The Adhyātma of Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya.docx

8/14/2019 The Adhytma of akaras Brahmastra-Bhya.docx

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The Adhytma of akaras Brahmastra-Bhya

Abhysa-Bhya

akaras introduction to his bhya (commentary) on the Brahma-stras (or the

rraka-mms-stras) has acquired considerable fame in its own right under thename of adhysa-bhya, in which he lays down adhysa (superimposition) as thefoundational concept of Advaita philosophy. This adhysa occurs between the viaya(object), which is yumat-pratyaya-gocara (what is encompassed by the notion ofyou),and the viayin (subject), which is asmat-pratyaya-gocara (what isencompassed by the notion of I). By superimposition is meant the appearance ofthe bhva (essence) and dharmas (properties) of one thing in another. Specifically,akara is referring to the superimposition between the arra (body) which is theviaya and the rra (self) which is theviayin. The svabhva (inherent being) of

the body is to act and of the self is consciousness. However, on account of mutualsuperimposition between them, it appears as though the body is conscious and the

self is an agent. akara argues that such a superimposition of the viaya andviayin upon each other is mithy, an inverted view of reality.

We have now become accustomed to approaching the dichotomy between the

subject and object as a distinction between a Self and an Other, corresponding to

the asmat (I) and the yumat (you) of akara. It is then claimed that theAdvaitin unity of being means that it is precisely the appearance of such a difference

which is mithy that should be dispelled by the realization of the oneness of subjectand object, or the conviction that asmat (I) and yumat (you) are the same.However, the astute reader would have discerned that akaras position as statedabove is utterly contradictory to this view. According to him, the problem lies in the

quite naturally occurring human error of failing to discriminate between the subject

and object when they are in reality completely distinct from each other in terms of

their essences and their properties. Consequently, the wise person is one who is

able to resolve their misconceived unity and correctly discriminate between them.

An investigation of how such a reversal of meaning has come to pass is beyond the

scope of this work. What I do seek to accomplish, however, is to find a way back to

the correct meaning. First of all, akara claims that it is a well-known fact that theobject which encompasses the cognition of you and the subject whichencompasses the cognition of I cannot be the same in terms of their essences andtheir properties. This realization, I propose, is the key to the whole system; what

permits Advaita to conceptualize the tman as identical with brahman or vara andthe human being as an inherently divine being who is capable of attaining liberation

from knowledge alone without dependence on divine grace or mystical vision,

because the human being on account of self-consciousness is aware of tman(oneself) as subject and of the antman (non-self) as object. On the basis of such


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an awareness, akara argues, it should be self-evident to human beings that themutual superimposition of the subject and the object must be mithy.Nonetheless,he laments, they do superimpose the essences (tmakats) and properties(dharmas) of the subject and object upon each other. Having done that, by their

failure to discriminate between these two, the mithy-jna (contrary knowledge) ofthe dharma (attribute) and the dharmin (bearer of the attribute), which are

absolutely distinct from each other, becomes the cause, having paired together truth

and falsehood, of this naturally occurring loka-vyavahra (practical world)characterized by I am this and this is mine.

The last sentence is a bit hard to follow because it is a literal translation of the

Sanskrit; so it needs a gloss. I think the shift from viaya-viayin (object, subject) todharma-dharmin (attribute, attribute-bearer) is deliberate. The mithy-jna is ofthe dharma-dharmin i.e., since we fail to discriminate between the viaya andviayin they appear to us as dharma and dharmin. When the viaya getssuperimposed upon the viayin and vice versa, the viaya appears as if it were anattribute of the viayin and the viayin as its bearer. It is like looking at a whitecrystal through a red filter. The redness appears as a dharma (property) of the

crystal and the crystal appears as the dharmin (attribute-bearer) of redness. But this

as we know is mithy-jna.

Another point to note is the pairing together of truth and falsehood (satyntemithniktya) which has a gerundive relation with (i.e., having done such pairing,there arises) the world of practical relations. It means that the world of experience is

not entirely false from which escape is the only solution: there is an element of truth

in it but it is in combination with a falsehood and that is why it appears the way it

does. With regards to our self-understanding too, it is not absolutely false i.e, our

egoity which our self-consciousness reveals to us is not a complete fictionit is atrue being but mixed with falsehood. The ego is not a fully corporeal entity distinct

from the soul but is in fact the soul upon which corporeality has been superimposed.

