THE BRITISH COMMANDOS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR:

IN DEFEAT DEFIANCE!

by

ALEC WILLIAMS, B.A.

A THESIS

IN

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Accepted

August 1974

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m-'n^\

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CONTENTS

PREFACE iii

Chapter

1. FROM INDECISION TO OFFENSIVE: "IN WAR

RESOLUTION, IN DEFEAT, DEFIANCE" 1

2. THE FIRST STAGE: LOFOTEN, SPITZBERGEN, AND VAAGSO 19

3. THE RAID ON ST. NAZAIRE: THE FRUITION OF THE CONCEPT 41

4. DIEPPE: DELIVERANCE THROUGH DISASTER 62

5. NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, ITALY, AND NORMANDY: THE FINAL STAGES 78

6. EPILOGUE 97

BÎBLIOGRAPHY 105

INDEX 118

n

PREFACE

In searching for a thesis topic on twentieth century Britain,

I concluded that the central event in the twentieth century for

Britain, as well as the rest of the world, was World War II. The war

was not only Britain's "Finest Hour," as Churchill put it, but also

marked her eclipse as a world power. Britain's war effort is person-

ified in Churchill, and ChurchilTs approach to leadership is found in

the theme of his The Second World War: "In War: Resolution. In

Defeat: Defiance. In Victory: Magnanimity. In Peace: Good Will."

The second phrase struck me as particularly Churchillian, and charac-

teristic of the British people as well. The desire of Churchill and

the British nation to defy Hitler's Germany was probably best

expressed in the formation of commando units and their deployment in

raids against the coast of occupied Europe.

In the course of my research on the commandos, I found ways

to venerate Churchill, one of my favorite historical figures, but the

topic was interesting and important for other reasons. The commandos

pave the way for the irregular troops of World War II, and they remain

a significant British contribution to not only the war effort but to

the concept of modern warfare. If one looks at history as a sequence

of causes and effects, the commandos were the cause of many effects.

They were an important part of the history of the British war effort

and of the war in general. They were one of many important British

• • •

contributions to the Allied victory, contributions often overlooked by

popular opinion. Many Americans consider the British as so much dead

wood in the history of the war, when, in fact, the Allied effort was

that of a coalition, with the British composing a \/ery important part.

This is not to belittle the Americans, whose role in the v/ar is practi-

cally legendary. An examination of one aspect of the British contribu-

tion to the war will not detract from the American role but, in fact,

enhance its stature. The two countries worked wery well together, and

each made its own contribution to the defeat of the Axis. The commandos,

as part of Combined Operations Headquarters, contributed an important

part of the British contribution in both tactics and strategy.

I faced a problem with research material. I was not able to

obtain many documents and letters that might have been available to

the well-financed professional historian, but I found that the amount

of published material is incredibly voluminous. Most of the important

people who were involved in the conflict left their memoirs. Of

course, there are two notable exceptions, Roosevelt and Stalin. On

the other hand, an incredible number of people did leave their

memoirs: Churchill, Eisenhower, Patton, Montgomery, Goebbels, Rommel,

Bradley, Doenitz, Zhukor, Chuikov, Galland, Guderian, Clark, Truscott,

and Speer. Hitler's wartime conversations ("table talk") have also

been published. A number of less famous, but important, people have

left memoirs, such as Peter Young and John Durnford-Slater. Noted

war correspondents have contributed material, among them Ernie Pyle,

William Shirer, Gordon Holman, Quentin Reynolds, and A. B. Austin.

iv

The war has been a favorite topic with military and non-military

historians, adding more available sources. Both the British and

American governments have published official histories. With the

boom in paperback books and a receptive public, the amount of published

material on the Second World War will undoubtedly increase.

The objects of this thesis are to gain some new insights into

the commandos and provide a synthesis of published works on this

aspect of the war. There is a growing need for this approach to the

study of World War II. Kent Roberts Greenfield's book on American

strategy is a move in this direction. The Ballantine History of the

Violent Century is another more popular effort making use of both

published material and the rich photographic record available. For

this reason, the footnotes for the thesis are extensive. Many of the

sources used are in paperback, indicative of the popular appeal of

this area of history. The corresponding hardcover editions are listed

in the bibliography. I hope that this work will serve not only to

show how much has been published, but also that it will give some new

perspectives of the history of World War II.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the members

of my committee, Brian L. Blakeley and Otto M. Nelson, for their

guidance and criticism.

Alec Williams Lubbock, Texas August 1974

CHAPTER 1

FROM INDECISION TO OFFENSIVE: "IN WAR

RESOLUTION, IN DEFEAT DEFIANCE"

The inter-war years in Britain were a period of complacency

and false security. After 1933 Winston Churchill and other alarmists

or "jitterbugs" opposed, to little avail, the complacency of Britain

and the policy of appeasement. They would later be hailed as prophets.

Men such as Churchill could not for foresee the future, but they did

realize that Germany had been humiliated at Versailles, and that she

would want to reassert herself as a great European nation. If she

chose to dominate the continent and indulge in acts of aggression,

Britain would have to meet her with force, or back down and lose her

place as the main European power. The figure of the German chancellor,

Adolf Hitler, was hardly a reassuring one. Unfortunately, the British

government was controlled by well-meaning men such as Neville

Chamberlain who did not agree with the jitterbugs. These honest,

patriotic, and otherwise capable men built their own dream castles,

and then proceeded to live in them. Their policy of appeasement was

served even at the expense of ramming a disastrous political settle-

ment down the throats of the Czechs at Munich. Both Munich and the

2

Nazi-Soviet Pact showed Britain's tragic inability to deal with the

concept of political warfare.^

This dream world extended to the British military as well.

Again, well intentioned, honest, patriotic men failed to see what was

going on in the world around them. It was as though the clock had

stopped at 1918 or before. Military planners who should have been

thinking in terms of mechanization thought only of horse flesh. The

ideas of B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller were not within their

grasp. Liddell Hart and Fuller told strange tales of the importance

of mechanization and mobile tactics. While the British Army laughed,

Heinz Guderian was putting these ideas to good use, eagerly absorbing

every bit. When his tanks broke the French lines in 1940, the idea of

tank warfare was vindicated. Yet, while this process was in motion in

Germany, wery little was happening in Britain. The House of Commons

debated the future of the cavalry in 1935. In 1937 Duff Cooper told

that assembly that Britain's worsening military position showed little

hope of improving. What should have been going on for fifteen years

A. J. P. Taylor, The Oriqins of the Second World War, 2d ed. (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1961), pp. 38, 101-239; A. L. Rowse, Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 1933-1939 (New York: Norton, 1963), pp. 381-41, 44-47, 78-84, 111-19; Winston S. Churchill, The History of the Second World War, 6 vols. (New York: Bantam, 1961), vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, pp. 60-358; William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1960), pp. 485-577, 721-818; Duff Cooper, The Second World War: First Phase (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), pp. 80-89, 152-53, 260, 280-81, 294.

could not be done in an instant. Even in 1939, the full impact of

Britain's military situation was not perceived by many.

It became apparent to all in 1940. Britain sent a hastily

improvised and muddled expedition to Norway, proving conclusively

that an army could not operate effectively if it was poorly equipped

and lacked air cover. The Germans drove the point further home in

the Ardennes Offensive in France, before the campaign in Norway was

over. Guderian's tanks broke through the French defenses with the

fall of Sedan, while the Allies were occupied with holding up the

German advance through Belgium, which was only a decoying movement.

The French Army buckled and broke. The bulk of the British forces 3

were evacuated at Dunkirk.

The details of the Allied fiasco are a matter of record. The

important question is why one major European power was defeated, and

2 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader. with a Foreword by B. H.

Liddell Hart, abridged ed., trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Ballantine, 1957), pp. 1, 10; Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. 25-50; Jay Luuvass, The Education of an Armv: British Military Thouqht. 1815-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 356-403; B. H. Liddell Hart, "The Inter-War Years, 1919-1939," The Historv of the British Armv, ed. Peter Young and J. P. Lawford (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), pp. 249-53; Churchill, Ihe. Gatherinq Storm, pp. 64-70, 99-116, 132-47, 301-03; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Liddell Hart Memoirs, 5 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1966), vol. 2: The Later Years, pp. 2-220; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (CommoniT, 5th series, 299 (llth March-25th March 1937): 1889.

\inston S. Churchill, The History of the Second World War (New York: Bantam, 1962), vol. 2: Their Finest Hour, pp. 24-102; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp. 530-87; Christopher Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), pp. 10-155; Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 75-98; Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 889-902, 924-38, 953-71.

another driven off the European continent. The armies of these two

nations were beaten decisively and quickly. The so-called "phoney war"

or "twilight war" was no such thing. When the Germans attacked Poland

in September 1939, they counted on Britain and France taking a defen-

sive stance and doing nothing. The French were obligated to stage an

offensive against Germany in the event of an offensive against Poland,

but they did not. The Poles found out what the Czechs could have told

them and what the British later discovered--the French være not reli-

able allies. The hesitant French saw self-preservation as their prime

objective and stayed behind their Maginot Line. As a result, the

Allies were held back by a much smaller German force that was never

in any danger of attack. When the German thrust came, it was well

prepared and decisive. The Germans were prepared to take the initi-

ative, to take great risks in the process.

The Allies were unprepared to take risks. The British

Expeditionary Force was too small to turn the tide. It was poorly

equipped and trained. As for the French, their hearts were never in

the struggle. Despite the fact that the Allies, collectively, had

more and better tanks than the Germans, it did them no good. They

were amateurs at mechanized warfare. The Germans, on the other hand,

were fascinated with the concept, particularly the British concept

4 Eric William Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army,

4th ed. (London: Constable, 1950), pp. 376-78; J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-1945: A Strateaical and Tactical History (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949), pp. 73-74; Shirer, R ie and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 838-42; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp. 417-30.

as expressed by Liddell Hart and Fuller. Their concept was mobile

warfare with fire-power. Basically, this was Napoleon's concept, via

Carl von Clausewitz, adopted to meet the new conditions of the

twentieth century. The Germans took advantage of Allied hesitancy,

and they struck to destroy their enemy quickly--or almost. The British

Army had escaped. Perhaps it was not in the best condition as a result

of the Dunkirk evacuation, but British seapower and the RAF had managed

to save most of the men. As a result, the issue in the West was not 5

decided.

In 1940, the question for Britain was of what to do until she

could build up her strength for a return to the European continent.

It was a question that was on many minds. Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley

Clarke, Military Assistant to Sir John Dill (Chief of the Imperial

General Staff), was one of those who pondered the problem. Defeated

armies usually resorted to guerrilla warfare, as had been the case

with the Spanish during the Peninsular War. There were other examples,

but since Clarke had been born in the Transvaal, he remembered the

Boer commandos of 1899-1902. What Britain needed were guerrilla

fighters, who could put Britain's seapower to good use for mobility

and who could strike against the Germans. A raiding program could be

5 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 24-102; Carl von Clausewitz,

On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), pp. 17-31, 46-47, 61-62, 101-22; Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 93-97; Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 352-56, 944-48, 952-60, 962-71; Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 23-28; Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army, pp. 381-83.

started which would accomplish this. Clarke presented his proposals

to Dill, and found himself in charge of the project at Section M09 at

the War Office three days later.

Clarke's proposal won quick acceptance because of ChurchilTs

enthusiastic support. A more perfect patron could not have been found.

ChurchiU assumed power after Chamberlain's government had fallen over

the defeat in Norway. Ironically, it was on Churchill that part of the

blame should have fallen. It did not, however, and Churchill was in

a position of leadership, the high point of his life. For him it was

a chance to lead his country to victory, as his ancestor Marlborough

had done. The reins of power were gladly taken and puUed tight. A

veterán of the Asquith and Lloyd George governments of the First World

War, where organization was chaotic and where the military was a

privileged caste, Churchill would rule with a firm hand. He was not

only prime minister, but also minister of defense. He gathered and

held more power than any prime minister before or since. If there

were to be any more Gallipolis, the man v/ho was to take the blame

would know exactly what was going on. With ChurchilTs iron hand

came a vigorous approach to leadership, a strong sense of history and

destiny, and a desire to take the initiative at all costs. Whatever

his earlier shortcomings, he had amassed a great deal of technical

knowledge on war. He had been involved in the Boer War as a corres-

pondent, and had been captured by Boer Commandos. After his escape.

