Paracels in 1816. Under his successor,

Emperor Minh Mang, the Hoa Sa Flotilla continued to survey and map the islands,

constructed a temple (1835), and planted stone stele marking the Kingdom of An Nam’s

territorial claims.

An Nam maintained claims to sovereignty over the Paracels for much of the colonial era.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Hue in 1884 France assumed responsibility for Annam’s

external affairs including defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. For example,

in 1931 and 1932 France protested to the Government of China when authorities in

Guangdong province called for bids to exploit guano in the Hoang Sa archipelago.

It can be argued that the Qing Dynasty recognized the sovereignty of the French

Protectorate of An Nam in a treaty convention signed in 1887 and a supplement to this

convention signed in 1895. The Kingdom of An Nam later became an Associated State of

French Union as the State of Vietnam.

French Navy warships and Customs ships made frequent visits to the Paracels in the

1920s and 1930s. The French Institute of Oceanography in Nha Trang carried out

scientific surveys in this period as well. In 1938, the French Governor-‐General signed a

decree formally establishing an administrative unit in the Hoang Sa. France constructed

a lighthouse, a meteorological station and a radio station on Pattle Island in the

Crescent group.

In 1947, after the Second World War when French authority was restored in Indochina,

French armed forces secured control of the Paracel archipelagoe where they rebuilt the

radio and meteorological stations. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) occupied the

Amphitrite group in 1950 following the withdrawal of the Republic of China (Nationalist

China).

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In 1951, the head of the State of Vietnam’s delegation to the San Francisco Peace

Conference stated, “we affirm our right to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which have

always belonged to Vietnam.” No objections were recorded.

The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954 provisionally divided Vietnam

into two zones roughly along the seventeenth parallel. The Paracel Islands lay below the

this parallel and therefore came under the control of the RVN. In 1956 the RVN

protested the PRC’s occupation of the islands in the Amphitrite group. That year the

RVN replaced French forces in the Paracels and the Department of Mining, Technology

and Small Industries conducted a survey of four islands in the Paracels.

Bateman’s claim that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) recognized China’s

sovereignty over the Paracels in 1958 is inaccurate. Premier Pham Van Dong’s letter to

China does not mention the Paracel (or Spratly) archipelago nor does it recognise

China’s sovereignty over the Paracels. In 1958 the DRV still held out hopes of reunifying

Vietnam under the political terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

The RVN maintained a continuous presence in the Crescent group from 1956 until

January 1974. For example, in 1959 the RVN detained Chinese fishermen who landed on

four islands in the Paracel archipelago. From then and throughout the 1960s RVN

authorities continually chased away Chinese fishermen operating in waters around the

Crescent group. By 1966, the RVN presence on Pattle Island was reduced to a single

garrison and a weather station. After the 1973 Paris Agreements the RVN presence was

reduced to a single platoon of soldiers.

China Seizes the Paracel Islands

In January 1973 the Vietnam War was brought to an end with the signing of the

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam in Paris by four

parties: the United States, RVN, DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of

the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG). As a result of the Paris Agreement the United

States withdrew all military forces from South Vietnam and left the RVN without an ally.

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This was the strategic context in which the PRC made the decision to reassert control

over the Crescent group.

In January 1974 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops landed on Drummond and

Duncan islands in the Paracels supported by two armed fishing trawlers. The RVN

dispatched the frigate HQ-‐16 Ly Thuong Kiet to investigate. The frigate discovered a

Chinese landing ship moored on Duncan Island and bunker manned by PLA soldiers.

The Chinese also deployed two Kronstad-‐class submarine chasers, #281 and #282. When

HQ-‐16 Ly Thuong Kiet reported the presence of Chinese forces to Saigon, three naval

vessels were dispatched with orders to evict the Chinese. On arrival on 16 January the

RVN naval force signaled the PLAN forces to withdraw. The Chinese responded by

demanding the RVN ships leave Chinese waters.

On the following day, the RVN landed about thirty naval commandos on Robert Island

where they removed a PRC flag. They were reinforced by the arrival of the frigate HQ-‐4

Tran Khanh Du. On 18 January, RVN frigates HQ-‐5 Tran Binh Trong and HQ-‐10 Nhat Tao

arrived on the scene. The naval commandos were augmented by a platoon of soldiers

and an underwater demolition team. China reinforced its position with the dispatch of

four PLAN corvettes, #271, #274, #389 and #396, and landed an unknown number of

PLA marines and armed militia on Duncan Island.

The battle for the Paracels commenced on 19 January with the landing of RVN soldiers

from HQ-‐5 Tran Binh Trong on Duncan Island where they engaged PLA troops. Finding

themselves outnumbered the RVN troop withdrew.

RVN frigates HQ-‐10 Nhat Tao and HQ-‐16 Ly Thuong Kiet initiated an armed engagement

with their Chinese counterparts that lasted less than three quarters of an hour. The HQ-‐

10 Nhat Tao was sunk and the HQ-‐16 Ly Thuong Kiet was badly damaged. All remaining

RVN naval forces withdrew from the area. On 20 January China committed jet aircraft

and ground attack aircraft from Hainan Island to bomb and strafe three of the RVN-‐

occupied islands. After the PLA conducted an amphibious landing the remaining RVN

forces surrendered. The RVN was dissuaded from sending reinforcements to the

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Paracels by intelligence reports from the United States that indicated China has

mobilized a more powerful fleet. Nonetheless the RVN issued public denunciations of

China’s actions and unsuccessfully tried to raise the matter at the United Nations.5

Much has been made by Chinese officials and scholars such as Bateman about the DRV’s

equivocation on sovereignty issues with respect to the Paracel Islands during the

Vietnam War. Vietnam needed Chinese support and thus either downplayed the

sovereignty issue or gave the impression that China held sovereignty over the Paracel

Islands. This view fails to take into account protests by the PRG immediately after

China’s seizure of the Paracels and subsequently (26 January and 14 February 1974). The

PRG was not only a signatory to the Paris Peace Agreements, but prior to the formal

reunification of Vietnam in 1976 was an applicant (along with the DRV) for membership

in the United Nations. The US vetoed the PRG’s bid. After reunification the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam became the successor state and assumed the policy positions of the

PRG on the South China Sea (see White Papers issued in 1979, 1981 and 1988 on

Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracels).

What are the lessons learned from the battle for the Paracels?

• China opportunistically will use changes in the geo-‐strategic balance to press its maritime claims in the South China Sea.

• Hainan Island (and a major naval base near Sanya) is a vital rear area for the surge of military forces into the South China Sea.

• Occupied features in the Paracels and elsewhere in the South China Sea are vulnerable to interdiction and attack by superior air and naval forces. It is easier to take an island than to defend it.

• China demonstrated it could mobilize more powerful naval force than the RVN. These naval forces were equipped with larger and longer-‐range naval guns than their RVN counterparts. The Chinese ships had better fire gun control than the lightly armed RVN ships.

• The RVN (like the Socialist Republic of Vietnam today) cannot count on the United States for support. Although U.S. Pacific Fleet forces were in the area they were ordered not to assist the RVN.

