The Air Cargo System

The Air Cargo System

January 1982

NTIS order #PB82-186818

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600060

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402

Foreword

This background paper is one of four parts of an OTA assessment of the econom-ic, environmental, and societal impacts of advances in the technology of transport air-craft. This paper, Part 2, addresses the air cargo system. It seeks to put in perspectivethe role and importance of aircraft technology in the total air cargo system. It is not adetailed study of aircraft technology; it focuses instead on the principal factors thatcould influence the future evolution of air cargo transport.

The overall assessment had its origin in a request from the House Committee onScience and Technology asking OTA to examine the implications of the eventual wide-scale introduction—or nonintroduction—of advanced high-speed passenger aircraft.At the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,the assessment was subsequently broadened to include the aircraft used in providingservice to small communities and to embrace cargo as well as passenger transport.

This paper and the other three parts to this assessment (“Advanced High-SpeedAircraft,” “Air Service to Small Communities,” and “Financing and Program Alterna-tives for Advanced High-Speed Aircraft”) together comprise OTA’s publisheddocuments for this study.

In conducting this assessment, OTA was assisted by an advisory panel that pro-vided advice on the overall assessment and a working group focused on air cargo. Iwould like to thank these individuals for their contributions.

●

JJOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

.///

OTA Advanced Air TransportTechnology Assessment Advisory Panel

Robert W. Simpson, ChairmanDirector, Flight Transportation Laboratory

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Jane H. BartlettPresidentArlington County League of Women Voters

Ray E. BatesVice PresidentDouglas Aircraft Co.

Norman BradburnDirectorNational Opinion Research Center

Frederick W. Bradley, Jr.Vice PresidentCitibank, N.A.

John G. BorgerVice PresidentPan American World Airways, Inc.

Secor D. BrowneSecor D. Browne Associates, Inc.

F. A. ClevelandVice PresidentLockheed Aircraft Corp.

Elwood T. DriverVice ChairmanNational Transportation Safety Board

James C. FletcherBurroughs Corp.

William K. ReillyPresidentThe Conservation Foundation

David S. StemplerChairman, Government Affairs Committee

of the Board of DirectorsAirline Passengers Association, Inc.

Janet St. MarkPresidentSMS Associates

John WildExecutive DirectorNational Transportation Policy Study Commission*

Holden W. WithingtonVice PresidentBoeing Commercial Airplane Co.

Michael YarymovychVice PresidentRockwell International

Observers:

Charles R. FosterAssociate Administrator for Aviation StandardsFederal Aviation Administration

James J. Kramer**Associate Administrator for Aeronautics

and Space TechnologyNational Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOTE: The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do not necessarilyapprove, disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

‘Commission was dissolved Dec 31, 1979.● ● Resigned from panel during conduct of study after leaving National Aeronautics and Space Administration

iv

OTA Air Cargo Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Yupo Chan William Mills Marsha Mistretta Jacquelynne Mulder

David Seidman Paula Walden Richard Willow

Contractors

M. Karen Gamble James Gorham Dorothea Gross

John Vaughan Arthur L. Webster

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

Air Cargo Working Group

Keith G. Brady William T. MikolowskyManager, Innovative Concepts Development Manager, Operation Research DepartmentBoeing Commercial Airplane Co. Lockheed Georgia Co.

Tulinda DeeganDirector, Government RelationsCommuter Airline Association of America

Leo F. DugganVice President, Technical AffairsAirport Operations Council International

Douglas A. FisherAssistant General ManagerEmery Air Freight

Joel H. FisherDirector and Washington CounselSeaboard World Airlines

E. R. HichensManager, Traffic SystemsSears Roebuck and Co.

William H. KuhlmanCargo Market DevelopmentDouglas Aircraft Co.

George A. PasquetU.S. Air ForceMilitary Airlift Command

William F. PieperDirector, Technology DevelopmentFlying Tiger Line

Ray SiewertOSD/OUSDR&E (ET)Department of Defense

Nawal K. TanejaFlight Transportation LaboratoryDepartment of Aeronautics and AstronauticsMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Matthew M. WinstonLangley Research CenterNational Aeronautics and Space Administration

Dennis J. Marshall Shirley YbarraManager, Development and Operation Engineering Vice PresidentFederal Express Corp. Simat, Helliesen, & Eichner

Contents

Chapter Page

1. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Growth Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dedicated v. Derivative Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ground Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Industry Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lighter-Than-AirVehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Deregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Federal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. An Overview of the Air Cargo System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Air Cargo Industry Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Impact of Long-Haul Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Costs and Profits of U.S. All-Cargo Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air Cargo Deregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Industry Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Impact on Rates and Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Present State of the Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Forecasted Industry Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Major Concerns of Cargo Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Future Air Cargo Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Freighters Derived From Passenger Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Advantages and Disadvantages of Derivative Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dedicated Air Freighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Advantages and Disadvantages of a Dedicated Air Freighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Joint Military-Civil Cargo Airplane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Advantages and Disadvantages of Joint Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Ground Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Air Terminal Space Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mechanization and Containerization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Degree of Mechanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Degree of Containerization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Computerization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pickup and Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. Air Cargo Operating Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Federal Noise Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Airport Operating Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Night Curfews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Economic Impacts of Curfews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Benefits of Curfews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Federal Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Operating Restrictions Overseas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33334445

999

11121212131414161616

21212323242527

31313234363637

4141424244454546

vii

6.

List

Page

Lighter-Than-Air Vehicles ., ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Long Range Airships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Potential Properties of Modern Airships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Modernized Conventional Airships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Surveillance Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Heavy Lift Airships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

of TablesTable No. Page

1.2.3.4.

General Air Freight Rate Increases for Selected Carriers, 1975-80 . . . . . . . . . . 15Relative Cost per Unit Loading Device Under Varying Conditions . . . . . . . . . 36Airport Operating Restrictions, 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Annual Direct Effects on the New England Economy of an ll p.m. to7a.m. Curfew at Boston, Mass. .. .. ~. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

List of FiguresFigure No. Page—

1.2.

3.

4.5.6.7.8.9.

10.

Labor and Fuel Prices for U.S. Trunks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Operating Ratio Scheduled All-Cargo Service by Carrier Group(international) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Operating Ratio Scheduled All-Cargo Service by Carrier Group(domestic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Straddle Lift for 6-Meter or Larger Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Side-by-Side Loading Capacity of Intermodal Containers in the B-747F . . . . 33High Mechanization Elevating Transfer Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Future Air Cargo Ground System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Modular Intermodal Container Concept Modcon Array and Adaptor . . . . . . 37Heavy Lift Airship Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53Heavy Lift Airship—General Arrangement and Selected PerformanceCharacteristics 75 Ton Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

.,.VIII

Chapter 1

SUMMARY

Chapter 1

SUMMARY

GROWTH RATE

Following World War II, U.S. air cargo car- cargo totals only 11 percent of all U.S. airlineriers exploited the speed advantage offered by revenues and 1.4 percent of all domestic freightmodern aircraft to build an industry with reve- revenues, For years, predictions have been madenues that exceeded $3 billion in 1980. Despite that dramatic growth was just around the cor-this growth, air cargo is still dwarfed both by the ner. In reality, the growth has been steady butpassenger side of the airline business and the sur- unspectacular.face transport side of goods movement. Air

DEDICATED V. DERIVATIVE AIRCRAFT

Today, almost all civil cargo aircraft arederivatives of passenger aircraft, largely becausethe air cargo market is too small to support pro-duction of a completely new aircraft dedicatedto cargo service only. Current estimates offuture market prospects (7 to 12 percent annualgrowth) do not indicate that this situation willchange in the next 20 years. Aircraft manufac-turers are at the moment unwilling to assume therisk of producing a dedicated all-cargo aircraft,particularly given the prospect of strong com-petition from future passenger derivatives.

Future cargo aircraft are expected to be farmore economical to operate because the passen-ger aircraft from which they are likely to bederived necessarily will become more efficient tostay competitive in a world of sharply risingenergy costs. While a dedicated cargo carrierusing 1990’s technology might cut fuel consump-

tion by as much as 50 percent compared totoday’s most efficient carriers, very nearly thesame gains in efficiency could be achievedthrough conversion of 1990’s passenger aircraftfor cargo use.

The Department of Defense is currently study-ing several options for meeting its future airliftneeds, including the design of a joint civil/military cargo aircraft, While such an aircraft of-fers the theoretical advantage of higher volumeproduction and therefore lower unit cost, similarjoint planning efforts in the past did not workout to the satisfaction of the commercial sector.Industry remains skeptical that the product ofsuch a joint planning effort, compromised as itmust be to meet military requirements, would becompetitive with derivatives of future passengeraircraft.

GROUND OPERATIONS

More efficient handling of cargo on the modal containers and mechanized equipment toground could have as much impact on future move the containers between carriers or intogrowth and profitability of air cargo as would storage. It has been estimated that complete con-the introduction of more efficient aircraft. The tainerization of cargo and a high level of mech-private sector is working to develop more effi- anized handling could reduce the cost of groundcient systems, including standardized inter- operations by as much as 70 percent. Such po-

3

4 ● Impact of Advanced Air Transport Technology

tential savings are sufficiently large that marketpressures will be sufficient to move cargo car-

riers and freight forwarders in the direction ofincreased containerization and mechanization.

INDUSTRY PROBLEMS

To cope with the problem of aircraft noise, afew airports in this country and many moreabroad have instituted nighttime curfews. Theserestrictions could seriously limit the movementsof all-cargo carriers. Currently about half of all-cargo landings and takeoffs occur during the 10p.m. to 7 a.m. time period in order to provideovernight delivery. In deciding whether curfewsshould be instituted, the concerns of residentsliving adjacent to airports need to be weighedagainst the community’s interest in preventing a

loss of jobs and the Nation’s interest in maintain-ing the free movement of interstate commerce.

U.S. air cargo carriers also are concernedabout a variety of constraints associated withlanding in foreign airports which appear de-signed solely to protect that nation’s airline fromcompetition. Active support of relevant U.S.agencies has been and will probably continue tobe needed to help carriers cope with these bar-riers.

LIGHTER-THAN-AIR VEHICLES

Interest in using lighter-than-air (LTA) or cles are expected to cruise at about one-fourthhybrid LTA vehicles as air cargo carriers con- the speed of conventional jet aircraft, they aretinues. The primary role for LTAs or hybrids not likely to compete with conventional air andseems to be in the short distance movement of surface modes for the movement of goods oververy large cargo or for long endurance aerial long distances.surveillance. Since modern, nonrigid LTA vehi-

DEREGULATION

The air cargo industry is currently undergoinga period of rapid change brought about in partby deregulation of air cargo in 1977, followed byderegulation of passenger airlines in 1978 andtrucking in 1980. Air cargo carriers are now freeto raise or lower rates, serve any markets theychoose, and own and operate trucks that can fanout for hundreds of miles to pick up and delivergoods. The only requirement is that this goodsmovement be related to an air cargo operation.Several carriers are now taking advantage ofthese newly won freedoms to offer single carriershipping using both air and ground modes of

transportation. It is of interest that this trendtoward integrated services does not necessarilydepend for its success upon the introduction ofnew technology in the air or on the ground. Ex-press package delivery, which is the fastestgrowing and most profitable segment of the aircargo industry, uses conventional aircraft andground handling systems largely consisting ofconveyor belts. The express package industryexperience suggests that while new technologycan result in operating efficiencies, it is not asubstitute for providing services carefullytailored to the needs of shippers.

Ch. l—Summary ● 5

FEDERAL

The only significant Federal regulations affec-ting air cargo operations still in place followingair cargo deregulation concern aircraft safetyand noise standards. Two additional areas forcontinued Federal involvement relate to unfairforeign practice concerning U.S. carriers and in-ternational agreements on ratemaking. Onepotential problem area relates to the phasing outor elimination by the Civil Aeronautics Board

POLICY

(CAB) of reporting requirements. This has leftboth the Government and the public with nomeans of monitoring the flow of the air cargoportion of interstate commerce. The Air FreightForwarders Association has requested that CABreestablish some “minimal” reporting re-quirements to show where freight is moving andwhere traffic is developing.

Chapter 2

AN OVERVIEW OF THEAIR CARGO SYSTEM

Chapter 2

AN OVERVIEW OF THEAIR CARGO SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of air transportation, aircargo has grown largely as an auxiliary to pas-senger service. As late as 1978, more than one-half of scheduled air cargo moved in the belliesof passenger aircraft. In the last decade, how-ever, domestic all-cargo carriers (those airlinesthat carry only goods, not people) have begun toincrease their share of the market, Cargo ac-counts for 11 percent of the total revenues ofU.S. commercial air carriers. In 1980, scheduledair cargo generated over $3 billion in revenues. 1

‘Air Cargo Statistics, U.S. Scheduled Airlines, Total industry,1980 (Washington, D. C.: Air Transport Association of America,1981 ), p. 4.