Dudley Clarke, Seven Assignments (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), pp. 205-6; Peter Young, Command"ô~rNew York: Ballantine, 1969), p. 8.

he had loudly advocated the formation of irregular British cavalry

units to counter the Commandos. When this was done, he joined one of

them and participated in the relief of Ladysmith. He was especially

fond of the raiding concept, having been responsible for a successful

raid on the German fleet, successful air raids on the German zeppelin

bases, and a landing of Royal Marines on the Belgian coast to fool

the Germans into thinking that a major landing was in effect. All of

this had occurred during World War I, but the years had not dimmed

ChurchilTs enthusiasm. Clarke's suggestion was exactly what this

dynamic and controversial statesman was looking for.

ChurchilTs memo of June 6, 1940, to General Lord Ismay, Head

of the Military Wing of the War Cabinet, showed ChurchilTs apprecia-

tion of the possibilities of raiding, the technological problems of

amphibious warfare, and the importance of taking some action against

the Germans:

We have got to get out of our minds the idea that the Channel ports and all the country between are enemy terri-tory. . . . Enterprises must be prepared with specially trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a

Max Aitken [Lord Beaverbrook], "Lloyd George and Churchill," History Today 23 (August 1973): 546-53; Robert Lewis Taylor, Winston Churchill: The Bioqraphy of a Great Man (New York: Pocket Books, 1954), pp. 331-32; Brian Gardner, Churc"h"ill in Power: As Seen By His Contemporaries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 42, 51, 75-78; Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (New York: Harper and Bros., 1953), pp. 4, 7, 174-75, 186, 316-21; B. H. Liddell Hart, "The Military Strategist"; A. J. P. Taylor et al., Churchill Revised: A Critical Assessment (New York: Dial Press, 1969), pp. 178-85, 219-23; Hastings Lionel Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 159-63; Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (New York: Charles y L n e

i ) , pp. Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 252-53, 301-54.

8

reign of terror down these coasts, first of all on the "butcher and bolt" policy; but later . . . we could surprise Calais or Boulogne, kill and capture the Hun garrison and hold the place until all the preparations to reduce it by seige or storm have been made, and then away. The passive resistance to war, in which we have acquitted ourselves so well, must come to an end . . . Tanks and A. F. V.'s (Armored Fighting Vehicles) must be made in flat bottomed boats out of which they can steal ashore, do a deep raid inland . . . and then back. leaving a trail of German corpses behind them. . . .̂

Churchill had found the perfect application for his belief in

initiative in war and his love of technology and gadgets. By July 17,

1940, Churchill had created Combined Operations to handle the new

commando troops and to set up some sort of raiding program. Initially,

Combined Operations was headed by Lieutenant-General Alan Bourne as

Commander of Raiding Operations. Bourne received his appointment from

the Chiefs of Staff on June 14, 1940. Churchill disagreed. He felt

that a man with more seniority was needed for the job. Making it quite

clear that he had nothing against Bourne, personally or as a soldier,

he replaced Bourne with Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. Keyes took over as

Director of Combined Operations on July 17, 1940. Keyes had more

seniority, experience, and authority to deal with the problems to be

faced. Keyes was a veteran of both the Gallipoli campaign and the

Zeebrugge raid of the First World War. Despite these impressive

credentials, Keyes later proved to have severe limitations. At any 9

rate, the venture was off to a promising start.

^Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 143, 211; Ismay, Memoirs, pp. 160-62.

û Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined

Operations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), pp. 47-52; Arthur Marder, "Winston is Back: Churchill at the Admiralty," English Historical Review, Supplement 5, pp. 8, 20-23.

The commandos occupy a niche in British history that is both

traditional and modern. As Combined Operations, they were trained to

participate in operations that combined the three services into one

unit. A landing on a hostile coast required that land, air, and sea

services act together as parts of a single effort. Success would

depend on this. If one of the three failed in its part, it could well

mean the failure of the entire operation.

The original commandos were different, however. The term was

first used by the Boer guerrillas in South Africa. The Boer commando

units consisted of field cornetcies (150 to 200 men), v/hich were sub-

divided into corporalships of about 25 men. The Boer units were

loosely organized and disciplined. They were irregular guerrillas in

the traditional sense of the term, depending on nationalism and the

ineptitude of the British for success. Both were available in

abundant supply. Their World War II counterparts were just the

opposite. The men of Combined Operations were professional soldiers,

picked from the Independent Companies that had been raised for the

Norwegian expedition and from volunteers. They were subject to

military discipline and training, which, if unorthodox, was still of

[Hillary A. St. George Saunders], Combined Operations: The Official Story of the Commandos (New York: "Macmillan, 1943), p. v. Mountbatten later replaced Keyes as head of Combined Operations. St. George Saunders was the official historian of the organization, but he remained anonymous at the time of the book's publication. The reference cited is from Mountbatten's foreword for the book.

Deneys Reitz, Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War, 2d ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1931), p. 21; Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970: A Military, Political, and Social Survey (New York: William Morrow, 1970), pp. 340, 343, 348.

10

a professional military caliber. 'They qualified as guerrillas only in

the sense of professionals fighting la petite guerre or kleinkreig

("little war"), a conflict or strategy waged within the scope of a

larger conflict or strategy. The commandos of World War II were a

product of both traditional skirmishing tactics and modern technology.

The hybrid was created for the purpose of striking back at the Germans.

Raiding was one meâns of doing this. An army does not have to do things

in a big way to hurt the enemy; anything that drains the enemy's

resources is justifiable military action. Temporary occupation of

enemy territory, such as Churchill envisioned, is one way. Even less

ambitious raid can cause the enemy more loss than he inflicts, hurting

him both materially and psychologically. This application of "little

12 war" can also drain and overextend his resources. In 1940 raiding

was one of the few options open to Britain for bringing military force

to bear against the enemy. This was to be done initially by ten

commando units (35 officers and 500 men each), ten troops of 50 men to

a commandoJ3

The British commandos had yet another aspect that differenti-

ated them from the Boers. They were amphibious. The sea provided the

Alfred Vagts, Landing Operations: Strateqy, Tactics, Poli-tics, From Antiquity to 1945 (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1946), p. 619; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Future of Infantry (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), pp. 62-63; Clausewitz, 0]i War, pp. 127-29; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 160-61. J. R. M. Butler, Grand StrTtegy, 6 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), vol. 3, pt. 2: June 1941-Auqust 1942, pp. 513-14.

^"^John Durnford-Slater, Commando (London: William Kimber, 1953), pp. 12-15.

11

mobility necessary for their style of warfare. This in itself gave

them an advantage over the Germans who thought in terms of land warfare,

being relative amateurs at amphibious and naval warfare. Raiding had

always figured in British military history, acted out by and upon the

British. Britain's traditional strategy often minimized the importance

of sending large armies to Europe. Equally traditional was Britain's

policy of sending small forces overseas when she was in difficulty.

Britain had her navy and, thereby, a means of getting her army to

widely separated and far off places. Sometimes the attacking force

had been considerably weakened by the wretched conditions on the troop

14 transports, but Britain usually made a showing.

Whenever Britain needed to enter a conflict away from the home-

land, she used her navy. This entailed combined or conjunct operations,

combining her army and navy and later her air force to bring her

military potential to bear on the enemy. Everyone learns about the

capture of Quebec (1759) as the key operation to the capture of French

Canada. Few realize that it was a combined operation, one using the

navy to bring the army into contact with the enemy to accomplish an

objective. The difference between a raid and the beginning of a major

campaign is purely a matter of the objective sought. Both require a

combined operation. The Gallipoli and Normandy operations sought

Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 309-10; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 144-45, 246-47; Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army, pp. 2, 168; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 15-18; Fuller, The^ Second World War, p. 31; Vagts, Landing Operations, pp. 169-81, 241-43.

12

extended goals of occupation and conquest. Raiding seeks more limited

objectives, such as the destruction of vital resources and material and

the temporary engagement of enemy forces. The British attacks on

Cadiz (1596) and on St. Malo (1758) were in the latter category.

William Pitt and Elder staged a series of raids against the French

coast during the Seven Years War which were quite similar to the raids

that Churchill had in mind in 1940. In fact, one of the raids that

Pitt staged was led by one of ChurchilTs ancestors. Unfortunately,

Pitt's raids were not wery successful. Nonetheless, they helped further

the tactical concept. Amphibious warfare, successful or not, has always

been a part of the British scheme. The commandos were a logical out-

come of this tradition, but with the application of modern technology

15 as a counterstroke to the German Blitzkreig.

Admittedly, Britain's tradition of amphibious warfare suffered

some neglect in the twentieth century. The predominance of the

Western Front during World War I limited combined operations. This

should not have been the case. One of the few attempts to use Britain's

amphibious potential on the Western Front was ChurchilTs attempt to

relieve Antwerp, although he had more success with his scheme for land-

ing troops on the Belgian coast during the early stages of the conflict,

an operation which convinced the Germans that a major landing was in

15 Roger Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations (New

York: Macmillan, 1943), pp. 7-17. This book is compiled from a series of lectures that Keyes gave after he was replaced by Mountbatten as head of Combined Operations; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 18-23; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 204-08; Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army, pp. 51-55; Vagts, Landinq Operations, pp. 243-57, 267-73, 281-302, 331-37, 381-87, 619.

13

progress. The major amphibious stroke of the war was, however, the

disastrous Gallipoli offensive against Turkey. Again, it was a

brilliant attempt to use Britain's seapower to the best advantage, but

the concept was scuttled in the application. Another attempt to use

amphibious warfare in Africa suffered the same fate.

These attempts did little to promote the concept of combined

operations. The major exception, however, was Sir Roger Keyes's

brilliant raid on Zeebrugge in German-occupied Belgium. Keyes's force

of Royal Marines managed to block the Bruges shipping canal with a

blockship. A similar venture to block the other canal at Ostend failed,

and the Germans managed to dredge a channel around the blockships at

Zeebrugge. The use of the main canal was still limited, however. The

large German destroyers and large submarines were trapped at Bruges.

If the raid's tactical success was limited, the raid was a technolog-

ical triumph. Its use of modern technology distinguished it from

earlier British raids and foreshadowed the commando raids of World

War II. A submarine loaded with explosives was used to destroy an

aqueduct to keep German reinforcements from reaching a critical point,

a tactic similar to the bomb-ship used at St. Nazaire in 1942. Other

innovations included a smoke screen, flame throwers, parachute flares

dropped from planes and rocket flares from the ships, and light buoys

to mark the attack route for the force. After the raid, Keyes initiated

Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 383-85; Fergusson, The^ Watery Maze, pp. 24-34; Liddell Hart, "The Military Strategist," pp. 185-87, 190; Cowles, Winston Churchill, pp. 178-82; Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 5 vols., 2nd ed. (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923), vol. 2: 1915, pp. 31-33, 101-11, 166-68, 243, 276.

14

several attempts at bombing the locks of the canal but, unfortunately,

the attempt was a failure. Still, Keyes had demonstrated that a

well-planned raid by an adequately trained force with technological

innovations was a feasible venture.

Unfortunately for amphibious warfare, Gallipoli, rather than

Zeebrugge, was remembered. Amphibious warfare suffered accordingly

in the interwar years. Some work was done under L. E. H. Maund at the

Inter-Services Training and Development Center established in 1938.

Maund, who went on the Norwegian expedition, later came to realize

how much work still needed to be done in the area of amphibious assault.

The mistakes made during the Norwegian campaign were incredible. No

one had realized exactly how important amphibious technique was.

Training in amphibious warfare was obviously going to be needed before

18 any more expeditions were launched.

In 1940 the commandos were faced with the problem of just how

to develop this technique and how to make it work. Britain's tradi-

tions had been badly neglected. Experience was the only real teacher,

especially as it applied to the new conditions of World War II. The

need for training became painfully evident in the first commando raids.

Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 54-73; James W. Stock, Zeebruqqe and Ostend (New YorÍT: Blllantine, 1974), pp. 28, 64-155; Hillary A. St. George Saunders, Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power, 1911-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 254-55; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 35; Vagts, Landing Operations, pp. 566-77; Winston S. Churchill, The Wor d Crisis (London: Thô'rnton Butterworth, 1927), vol. 4: 1961-1918, Part II, p. 371.

^\. E. H. Maund, Assault From the Sea (London: Methuen, 1949), pp. 1-60; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 39-45.

15

The first was carried out on June 23-24, 1940, on the French coast

between Boulogne and Le Touquet by Major Ronnie Tod and No. 11 Inde-

pendent Company. Little was accomplished. Two Germans were killed by

one party, while another party failed to find any Germans at all. The

second raid was on the island of Guernsey on July 14-15. It was a

comedy of errors, and Churchill was not pleased with the meager results.

After two more equally unsuccessful raids in September, Keyes called a

halt to raiding. There would be no more futile efforts. The commandos

19 would first be trained and prepared.

After Boulogne each side issued communiques. The British

response was, of course, favorable, while the Germans played down the

raid. The latter was probably more accurate in the tactical sense.