With regards to the example given above, one could compare the soul to the white

crystal and the body as the filter through which it is seen falsely superimposing

embodiedness upon it. It is interesting to compare this Advaita conception of a

human being as partly real and partly unreal, the real being the tman (self)and theunreal being the body, with the conception of vara in the Gt as consisting of twopraktis (natures), the para (higher) one is vara-tmika (the self of vara) and theapara (lower) one is the my which evolves into the world. Needless to add, in theAdvaita view, tman and vara are one.

Finally, we attend to I am this and this is mine as the fundamental expression ofthe practical realm. It should be obvious by now that we are not at all concerned

with the relation between the Self and the Other. Rather, from akaras point ofview, the Self as understood in this relation would be already problematic


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constituted as it is by an admixture of truth and falsehood. To attempt to reconcile

such a Self with the Other would only end up reinforcing its false understanding of

itself. Rather, Advaita attempts to deconstruct this Self and show that it is itself

constituted by a self and a non-self and it is these sub-elements of ones identity

that akara is referring to when he speaks of the asmat-pratyaya-gocara viayinand the yumat-pratyaya-gocara viaya. It is very tempting for us, when we comeacross the words subject and object, to understand the former as oneself and the

latter as the world around us. But akaras point is that the oneself as wenaturally perceive it is itself the outcome of the superimposition between subject and

object i.e., the subject and object we are concerned with here are within oneself and

our failure to discrimate between them is what produces the oneself. And it is this

oneself, which we regard as a unity, that akara has characterized as I am thisand this is mine i.e., in each of these statements there are two items here

becoming one of which one is true and the other is false.

*

akara defines adhysa (superimposition) as smti-rpaparatra prva-da-avabhsathe perception in the form of a memory of something perceived at a prior

time, at some other place. It is interpreted in a variety of ways but there is no

variance in the interpretations with regards to the idea that adhysa involves theperception of the properties of one object in another such as a pearl-oyster

appearing as silver or the one moon appearing as two. There are several other

examples, more famous being the rope appearing as a snake, the stump appearing

as a man, the white crystal appearing red through a red filter, and so on. However,

all of them deal with objects existing out there which are superimposed upon each

other by a knowing subject. These examples are to be used as analogies merely to

illustrate the phenomenon of adhysa. akara is well aware of the limitationsinvolved in drawing an equivalence between them and the adhysa between theantman (non-self) and the tman (self). In these examples, both objects belong tothe material realm or both are contents of consciousness, whereas in the adhysaunder consideration, the antman belongs to the material realm or is a content ofconsciousness, and the tman belongs to the spiritual realm or is consciousnessitself. This issue has been raised in the Gt-bhya as well with regards to thestatement:

sarva-jantnhi dehdiu antmasu tmabhvanicitaavidyktayath

sthau purua-nicaya.

For in case of all living beings, the determination with regards to the antman suchas the body and so on, as being the tman is caused by ignorance, just as thedetermination with regards to a stump as being a man.


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Here the antman-tman superimposition is compared to a stump appearing in poorlight as a man as a result of which the properties of a man become falsely attributed

to the stump. A purva-paka (objection) is cited at this point arguing for what mightbe called a dnta-drntika doa (fallacy arising from the incompatibility of the

analogy and the analogized):

sthu-puruau jeyau eva santau jtr anyonyasmin adhyastau avidyay. deha-

tmanotu jeya-jtroeva itaretara-adhysaiti na samadnta.

Both the stump and the man are objects of cognition whom a cognizer superimposes

on each other due to ignorance. But in case of the mutual superimposition between

the body and tman, one is an object of cognition and the other is a cognizer. Thus,these are not similar cases.

In defense, akara first of all argues that avidy.dhysa-mtrahi dnta-drntikayosdharmyavivakitami.e., the only commonality between theanalogy and the analogized that is desired to be asserted is that both are

superimpostions caused by ignorance. He also addresses the problem arising from

one of the objects being the cognizer but for that we will return to the Brahmastra-bhya where the prvapaka raises a similar query:

How can there be a superimposition of the object and its properties on the pratyag-

tman which cannot be an object? Everybody superimposes a different object onlyupon an object placed in front of them. And you assert that the pratyag-tmancannot be an object such that it can apprehended as you.