In the period following World War II andthrough the 1960’s, the introduction of new tech-nology—long-haul propeller and then jet air-craft—had a great effect on the air cargo in-dustry. In recent years, Government deregula-tion has come to have a major impact. Althoughthe long-term effect of deregulation is stillunclear, it already has enabled such innovationsas intermodal cargo service (by Flying Tiger).While the air cargo industry as a whole showedoperating profits only during the 1960’s, com-bination (passenger/cargo) carriers flying inter-national routes have generally made a profit andinnovators such as Federal Express have been ex-tremely profitable.

AIR CARGO INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

The world’s air cargo delivery system is com-prised of two networks. The first is essentiallythe same as the passenger network. In this sys-tem passengers are carried above and cargo iscarried below in the belly of the aircraft, utiliz-ing space not needed by baggage or mail—hencethe name “belly cargo. ” These flights are routed

and scheduled for the convenience of the passen-gers. While the passenger airlines are generallywilling to sell this otherwise unused space, theyhave not always wanted to bother with theground operations of pickup and delivery andloading the belly containers, so a class of in-direct carriers—called “forwarders’’—has ful-filled this function. Until the Air CargoDeregulation Act of 1977 these forwarders couldnot operate their own aircraft, although onelarge forwarder, Emery, organized a fleet ofleased aircraft totally dedicated to its service.

A second network utilizes aircraft that carryjust cargo. These dedicated cargo aircraft, some-times referred to as freighters, or all-cargo air-craft, come in all sizes from small, propeller-driven aircraft to giant Boeing 747s configuredto carry only cargo. The network over whichall-cargo aircraft operate is less extensive thanthe passenger network, but has over the yearscarried a growing proportion of total air cargo.These aircraft generally fly at night and arescheduled for the convenience of shippers.

All-cargo aircraft are flown by both all-cargocarriers and some combination carriers. As thename suggests, all-cargo carriers fly all-cargoaircraft exclusively. Federal Express, the smallpackage delivery service, and Flying Tiger are

examples of all-cargo carriers. Combination car-riers transport both passengers and freight.

9

——

10 ● Irnpact of Advanced Air Transport Technology

Some, such as Pan American and Northwest, Approximately 20 percent of air cargo ton-own all-cargo aircraft while others such as Con- miles is carried by all-cargo carriers, with thetinental, TWA, and most commuter airlines rest flown by combination carriers. The combin-carry only belly cargo. ation carriers in turn transport about half their

Photo credit McDonnell Douglas

Cutaway layouts of a DC-8F combination cargo and passenger aircraft

Photo credit Flying Tiger Lines

All cargo aircraft

Ch. 2—An Overview of the Air Cargo System ● 11

cargo in the bellies of passenger aircraft and theother half in their own all-cargo aircraft. Loadfactors are much higher for all-cargo aircraft: in1978, only 28 percent of available belly cargospace was used, while for all-cargo aircraft thefigure was 64 percent.2

The air cargo market is not homogeneous,and the differences have resulted in specializa-tion among various carriers. Federal Express,Emery Express (part of Emery Air Freight),Purolator Courier, and others have concen-trated on the express or premium-package-deliv-ery market, which is a special segment of the aircargo market. This specialization came about inpart because the individual pieces are small,thereby enabling hub operations to be less mech-anized than that required for the bulky con-tainers common to general freight. In addition,while the cost per package is moderate, thepackage is small, so the net result is high revenueper pound. Higher unit revenue makes it possi-ble to cover the higher costs inherent in the useof the small business jets and the small-shipment

——‘Air Cargo Statistics, U S Scheduled Airlines Total Industry,

1978 (Washington, D, C,: Air Transport Association of America,1979), chart D .

ground pickup and delivery system typicallyused to provide this service.

The express package market is the fastestgrowing segment of air cargo. Federal Express,with over half of the market, reported 67-per-cent growth from 1978 to 1979,3 The expressbusiness has grown to the point where small jetsare often too small, and express carriers areusing the freedom granted with deregulation toacquire 727s, 737s, and even DC-1 OS.

Other characteristics of air express are dif-ferent from general air freight. Contrary to theobservation that air cargo is only competitive atlong distances, some of these shipments, espe-cially those on commuter passenger flights, canbe on the order of 100 or so miles. In this situa-tion air is competitive with ground modes be-cause of the high frequency and convenience ofservice; the commuter carriers can easily andcheaply offer no-wait movement of goods. Thecommuters also sometimes offer special pickupand delivery service, as do the specialized ex-press package carriers.

‘Federal Express Corp., Development of Operation EngineeringSection, telephone interview, Feb. 5, 1980.

THE IMPACT OF LONG-HAUL AIRCRAFT

Total world scheduled air cargo traffic, asreported by International Civil Aviation Organ-ization, experienced a sharp build-up in 1947 to1951 and a growth of 100 percent in the decadeof the 1950’s.4

This 1950’s growth coincided with the adventof propeller aircraft capable of long-haul, non-stop domestic and international service.Another surge began in 1958 with the introduc-tion of jet aircraft for passenger operations; theirbelly capacity was such as to provide an enor-mous increase in available lift capacity. How-ever, air cargo traffic and revenues most clearlybegan to respond when jet freighters (B-707F andDC-8F) entered service in 1963.

Turbine-powered aircraft have dominated thecommercial U.S. all-cargo system since 1967,pacing the development of the present system.The introduction of the stretched DC-8-63F in1968 further spurred the growth of all-cargotraffic, particularly in international operations.The DC-8-63F carried over 40 percent of totalscheduled U.S. all-cargo traffic by 1974, andthen started to lose ground to the B-747F. By1978, the 747F carried 57 percent of total U.S.all-cargo traffic and 81 percent of U.S. interna-tional all-cargo traffic. 5

— —— --—----4ICA0 Bulletin, May 1969, table 9, p. 28 and diagram 1, p. 19.

ICAO “cargo” does not include mail.

‘Operating Results From Scheduled All-Cargo Service for the 12Months Ended June 30, 1978 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Civil Aero-nautics Board, October 1978), table 4.

72 • Impact of Advanced Air Transport Technology—

COSTS AND PROFITS OF U.S. ALL= CARGO OPERATIONS

costsDuring the 1962-66 period, unit operating

costs sharply declined. This coincided with theintroduction of turbine-powered all-cargo air-craft (B707Fs and DC-8FS) in 1963 and with amajor increase in all-cargo volume and growthrates. Overall U.S. all-cargo aircraft trafficgrowth rates reached over 55 percent in 1965,with the all-cargo traffic of combination carriersincreasing 134 percent. G

After 1973, as shown in figure 1, fuel costsnearly quadrupled. Labor costs also increasedduring the 1970’s, but not as rapidly as did fuelcosts. Fuel and labor were roughly equal com-ponents of total operating costs in 1979; but con-tinued price increases now make fuel the largestsingle cost element.

6Trends in Scheduled A1l-Cargo Service, 6th ed. (Washington,D. C,: U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board), table 10A, p. 31. -

Figure l.— Labor and Fuel Prices for U.S. Trunks

30

25

20

15

10

c.

. SOURCES:

(1967 dollars)

i

.

Profits

International air cargo has a greater speed dif-ferential over the ocean shipping industry thandomestic air cargo has over the domestic truck-ing industry. This comparative advantage hashelped international air cargo operations toshow a better operating and profit performance.

As shown in figure 2, the international opera-tions of both combination carriers and all-cargocarriers, produced an operating profit—an ex-cess of revenues over expenses—for a sustainedperiod of time. By contrast, figure 3 shows thatin the domestic market combination carriersshowed profits for only one brief period(1966-67). The all-cargo carriers did little better:they were profitable in 1966-67 and again in1972-73. Although they were in a loss positionwhen the data ended (1977), the losses were nar-rowing.

This lackluster performance has caused manyall-cargo carriers to drop out or be absorbed byother carriers. Several combination carriers,most recently TWA, have discontinued all-cargoservice. Those remaining in the business havedone so for a variety of reasons. Combinationcarriers flying international routes have gener-ally been able to show a profit and the prevailing

Figure 2.—Operating Ratio (operating expense as apercent of operating revenue) Scheduled All-Cargo

Service by Carrier Group (international)

Percent

’ 8 0~160

140 IUnprofitable I

I 1 1 1 I 1 1 t I t 1

i 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80

1963 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Handbook of Airline Statistics(Washington, D.C,, 1973) part VII, table 16; Handbook of AirlineStatistics Supplement, 1974-7978, part Vll, table 16, Air TransportAssociation, Air Cost index (Washington, D C., 1980), p 7.

SOURCE U S Civil Aeronautics Board, Trends in Scheduled A// Cargo Service6th ed (Washington, D C Government Printing Off Ice, 1977) table3A, p 8

Ch. 2—An Overview of the Air Cargo System • 73——. -. —.—.

Figure 3.—Operating Ratio (operating expense as apercent of operating revenue) Scheduled All-Cargo

Service by Carrier (domestic)

Percent180 T

160 - CombinationUnprofitable

A l l c a r g o c a r r i e r s

12010080604020

view is that the prospects for future growth andprofitability are good. In the case of all-cargocarriers, Flying Tiger is convinced that thepotential for growth is strong in the domesticmarket and deregulation of both air cargo andtrucking opens up the prospect of forging ahighly profitable intermodal cargo service.

Federal Express has demonstrated that it is notimpossible to reap huge profits from air cargo.Their revenues have grown from $17 million in1974 to $415 million in 1980. Since the companyturned a profit in its third year of operation(1976) earnings have multiplied at the annualrate of 76 percent.

1963 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 7576 77

SOURCE U S CiVil Aeronautics Board Trends in Scheduled All-Cargo Service,6th ed. (Washington D C Government Printing Off Ice, 1977), table3A, p 8

AIR CARGO DEREGULATION

Prior to the passage of the Air CargoDeregulation Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-163),the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was respon-sible for the economic regulation of commercialairlines including both the all-cargo and com-bination carriers. (Commuter carriers operatingaircraft with payload under 7,500 lb and airlinesoperating solely within the borders of one Statewere exempt from regulation). CAB grantedeach carrier a “certificate of public convenienceand necessity” which specified the points whichcould be served. CAB was also responsible forsetting rates.

The domestic all-cargo industry was in poorfinancial health in the early to mid-l970’s. Aseries of congressional hearings on air cargo heldin 1976 highlighted the precarious state of the in-dustry. 7 Only two certificated all-cargo carrierswere operating domestic services, and both hadexperienced financial difficulties, During the1970-1976 period, Western, Continental, Delta,and Eastern terminated all-cargo service. Amer-ican and United reduced prime-time (overnight)

‘See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Public Works andTranspi ra t ion , Reform of t)ILJ Eco)~omic R~~<g~/l~~tio~l of ,41r ~or-

ricrs, hearings before the Subcommittee on Avia tlon, 94th Cong.,1st sess., serial No. 94-55, 1976.

air freight service and discontinued freighteroperations to a number of cities. In the late1960’s, approximately 50 U.S. cities were receiv-ing domestic all-cargo service. By 1977, thatfigure had been cut almost in half. There was amovement away from scheduled service as ship-pers increasingly turned to contract (charter)carriage or to other modes. 8

It has been argued that the regulatory systemfrustrated the growth of the air cargo industrynot only by restricting the routes but also bykeeping many rates below costs. Carriers claimthat prior to deregulation air freight rates hadbeen too low to support the level of prime-timefreighter operations which the market de-manded. The Domestic Freight Investigationcompleted by CAB shortly before cargo deregu-lation concluded that regulated freight rateswere fully 42 percent below those justified byestimates of long-run costs during 1976.9

On November 9, 1977, President Cartersigned Public Law 95-163 deregulating air cargo-- ——. -

8Domestic Air Cargo Deregulatio A Prrli))/it/urw RL~I/LUI(Washington, 13. C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Office ofthe Secretary, 1979), p. 7.

‘Dotl~cTstIc AIr FrcIg/It RL/tcs lt~i~(’stig~?tl~~r~ order No. 77-8-62,(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, 1976), p. 42.


rates and for 1 year limiting free entry into newmarkets to “grandfathers,” that is carriers whohad offered all-cargo service in the past (whethercertificated or not). This authority was extendedby subsequent act to include supplemental (char-ter) carriers in March 1978.

Rights under the new authority are grantedunder section 418 of the Federal Aviation Act.Seventy-four carriers received “section 418 cer-tificates. ” Most of these were small contractcarriers. Trunk airlines receiving certificatesincluded American, Braniff, Pan American,TWA, Northwest, and United.

Industry Response

During the first year under deregulation, PanAmerican was the only trunk carrier to beginnew services. TWA discontinued its all-cargooperations, and there was little activity fromother CAB certificated carriers. Six supplemen-tal carriers received section 418 certificates,but only two (Evergreen and Zantop) began newservice.

As expected, the all-cargo carriers, Airlift,Flying Tiger, and Seaboard, took advantage ofthe new route freedom. Flying Tiger has been es-pecially aggressive in expanding the network ofcities it serves. In addition, it has acquired bothSeaboard and several regional trucking firms.

Federal Express, a commuter airline originallyorganized to carry express packages and docu-ments in small business jets, has also expandedits route structure since deregulation. For Fed-eral Express, deregulation meant the right tooperate larger aircraft. It took advantage of thisnew freedom by purchasing B-727s, B-737s, andDC-1 OS.