The public response to the raids was quite another matter. The London

Times was happy and encouraging in a cautious sort of way. The American

press was enthusiastic, giving the two raids much more attention than

they deserved. In response to Boulogne, Harold Denny of the New York

Times reported that American military experts were elated. The

St. Louis Post-Dispatch mentioned "heavily armed shock troops" who had

"stormed German positions." This was the beginning of the public's and

the nev/spapers' fascination with the commandos, which would continue

throughout the war.

"IQ

Young, Commando, pp. 13-15; Durnford-Slater, Commando, p. 34; Clarke, Seven Assignments, pp. 227-48; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 167-71; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 553.

Times (London), June 27, 1940, pp. 6-7; Harold Denny, "British Troops Raid Enemy Lines on Channel," New York Times, June 26, 1940, p. 1; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 26, 1940, p. 1.

16

The press insisted on playing up the sensational aspects of

the troops and the raids. This made the infatuation grow increasingly

one-sided as time passed. However overblown the accounts of these two

raids and the others that followed may seem today, they were important

in their own way. In modern war, the morale of both one's own popula-

tion, that of one's Allies, and that of one's adversaries is an

integral part of the conflict, the psychological sphere. Churchill saw

the advantages of the commandos as good publicity. As with all the

major powers involved in the conflict, morale on the home front in

Britain was important. Likewise, the morale of the occupied countries

and that of Germany herself was important in the opposite sense. The

first required boosting, the second required weakening. By using the

spectre of invasion, amphibious warfare is a particularly effective

means of affecting the morale of another country. Lastly, anything

British that got good press in the United States was hardly to be

ignored. The catch was that amphibious warfare was good publicity if

21 successful, but bad if it failed.

There was something more important than publicity gained from

these two raids, but it was not immediately realized by either side.

The raids failed in their tactical objectives; none of the targets

ear-marked for destruction was destroyed. Strategically, the raids

succeeded. Little was learned about German defenses or the defenders.

Hillary A. St. George Saunders, The Green Beret: The Story of the Commandos, 1940-1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1949), pp. 39-41; Clausewitz, On War, pp. 251-52; Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, pp. 73-76; Vagts, Landing Operations, pp. 63-70; A. J. P. Taylor, "The Statesman," Churchill Revised, p. 41.

17

but the British did learn that the coastline of occupied Europe was

vulnerable. The Germans could not fortify and defend every inch of an

empire that stretched from Norway to the Franco-Spanish border. Raid-

ing was feasible; and, more important, so was an invasion of the

Continent. The Germans assumed that it was, and they followed the

Fortress Europe concept of static defense. Every raid on this coast

would only reinforce their belief in the fortress concept which would

22 be their undoing in 1944.

Everyone learns by doing. A comedy of errors is not really

such a bad thing if something is learned from the mistakes, and the

corímandos had a great deal to learn from. The commandos needed train-

ing and improved planning. Both were necessary if amphibious warfare

were to be developed into a science. Technical concepts needed work;

RAF rescue craft were not suitable substitutes for specialized landing

craft, and navigational methods needed improving. Nothing could take

the place of proper planning. This learning process would go on until

1945; what was learned was applied to all the amphibious operations of

World War II. This was a great contribution since the great campaigns

23 of the war entailed some sort of amphibious operations.

22 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper

and Bros., 1952), p. 97; B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), p. 543.

oo T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., A Military

History of World War Two, 2 vols. (West Point: United States Military Academy, 1956), vol. 1: Operations in the European Theater, pp. 310, 324-25; Wilmot, Strugqle for Europe, p. 109; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 49; Clarke, Seven Assignments, pp. 242-4^; Durnford-Slater, Commando, p. 22; Preston and Wise, Men in Arms, pp. 321-22.

18

In 1940 the great raids—Vaagso, St. Nazaire, Dieppe--and the

great campaigns—North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, the conquest of

Europe--were still in the future. The commandos were faced with long

months of training. The basis for Britain's role and strategy in

Viorld War II had been laid down, however. Also, and of imrnediate

importance, she now had a means to take the initiative and the

offensive in strategy, something that had so disastrously eluded her

the previous year. As correspondent Gordon Holman noted, Britain had

established quite a reputation for being able to "take it." Now she

could give some thought to "the pleasures of giving." It was both a

24 pleasure and a necessity. It would come with time.

24 Gordon Holman, Commando Attack (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p. 13.

CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST STAGE: LOFOTEN, SPITZBERGEN, AND VAAGSO

Britain's military position from the fall of France in June

1940 until America'.s entrance into the war in December 1941 was

precarious. Her conduct of the war alone is the theme of ChurchilTs

second volume of his history of the war. The nation that had spent

twenty years combating Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was unready

to admit defeat. The principles of military tactics are strength,

position, and mobility. Britain's strength and position lay in the

fact that the British Isles were an unconquered position on the edge

of the German continental empire. Britain's mobility was her navy.

The Royal Navy meant that Britain would have the means to implement her

strength and position. In the case in point, she could send her forces

to any place she wished and do damage to the enemy on her own terms.

Raids were the logical means to do this. Initially, Britain could not

do significant harm to the Germans, but she had reached the point where

anything was something. Any damage done to the enemy in warfare is a

step in the right direction, even if it seems small at the time. If it

hurts one's enemy, it has helped one's cause. In war, one must take

decisive action against one's enemy. Failure to do so often means

defeat. In war, one must take the initiative or suffer destruction.

^Clausewitz, On War, pp. 127-38, 244-46, 247-48, 258-62, 267-69, 292-94, 316-18, 343, 368, 397-99; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 220-21.

20

Before Britain could utilize her commando troops, however, she

had to train them. Keyes, as well as his subordinates, realized

that if the concept was ever to prove a success the men would have to

be trained in amphibious warfare, gaining knowledge and developing an

approach and a technique. The first two raids failed because no one

had any concrete idea of what he was doing. The raids were amateurish 2

efforts conducted by amateurs.

Keyes meant for his organization to be a major success and a

major factor in the conflict. Training was one means of making this

possible. He went further. He moved Combined Operations out of the

Admiralty and into its own headquarters at Richmond Terrace. He

reorganized his personnel into two Assistant Directorates, Combined

Operations Division and Combined Operations Material. He wanted a

stable organization that was able to stand on its own two feet. Any-

thing less might fall victim to his hated enemy, the military bureauc-

racy. The paper pushers could destroy everything. A strong, inde-

pendent organization could overcome this; it would also be in a better

position to coordinate the three services. Inter-service strife could

destroy an operation, too. Churchill was no stranger to that problem, 3

and he was no doubt thinking along the same lines.

Keyes was fully in sympathy with ChurchilTs desire for an

offensive. He was a veteran of both the Gallipoli campaign and the

2 Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 22-32.

^Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 54-55; Arthur Swinson, Mountbatten (New York: Ballantine, 1971), p. 38.

21

Zeebrugge raid of the First World War. He had no sympathy with those

who would hesitate. Wars were not won by hesitation, and they could be

lost by those who were afraid to take the initiative. This had been

his outlook since his service in the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900.

He was sixty-eight years old when he assumed leadership of Combined

Operations, but age had not duUed his spirit or modified his one

overriding idea of military tactics: take the initiative and take

it well.^

There were two major obstacles that were to get in his way,

however. First, England was desperate for materiel, particularly

landing craft. Also, Keyes had to fight the establishment of the

services, particularly the Admiralty. Combined Operations was a bad

joke to many--Winston ChurchilTs private army. The organization was

a bastard child of dubious origin, and there were many who wanted

nothing to do with it. These men probably saw nothing wrong with this

attitude. They v/ere loyal, hard working men who made their own con-

tributions to the war effort. They could not understand the need for

such an organization, though, and they frustrated the old admiral on

a number of occasions. The commandos, as well as their parent organi-

zation, are still viewed as overrated and unnecessary by some historians. 5

These obstacles were to prove too much for Keyes.

Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 18-81; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 31-34, 51-53.

^Swinson, Mountbatten, p. 38; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 58-59.

22

Training continued until it reached the point where it became

detrimental to morale. Under Keyes's vigorous leadership, the organi-

zation began to take shape. A program was set up for the training of

paratroopers, but this was later taken over by the Air Ministry. The

development and construction of landing craft was a problem with

Britain's limited resources, but it was absolutely necessary to obtain

landing craft if amphibious operations were to be staged. Three Glen

ships and five Dutch packets were procured. The Inter-Services Train-

ing and Development Center converted these to Infantry Landing Ships.

Some Eureka craft were ordered from a firm in New Orleans. These

craft were built for use in the Louisiana swamps. In addition to

these, 120 Assault Landing Craft, 30 Mechanized Landing Craft, and

8 Landing Support Craft were on order by August 1940. Keyes was placing

Combined Operations on a firm footing. The commandos would not have

to use RAF crash boats again. Combined Operations had organization,

training, and equipment. Using the commandos became a problem, how-

ever. Keyes was not interested in small raids but in large-scale,

properly assembled operations. Here he had problems.

Keyes had a number of schemes in mind. The possibilities were

considerable, but the operations v/ere cancelled, and the men grew

weary of waiting for something to happen. Keyes planned an operation

to capture the Azores, but it was cancelled after much training. The

same thing happened to his plan for the capture of the Isle of Aran.

^Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 82-83; Clarke, Seven Assiqn-ments, pp. 242-44, 247-48; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 38, 55-56; Young, Commando, pp. 15, 37.

23

This disappointment was offset somewhat by the successful raid against

the Lofoten Islands in Norway in March 1941. The first airborne opera-

tion in British history was carried out in February 1941, but it was

only partially successful. The target was an aqueduct in Italy which

was damaged, but not seriously; the raid was valuable only for its

psychological effect on the Italians. Keyes was not satisfied with

these raids, though. His big project was the capture of the island of

Pantelleria in the Mediterranean. This was not a small enterprise,

but a project that Keyes saw as wery important to the v/ar effort. It,

too, was cancelled. Air cover could not be provided, and without air

cover the operation would be just another Norwegian campaign. This

v/as the turning poinc for Keyes, who was bitterly disappointed at

having the Pantelleria project cancelled.

By the autumn of 1941 Keyes was at the end of his patience.

He saw conspiracies of paper pushers and craven cowards blocking his

way. He was not given to diplomacy; he tended to distrust those who

committed the heresy of caution. He also had a great deal of narrow-

mindedness and venom. He could not see that his was not the only

part of the war effort or that all of his strategical and material

demands could not be met. Another man might have taken consolation in

the fact that he had the Lofoten and Italian raids to his credit, as

well as the achievements of the Middle East commandos, who had seen

considerable duty. Keyes did not. His disappointments only rubbed

Buckley, Morway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 172-75; Young, Commandos, p. 16; Winston S. Churchill, The History of the Second World War (New York: Bantam, 1962), vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, pp. 49-50.

24

salt on various wounds, the quarrels with the War Office and the

Chiefs of Staff. He lashed out at his supposed tormentors until they

were so numerous that he was no longer an effective leader. He refused

to accept a reduction of his status to advisor, and Churchill dismissed o

him. By this time, he had evidently called the Chiefs of Staff the

biggest bunch of cowards he had ever seen; it was small wonder that his

tenure lasted as long as it did.^ He told the Commons that he had been

"frustrated in ewery worthwhile action" that he had tried to initiate.^^

His old enemy the bureaucracy was in control. He left Combined Opera-

tions in October 1941 a bitter, frustrated old man. Five weeks later,

his son was killed in a commando raid in the Middle East. This must

have added immeasurably to his burden.

Keyes did take some consolation in ChurchilTs choice for his

successor, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Mountbatten was forty years old,

a grandson of Oueen Victoria, and the son of Prince Louis of Batten-

berg, who had been dismissed from his post as First Sea Lord during

World War I because of his German name and background. His son

certainly owed part of his initiative to this fact, wishing to vindi-

cate his father's name. As Churchill yvell knew, there were other

o Swinson, Mountbatten, pp. 38-39; Fergusson, The Watery Maze,

pp. 75-84; Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 456; Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, pp. 83-86.

9 John Terraine, The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten (London:

Hutchinson, 1968), p. 84; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 84-85.

Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 376 (12th November-19th December 1941): 661-65.

"Keyes's Son is Slain in Bold Lybia Raid," New York Times, December 31, 1941, pp. 1, 8.

25

qualities in Mountbatten's character which suited him for the job.