In other words, viayas can be superimposed upon each other. How can anything besuperimposed upon the viayin? In order for that to happen the viayin would haveto be a viaya, in which case it cannot be a viayin anymore. But this, of course,touches the very core of Advaita philosophy which provides many examples of

superimposition occurring between viayas, the objects of cognition, to illustrate theidea that the viayin, the cognizer who is the subject of cognition, is itself a productof superimposition between what the cognizer truly is and what the cognizer is not.

The idea of a pratyag-tman becomes useful in this regard. This word is oftentranslated as the inner self, real self, etc. When the tman is problematized as aproduct of superimposition between what the tman truly is and what it is not, thepratyag-tman can be used to refer unequivocally to the tman as it truly is, anddifferent from the antman. Of course, this rule, as any other rule, is not universallyfollowed and in most cases the tman is used unproblematically even in Advaita, inwhich case it is synonymous with the pratyag-tman.In this case, however, I thinkthe word pratyag-tman is used precisely to refer to the unadulterated tman free ofany superimposed antman properties. The problematized tman has arisen from

the despoilation of the pratyag-tman by the superimposition upon it of the antman


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and the prvpaka is objecting to this very ideahow can the pratyag-tmanbecome thus sullied when it has been conceptualized it as a non-object?

akaras response is two-fold, the first part of which is justly famous:

na tvad-ayam-ekntena-aviayaasmat-pratyaya-viayatvt aporakatvt-capratyag-tma-prasiddhe

First of all, the pratyag-tman is not absolutely a non-object because it is well-known on account of being the object of self-cognition and by virtue of its

immediate perceptibility.

na ca ayamasti niyamapuro.vasthita eva viaye viaya-antaram-adhyasitavyam-iti.

apratyake.pi hyke bltala-malina-di adhyasyanti. evam-aviruddhapratyag-

tmanyapi antmdhysa.

Also, it is not a rule that an object can be superimposed only upon another object

situated in front of oneself. Children superimpose a base, dirt, etc. on the sky which

is not visible. In this way, the superimposition of the antman (non-self) upon thepratyag-tman is also not a contradiction.

The core narrative of Advaita is that the subject that we are ordinarily conscious of

as self-conscious beings is itself a product of superimposition, constructed from an

admixture of truth and falsehood, where the true self is called the pratyag-tman

and the false self as the antman. In other words, one could say that theaham/tman is a mithy-viayin (false subject) apparent due to the superimpositionbetween the pratyag-tman which is a sat-viayin (real subject) and the antmanwhich is viaya. akara argues that such superimposition upon the pratyag-tmanis possible because although it is not the object of yumat-pratyaya (youcognition) like the pearl-oyster, the white crystal, the snake, the stump, etc. it is the

object of asmat-pratyaya (I cognition) and to that extent it can be the target ofsuperimposition. In fact, as the example of the sky shows, any vague object of

human consciousness is exposed to this problem. Therefore, there is no difference

between the adhysa with regards to viayas out there that is perceived by theknowing subject, and the one occuring in case of the pratyag-tman and antmanwhich produces the knowing subject and is not perceived by it. Such adhysa whichcauses the properties of one object to be perceived in another and vice versa, is

called avidy (ignorance). And contrarily, the understanding of the real nature ofthings (vastu-svarpa-avadhraa) by discriminative intelligence is called vidy(knowledge). Since it is only on account of ignorance that the properties of objects

appear in each other and not due to a real transfer of properties between them,

when an object is superimposed upon another it does not come into the slightest

contact with either the guas or the doas of the latter.


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*

The person that emerges from the ignorance which is the superimposition between

the tman and antman becomes the basis of vyavahra (practical engagement).There are two kinds of vyavahras: laukika-vyavahra (practical engagement withregards to worldly matters) that proceeds from the pramas and para-laukika-vyavahra (practical engagement with regards to other-worldly matters) thatproceeds from the stras (pedagogical texts) concerned with vidhi (religiousprescriptions), pratiedha (religious proscriptions) and moka (liberation).

A person cannot be a pramt(knowing subject) or use the pramas without afalse conception of I and mine with regards to the body and organs.Unless thesense organs are appropriated to oneself, the operations such as perception, etc.

cannot occur. Unless there is a presiding entity (adhihna) the sense organs will

not operate. Unless a body is superimposed upon by a selfhood, it does not act onanything. If these conditions are not satisfied and the tman remains unattached,then it cannot become the pramt(knowing subject). Without being a pramtitcannot operate the pramaas. Therefore the pramas and stras are objectsconnected with ignorance.

