The Battle of Pydna (Senior Seminar)

Jacob M. Stout The Battle of Pydna, Emergence of Roman Dominion, � 1 and Victory of Hellenistic Culture

Since before the Battle of Pydna, 22 June 168 BCE, the Successor Kingdoms of 1

Alexander the Great’s conquests had dominated from the eastern Mediterranean to central Asia

and from the Black Sea to Egypt. Following the defeat of Macedonia at the hands of the Romans

at the Battle of Pydna, Roman dominion over the Hellenistic powers would become all but

certain; for the kingdom of Macedonia it was the end of independence: the first of the Hellenistic

monarchies to fall to Rome. 2

In order to understand this transition of power to Rome and the saturation of Rome with

Hellenistic culture it’s prudent to examine the events leading up to this fateful battle. Moreover,

the domination Rome would portray at Pydna should be clearly understood as well in terms of

battle tactics, military equipment and discipline, and the manpower and politics of both sides of

the conflict. This borne in mind, we will see a brief history of the Macedonian kingdom and the

Roman Senate followed by the maneuvering of Aemilius Paullus and the battle itself. In addition

we’ll realize the true victor of Roman dominion: Hellenistic Culture. 3

THE ROMAN AND MACEDONIAN ARMIES

Rome and the Greek poleis had structured their militaries in very much the same way

during the early days of the Republic up to the Peloponnesian War (fought 431-404) in that they

both originally drew upon the hoplite panoply. Throughout the years, though, Rome had

managed to transform its military, weaponry, armor, and tactics. Under the Republic the Roman

army had evolved into a conscript force matched by an ingenious organizational system capable

of fielding large armies year after year.

All dates BCE.1

Peter Green The Hellenistic Age: A Short History (New York, 2007) 93.2

Green, 95.3


The Macedonians meanwhile had become the fiercest fighting machine the world had

ever known under the rule of Philip II and his son Alexander in the fourth century. Philip had

learned to utilize the cavalry in a way that supported his transformed phalanx, a technique that

allowed his son Alexander to conquer a huge swathe of the ancient world and topple the Persian

empire.

The Macedonian Army

The bulk of the army at Perseus’ disposal was composed of the phalanx. The phalanx was

a tightly formed block of individual troops. The phalanx in 168 maintained many key elements

Philip II had installed and Alexander the Great had perfected. These two military practitioners 4

developed upon the traditional Greek hoplite formation, particularly in weaponry. The Greek

hoplite was armed with a spear of six to eight feet used for thrusting in one hand and a large

ornate shield in the other hand. 5

The Macedonians to the north (unlike their Greek counterparts) had adopted a long lance

called a sarissa which brought about huge changes in their military tactics. The sarissa ranged 6

from fifteen feet to eighteen feet and weighed 14.5 lbs. Since this immense weight and length 7

required both hands in order to carry the sarissa, each man could only carry a small shield over

his shoulder. However, the Macedonian units had little use for significant armor since they were 8

protected by their serried mass of sarissae as implemented by Philip II. The sarissa was wielded 9

too by the Macedonian cavalry. Originally Philip and Alexander had used the phalanx to pin the

Adrian Goldsworthy In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won The Roman Empire (London, 2004) 21.4

M.M. Markle “The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor” AJA (1977), 331.5

Markle, 323.6

Markle, 323-324.7

Plut., Aemilius Paullus, 19.1.8

Markle, 327.9


enemy in place while the cavalry attacked a key position flanking the enemy line. By Perseus’

time the Successor states of Alexander’s empire had resorted to reducing the cavalry to a more

supportive role. The sarissa, though, was a useless weapon for hoplites outside the tight

formation of the phalanx. This striking weakness is laid out by Polybius describing the phalanx

as it existed at the time of the Battle of Pydna:

There are a number of factors which make it easy to understand that so long as the phalanx retains its characteristic form and strength nothing can withstand its charge or resist it face to face . . . [But] once the charge is launched, the rear ranks by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight . . . make it impossible for the foremost ranks to face about.10

A Macedonian phalanx charging forward could do little to nothing if attacked from the rear or

the side. Moreover, a sarissa-armed infantry could only be positioned on level ground with no

obstacles whatsoever or the formation could easily break up and be penetrated by the enemy. 11

This latter weakness will become evident at Pydna as Aemilius Paullus and his Roman

legionaries take full advantage of this fact.

