The appendix to this brief is not available for online viewing as specified in the Minnesota Rules of Public Access to the Records of the Judicial Branch, Rule 8, Subd. 2(e)(2).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. iii

STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES ................................................................................. vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 1

ARG,UMENT .................................................................................................... : ................ ; 3

I. Appellant's Vehicle Was Subject to Forfeiture ....................................................... 3

II. The Vehicle Exemption in Section 550.37, subd. 12a Does Not Apply to Vehicle Forfeitures ................................................................................................... 5

A. The Plain Language of Section 169A.63 Precludes Inclusion of a Vehicle Exemption ........................... _. .......................................................... 6

B. A Straightforward Construction of Sections 169A.63 and 550.37, subd. 12a, That Excludes the "Vehicle Exemption" in Forfeiture Actions Avoids Irreconcilable Conflicts ...................................... 7

C. Minnesota's Forfeiture Law, Section 169A.63, Controls Even If There Is an Irreconcilable Conflict With Section 550.37, subd. 12a .......... 11

III. The Legislature's Enactment of Section 169A.63 Without an Exemption for Inexpensive Vehicles is Constitutional .................................................................. 17

A. Torgelson Does Not Control Because the Homestead Exemption Does Not Apply to Vehicles ....................................................................... 23

B. The Legislative Decision to Create an Exemption for Vehicles in Section 550.37, subd. 12a and to Not Provide Such an Exemption in Forfeiture Actions Is Constitutional.. .......................................................... 26

1. A Vehicle Exemption Is Not Constitutionally Required ................. 27

2. Creation of a Limited Vehicle Exemption That Excludes Vehicles Used By Repeat Drunk Drivers Is Constitutional.. ........... 28

C. An Administrative Vehicle Forfeiture under Section 169A.63 Is Not Limited by Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution ................ 36

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 39

ADDENDUM

Affidavit of Kirk M. Anderson ...................................................................... Addendum 1

State v. Nielson, Henn. Dist. Ct. File No. 27-CR-11-14967 (Ex. A to Anderson Aff.) ................................................................... Addendum 2

Notice of Seizure and Intent to Forfeit Vehicle (Ex. B to Anderson Aff.) ..................................................................... Addendum 5

Order and Memorandum Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Respondent, Nielson v. 2003 Honda Accord, (Dist. Ct. File No. 27-CV-11-20747) ............................................................ Addendum 6

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

MINNESOTA CASES

Barton v. Drake 21 Minn. 299 (1875) .............................................................................................. 20

City of New Hope v. 1986 Mazda 626 546 N.W. 2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) ............................................................... 16

Denzer v. Prendergast 126 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 1964) ................................................................... 21, 33,34

Dimke v. Finke 295 N.W. 75 (1940) ................................................................................... 20, 25, 29

Lumber Co. v. Carstens 80 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1956) ............................................................................... 32, 34

Grimes v. Bryne 2 Minn. 89 (Minn. 1858) .................................................................................. 30, 31

In re 2010 Gubernatorial Election 793 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 2010) ................................................................................. 6

In re Haggerty 448 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1989) ............................................................................... 20

Holden v. Falwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co. 27 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1947) ..............................................................•.................. 24

Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm 'r of Revenue 698 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2005) ................................................................................. 6, 7

Lukkason v. 1993 Chevrolet Extended Cab Pickup 590 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) ................................................................ 16

Miller v. ONE 2001 Pontiac Aztek 669 N.W. 2d 893 (Minn. 2003) ........................................................................ 17, 18

Minneapolis E. Ry. V. City of Minneapolis 77 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1956) ................................................................................. 16

lll

Minneapolis Fed'n ofTeachers Local 59, AFL-CIO v. Obermeyer 147 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 1966) ............................................................................... 29

Nielson v. 2003 Honda Accord -- N.W.2d --, 2012 WL 3892395 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2012) ................. 1, 2, 5

Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet 821 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2012) ............................................................................. 6, 7

Poznanovic v. Maki 296 N.W. 415 (Minn. 1941) ............... ; .............................. : .... , ........................ passim

Ryan v. Colburn 241.N.W. 388 (Minn. 1932) ................................................................................... 21

State v. Johnson 813 N.W.2d I (Minn. 2012) ................................................................................... 17

State v. Merrill 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) ............................................................................... 17

Torgelson v. Real Property Known as 17138 8801h Ave, Renville County

749 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 2008) .......................................................................... passim

Tuttle v. Strout 7 Minn. 465 (Minn. 1862) ...................................................................................... 21

Whitney v. Welnitz 190 N.W. 57 (Minn. 1922) ............................................................................... 27, 34

STATE CASES

State of Oklahoma v. One 1965 Red Chevrolet Pickup 37 P.3d 815 (Okla. 2001) ....................................................................................... 35

State v. Ten Acres 877 P.2d 597 (Okla. 1994) ..................................................................................... 35

MINNESOTA STATUTES

Minn. Stat.§ 169A.63 ................................................................................................ passim

Minn. Stat.§ 510.01 ...................................................................... 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 33

IV

Minn. Stat. 550.01 ............................................................................................. 9, 10, 12, 23

Minn. Stat. 550.02 ............................................................................................................... 9

Minn. Stat. 550.03 ............................................................................................................. I 0

Minn. Stat. 550.04 ............................................................................................................... 9

Minn. Stat. 550.08 ............................................................................................................... 9

Minn. Stat. 550.18 ............................................................................................................... 9

Minn. Stat. 550.20 ............................................................................................................... 9

Minn. Stat. § 550.37 ................................................................................................... passim

Minn. Stat.§ 609.5311 ........................................................................ 18, 19, 21, 23, 24,27

Minn. Stat.§ 645.16 ........................................................................................................ 5, 6

Minn. Stat. § 645.17 .......................................................................................................... 17

Minn. Stat. § 645.26 ........................................................................................ 11, 13, 14, 16

CONSTITUTION

Minn. Const. art. I, § 12 ............................................. · ......................... 20, 23, 28, 29, 37, 38

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Minnesota Convention Debates 99 (1857) (debates of July 24, 1857) ............................. 20

1858 Minnesota Laws Chapter 35 § 8 ........................................................................ 14, 20

1980 Minn. Laws Chapter 550, §2 ........................................................................ 14, 24, 27

1992 Minnesota Laws Chapter 570, § 15 ......................................................................... 15

1993 Minnesota Laws Chapter 78 § 7 .............................................................................. 15

Minn. Reg. Vol. 36, No. 39 at pp. 1217-18 (April16, 2012) ............................................. 4

v

STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES

1. Did the Court of Appeals commit error when it held that Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, is not limited by the vehicle exemption found in Minn. Stat.§ 550.37, subd. 12a?

District Court: Held that the exemption found in Minn. Stat.§ 550.37, subd. 12a did not apply to vehicle forfeiture cases. Resp. Addendum. at 8.

Court of Appeals: Affirmed the District Court and held the exemption found in Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a did not apply to vehicle forfeiture cases. Appellant's. Appendix at AS.

Most Apposite Cases: Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 812 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2012)

Most Apposite Statutory Provisions: Minn. Stat.§ 169A.63 Minn. Stat. § 550.37 Minn. Stat. § 645.16 Minn. Stat. § 645.26

2. Did the Court of Appeals commit error when it held that Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, did not violate Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution?

District Court: Held that there was no constitutional violation. Resp. Addendum. at 8.

Court of Appeals: Affirmed and held that there was no constitutional violation. Appendix at A4-A5.

Most Apposite Cases: Torgelson v. Real Property, 749 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 2008) Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Carstens, 80 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1956) Poznanovic v. Maki, 296 N.W. 415 (Minn. 1941) Dimke v. Finke, 295 N.W. 75 (Minn. 1940)

Most Apposite Constitutional and Statutory Provisions: Minn. Const. art. I, § 12 Minn. Stat.§ 169A.63 Minn. Stat. § 550.37

VI

INTRODUCTION

Appellant boldly argues that Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture law is unconstitutional

or that the Minnesota Constitution compels an exemption from forfeiture actions for less

expensive vehicles. Appellant contends that because Minnesota has exempted vehicles

with a current value below $4,600 from civil judgment enforcement actions, Minnesota's

vehicle forfeiture law for repeat drunk drivers, which does not include this exemption, is

unconstitutional. This argument is predicated on a dramatic and unwarranted application

of this Court's decision in Torgelson v. Real Property, 749 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 2008). In

a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected

Appellant's arguments. See Nielson v. 2003 Honda Accord,-- N.W.2d --, 2012 WL

3892395 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2012). Appellant's novel argument should similarly

be rejected by this Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant is a repeat drunk driver. At 9:30p.m. on April 11, 2009, Appellant

dfove his 2003 Honda Accord the wrong way down First Avenue in Minneapolis near

Lake Street. He was stopped by a Minneapolis police officer, who was driving the

correct direction on First A venue. Appellant did not have license to drive, nor did he

provide proof of insurance when he was stopped. Appellant displayed several signs of

intoxiCation. After being read the implied consent advisory, Appellant provided a urine

sample. Laboratory testing revealed that Appellant had a blood alcohol concentration of

.23, nearly three times the legal limit of .08.