5 The Gioi Len An Trung Cong Xam Lang Hoang Sa Cua VNCH [The World Condemns Communist Chinese Aggression in the Parcels Islands of the Republic of Vietnam] published by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, 1974. Indochina Archive (Douglas Pike Collection), The University of California at Berkeley. http://paracels74./tripod.com/hoangsahaichien.htm.

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Sovereignty over the Paracels is currently contested by the Republic of China on Taiwan

and Vietnam.

Geo-‐Strategic Issues

The Paracels Islands are important for their strategic location and possible oil and gas

deposits in their surrounding waters. In 1990, China constructed a 365 metre runway on

Woody island that has been extended twice to it present length of 2,399 metres. The

airstrip on Woody Island can accommodate fighter aircraft such as the Su-‐27 and Su-‐

30MKKs, H-‐6 bombers and large supply transport aircraft. The facilities adjacent to the

runway include four hangers. Air traffic is controlled by a Type 791 X-‐band precision-‐

approach radar. Other military infrastructure on Woody Island includes naval docks

capable of accommodating frigates and destroyers and a fuel depot. PLA soldiers are

based on Woody island to protect the runway and other military facilities.

China has also built military-‐related facilities elsewhere in the Paracels. A weather

station has been built on Pattle Island, while Robert Island houses a radio beacon, the

only beacon south of Hainan. The docks on Duncan Island are being expanded. A Signals

Intelligence (SIGINT) station has been operating on Rocky Island, the highest

premonitory, since 1995.6 This station could provide air or surface warning and support

air missions or ship targeting. Open sources report that China may have stationed the

HY-‐2 anti-‐ship cruise missile on Woody Island.7

On 19 July 2012, China’s Central Military Commission officially decided to establish a

military command in Sansha City after its elevation to prefecture-‐level administrative

status. The garrison was placed under the PLA Hainan provincial sub-‐command within

the Guangzhou Military Command. The Sansha military garrison has been assigned

responsibility for national defence mobilization, military operations and reserves.

According to Defence Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng, “China may set up local

6 J. Michael Cole, “China Deploying “Military Garrison; to South China Sea?,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2012 7 Bill Geertz, “Woody Island Missiles,” The Washington Times, June 15, 2001.

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military command organs in the city [Sansha] according to relevant regulations.”8 Senior

Colonel Cai Xihong was appointed commander of the Sansha garrison and Senior

Colonel Liao Chaoyi was named Political Commissar.9

Retired U.S. Rear Admiral Mike McDevitt argues that a military garrison in Sansha will

not affect the military balance or signal imminent hostilities in the South China Sea.

McDevitt points out that any major military operations in the South China Sea would be

mounted from Hainan where the PLA has major bases. According to McDevitt, “putting

garrisons on Woody Island or elsewhere in the Paracels would effectively maroon these

guys, so the only advantage would be just showing the flag -‐ to say, ‘We are serious’.”10

China’s Doctrine of Three Warfares The maritime confrontation between China and Vietnam over the placement of M/V Hai

Yang Shi You 981 (HYSY 981) mega oilrig in disputed waters in the South China Sea is

now entering its seventh week. On 9 June China unexpectedly opened a new front

when Wang Min, Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, presented United Nations

Secretary General Ban Ki-‐moon a formal position paper on the dispute with a request

that he circulate it to all 193 UN members.

China’s actions in internationalizing its dispute with Vietnam does not represent a

change in its long-‐standing policy that maritime disputes can only be settled bilaterally

through direct consultations and negotiation of the parties directly concerned. A day

after China submitted its position paper Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Ministry

8 Xinhua, “Chinese military may establish presence in Sansha: defense spokesperson,” Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China, June 28, 2012. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2012-‐06/29/content_4381230.htm. 9 “China steps up claims over world’s most disputed waters,” National Post, July 27, 2012. 10 Kirk Spitzer, “New Garrison, Old Troubles In The South China Seas,” Battlefield, July 26, 2012. http://battlefield.blogs.time.com/2012/07/26/new-‐garrison-‐old-‐troubles-‐in-‐the-‐south-‐china-‐sea. Another analyst argues, “the Sansha garrison has minimal operational value barring a significant upgrade in naval and air infrastructure to enable sustained operations” and is mainly an example of Chinese coercive diplomacy. See: Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Sansha Garrison: China’s Deliberate Escalation in the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, East and South China Sea Bulletin no. 5, September 2012.

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of Foreign Affairs stated that China rejected United Nations arbitration of its dispute

with Vietnam.

Why then did China take its dispute with Vietnam to the United Nations?

In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Central Military

Commission formally adopted the doctrine of “three warfares” (san zhong zhanfa). The

three warfares doctrine is an essential element of information warfare.

According to China’s Three Warfares, a study written by Timothy A. Walton for Delex

Consulting, Studies and Analysis (18 January 2012), China’s “three warfares” comprises

the following components: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. It is

the latter two components that shaped China’s position paper.

Media warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy designed to influence international

public opinion to build support for China and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing

actions contrary to China’s interests.

China’s position paper was sent to the United Nations in order to outflank Vietnam’s

own propaganda effort and to isolate Vietnam. The vast majority of UN members have

no direct interest in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian

states that hold concerns about China’s actions would shirk at being forced to take a

public stand on the issue.

Legal Warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy to use China’s domestic and

international law to claim the legal high ground to assert Chinese interests. China’s

position paper is replete with selected reference to international law to support China’s

stance.

China initially defended its placement of the oilrig by arguing that it was within China’s

territorial waters. China noted that the HYSY 981 was located seventeen nautical miles

from Triton islet, the western most feature of the Paracel Island. China’s use of the term

“territorial waters” carried at least two meaning: (1) a claim to all the waters inside its

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nine-‐dash line as “territorial waters” or (2) a claim to “territorial waters” under the UN

Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

China could not possible claim “territorial waters” as the justification of the location of

the oilrig because it was at least five nautical miles beyond its legal territorial sea under

the definition provided by UNCLOS.

On 6 June China’ statement amended this error by claiming that the HYSY 981 was

within China’s contiguous zone. This new claim, however, also lack legal foundation.

According to UNCLOS the sole purpose of the contiguous zone is to enable a coastal

state to “exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs,

fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;

(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory

or territorial sea.”

China has also attempted to justify its dispute with Vietnam by advancing the argument

that the location of HYSY 981 is closer to the Paracel Islands than the Vietnamese

coastline. China’s position paper argues, for example, the HYSY 981 was operating

seventeen nautical miles from both Triton islet and the baselines drawn around the

Paracels and 133 to 156 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coastline.

At the same time China claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal which is located

closer to the Philippines than the nearest Chinese land feature. Under international law

mere proximity is not sufficient to demonstrate sovereignty.

China’s position paper to the UN actually undermines its use legal warfare to advance its

case. For example, China’s position paper states:

The waters between China’s Xisha (Paracel) Islands and the coast of Vietnamese mainland are yet to be delimited. The two sides have not yet conducted delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in these waters. Both sides are entitled to claim EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with the UNCLOS.