In November 1978, 1 year after the passage ofthe deregulation bill, entry to air cargo opera-tions was no longer confined to airlines whichhad offered prior service. “Any citizen of theUnited States” interested in operating an all-cargo airline was allowed to file an applicationfor a section 418 certificate.

By the middle of September 1979, several ad-ditional carriers received section 418 certificatesunder these new open-entry rules. These in-

Photo credit Federal Express

eluded Delta, Continental, and Allegheny (nowUSAIR), together with such major air freightforwarders as Emery and Airborne. Currentlyover 100 carriers hold section 418 certificates.

There has been no rush of total newcomers tothe air freight industry. Because of high startupcosts, most of those entering or expanding aircargo service have been established carriers.Several air freight forwarders are furnishingtheir own cargo service in markets where bellycapacity is inadequate. Often they lease aircraftand pilots—an arrangement called a wet lease.The major air freight markets remain dominatedby the same carriers as before deregulation, Thenew entrants are primarily operating in localcommuter-type markets.

Impact on Rates and Service

Although some early proponents of cargo de-regulation had predicted that rates would drop,there has been an increase in air freight ratelevels and premium rates charged for commodi-ties requiring special handling. The Shippers Na-tional Freight Claim Council, Inc., has testifiedthat the real increases in rates published betweenJanuary 1978 and January 1979 range up to 89percent on minimum charges, 21 percent on100-lb rates, and 76 percent on 5,000-lb rates.10

CAB reports, however, that air cargo rates— .10Shippers National Freight Claim Council, testimony of

William J. Angello, Executive Director/General Counsel beforethe Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on PublicWorks and Transportation, July 25, 1979.


began to increase in the 2 years preceding dereg-ulation and that some carriers have boostedtheir rates more than others (see table 1).

The rates for some commodities and somemarkets have increased more than others. Ratesfor live animals have increased from 110 to 200percent of general commodity rates. Many car-riers have increased priority rates from 130 to150 percent of the general commodity rates.Rates in short-haul markets have increased morethan in long-haul markets. Short-haul marketshave long been unprofitable, while the denserlong-haul markets are more compatible withfreighter aircraft economics.

Published rates, however, do not tell thewhole story. Air freight rate levels and premium

Table 1 .—General Air Freight Rate Increases forSelected Carriers 1975-80

Carriers operating Carriers with nofreighters freighter operations

Effective dates AA FT UA CO DL TWA

Jan. 1975 . . . . . . 10% 80/0 70/o — — 80/0July/Aug. 1975 . . . . . . . . . . 10 9 7 7% 60/0 9Feb. 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 8 — — 9April 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — — 6 –Oct. 1976 . . . . . . . . . 10 10 8 — — 8Dec. 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 8 6 1July 1977 9 9 9 — — 8Sept. /Oct. 1977 . . . . . . – – – 8 8 –Nov. 9, 1977 Al R CARGO D E R EG U LAT 10 NMar./April 1978 10 8 9 – 10 9N OV . 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 11 — —Jan./Feb. 1979 . . . . . . . . . . 9 8 9 – 5 –May 1979 – 5 — – — –June 1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 — – — —Aug,lSept. 1979 . . . . . . . . . 7 – 12 – — 8oct. 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . – 4 – 10 15 –Nov./Dee. 1979. . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5 — — 5Jan./Feb. l98O . . . . . — 5 5 10 – –Mar./April l98O 10 5 2 – 10 12June/July 1980. . . . . . . . . . 10 10 10 10 — 10Sept. /Oct. 1980 . . . . . . . . . 10 7 7 – – –

Carrier codes. AA American CO ContinentalFT Flying Tiger DL DeltaUA United TW TWA

aTwA terminated freighter operations m 1978

NOTE. These percentages represent in some cases simple “across. the-board”Increases by the amount Indicated, and in others a weighted average ofIncreases of varying amounts for different categories of rates (I e ,changes in the rate structure Itself)

SOURCE. CiviI Aeronautics Board

rates have increased, but carriers have been of-fering discounted rates—usually for large ship-ments and particularly on selected daylightflights which are less popular with shippers than“prime-time” (overnight) flights. There havealso been some rate cuts in the small packagesector as some of the larger carriers attempt tocompete with Federal Express in the rapidlygrowing small package business.

Although CAB has yet to issue a new set ofrules governing ratemaking on internationalroutes, it has notified domestic carriers that itdoes not favor their participation in the Interna-tional Air Transport Association ratemakingproceedings. Substantial excess cargo capacityover the North Atlantic has led to a rate war,and CAB apparently is not going to intervene.

Some shippers have claimed that air cargoservice has been reduced since passage of the AirCargo Deregulation Act. It is likely, however,that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (PublicLaw 95-504) at least initially had more effect oncutbacks in belly capacity than did the cargo de-regulation act. Immediately following airline de-regulation, there was an increase in passen-gers—and therefore passenger baggage—with aresulting decrease in belly space available forcargo. In 1980, passenger load factors fell, thusfreeing up additional belly space. Some of thelarger air freight forwarders have begun to workmore with charter and commuter carriers whichwill serve those areas abandoned by trunk air-lines. CAB officials of the previous administra-tion admitted that some small communities lostair freight capacity when airlines discontinuedcombination service. They did not see this as aproblem, however, saying that the type of air-craft used in such service typically did not carrymuch freight and also pointing out that it israpidly being replaced by truck service owned orleased by air cargo carriers to funnel shipmentsto nearest air freight traffic hubs.

16 • Impact of Advanced Air Transport Technology

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE INDUSTRY

It is not possible to put together a completepicture of the present state of the cargo industry.Following deregulation, CAB reduced, and insome cases, eliminated reporting requirements,leaving both the Government and the publicwith no way to monitor the performance of theindustry, The Air Freight Forwarders Associa-tion has requested that CAB reestablish some“minimal” reporting requirements for for-warders and airlines that would at least providedata on where freight is moving and where traf-fic is developing. There is concern as well thatthis lack of data may permit organizations andindividuals to use fragmentary information tosupport their particular positions.

CAB testified before the House Subcommitteeon Aviation in July 1979 that the all-cargo car-riers increased their total revenue ton-miles ofshipments by approximately 26 percent during1978 compared to an Ii-percent growth during1977. Flying Tiger increased its domestic revenueton-miles over 33 percent, but a large part of thisincrease was due to a reclassification of someAlaska traffic (enroute between the UnitedStates and Japan) as domestic.

Commuter airlines increased their total cargotonnage by 48 percent during 1978, compared to12 percent in 1977. ’ 11 In this category, FederalExpress has expanded its total shipments by 67percent in 1979 as compared to 38 percent in1978, and 15 percent in 1977.2

Total freight revenue ton-miles of the trunkcombination carriers increased only 1.1 percentin 1978 compared to 7.0 percent in 1977. All-cargo traffic of the trunk carriers increased 2.0percent in 1978.13 Data from the Air TransportAssociation show that freight revenues for thescheduled carriers increased 14.5 percent in1980, but traffic (ton-miles) decreased 1.7 per-cent, 14 reflecting both the rate increases and theimpact of the recession.

——. .— .-. — .- -1‘U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, testim~ln?’ bet(>re the Subc(}m-

mittee cm Aviation, House C(>mmittee <>n I’ubllc \\’~~rl+ andTransportation, July 25, 1Q79, p. 37.

‘2Fecleral Express Corp., Development [~t Operatli~n EnglncenngSection, telephone interview., Feb. 5, 1Q80.

‘3AZII,ItIC))I D,~Ilu Dec. 5, IQi’Q.‘4A I t ~-~~~g(~ St[~tI+tIt+ I Q,W (~’ashingt[~n, ~.~- Alr Tr~n<p~~rt

Association, June 1Q81 ).

FORECASTED INDUSTRY GROWTH

Available forecasts of long-term air cargo occurred in late 1979. While air cargo marketgrowth vary from about 8 to 11 percent for both forecasts in the past have tended to be overop-U.S. domestic and U.S. international traffic. timistic, it should be noted that in 1972 few ex-Total free world growth was estimated by one pected the phenomenal rate of growth that sub-forecaster at 12 percent, and by another to be sequently occurred in the express package deliv-between 7 and 9 percent. All estimates were ery business.made before the sharp increase in fuel prices that

MAJOR CONCERNS OF CARGO CARRIERS

The major concerns of the air cargo industry Another concern is that airport space istoday are similar to the concerns of the air pas- becoming increasingly tight, especially for cargosenger industry. Fuel costs, though having re- carries. As will be discussed in chapter 4, thecently stabilized, still play a major role in deter- construction of major new airports appears un-mining which markets to enter or exit. likely in the near future, but some alternatives


are available for making better use of existingfacilities.

Also, carriers will have to bring their fleetsinto compliance with Federal Aviation Adminis-tration noise standards under new noise legis-lation. Communities are continuing to exertpressures against aircraft noise, resulting in in-creased attempts to reduce noise impacts by im-posing operating restrictions on carriers. Night

curfews are still not common in the UnitedStates, but if adopted they could severely impactcargo operations.

Another industry concern relates to actions ofsome foreign government policies to protecttheir national airline from U.S. competition.Some industry spokesmen state that a concertedU.S. Government effort is needed to ensure thatU.S. carriers are treated fairly overseas.

Chapter 3

FUTURE AIR CARGO AIRCRAFT

Chapter 3

FUTURE AIR CARGO AIRCRAFT—.— .—Almost all commercial all-cargo aircraft cur-

rently in the fleet are derivatives or conversionsof passenger aircraft. Some civilian and militaryplanners, as well as some all-cargo operators,have argued that the growth of the industry hasbeen hampered by the lack of aircraft optimizedto fulfill cargo carrying requirements.

Three alternative approaches to the develop-ment of future all-cargo aircraft have been iden-tified:

1. as a derivative of a new or existingpassenger or military airplane;

2. development of a dedicated civilian cargoaircraft designed without regard for eitherpassenger or military requirements; and

3. development of a joint civil-military aircargo plane that would satisfy both com-mercial and military requirements.

Each of these alternatives will be discussed inturn.

FREIGHTERS DERIVED FROM PASSENGER AIRCRAFT

In 1963, freighter service was available onlywith propeller aircraft: about 75 percent pistonaircraft (primarily the DC-7) and 25 percent tur-boprops (such as the CL-44). By 1970, almost 98percent of scheduled freighter service was of-fered with jet aircraft: 55 percent with theB-707-300 B/C, 22 percent with the DC-8-63F,11 percent with the DC-8-50F, and 10 percentwith the B-727-1OO C/QC.

The fleet average operating cost declined from$0.30 per revenue ton-mile in 1963 to $0.16 in1967 and then began to increase, reaching $0.27in 1977 (current dollars). Total operating costshave been steadily rising since 1973 because ofgeneral inflation as well as the abrupt increase inthe price of fuel. Although the introduction ofthe B-747 in domestic service did produce lowercost freighter service, the small number ofB-747s relative to the B-707s and DC-8s has notyet changed the fleet average cost curve. B-747shave found much greater use in internationalcargo operations than they have in domesticoperations.

Both the B-707 and the DC-8 were designed aspassenger aircraft, with the fuselage cross-sec-tion being determined by the requirements ofsix-abreast seating and the width of the aisle.

Both aircraft could carry 13 pallets of 88 by 125inches, the standard units at that time.

The B-747 freighter comes closest to being adedicated or uncompromised freighter design forcommercial operations. When Boeing lost thecompetition for the military cargo C-5A con-tract to Lockheed in 1965, Boeing took itsassembled C-5A design team, added personnelfrom their commercial program, and set out todesign an aircraft to meet the perceived needs ofthe rapidly growing commercial market. The re-sulting B-747 was designed as a passenger plane.However, because it appeared at that time that asupersonic transport (SST) would be a strongcompetitor, the 747 was also designed to be anefficient freighter in the event that the SST tookover the passenger market.

The 747 was designed to hold two 8 by 8 ftcontainers abreast. This was the origin of thewide body, which at the time had little to dowith passenger appeal. 1 The requirement thatcargo be loaded through the nose of the aircraftforced the cockpit to be placed at the upper

‘John E. Steiner, ]et Aviation Deueiopmeut: Ot~e Compan ysP~mp~ctizw, prepared by Boeing Commercial Aircraft Co. (Wash-ington, D. C.: National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian In-stitution, October 1979), pp. 15-18.

21

deck. Aerodynamic considerations required thedesigners to allow a door height of only 8 feet, 2inches—resulting in only a 2-inch clearance forcontainers.