I

Appellant was arrested and charged with First Degree Driving While Impaired,

based on his driving while under the influence and his previous convictions for driving

under the influence from January 24, 2009, July 4, 2009, and November 11, 2009. 1

Ultimately, in August 2011, Appellant pled guilty to First Degree Driving While

Impaired. He was sentenced in October 20 11.

After Appellant's arrest on April 11,2009, he was served with a Notice of Seizure

and Intent to Forfeit Vehicle for his 2003 Honda Accord,

Resp. Addendum at 5. Appellant challenged this forfeiture by filing a Petition for

Judicial Determination of the Forfeiture in Conciliation Court in Hennepin County. On

September 30, 2011, the Conciliation Court Referee granted Appellant's request that the

motor vehicle exemption found in Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a be applied to the

forfeiture of his vehicle. The Hennepin County Attorney's Office appealed this decision

to Hennepin County District Court. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on

the legal issue of whether Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a applied to the forfeiture of

Appellant's vehicle. On December 1, 2011, Hennepin County District Court Judge

George McGunnigle granted the County Attorney's summary judgment motion and

concluded that the motor vehicle exemption in Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a did not

apply. Resp. Addendum. at 6-8. Appellant appealed and the Minnesota Court of Appeals

affirmed the district court. See Nielson v. 2003 Honda Accord,-- N.W.2d --, 2012 WL

3892395 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2012).

1 The facts relating to Appellant's conduct are from the criminal complaint that was part of the summary judgment record before the district court. See Resp. Addendum at 2.

2

·ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. There are no disputed

facts at issue in this appeal and this Court's review of the legal issue is de novo. The

legal issue presented is whether Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture law is somehow limited

by either: (1) Minnesota Statutes§ 550.37, subd. 12a, which exempts vehicles to the

extent the value does not exceed $4,600, from methods of enforcing or collecting on civil

monetary judgments; or (2) Article I, Section 12 of Minnesota's Constitution, which

requires the exemption of a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the

payment of debts and liabilities.

I. Appellant's Vehicle Was Subject to Forfeiture.

There is no dispute that Appellant was driving his vehicle while intoxicated, that

he was convicted of a "designated offense," and that his vehicle was properly seized

pursuant to Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture laws. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(a)

("A vehicle is presumed subject to forfeiture under this section if: ( 1) the driver is

convicted of the designated offense upon which the forfeiture is based ... "); subd. 8(a)

("A motor vehicle used to commit a designated offense or used in conduct resulting in a

designated license revocation is subject to administrative forfeiture under this

subdivision"). First Degree Driving While Impaired, Appellant's conviction related to

the seizure of his vehicle, is a "designated offense." See Minn. Stat. 169A.63, subd.

1( e )(1 ).

Pursuant to Minnesota law, legal title to the 2003 Honda Civic vested with the

City ofMinneapolis on April 11, 2009, based on Appellant's drunk driving offense. See

3

Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 3 ("All right, title, and interest in a vehicle subject to

forfeiture under this section vests in the appropriate agency upon commission of the

conduct resulting in the designated offense or designated license revocation giving rise to

the forfeiture. Any vehicle seized under this section is not subject to replevin, but is

deemed to be in the custody of the appropriate agency subject to the orders and decrees of

the court having jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings.").

There is no limitation on the value ofvehicles·that can be seized and forfeited, nor

is there a motor vehicle exemption in this forfeiture law for lower value vehicles.

Appellant argues that despite the plain language of this vehicle forfeiture law, an

exemption for vehicles must be imposed in this case, to the extent the vehicle's value

does not exceed $4,600. Specifically, Appellant argues that Minnesota's law exempting

some property from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued from

any court," Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 1, including vehicles "to the extent the value does

not exceed $2,000," Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a,2 applies to vehicles subject to

forfeiture as a result of drunk driving offenses. Appellant's Br. at 8 ("Once the

Legislature has determined what property is exempt (as it did with motor vehicles), that

property is entitled to constitutional protection.").

Appellant argues that the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 169 A.63 are limited by

Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution and/or by Section 550.37, subd. 12a.

However, he has cited no precedent that would directly support this argument. Moreover,

2 As pointed out by Appellant, this dollar figure is subject to periodic adjustment. Effective July 1, 2012, this amount is now $4,600. See Minn. Reg. Vol. 36, No. 39 at pp. 1217-18 (April16, 2012).

4

the forfeiture law at issue and the motor vehicle exemption in Section 550.37, subd. 12a

have coexisted for more than 20 years. Appellant attempts to graft a statute related to

methods for enforcing and collecting on civil monetary judgments onto the vehicle

forfeiture statute, but there is no legal basis to read such a limit into the vehicle forfeiture

statute. Appellant's argument should be rejected as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeals rejected Appellant's argument, as follows:

The constitution does not require the motor vehicle exemption provision in section 550.37 to prevent or limit the forfeiture of motor vehicles, and the statutory provision does not, by its terms, restrict the operation of the forfeiture provision of 169A.63 or require the forfeiting authority to reimburse the owner the value of the vehicle forfeited to the state because of his drunk driving.

Nielson, 2012 WL 3892395, at *5. This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals'

decision.

II. The Vehicle Exemption in Section 550.37, subd. 12a Does Not Apply to Vehicle Forfeitures.

As noted, Appellant argues that Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture law is limited by

Section 550.37, subd. 12a. Pursuant to its plain language, however, Section 550.37, subd.

12a does not apply to vehicle forfeitures, thus Appellant's argument must be rejected.

The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of

the legislature. See Minn. Stat.§ 645.16. Section 550.37, subd. 12a does not apply to

vehicle forfeiture actions under Section 1,69A.63 for three separate reasons: (1) the plain

language of Section 169A.63 precludes such an exemption; (2) Section 169A.63 and

Section 550.37, subd. 12a can be read to give effect to both laws without creating a

5

conflict; and (3) even if there were an irreconcilable conflict between these statutes, the

rules of statutory construction dictate that the provisions of Section 169A.63 prevail.

A. The Plain Language of Section 169A.63 Precludes Inclusion of a Vehicle Exemption.

The plain language of Section 169 A.63 does not contain a limit or exception for

vehicles with a value less than $4,600. This Court has repeatedly stated that the starting

point for interpreting statutes is the language ofthe statutes. See, e.g. In re 2010

Gubernatorial Election, 793 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn. 2010). Ifthe language of a statute

is unambiguous, the Court will not inquire further to determine the statute's meaning.

See Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 2012) ("Ifthe language ofthe

statute is clear and free from ambiguity, the court's role is to enforce the language of the

statute.") (citing Minn. Stat. § 645 .16); Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm 'r of Revenue, 698

N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2005) ("We have repeatedly held that we must give effect to the

plain meaning of statutory text when it is clear and unambiguous.").

The vehicle forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, authorizes the seizure of

vehicles when the owner violates the law and commits a "designated offense." Minn.

Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 6(a). There is a presumption that the vehicle is subject to

forfeiture when the driver is convicted. See !d., subd. 7(a). The statute also authorizes an

administrative forfeiture procedure, which is the procedure used in this case. !d., subd.

8(a). Finally, the law mandates the disposition of vehicles that are forfeited. The

vehicles are sold, with the proceeds being split between the appropriate law enforcement

6

authority and the prosecuting authority, or the vehicles are kept for official use by the law

enforcement authority. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. IO(a).