The Roman Army

The core unit at Aemilius Paullus’ disposal was the Roman legion. One Roman legion

was composed of heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry. The Roman equites, their cavalry,

were suited well for making decisive charges on the battlefield, but were generally lacking in

number compared to their eastern counterparts. Like the Greek hoplite phalanx, the Roman 12

heavy infantry were made up of citizens who could afford the panoply. Unlike the phalanx,

though, they legionaries fought in three separate lines instead of a homogenous block. This

afforded great flexibility allowing each legionary to defend himself with his long shield (scutum)

Polyb., 18.29-30.10

Markle, 332.11

Adrian Goldsworthy Roman Warfare, (London, 2002), 49.12


and using his tempered steel gladius, or short sword, for thrusting and cutting. Polybius 13

explains that:

Obviously these tactics require a more open order and an interval between the men, and in practice each soldier needs to be at least three feet from those in the same rank and from those in front. of and behind him if he is to perform his function efficiently. . . moreover, in the Roman formation the rear ranks do not support the front, either in forcing the spears away or in the use of their swords.14

The units in the back did not engage the enemy as those in the phalanx did. So if engaged

directly from the front the legions would be met with deadly consequences. But the flexibility

both in command and to the individual gave the Romans the unique ability to supply the line

with fresh troops where required. Unlike the Macedonian commander who rarely made much use

of reserves, the Roman commanders generally stayed in the back and moved along the line

where directing and encouraging the troops and making full use of reserves. The basic formation

of the Roman legion kept half to two-thirds of its men away from the battle for these purposes. 15

This form of organization proved to be deadly effective.

It is worth mentioning that the Roman commander differed remarkably from his

Macedonian counterpart as well. The Hellenistic ruler was a king who usually led by example

often putting himself in dangerous proximity to the enemy--if not entirely engaged in combat.

The Roman consul who led on the battlefield was a magistrate elected to office who, as

mentioned before, had little interest in fighting in the front ranks having already reached high

Polyb., 18.30.313

Polyb. 18.3014

Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome, 23-24.15


office. Roman war and politics were inexorably linked since foreign enemies often posed 16

threats to the sanctity of the state. So although not from the same ilk as the Macedonian kings,

the Roman commander was often as able a general nonetheless. It will now be prudent to meet 17

each side of the conflict and the events leading up to the battle itself.

PRELUDE: EVENTS LEADING TO WAR

I have already touched upon the scope of the geography as it was in 168 BCE, but a more

thorough look at the political map is merited. The Antigonids of Macedonia dominated the Greek

peninsula, Macedonia, Thrace, and other holdings before Rome ever became a serious threat.

There were other forces in and around the Aegean such as the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues,

who often tinkered in playing sides with the larger powers around the region, but these remained

burdensome and not life threatening to the Macedonian kingdom. Nor were the Successor

kingdoms who were still keeping the status quo a serious threat in the foreseeable future.

The Second Punic War and First Macedonian War

The Macedonian king Philip V had proved an able commander and a thorn in the

Romans’ side. He had aided the Carthaginians and Hannibal during the Second Punic War in an

effort to gain ground from the Romans on the Adriatic coast in 218, a region in which they had

long been a presence since subduing the Illyrian pirates. This eventually sparked the First 18

The Roman Consul was the highest elected office and a great honor to any who achieved it. A Roman 16

magistrate during the mid-republic was supposed to embark on the cursus honorum climbing the political ladder as far as he could. Generally by this time he will have already proven himself in battle as either an equite or lower officer. One who had distinguished himself in battle or otherwise would honor his family for generations to come.