Because the SST did not materialize as a com-petitor, the first 747 freighter was not delivereduntil 1972, more than 2 years later than the firstpassenger version. Since then, however, prog-ress has been rapid, with a total of 129,747freighters delivered by December 1980.2

Manufacturers are currently considering anumber of variations on their existing aircraft.In the large-payload category, Boeing is con-sidering stretching its B-747-200F up to 50 ft,resulting in 30 percent additional containerizedvolume. In the medium-payload category-de-rivative aircraft would include the L-1011-500F,the DC-1 OF, and the B767F. Douglas’ DC-1OFcould be stretched and offered in a “combi” ver-sion. Boeing’s B-707-320C could conceivably be

—‘Boeing Aircraft Co., telephone interview, July 14, 1981.

stretched. Finally, Boeing is planning a freighterversion of the B-767 aircraft.3

For the light-payload category of freight-ers—under 60,000 lb—Lockheed is consideringmarketing a potential derivative of its HerculesL-1OO, Dash sO. Current proposals include astretch of up to 45 ft over the basic model, whichwould provide capability for transporting up toeight 8 by 8 by 10 ft containers with payloadranging from 54,000 to 72,000 lb. This aircraftcould replace the B-707-320C and the DC-8F ona number of routes and also have the capability(because of being able to handle the 8 by 8 ftcontainers) to be an intermodal feeder freighterfor carriers using the B-747F. Other advantagesinclude lower fuel cost and straight-in, straight-out loading. The Dash so would be appropriatefor short- to medium-range hauls—l,400 statutemiles with a payload of 66,000 lb and 1,960miles with a payload of 50,000 lb. Derivatives ofthe present B-727 and B-737 may also be possi-ble.’

3Steiner, op. cit., 167-168.‘Ibid.

Ch. 3—Future Air Cargo Aircraft ● 2 3——

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DERIVATIVE AIRCRAFT

Existing air cargo derivatives of passengerairplanes have proven very satisfactory. For ex-ample, the B-747-200F has proven to be the largepayload workhorse of the air cargo fleet andcould continue unmodified for a number ofyears.

Any derivative freighter has the advantage ofhaving most of its development costs alreadycharged against the sale of its passenger counter-part. In addition, the financial arrangements forpurchasing the airplane have already been estab-lished and there is a relatively short lead time

before production (as compared to all new air-craft).

A major disadvantage of existing air cargo air-craft is that they represent 1960’s technology andthat, therefore, their direct operating costs arehigher than what might be achieved with presenttechnology. Additionally, since they generallyhave not been designed specifically for air cargo,loading and unloading can present problems; theaircraft may be pressurized more than neces-sary, and there may be equipment built in forpassenger safety that is unneeded for cargo.

DEDICATED AIR FREIGHTERS

A dedicated commercial air freighter is anairplane which has been designed from theground up as a freighter, with no constraints im-posed by either passenger or military require-ments. Over the years, there has been a debateconcerning the cost effectiveness of such anairplane, with some all-cargo carriers claimingthat they could consistently earn a profit if theyhad such an aircraft. To help resolve this contro-versy, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration (NASA) selected two contractors,Douglas Aircraft Co. and Lockheed-GeorgiaCo., to independently evaluate the feasibility ofproducing such a freighter by 1990. This wasdone as part of the Cargo/Logistics AirliftSystems Study (CLASS). ’

Douglas made several forecasts of the futurefleet composition given various developments.Their analysis indicated that two new cargo air-craft could be derived from existing wide bodyaircraft using 1980 technology. These aircraft——

‘See: McDonnell Douglas Corp., Douglas Aircraft Co., CargoLogistics Airlift Systems Study (CLASS), 4 vols,, prepared by R. J.Burby and W. H. Kuhlman, under NASA contract No. NASl-14948 (Hampton, Va.: Langley Research Center, National Aero-nautics and Space Administration, October 1978). (Hereafter citedas “Douglas, CLASS.”) See also: Lockheed-Georgia Co.,Cargo ‘Logistics Airlift Systems Study (CLASS) 2 vols., preparedby J. M. Norman, R. D. Henderson, F. C. Macey, and R. P.Tuttle, under NASA contract No. NASA-14967 (Hampton, Va.:Langley Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration, November 1978). (Hereafter cited as “Lockheed,CLASS.”)

could be commercially viable and could becomeoperational in 1985. Results suggested a prefer-ence for a short- and a long-range version, eachwith a payload of about 330,000 lb. G At com-parable payloads, these cargo aircraft wereestimated to provide a 20 percent reduction intrip cost and a 15 percent decrease in aircraftprice compared to current wide bodies in in-flated 1984 dollars, ’ Douglas estimated therecould be 400 such derivatives produced by1998. 8

A long- and a short-range dedicated freighterwere then hypothesized to be introduced in 1994using 1990 technology (an unrealistically shortdevelopment time according to some experts).The 1990 technology assumed was derived fromNASA’s Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) pro-gram, which seeks to develop a variety oftechnologies leading to fuel savings and loweroperating costs for future passenger aircraft.Some of the new technologies include: 1) com-posite materials, which reduce weights and pro-vide higher strengths; 2) active controls, whichprovide automatic response to flight and gustconditions; and 3) advanced engine technology,with higher thrust to weight ratios and betterspecific fuel consumption.—. —.——

‘Douglas, CLASS Volume -? F//tur~~ 1<~’(l~{tr~~t)l[~~lts c)f DL~dIcL~t(~LiFreighter Aircraft to Year 2008 pp. xxiv-xxv.

‘Ibid., p. xxv.‘Ibid., p. xxvii.


In order to achieve a manufacturer’s return oninvestment (ROI) of 15 percent while maximiz-ing the airlines’ ROI, it was determined that thelong-range dedicated aircraft should have a pay-load of 150,000 lb, and the short-range, a pay-load of 100,000 lb. The airline ROI was rel-atively insensitive to payload in the cases as-sumed, however, because the payload could beincreased to 330,000 lb for the long-range and220,000 lb for the short-range with only al-percent decrease of airl ine ROI.9 S u c hdedicated freighters could reduce aircraft oper-ating costs per trip (direct operating cost—DOC—less depreciation and insurance) by anestimated 43 percent below current widebodies. 10 In combination with other improve-ments, such as containerization and mechanizedterminals, shippers could gradually achieveoverall savings of roughly 20 percent over the1978-2000 period. ’

‘Ibid., pp. xxxiv-xxxv.‘“Ibid., p. xxix.‘lAllen H. Whitehead, Jr., and William H. Kuhlman, “Demand

for Large Freighter Aircraft as Projected in the NASA Cargo/Logistics Airlift Systems Studies, ” NASA Technical Memorandum80074 (Hampton, Va.: Langley Research Center, National Aero-nautics and Space Administration, April 1979), p. 6.

Lockheed calculated the payload which max-imized air carrier profits assuming no constrainton manufacturer’s ROI. For 1990 this was esti-mated to be 330,000 lb, as compared to 225,000lb for the current 747-200F freighter. It wasestimated there would be a demand for 270 suchairplanes in 1990 and over 480 in 2000. Air cargorate reductions of up to 45 percent were esti-mated to be possible. These estimates, however,not only assume concomitant improvements interminal operations, but also postulate an in-crease in air cargo demand of over 250 percent inresponse to the 45 percent rate decrease. In addi-tion, the phase-out of all other aircraft is as-sumed. 12

Thus, while there appears to be some uncer-tainty about the optimum payload for a dedi-cated air freighter, Douglas and Lockheed agreethat substantial cost savings and rate reductionscould result. These findings, however, are ex-tremely sensitive to assumptions about fuel andlabor costs and, most particularly, to growth indemand for air cargo services. Further, it ignoresthe competitive situation brought about by thelower capital costs of future derivative air cargoaircraft.

‘zLockheed, CLASS Executive Summary, pp. 27-32.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ADEDICATED AIR FREIGHTER

In summary, the advantage of the dedicatedair freighter is that it can be designed very specif-ically for air freight demand, providing the typeof loading and unloading, flooring, fuselageconfiguration, pressurization, etc., which is op-timal for its contents. Furthermore, given that itis unlikely to be built before the 1990’s, it canmake full use of NASA’s ACEE results, with thepotential of significantly lowering operatingcosts and fuel usage.

that airplane. 13 Such a high overhead raises theprice of the airplane and its DOC (because of de-preciation and insurance costs) and increases thefinancial risks to investors, especially since itwould be competing with derivatives whichhave much smaller development costs per unitand which themselves have incorporated someof the cost-reducing technology.

A 1979 NASA analysis suggests that the sig-nificantly lower purchase price for the deriva-

A major disadvantage of the dedicated air “U.S. National Defense Transportation Association, Militaryfreighter would be that the estimated $2 billion Airlift Committee, An Executive Report on the Potential for a

to $2.5 billion development cost (1976 dollars) ]oint Commercial Military Air Cargo System Development(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 29, 1977), p. 47. (Hereafter cited as

would have to be absorbed solely by the sales of “NDTA, Executive Report.”)

Ch. 3—Future Air Cargo Aircraft ● 2 5

tives would overshadow the economic benefitsof the dedicated aircraft. 14 Apparently havingcome to the same conclusion, manufacturers arereluctant to undertake development of a dedi-cated air freighter unless there is some way toreduce the risk.

Some planners have spoken of a passenger de-rivative of the dedicated air freighter as one. — —

“William D. Conner, and John C. Vaughn, III, “Multi-roleCargo Aircraft Options and Configurations, ” NASA TechnicalMemorandum 80177 (Hampton, Va.: Langley Research Center,National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 1979),p. 3.

means of reducing risk. Since all-cargo airplanesform a very small percent of the carrier fleet, thiswould be an extreme example of the tail waggingthe dog. It is much more likely that an all-cargoairplane would be derived from a passenger air-plane which incorporates all ACEE technolog-ical improvements. However, assuming favor-able growth in air cargo, there is increasing in-centive for aircraft designers to take cargo needsinto account when designing new passenger air-craft.

A JOINT MILITARY-CIVIL CARGO AIRPLANE

The Department of Defense (DOD) perceivesa shortfall in military airlift capability which willgradually worsen as the Army moves toward theuse of larger and heavier vehicles. DOD wantsthe capability to react more quickly to overseasemergencies and to move equipment from onebattle zone to another as needed.

There are several alternatives for making upthe described shortfall in airlift capacity. Oneoption would be to purchase an aircraft designedexclusively to meet military needs. The cost ofprocuring 200 such vehicles with a payload of350,000 lb was estimated in 1977 to be in therange of $12 billion in 1976 dollars (about $60million per aircraft). 15

An alternative, longer range option is a jointmilitary-civil airlift vehicle, which would beproduced in two versions—a military versionand a civilian version. Originally designed as theC-XX, it has recently been renamed the Ad-vanced Technology Civil Military Aircraft(ACMA). The civilian version would include areinforced floor and other special features sothat it could serve as part of the Civil ReserveAir Fleet (CRAF). This could also reduce thenumber of required military ACMAS. The Mili-tary Airlift Command has also considered thefeasibility of a commercial passenger version in

“NDTA, Executive Report, pp. 14, 20.

order to increase the number built, and therebyreduce unit costs.

The 1977 Executive Report of the MilitaryAirlift Committee of the National DefenseTransportation Association estimated it wouldstill cost over $11 billion to produce 200ACMAs, despite some cost savings achievedthrough design compromises to meet civilianneeds. However, they estimated that 80 percentof the 200 airplanes could be purchased by thecommercial air carriers at a cost of $50 millioneach, or a price subsidy of $7 million apiece(1976 dollars) to cover decreased payload andincreased operating cost. The cost to the militarywas estimated to total approximately $3 billion,a savings of some $9 billion over the cost of pro-curing 200 aircraft that might lie idle much of thetime waiting for a crisis to develop. 1 6

The Air Force has funded Boeing, Lockheed,and Douglas to look more closely at airplanedesigns and to anticipate the penalties to be in-curred by a joint design. Douglas developed adesign for a 200,00()-lb” payload aircraft with aconversion kit to convert a CRAF airplane formilitary use. The lower recommended payloadwas based on the contractor’s estimate of thebest commercial market. The conversion kit in-cludes a heavy military floor for installation on

“Ibid., pp. 61-62.


top of the original floor as well as extra floorbracing, a front drive-in ramp, and landing gearconversion components that provide kneelingcapability. 17 The conversion was estimated totake about 24 hours to complete. 18

The civilian version of the ACMA aircraftwould weigh approximately 6,500 lb more thana fully dedicated commercial freighter. TheACMAs purchased by the military would weighapproximately 6,8oo lb less than those civilreserve aircraft brought up to military standardsthrough the kit modification approach.l9 Thus,this ACMA concept involves a weight penaltyfor both its civil and military applications.However, advanced technology could greatlyreduce airplane size and weight compared tocurrent technology. It has been estimated thatoperating weight and takeoff gross weight of adedicated ACMA freighter would be only 65percent and 76 percent of the correspondingweights for a current technology freighter hav-ing the same payload, range, cruise speed, andfield length.20

Lockheed’s ACMA design was considerablylarger, having a payload in the range of 400,000l b .21 The contractor estimated a 34-percentreduction in DOC over the B-747, at a range of3,5oo nautical miles, and a 5&percent decreasein fuel consumption .22

One question to be answered if an ACMAwere to be developed is what organizationwould be responsible for its production. This is a

“E. A. Barber, R. J. Marhefka, and D. G. Blattner, “Prospectsfor Commercial Commonality in Military Transport, ” presentedat AIAA Aircraft Systems and Technology Meeting, Aug. 21-23,1978, p. 10.