Mountbatten had shown great courage and daring while commanding the

destroyer Kelly, which was sunk in the evacuation of Crete. Added to

this courage were initiative and intelligence. Mountbatten understood

the importance of science and technology in war. These qualities

combined to make a unique war-leader. He inherited a sound organiza-

tion from Keyes and put it to good use. He began a series of successful

raids to improve morale and to gain experience, remembering ChurchilTs

instructions that his organization was to be directed toward the goal

of a continental invasion. He brought in scientists to form a brain

trust, so that technology could keep pace with operations. His tact

and diplomacy kept him from creating enemies as Keyes had done. That

trait was to be of great importance, because the opposition to

Combined Operations at this point was considerable. In retrospect, it

is hard to see how Churchill could have made a better choice.

Mountbatten's contribution to Combined Operations, and to the war as

12 a whole, was considerable.

Mountbatten now commanded both Combined Operations and the

coíTînandos. The latter was an elite raiding force, specially trained

for tasks beyond the capabilities of the regular armed forces. The

German concept of an elite consisted of the S. S. and the Waffen or

^^Swinson, Mountbatten, pp. 9-42; E. H. Cookridge, From Battenberg to Mountbatten (New' York: John Day, 1968), pp. 171-82; Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 456; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 86-90; William Bayles, "Mountbatten and His Commandos," American Mercury 56 (February 1943): 182-89; "Lord Louis Mountbatten," Life 13 (August 17, 1942): 63-66.

26

Field S. S. As a military entity, the S. S. combined rigorous train-

ing with a racial and political concept. It was part of the all-

encompassing totalitarian state, and the all-encompassing political-

military nature of such a state. The commandos were an elite simply

because of the specialized training given the individual soldier as

an intelligent man v/ho had proven his self-reliance and skill through

training and accomplishment. Ability, intelligence, and self-discipline

were the main requirements. The German and British concepts of a

military elite were as opposed to each other as totalitarianism and

democracy.

Training was what made the commando soldier. Commando training

became almost legendary as the war progressed. When the first American

Rangers volunteered for the program, they were warned that the training

was worse than the real combat they would face in the field. Its pur-

pose was not to create destruction machines but to produce a soldier

who v/as competent and reliable in extreme conditions of combat. This

would produce a soldier who was efficient in killing and destruction,

but also one who utilized these abilities to fulfill tasks of war. The

type of soldier that the commando leaders looked for was the typical,

quiet sort of Englishman, who was intelligent, tenacious, and reliable.

They were not looking for psychopaths who enjoyed killing. Tough guys.

13 Roger Manvell, S. S. and Gestapo: Rule by Terror (New York: Ballantine, 1959), pp. 10-11, 38-63; Gerald Reitlinger, The S. S.: The Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945, 2d ed. (London: Heinemann, 1957), pp. 76-84; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, p. 36; George H. Stein, The Waffen S. S.: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 10-17, 123-30, 282-89.

27

gangsters, bullies, and criminals would not do. These men were con-

sidered unreliable, cowardly, and detrimental to the concept. A

man who could start a fight in a bar or hold up a bank would probably

crumble under combat conditions. A well-trained school teacher, or

bank teller could be depended on to use both courage and intelligence

to accomplish his task. In actual reality, a number of heros of

commando raids were teachers and bank tellers in civilian life.

The combination soldier-sailor concept of the Royal Marines was

absolutely necessary for amphibious warfare. The Royal Marines were

not available until 1942, but men could be trained in the use of boats

and landing craft whether they were marines or not. Land training was

equally important since the sea was only a means to reach the land.

Physical fitness was required both for admission and as a continuing

standard to be maintained. Marches and exercises were directed toward

this end. A few calisthenics before breakfast was not what commando

instructors considered to be physical training. If a man were

physically fit by the standards set, marching seven miles in one hour

was no more difficult than an uphill march in two hours and fifteen

minutes. Physical fitness trained the men for the long marches they

would have to make in the field. Even more important was the realiza-

tion that a man who was alert enough to master a number of physical

tasks was more alert mentally as well. Therefore, physical training

included not just marches, but obstacle courses, such as cliff climbing

St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 37-39; Durnford-Slater, Commando, p. 16; James Alteri, The Spearheaders (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 16, 236.

28

(with and without ropes), and also swimming. Practice landings and

assaults were executed with live ammunition so that the men v/ould be

able to function under fire. Forty of the 25,000 men who trained at

the Achnacarry center were killed in training. Mock graves were set

up at the entrance to impress this fact on newcomers. The men were

also taught night fighting, hand-to-hand combat, and woods craft to

15 enable them to live off the land, concepts established by Keyes.

The first training center was at Lochailort Castle in Scotland.

Operations started there in 1940. The instructors included men who

would later make their own mark in the history of the war: David

Stirling who started the SAS, Lord Shimy Lovat who commanded No. 4

Commando at Dieppe, and Michael "Mad Mike" Calvert who commanded a

Chindit batallion in Burma. Another center was established at

Achnacarry, Scotland, in 1941. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Vaughn took

over there in 1942 and pushed commando training to a new level of

excellence. Amphibious exercises were carried out at Inveraray,

Scotland, at the head of Loch Fyne.

Training was always logical and practical. Nothing was ever

initiated in training that did not have a purpose or objective. It

rested on the desire of the individual to excel. Therefore, the only

15 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, p. 83; St. George Saunders, Th£

Green Beret, pp. 37-39, 41-44; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 35-37.

^^David Niven, The Moon's A Balloon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), pp. 261-62. Niven was an early commando. He later acted as liaison officer between the War Office and the commandos; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 57-58; Young, Commando, pp. 115-22; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 56-60.

29

disciplinary measure was R. T. U., meaning "Returned to Unit." This

was used by commanders and instructors to weed out the physically and

psychologically unfit, and it could be instituted without explanation.

This left the initiative and discipline entirely up to the individual.

The men were often left to find their own transportation to and from

places, and they were given an allov/ance and left to find their own

quarters in private homes. There was no sergeant to police the

barracks. All of this was aimed at developing the individual initiative

of the soldier. If a man could not discipline himself and stay out of

trouble, he could stay in the regular army. If he could not use his

head to look out for himself, he was of no use to the commandos. The

man for the organization was the man who could use his brain and not

have to sit around, mindlessly waiting for an order. The commandos

were above all else an elite of individuals. They received the most

varied training in modern warfare, but it was a means to an end, not an

end unto itself.

Norway was the first proving ground for these new troops.

Germany had occupied it in 1940 to protect her shipments of iron ore

from Sweden. Norway, although a neutral nation, had been caught between

two great powers and had become a battle ground. Germany won, thereby

protecting her lines of supply. Although iron ore shipments never

reached their pre-war level, due in part to the damage that Germany

herself had inflicted on the port of Narvik, Norway was important for

Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 15-16, 65-67; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 36-45; Stephen Watts, "All Fighting Men Together," New Yorker 18 (April 25, 1942): 34-42.

30

other reasons. Germany could threaten, after 1941, Allied convoys to

Russia from Norwegian naval bases. Norway's fishing industry supplied

her with fish, glycerin for explosives, and vitamins A and B which

could be given to her U-boat crews. Like all the western-occupied

countries, Norway was forced into a deficit of trade which worked in

Germany's favor. Germany fleeced her western empire to the sum of

^125,000,000 in occupation costs. Norway's annual burden was 1,200

million crowns, or eí 68 million. Broken down, this amounted to,^25 per

capita per year, the heaviest burden of any of the occupied countries.^°

Three raids were staged against this part of Germany's new

empire. The Lofoten Islands were raided in March 1941 and again in

December of that year in conjunction with a third ^aid against Vaagso.

These raids were for economic reasons. The main targets were the fish-

oil factories and shipping. In a small, but effective, way these raids

hurt the Germans. Britain was trying to blockade occupied Europe, but

the attempt was largely ineffective. The raids helped supplement this

attempt at economic warfare. In 1941 the Axis approached its highest

point of power. Britain's position was such that she had to make some

sort of move against Germany, whether large or small, for both the

19 sake of strategy and morale.

The Lofoten Islands raid took place on March 4, 1941. The

British naval force was able to reach the islands without detection.

]0 Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 3-155, 181-82;

Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 370 (18th March-lOth April 1941): 138-39.

^%utler, Grand Strategy, 3:510-13; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 181-82.

31

A British submarine acted as beacon to guide the force to its target.

The German garrison was taken completely by surprise and captured with-

out firing a shot. Two hundred twenty-five prisoners were taken in

all. Ten of these were Quislings, supporters of the German puppet

regime. Three hundred Norwegians left with the British as volunteers

for the Allied forces. Gifts of food and tobacco were distributed to

the inhabitants who stayed behind. It was hoped that this would make

their plight a little easier and also counter German propaganda that

Britain was starving. Eleven fish-oil factories were destroyed along

with their storage tanks. About 18,000 tons of shipping was sunk.

The inability of the Luftwaffe to enter the conflict was the crowning

touch to a completely successful raid. Weather conditions rendered

the German air field useless. It was an extra triumph for the British,

who had been brutally pounded by the German air force in the Norwegian

campaign. The raid was good for the esprit de corps of the commandos.

There was no combat, but then it was planned that they should avoid

combat at that early stage. The concept had been proven sound. Both

the potential of the commandos and the power of the British Navy were

validated. The success of the raid was good for public morale at a

time when the British war effort was not going well. It was a victory

20 that the British could relish, even if it was a small one.

20 Young, Commando, pp. 17-24, and Storm From the Sea (London: William Kimber, 1958), pp. 26-30. Young was one of the early commandos, participating in the Lofoten, Vaagso, and Dieppe raids. He is now head of the Department of Military History at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; J. E. Dunning, "Lofoten Islands Raid," The Army Quarterly Journal 88 (April 1964): 40-42; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 181-85; Holman, Commando Attack, pp. 25-30; Evan John [Evan John Simpson], Lofoten Letter (London: William Heinemann, 1941), pp. 20,

32

There was not much commando activity in the European theater

between the two raids. A raid was staged on the island of Spitzbergen

by a Canadian force trained at Inveraray, along with a Norwegian

detachment, a few British soldiers, and Royal Engineers. The Norwegian

island was rich in coal. Britain feared that Germany would seize the

island and use its coal for both a fuel and for distilling synthetic

gasoline. The force was dispatched to the island to destroy the mines

and evacuate the Norwegian and Russian miners there. This was success-

fully accomplished on August 25, 1941. The mines and stocks of coal

were destroyed. Two thousand Russians were taken to Archangel, where

186 escaped French prisoners of war were picked up and taken back to

Britain. About 800 Norwegians were evacuated from the island and taken

to Britain as well. There was no interference from the Germans. The

island's radio station was used to send the Germans false v/eather

reports, which kept them in complete ignorance of the operation. Both

21 the raiding concept and the Royal Navy were victorious.

The Middle East was the main theater of commando operations

during most of 1941. In February 1941 three commando units were sent

22-23, 30-31, 36, 45, 5-53; Robert P. Post, "Raiders in Norway Sank Eleven Ships," New York Times, March 7, 1941, pp. 1, 6; "Hitler's Back Doorstep," The Times (LondonT, March 7, 1941, p. 4.

21 C. P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in

the Second World War, 2 vols. (Ottawa: Edmund Cloutier, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1955), vol. 1: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific, pp. 301-07; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 185-87; "An Allied Raid in the Arctic," The Times (London), September 9, 1941, p. 4; Craig Thompson, "Spitzebergen Raid Left Huge Fires," New York Times, September 10, 1941, pp. 1, 3.

33

to the Middle East. These were Commandos 7, 8, and 11, under the

command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E. Laycock. The force became

known as Layforce after its commander. Its career was glorious, but

brief. It participated in a successful diversionary raid against

Bardia (April 19-20, 1941), a brilliant rear guard action during the

evacuation of Crete (May 26-31, 1941), a flanking operation during the

invasion of Syria (June 7-8, 1941), and a successful raid against the

Italian lines around Tobruk (July 18-19, 1941). After these actions,

Layforce was sadly depleted of manpower. It could not make good its

losses and was forced to disband. Laycock was left with only a small

force. This he used for a raid on Rommel's headquarters, or what was

thought to be Rommel's headquarters. The raid took place on November 17-

18, 1941. It failed due to faulty intelligence. Rommel was actually

nowhere near, and what could have been a great triumph was a practi-

cally useless sacrifice. Only Laycock and one other man returned.