The difference between the two kinds of vyavahras, the prama-prameya andstra is that the former is seen even among animals because it is not dependent onany self-understanding while the latter is restricted to humans inasmuch as it is

dependent on a particular though false self-understanding. Human beings use thepramas in the same way as do animals. When any sense object such as sound,form, etc. comes into contact with the particular sense organ such as ears, eyes, etc.

then if the knowledge derived from the senses is cautionary it turns away from the

object or if it is congenial it proceeds towards it. Thus, if cows see a man branding a

club they run away thinking he wants to beat me. On the other hand, when theysee one with green grass in his hand, the run towards him. Human behaviour is no

different. The way even wise humans use pramas is just as spontaneous as theanimals and without any prior self-understanding.

striya vyavahra (learned engagements), on the other hand, arise fromknowledge about the other-worldly connection of the tman. The operation of strapassages such as a brhmaa should perform yaja is based on the particularadhysa (superimposition) of vara, rama, vaya, avasth, etc. upon the tman.

Adhysa as explained before is the cognition that something is such and such withregards to something that is not so. One superimposes upon the tman a variety ofdharmas such as the follows:


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bhya-dharmas (external attributes) such as the sense that one is healthyor unhealthy when ones wife and sons are so, i.e., one thinks that one is sowhen the wife and sons are so because they are misconceived as the tman

deha-dharmas (bodily attributes) such as one I am fat, I am thin, I a fair-skinned, I stand, I go, I jump i.e., one thinks that one is so when it is thebody that is so since the body is misconceived as the tman

indriya-dharmas (attributes of the bodily organs) such as I am dumb, cock-eyed, effeminate, deaf, blind i.e., one thinks that one is so when it is theindriyas that are so since the indriyas are misconceived as the tman

anta-karaa-dharmas (attributes of the internal organs) such as kma(desires), sakalpa (volition), vicikits, adhyavasya (reflection), etc.

Such aham-pratyayin(self-believing) is superimposed on the pratyag-tmanwhich is

described as aea-svapracra-skinthe witness of its own self-proliferation without

remainder and vice versa the pratyag-tmanwhich is the witness of all is

superimposed on the internal organs and so on. In this way, this beginningless,

endless, natural superimposition which has the form of a false apprehension that

arouses a sense of karttva-bhokttva(doership-enjoyership) is observed among all

the people. The study of all the Vedntic texts is undertaken to destroy it, the causeof misfortune and gaining the knowledge of the unity of the self (tma-ekatva-vidy). And since this is the essential point of all the Vedntic texts, akarasobjective is to show it in the rraka-mims.

*

Again, this point takes us to the heart of the Advaita view that the ego conceived as

material or mental is not absolutely distinct from the soul. The aham/tman isthepratyag-tman perceived differently by ignorance. It was stated earlier that thetman as viayin cannot be the viaya but upon it are superimposed the propertiesof the viaya. But now it is being stated that the tman is not entirely an aviayai.e., some degree of, or rather some quality of, viayatva is inherent within it. Thisviayatva of consciousness is distinct from the viayatva of the contents of

consciousness inasmuch as the former is aparoka i.e., it is unmediated through anypramas because consciouness by virtue of its own being simply reveals itself assuch. This immediacy makes it a different kind of viaya then the contents ofconsciousness. This ambiguity with regards to the tman that it is the viayin whocannot be a viaya and yet it is a viaya of some kind goes all the way back to theUpaniads. I dont think this ambiguity can be ultimately resolved and, indeed, Idont think it needs a resolution becauseit is a theological assumption that Advaitaexpounds as a path to liberation. And that principle asserts the meaningfulness of

ordinary self-consciousness in that even if it provides us a distorted picture of our

own reality it nonetheless opens a passage to it which can be navigated by means ofknowledge alone. On other paths of liberation such as bhakti or yoga, it is necessary


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Here, stra means the Vednta-stra. Not only are we dependent on it forknowledge about brahman but the various texts that comprise the Vednta-straalso become coherent (samanvita or samanugata) inasmuch as they are concerned

with teaching the svarpa (reality) of Brahman. With regards to the stra passages

concerned with teaching brahman, akara cautions us against the followingmisconceptions:

(i) Their primary aim is to teach the svarpa (reality) of the agent or deityin thecontext of a ritual. Nobecause passages such as tat kena kam payet(by whatwould one see what) deny kriy (action), kraka (instrument) and phala (result).