1’Ibid., p. 10.“Ibid., p. 11.‘“ Ibid., pp. 11-21.“W. T. Mikolowky, et al., Lockheed Aircraft Co., “Identifying

Desirable Designs Features for the C-XX Aircraft: A Systems Ap-proach,” presented at the AIAA Aircraft Systems and TechnologyMeeting, Aug. 20-22, 1979, p. 4.

“Ibid., p. 9.

major problem, because accommodating a widevariety of potential commercial customers, eachwith their own views, is inconsistent with tradi-tional military purchase procedures. Previousattempts at interagency cooperative develop-ment of a joint military/civil cargo aircraft havenot been successful. The Air Force’s C-141 is aprimary example of such a developmental effort;there appeared in the beginning to be enoughcommonality of military/civil aircraft require-ments to justify a cooperative effort. The FederalAviation Administration consulted with pro-spective commercial users of the aircraft andworked closely with the Air Force in certificatingthe plane for civil air operations. Nevertheless,only the military purchased the aircraft. 23 Whilethere is general agreement that a joint effortmakes sense, there is great skepticism on thecommercial side that it would work to their ad-vantage in practice.

A recent development could have a significantimpact on the ACMA program. The Air Forcehas been directed to cancel its existing programto develop a tactical airlifter and to plan a newstrategic airlifter, the CX, having some tacticalcapability. The emphasis is on developing anaircraft which will be in operation earlier thanthe ACMA. A CX task force is currently work-ing to determine the specifications of the air-plane. It seems likely that a CX would be a de-rivative of an existing aircraft. The effects of theCX program on the proposed ACMA programare uncertain at present, and would not be clar-ified until the CX is better defined. If the CX pro-gram is implemented, the most likely effectwould be to delay consideration of theA C M A .24

Z3D H ~her, Suney of institutional Mechanisms Within theFederal Government for Cooperative Development of Mil-itary\CiviZian Transport Aircraft (Arlington, Va.: Analytic Serv-ices, Inc., April 1972), p. 4.

*’Ibid.

Ch. 3—Future Air Cargo Aircraft . 27

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT

One advantage of a joint development is thatthe development costs would be shared by thecivil and military sectors, and the number of air-planes required by the military could be de-creased by the number of CRAF airplanes pur-chased by air carriers and available to the mili-tary in case of emergency.

There are a number of potential disadvan-tages, including the constraints imposed by jointdevelopment, the penalties that would be in-curred by both civil and military airplanes, andthe difficulty in finding an organizational struc-ture that permits their reconciliation. Certainfeatures suitable to a military aircraft wouldhave to be discarded, for example, because theyare incompatible with a civil freighter. Also,

each airplane would have to carry some weightwhich it would not carry if it were independent-ly designed. This penalty weight reduces thepayload and the profitability of the commercialversion. MAC proposes to compensate for thisthrough either a transfer payment at purchase,or an operating penalty compensation payment,or both.

Perhaps most important, it is not clear thatthere will be a sufficient market for the civil ver-sion or that it will be cost competitive with de-rivatives of future passenger aircraft. Finally, theadvent of the CX program renders the timing ofthe ACMA program uncertain. The future of theACMA program cannot be addressed until thedetails of the CX program have been agreed on.

Chapter 4

GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Chapter 4

GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEMS

There is a widely held point of view in the in-dustry that air cargo’s competition for increasedvolume and market share could be decided moreby how well it performs on the ground than inthe air. The ground side support systems so im-portant to the future of air cargo include: 1) air-port terminal operations, and 2) pickup and de-livery services. Cargo must be picked up at theorigin of the trip (usually by truck) anddelivered to the airport. At the terminal cargomust be transferred from truck to aircraft, air-craft to aircraft, or from aircraft to truck. Cargois offloaded, weighed if necessary, and sorted bydestination. The necessary airbills and other per-tinent forms move with the shipment.

Average terminal costs for processing bulkcargo, as a percentage of total line haul plus ter-

Several ofapproaching

minal costs, have been computed to vary from ahigh of 83 percent for flight lengths of 400 milesto 33 percent for a stage length of 4,OOO miles. 1

The high percentage cost of ground operationsfor shorter trips is particularly significant, sinceit is in these domestic trips where air cargo con-fronts some of its strongest competition fromsurface modes.

AIR TERMINAL SPACE LIMITATIONS

the major air cargo terminals arethe limits of their capacity with

current operations and equipment, thus creatinga major problem for air cargo carriers. 2 It wouldbe difficult to expand many of these terminals,given the lack of available land. Two optionssuggested to accommodate future increases in airfreight traffic are: 1 ) off site bulk freight process-ing, and 2) all-cargo airports. 3

Offsite bulk freight processing terminals movethe freight consolidation operations away fromthe crowded airport areas, to less crowded, lessexpensive quarters. Consolidated freight couldbe moved back to the airport in containers orspecial bins. The airport area could be used foraircraft loading and a limited amount of con-tainer storage and staging functions. Terminalproductivity would increase because of thegreater use of containers, and congestion would

2Nawal K. Taneja, The U. S. Air-freight Industry (Lexington,Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), p. 206.

31bid., p. 212.

decrease because trucks and parcels would go tothe off site terminals.

While some forwarders and all-cargo carriersfavor this option, combination carriers generallyconsider their passenger and freight operationsto be too closely integrated to have separate ter-minals. These combination carriers believe theywould need to duplicate some of their functions,equipment, and personnel.

The off site bulk freight processing terminal isof interest if there is a significant percentage ofcargo not containerized by the shipper. The fa-cility could be used by the forwarder or the air-line to containerize cargo prior to the airport ter-minal operation.

The all-cargo airport would, as the name im-plies, be entirely devoted to the handling ofcargo. Given the difficulty of developing anymajor new airports, this must be regarded asonly a remote possibility. The Airport and Air-ways Development and Revenue Act of 1970

31


made funds available for construction of newairports, but of the 85 new airports built duringthe first 5 years, all but three were for the use ofgeneral aviation exclusively.4 Citizen oppositionto major new airports continues to be a very po-tent and effective force.

It might be possible to use abandoned or un-derutilized military airports as all-cargo air-

4Jeff Cochran, Associate Administrator for Engineering andDevelopment, Federal Aviation Administration, presentationbefore the National Academy of Sciences.

ports. The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration (NASA) and the Air Force experi-mented with this idea at one Air Force base thatwas still in use but underutilized. The experi-ment was not successful because the demands ofthe Air Force mission compromised the kinds ofservices to the commercial tenants which themanagement of a commercial airport could pro-vide. 5

‘Operations Research, Inc., ]oint Tenancy for Cargo Airports,prepared by M. N. McDermott, under NASA contract No.NASW-2961 (Washington, D. C.: ORI, July 1977).

MECHANIZATION AND CONTAINERIZATION

One promising long-range option for allevi-ating the space problem at air terminals is mech-anization. A major concern of terminal man-agers is to define the appropriate type of mech-anization and the optimum rate at which itshould be introduced into the cargo handlingsystem. The desirable degree of mechanizationdepends on the volume of cargo, the degree ofunitization (e. g., palletization or containeriza-tion) and the uniformity of shipments with re-spect to volume, shape, and weight. Today onlya handful of heavily utilized terminals haveeither the volume or the size and type of ship-ments to warrant extensive mechanization.

Sorting of shipments is still done manually atmost terminals, partly because of the large varia-tion in package size. To reduce labor cost andsave space, a number of carriers have automatedthese cargo handling functions at the majorhubs. The success of this automation has beenmixed. In the late 1960’s, TWA automated itscargo facilities in St. Louis airport so extensivelythat a failure in one component usually tied upthe whole system, and there was also no room tomake repairs. On the other hand, a number ofEuropean carriers have extensively automatedtheir air freight operations with apparent suc-cess, although actual sorting decisions are stillmade by a human operator.

Varying degrees of mechanization are ap-propriate dependent on shipments. At the lowerend of the spectrum, there are specially adaptedforklifts for handling containers. There are also

straddle lifts, illustrated in figure 4. Figure 5shows two such containers stowed in a 747.Other mobile systems are commonly used forloading freight on aircraft. Such mobile equip-ment is less costly, and more cost effective forlower cargo volumes than is a fixed system.

As the volume and degree of unitization in-creases, the cost effectiveness of fixed mecha-nized systems, both for sorting and for loading,increases. Assuming an annual air cargo growthrate of 8 percent, an increasing number of sys-tems are likely to become heavily mechanized inthe future.6 A NASA CLASS study forecaststhat growth will initially be handled by increas-ing the efficiency of existing systems along withincreased use of containers loaded by the shipperor forwarder. For example, with a modest in-vestment, the equipment now widely used in ter-minals to handle large containers can be readilyadapted to handle 3-meter containers andsmaller. This could allow for over a fourfold in-crease in terminal throughput, with a resultingpotential reduction in capital investment percontainer of 72 percent. To handle the popular6-meter containers, a relatively advanced ter-minal capable of a ninefold increase over currentprocessing levels could be achieved with cur-rently available technology. G

One particularly useful technology for highvolume situations is the elevating transfer vehi-cle (ETV) and stacker system which allows

—

Figure 4.—Straddle

4 — G r o u n d S u p p o r t S y s t e m s • 3 3——-— — — — —

Lift for 6. Meter or Large CoI~41aliler

SOURCE McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Douglas Aircraft Company , Cargo logistics Airlift Systems 5 If ‘M ~ S ‘ (1 , ( . . # olu(~le // ;jrepdred by R D E3u rby and W H

Kuhlman, under NASA contract 1-14948 (Hampton Va. Langley Research Center, National ~ t, Spa{ *> ~~ tin I n I st rat I I n )C tober 1978) p 18 ~

Figure 5.–Side-By-Side Loading Capability of Intermodel Containers in the B-747F

SOURCES: Nawal K. Taneja The u S , 1‘[~ JIIFI I 1~ ~u ,trv, (Lexington Mass I C>X 1{’gl II BJU ~ ‘9) , 19>

Seaboard World AI I I Ines


multilevel storage of containers where verticalspace is not a restriction (see fig. 6). Containerweight reduces the useful payload of the aircraft,however, and there is a tradeoff between con-tainer strength—needed for stacking—and theextra weight required to achieve stackingstrength.

Degree of Mechanization

In the late 1980’s, if growth rates of the pastdecade continue, some airport terminals can be

Figure 6.— High Mechanization

expected to have implemented even more ad-vanced systems capable of handling larger andheavier containers than the 3- and 6-meter con-tainers preferred now. Figure 7 illustrates asystem which could increase the throughput ofcontainers nearly 20 times over today’s level.

Cargo volume is the major determinant ofcargo terminal cost. As volume increases it iseasier to justify systems that can dramaticallyreduce cost as well as provide faster and surerservice.

Elevating Transfer Vehicle (ETV)

SOURCE McDonnell Douglas Corp , Douglas Aircraft Co., Cargo Logistics Airlift System Study (CLASS), Volume ///, prepared by R. D. Burby and W. H Kuhlman, underNASA contract No 1-14948 (Hampton, Va : Langley Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 1978), p 185.

At each stage, mechanization must be de-signed carefully to minimize breakdowns and toallow the rest of the system to continue tooperate in case of a breakdown in one compo-nent. Backup systems are also highly desirable.As the TWA case showed, it is possible to installsystems too advanced for conditions, for- vol-ume requirements, or for the technological stateof the art.

An example of a very successful high volumeoperation that uses little in the way of mech-anization other than conveyor belts is that of theFederal Express Corp., which specializes in pro-viding overnight service for small parcels. 7 It hasover 1,000 radio-dispatched trucks that collect

—.‘Yupo Chan, and Ronny J. Ponder, “The Small Package Air

Freight Industry in the United States: A Review of the Federal Ex-press Experience, ” Trumportatlo)l Reseurc/], September 1979, pp.221-229.

packages on call throughout the’ day. Alter theclose of business, the parcels are brought to theairport stations and flown to Memphis is, Term.At Memphis there is a quarter-mile long sortingfacility with a conveyor system capable of han-dling 130,000 parcels per night. This will expandto 150,000 per night by December 1981. Thecontents of arriving planes are unloaded intobins that are placed in a series of conveyor beltsand sorted by destination. Containers are direct-ly offloaded or onloaded but their contents maybe hand sorted.

When the parcels are sorted, the outboundshipments are weighed, and the aircraft areloaded and dispatched. This entire process takesabout 6 hours from the time the first airplane ar-rives until the last departs. More importantly,the time from the arrival of the last airplane tothe departure of the first is only 1/1 2 hours. Fed-


eral Express now claims to achieve better than a99 percent overnight delivery service rate for thesmall high-priority parcels that comprise thebulk of its cargo. Although Federal Express isnow introducing a higher level of mechaniza-tion, this operation serves as a reminder thatmechanization is not an end in itself, but merelyone way to get a job done.

Degree of ContainerizationVirtually all highly mechanized systems de-

pend on containerization. Several methods ofassuring a high level of containerization havebeen proposed including cost and service incen-tives to shippers and forwarders that contain-erize, thus passing on some of the savings fromthe mechanized system. Shippers who do notcontainerize could use a forwarder who does.The air carrier can also containerize bulk cargo.Although there is a cost to containerize, it is gen-erally small compared to the savings in han-dling.