Macedonian War during which the Romans were somehow able to muster enough forces to fight

simultaneously with the Punic war. 19

The Romans had gained the Aetolians as allies in the region, who were still grousing

about an unfavorable treaty the Achaeans and Macedonians had imposed on them (in 217). The

fighting that ensued was notoriously savage and gained Philip infamy among many in the Greek

world. Following this action Sparta and Pergamon threw in their lot with the Romans but were

swiftly defeated by the Macedonians. At this point (207) the Romans turned their attention to

quashing Hannibal and left the Aetolians to their own devices. The Aetolians were then duly

defeated and in a treaty returned all Philip’s lost territory to him. The Romans’ attentive eye

captured once more, responded with a force but failed to gain the Aetolians’ continued support

and, thus, made a treaty at Phoenice in Epirus ending the First Macedonian War (205). The 20

status quo in the region was more or less retained.

In the west the Romans were celebrating Scipio Africanus’ triumph (his victory parade

and celebration down the sacra via in the city of Rome) for his numerous victories in Spain and

North Africa, his capitulation of Carthage, and his victory over Hannibal at Zama (just to name a

few). The outcome of Rome’s second war with Carthage left it as the greatest power in the

western Mediterranean. Rome had added the Carthaginian holdings of Spain, North Africa, and

more to their overlordship and had grown in power and wealth at a stellar rate. Following their

victory over Carthage (202) they were able to turn more attention to Illyria and address the slight

by Philip V.

Green, 81.19

Green, 81-83.20


Rome Expands its Dominion Over Greek Affairs

The Roman Senate, finally finished with its costly war with Carthage, had plenty of

resources at its disposal to devote to other theaters. In the east this was highlighted by vigorous

diplomatic coercion in Greek affairs. Athens (currently at war with Philip V) hosted a Roman

embassy meeting with envoys from Rhodes and Pergamon who had become increasingly

concerned with Philip’s activities in the Aegean and the Black Sea. Philip had amassed a fleet of

more than 200 vessels by raiding the islands of the Aegean controlled by many disparate factions

and even sold the population of Thasos into slavery. 21

The Romans readily met the distressed victims of Philip’s exploits at Athens who

proceeded to give Philip an ultimatum: desist from attacking Greek states and pay Attalus of

Pergamon indemnity for damages rendered or otherwise war will be made by you against the

people of Rome. Rather than be humiliated or acquiesce to Roman authority Philip instead

attacked Attica where the Roman envoys were still in Athens. He then attacked the cities of the

Hellespont at which time Rome issued one last ultimatum to him: in addition to the previous

ultimatum you must also pay indemnity to Rhodes and refrain from attacking Egypt. He

naturally maintained his stalwart defiance. The Second Macedonian War was, thus, begun, but

swiftly ended as the Romans managed to achieve their first victory over Greek forces at the

Battle of Cynoscephalae (197). The Romans entered Greece as saviors of Greek freedom and

independence and were originally met with such enthusiasm. For whatever reason Rome decided

to make its present permanent in Greece. But it wouldn’t directly rule over any part of the area

until after the Third Macedonian War. 22

Green, 83.21

Green, 83-84.22


Philip V died in 179--of remorse, according to Livy, for executing his son Demetrius on 23

counts of treason brought up by his other son and heir Perseus. Perseus set about earning the

favor of many Greeks and quickly became popular to Rome’s alarm. His popularity unnerved

Rome because to them he was perceived as a potential would be leader of rebellion. In 172 one

Eumenes approached Rome with outlandish accusations against Perseus. The Romans publicly

displayed these accusations at Delphi and in 171 made a conditional declaration of war: the Third

Macedonian War. For three years nothing more than skirmishes ever broke out between the two

sides. However, in 168 the Roman consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus marched north in Greece and

met Perseus in battle outside the city of Pydna. 24

THE BATTLE OF PYDNA

The Battle of Pydna was the turning point for Hellenistic civilization in that the

Hellenistic kingdoms would no longer be ruled solely by the Successor states left behind by the

quarreling generals of Alexander the Great. Instead Rome was to dominate the region for

centuries to come. Rome began the subjugation of the east with Macedonia.