Leiutenant-Colonel Geoffry Keyes, Roger Keyes's son, was killed on

the raid. This was the end of Layforce. Laycock returned to London,

and he later became head of Combined Operations. His group had done

well during its short existence, the men performing practically every

type of commando task with skill and bravery. The Rommel raid had

failed because of misinformation, not because the men lacked determina-

tion and expertise. The need for specialized troops in North Africa was

34

filled by Major David Stirling (a veteran of Layforce) who formed and

successfully led the Special Air Service (SAS).^^

Mountbatten's leadership of Combined Operations marked the

maturity of that organization. His first raid, the Vaagso raid of

December 1941, marked the maturity of the commandos as specialized

shock troops. Mountbatten was working for a coordination of the three

services in a series of raids against the Germans. Here, as with the

raid on the Lofotens, the strategy was economic. In fact, another

raid on that target was carried out simultaneously with the Vaagso raid.

Again, the main targets were the fish-oil factories. Prisoners, docu-

ments, Norwegian volunteers, and shipping were the other objectives.

Since Russia's entry into the war, the shipping v/as more important than

ever since these German vessels were being used to supply the Eastern

Front. It was also realized that raiding could force the Germans to

spread their forces along the occupied coastline, stretching their men

and material farther than would be otherwise necessary. This in itself

would aid the economic effort against Germany. There was one major

difference between this raid and the Lofotens operation. In March, the

commando troops had been ordered to avoid combat if possible. For the

22 Young, Commando, pp. 38-55; St. George Saunders, The Green

Beret, pp. 64-79; Evelyn Waugh, "Commando Raid on Bardia," Life 11 (November 17, 1941), pp. 64-74. Waugh, as well as being a commando, was the noted author of The Loved One and Vile Bodies.

35

Vaagso operation, they were ordered to fight and to kill or capture as

23 many of the enemy as possible.

The Vaagso raid was planned as a real combined operation; each

of the three services would have an important role to play. The

commandos would destroy the garrison and the fish-oil factories. The

RAF would lay down a smoke screen for the landing, bomb targets at

Vaagso, and bomb the air field at Herdla to stop any interference from

the Luftwaffe. Air cover would be provided throughout the operation.

The Navy would supply transportation and fire-support. The cruiser

Kenya and a group of other ships would open fire on the Maaloy battery

which guarded the port. The naval force would also take care of any

24 shipping in the harbor.

The assault force was made up of Commando No. 3, half of

Commando No. 2, members of the Royal Norv/egian Army, Royal Engineers

from No. 6 Commando, and medical personnel of the Royal Medical Corps

from No. 4 Commando. A press unit was also included to cover the raid.

The landing force was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John

Durnford-Slater, the commander of No. 3. The force was split into five

groups. Two of these were reserves. Major J. M. T. F. ("Mad Jack")

Churchill was in charge of the group charged with the capture of Maaloy

Island, while Durnford-Slater took the largest group for the capture of

23 Young, Commando, p. 56; Joseph H. Devins, Jr., The Vaagso

Raid: The Commando Attack That Changed the Course of World War II (Philadelphia: Chilton. 1967), pp. 38-39, 61; Buckley, Norv/ay, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 187-88; "Brilliant Combined Raid on Norwegian Coast," The Times (London), December 30, 1941, p. 5.

24 Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, 188-90; Young,

Commando, pp. 56-58; Devins, The Vaagso Raid, pp. 61-71.

36

the town of Vaagso. The last group v/as charged with blocking a possible

route for German reinforcements. Durnford-Slater's No. 3 Commando had

participated in the earlier Lofotens raid and could claim experience

as v/ell as skill. The force for the second Lofotens raid v/as No. 12

2R (Irish and Welsh) Commando under Lieutenant-Colonel S. S. Harrison.

The raid began early on the morning of December 27. The force

was mistaken for a German convoy, and it managed to slip into the harbor.

Due to the incompetence of one of the German signal men, the force was

given time to get into position. Then it was too late for the Germans

to stop it. The British air and sea arms worked in magnificent coordi-

nation. Maaloy Island was captured without a shot fired, but the town

of Vaagso was a different proposition. The Germanr, initiated a house-

to-house defense. The commandos were forced to call for reinforcements

from Maaloy Island and the reserves. It v/as not only a matter of pull-

ing off the raid. The question was whether or not the commandos could

match the Germans in combat. It took most of the day and some heavy

losses, but No. 3 proved that the commandos could match and beat the

Germans in combat. The commandos beat the Germans back to the very

edge of town, allowing the demolition of the factories and redeeming nc.

the image of the British soldier in modern warfare.

Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 188, 193-94; Young, Commando, p. 58; Devins, The Vaagso Raid, pp. 47-60. The organization of the commando unit was originally ten troops of fifty men. In early 1941 this was changed to six^troops of sixty-five men. One troop could then be put into two Eureka landing craft.

^Sounq, Commando, pp. 62-86, and Storm From the Sea, pp. 32-56; Devins,""The Vaagso Raid, 98-177; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 69-89; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, p. 63, and Combined Operations, pp. 49-62.

37

The results of the raid were impressive. About 15,630 tons of

shipping were sunk. In the process, a German code book giving the call

signs, challenges, countersigns, and emergency signals of all the

German vessels in Norway and France was captured. This information was

put to good use for the St. Nazaire raid in 1942. The fish-oil

factories were destroyed, as were other facilities of use to the

Germans. One hundred fifty of the enemy were killed and 98 were cap-

tured. Twenty-seven commandos were killed and 57 wounded. Seventy

Norwegian volunteers, along with members of their families, were taken

back to Britain. The most impressive result of the raid was the suc-

27 cessful cooperation of the three services.

The second attack on the Lofotens was also successful, if

uneventful. What construction that had been done on the new fish-oil

factories was destroyed. Twenty-nine Germans were taken prisoner, and

an armed trawler v/as sunk. A few more Quislings v/ere captured, and

266 Norv/egians returned to Britain with the force. The British thought

about establishing a base there, but the Luftwaffe would have only done

to it what it did to the Rritish force in the Norwegian campaign. The

inhabitants would have been pleased if the force had stayed, because

another raid only meant more reprisals from the Germans. This was not

a pleasant thought, as the inhabitants of Vaagso soon found out.

Reprisals against the civilian populations were alv/ays a serious

^^Young, Commando, pp. 86-87, and Storm From the Sea, pp. 32-56; Devins, The Vaagso Raid, pp. 152-61, 172; "British Commandos Raid Hitler's Europe," Life 12 (January 26, 1942), p. 21; Ralph Walling, "Norse Base Razed in Commando Raid," New York Times, December 30, 1941, pp. 1, 8; "Success of Raid on Norway,"^he Times (London), December 30, 1941, p. 2.

38

problem, never satisfactorily resolved, in raidinq operations. After

the Lofoten and Vaagso raids, no more harassment raids were staged oo

against the Norwegian coast for fear of the German reprisals.

The full extent of the German military reaction was not

immediately apparent. It turned out to be beyond the most optimistic

hopes of the planners. Hitler became convinced that the Allies v/ere

planning an invasion of Norway. Reinforcements were sent to Norway;

and on June 6, 1944, there were 372,000 German troops defending the

country against an invasion that was not coming. By March 1942 a large

part of the German surface fleet was also guarding Norway against the

invaders. Hitler's logic is not clear, if indeed any was involved.

His decisions sometimes came out of a little dream world where logic

did not enter. Hitler had already begun to worry about Norway when the

Vaagso raid took place. He had turned his back on Britain in 1940,

thinking that she could no longer threaten him. Now he was faced with

the threat of raiders and what he thought to be the threat of an

invasion. He did not understand sea warfare, and he did not realize

that he was sending his surface fleet to the one place in the world

where it would do the least good. Even though the German ships could

threaten the Arctic convoys and keep the British Navy occupied from

Norwegian waters, they were not effectively deployed in the long run.

More important in examining the impact of the commando raids is the

fact that Hitler was mentally ill. He was a neurotic psychopath

28 Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 194; St. George

Saunders, Combined Operations, pp. 63-64; Devins, The Vaagso Raid, pp. 190-98.

39

bordering on schizophrenia. His whole career was an attempt to prove

himself a superman and messiah at all cost. As the war turned against

him, he became increasingly neurotic in order to maintain his image.

Any successful move against the Reich was a move against Hitler's

judgment and stability, whether it was a major campaign or a small-

29 scale commando raid.

The year 1941 marked the growth to maturity of the commando

force as a weapon against the Germans. The raiding concept was sound.

Raids could be used to damage the enemy while gaining experience in

amphibious v/arfare, experience which would prove its v/orth as the war

progressed. The principles of amphibious warfare and combined opera-

tions needed to be worked out scientifically and systematically. At

the same time, the raids could be used to spread the Germans thinly

along the occupied coastline. To attack it was much easier than defend-

ing it. The initiative lay with the attackers who could pick the time

and place of the conflict. The raids were good for the morale of the

British people and the people of the occupied countries as well. A

successful raid was likewise very bad for the morale of the German

29 Young, Commando, pp. 88-91; Devins, The Vaaqso Raid, pp. 199-

205; Adolf Hitler, Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944, trans. R. H. Stevens and Norman Cameron (New York: Signet, 1961), pp. 414-15; Walter C. Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report (New York: Signet, 1973), pp. 26, 37-38, 41-47, 62-63, 131-39, 166, 203-04, 216-17, 221-41. This is the official 0. S. S. report compiled in 1943; Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Bros, 1962), pp. 375, 383-85, 582-97, 651, 705; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 165, 180, 243-44, 292, 304-06, 357-58; Butler, Grand Strategy, 3:500-01.

40

troops faced with defending the new German empire. The leadership of

Mountbatten was the key factor in the success of the commandos.

Mountbatten had a strong organization at his disposal. For the

commandos and Combined Operations, the first stage v/as successfully

concluded. Opportunities stretched as far as the occupied coastline.

30 The next move was up to the British.

Butler, Grand Strategy, 3:513-16; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 621-26; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 165-67; Swinson, Mount-batten, p. 49; Devins, The Vaaqso Raid, pp. 36, 206-10; "The Perfect Raid," The Times (London), December 30, 1941, p. 5.

CHAPTER 3

THE RAID ON ST. NAZAIRE: THE FRUITION OF THE CONCEPT

The year 1942 was a landmark year in the history of World War

II. The Allies began to gather strength, while the Axis began its

saga of increasing decline, exhaustion, and collapse. For Combined

Operations and the commandos, 1942 was the year of the Bruneval,

St. Nazaire, and Dieppe raids. These actions were a part of the larger

story of success, but they were an important part. By the end of 1942,

the course of the war was set. The outcome of the game, if not a sure

thing, was a pretty good bet.

For two yery long years, Britain and Germany had watched each

other across the English Channel. With the German involvement in

Russia, however, an invasion of England became less practical and less

important. At some point in the war, Britain would have to invade the

continent to strike the decisive blow against Germany. In 1942, any

invasion attempt was a long time away. The raids showed Britain's

ability to use the sea to take the initiative, and eventually to invade

the continent. The first stroke of 1942 was delivered at Bruneval, the

site of an important radar installation on the coast of France, on

Henry H. Adams, 1942: The Year That Doomed the Axis (New York Paperback Library, 1969^ pp. 472-77; Winston S. Churchill, The History of the Second World War (New York: Bantam, 1962), vol. 4: The Hinge ofFate, pp. 524, 722.

41

42

February 27-28, 1942. To destroy the installation would be a signifi-

cant achievement, to gain data on it would be even more important.

Britain needed to maintain her lead in the field of radar. A raid was

the answer, but a seaborne landing was impossible because of the strong

German defenses, well situated in the high cliffs along the French

coast. A paratroop landing was the only alternative. Paratroops would

land behind the defenses, destroy the installation, deal with any

opposition, and make their way to the coast, where they would be picked

up by the Navy. All three services would be involved. Cooperation

2 would be just as crucial here as it had been at Vaagso.

The operation was successfully executed with paratroops from

the Ist Airborne Division under Major J. D. Frost. The force landed

and kept the Germans occupied while the necessary parts of the radar

equipment v/ere removed and the remainder destroyed. The force then

made its way to the coast. The opposition was overcome after some of

the scattered parts of the force rejoined the main group. Evacuation

was then carried out. All that the Germans found was evidence of the

destruction of their radar apparatus. They did not realize that part

of it had left with the raiding force. Also, the RAF was able to take

advantage of the gap in the German radar defenses with a successful

2 Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 195-98; "Commando

Raid: English Tourist Pictures of the French Coast Help Commandos Execute a Daring Rade on Enemy Positions," Life 13 (October 5, 1942), p. 82.

43

raid on the Renault factory near Paris four nights later. From ewery 3

vantage, the Bruneval raid was a successful combined operation.

The Bruneval raid was well received by the public and press,

although the fact that part of the apparatus was taken was kept secret.