Table 2 contains estimates from a NASAstudy of the cargo handling cost per pallet orcontainer under varying conditions of storageand handling. This analysis assumes that eachsystem operates at capacity. It can be seen thatcutting storage time in half for imports couldsave nearly 20 percent. Maintaining the shorterstorage time while going from the current 40 per-cent average containerization rate to 70 percentwould save an additional 16 percent; going to100 percent containerization would save over 33percent with no change in system. Using the

Table 2.—Relative Cost Per Unit Loading Devicea

Under Varying Conditions

Degree of International Type of cargocontainer- import storage handling Relative

ization time system cost

40 ”/0 3 day Current 100 0/040 ”/0 1.5 day Current 81 .60/070 ”/0 1.5 day Current 75.30/0

100 ”/0 3 day Current 67.70/o100 ”/0 1.5 day Current 57.7 “/0100 ”/0 1.5 day Single level ETV 59.90/0100 ”/0 1.5 day Double level ETV 38.50/o1000/0 1.5 day Triple level ETV 28.40/o

ae.g. Pallet or container

SOURCE McDonnell Douglas Corp , Douglas Aircraft Co. Cargo Logistics Air-lift Systems Study (CLASS), Volume ///, prepared by R D Burby andW H Kuhlman, under NASA contract No NAS1.14948 (Hampton, Va.Langley Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-tration, October 1978) P 222

single level ETV system saves nothing in unitcost, but the double and triple level ETV systemssave roughly 20 percent and 30 percent, respec-tively.

With 90 percent off-airport containerization,these terminal improvements could reduce in-direct operating costs by as much as 30 percent,with a resulting potential overall system ratereduction of up to 11 percent per air cargo ship-ment. 8

Flexibility to adjust the size of the containersappears desirable. Currently containers of gen-eral cargo air freight are on the average only 54percent full. g This reduces the efficiency of boththe containers and the cargo aircraft themselves,which frequently “cube out” rather than “weighout” — i. e., the available space in the aircraft isfilled before its weight limit is reached. Use ofcontainers of excessive size tends to exacerbatethis situation, A modular container system hasbeen proposed to minimize this problem. Thesystem consists of a standard 8 by 8 by 20 feetintermodal container but made up of modules of40 by 48 by 48 inches, which could be connectedtogether to form the standard container or somecontainer of intermediate size (see fig. 8). Thedesign also allows complete disassembly forempty return. Boeing is also designing a versionof this same concept.

ComputerizationAs the degree of mechanization increases, the

degree of computerization is likely to increase aswell. The basic functions of a computerized sys-tem are to generate the necessary documents, in-cluding intermodal waybills, to keep track of theshipments, and to trace lost shipments. How-ever, many other management functions—suchas billing and settlement, cargo space allocation,cargo scheduling and counting, and market-ing—can be aided by manipulation of the basicdata. Many carriers are already operating so-phisticated c o m p u t e r i zed documentationsys tems. 0

—‘Allen H. Whitehead, and William H. Kuhlman, “Demand for

Large Freighter Aircraft as Projected by the NASA Cargo / Logis-tics Airlift System Study,” NASA Technical Memorandum 80074(Hampton, Va.: Langley Research Center, National Aeronauticsand Space Administration, April 1979), fig. 3.

‘Taneja, op. cit., p. 212.10Douglas, CLASS, Volume 111, pp. 188-189; Lockheed, CLASS,

Volume 1, pp. 1-93.

Ch. 4—Ground Support Systems ● 37

Figure 8.— Modular Intermodal Container Concept Modcon Array and Adapter

SOURCE J L Weingarten, Closing the Air Transport Gap on Intermodal Containers, Publication 73-1 CT-30(New York American Society of Mechanical Engineers, May 1973), p.6

PICKUP AND

Because virtually every air shipment beginsand ends as a truck movement, it is necessary toimprove the interface between truck and the ter-minal. Although intermodal containers designedto be used by both airplanes and trucks involvesome weight penalties, the productivity im-provement resulting from using containers issubstantial. A study done in Europe found thatlabor productivity increased from 421 lb perman-hour for handling loose freight to 2,205 lbper man-hour for handling pallets or containersspecifically designed for aircraft, an increase of423 percent. Productivity increased to 4,778 lbper man-hour when intermodal containers wereused, an additional increase of 117 percent. 11

According to a Lockheed-Georgia study, thepickup and delivery (PUD) cost for shipmentsizes less than 1,000 lb, using conventional

‘‘Taneja, op. cit., p, 212

DELlVERY

methods, averaged over the 20 largest U.S.cities, is $3.35/100 lb at each end of the move-ment. This amounts to $134/ton, which whenadded to the computed average airport-to-air-port cost of $175/ton yields a total of $309/ton.The use of an advanced technology aircraft andintermodal containers reduces the PUD cost to$86 and the airport-to-airport cost to $122, for atotal cost of $208/ton. If a truckload-sized con-tainer is used, the costs reduce to $25/ton PUD,$7/ton container cost, and $122/ton airport-to-airport cost, for a total of $154/ton total. Thustotal costs might be halved with advanced, inter-modal truckload containers. 12

‘2Lockheed-Georgia Co., (-tlr<qo LCl<qI+tJ~-> ,4 It IJII .Su.t[,~~I~ stIi~iu((-1 ASS) lr[III//~I~T 1 prepared b}~ 1, M, Norman, R. ]). FIertder-w)n, F. C, Mamy, and R. P, Tuttle, under N A S A contract N(~.NAS1-1467 (Hamptc~n, Va.: Lang]e> Rewarch Center , Nati(~nialAeronautics and Space Admini+trationf November 1Q78), pp. S-S3to 5-55,

Chapter 5

AIR CARGO OPERATINGRESTRICTIONS

Chapter 5

AIR CARGO OPERATING RESTRICTIONS

With passage of air cargo deregulation in1977, most of the controls governing the air sideof domestic freight movements were lifted, in-cluding tariff controls, market entry restrictions,and limitations on the payload of aircraft flownby the express package delivery carriers.

Not until passage of the Motor Carrier Act of1980, however, were air cargo carriers and for-warders allowed the unrestricted right to per-form their own pickup and delivery services. Inthe past, they were only allowed to operate theirtrucks for collection and distribution within 35miles of the airport. As a direct consequence ofthis restriction, air cargo carriers were forced touse air links in short hauls where trucks wouldhave been more efficient. Air carrier-ownedtrucks are now allowed to operate anywhere, aslong as the movement of goods on the ground is

incidental to their shipment by air. Several aircarriers are already taking advantage of this newintermodal flexibility to provide the shippersingle carrier integrated service.

Air cargo carriers continue to be adversely af-fected by airport curfews and other operating re-strictions imposed by some airports in this coun-try and by governments abroad. However, theonly Federal regulations of major consequencestill in place following air cargo deregulationconcerned aircraft safety and noise standards,both promulgated by the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration (FAA). While regulation of aircraftsafety is a widely accepted practice, aircraftnoise standards have been far more controver-sial. As discussed below, these noise standardshave led to major, costly changes in the air cargofleet.

FEDERAL NOISE REGULATION

At the Federal level, the Environmental Pro-tection Agency (EPA) is responsible for develop-ing transportation noise programs. EPA recom-mends noise standards to the FAA, which caneither adopt them or develop its own. In 1969,the FAA promulgated part 36 of the Federal Avi-ation Regulations (FAR 36), stating Federal air-craft noise regulations. These regulationsoriginally set noise limits for newly designedcivil turbojet aircraft over 75, OOO lb which firstwent into production after 1969 (these includedthe DC-10, L 1011, B-747-200, and A-300,among others). In 1973, the FAA extended FAR36 to include new production units of older air-craft such as the 707, 727, 737, DC-8, DC-9, andmost business jets.

In December 1976, the FAA promulgated FAR91 which required virtually the whole fleet ofjets over 75, OOO lb (including previously exemptaircraft) to meet FAR 36 noise standards by1985. Airlines were given the option of retrofit-

ting their noncomplying aircraft with sound-absorbing materials, replacing the engines, orreplacing the aircraft.

Amendments to FAR 36 in March 1977 andApril 1978 require that the next generation ofaircraft meet more stringent noise standards(stage 3 noise limits). These new standards arenot presently retroactive to the types of aircraftalready certificated.

Aircraft noise regulations are controversial,because the measurement of actual noise impactsis highly subjective and because the cost of com-pliance will be high. The airlines do not want tospend an estimated $4OO million to retrofit andreengine the 1,600 noncomplying aircraft now inservice in order to meet the 1985 deadline. Theywould prefer to gradually replace these withnew-technology aircraft that would not only be

“’Airlines Face Huge Bills for Controlling Noise, Pollution, ” AirTransport World, July 1978, p. 16.

41


quieter, but would also be more fuel efficientand would comply with pollutant emissionsstandards. Because an airplane’s operatinglifetime is at least 10 to 15 years, and in somecases up to 30 years, most of the noncomplyingaircraft would not be subject to normal replace-ment before the 1985 deadline. In fact, someobservers estimate that if it were not for the pro-visions of FAR 36 standards, 60 percent of thepresent noncomplying fleet could still be inoperation in 1990. The costs for acceleratedreplacement of these aircraftmated as high as $8 billion.2

There have been attemptsdelay the existing compliance——- —-—

‘Ibid.

have been esti-

in Congress todeadline and to

prevent the FAA from imposing more stringentnoise standards. These have been offset by astrong DOT stance favoring current noise rules.The final noise control bill,3 however, was acompromise. For example, it requires that allfour-engine aircraft comply with FAA FAR 36,but it allows operations of noncomplying two-engine jets for an additional year if a contract fora stage 3 replacement has been signed byJanuary 1, 1983. At least one major carrier hasindicated it may discontinue its all-cargo servicerather than undertake the expense of retrofittingits existing fleet or purchasing new aircraft.

3Aviation Safety and Aircraft Noise Abatement Act of 1979,Public Law 96-193.

AIRPORT OPERATING RESTRICTIONS

Airport operators, under the FAA’s “AviationNoise Abatement Policy,14 have a responsibilityto help manage noise through proper locationand design of airports, cooperation with localauthorities to insure that surrounding land isreserved for compatible uses, and constructionof noise-reducing barriers.

In various locations, flight operation pro-cedures have been modified to reduce noise.Some airports impose limits on ground opera-tions, for example designating permissible areasand times for engine runups of jet planes.Another alternative is to require minimum alti-tudes or use of stepped approaches and steepclimbouts. Another strategy is to prescribe pre-ferred runways and approach paths which willminimize the impacts

“’Aviation Noise AbatementDepartment of Transportation,

of noise on populated

Policy” (Washingtonr D. C.: U.S.Office of the Secretary, 1976).

areas, or rotational runway programs which dis-perse the noise equally over several populatedareas,

A substantial number of airports throughoutthe world have imposed some kind of restric-tions on airport operations in order to reducenoise. As can be seen in table 3, of the 1 4 0respondents to a survey by the Airport Oper-ators’ Council International, 85 reported havingsome sort of noise abatement program.

Table 3.—Airport Operating Restrictions, 1979

Total Number withairports noise abatement

Type of airport responding programs

Large U.S. hubs . . . . . . . . . 24 15All other U.S. airports ., . . 76 35Large foreign hubs . . . . . . 40 35

SOURCE: Report on Aircraft Noise Reduction Operating Procedures (Washing-ton, D. C.: Airport Operators Council International, 1979).

NIGHT CURFEWS

The most drastic airport operating restriction noise is considered more annoying during theseis prohibiting the operation of jet aircraft during quiet hours. Thus, at first glance, a night curfewcertain hours of the night. Although an aircraft seems a logical way to greatly improve the noiseis no noisier at night than it is during the day, the environment around an airport. Only three U.S.

Ch. 5—Air Cargo Operating Restrictions ● 43

airports in the top 25 by air cargo tonnage haveimposed curfews: Minneapolis/St. Paul (Num-ber 18), Washington National (Number 21), andBaltimore-Washington International (Number23). Internationally, 15 major airports havecurfews.

The right of a U.S. community to curfew airoperations has often been contested in thecourts, Although some local ordinances con-trolling aircraft have been upheld, many havebeen declared unconstitutional because theyposed a threat to interstate commerce and in-fringed on the Federal Government’s ability toregulate the airways. Many of the existing cur-fews are, in fact, voluntary agreements betweenthe airport authority and the carriers, arrived atin an effort to avoid litigation or bad publicity.

Night curfews actually disrupt only a smallamount of an airport’s total daily activity—from5 to 10 percent of takeoffs and landings for mostairports (Honolulu is exceptional in that 16 to 24percent of its traffic is during late night hours).5

However, in the case of air cargo, night curfewsare of particular concern because so much cargois moved at night; the hours of 11 p.m. and 6a.m. are often referred to as “prime-time lift. ”About 41 percent of San Francisco’s all-cargooperations take place between 10 p.m. and 6a.m.’ At JFK and Newark Airports in 1977, 35percent of all freight moved between 10 p.m.and 7 a.m.; 94 percent of this was on all-cargoflights. ’

Many shippers have come to depend on night-time air cargo service for movement of high-value or perishable goods. Shippers tendergoods to the forwarder or carrier toward theclose of the business day so that they can beshipped at night and be available at theirdestination in time for the next day’s market.From the shipper’s point of view, the later theplane departs, the better. A study by the

‘Douglas A. Fisher, An Analysis of Airport Curfews and Theirimpact on Airline and Air Cargo Operations, dissertation, Grad-uate School of Business, Indiana University, 1977, p. 1.