By its plain language, the vehicle forfeiture statute mandates forfeiture of

qualifying vehicles regardless of their value. There is no exemption or statutory limit to

these forfeiture actions. Specifically, there is no provision that "exempts" vehicles to the

extent the value is below a certain threshold. Moreover, the statute is clear that all of the

proceeds from any sale are split between the law enforcement agency that seized the

vehicle and the relevant prosecuting authority. !d. The language of Sections 169 A.63,

subds. 7(a), 8(a), and 10(a) is clear and unambiguous. There is no "vehicle exemption."

Accordingly, the Court need go no further to reject Appellant's statutory argument. See

Patino, 821 N.W.2d at 814-15; Hutchinson Tech., 698 N.W.2d at 8.

B. A Straightforward Construction of Sections 169A.63 and 550.37, subd. 12a, That Excludes the "Vehicle Exemption" in Forfeiture Actions Avoids Irreconcilable Conflicts.

Despite the plain language of Section 169A.63, Appellant argues that Section

550.37, subd. 12a conflicts with and somehow limits Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture law.

Appellant's Br. at 6-7. This argument fails for several reasons. First, as discussed above,

the plain language of Section 169A.63 does not include any "exemption" for vehicles

valued below a certain limit. The legislature created a vehicle forfeiture law related to

vehicles used to commit "designated offenses" and explicitly chose not to exempt such

vehicles from forfeiture actions.

Second, despite Appellant's attempt to create a conflict between Section 169A.63

and Section 550.37, the statutes are easily harmonized. In enacting Section 169A.63, the

7

legislature created a comprehensive procedure for administrative and judicial forfeitures

of vehicles used by repeat drunk drivers who commit designated offenses. This law

authorizes forfeiture of vehicles regardless of their value, does not contain an exemption

for lower value vehicles, and dictates the process by which forfeited vehicles are sold and

the proceeds distributed. There is no statutory basis to look outside of Section 169A;63

to determine whether some vehicles are exempt from forfeiture.

Most forfeiture actions, like this one, begin with the law enforcement agency

seizing the vehicle incident to arrest and providing notice to the driver of the

administrative forfeiture process. !d., subd. 8; see also Resp. Addendum at 5. All right,

title and interest in a vehicle subject to forfeiture immediately vests in the law

enforcement agency when seized. !d., subd. 3. An individual may challenge the

propriety of a seizure by filing a demand for judicial determination, and after review the

court will either order the vehicle returned or conclude that the vehicle is subject to

forfeiture. !d., subd. 9. If the vehicle is administratively forfeited or if a court finds that

the vehicle is subject to forfeiture, the appropriate agency must sell the vehicle and

distribute the proceeds, or keep the vehicle for official use. !d., subd. 10. Pursuant to this

law, the court's role is limited to determining whether the vehicle is subject to forfeiture.

Moreover, at the conclusion of a forfeiture action, there is no judgment to enforce or

execute, because by operation of law, all right, title and interest vests in the law

enforcement agency upon seizure. See id., subd. 3.

In contrast to the unique and specific provisions in Section 169A. 63 related to

vehicle forfeiture actions, Chapter 550 of Minnesota Laws contains Minnesota's general

8

I I

I

laws related to obtaining and executing civil judgments. This chapter is focused on

providing a method for parties in civil litigation, who obtain a judgment in their favor, to

"proceed to enforce the [judgment]" against the judgment debtor. Minn. Stat. § 550.01.

In general, in Minnesota, a judgment debtor is required to disclose his or her assets and a

judgment creditor may then seek to enforce the judgment by execution. See Minn. Stat.

§ 550.02. Such an execution may involve confiscation and sale of personal property of

the judgment debtor. See Minn. Stat.§§ 550.04 (1), (5); 550.08; 550.18; and 550.20.

When execu.ting a judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff may

proceed by "levying upon the same, collecting the things in action, or selling the same if

the court so orders, selling other property ... and paying to the judgment creditors the

proceeds, or so much thereof as will satisfy the execution. " Minn. Stat. § 550.08.

In Section 550.37, the legislature exempted certain property from individuals

seeking to enforce civil judgments. See Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 1 ("Exemption. The

property mentioned in this section is not liable to attachment, garnishment, or sale on any

final process, issued from any court.") (emphasis added). Specifically, the legislature

exempted one motor vehicle from the enforcement of civil judgments. See Minn. Stat.

§ 550.37, subd. 12a ("Motor vehicles. One motor vehicle to the extent of a value not

exceeding $2,000 ... "). Accordingly, property identified in Section 550.37 is exempt

from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued by any court." Minn.

Stat. § 550.37, subd. 1. "All articles exempted by [Section 550.37] shall be selected by

the debtor, the debtor's agent, or legal representative." !d., subd. 17. By its plain

language, Chapter 550, including the property exemptions in Section 550.37, does not

9

apply to forfeiture actions. The exemptions listed in Section 550.37 exempt certain

property owned by a "judgment debtor" from being used to satisfy civil judgments owed

to a ''judgment creditor."

Despite Appellant's protests to the contrary, Section 550.37, subd. 12a has no

applicability to vehicle forfeiture actions under Section 169A.63. Under Section 550.37,

subd. 12a, a ''judgment debtor" can select a vehicle, to the extent of a value not exceeding

$4,600, which will be exempt from confiscation and sale to satisfy a judgment owed to a

''judgment creditor." This "exemption" from civil enforcement actions has no application

to forfeiture of a vehicle used to commit a designated offense. Forfeitures do not involve

"attachment," "garnishment," or "sale on any final process." Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd.

1. Similarly, forfeitures do not involve a "judgment debtor" who is the subject of a civil

judgment that must be satisfied. See Minn. Stat. § 550.03. Administrative forfeitures

that are not challenged do not involve any court involvement. There is nothing in

Chapter 550 to indicate that the legislature intended the provisions of this chapter to

control vehicle forfeiture proceedings related to repeat drunk drivers committing

designated offenses. In fact, since the vehicle is already in the possession of law

enforcement, and since ownership vests at the commission of the offense, see Minn. Stat.

§169A.63, subd. 3, the methods to enforce a civil monetary judgment against a judgment

debtor found in Chapter 550 are not needed. Thus, there is no need for law enforcement

to "proceed to enforce the [judgment.]" Minn. Stat. § 550.01.

The statutory exemption relied upon by Appellant, Section§ 550.37, subd. 12a, is

solely for the purposes contained in Chapter 5 50, namely: executions, redemptions for the

10

payment of money, or the delivery of real or personal property. Nowhere in Chapter 550

is there any indication that this statute "exempts" certain property from Minnesota's

forfeiture statutes and there is nothing in Section 169A.63 that would indicate there is any

"exemption."

Accordingly, there is no conflict between Section 169A.63 and Section 550.37,

subd. 12a. Because Chapter 550 simply does not apply to vehicle forfeiture actions,

Appellant's statutory claim predicated on Section 550.37, subd. 12a fails as a matter of

law.

C. Minnesota's Forfeiture Law, Section 169A.63, Controls Even If There Is an Irreconcilable Conflict With Section 550.37, subd. 12a.

Even if the Court were to conclude that the exemptions contained in Section

550.37 apply to forfeiture actions and therefore conflict with Section 169A.63,

Appellant's claim still fails as a matter of law under principles of statutory interpretation:

When a general provision in a law is in conflict with a special provision in the same or another law, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If conflict between the two provisions be irreconcilable, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted at a later session and it shall be the manifest intention of the legislature that such general provision shall prevail.

Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1.

Here, Section 550.37, subd. 12a and Section 169A.63 can be construed to give

effect to both laws. As discussed above, this construction involves following the plain

language of these two statutes and construing Section 550.37, subd. 1 (exempting certain

property from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process," Minn. Stat.

11

§ 550.37, subd. 1) to apply only to the enforcement of civil judgments See Minn. Stat.

§ 550.01. This construction simply limits Section 550.37, subd. 12a to actions involving

enforcement of civil judgments. Similarly, Section 169A.63 can be construed to be

limited to actions involving forfeitures for individuals that commit designated offenses.

This construction gives effect to both Section 550.37, subd. 12a and Section 169A.63.

The Court need go no further to reject Appellant's argument that these two statutes

conflict.

Moreover, this construction avoids several irreconcilable conflicts that are created

by Appellant's strained construction. First, Appellant's reading of the statutes would

prohibit forfeiture of vehicles to the extent they were valued at less than $4,600, even

though Section 169A.63 does not have any limit on the value of vehicles that can be

forfeited. A vehicle is subject to forfeiture regardless of its value if it was used to commit

a designated offense. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 6(a).