The Third Macedonian War had begun with little action. The Roman consul Quintus

Marcius Phillipus brought the Roman army within striking distance of Perseus’ forces but was

never able to bait him into a pitched battle. Choosing the conditions for battle should be the goal

of any able commander, but equally so so should convincing your enemy to meet you in battle.

According to Plutarch, Marius aptly describes such circumstances while on the defensive during

the Social War years later in Italy. The opposing commander implores him to fight saying that “if

you are a great general, come down and fight it out.” Marius responded, “And if you are a great

Livy, 40.51.9.23

Green, 92-93.24


general, make me fight it out against my will.” The next consul to be appointed was Lucius 25

Aemilius Paullus.

Lucius Aemilius Paullus Arrives in Greece

Lucius Aemilius Paullus had governed Further Spain in 191 to 189 campaigning against

the Lusitanian tribes with considerable success. He was later elected to his first consulship in 182

and had eventual success there as well. After a few unsuccessful bids for reelection he finally 26

reached the consulship again in 168, due in large part to Phillipus’ unsuccessful campaign against

Perseus. Aemilius arrived at the Roman camp outside Phila in early June where he found the

camp in dismal circumstances. He immediately set about finding a proper water supply and duly

did so. He then gathered his officers and reconnoitered the enemy position, seeking out the best

route to across the dried-up river Elpeüs and assessing the strength of the Macedonian line. This

proved to be great as Perseus had fortified key positions from Mt. Olympus to the sea. His 27

static defenses were nothing new as Hellenistic rulers sought to avoid a pitched, decisive battle--

in stark contrast to Alexander the Great--fearing that the outcome could lead to their swift

demise. They had reason to believe so based upon past battles between the Successor states, but

this may have also been a sign of the poor quality of troops the Hellenistic kings possessed. The

discipline of Roman troops, however, was by this time far better. This was possibly largely due to

the incessant fighting of the Second Punic War but may have also been the product of a few

noteworthy commanders such as Aemilius.

Plut., Marius, 33.4.25

Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome, 90.26



Aemilius set about fashioning his troops to his style of command. Livy says he did so in

three main ways. He first emphasized tight discipline on the march, smoothing the issuing of

orders by first having them given to officers who disseminated them. Then when the order was

actually given the troops would all be on the same page. Secondly, he forbade sentries from

carrying shields because they had become accustomed to using them as support for their

unauthorized naps. Thirdly, he ordered the men at the frontal outposts to switch shifts twice a day

rather than once in order to avoid fatigue or weariness and keep the sentries alert. After a short

three or four days of preparation, the consul set about breaching Perseus’ defenses. 28

Aemilius Outmaneuvers Perseus

Aemilius quickly decided a frontal assault on one of the fortified passes might prove too

costly and have little chance of success. He resided in two local merchants familiar with the area

to lead a regiment of troops through one of the passes. Meanwhile, the Roman fleet just off the

coast would be sent to Heracleum to disguise the army’s true movements. The merchant-lead

regiment met the fleet at Heracleum then after their evening meal in the city, headed back inland

at nightfall. For the next couple days they would be headed to a chosen pass in order to outflank

the Macedonian defenses. As they were on their covert mission Aemilius, meanwhile, brought

the rest of the army up in battle order and roused the attention of the Macedonian outposts with

minor skirmishes. The separate regiment reached the Petra Pass after a couple days and

proceeded to capture it and move into a plain near Dium. After discovering this force to his rear 29