If this is the case, China should have followed the provisions of UNCLOS to deal with

overlapping claims. Both China and Vietnam should have entered into provisional

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arrangements over the disputes area until agreement was reached on delimitation.

During this period each side was enjoined from altering the status quo and from the

threat or use of force. Clearly China’s placement of the oilrig in disputed waters violated

international legal principles.

But China’s position paper undermines its legal case by arguing that international law is

irrelevant. The position paper states:

However, these waters will never become Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf no matter which principle [on international law] is applied in the delimitation [emphasis added].

China’s Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaozu, contributed to Beijing’s information

warfare campaign by repeating the same argument in an op ed article in The Australian

on 13 June. Ma argued that the disputed area has never been delimited and “no matter

which principle [of international law] is applied these waters concerned will never

become Vietnam’s part of EEZ and continental shelf.”

Using international Law to Promote Cooperation

China’s formal tabling of a position paper with the UN Secretary General should be

taken up by members of the international community that are concerned about

escalating tensions between China and Vietnam and their possible impact on regional

security. These states should argue that the matter be taken up by the Security Council.

China should not be permitted to pursue information warfare in order to have it both

ways – circulating a position paper to the UN in order to demonstrate the serious nature

of its dispute with Vietnam and rejecting UN arbitration. The United States and Australia

should press for a UN Security Council debate. Japan and other maritime powers with a

stake in stability in the South China Sea should join in.

China should be forced into the uncomfortable position of opposing any Security Council

debate and thus scuttling its attempt to use UN for propaganda purposes. Or China

should be placed in the position of vetoing any resolution arising from a debate in the

Security Council critical of China’s action in the South China Sea. The international

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community through the United Nations should demand that China shold withdraw its

drilling rig and armada of ships form its present location.

The present dispute over sovereign rights in the waters surrounding the Paracel Islands

can only be resolved bilaterally by China and Vietnam based on international law

including UNCLOS. Vietnam should strongly argue this point in government-‐to-‐

government level talks with China.

Vietnam should lobby the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to be more forcible in

its support for the settlement of disputes on the basis of international law and withouth

the threat or use of force.

ASEAN states should continue to pursue with China the implementation of the 2002

Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and a Code of Conduct

for the South China Sea (COC). It must be noted, however, that ASEAN’s objectives in

working towards a COC with China are possibly unachievable in the foreseeable future.

The COC process has led to divisions within ASEAN and divisions among ASEAN’s

claimant states. China’s assertion of “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China

Sea, and its recent unprecedented aggressive assertion of sovereignty utilizing military

vessels and aircraft, is now the major impediment to managing the maritime commons

in the South China Sea.

In light of this development ASEAN should draft and ratify a Code of Conduct Treaty for

Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons. The security of the region’s maritime commons is

indivisible and International law is universal. In order to develop Code of Conduct Treaty

for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons individual member states should resolve

territorial and maritime disputes with other members. The recent agreement between

Indonesia and the Philippines on demarcating the maritime boundaries in the Celebes

and Mindanao seas is a good example.

The proposed COC Treaty for Southeast Asia’s Maritime Commons would enhance

ASEAN’s unity and cohesion, promote regional autonomy and ASEAN’s centrality in the

region’s security architecture. The regional Code of Conduct Treaty should cover

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Southeast Asia’s maritime commons in a manner analogous to the Zone of Peace

Freedom and Neutrality (1971), Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and Southeast

Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (1995) and be open to accession by ASEAN’s

dialogue partners.

TRANH CHAP HOANG SA: cAC VAN DE BJA CHIEN LLJ'<)C VA VAl

TRO CVA LU~T PHAP ouoc TE

TRONG VIEC TANG CU'O'NG HOP TAC. . Carlyle A. Thayer

CO' sO'

QuAn GaO Hoang Sa (ten Viet Nam 1::\ Hoang Sa, ten Trung Quoc la Narn

Sa) la 111Qt nhorn khoang 30 cau true (ciao nho, cia, bai can) n~111 0- ph An cuoi phia

8~c cua VLlI1g Bi~n Dong mra kin. Quan ciao Hoang Sa g6111 hai nh0111. Nhom An

VTnh n5m 0- phia Dong B5c va nhorn Nguyet Thi~111 aphia TBy Na111. Dien tich

dAt du doan vao khoang 8kl112 bao g6m 111Qt vung bi~n rQng 15000 1(111 2.

Hanh dong 00'11 phuong CLIa Trung Quoc ha o~t gian khoan khung HYSY

981 dAu thang 5 vira qua trong VLlI1g d0C quyen kinh t~ CLIa Viet Na111 d?t ra cac

van d~ lich sir, chinh tri va phap Iy phirc tap lien quan G~n cac yeu sach tranh

chAD nhau v~ ChLI Cluv2n. Vi duo BE> Nooai [7i80 llUO'C CT-fDrND Trnn« Hoa elll;']1 J .; • / • t.....;J. U - - - - - --0 _.- -1 _._

quyet: "Quan dao Tay Sa la mot phan c6 hiru cua lanh th6 Trung Qu6c khong h~

co tranh chap. Trung Quoc la nuoc o~u tier: phat hien, phat trien, khai thac va

tlnrc hien tai phan d6i voi quan dao Tay Sa. Trong thoi ky Bilc T6ng (960

1126) Chinh phu Trung Quoc cia xac lap tai phan d6i voi Tay Sa va cir lire IUQ'ng

hai quan tu~n tharn vung bi~n nay. N3111 1909, do cl6c Ly C11llAn cua luc IUQ"ng

hai quan Quang Dong thai nha Thanh Ga ti~n hanh mot cuoc thanh sat bang

quan su' toi quan dao TBy Sa va khang dinh 10i chu quyen cua Trung Quoc bang

each dun cava ban mot loat dai bac tren dao Phu Lam".

Thong tin rna Trung Quoc thu thap duoc 00t 1'a cac cau hoi v6 khai ni~111 tai

phan va chu quyen hiiu hieu. Cho toi thoi tlnrc clan thi quan dao Hoang Sa

khong co ngurri a. QuAn dao khong co gia tr] kinh t~ thuc sir tnr mot khu vue

danh ca t0111 thai va nguon phan chim c1~ san xuAt phan bon. Su' lien h~ CLIa

Trung Quoc dbi voi quan GaO nay luc co, luc khong va khong lien tuc.