Second, in a forfeiture action, all of the proceeds of any sale of a forfeited vehicle

are split between the law enforcement agency and the prosecuting authority. See Minn.

Stat. § 169A.63, subd; 10. This provision, requiring a division of the proceeds of the sale

of the vehicle be divided 70%-30% between law enforcement and the prosecuting

authority, could not be followed under Appellant's flawed construction. The forfeiture

statute provides for division of sale proceeds as follows:

(a) If the vehicle is administratively forfeited under subdivision 8 ... the appropriate agency shall:

( 1) sell the vehicle and distribute the proceeds under paragraph (b) or

12

(2) keep the vehicle for official use. If the agency keeps a forfeited motor vehicle for official use, it shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the motor vehicle is available for use by the agency's officers who participate in the drug abuse resistance education program.

(b) The proceeds from the sale of forfeited vehicles, after payment of seizure, towing, storage, forfeiture, and sale expenses, and satisfaction of valid liens against the property, must be distributed as follows:

(1) 70 percent of the proceeds must be forwarded to the appropriate agency for deposit as a supplement to the state or local agency's .operating fund or similar fund for use in DWI-related enforcement, training, and education; and

(2) 30 percent of the money or proceeds must be forwarded to the prosecuting authority that handled the forfeiture for deposit as a supplement to its operating fund or similar fund for prosecutorial purposes ...

Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 10 (emphasis added). There is no provision in Section

169A.63 to sell the vehicle and provide the first $4,600 to the offender and then split the

rest of the proceeds.

If the Court reaches this "conflict" issue, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1,

it must construe these statutes to avoid these irreconcilable conflicts by limiting Section

550.37, subd. 12a to actions involving enforcement of civil judgments. Accordingly, the

Court should reject Appellant's effort to import the civil judgment "vehicle exemption"

into Section 169A.63.

However, even if the Court were to conclude that these statutes cannot be so

construed and therefore are in conflict with one another, then as matter of statutory

interpretation the forfeiture provision prevails because it is more specific and more

recent. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 and subd. 4. Section 169A.63 creates a unique

13

process for vehicles (as opposed to other types of property), where the vehicle is seized at

the time of the offense by a law enforcement agency for forfeiture, ownership

immediately vests in the law enforcement agency, the owner of the vehicle must

challenge the forfeiture, and the proceeds from a sale of the vehicle are divided between

law enforcement and the prosecuting authority. Thus, even if the Court concludes the

laws conflict, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the forfeiture provision must control

because it is more specific than the general laws regarding vehicle exemptions in Section

550.37, subd. 12a. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1. A brief examination of these two

statutes confirms that Section 169A.63 is more specific.

The exemption for vehicles found in Section 550.37, subd. 12a provides an

. exemption for vehicles from execution of judgments relating to debts owing, to the extent

the value of the vehicle does not exceed $4,600. The predecessor to Section 550.37 was

first enacted in 1858 and exempted certain property of the day, including a horse and cart,

wagon, or sleigh. See 1858 Minn. Laws ch. 35, § 8 at 90-91. The items identified were

"not liable. to attachment, execution or sale, or any final process, issued from any Court in

this State." /d. § 8, p. 90. This language, regarding the actions to which the exemptions

apply, has only changed slightly in the last 145 years. See Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 1

(exempting the listed property from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final

process, issued from any court"). The exemption for motor vehicles was not added until

1980. See 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 550, § 2 (adding subdivision 12a: "One motor vehicle to

14

the extent of a value not exceeding $2,000"). This language has not changed since 1980

and is codified at Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 12a.3

Minnesota's vehicle forfeiture laws are more recent and more specific. The

precursor to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63 was passed in 1992. See 1992 Minn. Laws, ch. 570,

§ 15. Like the current law, the law passed in 1992 authorized the forfeiture of a vehicle

regardless of its value, and vested all right, title and interest in the vehicle with the

appropriate law enforcement agency upon commission of the designated offense. See

1992 Minn. Laws ch. 570, § 15, subds. 2-3. In 1992, the law directed all of the proceeds

of the sale of any forfeited vehicle to the law enforcement agency, after relevant fees and

costs were paid. !d., subd. 15. These proceeds are now split 70% to the law enforcement

agency and 30% to the prosecuting authority. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 10.

The forfeiture statute, Section 169A, is more specific because it only applies to

vehicles used by repeat drunk drivers that commit designated offenses, it can only be

used by law enforcement agencies, and because it provides for a complete forfeiture at

the time that the vehicle is used to commit a designated offense. It was enacted in 1992,

well after the more general law related to exemptions of certain property from

"attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process," wh~ch was first enacted in 1858.

Moreover, the vehicle forfeiture laws were enacted 12 years after the motor vehicle

3 The subdivision has added additional language related to the value of a vehicle modified for a physically disabled individual. See 1993 Minn. Laws, ch. 79, § 7. The Amicus states that this statute was amended in 2010. See Amicus Br. at 12. In fact, there were no changes made to Minn. Stat. § 550.37 in 2010. More importantly, the scope of Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. I has not changed since its creation and the relevant language in the automobile exemption in subd. 12a has not changed since it was first included in 1980.

15

exemption was first included in Minn. Stat. § 550.37. This Court presumes that the

legislature has existing statutes in mind when it passes new laws. See Minneapolis E. Ry.

V. City of Minneapolis, 77 N. W.2d 425, 428 (Minn. 1956). The default rule is that when

a general provision in another law is in conflict with a more specific law, the specific law

prevails. Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. I. Here, the forfeiture law, Section 169A.63, is

both more recent and more specific. Therefore, if the Court concludes that Section

169A.63 conflicts with Section 550.37, subd. 12a, Section 169A.63 prevails"and

precludes inclusion of a vehicle exemption in forfeiture actions. See Minn. Stat.

§ 645.26, subd. I and subd. 4.

Finally, Appellant's argument, to insert a vehicle exemption into Section 169A.63,

would create an absurd result. Under Appellant's _argument, repeat drunk drivers could

drive cars valued at less than $4,600 and simply be exempt from forfeiture laws. This

result would undermine the remedial purpose of motor vehicle forfeiture in the context

presented in this case, which is to protect the public from the known dangers of

intoxicated drivers:

The primary remedial purpose of protecting public safety is effectuated by vehicle forfeiture. The statute applies only where the driver of the vehicle has not heeded the warnings of previous sentences and license revocations. Only where those sanctions have failed is the instrumentality forfeited as another means toward the desired end of removing intoxicated drivers from public streets and highways.

Lukkason v. 1993 Extended Cab Pickup, 590 N.W. 2d, 803, 806 (Minn. App. 1996),

citing City of New Hope v. 1986 Mazda 626, 546 N.W. 2d, 300, 303-304 (Minn. App.

1996). The legislature could not have intended this illogical result. See Minn. Stat.

16

§ 645.17 ("In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided by the

following presumptions: (1) the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd,

impossible of execution, or unreasonable[.]").

In sum, even ifthe Court concludes Section 169A.63 conflicts with Section

550.37, subd. 12a, the provisions of Section 169A.63 control because: (1) this law is

more specific; (2) this law is more recent; and (3) this construction avoids an absurd

result.

III. The Legislature's Enactment of Section 169A.63 Without an Exemption for Inexpensive Vehicles is Constitutional.

Appellant next argues that if the vehicle exemption in Section 550.37, subd. 12a is

not applied to forfeiture actions, then Section 169A.63 violates the Minnesota

Constitution. Appellant's Br. at 7-8. There is a presumption that Minnesota statutes are

constitutional and this Court will only strike down a statute as unconstitutional if

absolutely necessary. See State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012). By

challenging the constitutional validity of Section 169A.63, Appellant bears the very

heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is

unconstitutional. See, e.g. ld;, State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990).

Appellant cannot satisfy this burden.