The public was just recovering from the loss of Singapore, and the

future, at that time, did not look bright. El Alamein was still some

months away, and everyone was more than ready for whatever the military

could offer as a victory. The House of Commons debated at considerable

length the subject of cooperation between the services, as well as the

effectiveness of the RAF as a service. The military establishment

therefore needed a successful combined operation to maintain its own

prestige and show that the services could work together. Bruneval was

good publicity for Combined Operations and its defenders.

Mountbatten was rightly pleased with the raid. It perhaps made

up for some of the difficulties he faced in running Combined Operations,

especially the opposition of those who did not understand its impor-

tance. The combination of Mountbatten's tact and ChurchilTs support

helped the organization to survive, but survival was not easy. The

opposition to Combined Operations was both strong and unscrupulous.

3 Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 198-201; St. George

Saunders, Combined Qperations, pp. 58-70; Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, ed. and trans. Louis P. Lochner (New York: Award Books, 1971), pp. 124-25.

"Parachutists in Action," Times (London), March 2, 1942, p. 4; Robert P. Post, "British Paratroopers Raid French Coast," New York Times, March 1, 1942, p. 1; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 372 (lOth June-3rd July 1941): 42-52, 282-84, 288-89, 317-439, 669-74, 701-22, 743-46, 1139-40.

44

Mountbatten's status was raised on March 18, 1942. Churchill promoted

him from Advisor on Combined Operations to Chief of Combined Operations.

It was more than just a change of titles. With the promotion came the

acting rank of Vice-Admiral and the honorary ranks of Lieutenant-

General and Air Marshall. Mountbatten held rank in all three services,

and he had a place on the Chiefs of Staff. Churchill, who was always

interested in the organization and its future, gave the young 5

Mountbatten a much stronger position from which to conduct his affairs.

Mountbatten remained committed to a vigorous raiding schedule.

Among the targets considered was the port of St. Nazaire on the coast

of France. What made it worth considering was the Forme Ecluse, or

Normandie dry dock. It was the largest facility of its kind in Europe,

with a length of 1,148 feet and a width of 164 feet. Its gates were

54 feet high and 35 feet thick. These were actually caissons which

moved laterally on rollers. Its construction allowed it to act as

both a docking facility and a lock between the Penhouet Basin and the

Loire River, which connects St. Nazaire with the Atlantic Ocean. With

its winding house for moving the caissons and its pumping house for

emptying the dock, the Forme Ecluse constituted one of the most

magnificent facilities of its type in the world. What made the dock

so important, however, was the German battleship Tirpitz. The

Admiralty, which requested the raid, was worried that the Tirpitz

Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 109-23; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 54-55; Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commôrrs), 5th series, 379 (13th April-14th May 1942): 44.

45

might be used to attack the Atlantic convoys, much as her sistership

the Bismarck had done. For such an operation, she would need the

Normandie dock as a repair base and refuge. The dock could accommodate

a ship of 85,000 tons, twice as large as the Tirpitz. The Tirpitz

would need the dock, for it was the only facility on the Atlantic

coast that could handle her. The Bismarck had made for the same place

when she was crippled by a British torpedo. If the Bismarck had made

it, she could have been repaired in the dock and have set out again.

She did not make it, but the dock was still there, and the Tirpitz

was still afloat off the coast of Norway. If the dock was destroyed,

presumably she would be forced to stay where she was. The added

targets of U-boat pens and fuel shortage tanks made St. Nazaire an

even more important target.

St. Nazaire had previously been dismissed as a target as being

too difficult to attack. The idea of a raid on St. Nazaire had first

been raised in August 1941 by the Admiralty, which asked Admiral Sir

Charles Forbes, Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, to work out a plan for

Combined Operations. Keyes was in charge of Combined Operations, and

no satisfactory scheme could be worked out. The plan remained dormant

until Mountbatten assumed command. He became interested in it, provid-

ing the needed catalyst. The difficulties to be overcome were

Savid Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire (New York: Ballantine, 1970), pp. 10-19; R. E. D. Ryder, The Attack on St. Nazaire, March 28, 1942 (London: John Murray, 1947), pp. 1-3, 8; Cajus Bekker [Hans Deiter Berenbrok], The Luftwaffe War Diaries, ed. and trans. Frank Ziegler (New York: Ballantine, 1969), pp. 380-82; C. E. Lucas-Phillips, Th£ Greatest Raid of All (New York: Popular Library, 1961), pp. 18-19/

46

considerable. St. Nazaire was one of the most heavily defended ports

in Europe, an indication of how much value the Germans placed on it.

The mouth of the Loire was flanked with five coastal batteries. The

port and surrounding area were defended by 29 gun positions of 20-,

37-, and 40-millimeter calibers. There were a number of other 20-

millimeter batteries mounted with four guns to a battery. Along with

these, there were approximately fifteen searchlight positions. All of

these guns, except for the coastal batteries, could be used inter-

changeably as anti-aircraft or shore defense weapons. A defensive

force of 6,000 men could be deployed against any attack. Finally,

geography played its part. The mouth of the Loire River, with the

exception of the Charpentiers Channel, was a mass of mud flats and

shoals. Any attacking force would have to travel to the Bay of Biscay

and the mouth of the Loire unobserved. It would then face the diffi-

cult task of reaching the port and destroying a dock installation of

massive proportions. The U-boat pens were an even more difficult

project.

The only way to destroy the Normandie dock was to use a ship

packed with explosives. Keyes had used a similar tactic in the

Zebrugge raid with submarines. Since a submarine could not cross the

shoals, however, a destroyer was the only answer. It was the very

smallest ship that could successfully ram one of the dock's caissons.

"^Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 15-17, 69-73; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 10, 29-31, 54-61, Ryder, Attack on St. Nazaire, pp. 13-15; Young, Commando, p. 92, and Storm From the Sea, pp. 58-59. Young was on the planning staff for the St. Nazaire raid.

47

The Admiralty was not pleased with the idea, but a destroyer had to be

sacrificed if the raid was to take place at all, and the H. M. S.

Campbeltown was finally chosen. She was one of fifty destroyers that

Churchill had obtained through the destroyers for bases deal with

Franklin Roosevelt. She was old and hard to manage, but with a little

remodeling she could be made to pass for a German destroyer. She would

be packed with 4 1/4 tons of explosives and rammed into the caisson

facing the Loire. She would then be scuttled. Securely in place with

the explosives in her bow, the ship would act as a huge bomb as soon as

the time fuses set off the charge. By this time, if all went well, the

commandos who went in with her would have accomplished their own o

demolitions and be gone.

Originally, the planners at Combined Operations had hoped for

two destroyers, since more men and fire-power were needed. The

Admiralty would not go this far, however, and additional ships came

from the Light Coastal Forces. The elements of this force were made

up of Farmile class motor launches (MLs). There were two types—motor

gun boats (MGBs) and motor torpedo boats (MTBs). These "Little Ships"

were made of thin wood which could be easily pierced; one bullet

through their gasoline tanks would turn them into infernos. Despite

this, they had been fighting the war in the English Channel, and with

the MTBs acting as bombers and the MGBs acting as fighters, they were

slowly turning their own tide in the Channel. Twelve of the MLs would

\ucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 20-24, 58-62, 67; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 27-28, 36-37, 47; Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 54-73.

48

act as troop transports, while four would be armed with torpedos for

defense. An MGB would act as headquarters ship for the operation. The

MTB 74 was the last of the group. She was equipped with special delayed

action torpedos, designed to destroy the lock gates if anything happened

to the Campbeltown. Whatever their vulnerability, the MLs had the

advantage of a shallow draft. Along with the specially lightened

Campbeltown, they could make it over the shoals at the mouth of the

Loire, avoiding the Charpentiers Channel and, hopefully, detection by

the defenders of St. Nazaire.

The manpower for the raid was of the very best quality.

Leiutenant-Colonel A. C. Newman's No. 2 Commando was assigned the com-

bined task of demolicion and fighting. Certain men would carry out

demolitions on such target areas as the pumping house, winding house,

and the other caisson, while others formed squads to guard them from

the Germans. Newman was an able leader, and his men were well trained

in night fighting, street fighting, and demolitions. The George V

dock at Southampton was a precise duplicate of the Normandie dock, and

it made the perfect training area for the raid. The men involved in

demolitions had an exact idea of their tasks. They could, as a matter

of training, do their exact tasks blindfolded. Newman's men v/ere the

9 Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 33-41; Buckley, Norway, the

Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 206-07; Gordon Holman, The Little Ships (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1943), p. 21; Peter Scott, The Battle of the Narrow Seas: A History of the Light Coastal Forces in the Channel and the North Sea, 1939-1945 (London: Country Life, 1945), pp. 4, 48; Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 23, 43-46.

49

perfect commando type; they were quiet, soft-spoken men who had

achieved their status through training and ability.^^

R. E. D. Ryder was the naval commander of the force. He was

an able seaman and explorer with an even temper and judgment.

Lieutenant Nigel Tibbits and Captain l/. H. Pritchard were in charge

of explosives and demolitions. Pritchard was an expert in dock

demolitions; Tibbits devised the explosives for the Campbeltown.

Captain R. E. Montgomery, a friend of Pritchard's, helped work out

the demolition plans. Leading Signalman F. C. Pike would supply the

bluff. Pike could signal in German. With the help of code books cap-

tured in the Vaagso raid, Pike would try to convince the Germans that

a German convoy was entering the harbor. Lieutenant-Commander Samuel

H. Beattie commanded the Campbeltown, with Lieutenant A. R. Green, a

navigator whose job v/as to get the ship over the mud flats. Sub-

Lieutenant R. C. M. V. ("Mickie") Wynn commanded the MTB 74. These

and the other participants in the raid made up a highly skilled and

exceptionally competent force. As a result, the plans were well laid,

and the men were well trained. The force that raided St. Nazaire was

as well suited for its task as any that could have been assembled

under any conditions.

^^Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 28-30, 36-43; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 20-22, 42-43.

^\ucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 26-28, 37-43, 47-51; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 23-25, 38-42; Ryder, Attack on St. Nazaire, pp. 60-63, 72; Devins, The Vaaqso Raid, pp. 191-92.

TEXAS TEC:3 LíDuASîY

50

The main object of the raid was the Normandie dock: to accom-

plish its destruction was to achieve success. The planners also

desired to destroy the U-boat pens in the harbor, but this was practi-

cally impossible. If the RAF had bombed the U-boat pens while they

were under construction, the problem would have been solved. It had

not, however, and the German U-boats rested in comfortable bomb-proof

shelters. The best that could now be done was to destroy the lock

gates that controlled the water level of the facility. The principal

target remained the destruction of the dock and its related facilities.

The planners knew, however, that, even if this were done, the attacking

force would probably not be able to withdraw. The commandos were

accordingly told, and any man was given the chance to back out. None

did. The sacrifice of a force this size was a great loss; but if the

Tirpitz raided the Atlantic sea lanes, this much and more would be

lost anyway. The attacking force had the advantage in that a raid on

St. Nazaire seemed impossible, and surprise might be achieved. Also,

an air raid was scheduled to give the force some hope of getting in.

The most vulnerable spot in the port's defenses was the water itself.

There were no boom defenses, only a torpedo net in front of the dock.

The real problem lay in the port's land defense and the searchlights

that went with them. There was no way to overcome the blinding light

12 that the searchlights put out.

Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 43-53; Lucas-Phillips, Th£ Greatest Raid of All, pp. 19-25; Ryder, Attack on St. Nazaire, pp. 8-10, 15-17, 88, 92; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, pp. 72-73; Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, trans. R. H. Stevens and David Woodward (Cleveland: World, 1959), pp. 409-10.

51

The force, properly briefed and equipped, sailed on March 26,

1942. With the Campbeltown and the MLs were two Hunt class destroyers

acting as escorts, two more being sent later. The force travelled the

250 miles to its target masquerading as a submarine patrol. A U-boat

was spotted and attacked. The submarine escaped, however, presenting

everyone with a new problem: how much had the craft seen, and how much

could it report? Ryder decided that the force must go on; and, as it

turned out, the submarine did indeed report the presence of the force,

but it described the attack force as a British submarine patrol. The

Germans reacted by sending out their own force to intercept it. Five

German destroyers left St. Nazaire and went to look in the wrong place,

eliminating one threat to the expedition's success. The British also

encountered two French vessels which had to be sunk. The French crews

13

did not seem too upset, and the secrecy of the venture was maintained.

The raiders reached the mouth of the Loire on the evening of

March 27. The cloudy and misty weather was perfect for the ground

force, but not for the RAF. The RAF's diversionary raid had little

effect. Not only was visibility poor, but Churchill had forbidden the

RAF to bomb French civilians. In addition, the RAF crews did not know

the exact purpose of the bombing raid. As the amazed Germans watched

from the ground, the British bombers made their passes one at a time.

Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 53, 65-72; Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of Al1, pp. 73-84; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, pp. 74-75; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 210.

52

dropping only one bomb per pass. The RAF finally gave up on what was

obviously a hopeless venture.^^

The RAF bombing alerted the Germans to the fact that something

was going on. By the time the clouds cleared away exposing a full

moon, Ryder's group had crossed the mud shoals, having executed a fine

feat of navigation and seamanship. The Germans spotted what looked

yery much like a German destroyer and motor launch escort, but they

suspected that something was wrong. Signalman Pike went to work, and

the game of bluff went on for four minutes. The Germans fired several

intermittent bursts and finally realized that they had been duped.

The game was over, and all the shore defenses opened fire. The

British returned a wery heavy fire. Counting small arms fire, about

eight hundred guns were firing on the harbor, making an incredible

15 fireworks display.

The Campbeltown was by this time, however, beyond the point at

which she could have been stopped. As the shore defenses poured

rounds into her, the Campbeltown picked up speed and headed for the

Normandie dock. She used her own guns to return fire and mauled a

German flak ship that tired to stop her. She snapped through the

torpedo net and crashed into the outer south gate of the Normandie dock.

The scuttling charges were then fired, her stern sinking and lodging

her in place. The fuses on the explosives had already been set to go

^\ucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 63-66, 85-86; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, p. 76.

^^Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 5-6, 88-94; Mason, The Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 76-80; Holman, Commando Attack, p. 189; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 135.

53

off after daylight when the force had left. The commando force aboard

the Campbeltown suffered heavy casualties during the run for the dock,

but those who could headed for their targets. They managed to destroy

the winding house and pumping house for the dock, ensuring that the

dock would be out of service for at least a year. One group managed

to damage the other caisson. Several gun positions were destroyed,

and two tug boats were sunk with explosives. Despite these successes,

the casualties for this group were high.^^

The MLs had no success. They entered the cross-fire in two

columns, the port column trying to land its troops at the Old Mole.

This point was heavily defended, and only one party made it ashore.

The boats of the starboard column tried to land troops at the 01 d

Entrance. Two of the boats landed troops, but the landings were turned

back. One party was landed south of the Old Entrance. Ryder's head-

quarters ship landed Newman and a small party. The rest of the troop-

carriers failed to land their troops. Wynn's MTB 74 fired its delayed

action torpedos at the lock gates to the 01d Entrance. They settled

to the bottom of the harbor with their fuses activated. The craft

would have escaped, but she stopped to pick up survivors of one of the

MLs and was sunk herself. Only six of the MLs made it out of the

harbor, and one of these was disabled by a German destroyer before she

could reach England. The rest suffered the same fate as Wynn's boat.

Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 95-120; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 80-93; Desmond Flower and James Reeves, eds., The Taste of Courage: The War, 1939-1945, 5 vols., vol. 3: The Tide Turns (New York: Berkeley, 1971), pp. 41-42; Young, Commando, pp. 98-100.

54

The MLs were simply not made for the type of action; shells ripped

through their hulls, hitting the hydraulic steering system and the

gasoline tanks. The large pools of burning gasoline from the v/recks

then engulfed many survivors. Blinded by the lights and riddled with

fire from the land, the crews of the MLs were helpless in the battle

which lasted about an hour. Not only were many parties kept from

landing, but those ashore had to be left behind. Ryder's boat v/as the

last to withdraw, nine being lost to the murderous German fire. Three

made the rendezvous with the destroyers, and the crews were picked up;

the remaining three returned to England under their own power.

Newman and his force were left to their own devices. Their

position was hopeless. None of the commandos had been able to cut the

points through which the Germans brought their reinforcements. Also,

even if the MLs had not been destroyed, the evacuation point known as

the 01 d Mole remained in enemy hands. Newman decided that the force

should try to fight its way out. The members of Commando No. 2 were

some of the finest troops in the world, but they could not hope to

hold out against vastly superior numbers and fire-power. The attempt

to break out began at 3:00 A.M., but most of the commandos were found

hiding the next day. Five eventually managed to escape to Vichy

18 France, and Spain, but the rest were captured.

St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, pp. 87-90; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 95-111, 125-131; Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 120-44, 160, 169-86; Scott, The Battle of the Narrow Seas, pp. 43-52.

^\ucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 147-169; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 114-23; Young, Commando, pp. 100-101; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations~pp. 91-97.

55

The Germans did not realize the exact purpose that the

Campbeltown served in the British scheme. If they searched the ship

for explosives, they did not find any. They were confused; the ship

was no real problem to remove, and the ramming had not damaged the

caisson. As time passed, the commandos began to worry. The explosives

were calculated to go off between seven and nine that morning. The

Germans, hearing that cigarettes and chocolate were to be found on

board, swarmed all over the ship. At ten-thirty the explosive charge

went off with a deafening boom, scattering debris over a wide area.

The caisson was blown completely out. The dock was flooded, the force

of the water pushing both the Campbeltov/n and the caisson into the dry

dock. Two ships inside the dry dock were damaged when the inrushing

water knocked them into the side of the dock. About 380 Germans, who

were on board the ship or standing near, were killed along with their

girl friends. The rumor spread at the time that a British officer had

lured the Germans on board and had reactivated the explosive mechanism.

The charge was an hour and a half late, but most likely the makeshift

nature of the fuse was responsible for the delay. Whether any of the

commandos returned to the Campbeltown remains heresay. At any rate,

the Forme Ecluse was damaged beyond use and the facility would remain

19 so for the next ten years.

Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 134-37; Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 186-90; Robert P. Post, "St. Nazaire Basin May Be Long Out," New York Times, March 31, 1942, p. 6; "Commandos Held Base for Two Days," New York Times, May 5, 1942, p. 8.

56

The Germans were nervous following the raid, and the explosion

of the Campbeltown did little to set their minds at ease. Two days

later, one of the delayed action torpedos fired by the MTB 74 went off.

Houses were searched and identity cards chec^ed. The cafes were

ordered closed by 9:00 P.M. The second tor^^áo exploded an hour later.

The Germans' nerves snapped. They shot a g- :' of frightened dock

workers, who had r n at the sound of the sec':,nd explosion. The Germans

continued to fire at anything that moved, causing causalties among the

French civilian population and themselves as well. The German troops

in World War II were usually well disciplined, but the troops at

St. Nazaire were almost pathetic in their panic, shooting at imagined

enemies everywhere. There are a number of possible explanations for

this. About sixty German officers were killed in the explosion of the

Campbeltown, depriving the troops of leadership. The French Maquis

or Resistance had also been active from the start of the raid, con-

tinuing their efforts afterwards, thinking that an invasion had occurred.

Certainly, the Germans felt that they were surrounded by enemies. The

explosions, so strange and unexplainable from their point of view,

added to their sense of helplessness. Very important to the commando

concept is the effect of a successful amphibious assault on the

defenders. A successful commando operation damaged German morale, one

of the basic concepts of the British raiding program, and the St.

20 Nazaire raid showed how well it could work.

?n Flower and Reeves, The Tide Turns, p. 44; Mason, Raid on St.

Nazaire, pp. 137-38; Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 190-92; Vagts, Landing Operations, pp. 63-67; Scott, The Battle of the Narrow Seas, p. 61.

57

Although the Germans minimized the importance of the raid,

portraying it as a v/asteful and futile effort, the raid v/as well

received by the Allied public. The Allies v/ere impatient for some

form of offensive action against the Axis, and St. Nazaire supplied

it. The raid was also indicative of the growing Allied war potential.

There were no comparable German efforts, the Germans slowly, but

surely, losing the initiative in the west. St. Nazaire showed the

ability of the Allies to make war on their own terms, particularly

Britain's ability to use her sea power and limited resources to the

best advantage. In 1942 this ability was expressed in small raids,

but the raids pointed to the eventual invasion of the continent that

21 everyone knew would nave to come.

Combined Operations had some difficulty in proving the success

of the raid because of the heavy losses suffered. For the commandos,

the losses were particularly high. Fifty-nine men were killed and

153 taken prisoner out of a total of 277 men committed to the opera-

tion. Eighty-five naval personnel were killed and 106 captured.

British losses, killed and captured, were 403 out of 630 men. The

French had their own losses to count,.totalling about 400 poorly armed

but valiant members of the French Resistance who had thought that the

day of liberation had come. The British had taken liaison officers

along to try to prevent French participation, but they had been unable

lÍIOii (London), March 30, 1942, p. 4; Craig Thompson, "British Raid St. Nazaire U-Boat Base," New York Times, March 29, 1942, pp. 1, 3; Kirke L. Simpson, "As an Expert Sees It," Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, March 31, 1942, p. 14; "Biggest Raid," Time 39 (April 6, 1942): 23; "Night Raiders," Newsweek 19 (April 6, 1942): 23-24; Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, pp. 180, 187.

58

to do anything in the chaos. Excluding the losses from the Campbeltown,

German losses numbered around forty-two. Although estimates vary as

to how many were killed by the explosion, the generally accepted

figure is 380, putting the total losses around 422."^^

The high British losses resulted primarily from the use of the

MLs for the raid. Without a second destroyer, these little craft were

a logical choice, especially considering the shallow draft needed for

crossing the mud shoals. They were structurally unfit for the type of

operation, however. The town and dock area of St. Nazaire was about

one square mile. This area and the area around the port was covered

by strong defenses. Vulnerable and operating in a small area, the

position of the MLs was practically hopeless. Their destruction meant

both the loss of the crews and the commandos on the boats and the

23 marooning of the commandos on the shore.

The failure of the air raid helped seal the fate of the com-

mandos. The planning was sound, but the execution was a disaster.

Weather conditions doomed the whole air operation. The peculiar manner

in which the pilots tried to carry out their restrictive orders alerted

the Germans. Even so, if the RAF crews had persisted a little longer,

the Germans would have been distracted because of the very peculiarity

of the raid. The air raid served only to alert the defenders. It

22 Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 223; Mason, Raid

on St. Nazaire, pp. 137, 141; Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 58, 193, 196.

23 Herbert Molly Mason, The Commandos (New York: Duell, Sloan,

and Pierce, 1966), p. 14; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, p. 149; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 225.

59

should have been carried out longer or not at all. The whole business

discredited bombing as a prelude for amphibious landings, but this was

a grievous misunderstanding of the factors involved.^^

Even considering the cost, the raid was worth it. The main

objective of the raid was accomplished; the Normandie dock was never

repaired during the war, although the Germans diverted manpower and

material to that end. Although the party assigned to attack the U-boat

base failed, this was a secondary object. The success or failure of

the operation depended entirely on the destruction of the Forme Ecluse.

By the time the fighting had stopped, the commandos had set off enough

demolitions to keep the dock out for at least a year. The Campbeltown's

explosion finished the job. It is now known that Germany did not

intend to send the Tirpitz into the Atlantic, and it is therefore easy

to say that the raid was useless. The Tirpitz remained in Norway until

1944, when she was sunk by the RAF. The Germans intended to use her

against the suspected Allied invasion, for harassing the Arctic con-

voys, and as a decoy to keep the British Navy occupied. The fact

remains, however, that the Germans could neither use the dock, nor

could they send the Tirpitz into the Atlantic after 1942. The dock

was useless for the repair of any German vessels. The objective of the

raid was accomplished, even if the losses were heavy. Everyone had

known that it was going to be a costly venture from the start but,

hopefully, one which would be worth the cost. The dock was destroyed.

?4 Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 5-6, 21-22,

62-66, 84, 89-90, 195; Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, pp. 144, 149; Ryder, Attack on St. Nazaire, pp. 79-80; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos Dieppe, pp. 224-25.

60

and the use of the St. Nazaire Basin was limited by the damage to the

01 d Entrance from the torpedos from the MTB 74. The Penhouet Basin

was not made tidal, since the other caisson was only partially damaged,

but this failure was connected with the secondary object, the U-boat

pens. The raid was a great success considering the amazingly small

force responsible for it. It was a raid par excellence: economy and

results.

The commandos acquitted themselves extremely well in the raid,

their training and discipline paying off handsomely. A lesser trained

group of men would not have been equal to the task. If the St. Nazaire

raid seemed an accomplishment of the impossible, it was largely due

to the skill and courage of the commandos.

The Vichy French were not pleased with the news of the

St. Nazaire raid because they feared both a German occupation of Vichy

France and a French civil war which a landing might initiate. Despite

the heavy German reprisals against the population of St. Nazaire and

the French lives lost in the fighting, the people of occupied France

were elated by the news of the raid. They felt that their cause was

not lost and that the Allies would gain strength and defeat the Axis.

Two of the commandos who escaped found that the best way to make

friends with the French was to say the magic words "evades de St.