Khai niern ngay nay v2 ChLI quyen ti~n trien sau Hi9P dinh Hoa binh

Westphalia n3111 1648 (hay con goi la Hiep uoc Westphalia) va chi ap d~ll1g dbi

vo-i cac qu6c gia oQc I~p. Vf d~l, Mohan Malik bi~n lu~n r~ng "0 Chall A tnro-c

th(\i hi¢n 00i, cac d~ ch& co 00C di~111 la dLrang bien gi6i chua dll'C)'c xac c1jnh,

khong duoc bao v~ va thirong thay d6i. Quan niern v~ srr ba chu luon thfJllg

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bao gio duoc xac dinh va duoc phan dinh qua 1ich su, lr~li ngiroc hoan ioan dc~i

voi quan Oi~111 rang ranh giai tren bi~n cua Trung Quoc luon luon duoc X~IC dinh

va duoc phan dinh 1'5 rang. Di6u nay cho thay mot mau thuan co ban. khong

virng ch~c trong l~p tnrong cua Trung Qu6e vc ranh gi6i ucn clAt Ii0n V~I runh

gioi tren bien. Thuc t~ la day la cac n6 hrc vao khoang giCra Ih0 ky 20 nh[ull

chuyen d6i nhimg duong bien gici chua diroc dinh 1'0 ella cue n~n van minh co

xua va cac vuong quoc thua huong su ba chu tro thanh ({IC ranh gi6'i duoc x.ic

dinh, phan dinh cua cac quoc gia moi thuc thi chu quyen va ch inh c1icu nay nJm

0' trung tam cua cac tranh chap lanh theS va bi0n giCra Trung Quoc \'~I cac nuoc

lang gieng. N6i 111Qt each don girm, chu quyen la mot kh,,'li nicm XU!11 hicn sau

thai cac ot ch~ va duoc gianh cho cac quoc gia dan IQe clur khcmg lihai I~l die cl~'

ch~ c6 xua". Cong uoc Lien hop quoc vc LUQt bien (UNCI.OS) khcmg ch~~ll

nhan yeu sach ljch str hay su bien minh lich su' nlur 1<1 y6u lc~ quyet dinh trong

viec xac dinh chu quyen 06i voi cac can true bi~n va cac vuug bi6n. Lu01 phap

quoc t~ hien et~i cling khong chap nh~11 s~r phat Ili~ll lilellig tinh lich su' (ic3i \'c)'i

cac dao, tinh g~n gui cua cac cau true bi6n voi ciAt lien, hay vice bao gC\11l die

cau true bi~n d6 trong nhu'ng tAm ban db do qu6e gia ph6t he1nh. eoi do hl bflllg

chu'ng dAy du o~ h6 trq cho mQt yeu sach Chll quy~n. Lu~t ph,,)p qu0e t6 c!c')i h6i

mQt qu6c gia yeu sach chu quy~n phai chlrng minh vi¢e ehi0m hehl Ve1 qU~lll I)!

lien t\IC.

Sam Bateman da lam blll1g ph{It IllQt eUQe tranh cui sc)i 1l()i kl1i. lrong mC)l

bai binh lu~n g~n day elta RSIS, ong ta bi¢n lUQn r5ng "i'v10e elLl CCl rAt nhicu )7

ki6n binh lu~n tren th6 gi6i cho r~ng Vi~t Nam e6 cO" so de hC11rq' cho yeu S{lC

chu qUY~l1 nhung S\I phal1 tfch sau hon v~ Ijch slr Cl'la tnlllh eh"lp 1",1i eho Ih{IY

khae". N~u ehlll1g ta tinh ttl' \!eh slr xa Xll'a t6i th~ ky 17 V~I th0 k)! 1Kdll 1'0 r6ng

thAy r5ng Vi~t Nam e6 co s6' dang k~ vc yeu s8eh ella minh d(\i vc)'i qu,\n cbo

Hoang Sa. Trong th~ ky thLI' ]7, ehlla Nguy~n cia ra l~nh cho dIe qUem chLrc

trong tri~u tim I1<;\P thuy thu eho tll' 5 d~n ] 8 thuy~n, t~o nen dQi HO<lng Sa, J)()i

Hoang Sa ho?-t dQng 6' qll~n dao Hoang Sa kh021llg 5 Ih{lllg de d{lllh dl, VC hell1

db, khao sat va l~y hang h6a tll' cae tau buon bj chim.

:2

Cac vi vua ella tri~u Nguyen tiep tuc duy tri doi Hoang Sa. Vua Gia Long

da chinh tlnrc ehi~m hiru quan dao Hoang Sa tir nam 1816. Duoi thai ella nguo.

k~ vi, Vua Minh Mang, dQi Hoang Sa lai ticp tuc khao sat va ve ban d6 quan

dao, xay mot mien tho nam 1835, dung mot bia da khiie len yeu sach lanh th6

cua virong quae An Nam.

Vuong quoc An Narn duy tri yeu sach chu quyen d6i voi Hoang Sa trong

phan lou thoi ky thuoc dia. Thea cac di~u khoan ella Hiep uoc Hu~ narn 1884,

Phap nhan trach nhiem dai dien eho cac van d~ d6i ngoai cua An Narn trong do

co vi~c bao ve chu quyen va roan ven lanh th6 ella An Nam. Vi du narn 1931 va

1932, Phap phan d6i Chinh phu Trung Quoc khi nha chirc trach tinh Quang

Dong goi thAu khai thac phan chim tren quan dao Hoang Sa.

Co th~ co tranh cai rang nha Thanh oa tlnra nhan chu quyen cua sir baa hc)

cua Phap d6i voi An Nam trong mot cong uoc ky nam 1887 va cong uoc b6

sung ky nam 1895. Vuong quoc An Nam sau do tro thanh quoc gia lien hicp

trong kh6i Lien hiep Phap voi tu each la quoc gia Viet Nam.

Hoang Sa trong nhirng niim 1920 va 1930. Vien H,1i duong hoc Phap a Nha

Trang cung oa ti~n hanh cac khao sat khoa 11Qe trong thoi gian nay. Nal11 1938,

Th6ng 06e Phap ky mot nghi dinh chinh tlurc thanh lap mot don vi hanh chinh (r

Hoang Sa. Phap xay dung mot cay den bien, mot tram khi urong thuy van va

I11Qt oai phat song radio tren dao Hoang Sa (PattIe Island) narn trong nhom

Nglly~t Thi~m.

Nam 1947, sau Chi~n tranh th~ gioi IAn thu hai, sir thong tri ella Phap lai

duoc khoi phuc a Dong Duong. Cac luc lirong vii trang cua Phap gianh quycn

kiSm soat quan dao Hoang Sa v,1119 xay dung l~i dai phat song radio va tram khi

tuo'ng thuy van. Nurre CHDCND Trung Hoa chi~m nhom An Vinh nam 1950

sau khi Trung Hoa dan qu6c rllt kh6i day. N3111 1951, nguo-i c1Crng dAu phili doan

ella qu6e gia Vi~t Nam t~i HQi nghi hoa binh San Fanciseo tuyen b6 "ehClllg toi

khAng c1inh quy~n 06i vai qu5n dao Hoang Sa va quAn c1ao Truo-ng Sa, chllllg

luon luon thuQc v~ Viet Nam". Khong co sv phsn d6i nao dll'C)'c ghi nh?n.

821t1 Tuyen b6 eu6i Cllllg ella HQi ngh) Geneva nam 1954 da t~m tho-i chia

ciit Vi~t Nam thanh hai khu V\l'e dQe thea VI tuy6n 17. Qu5n dao Hoang Sa n5m

duoi vi tuyen nay do vay no thuoc quyen ki~1ll scat cua Viet Naill Cong lIoa.