Provided that there is a sufficient nexus between the crime and the vehicle, this ;; ' I

Court has validated the practice of vehicle forfeitures. See, e.g. Miller v. ONE 2001

Pontiac Aztek, 669 N.W. 2d 893, 896 (Minn. 2003). In Miller, Bloomington Police

seized the 2001 Pontiac Aztek from Debra Jane Miller, who subsequently was convicted

17

of First Degree DWI. ld. at 894. The Supreme Court upheld not only the forfeiture of

the Miller vehicle, but also stated that forfeiture of the Miller vehicle was not grossly

disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, nor did it violate the Excessive Fines

Clauses of the Minnesota or United States Constitutions. ld. at 898. In the present case,

Appellant's use of his vehicle was a necessary prerequisite to his conviction for First

Degree Driving Under the Influence. Thus, a sufficient nexus exists between Appellant's

crime and the vehicle for the forfeiture to be constitutionally valid. I d. at 896, 898.

Appellant does not argue that there is not a sufficient nexus or that the forfeiture is

grossly disproportionate to the offense, but rather argues that Section 169A.63 violates

the Minnesota Constitution because it does not include an exception for vehicles valued

at less than $4,600. Appellant argues that pursuant to Section 550.37, subd. 12a, the

vehicle exemption, which exempts vehicles from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on

any final process," Minn. Stat. §550.37, subd. 1, must be applied as a matter of

constitutional law to forfeitures. Appellant argues that in 1980, when the legislature

exempted "one motor vehicle to the extent of a value not exceeding [$4,600]," in Section

550.37, subd. 12a, it created a vehicle exemption that is constitutionally required to apply

to vehicles subject to forfeiture pursuant to Section 169A.63.

Appellant's constitutional argument is predicated entirely on the Minnesota

Supreme Court's decision in Torgelson v. Real Property Known as 17138 8801h Ave,

Renville County, 749 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 2008). In Torgelson, the Court was asked "to

decide whether Minnesota's drug asset forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.5311, subd. 2

(2006), is constitutional as applied to homestead property." ld. at 25. County attorneys

18

for Renville and Yell ow Medicine counties had obtained a judgment of forfeiture of

respondents' homes. Minnesota's drug asset forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.5311,

subd. 2(a), states in relevant part that "[a]ll property, real and personal, that has been

used, or in any way facilitated ... the manufacturing ... delivering ... transporting ...

of a controlled substance ... is subject to forfeiture." There was no dispute that this

statute authorized forfeiture of respondents' homes. The sole issue was whether this

statute was constitutional as applied to respondents' homesteaded properties. The county

attorneys argued that Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution did not apply to

forfeitures. After surveying case law from other states related to homestead exemptions

and the language of the Minnesota Constitution, the Supreme Court held that "the

Minnesota Constitution precludes the forfeitures of respondents' homestead properties."

!d. at 25.

The Court construed Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution which

provides:

No person shall be imprisoned for debt in this state, but this shall not prevent the legislature from providing for imprisonment, or holding to bail, persons charged with fraud in contracting said debt. A reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined by law. Provided, however, that all property so exempted shall be liable to seizure and sale for any debts incurred to any person for work done or materials furnished in the construction, repair or improvement of the same, and provided further, that such liability to seizure and sale shall also extend to all real propertY' for any debt to any laborer or servant for labor or service performed.

19

Minn. Const. art. I,§ 12 (emphasis added). This provision of the Minnesota Constitution

is aimed at protecting individual's homesteads and certain other property identified by the

legislature from being taken from them for the payment of a debt or liability.

It was originally proposed that the Minnesota Constitution contain a homestead exemption with a specific dollar limit, Minnesota Convention Debates 99 (1857) (debates of July 24, 1857), but it was determined the constitution should not contain perfect or specific laws. Since its adoption in 1857, the Minnesota Constitution has empowered the legislature to determine what property is exempt from creditors, but has imposed a "reasonable amount" limit on any legislated exemption.

In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989). The "[h]omestead exemption is

therefore purely a creature of statute." Dimke v. Finke, 295 N.W. 75, 81 (Minn. 1940).

Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the Minnesota legislature enacted a homestead

statute that defines a homestead property and the "reasonable amount" of this property.

See Minn. Stat.§§ 510.01 and 510.02; see also Barton v. Drake, 21 Minn. 299,302

(1875) ("[T]his statute was originally enacted at the first session of the state legislature,

(Laws 185 8, ch. 3 5 ,) in obedience to an express mandate of the constitution, art. 1,

§ 12.")

Currently, Minnesota's homestead statute states:

The house owned and occupied by a debtor as the debtor's dwelling place, together with the land upon which it is situated to the amount of area and value hereinafter limited and defined, shall constitute the homestead of such debtor and the debtor's family, and be exempt from seizure or sale under legal process on account of any debt not lawfully charged thereon in writing, except such as are incurred for work or materials furnished in the construction, repair, or improvement of such homestead, or for services performed by laborers or servants and as is provided in section 5 50.17 5.

Minn. Stat.§ 510.01 (emphasis added).

20

In Torgelson, the Minnesota Supreme Court first concluded that Minn. Stat.

§ 609.5311, subd. 2(a), authorized forfeiture of respondents' homes. Therefore the Court

was faced with the question of whether Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota

Constitution, which exempts homesteads from claims of creditors, also exempts

homesteads from forfeiture actions related to criminal conduct. The Court stated:

We have never addressed whether Article I, Section 12, of the Minnesota Constitution prohibits drug asset forfeiture of homestead property. Yet we have long construed the constitutional language to refer to '"debts or liabilities of every kind or description, without exception."? Denzer [v. Prendergast}, 267 Minn. [212,] 220, 126 N.W.2d [440,] 445 [(1964)] (quoting Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465,468 (Minn. 1862)).

Torgelson, 749 N.W.2d at 27. After examining the language and this Court's precedent,

the Court concluded that the language "debt or liability" used in Article I, Section 12 "is

broad, and we see no basis for excluding civil forfeiture from its scope." !d. at 27. This

conclusion was based, in part, on the policy behind the homestead exemption:

"The homestead law is to be liberally construed. It would not be wholesome to construe the statute as conserving lawful homes only. To do so would tend to increase the burdens of the community chest; destroy homes; divide families; and increase the population of our orphan asylums. We construe our homestead law as relating to all debtors. It does not prescribe personal qualifications touching the moral character of the debtor; and upon principle and reason we see no justification for excluding from its protection the vicious, the criminal, or the immoral. All must live, and right consideration should contemplate not only the living but the next generation. This statute rests upon the thought of family. Our established policy is not restricted to right-thinking or right-acting persons; but sounds in hope for the future both as to the debtor and his children."

!d. at 29, quoting Denzer, 126 N.W.2d at 444 (quoting Ryan v. Colburn, 241 N.W. 388,

389 (Minn. 1932)).

21

The Court then concluded by holding that "[i]n light of these well-established

principles, the language of our constitution, and the decisions of other jurisdictions, we

hold that the Minnesota Constitution's homestead exemption, as implemented by Minn.

Stat. §510.01, exempts homestead property from forfeiture." Torgelson, 749 N.W.2d at

29 (emphasis added).

Appellant argues that Torgelson 's constitutional limitation on forfeitures should

apply not only to homesteads, but should be extended to all property exempted under

Section 550.37 from judgment creditors. In other words, Appellant seeks to have

Torgelson, which dealt with homesteads and Minnesota's Homestead Act, Minn. Stat.

§ 510.01, apply to vehicles and Minnesota's garnishment and judgment enforcement

statutes, Minn. Stat. Ch. 550. The Court should reject this attempt to apply Torgelson

under these circumstances.

Appellant's argument that Torgelson should be expanded beyond homesteads to

forfeiture of vehicles used to commit "designated offenses" fails for three distinct and

independent reasons. First, Torgelson involved forfeiture of a homestead and this Court

relied heavily on the liberal construction granted to the homestead law and the unique

status of homesteads. The case at bar involves a vehicle used to commit a "designated

offense" and unlike homesteads, this Court has already held that there is no constitutional

t€quirement to create a vehicle exemption. See Poznanovic v. Maki, 296 N.W. 415,417

(Minn. 1941 ). Second, the legislature has broad authority in crafting exemptions. It is

not required to grant them to automobiles. Its decision to create an exemption that

applies to vehicles, except when those vehicles are used by repeat drunk drivers who

22

commit designated offenses, is constitutional. Third, a forfeiture is not a seizure of the

vehicle "for the payment of' any debt or liability. Minn. Const., art. I, § 12. Each of

these arguments will be discussed in turn.