(ii) The stra is not a necessary source of brahman-knowledge. Since the reality ofBrahman is an existing thing (parinihita-vastu) it is knowable by means of otherpramas such as perception. Nobecause the identity of brahman and tman

(brahma-tma-bhva) cannot be understood except from stra passages such astat tvam asi(you are that).

(iii) As far as the stras reveal brahman as a heya-updeya-rahita or heya-updeya-unya or aheya-anupdeya thing, their instruction is useless; heya-rahita, heya-unya or aheya means what cannot be rejected or avoided; updeya-rahita,updeya-unya or anupdeya meanswhat cannot be taken up or received. Theopposite is true about vidhis (procedural norms)one may choose to undertake orneglect them depending on our need. If knowledge of brahman provides this kind of

information that can help one attain a particular goal, then it is useful. If it is merelyknowledge for its own sake as a fact of the world, then it is fruitless. Nobecausethere is a purua-artha (human or spiritual goal) that is accomplished only from theheya-updeya-unya knowledge of the identityof brahman and tman. That purua-rtha consists of the destruction of all afflictions (sarva-klea-praha).

(iv) Deities have their own statements extolling them for the purpose of upsan(paying homage). It would be contradictory to construe statements concerning

brahman in a different way. Noa supplementary process of paying homage(upsan-vidhi-eatvam) to brahman is not possible given its ekatva (identity orunity with tman). Two conditions are necessary for upsan: (a) Opportunity toexercise a choice. For example, consider an injunction Adore the eye as the sun.Here the deity, i.e., the eye, is not the sun according to any prama. But I exercisea choice by following this injunction and adoring it as such. I may choose not to do

so or I may adore the eye as something else. On the other hand, the knowledge of

brahman, as explained above, is heya-updeya-unya. (b) Consciousness of duality(dvaita-vijna). Differences such as kriy (action), kraka (instrument), etc. aresublated by the knowledge of brahman. Once the consciousness of duality is

sublated by the realization of the ekatva (unity) of brahman, it does not arise again.


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For these reasons, an upsan of brahman as a supplementary process is notpossible.

(v) The Vedas are seen as a prama (valid source of knowledge) only in thecontext of vidhi (ritual). Nosince the stras lead upto the realization of self-knowledge (tma-vijna) one cannot deny their prmya (validity) in this context.

(vi) The prmya of the stras can be shown through inference. (The implicationappears to be that self-knowledge can also be realized outside the stras wherebytheir truth claims can be verified, the point being, of course, that one need not be

dependent upon them for self-knowledge). Nothe stras are not dependent onany proof (nidarana) external to itself.

In this way, it is established that brahman has the stra as the prama.

TOPICWe agree that brahman is stra-pramakam i.e., stras are the validsource of knowledge about brahman. However, brahman is knowable from the

stras as an object acquired through a vidhi (pratipatti-vidhi-viaya). This isbecause the main purpose of the stras is prescription (pravtti) and proscription(nivtti). Statements that are neither prescriptive nor proscriptive should beinterpreted as being supplementary to those which are.

[Note that vidhi (commandment), pravtti (prescription) and nivtti (proscription)work differently in this case from the Abrahamic religion. They are not sanctioned as

part of Gods will to be enacted as part of Gods plan for the person, etc. Rather,they are to be performed for the sake of attaining a persons own goals. These couldbe worldly or other-worldly. As far as the former are concerned, a variety of

pramas are available to the person, while in the case of the latter, rti is the onlyprama. In the Gt, of course, acting for the sake of vara becomes an importantfeature but even here vara is not the source of those actions.In all cases, theorigin of action lies in human volition and therefore knowledge is meanginful only as

far as it is suitable for attaining a desirable goal which means that its vital

characteristic must be its ability to be accepted or rejected by one i.e., it should be

heya-updeya, depending on whether one desires the stated goal. For example, aknowledge claim like the performance of agnihotra leads one to heaven after death

is meaningful inasmuch as it produces such an outcome and it may be accepted by

those who desire heaven after death and rejected by those who dont.On the otherhand, knowledge for the sake of knowledge, as an end in itself, for the mere joy of

learning without aiming to accomplish any ulterior purpose, would be regarded as

useless, which explains the lack of development of philosophy in ancient India. Even

akara who defends the value of vastu-mtra-kathana (the articulation of the merefact of a thing without making it supplementary to an action) does not object to this

utterly practical approach to knowledge but rather makes his case by proving theusefulness of brahma-jna in overcoming bhti (fear) in the world.]