Narn 1956, Viet Nam Cong Hoa phan d6i sir chi0m dong cua CI-IND Trung I10a

d6i voi cac dao thuoc nhorn An Vinh. CLIng nam do Viet Naill Cong lloa thay

th~ cac 1I;1'c luong Phap tren quan dao Hoang Sa va BQ Khui khoung khoa hoc V:J

Cong nghiep I1h6 ti~n hanh mot cuoc khao sal d6i voi b6n duo thuoc quan dao

Hoang Sa.

Qua quyet cua Bateman la Vi~t Naill D8l1 chu cong hoa thira nh011 chu

qUY~l1 ella Trung Quoc d6i voi quan dao Hoang Sa nam 1958 I:J khong chinh

xac. Birc thu cua Thu tuong PIWIll V3l1 D6ng glri Trung Qu()C khong d0 cfip u)'j

quan dao Hoang Sa (hay la quan ciao Truong Sa) cLIng nhu khong h0 thira nhan

chu qUY~l1 cua Trung Quoc d6i voi quan dao HO[\11g Sa. Naill 1958, Viet Nal11

Dan chu cong hoa v~n hy vong th6ng nhat Viet Nam thco cue cli0u khoan chinh

tri cua Hiep dinh Geneva 1954.

Vi¢t Nam Cong Hoa duy tri mQt su hien dicn lien tuc ()' nh()111 Nguyct

Thi~1ll tir nam 1956 toi thang 1/1974. Vi du, 113111 1959, Vi~l N~\Il1 C'()l1g Hoa eli}

b~t giam ngu dan Trung Quoc tham nh~p tren b611 ([(10 thuoc quan dao Hoang

Sa. Tu do va trai qua nhfrng nam ]960, nha clurc trach Viet Na111 Cong lloa lien

tuc xua duoi ngu dan Trung Quoc hoat dong trong vung bien xung quanh nhom

Nguyet Thi~m. Nam 1966, sir hien dien cua Vi¢l Nam Coug 110,1 ircn duo Pattlc

giam xuong chi con mot don vi d6n tru V~I I11Qt tr(1111 du bao ihci li0t. Sau lIicp

dinh Paris 1973, sir hien dien ella Vi¢t Narn CQng Hoa gi,1111 xuong clu eon 111()l

trung dQi linh.

Trung Quae ehi~m quAn dao Hoang Sa

Thang 1/1973, chien tranh Viet Nam di d6n k2t thuc voi vice k) llicp dinh

Paris cham dirt ehi~n tranh va thi~t l~p lai hoa birth ()' Vi¢l Nal11 boi bC~11 ben:

My, Viet Nam Cong hoa, Vi¢t Nam Dan chu CQng hC1a Vel Chinh phLI e{lCh 111"l\1g

lam thai cQng hoa l11i~n Nam Vi¢t Nal11 (PRG). Theo k0l qU,l ella Ili¢p cljnh

Paris, Nly rLlt h~t eac l~rc lugng quan s~r kh6i mi~n Nam Vi¢l Nal11 cl0 Vi¢t Nal11

CQng Hoa khong co d6ng minh. Day chinh la b6i c,1nh ehi0n ]m.)'C l11a C(mg he'),1

DCND Trung Hoa quy~t dinh gianh l~i qLlybn ki6m soM dC)i vcyi nh{ml Nguy¢l

Thi~m.

4

dong ella Trung Quoc va ail e6 g~ng dua van (16 nay I'Ll Lien hq]J CJ uoc nhung

khong thanh cong, R~t nhieu qULm chirc VLl hoc gia Trung QlI(~C nlur Bateman (lEt

noi v~ su l~p 10 nuoc doi cua Viet Narn dan chu cong hoa v~ cac van d0 chu

quyen lien quan o~n quan dao Hoang Sa trong chifn tranh Vi¢t Narn. Viet Nam

can su ung hQ ella Trung Quoc va vi vay ho.ic la lam giam nhc vL1n cl~ chu quycn

hoac t'-,10 ra ~n tuong la Trung Qu0e co chu quyen cl0i voi qUL~n d,10 l Ioang Sa.

Quan di~m nay ail khong tinh d~t1 su' phan d6i cua PRCi-Chinh pliu Cach mung

Him thai Cong hoa mi~n Nam Vi~t Nam ngay sau khi Trung Ou{)C chi8m quan

dao Hoang Sa va sau 00 (26/1 va 14/2/1974). PRG khong nlnrng la mot ben k)!

Hiep dinh hoa binh Paris rna truce khi Viet Nam ehinh thuc thong nhfrl niim

1976 thi PRG la mot nguoi dung dun cung voi Viet Narn dan chu cong hoa tham

gia va 11'6 thanh thanh vien cua Lien hQ'P quoc. My dEt phu quyct e6 g~ng ella

PRG. Sau khi thong nhat, CHXHCN Viet Nam 11'6 thanh quoc giLl k8 thuu V<.l

tiep We ehinh sach ella PRG lien quan d~n Bien Dong (xcm Sach tr5ng niim

1979, 1981 va 1988 v~ chu quyen elm Viet Nam (10i voi quan dL10 l-Ionng S<.I),

Bai hoc nao tir tran chien Hoang Sa?

- Trung Quoc nhan co hQ l?n dung cac thay d{)i trong can cun chi0n iuoc de day nhanh cac yeu sach v~ lanh th6 tren Bien Dong;

- Dao Hai Narn (din ell' quan sir )6'11 ()' gc1n Tam A 1<'1 mot khu vue hau quan

s611g con eho viec phat tri~n lire IUQ'ng quan sir nhiim VaG Bi(~n Dong).

- Cac cau true bi ehi~m tren quan dao Hoang Sa VLl noi khac trcn Bien

Bong rat d~ bi phong toa va tan cong boi uu th6 elm cac Iuc Iuoug khCmg qULIn

va hai quan. Chi~m GaO thi cle hon la b,lo v¢ ciao.

- Trung Qu0e dil ehu'ng minh 119 co th0 huy dQng Im)t I\rc luqng hai qU<.ln

nlL,lnh hon Il;l'e luVng hai quEm Vi~t Nam eQng h()a. L\rc luqng h<.li qULIn n,ly dU'l)'C

trang bj o'-,1i bae to hon va co tam xa hOI1 so v6'i 1\l'e IUQ'ng clla Vi¢l Nam c(mg

hoa. Tau eua Trung Qu0e co ki6m soM hOLl l\l'e tAL hon so Vll'i C:1C UlU CllLI Vi¢t

Nam eQng hoa lrang bj vu khi h'-,1ng nhc;.