A. Torgelson Does Not Control Because the Homestead Exemption Does Not Apply to Vehicles.

The Torgelson decision is predicated on the_ fact that the forfeiture involved was a

forfeiture of a homesteaded property. Torgelson has no direct application to vehicles

used to commit driving while intoxicated crimes and therefore it is distinguishable from

this case. The statutory scheme for exempting certain property from actions to collect on

judgments, Minn. Stat. §§ 550.01-.42, is completely separate from the homestead statute,

Minn. Stat.§ 501.01, that was analyzed by the Court in Torgelson. In Torgelson, the

Court did not find that the exemption for homesteads found in Minn. Stat. § 510.0 I must

be imported into the drug forfeiture statute, Minn. Stat.§ 609.5311, subd. 2(a). Rather,

the Court found that Minn. Stat. § 609.5311, subd. 2(a) controlled, did not have an

exemption for homesteads, and therefore was unconstitutional. There is no argument that

the homestead statute, Minn. Stat.§ 510.01, which states that an individual's home is

"exempt from seizure or sale under legal process," has any application to this case. The

collection statute at issue in this appeal states that certain property is not "liable to

attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued from the court." Minn. Stat.

§ 550.37, subd. 1. Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution and Minn. Stat.

§ 510.01 are designed to protect property, including specifically homes of individuals, as

23

defined by the legislature. There is nothing in Torgelson that indicates the Court's

holding should be expanded to make forfeitures of vehicles unconstitutional.

Torgelson was based in part on the policy supporting Article I, Section 12, of the

Minnesota Constitution, which is focused on protecting homes, not vehicles or other

property used to commit crimes. The homestead exemption has special longstanding

significance under Minnesota law. See Holden v. Falwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 27

N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 1947) ('"In order to insure a stable and independent citizenry and

thereby promote the public welfare, it has always been the policy of the law to protect

with jealous zeal the homestead right of the citizen and his wife and minor children. This

right is based on the fundamental conception that the home should be a citadel of security

against the misfortunes of uncertainties of life."). In contrast, at the time the Minnesota

Constitution was drafted, motor vehicles had yet to be invented. Moreover, automobiles

were not exempt from judgment creditors until 1980. See Poznanovic, 296 N.W. at 417

(holding automobile was not exempt under precursor to Section 550.37); 1980 Minn.

Laws ch. 550, §2 (adding subdivision 12a to Minn. Stat. § 550.37: '"One motor vehicle to

the extent of a value not exceeding $2,000.")

In Torgelson, the Court concluded that Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota

Constitution, as implemented by Minn. Stat. § 510.01, which exempts homesteads from

'"seizure or sale under legal process," required that homesteads be exempt from payment

of"any debt or liability," including a civil forfeiture action brought against a home

pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.5311. Thus, the Torgelson Court concluded that Article I,

Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution protected homesteads from civil forfeiture

24

actions. Torgelson is grounded on protecting homesteads and the broad language of

Minn. Stat.§ 510.01, which exempts homesteads from "seizure or sale under legal

process." There is nothing in the language of Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota

Constitution or in Torgelson, which compels the legislature to exempt vehicles (or

vehicles valued under a specific amount) from forfeiture actions, nor is there any basis to

conclude that failure of the legislature to make such an exemption would violate Article I,

Section 12 ofthe Minnesota Constitution. See Poznanovic, 296 N.W at 417 (upholding

legislative decision to not exempt automobiles).

Accordingly, because: (1) homesteads are constitutionally protected by Article I,

Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution and automobiles are not; and (2) the homestead

exemption, Minn. Stat. § 510.01 is much broader than the exemption in Minn. Stat.

§ 550.37, subd. 1, Torgelson is not controlling precedent. In addition, because the

legislature has to power to eliminate any exemption for automobiles, it certainly has the

lesser power to create a vehicle exemption and exclude vehicles driven by repeat drunk

drivers from this exemption. See, e.g. Dimke v. Finke, 295 N.W. 75, 81 (1940) ("The

legislature, having created the homestead and having power to increase or diminish it, or

to abolish it altogether and substitute other property in its stead, unquestionably has the

lesser power to curtail the extent of the exemption. It has done so in the case of taxes and

special improvement assessments.").

25

B. The Legislative Decision to Create an Exemption for Vehicles in Section 550.37, subd. 12a and to Not Provide Such an Exemption in Forfeiture Actions is Constitutional.

Appellant's reliance on Torgelson also fails because, contrary to Appellant's

argument, the legislature explicitly chose not to exempt vehicles from forfeiture actions.

As discussed in Section II, supra, Section 169A.63 authorizes forfeiture regardless of the

value ofthe vehicle. The legislature's decision in 1980 to exempt vehicles valued at a

certain threshold from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued

from any court," Minn. Stat.§ 550.37, subd. 1, has no bearing on whether vehicles used

to commit designated offenses are subject to forfeiture under Section 169A.63. The

Minnesota Constitution leaves it to the legislature to implement Article I, Section 12 of

the Minnesota Constitution. It has done so by adopting Section 510.01 relating to

homesteads, and it has also exempted certain property from "attachment, garnishment, or

sale on any final process, issued from any court." Minn. Stat.§ 550.37, subd. 1. Thus,

the legislature, through its authority pursuant to Article I, Section 12 has concluded that ' '! i

vehicles valued at less than $4,600 should be exempt from civil judgment enforcement

actions. However, the legislature has also concluded that when used by repeat drunk

drivers to commit "designated offenses," a vehicle is subject to forfeiture regardless of its

value. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63. This legislative decision on when vehicles are entitled

to an exemption is constitutional.

Appellant's argument at its core is that the legislature cannot make such a

distinction. However, Appellant's argument is predicated on the following faulty

26

syllogism: the legislature enacted Section 550.37, subd. 12a based on the authority

provided by Article I, Section 12, therefore the legislature's decision to not include this

exemption in vehicle forfeiture actions under Section 169A.63, violates Article I, Section

12. This syllogism is faulty because Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution

does not compel the legislature to grant a vehicle exemption at all, nor does that

constitutional provision preclude the legislature from creating a limited exemption for an

identified piece of property (such as a vehicle).

1. A Vehicle Exemption Is Not Constitutionally Required.

Unlike homesteads, automobiles are not constitutionally protected under Article I,

Section 12 ofthe Minnesota Constitution. See Poznanovic v. Maki, 296 N.W. 415,417

(Minn. 1941) (automobile not exempt under precursor to Minn. Stat.§ 550.37); Whitney

v. Welnitz, 190 N.W. 57, 58 (Minn. 1922) (same); 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 550, §2 (adding

for the first time an automobile exemption to Minn. Stat. § 550.37).

This fundamental constitutional distinction between automobiles and homesteads

vitiates Appellant's argument. In Torgelson, this Court held that Minn. Stat. § 609.5311,

subd. 2(a) violated Article 1, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution because it did not

include a homestead exemption. 749 N.W.2d at 29. In other words, this Court held that

legislature did not have authority to create a statutory scheme (whether such scheme

applied to debtors or criminal defendants facing an in rem civil forfeiture action) unless it

included an exemption for homesteads. In contrast, there can be no dispute that the

legislature was not compelled to create an exemption for automobiles. Therefore, the

legislature could eliminate the current vehicle exemption without violating Article I,

27

Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution. Thus, unlike the situation presented in

Torgelson, it is constitutional for the legislature to create a statutory scheme that excludes

automobiles from a particular statutory exemption. In other words, Article I, Section 12

of the Minnesota Constitution does not compel the legislature to create a law that

includes automobiles as a "reasonable amount" of property that must be "exempt from

seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability."

2. Creation of a Limited Vehicle Exemption That Excludes Vehicles Used By Repeat Drunk Drivers Is Constitutional.

A vehicle exemption that excludes certain vehicles (i.e. those used to commit

designated offenses) is constitutional. Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution

creates power in the legislature to enact exemption laws, but also limits this authority to a

"reasonable amount" of property. The legislature has the ability to determine what is "[a]

reasonable amount of property ... [that is] exempt from seizure or sale for the payment of

any debt or liability. The amount of such exception shall be determined by law." Minn.

Const. art. I,§ 12 (emphasis added). "The exemption statute [now codified at Minn. Stat.

§ 550.37] executes the mandate of Minn. Const. art. 1, § 12, that a reasonable amount of

property to be determined by law shall be exempt from any debt or liability."

Poznanovic, 296 N.W. at 417.