Perseus withdrew allowing Aemilius and the rest of the army to join up with the forces coming




through the pass. Fearing his prestige would be forever tarnished, Perseus resolved to give 30

battle outside the city of Pydna 21 June on an even plain well suited for his phalanx. Aemilius, 31

surprised by this gesture, refused battle after lining up his troops in battle formation and keeping

them in order for some time. This is most likely because his troops had been marching much 32

of the day in the heat and will have been undoubtedly fatigued and parched whereas the

Macedonians were rested and fresh. Aemilius eventually retired the troops to camp on ground 33

that was unsuitable for the phalanx. That night a lunar eclipse took place. Both commanders 34

devoted themselves to an animal sacrifice to Heracles as this was viewed as a powerful omen to

both the Romans and Macedonians; this effectively dates the battle to 22 June, 168 BCE. 35

Both armies gathered strength and awaited the next day. This would usually be followed

by jockeying by the two sides seeking to exploit any tiny weakness the other might show. There

were thousands of troops in the plain. Livy breaks down the Macedonian numbers and array of

forces:

The total number of those who bore arms was 43,000, nearly half of whom formed the phalanx. . . 2000 men in the prime of strength and manhood were selected to form a body known as the "agema," . . . [there were also] caetrati, numbering about 3000 men, Paeonians and Thracians who made up a force of about 3000, 2000 Gauls, 3000 "free" Thracians, and about the same number of Cretans, and the Aetolians and Boeotians, who, all told, did not amount to more than 500 men. Out of these contingents drawn from so many people and tribes, a force of about 12,000 men was formed. Perseus had collected 3000 cavalry out of the whole of Macedonia. Cotys, the son of Suthis and king of the Odrysae, had come in with a picked force of 1000 horse and about the same number of infantry. Thus the total number of the army was 39,000


Plut., Aemilius Paullus, 16.1-7.31


Livy, 36.2-36.9.33


Such a sacrifice was common practice after an oman like a lunar eclipse (see N.G.L. Hammond “The 35

Battle of Pydna” JHS (1984), 33.)


infantry and 4000 cavalry. It was generally admitted that, next to the army which Alexander the Great had led into Asia, no Macedonian king had ever possessed so large a force.36

The force under Aemilius’ command was likely much smaller. The standard Roman legion

consisted of of three elements: 300 cavalry, 3000 heavy infantry, and 1200 light infantry. The

heavy infantry was further broken down into three lines with each line being broken down into

ten tactical units called maniples. The maniples were arranged with intervals equal to their

frontage between each unit; front to back, side to side. This arrangement would resemble a

checkerboard from above. The checkerboard, or quincunx, formation allowed for immense

flexibility that the Romans were to be sure to utilize to the fullest. These core units were then

supplemented by allied units of generally the same strength but with up to three times as many

cavalry. This would bring the total to just over 20,000 core troops.37

The Battle of Pydna

The following day contingencies from both armies set out to retrieve water and firewood.

Neither commander seems to have expected to fight that day since neither side had formed in

battle array. Both armies stationed outposts of formed troops guarding their tent lines but the

bulk of both armies remained in their respective camps. 38

It is difficult to realize the scope of the battlefield without a proper vision of it. Our

records indicate that once all forces were committed the lines of each side will have measured

approximately two miles across, face to face. Plutarch, describing a specific location on the 39

battle line, says that after skirmishes began to escalate:

Livy, 42.51.36


Livy, 44.37.5-9.38

Hammond, 40.39


Aemilius . . . came out of his tent and went through the legions encouraging his soldiers. Nasica [one of Aemilius’ legates], in the meantime, who had ridden out to the skirmishers, saw the whole force of the enemy on the point of engaging. First marched the Thracians, who, he himself tells us, inspired him with most terror; they were of great stature, with bright and glittering shields and black frocks under them, their legs armed with greaves, and they brandished, as they moved, straight and heavily-ironed spears over their right shoulders. After the Thracians marched the mercenary soldiers, armed after different fashions; with these Paeonians were mingled. These were succeeded by a third division, of picked men, native Macedonians, the choicest for courage and strength, in the prime of life, gleaming with gilt armor and scarlet coats. As these were taking their places they were followed from the camp by the troops in phalanx called the Brazen Shields, so that the whole plain seemed alive with the flashing of steel and the glistening of brass; and the hills also with their shouts, as they cheered each other on. In this order they marched, and with such boldness and speed, that those who were first slain died at but two furlongs (1/4 mile) distance from the Roman camp.40

This indicates Perseus had responded swiftly as his troops were just outside the Roman camps.