- Vi~t Nam CQng hoa (giAng nhu CHXI-ICN Vi~t NLlm ng[ly nay) kh6ng the

d~l'a vaG s~l' h~u thuan eua My. M0e clli 110m dQi Th{li Binh Duong Clla My IllC lit')

dang a trong khu v~l'e Hoang Sa nhung no dUq'e l¢nh khong gill)) Vi¢t Nam c(mg

G

H{Ji Iltao q1l8c 14: "lIo/lIlg Sa - Trtrang Sa: ~'{l'tlt(11 li~·1t SII'"

hoa. Chu quyen 06i voi quan dao Hoang Sa hien dang tranh chap boi Cong hoa

Trung hoa hay Dai Loan va Viet Nam.

C~lC vAn d~ din chi~n liro'c

Quan dao Hoang Sa rAt quan trang boi vi tri chi~11 liro'c va trfr luorig c1Au

khi tai cac VLl11g bi~n xung quanh no. Nam 1990, Trung Qu6c xay dung 365m . .

duong bang tren dim PhLI Lam va sau nay duoc mo rQng gap dci vo: chien dai

hi~n nay la 2399m. Duong bang tren dao PhLI Lam co th~ dap ung cho may bay

chi2n dAu nhir SU-27, SU-30, MKK, may bay IH~m bam H-6 va rnay bay van tai

hau can 16'n. C{lC thiet bi, co so vat chAt gAn duong bang baa gorn ca b6n h5m

chira may bay. Luu thong hang khong duoc ki~111 soar boi h¢ th6ng rada tiep can

chinh xac 10<,1i 791. Cac co so' ha t~ng quan sir khac tren dao PhLI Lam con bao

g6m cac b~n tau hai quan co kha nang dap irng cac tau khu true ICm nho va mot

khu clura c1~u. Quan linh cua PLA dong trcn dao PhLI Lal11 d6 baa v~ duong bang

va cac cc so quan su khac. Trung Quoc cung xay dung cac co so quan su O' ch6

khac tren quan dao Hoang Sa. MQt t1'<,1111 khi tirong oa duoc xay dung 6 dao

Pattle Trang khi 6 dao Robert cling da xay dung 111Qt tr<,1111 radio canh baa elfin

duong - tram c1uy nhAt 6 phia nam cua dao Hai Naill. Cac ben tau dau (). dao

Duncan hien dang duoc 1116 rong. Ttl' nam 1995, mot tram tin hieu thong tin tinh

baa da heat dong tren dao Rocky voi oQ canh baa cao nhAt. 1'1'<,1m nay co th~

cung cap eric canh baa tren khong va tren 111~t bien o~ h6 tro eho cac cuoc khong

kich va nham b~n vao cac muc tieu tau thuyen, MQt s6 nguon tin cong khai cho

rang Trung Qu6c co th~ da 00t ten lira HI-2 chong tau chi6n tren dao PhLI Lam.

Ngay 19/7/2012 HQi dong Quan uy Trung irong Trung Quoc chinh thLI'C quyet

dinh thiet l~p so chi huy quan su oong 6 thanh ph6 Talll Sa sau khi no duqc

nang cAp th,1nh mQt dO'n vi hanh chinh cAp huy~n. Dan vj d6n trLl nay ouqc et0t

duoi s~r chi huy clla quan c1Qi T1'ung Qu6c 0 oao Hai Na111 Trang khuon kh6 Clla

BQ Chi huy quan s~r tinh Quang Chau. KIm v~rc 06n trLI quan S~l' 6' Tam Sa cia

du~)'c giao trach nhi~111 tri~n khai phong thll qu6c gia, cac chi~n dich quan s~1' va

d~r tru·. Thea Nguoi phM ngon clla 8Q Qu6c phong Trung Qu(3c Geng Yansheng

"Trung Qu6c co th~ thi~t 10P cac cO' quan chi huy quan s~r dja phuang 6 th,1nh

ph6 Tam Sa thea cac quy oinh tLl'ong Lrng". ChuAn tuang Cai Xhihong oUQ'c Cll'

h1111 chi huy Clla khu vvc 06n trLl Ta111 Sa V,1 Chufrn tuang Liao Chaoyi Cl1l1g

c1uQ'c cu lam chinh llY.

7

Chuan ao a6e aft nghi huu cua My 1a Mike MucUevitt iranh luan rang mot

khu vue a6n tru quan su 6 dao Tam Sa se khong anh huong d0n dill can luc

luong hay phat di d~u hieu v~ S~I' thu dich dang k~ trcn Bien Dong. MacDevil.l

chi ra rang b~t ell' mot hoat dong quan su 16'n nao tren Bi~n DC)Jlg d~ll phai Xuf\l

phat tir dao Hai Nam nai rna quan aQi Trung Q1l6e co cac co so chinh. Theo

MaeDevitt "dat cac dan vi d6 tru tren dao Phu Lam hoac 110i khac lren d[IO

Hoang Sa se la viec bo tren GaO hoang mot each co hicu (jwl nhirng ngu()'i linh

nay, nen 1Q'i th~ duy nh~t chi 1a vay e(J va noi "chung loi nghicm lLIC".

HQc thuy~t v~ ba hinh thai chi~n trunh cua Trung Qu6c

Su d6i a~u tren bi~n giG'a Viet Naill va Trung Quoc xung quanh vice ha d.it

gian khoan khung Hai Duong 981 trong vung bi0n tranh chap gj(J day cl<1 sang

tu~n tlnr 7. Ngay 9/6, Trung Quoc bAt ngo mo mot mat tran moi khi Vuong Dan,

Pho Dai sir tai Lien hop quoc a~ trinh len Tong Thu k)1 Lien hop quoc Ban Ki

moon mot van ban neu quan diem chinh thuc cua Trung Quae d6i v6'i tranh chap

va d~ nghi Tong Thu ky eho luu hanh trong 193 thanh vieu ella Lien hop quoc.

Hanh dong cua Trung Quoc trong vice quoc to hoa tranh chap \()'i Vi¢l N(1l1l

kh6ng th~ hien mot su thay doi troug chinh such lau dui CLI~I 11C) la cac trunh chap

bi~n co chi th~ giai quyet song phuong thong qua tham van true iiep va darn

phan cua cac ben true tiep lien quan. MQt ngay sau khi Trung Quae d¢ lrinh

quan ai~l11 cua 119 thi Hoa Xuan Oanh, Nguoi phat ngon cua B() Ngoai giao

tuyen b6 Trung Quae bac bo co eh~ trong tai cua Lien hop qual' Iicn quan d~n

tranh chAp vai Vi~t Nam. T~i sao Trung Quae lS1i mang tranh eh5p eLla minh V()'j

Vi~t Naill 1'a tnrae Lien hQ'p qu6e ?