Because automobiles are not constitutionally protected under Article I, Section 12

of the Minnesota Constitution, the relevant constitutional question is whether the

legislature has authority to grant a limited exception for vehicles in civil judgment

actions, but not grant this exemption when a vehicle is subject to an in rem civil forfeiture

28

action because of how it was used. In other words, even though it is not constitutionally

compelled to grant an exemption to vehicles at all, is the legislature constitutionally

precluded from treating vehicles used to commit designated offenses differently from

vehicles owned by individuals facing civil judgment enforcement actions? The answer to

this question is no.

The legislature has broad authority both to create and to limit exemptions and

Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution does not require the legislature to

grant the same exemptions to both debtors facing actions to enforce judgment (an

exemption from "seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability," Minn. Const.,

art. I, § 12) and repeat drunk drivers using their vehicle to engage in criminal activity.

See, e.g. Dimke v. Finke, 295 N.W. 75,81 (1940) ("The legislature, having created the

homestead and having power to increase or diminish it, or to abolish it altogether and

substitute other property in its stead, unquestionably has the lesser power to curtail the

extent of the exemption."); See also Minneapolis Fed'n ofTeachers Local 59, AFL-C/0

v. Obermeyer, 147 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Minn. 1966) ("When the legislature has

determined that a sufficient distinction exists between two classes of persons to justify

applying rules to one class which do not apply to the other, such determination is binding

upon the courts unless it appears that the distinction is purely fanciful and arbitrary and

that no substantial or logical basis exists therefor .... In the matter of classification courts

have viewed the action of the legislature with great liberality.") (citing Dimke among

several cases).

29

The legislature has extremely broad constitutional authority to define both a

"reasonable amount of property" and when such property is exempt. It has exercised its

discretion by exempting property only under particular circumstances, and primarily to

protect a person's home and livelihood. See, e.g. Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 5

(exempting farm machines, but only when used by a debtor engaged principally in

farming); subd 6 (exempting tools, machines, and equipment, but only if these items are

"reasonably necessary in the trade, business, or profession ofthe debtor,"); subd. 12

(exempting a manufactured home, if actually inhabited as a home by the debtor). The

legislature has deliberately limited and qualified the exemptions it has provided to ensure

that only property identified for particular purposes is exempt. Thus, the same piece of

property in the hands of two different debtors may be treated differently, depending on

the exemption. This Court has repeatedly upheld the legislature's authority to create and

limit exemptions.

In 1858, this Court first examined Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota

Constitution and the exemptions the legislature had recently passed, and it held that an

exemption for "[t]he tools and instruments of any mechanic, minor [miner], or other

person, used and kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business; and, in

addition thereto, stock in trade not exceeding four hundred dollars in value" did not

exempt groceries held by a merchant, because he was not a minor, mechanic or other

tradesperson and therefore his "stock and trade" was not exempt. Grimes v. Bryne, 2

Minn. 89, 103-06 (Minn. 1858) (emphasis added). The Court outlined the legislature's

30

intent in exempting property and its authority to limit these exemptions to the

circumstances of individuals in differing circumstances:

The constitution of this state contains the just, but somewhat novel provision, that "a reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure or sale for the p~yment of any debt or liability. The amount of such exemption shall be determined by law." Const. art. 1, § 12. This provision clearly embraces all classes of citizens, and any law passed in pursuance of it would require language of unmistakable certainty to receive a construction debarring any description of persons from a participation in its benefits. All laws, to receive a reasonable and just construction, must be supposed to have been enacted with reference to the condition of the society they were to affect. Laws of this nature are not intended to aid debtors in defeating the just demand of their creditors, but are passed in that humane and enlightened spirit of legislation which considers the preservation of the family, and the means of supporting and educating the children, and maintaining the decencies and proprieties of life, as paramount to the temporary inconvenience that the creditor may be subjected to in the collection of his demand. The legislature, knowing that the general exemption of a farm in the country, or a house and lot in town, or any other general exemption of specific property, must, in the nature of

· things, be unequal in its operation upon a community engaged in all the different pursuits of life-commercial, professional, agricultural, and mechanical-and inadequate to the end proposed, they have, therefore, made, by the act of August 12, 1858, such specific enumeration of the property to be exempt as would divide the benefits of the exemption as equally as possible among all the citizens of the state, according to their individual circumstances and necessities, when the hour of misfortune overtakes them. It is intended as a shield to the unfortunate, and not to increase the facilities of the dishonest to avoid justice. . . . . The act cannot, therefore, have intended that all or any of the enumerated articles shall be exempt in the hands of every citizen, without regard to circumstances, but must receive a construction in accordance with its general intent, as evidenced by the nature of the subject treated of, and the general spirit of such legislation.

Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 89, 103-06 ( 1858) (emphasis added); see also Poznanovic v.

Maki, 296 N.W. 415,417 (Minn. 1941) (holding that an automobile was not exempt as a

farming tool and stating "[t]he humane and enlightened purpose of an exemption is to

protect a debtor and his family against absolute want by allowing them out of his

31

property some reasonable means of support and education and the maintenance of the

decencies and proprieties of life. The legislative purpose was to adapt the exemptions

granted to the circumstances and needs of different classes of debtors.") (emphasis

added).

In another particularly relevant case, Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Carstens, this Court

held that a horse was not exempt under the then existing statute that exempted a "span of

horses," because the horse at issue was not used for farming, but rather its owner was a

contractor. 80 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1956). The Court held "that the exemption for horses

contemplated by the legislature comprehends that class of horses which is used in place

ofand in the same manner as a farmer's tractor." !d. Thus, the Court concluded that a

horse owned by a farmer was exempt, but one owned by a contractor was not. The

legislature exercised its authority to grant exemptions designed to fit "to the

circumstances and needs of different classes of debtors," and this decision to limit when

property was exempt and when it was not was constitutional, Fullerton, 80 N.W.2d at 4,

8 (citing Poznanovic, 296 N.W. at 417)

These cases highlight that the legislature has broad authority to create legislative

exemptions and to limit those exemptions to particular circumstances and needs of

different classes of individuals. Here, the legislature has exercised its discretion and

determined that a vehicle, when used to commit a designated offense, is subject to seizure

and ultimately forfeiture and there is no exemption for lower valued vehicles. See Minn.

Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 6 (a)(l). The creation ofthe exemption in Section 550.37, subd.

12a is designed to protect judgment debtors and does not create a constitutional

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exemption that prohibits vehicle forfeitures when the vehicle is used by a repeat drunk

driver. In exercising its authority under Article 1, Section 12 of the Minnesota

Constitution to create a vehicle exemption, the legislature has also limited the exemption.

The legislature has concluded that a vehicle used to commit a designated offense is not

entitled to an exemption and this conclusion does not violate the state constitution.

Despite this Court's decisions upholding the broad authority of the legislature to

determine a "reasonable amount of property" and create and limit exemptions, Appellant

argues that the legislature cannot create an exemption for vehicles owned by individuals

facing civil judgment enforcement actions without applying this exemption to forfeiture

actions. App. Br. At 7-8. Appellant cites to this Court's decision in Denzer v.

Prendergast, as support for his argument. 126 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 1964). In Denzer the

Court was faced with the question of whether the homestead exemption, Minn. Stat.

§ 510.01, applied to a judgment enforcement action based on a tort claim, as opposed one

based on a contract. !d. at 445. The Court concluded that the homestead exemption

applied to obligations based in contract as well as those arising from damages caused by

a wrong, and stated "we do not think the legislature intended to, or could, make property

exempt from one class of obligations and not the other in view of the language of the

constitution as construed by this Court." !d.

Appellant argues that Denzer precludes the legislature from limiting the vehicle

exemption to civil judgment enforcement actions. This argument is misplaced because,

just like with Torgelson, the Court in Denzer was analyzing the constitutionally

compelled homestead exemption and was not analyzing the "reasonable amount of

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property." The legislature was compelled to create an exemption for homesteads of some

type and value and the Denzer Court held that this exemption must be applied to

judgment enforcement actions based in tort, as well as those based on contract. !d.

Similarly, the Torgelson Court concluded that this homestead exemption must be applied

equally to forfeiture actions. 749 N.W.2d at 25, 29. Thus, this Court has held that a

homestead is exempt from all "debts or liabilities," regardless of whether the home owner

is facing the loss of his home because a judgment creditor is enforcing a judgment based

on a contract or tort, or because of a civil forfeiture action.