6Ibid.‘John E. Wesler, “Keynote Speech,” in Raymond A. Ausrotas

and Nawald K. Taneja (eds. ), Air Freight; The Problems of Air-port Restrictions, FTL report No. R79-1 (Cambridge, Mass: FlightTransportation Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-nology, 1979), p. 42.

Massachusetts Port Authority found that thelater night flights were more economically suc-cessful than earlier ones. An experiment to in-duce shippers to use earlier flights by offeringthem lower rates was not successful.8

An airport curfew could result in delays of 12to 36 hours for some of these perishable or high-value goods. Shipments arriving at the airportafter curfew would be held overnight and sentoff the next morning. In many cases they wouldarrive too late for that day’s market and wouldremain in storage until the following morning.Such a delay would eliminate air express servicesalmost totally, and severely cut the demand forair movements of produce, such as cut flowers,which are not refrigerated when sent by air. TheU.S. Government is a major user of nighttimeair cargo service with about 60 percent of inter-city mail planned for overnight delivery by air. 9

A study for the Massachusetts Port Authorityfound that even with optimum rescheduling, 6to 8 percent of the mail handled in Boston wouldbe subject to delays if an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.curfew were imposed. 10

Curfews at a major airport could have asignificant effect because of the highly concen-trated nature of the air freight industry. Only 23U.S. cities have daily scheduled freighter service(not counting express service), and of these, fivemajor airports handled more than half of thetotal cargo tons. 11 Closing even one major air-port at night would greatly affect the others. Forexample a 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew in New Yorkwould impose an unintentional 2:30 p.m. to10:30 p.m. curfew on takeoffs of New York-bound aircraft in Los Angeles. In internationaltravel, because of the Hong Kong and Tokyocurfews, around the world flight beginning inNew York takes 45 hours. A curfew added atone other stop—say Karachi or Delhi—adds 21more hours to the trip. 12 Although the latter ex-

——‘Fisher, op. cit., p. 113.‘U.S. Postal Service, Air Transportation Division, telephone in-

terview, Jan. 14, 1980.IOGuy Goodman, PotentiaJ Effects of Curfews on Scheduling

and Delays, SAE Technical Paper Series No. 780545 (Warrendale,Pa.: Society of Automotive Engineers, 1978), p. 6.

‘ ‘Air Cargo Statistics, U S. Scheduled Airlines, Total Industry,1978 (Washington, D. C.: Air Transport Association, 1978), p. 2.

“Goodman, op. cit., p. 6.

44 . Impact of Advanced Air Transport Technology

ample is a passenger flight, the effect on cargoflights, which tend to originate or end at night,would be more severe.

Economic Impacts of Curfews

Night curfews can have adverse economic im-pacts on shippers, freight forwarders, airlines,the airport itself, and the local economy. Table 4summarizes estimated impacts for 1975 when an11 p.m. to 7 a . m . curfew was proposed forBoston’s Logan Field. As can be seen in the table,shippers would pay up to an additional $23 mil-lion annually due to increased transportationand warehousing costs.

The types of shippers most affected by thecurfew would be those specializing in perishableor high-value goods. Some firms have central-ized their manufacturing and warehousing facili-ties near a good airport and rely on air freight tomake overnight delivery of their products tocustomers or branch offices throughout thecountry. Delays resulting from curfews wouldcause severe disruption in these distribution pat-terns, and might make it difficult for these firmsto remain competitive with regional firms whosefactories are located close to retail markets.

Freight forwarding companies, which accountfor over 40 percent of domestic air freight reve-nues, make extensive use of night flights. EmeryAir Freight, the largest forwarder in the busi-

ness, moves almost two-thirds of its traffic be-tween 11 p.m. and 3 a.m. Many consider over-night delivery to be a key selling point of airfreight forwarder’s service. 3

Boeing has estimated that in a “typical” in-dustrial city like Philadelphia, Cleveland, orMinneapolis-St. Paul about 17 percent of airfreight is curfew sensitive and that 10 percent ofcurfew-sensitive cargo would be lost totally if acurfew were imposed; that is, the goods wouldnot be manufactured because they could not bedistributed at a reasonable price. Assuming traf-fic of 50,000 tons of air cargo per year at a valueof $10/lb, this could mean a total of $17 millionin goods might not be made or sold because ofthe curfew. 14

The elimination of airport activity at nightwould result in a loss of jobs in the airlines,freight forwarders, and the various airport con-cessions. According to a study by Guy Good-man, an estimated 1,114 jobs would be lost inBoston as a direct result of curfew, as shown intable 4.

In addition to these direct effects, indirectcosts and multiplier effects are anticipated. TheBoeing study, using a regional multiplier of 1.8,

‘3 Fisher, op. cit., p. 121.“Raymond A. Ausrotas, and Nawal K. Taneja (eds. ), Air-

Freight: The Problems of Airport Restrictions, FTL report No.R79-1 (Cambridge, Mass: Flight Transportation Laboratory,Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979), pp. 32-35.

Table 4.—Annual Direct Efforts on the New England Economyof an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Curfew at Boston, Mass.

With minimum With schedulesreschedul ing reoptimized

ShippersTransportation, freight penalty (000) . . . . . . . $20,100 $18,600Increased warehousing (000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2,930 $2,620Transferred warehouse jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440 280

AirlinesJob loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 244Payroll loss (000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,882 $4,687

Freight forwardersJob loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 53Payroll loss (000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,584 $672

ConcessionairesJob loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Payroll loss (000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $589 $336

PassengersIncreased fares (000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,966 $1,966

SOURCE Guy Goodman, Potential Effects of Curfews on Scheduling and Delays, Technical paper series no 78045 (Warren-dale. Pa Society of Automotive Engineers. 1978), P 6

— . —

Ch. 5—Air Cargo Operating Restrictions ● 45

estimated that $30.6 million worth of businesswould fail to be generated in the “typical” citybecause of a curfew.15 The Massachusetts studyestimated that $373 million in lost sales potentialand 13,058 jobs would ultimately be lost in NewEngland in the event of an 8-hour curfew. 16

Benefits of Curfews

Little research has been done on the benefits ofcurfews for people living near airports. Studiesof noise annoyance have found that interferencewith listening and speaking is the most annoyingaspect of aircraft noise, while interference withsleep and rest is second. It is generally assumedthat this annoyance would be greater at nightwhen ambient noise levels are lower and aircraftnoise is more noticeable.

On April 29, 1973, landing patterns at LosAngeles International Airport were reversed be-tween 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. so that planes ap-proached over Santa Monica Bay rather thanover populated areas to the east. This procedurewas followed for a year before further modifica-tions were made. The change reduced noise ex-posure east of the airport by about 50 flights pernight out of an average 657 landings per 24-hourday. Surveys were conducted in the high andmoderate noise exposure zones immediatelybefore, immediately after, and about one monthafter the change in operations. 17 Before thechange, 92 percent of the respondents in thehigh-exposure area reported some annoyancewith aircraft noise: 90 percent of these said it in-terfered with listening to radio, TV, or hi-fi and20 percent said it interfered with their sleep.

Although the objectively measured change innoise exposure seemed large—averaging around50 dB(A) at night as compared to around 70dB(A) before the change—little or no consistentchange in response was found in the Los Angelesinterviews. In the medium-exposure area, therewere slight decreases in reported annoyancelevels. In the high-exposure area, the number ofpersons claiming that aircraft noise interfered— .

“Ibid.“Goodman, op. cit., p. 6.1‘All survey results reported in S. Fidell and G. Jones, “Effects of

Cessation of Late-Night Flights on an Airport Community, ” )o~(r-

tIa~ of SouHd a)~d VI bmtI(>)I VO] 42, 1975, pp. 411-427.

with their sleep actually went up. The thirdround of interviews, conducted between amonth and 6 weeks after the change, showedno significant changes compared with the firstround. Overall, almost 56 percent of respond-ents replied they had not noticed a change in thenumber of flights; 20 percent noticed fewer; and20 percent said they noticed more. Many ofthose who reported noticing fewer flights wereaware of the new flight restrictions fromnewspapers or other sources.

The perceived benefit of reduced noise levelsin this experiment was minimal. However, thetemporary discontinuation of all nighttimeflights at airports in Hong Kong and San Diegoto permit runway resurfacing was so popularwith the public that they were turned into per-manent curfews when the airports attempted toresume around-the-clock operations after thework was completed.

The Federal Role

The FAA has the responsibility for regulatingnoise levels at their source—the aircraft them-selves. The local authorities at a particular air-port have the responsibility for controlling thenoise levels at their airport.

The appropriate Federal role in the curfewissue is not clearly defined. On the one hand, theissue appears to be a local one—a conflict be-tween local home owners and their airport. Onthe other hand, if local citizens are able to estab-lish night curfews in one or more major airfreight cities, they could essentially shut downnight cargo flights and create a massive changein modal choices.

In 1977 the Air Transport Association ofAmerica (ATA) petitioned the FAA to adoptregulations governing airport noise abatementplans. Essentially, the ATA petition called onthe FAA to utilize the provisions of the FederalAviation Act of 1958, as amended, to disap-prove local noise abatement rules related to airtransportation, which were claimed to be:

1. inconsistent with the highest degree of safe-ty in air commerce and air transportation;

2. inconsistent with the efficient utilization ofnavigable airspace;

—. —--


3.

4.

5.

unduly burdensome to interstate or foreigncommerce or unduly interfering with thenational transportation system;unjustly discriminatory. For example, aban on jet aircraft only would be discrim-inatory, since some jets are quieter thansome propeller aircraft; andin conflict with the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration’s statutory regulatory author-ity. 18

The FAA has not taken the actions suggestedby ATA, but it has challenged proposed airportplans through advisory opinions and statementsin local public hearings. The FAA contends thatthe field of airport noise abatement has not beentotally preempted, and that the Federal Govern-ment shares responsibility to some degree withState and local authorities. How these variousresponsibilitiesunresolved.

Operating

will be sorted out is still

Restrictions OverseasThe airport curfew is only one of several types

of operating restrictions imposed on U.S. car-——

“Clifton F. Von Kann, “Keynote Speech, ” in Ausrotas andTaneja, Air Flight; The Problems, p. 52,

riers by foreign governments. Some of the re-strictions are regarded by U.S. carriers as clear-cut attempts by foreign countries to inhibit com-petition with their own national airlines. For ex-ample, U.S. carriers report that one Europeancountry, which owned no 747 freighters, refusedlanding rights to foreign 747 freighters until anarrangement was worked out to lease them a 747for part of the week. Another European nationinsisted that an airline could only providepickup and delivery service in towns where italso offered passenger service. Since the localcarrier served many more cities than the U.S.carrier, competition for cargo business wasdecidedly one-sided. In this particular instance,the problem was overcome with U.S. Govern-ment assistance. In another example, one Asiancountry requires elaborate cargo clearance pro-cedures for foreign carriers only that are bothcostly and time-consuming. In another instance,the national carrier is allotted prime terminalspace and is the only carrier allowed full controlof its freight from terminal to warehouse. Theseconstraints seriously jeopardize the economicviability of U.S. carriers in international service.Continuing U.S. Government efforts appearneeded in order to address such restrictions.

Chapter 6

LIGHTER-THAN-AIR VEHICLES

Chapter 6

LIGHTER-THAN-AIR VEHICLES’

Lighter-than-air vehicles (LTAs), or airships,were very active from the first years of this cen-tury until about 1960. During World War I, eachside operated about 100 airships. They rangedfrom the smaller (100,000 f t3) non-rigids tolarger (2.5 million ft3) rigids. In 1933, the Goodyear Zeppelin Corp. completed two rigid air-ships, Akron and Macon, for the U.S. Navy;these were the largest airships built to that date,and two of the largest airships ever built.2 Four.

‘We wish to thank D. E. Williams of Goodyear AerospaceCorp. for his assistance in the preparation of this chapter.

2Goodyea r Aerospace Corp., Feasibility Stz/d.w [)~ Modcr/~ Air-~lli~~s, L’(11 /// Hlstoric[?llv Ovcn~ieu] (Task I), p r e p a r e d by

Gerald Faurote, NASA report No. CR-137692 (Moffett Field,Calif.: Ames Research Center, National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration, August 1975), pp. 2-3,

of the largest non-rigid airships ever built (ZPG-3W) were completed in 1960 also by Goodyear.

Rigid airships are built of a lightweight rigidstructure with an outer fabric of treated cloth.The lifting gas is contained in several independent gas-tight cells. In contrast, the non-rigidairship consists merely of an envelope (hull)typically of a coated fabric filled with a liftinggas and pressured slightly above that of the out-side atmosphere. Several air compartmentswithin the hull are used to maintain a constantpressure and provideand out as needed.3

ballast by ducting air in

31bid,, pp. 4-8.