Aemilius awaited contact before ordering the troops along the line, using the time to prepare and

inspire his legions. A skirmish between the elite Macedonian agema and a force of Italian allies

was met on the Romans’ right wing at the river Ayios Dimitrios which was already red with

blood from fighting farther down the line. The Macedonians were in good order and the Italians 41

found difficulty trying to dodge the mass of pikes coming straight at them. The agema had some

3,000 troops and auxiliaries to the Roman forces were likely outnumbered. In an effort to break

the stalemate the senior officer of the unit, one Salvius, grabbed the legion’s standard and hurled

it into the Macedonian ranks. The Italians surged forward to recover their beloved standard. A

short and brutal battle ensued, some legionaries able to take out a few hoplites, but the phalanx

Plut. Aemilius Paullus, 17-18.40

Hammond, 39.41


stood firm and the Italians were forced to draw back up the slope toward the Roman camp. The

entire Macedonian line now descended upon the Roman camp. 42

The remainder of the Romans then back stepped toward uneven ground where the deep

masses of the Macedonian phalanx would be compromised. The ploy worked for Aemilius as 43

the Macedonian line lost cohesion and the mile long line bulged forwards and backwards. 44

Elephants on the Roman right flank created even more havoc for the Macedonians. Perseus had

created a contingency of anti-elephant troops but they proved utterly ineffective. Moreover, the

noise, appearance, and smell of elephants tended to terrify horses which will have made the

cavalry useless or greatly hindered. The ebb and flow of the battle opened up gaps which

maniples of the Roman legion quickly exploited. Once to the side of the phalanx the Roman

scutum and gladius made short work of the Macedonian sarissa and side arm. 45

It is possible, perhaps, that had the phalanx been able to maintain its cohesion and keep

pressure on the Roman line they would have been successful in this battle. But what this

certainly points out is that the flexibility of the Roman legion proved superior. The battle turned

into a rout as the Macedonian line disintegrated. Perseus fled toward Pydna with his cavalry

leaving a field of corpses behind him. The next day the waters of the Leucus river were still

awash with the red of Macedonian blood. Over 20,000 are said to have been killed and another

6,000 taken prisoner while the number of Romans who fell was shy of 100. 46


Hammond, 39.43





The battle was unusually short, lasting little more than an hour. The quick nature in which

the battle had begun didn’t allow for either general to form his army in the way he would have

liked. The flexibility of the Roman military system proved to be the deciding factor when all else

failed. The Macedonians had a superior force in numbers but many failed to even reach the battle

in time to make a difference. Perseus continued to his capital at Pella in Macedonia where he

eventually conceded defeat and accepted the terms of Roman peace. The Roman Republic at this

time decided they had had enough of Macedonia and opted to see the kingdom cease to exist,

dividing the land into four autonomous regions. Perseus was taken prisoner and sent back to

Rome where he was to be paraded in Aemilius’ triumph and spend the rest of his life as a Roman

captive.47

THE VICTORY OF HELLENISTIC CULTURE

The Battle of Pydna was the first serious blow to a Hellenistic kingdom of many to come.

The Macedonian kingdom was no longer going to merely be within the Romans’ sphere of

influence. Macedonia would later become a province of the burgeoning Roman empire. The

rebellious poleis to the south would soon follow suit followed by the kingdoms of Anatolia, the

Seleucid east, and Ptolemaic Egypt. It would take until the Battle of Actium in 30 BCE and the

victory of the first Roman emperor Octavian (Augustus) over Antony and Cleopatra to bring an

end to Hellenistic sovereignty. But in the end it would prove impossible--undesirable even--to

bring an end to Hellenism and Hellenistic culture.