Here, however, unlike the constitutionally compelled homestead exemption, this

Court has made it clear that the legislature is not compelled to exempt automobiles at all.

See Poznanovic, 296 N.W. at 417; Whitney, 190 N.W. at 58. Because of this distinction,

neither Denzer nor Torgelson limit the legislature's ability to grant an exemption for

vehicles to judgment debtors while withholding the exemption in forfeiture actions

involving repeat drunk drivers who use a vehicle to ·commit designated offense. The

legislature has not made a distinction on the source of the obligation (contract, tort

liability, or forfeiture), but rather has defined the "reasonable amount of property," based

in part on how the property is used. A vehicle when used to commit a designated offense

is not entitled to an exemption. The distinction drawn by the legislature is to authorize an

exemption when the vehicle is sought for payment of a debt or liability to a judgment

creditor and to preclude this exemption when the vehicle is used to commit a designated

offense. This classification of when vehicles are entitled to the exemption is

constitutional. See Fullerton Lumber Co., 80 N.W.2d at 8. Neither Denzer or Torgelson

34

limit the legislature's discretion to define the reasonable amount of property with respect

to who is using the property and how it is being used.

This analysis is supported by the only case on point identified by the parties. In

State of Oklahoma v. One 1965 Red Chevrolet Pickup, 37 P.3d 815 (Okla. 2001), an

individual asserted that the State of Oklahoma's constitution required a forfeiture action

to include the State's personal property exemption. The owner of the vehicle argued that

"if Oklahoma's 'homestead-and-exemption statute' protects a homestead from forfeiture,

it should likewise shield his motor vehicle from forfeiture that is pressed under the

general seizure-and-forfeiture statute." !d. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, like this

Court in Torgelson, had previously held that a homestead was exempt from a forfeiture

action pursuant to the homestead provision in the Oklahoma constitution. See State v.

Ten Acres, 877 P.2d 597 (Okla. 1994) (cited in Torgelson). However, the Court in One

1965 Red Chevrolet Pickup rejected the vehicle owner's argument and stated:

Although our pronouncement in State v. Ten Acres [the case extending the homestead exemption] makes no reference to the fundamental law underpinnings of [Oklahoma's homestead exemption], the court's decision in that case is firmly anchored in the constitutional homestead protection .... In short, homestead exemptions are in a class by themselves.

Personal property that is to be forfeited in consequence of its use in criminal activity must be viewed as entirely different from that which is subject to a 'forced sale' to satisfy the payment of debt. Forfeiture is a government's expropriation of the owner who used the subject property in the commission of certain crimes. . . . In contrast to scenarios affected by [personal property] exemptions, no personal liability is imposable in [forfeitures]. It is only the object (or the res) to be forfeited which stands liable for unconditional delivery to the State. A forfeiture proceeding is one in rem. It is predicated upon the property's illegal use. In short, the [forfeiture] liability of a res may not be exonerated, either in whole or in

35

part, by any personal-property exemption extended by [the personal property exemption].

ld. at 818-20.

Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution grants the legislature broad

authority to define and limit a reasonable amount of property. Here, the legislatu~e has

exercised its authority by treating vehicles used by repeat drunk drivers differently than

vehicles owned by individuals facing actions by a judgment creditor. Accordingly, the

grant of an exemption for vehicles in Section 550.37, subd. 12a does not require the

legislature to exempt these same vehicles from forfeiture actions under Section 169A.63.

C. An Administrative Vehicle Forfeiture under Section 169A.63 Is Not Limited by Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution.

Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution is aimed at protecting

individuals who are in debt. Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the legislature has

exempted numerous articles of property from collection actions. See Minn. Stat.

§ 550.37. As discussed above, with respect to vehicles, the legislature has granted an

exemption when an individual is facing civil judgment enforcement, and has not included

this exemption in forfeiture proceedings under Section 169A.63. As explained in Section

liLA and III.B, this distinction is constitutional. However, if this Court concludes that

such a distinction does not comply with Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota

Constitution, Section 169A.63 is nonetheless constitutional because it does not involve an

action involving seeking a "payment of' a debt.

36

This is a third basis for this Court to uphold the constitutionality of Section

169A.63. A forfeiture does not involve the "payment of' a debt or liability.4 Article I,

Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution is aimed at protecting individuals who are in

debt. It requires the legislature to exempt a "reasonable amount of property" from

"seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability." Minn. Const., art. I, § 12

(emphasis added). Here, the forfeiture of Appellant's vehicle is not "for the payment of'

any debt or liability. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding and does not attach to a

liability or o_bligation of an individual. In Torgelson, this Court concluded that the words

"debt or liability" in Article I, Section 12 were construed broadly and included forfeiture

actions. 749 N.W.2d at 27. This holding was based on the property at issue, a

homestead, and the homestead statute, which exe~pts homesteads from "seizure or sale

under legal process."

Vehicle forfeitures are categorically different than homesteads. Vehicles are not

constitutionally required to be exempted at all. More specifically, a vehicle forfeiture

does not involve an action "for the payment of' a debt or liability. Minn. Const. art. I,

§ 12. The seizure and forfeiture of vehicles pursuant to Section 169A.63 is designed to \

discourage repeat drunk drivers from driving while intoxicated and to remove the

4 In Torgelson, this Court concluded that a forfeiture action involving a homestead was an action that was within the purview of Article I, Section 12 because it was a "debt or liability." The Court stated "[t]he constitutional phrase 'debt or liability' is broad, and we see no basis for excluding civil forfeiture from its scope." Torgelson, 749 N.W.2d at 27. Thus, this Court has precluded the argument that forfeitures are not a "debt or liability." Here, however, Respondent is arguing that the seizure of the vehicle is not "for the payment of' a debt or liability. Rather, the forfeiture is based in part on public safety and removing the instrument of the crime from the repeat drunk driver.

37

instrument of the driver's offense (the vehicle) for public safety. Because the forfeiture

action is not a seizure or sale of the vehicle "for the payment of' any debt or liability,

Article I, Section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution does not apply. This issue has not

been directly addressed by this Court.

In her concurrence in Torgelson, Justice Gildea declined to reach the question of

whether a forfeiture of a homestead was a seizure "for the payment of' a debt or liability.

749 N.W.2d at 30, n.l. Justice Gildea stated that it was a "close question," but one she

did not need to reach because she concluded the homestead statute prevailed over the

drug forfeiture statute, under principles of statutory interpretation. !d. The majority in

Torgelson did not directly address the "for the payment of' language, but stated that it

disagreed with Justice Gildea's concurrence, including her statement that it was "a close

questibn" whether forfeiture of a home was prohibited under Article I, Section 12 of the

Minnesota Constitution. !d. at 29, n.4.

If the Court reaches this issue, it should conclude that vehicle forfeitures under

Section 169A.63 are not "for the payment of' a debt or liability. Minn. Const. art. I,

§ 12. The legislature is presumed to have acted in a constitutional manner. It has

determined that vehicles used by repeat drunk drivers should be forfeited without any

''vehicle exemption" for inexpensive vehicles. This legislative determination can be

upheld by holding that a vehicle used by a repeat drunk driver who conimits a designated

offense is subject to forfeiture and this action is not a seizure "for the payment of' any

debt. Minn. Const., art. L § 12. Accordingly, Respondent asserts this is a third basis for

upholding the constitutionality of Section 169A.63 without a vehicle exemption.

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CONCLUSION

There is uncontroverted evidence that Appellant's 2003 Honda Accord is subject

to forfeiture. Case law establishes the remedial purpose of protecting the public from the

dangers of intoxicated drivers, and approves the sanction of vehicle forfeiture as a means

of removing intoxicated drivers from public streets and highways. The legislature has

concluded that vehicles forfeited pursuant to Section 169A.63 are not entitled to the

"vehicle exemption" that the legislature created for individuals facing civil judgment

enforcement actions. This decision to treat vehicles subject to forfeiture under Section

169A.63 differently than vehicles subject to civil judgment enforcement action is

constitutional. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

Dated: January 28, 2012

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Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL 0. FREEMAN Hennepin County Attorney

Bylla4L~ Daniel P. Rogan (274458) Sr. Assistant County Attorney Attorneys for County of Hennepin A2000 Government Center Minneapolis, MN 55487 Telephone: (612) 348-5529 FAX No: (612) 348-8299