Nal11 2003, Oy ban chAp hanh T1'ung HO'ng Dang C(mg S(lI1 Trung QUtlC vii

Quan LIY t1'ung uang ehlnh thlre thong qua mQt hQc thuy~t gqi I~I "ba hin11 lh{li

chi~n tranh". HQe thuy~t ba ki~u chi~n tranh 1a 111Qt nhf\l1 lC) co ban eua ehi0n

tranh thong tin. Thea bai vi~t "Sa 111nh thai ehi~n tranh eLla Trung C)utK''', 111()l

nghien ell'll eua Timothy A. Walton thuQe Cong ty 'I'll' vtll1 nghicn elru V[1 p11fll1

tlch De1ex ngay 18/1/2012, ba cUQe ehi~11 tranh ella Tnmg Qlll\C bao gl)tr! nhCrng

th8.l1h t6 sau day: Chi~n t1'anh tam 1y, ehi~n tranh truy~n thong, chi~n tranh ph~lp

1y trong a6 hai thanh ta sau cLlI1g eta tSlo nen quan diem eLla Trung Qu6e. Then

Walton, Chi~n t1'anh truy~n thong 1a 111Qt ehi~n 1u9'e nh5111 t~IO (mh hU'C'mg lrang

c1u 1u~n qU6e t~ a~ xay d~rng s~r Llllg hQ cho Trung QU6e V~I C{lI1 tl'l)' dai thll khong

thea du6i cae hanh aQng di nguQ'e l~i lQ'i feh Cl:13 T1'ung Qu0c. 8

lI(Ji tluio quiJc: Ii: "II()(I/lK§(~_-Truong Sa:S~rlft(11 licllslj·~'

Van ban neu quan diem chinh thirc ella Trung Quoc glri tci Lien hop quoc

11h~m danh vao suon cac n6 lire tuyen truyen ella Viet Nam Vel co lap Vi~t Nam.

Phfm lou cac niroc thanh vien ella Lien h9'P quoc khong co loi ich true tiep trong

tranh chap lanh tho 6' I1i~n Dong. R<1t nhi~u nuoc Dong Nam ;\ quan tam v~ cac

hanh d()ng ella Trung Qu6e c1~u ne tranh viec phai co mot quan diem cong khai

v6 v5n d~ nay.

Theo Walton thi ehi~n tranh phap ly la mot ehi~n luoc su' dung luat phap

ella Trung Quoc va luat phap quoc t~ c1~ gianh l<1y uu th~ phap 1)1 eao han d~

khang dinh cac IQ'i ich cua Trung Qu6e. Trang cac van ban chinh thirc cua Trung

Ouoc, nhi6L1 thir da diroc eung cap qua cac vien dan da diroc lua chon ella ILl0t

phap quoc te nham h6 tro eho quan di~m ella Trung Quoc. Luc daLl Trung Quoc

bao v~ viec 110 dat gian khoan bang bien luan rang no n~m trong lanh hai ella

Trung Quoc. Trung Quoc luu y la gian khoan Hai Duong 98 J duoc d?t each dao

Tri Ton J7 hai ly, each e<1u true xa nh<1t v~ phai Tay quan dao Hoang Sa. Trung

Ouoc su clung thuat ngir lanh hai mang lai ft nh<1t hai y nghia: J. Yell sach goi

C,1c vung mroc trong duong 9 dO~lI1 la lanh hai; 2. Yeu sach g9i "lanh hai" theo

Cong troc Luat bien. Trung QuAe khong th~ dOl hoi Iftnh hai theo each giai thich

v~ vi tri ella gian khoan boi vi no duoc d?t it nh<1t 5 hai ly ngoai vung lanh hai

hop phap theo quy dinh ella UNCLOS.

Ngay 6/6, Tuyen b6 ella Trung Quoc da sua lai 16i nay qua vice eho r~ng

gian khoan Hai Duong 981 duoc c1?t trong vllllg ti~p giap ella Trung Qu6e. TLlY

nhien tuyen b6 nay cling thi~u cO' So' phap lY. Theo UNCLOS, nwc dfch duy

nh<it eUL1 vlmg ti~p gi2lp la cho phep qu6e gia yen bi~n "th~re hi~n ki~ITI soM efrn

thi6t d~: a. ngan eh?n vi~e vi ph'.lITI quy dinh ella nuo'c do v~ hai quan, tai kh6a,

di trLI VLl ki~m dieh trong Uinh th6 hay lanh hai; b. T1'lrng pl10t vi~c vi pl10m lu(1t

VLl cae quy dinh noi t1'en di~n I'a tl'Ong lanh th6 va lanh hai".

Trung QuAc eung co muu d6 bi~n minh t1'anh eh<1p elW minh v6i Vi~t Nam

b5ng vi~e Sll' d~ll1g ly Ie 1<1 vi trf ella gi~ll1 khoan Hai DuO'ng 981 gfrn qu§n dao

I JO,lng Sa hO'n ber bi~n Vi~t Nam. Van ban ehinh thLl'e eLla Trung Qu6e bi~n lu?n

ILl giiln khoan I-Iai Dmmg 981 dang tae nghi~p eaeh Tri Ton 17 hai 1)' vii dm'mg

cO' S()' vc xung quanh qUfrn (tao Hoang Sa, va caeh boo bi~n Vi~t Nam tll' 133 d~n

156 hai IY.

9

Hili tluio (!1I(1c la: "Hoane Sa - Trtrone Sa: SIt' IIu71 liclt sii".~====~.' b ,.... •

Dong thoi Trung Quoc cling doi hoi chu quycn dbi v6'i bai can

Scarborough, gAn Phil ippines hon Ja cac cau true etA1 gdn nh~1( cua TQ. Thco lu.it

phap quoc t~, chi su' gAn gui khong thai lil chua elL! (10 chung minh ChLI quycn.

Van ban chinh thirc neu quan diem cua Trung Ouoc tlnrc 10 cia IUIll suy ycu

viec Trung Quoc sir dung chi~n1ranh phap Iy d~ gianh lqi 1h0. Vi du, (juan diem

chinh thirc cua Trung Quoc cho rang: Vllng bien giiia q/lc;n (/OO](IJ' So (I foclng

Sa) va (16t lidn Vi¢t Nam c1711'Cl G1u'(J'c phdn clinh. Hoi hen chtra lic;17 lianh !JIUIII

dinh vung tk.lc quyen kinh Id vel th6m luc dia trong v/'l/7g hic~n /7(1.1', Hui hell e1m/c

quydn doi hoi vung dac quyen kinh Id va IhJI/1 luc diet phi, 170/) voi UNCLOS.

N~u tnrong hop nay la dung thi Trung Qu6e phai tuan thco die quy dinh

cua UNCLOS d~ XLI' ly voi cac yeu sach chong lan. C~1 Trung Qube va Vi¢1 Nam

deu phai tharn gia V210 cac tim xep tam thoi d6i voi khu vue 11'a11h chap cho c10n

khi co duoc th6a thuan v~ phan dinh.Trong thoi gian n~1Y mo: ben khCmg durrc

phep thay dbi nguyen trang hay de doa h00C sir clung VlI luc. [\6 rang Iii vice

Trung Quoc ha d~t gian khoan trong vung bien tranh chap cia vi pharn cac

nguyen t~c cua luat phap quoc t6. Nhung van ban ncu quan di0111 chinh thirc cua

Trung Quoc da huy hoai truo'ng hop pluip ly cua minh b5ng each cho rang luat

phap quoc t~ la khong phil hop. Van ban tuyen b6:

Tuy nhien nhiing vung bie"n /1(7Y se khcJng boo gic'y 11'0' tlianh l'img diu: qlllJn

kinh ttl va thdm ll;Jc aia ciia Vi¢t Nam Ice' ca khi {1j7 dung hefl k.l' nglll/en le~c nao

cua ludt phap quoc td vao vice phan dinh.