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Two points follow: [1] Just as the agnihotra is sanctioned as the means for the

attainment of heaven after death, so brahma-jna is recommended for theattainment of amtatva (immortality) i.e., moka (liberation) which is escape fromthe cycle of birth and death. [2] The articulation of the mere fact of a thing (vastu-

mtra-kathana) without connecting it with any vidhi (process) to be accomplished ismeaningless for such knowledge, similar to statements like the earth has sevenisles or there goes the king can neither be accepted nor rejected.

We argue and counter-argue against these two points:

Argument against [1]The inquiry of dharma is contradictory to the inquiry ofbrahman. Since dharma is bhavya (a thing to be accomplished) it does not yield its

fruit through mere knowledgeit also requires enactment. But brahman is bhta(an accomplished thing) and therefore the mere knowledge of it is sufficient to yield

its fruit.

Counter-argumentBrahman is set forth as a thing to be accomplished instatements such as the tman ought to be seen, ought to be investigated, ought tobe adored, etc. which raises questions about brahman, in regards to which the

knowledge is provided that it is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. And moka(liberation), the stra-da ada phala (the unseen fruit seen by the stras), isrealized by its upsan (adoration).

Argument against [2]The factual knowledge of a thing such as this is a rope, thisis not a snake is meaningful as far as it removes the fear arising from themisapprehension of a rope as a snake. In the same way the factual knowledge about

the tman as asasr is meaningful as far as it removes the misapprehension of itssasritva.

Counter-argumentThis would be a valid point if, indeed, the mere hearing of itsreality (svarpa) as brahman would remove the misapprehension of its sasritva.But that does not happen. Even one who has heard of brahman is seen as being

possessed of the characteristics of a sasr such as happiness and sorrow. Also,

statements such as it ought to be heard, it ought to be reflected, it ought to bemeditated imply that hearing should be followed by reflection and meditation.

Thus it is established brahman is stra-pramakam (has the stras as its validsource of knowledge) only as a pratipatti-vidhi-viaya (the object of process leadingto an acquisition).


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The difference between karma-phala and brahma-vidy-phala.

aarraarreu anavastheu avasthitam. mahntavibhum-tmnamatv dhrona ocati. Having conceived the mahat (great) and vibhu (all-pervading) tman asaarra (bodiless) among arras (bodies) and as avasthita (steadfast) among theanavasthita (unsteady), the wise do not grieve.

Karma-phalas (results of action) is anitya (impermanent) and tratamya-avasthita(occurs in a graded position).

ruti passages show that the result of tma-jna (self-knowledge) is merely thenivtti (cessation) of moka-pratibandhas (hindrances to liberation).

Topic: Moka is not saskrya and hence not dependent on vypra. Saskrainvolves a gua-dhna of the saskrya or its doa-apanayana. First of all, gua-dhna is not possible becausethe svarpa ofmoka is the andheya and atiayaBrahman. Neither is doa-apanayana because the svarpa of moka is the nitya anduddha Brahman.

Objection: Although moka is a svtma-dharma it is trobhta. When the tman issaskriyama by kriy, moka becomes manifest (abhivyakta) just as the dharmawhich is bhsvaratva (resplendence) becomes manifest when the dara issaskriyama by nigharaa-kriy.

Reply: No. Because the tman cannot be dependent on action. yadray kriy tamavikurvat na eva tmnam labhate. yadi tm sva-raya-kriyay vi

Topic: We agree that moka cannot be attained by kriy (action) but only throughjna (knowledge). But is not jna a mnas kriy (mental action)?

A kriyis an impulsion that is independent of the real essence of the object (vastu-svarpa-nirapeka) and dependent on the functioning of the persons mind (purua-citta-vypra-dhna). A mnaskriyis articulated in the form ofmanasdhyyet(reflect upon by the mind) with regards to some object. For example, devatmmanasdhyyet (reflect upon the deity by the mind). In this case, the person maychoose to reflect upon the deity or not, or choose to reflect upon something else.