LONG RANGE AIRSHIPS4

Both rigid and non-rigid airships have beenused extensively as long endurance/long-rangeplatforms to carry payloads which are essential-ly fixed (constant weight). Due to the difficultyin managing excess buoyancy, applications withwidely varying payload weights, such as cargotransport, were not pursued; passenger servicewas considered more suitable. In addition, lim-ited ability to exercise control at low speed com-plicated ground handling and made terminal op-erations cumbersome.

The rigid airship declined in popularity afterthe Hindenburg disaster in 1937. No doubt thedisaster itself had an effect, but there were morefundamental causes at work. In the 1930’s, theairplane surpassed the airship in speed, produc-tivity, operating cost, and even safety. In 1937,the most advanced passenger airplane, theDC-3, had double the cruising speed of the mostadvanced airship, the Hindenburg; the DC-3

‘This discussion is based on Mark D. Ardema, “Economics o fModern Long-Haul Cargo Airships, ” paper presented at Lighter-Than-Air Systems Conference, Aug. 11-12, 1977, AIAA paper No.77-1192

also had total operating costs per seat-mile be-tween one-half and one-third those of the Hin-denburg. Thus, although the Hindenburg dis-aster and the approach of World War II has-tened the end of even the commercial passengercarrying airship operations, it is clear that thefundamental cause was the growing inability ofthe airship to compete economically with theairplane.

The economic nonviability of the long-haulairship can be better understood by noting thestandard computation of a vehicle’s productiv-ity: payload by speed. The airplane came to farsurpass the airship’s speed; the present-day ratiois roughly four to one for a wide-bodied jet ver-sus an airship. This means that a jet with thesame payload as an airship can transport severaltimes as much freight in the same time as the air-ship (although less than fourfold because of theterminal time at each end).

The productivity difference is reflected indirect operating costs. Direct operating costs peravailable ton-knot of an airship based on the

49


latest technology are calculated to be from 50 to150 percent higher than those of an equivalentsize modern fanjet transport airplane. One studyconcluded that 747 costs were 21.6 cents per rev-enue ton-mile and airship lower bound costswere 35.7 cents per revenue ton-mile, assuminga 55 percent load factor and a 25 percent profitbefore taxes.5 Other studies project airship coststo be four times those of airplanes. These studiesassume the existence of adequate numbers andlocations of airports.

There are other advantages to higher speedbesides increased productivity. One is that a fastvehicle is less susceptible to weather delay than aslower one because head winds have less effecton ground speed, and adverse weather can bemore easily circumvented. Airplanes also havethe very important customer appeal of shortertrip times, which is a vital factor in passengerservice and is also important for most air cargoservice.

Higher fuel prices raise airplane operatingcosts more than those of the more fuel-efficient

51bid., p. 93.

POTENTIAL PROPERTIES

Under a recent National Aeronautics andSpace Administration (NASA) -funded study,the Goodyear Aerospace Corp. estimated that a26 percent reduction in empty weight as com-pared to the 1933 Macon could be achievedusing modern plastic and metallic materials. Theempty-weight-to-gross-weight ratio can be re-duced from 0.59 to about 0.40. The amount ofpayload would depend on the amount of fueltaken on, which depends on the requirements ofthe mission. G Such technological advances cansubstantially improve the payload of modernairships of the ZPG-3W and Macon designs.

In addition, studies conducted by Goodyearfor NASA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Alberta

airship. However, surface transportation—trucks, rail, and some ships—is more fuel effi-cient than airships. Thus higher fuel costs aloneare not likely to appreciably enhance theairship’s competitiveness.

Airships, as they are presently conceived, arenot competitive with airplanes for the long-range transportation of cargo. There are, how-ever, other roles for which a modern airship or ahybrid airship is well suited. Airships have defi-nite advantages over airplanes in short distancehauling of very heavy or bulky cargo, and forjobs that require long endurance in the air, suchas certain types of patrol. Airships can also beconfigured to perform vertical lift operationsmore economically than helicopters and can doso with much heavier and larger payloads. If air-ships do make the comeback some predict, itprobably will be because they solve new trans-portation problems and not because they com-pete directly with existing types of long-rangeaircraft.

OF MODERN AIRSHIPS

Ministry of Transportation, and the U.S. AirForce show that operational versatility as well asoperating economies can be substantially im-proved by marrying modern propulsion tech-nologies to rigid or non-rigid conventional air-ships. The propulsion system might be conven-tional fan/prop units, which would improvecruise performance and terminal operations, ormultiple rotor units to provide precision hovercapability for lifts ranging from 20 to 150 tons.Such an airship could operate into and out ofremote and unprepared areas at substantiallylower costs than current alternatives with pay-loads substantially larger or heavier than ex-isting air lift methods.

‘Goodyear, op. cit., pp. 118-126.

— --——-—

Ch. 6—Lighter-Than-Air Vehicles ● 51

.

Photo credit Goodyear Aerospace Corp

MODERNIZED CONVENTIONAL AIRSHIPS (MCA)

One of the inherent characteristics of conven-tional airships has been their ability to fly atslow speed with little expenditure of fuel. Thiscould make them appropriate for surveillancemissions of relatively long duration, providedground-handling and basing could be simplified,Modernization of these ships with efficient vec-torable propulsion could address this problem.In addition, it would provide the airship with

the ability for vertical takeoff and landing(VTOL) and coarse hovering, which wouldenable it to accomplish tasks not possible forfixed wing aircraft.

An MCA of this design would have takeoffand landing characteristics that approach thoseof a helicopter, together with range and payloadcapabilities well beyond that of the helicopter.


The ability of such an airship to carry moderate enable it to provide transportation for people orpayloads (20,000 to 80,000 lb) relatively long cargo in many locations for which it is imprac-distances and to service unprepared sites would tical to use conventional transportation.

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

In 1957, a U.S. Navy airship set an endurancerecord of 11 days aloft and 9,000 miles traveledwithout refueling. 7 This is well beyond what ispossible with fixed or rotary wing aircraft. TheLTA also has low vibration level, low noiselevel, and low pilot workload, all of whichreduce crew fatigue. Some suggested applica-tions have been:

1.

2.

3.

— —

Mineral detection. Armed with the neces-sary instruments, airships used in largemineral surveys could outperform air-planes in both accuracy and costs. Com-puters and a large amount of equipmentcould be put on board. The steady flightand low vibration would contribute to ac-curacy. 8

Pollution watch. A small airship, con-trolled by a radio signal and carryingseveral hundred pounds of detection in-struments and television cameras, couldpatrol the space above a city. The air pollu-tion level of any chosen point could bemonitored accurately, and signals frompollution sources could be transmitted tothe control center on the ground. g

Border lookout. Airships equipped withelectronic surveillance instruments couldserve as lookout posts and communicationlinks between patrol units and commandposts in key border areas.

‘Letter dated Mar. 27, 1980, from K. E. Williams, U.S. CoastGuard.

8Hsu Te Pao, “Prospects of Airship Applications” (originallypublished in Hang K’ung Chih Shih, Peking, No. 8, 1976, pp.30-32), translation prepared by Foreign Technology Division,FTD-ID(RS)T-2043-77 (Dayton, Ohio: Wright-Patterson AFB,Foreign Technology Divisionr December 1977), p. 607.

‘Ibid., p. 8.

4.

5.

Radar platform. The U.S. Defense Depart-ment recently installed special target-de-tecting radar on stationary ballons to spoteven very slow movements of troops. TheU.S. DOD estimates that the cost of usingstationary ballons for day/night lowaltitude observation is only one-tenth thecost of using airplanes. The mobility ofan airship combined with its tolerance for abroader range of atmospheric and environ-mental conditions would greatly expandthis capability.Police patrol. Both manned and unmannedLTA’s have been tried for police patrol.Goodyear and the city of Tempe, Ariz. in-dependently experimented with manneddirigibles. One experiment included the de-velopment of remotely controlled mini-blimps of up to 10,000 ft3, with downwardpointed TV cameras. This application is ex-pected to have several economic and opera-tional advantages over other patrol andsurveillance systems. Introduction of sucha system has been considered in SouthernCalifornia.

An MCA of about 875,000 fts has been as-sessed by the U.S. Coast Guard to be economic-ally and operationally effective in satisfying anarray of missions, including monitoring of buoyplacement, surveillance activities, port trafficcontrol, and monitoring ice conditions on theGreat Lakes.

— — —10Ibid., p. 11.‘‘ G. R. Semann, “Unmanned Blimp Patrol, ” paper No. 79-164,

1979 AIAA Lighter-Than-Air Systems Technology Conference.

Ch. 6—Lighter-Than-Air Vehicles ● 53

HEAVY LIFT AIRSHIPS (H LA)

The Heavy Lift Airship (HLA), a concept firstproposed by Piasecki Aircraft Corp., consists ofa helium-filled airship hull with propulsive liftderived from conventional helicopter rotors.The buoyant lift essentially offsets the emptyweight of the vehicle; thus all the rotor thrust isavailable for lifting the useful load, maneuver-ing, and controlling the vehicle. 12 The purposeof the HLA is to vertically lift and haul heavyoutsized cargo. The Piasecki version of this con-cept is shown in figure 9. Piasecki is now undercontract to the Navy to build and demonstratein flight a prototype of this aircraft.

Goodyear has also designed a 75-ton HLA(figure 10). It is estimated to have a range of 300nautical miles, and can be ferried without pay-load, with rotors folded, for over 3,000 miles.Without the buoyance, the collective payloadcapability of four equivalent helicopters at theirrated 100 mile range would be less than half thatof the HLA. 3

The HLA fuel consumption for a design speedof 80 knots with design payload of 150,000 lb isestimated to be 0.22 gal/ton-mile. Without thebenefits of buoyancy, fuel requirements wouldbe on the order of 0.52 gal/ton-mile.14

Table 4 indicates the estimated numbers andrequired payloads of HLAs in several potentialmarkets.

The two primary markets for the HLA appearto be logging and unloading cargo at congestedports. The environmental benefits of this use ofthe HLA when used in remote locations has beendescribed as follows:

In a study of the potential application of ad-vanced aircraft in developing countries spon-sored by NASA, it was found that the ecologyof the tropics can be seriously altered if normalmethods (i. e., timber roads) are employed togain access to certain natural resources—such asforests. Air lifting can mitigate these effects pro-

‘2Gooctyear Aerospace Corp., Fcmibllify St~/dW ,>f Mo~icr}t Air-\/~Ip>, PIIU5U 11– E.xcct/f/~~t’ S~~/)~t)~ury, NASA report No, 2922(Moffett Field, Calif.: Ames Research Center, National Aero-nautics and Space Administration, November, 1977), pp. 7-8.

“Ibid., p. 12.“Ibid., p. 9.

Figure 9.—Heavy Lift Airship Concept

‘*.

SOURCE: Piasecki Aircraft Corporation,

vialed the aircraft is capable of handling theloads. A heavy lift-type airship showed signifi-cant benefit for such applications. Similar eco-logical constraints also exist in Northern regionssubject to heavy winter freezes and surface thawconditions. These were discussed in studies bythe Canadian Province of Alberta which alsopointed out that undeveloped areas do not con-tain the surface transportation systems requiredto bring equipment into such regions or removethe resources. Furthermore, the costs ofbuilding adequate rail or road systems for shortterm use did not justify such construction. 5

Interest in LTA continues to be active. In July1981, the fourth international conference on

‘5Goodyear Aerospace Corp., Modern Airships Program, com-munication, March 1980.


Figure 10.—Heavy Lift Airship—General Arrangement and Selected Performance75 Ton Payloada

~ “ ’ ’ ”

*Fin split

c o m p a r t m e n t C o n t r o l Fuel Star frametanks

I

car

—

. -

Ram air—

231 ft. *

Rotor

Rotormodule

scoop Landing I Lift” PropellerOutboard

gear strut strut

a5,000 ft altitude, standard day, one engine out, .

SOURCE: Goodyear Aerospace Corp., Modern Airships Program, Akron, Ohio.

LTA systems technology was held in this coun-try. The three-day conference, sponsored by theAmerican Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-nautics (AIAA), received over 30 papers describ-ing work presently being funded by the NationalForest Service, NASA, the Navy, and the Coast

Gross weightDynamic lift

Characteristics

290,807 Ibs.150,000 Ibs.

Static lift 140,807 Ibs.Empty weight (including EREW, residual fuel) 140,564 Ibs,Useful payload 150,000 IbsStatic heavinessEnvelope volume 2,600,000 It 3 (unstretched)Ballonet volume 650,000 It 3

Ballonet celling 9,500 ItHull fineness ratio 418Design speed (TAS) 80 knotsRange

DesignMax. payload 300 nmNo. payload 1,137 nm

Ferry 3,180 nm

Guard as well as work underway in Canada,England, France, and Germany. Projects cur-rently in progress rangeysis, through subsystemopment to constructionH L A.

from theoretical anal-and component devel-of a proof-of-concept

o