Dai sir cua Trung Qu6c aOxtraylia Ma Tri~u IIt'IC (!c1ng, g()P \~j() chi0n dic

chi~n tranh thong tin cua B~c Kinh qua vi~c nh~c 10i lo'i bi¢n he) (ren trong 1l1()1

bai bao dang 6 trang 2 cua Bao The Allstralion. ()ng MB bi¢n minh r~ng khu v~re

tranh chAp chua h~ duQ'c phan dinh va "bAt k0 nguyen 1~e n~l() eua lu{11 ph~ll'

qu6c t~ se duQ'c ap d~ll1g thi nhu'ng vung bi0n nay cling sc kh6ng b~10 gio' (l"(l'

thanh Vlll1g d~c quy~n kinh t~ va th~m 1~IC dla cua Vi¢1 Nam",

SUo d\lng lu~t phap quac t~ va tang cll'irng IW'P t{le

Van ban quan di~l11 chinh tht'rc Clla Trung Qu6c d¢ 1rtnh TCmg Thu k)' Lien

hQ'p qu6c cfrn duqc cac thanh vien cQng d6ng Clu6c t~ ncu m, V~l c(mg c1(\ng n~1Y

dang quan ng~i tru6c cang th~ng dang tang Icn giLi'a Trullg Ou{)C V~l Vi¢t Nmll

va tac dQng co th~ clla no dbi v6i an ninh khu v~re. NhCrng CjU(\c gia n~1Y c() the

yell cfru dua v~n d~ nay I'a HQi d6ng Bao an.

10

H{Ji '/tito qlu]c Ii: ~'Ho(/Jlg S{I- Truong Sa: ,r.;{l' t11~t tjell sii"

Trung Quae khong duoc phep theo duoi chi~n tranh thong tin nh~m d~ co

no b5ng ca hai each - luu hanh van ban quan diem cua Trung Quoc tai Lien hop

qU(~C d0 chung minh ban chAt nghiem trong cua tranh chap vci Viet Nam va bac

bo co ch~ trong tai cua Lien 11911 quoc. My va Uc nen hai thuc cho mot tranh

luan tai HQi dong bao an Lien hop quoc. Nhat Ban va cac cuong quoc bi~n khac

co IQ'i ich trong sir on dinh cua Bi~n Dong nen tham gia.

Trung Quac co the se bi 6' VaG vi th~ khoug d~ chju lcl chang lai bAt ky mot

cuoc tranh lu~n nita trong 1-1Qi dong Bao an va phai loai bo ca g~ng cua minh

muan sir dung no Iire cho cac muc dich tuyen truyen, hoac Trung Quac se bi dat

VaG tinh th~ phai phu quyet b5t ky mot giai phap nao xuat phat nr tranh luau

trong I1Qi dong Bao an chi trich hanh dQng ella Trung Quac trcn Bi~n Dong.

C0ng dong quae t~ thong qua Lien hop quoc se yeu cAu Trung Quoc rut gian

khoan va doi tall ra khoi vi tri hien tai.

Tranh chap hi~n nay v~ quyen chu quyen trong cac vung bi~n xung quanh

quan dao Hoang Sa chi co th~ duoc giai quyet song phirong giCra Viet Nam va

Trung Quoc dua tren lu~t phap quoc t~ bao g6m UNCLOS. Viet Nam can tranh ') , , ,

1 '" 1 ........ rt-'" - r ::1-"'." 1 1 1·) , ••-J....,r ~"iuan mann me orem nay trong cac trao Cl01 cap cuinn pnu VOl t rung \juoc,

Viet Nam nen van dong Hi~p hoi cac uoc Dong Nam A to ra manh hon

trong SV' ung hQ cua ASEAN cho viec giai quyet tranh chap tren co So' lu~t phap

quoc t~ va khong de doa hoac Slt' dung vii luc.

Cac nuoc ASEAN can tiep tuc cung Trung Quoc thea duoi viec thirc hicn

Tuyen ba v~ cach t.'rng Xlr clla diC ben 6 Bi~n Dong nam 2002 (DOC) va mQt B()

Quy titc t.'rng xlr cho f3i~n Dong (COC). Tuy nhien cfm ILru y r5ng cac nwc tieu

eLla ASEAN huo'ng tai COC v6i Trung Quac co th~ khong d~t dll'Q'c trong tuO'ng

lai gAn. Ti~n trinh COC da dfln d~n s~r chia re trong n0i b0 ASEAN va chia re

trong nhu'ng mro-c ASEAN eo yeu Sacll. Vi~c Trung Quae kh~ng djnh "chi"t

Cluy2n khong tranh dii" d(~i v6i Bi~n Dong va s~r qua quy0t vb ChLl quy~n gAn

day mang tinh xam luC)'e khong luang tnro-c, va vi~c Sll' d~ll1g tau qW:ln s~r va may

b~\y hi~n nay la tr6 ng?i chinh cho vi~c quan Iy cac gia tri bi0n chung trcn Bi~n

Dong. Ova tren s~r phat tri~n nay, cac mro-c ASEAN nen d~r thilO va phe cl1U5n

mQt I-li~p lI'o-C v2 Quy titc lrng XLI' cho cac lQ'i ich bi~n chung eLla D6ng Nam A. S~r bao dam cho cae gia trj bi~n chung cua khu v~rc 13 khong the ehia se va lu?t

phap quac t~ la ph6 quat. Nh5m phM tri~n cac Hi~p lI'o-C v~ Quy titc lrng xlr, cac

quae gia rieng bi~t cAn giai quy~t cac tranh ch5p lanh t6 va tranh ch5p tren bi~n 11

voi nhau. Thea thuan g~n Gay giira Indonesia va Philippines v6 phan dinh ranh

gioi bien trong vung Celebest va Mindanao 1<'1 mot vi du tC)1. l-licp uO'C v~ Quy

t~c ling xu cho cac loi ich bien chung siS tang cirong su thong nh5t va dCmg

thuan trong ASEAN, tang cirong kha nang tu tri trong khu vue Vel vai tro trung

tam cua ASEAN trong cAu true an ninh khu vue. Hi¢p uoc v~ Quy telC ung XLI'

trong kim V\l'C se baa h<.1111 gia tri bien chung trong khu vue Dong Nam A then

mot each thirc giong nhu Khu vue hoa binh, W do va trung 1(11) ( 1971 ), Ilicp urrc

Than thien va Hop tac (1976) va Hi9P iroc Dong Naill A khong C() Vll khi hat

nhan (1995) va duoc 1116 eho su tham gia cua cac d6i rae d6i thoai CU<.l

ASEAN.I.

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Documents

Thayer Vietnamese/English Versions of Da Nang Conference Paper