Thus, mnaskriys such as dhyna, cintana, etc. are dependent upon the person

and independent of the object. On the other hand, jna is the result of a prama


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and prama is yath-bhta-vastu-viayam, it attempts to reveal the object as ittruly exists. Therefore, jna is not a matter of choice one cannot choose to knowor not know an object for what it is or choose to know it as something else. It is not

codan-tantra (dependent on an impulsion) or purua-tantra (dependent on the

person). It is only vastu-tantra (dependent on the object) and not on anything else.Therefore, although jna is also mental it is different from mental actions such asmeditation (dhyna or cintana).

For example, consider the Vedntic statements O Gautama, a man verily is fire andO Gautama, a woman verily is firethat are normative in nature. The mentalreflection on the man and the woman as fire is an action because it is dependent on

the injunction and the person who has chosen to carry it out. But our ordinary

understanding of fire as fire is not dependent on an injunction or a person. What

then? It is dependent on a thing that is an object of perception (pratyaka-viaya-vastu-tantra). Therefore, it is knowledge and not a mental action. This holds true

with regards to anything that is an object of any prama. This being the case, whathas for its object the reality of tman as brahman, is also knowledge independent ofany impulsion.

Topic: We agree with the difference between jna and mnaskriy. But then whyare verbs in the imperative mood used in the scriptures with regards to the object of

knowledge that brahman is the reality of tman? Such an object is not prescribable(aniyojya-viaya) and is not a thing that can be accepted or rejected (aheya-

anupdeya-vastu-viaya). Therefore, those statements that have a semblance ofinjunctions (vidhi-cchyni vacanni) such as tm v are draavarotavyabecome blunted like a sharp razor applied on stones. What is their point?

Their purpose is to divert the person away from the objects of natural impulsion.

One does not attain the ultimate human goal (tyantika pururtha) in the externalrealm where one engages with the hope that one gains the desirable and avoids the

undesirable. Statements such as tm v are draavadivert those who seek theultimate human goal from the natural domain consisting of the impulses arising from

the aggregate of the body and organs and set them on the stream leading to thepratyag-tman. Having motivated them to seek the tman they are taught the truthof the tman by statements such as: idam sarvam yadayamtm, yatra tvasyasarvamtmaivbhttakena kam pasyet ... kena kam vijnyt, vijtram are kenavijnyt, ayam tm brahma.

That the tma-jna of Vednta is primarily unprescriptive (akartavya-pradhna)and leaves no choice for acceptance or rejection i.e., it is not dependent on the

individual, is precisely how it should be. It is the prized feature of the system that

when tman is realized as brahman there is a lossof a sense of obligation (sarva-


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kartavyat-hni)and a sense of having accomplished onesobligations (kta-ktyat). Thus we have the ruti passage ...

Therefore, Brahman is not presented as a supplement to an injunction about

obtainment (pratipatti).

TOPIC: There is no section of the Vedas that concerns itself only with an object

(kevala-vastu-vdi) that is neither an injunction, prescriptive or proscriptive, nor asupplement to one.

There is a purua (being) found only in the Upaniads which is asasr, brahma-svarpa, different from the four types of substances viz., those which can beproduced, purified, transformed and achieved, situated in its own discourse

(svaprakaraa-stha) and is not supplementary to another (ananyaea).

One can deny neither the existence nor the accessibility of this being because it has

been termed as tman in the passage sa ea neti neti tm and nobody can denythe tman since even if one tried to do so, it would be the tman denying itself.

Objection: Since the tman is the object of self-consciousness (aham-pratyaya-viaya), it is not rational to say that it is known only from the Upaniads.

Reply: The object of self-consciousness (aham-pratyaya-viaya) is the kart (agent).The tman, however, is the sk (witness) of it. It is sarva-bhtastha, sama, eka,

kastha-nitya purua (being) that is not found in the vidhi-ka (ritual section ofthe Vedas) or tarka-samaya (logical discussions) being the tman of all.

Since it is the tman of all, it cannot be denied by anyone, it cannot be madesupplementary to a vidhi, it cannot be acknowledged or refused. For everything that

is vinayat-vikra-jtam

TOPIC

Documents

The Adhyātma of Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya.docx