Triumph



Aemilius was eventually granted a triumph by the Roman Senate after much

deliberation--he seems to have never been able to gain good favor with his own troops--which

proved to be a spectacular event spread over three days. He had 250 wagons of statues and

Hellenistic art paraded on the first day, wagons filled with the panoply of the Macedonian troops

and treasure on the second, and on the third the main procession took place. Perseus’ immense

treasury of three talents of gold and his most precious vessels carried through the streets. His

royal chariot with his empty armor and royal diadem came next followed by his children, two

boys and a girl, then the king himself. This latter spectacle was said to have brought the normally

stern Roman people to tears. Finally, Aemilius Paullus brought up the rear: 48

seated on a chariot magnificently adorned (a man well worthy to be looked at, even without these ensigns of power), dressed in a robe of purple, interwoven with gold, and holding a laurel branch in his right hand. All the army, in like manner, with boughs of laurel in their hands, divided into their hands and companies, followed the chariot of their commander; some singing verses, according to the usual custom, mingled with raillery; others, songs of triumph and the praise of Aemilius' deeds; who, indeed, was admired and accounted happy by all men, and unenvied by every one that was good . . .49

The trappings of Aemilius’ triumph serves a purpose to show the Roman fascination with

Hellenistic culture. Before Aemilius left Greece for Rome he had toured Greece and become

fascinated by its culture.

The Victory of Hellenistic Culture

In an effort to win over the Greek people Aemilius staged a Hellenic festival at

Amphipolis complete with drama, poetry, sports, and performances. The honor lavished upon

Roman generals was befitting a Hellenistic king. Though Rome had come into contact with


Plut. Aemilius Paullus, 34.49


Hellenic culture in southern Italy long before it wasn’t until this later influx of Hellenistic art and

and slaves that they were truly enthralled by it. The slaves in particular were brought in to teach

Roman children in all things Greek, the historian Polybius from whom most of our knowledge of

this time is derived was brought to Rome where he wrote his Histories, and Greek artists and

performers were set to work in the Eternal City. Senators and other aristocrats began to learn the

Greek language, spoken and written, attempting to show their superiority over their colleagues

by being educated in Hellenistic culture. By the end of the second century Roman aristocrats

were largely bilingual, Greek being the language of true civilization. Rome had come to 50

dominate the Hellenistic kingdoms but the conquest was far from over. In the end Rome became

the host of Hellenistic civilization. As a result we have the great fortune of experiencing it as

well.

Goldsworthy, In the Name of Rome, 107-10850


Bibliography

Primary ancient sources

Livy, Rome and the Mediterranean translated by Henry Bettenson; Penguin Group; London, England; 1976.

Plutarch, Lives the Dryden translation; Random House, Inc.; New York, NY; 2001.

Polybius, Histories translated by F.W. Walbank; Penguin Group; London, England; 1979.

Modern sources: Books F.E. Adcock The Greek and Macedonian Art of War; University of California Press; Berkeley, CA; 1957.

Adrian Goldsworthy Roman Warfare; Collins; New York, NY; 2002.

Adrian Goldsworthy In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire; Phoenix; London, England; 2004.

Michael Grant A Guide to the Ancient World: A Dictionary of Classical Place Names; Michael Grant Publications; New York, NY; 1986.

Peter Green The Hellenistic Age: A Short History; Modern Library; New York, NY; 2007.

F.W. Walbank Philip V of Macedon; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, England; 1967.

Modern Sources: Articles

N.G.L. Hammond, “The Battle of Pydna,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 104 (1984), pp. 31-47.

Minor M. Markle, III, “The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor,” American Journal of Archaeology, vol. 81, no. 3, (1977), pp. 323-339.

Documents

The Battle of Pydna (Senior Seminar)