^^Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 117-18, 184-85; Ryder, Attack on St. Nazaire, with Introduction by Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, pp. viii-ix, 88-90; Young, Commando, pp. 92, 111; Butler, Grand Strategy, 3:500-01; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 105.

Ryder, Attack on St. Nazaire, pp. 60-62, 72.

61

Nazaire." The mayor of St. Nazaire put it eloquently: "You were the

first to give us hope."^^

The Germans also were impressed. They took pains to improve

their harbor defense and reconnaissance. These precautions were really

more of a detriment to the German cause than to the British. The

Germans correctly assumed that there would be more landings, but the

large program of harbor defense drained their resources and manpower.

The yery possibility of more landings meant that fixed defenses would

not help. The Germans v/ere on the way to the Fortress Europe concept

that would eventually contribute to their downfall. It v/as a part of

their growing defensive stance as the initiative began to pass to the

Allies.^^

The year 1942 was still not over. Combined Operations had the

St. Nazaire raid to its credit. There was, however, much more coast-

line providing targets for raids of varying sizes. These targets

would be as tempting for the British to attack as they would be diffi-

cult for the Germans to defend. St. Nazaire showed how fruitful in

results a raid could be. Initiative often goes to those who can take

29 it, and the British were both able and willing.

27 Mason, Raid on St. Nazaire, p. 157; Lucas-Phillips, The

Greatest Raid of All, pp. 193, 201; Robert 0. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), pp. 288-89, 301-02; Robert 0. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps Under Pe'tain (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton ps ur

), p. University Press, 1966), p. 321. oo

S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 3 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), vol. 2: The Period of Balance, p. 173. Lucas-Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All, pp. 193-95; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 165, 225.

2Q Butler, Grand Strategy, 3:638.

CHAPTER 4

DIEPPE: DELIVERANCE THROUGH DISASTER

The commando concept was proven valid by the St. Nazaire raid.

Combined Operations could well be proud of Bruneval and St. Nazaire,

and it could look for new targets with a sense of self-confidence.

There were many targets suitable for raids, and the idea of a cross-

Channel invasion of the continent became increasingly present in every-

one's minds during 1942.

The entry of Japan into the war began a series of reverses for

Britain in the Far Eastern Theater. The year 1942 was critical in the

Far East, as it was elsewhere. As worries about India grew, so too

did the strategical importance of the French possession, Madagascar.

The huge island on the east coast of Africa stood astride British

supply lines to India. It was in the hands of Vichy troops, and if

the Japanese attempted to occupy Madagascar, no one doubted that the

Vichy garrison would surrender without fighting, much as similar troops

had done in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it was without any great hesi-

tation that the British decided to take the island. Troops, tanks,

and other vehicles landed on the island on May 5, 1942, in a success-

ful combined operation. By May 7 the key points of Diego Suarez Bay

and the city of Antsirane were captured, although the campaign dragged

on elsewhere until autumn. Commando No. 5 was used in association

with troops from the 17th and 29th Brigades to ensure the success of

62

63

the landing. The commando unit captured an important battery on the

coast to assure the safety of the landing operation. This use of the

commandos as spearhead troops to capture key positions remained a

factor in large-scale operations for the rest of the war.

The year 1942 was a year of great hopes, and with the hopes

came agitation for a Second Front. The natural desire to bring the war

to a quick conclusion and considerable sympathy for the Russians com-

bined to produce a great deal of popular agitation among people who

did not understand the problems involved. The American and British

governments were interested, but they had to face the reality of the

situation. "Sledgehammer" became the tentative name for an Allied land-

ing on the Cherbourg Peninsula. Its merits and chances of success

were debatable at best, however, and the British quickly cooled to

the idea. Britain was not interested in gambles; British manpower and

resources could not support hit-or-miss invasions of the continent. It

was all or nothing for the British. Knowing that they would not have

a second chance, the British were simply not ready in 1942 to back the

American scheme. Britain was thinking in terms of her traditional

peripheral strategy. She wanted to drain Germany before striking a

direct blow. The Americans were thinking more along the lines of a

direct blow to Germany. The British won the controversy in the end,

but in 1942 the differences of strategies posed the prospect of a

Christopher Buckley, Five Ventures: Iraq—Syria—Persia— Madaqascar—Dodecanese (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 165-208; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 193-207; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 157-68; Roskill, The War at Sea, 2:185-92.

64

potential split in the Anglo-American alliance. The split v/as healed

by a compromise, the invasion of North Africa ("Torch"). Thus, Allied

forces were committed to the Mediterranean, and there was no chance of

a European invasion until 1943 at the earliest. The only way to

initiate action in the European Theater was what it had been before—

namely, raiding which was part of Britain's peripheral strategy.

Churchill was also faced with the problem that none of his

military advisors would guarantee the success of a continental

invasion until some type of reconnaissance raid was carried out on

the French coast. Such an operation could be evaluated, and costly

mistakes could later be avoided. Because Allied strategy called for

the capture of a port during the early stages of an invasion, a recon-

naissance raid v/ould have to be staged to that end. A port would be

captured and held for a short period of time, the resulting combat

being a test for Allied strategical ideas. The idea was quite similar

to ChurchilTs original idea for the commandos. While the ground

troops were engaging German forces, the RAF would have the opportunity 3

to force the Luftwaffe into combat and hopefully reduce its numbers.

2 Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II:

A Reconsideration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 13-15, 24-30, 43-45; Richard M. Leighton, "Overlord Revisited: An Interpre-tation of American Strategy in the European War, 1942-1944," The American Historical Review 68 (July 1963): 919-37; Vagts, Landing Operations, p. 700; Roskill, The War at Sea, 2:239-40; Jean-Baptiste Douroselle, "Le Conflict Strategique Anglo-Americain De Juin 1940 A Juin 1944," Reyue d' Historie Moderne et Contemporaine 10 (July-September 1963): 165-70, 177-84; Trumball Higgins, WTnston Churchill and the Second Front, 1940-1943 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 62-63.

3 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 443; Fergusson, The Watery

Maze, pp. 168-69; Swinson, Mountbatten, pp. 52-54.

65

The most suitable target for a reconnaissance raid was Dieppe.

The port was not a target for the projected invasion. An attack here

would have little effect on Allied strategy, and it would tell the

Germans nothing. It was defended, but the defenses were not thought

to be strong. They would present a challenge, but not an insurmount-

able one. The overall effect would be that of a continental invasion

in miniature with the three services working in a combined operation.

The most important factor in the test was the chance to try out tank

landing craft and a battalion of Churchill tanks.

A plan was devised by a COHQ planning staff under Captain

Hughes-Hallet. It was this plan that was endorsed and backed by

Mountbatten. This plan called for flank attacks on the port, with a

landing at Quiberville, six miles from the town. Home Forces opposed

the plan, arguing that the Germans could easily destroy the two bridges

between Quiberville and Dieppe. The alternative was a frontal attack

on the port. Home Forces held out for this plan, and eventually got

it, despite the opposition of Mountbatten and Combined Operations.

It should have been obvious at this point that considerable fire

support was necessary. The only sea support allotted for the assault

was eight destroyers. The Navy did not want to commit any larger ships,

feeling that it was unnecessary. Originally, heavy bombing support

was called for. However, Air Vice-Marshall Leigh-Mallory opposed this

on the grounds that it would alert the German defense. It was correctly

Gordon A. Harrison, The United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations, 12 vols. (Washington: Department of the Army, 1947-), vol. 3, pt. 2 (1951): Cross-Channel Attack, p. 54.

66

assumed that this had been the case at St. Nazaire, but no one

realized that the air support had failed through application, not by

concept. The air bombardment was reduced accordingly. There would be

no bombing, only strafing by fighter planes. Evidently, the obvious

appeared obscure to everyone. Without adequate air and sea fire

support, the raid depended entirely on surprise. Its success became

a matter of fate. With this weakening, the loss of surprise would 5

mean the failure of the raid.

The 2nd Division of the Canadian Army was picked for the main

frontal assault on Dieppe. The division was under the command of

Major-General J. H. Roberts who would act as force commander.

Included were the Royal Regiment of Canada, the South Saskatchewan

Regiment, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the Essex Scottish

Regiment, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry,

and the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment. All had specific landing

places and objectives. The Canadians accounted for 4,963 men out of

a total of 6,100.^

The commandos picked for the raid were No. 3 under Lieutenant-

Colonel John Durnford-Slater and No. 4 under Lord Shimy Lovat. Both

units were given shore batteries to destroy. Originally, these tasks

were to be given to paratroop units. It was feared that bad weather

conditions would spoil any manoeuvres of this type, so the paratroops

Swinson, Mountbatten, pp. 52-54; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 169-71; Roskill, The War at Sea, 2:241; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, p. 115.

c Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 230.

67

were replaced with commandos. The commandos entered the picture

relatively late in the planning, only after the operation had been

cancelled and then revived, but their deployment in the Dieppe raid

proved to be a wise choice. No. 3 would land in two groups at Petit

Berneval and Belleville and proceed to the battery east of Dieppe.

No. 4 had an identical mission with the battery on the west; the unit

would land at Varengeville and at the mouth of the Saane River and

move inland to its target. These two units formed the flanks of the

assault, with the Canadian landing taking place between them.

Although Dieppe was planned as a raid, it was a different sort

of operation than the earlier raids. At Dieppe, the commandos formed

a specialized spearhead group. As such, they had objectives suited to

their talents which would make the going easier for the main body of

regular troops. It was critically important that they accomplish their

tasks at Dieppe, since either of the batteries could fire on the ship-

ping in front of the town. They were acting in the same capacity as

No. 5 at Madagascar and, indeed, a function similar to those carried

out later in the war. Other commando groups included Royal Marine

Commando A, members of the Inter-Allied Commando, and a few American

Rangers.

The raid was scheduled for July 4, 1942, but was postponed

until July 8 because of unfavorable weather. The Germans bombed some

Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 444; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 235; Durnford-Slater, Commando, p. 91; Young, Commando, pp. 128-32, and Storm From the Sea, p. 60.

p Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, p. 234.

68

of the shipping for the raid, and this raised the question of whether

they knew about it. They did not, but they did know that Britain

would surely try something of the sort on the French coast, and they

were surely on the lookout for concentrations of shipping for various

reasons. The planners could not know this, and they were worried.

The bad weather continued, and the raid was cancelled. When faced

with the question of what else might be done, everyone soon realized

that it was the Dieppe plan or nothing. The raid v/as necessary in

itself for experience alone. Furthermore, Churchill had promised the

Russians something in the way of a series of raids. He had been on

the receiving end of many Russian complaints about opening the second

front. When the Arctic convoys were cancelled, Churchill had tried

to make up for it with the promise of raids. The primary purpose of

Dieppe was experience and remained so, but something had to be done

for the Russians as well. The raid was rescheduled. This induced new

worries regarding security. Lieutenant-General B. L. Montgomery, who,

as Commander-in-Chief of the Southeastern Command, had been involved

in the planning, opposed the revival of the raid on the grounds that

the security question now made it impossible. He was overruled; it

was felt that knowledge of a cancelled operation could not help the 9

Germans. The raid would take place on August 19, 1942.

Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshall the Viscount Montqomery of Alamein (Cleveland: World, 1958), pp. 69-70; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 173-74; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 443-44; Swinson, Mountbatten, p. 54; Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:341; Robert Lacour-Gayet, Histoire du Canada (Paris: Fayard, 1966), pp. 523-24.

69

The force left England on the night of the eighteenth, pro-

ceeding across the Channel to the target. Off the coast of France,

the eastern edge of the convoy ran into a German convoy with its

escort. The unfortunate group consisted of Durnford-Slater's No. 3

Commando on its way to the landing positions in Eureka landing craft

and a gunboat. The force was badly mauled and scattered. One of the

British support craft came to help and sank one of the German ships,

but the damage was done. The force was dispersed, and most of the

group, including Durnford-Slater, were forced to turn back. Two

groups from the unit did, however, manage to make it ashore. The first

was made up of most of 6 Troop and about forty American Rangers. The

men came under heavy fire from the shore as they landed, found them-

selves trapped, and were forced to surrender. Another small group in

one craft made it ashore at another point. Under the leadership of

Lieutenant Peter Young, the men made their way to the battery. Having

only small arms with them, however, they could only snipe at the

battery to harass the crew. They kept up their fire until their ammu-

nition ran low. Then with the possibility of a German counter attack

becoming more real every moment that they stayed, the force withdrew,

boarded their landing craft, and returned to England. Their effort

was an excellent example of ingenuity and bravery. They had accom-

plished their task with a minimum of men and material; the combination

of the commando harassment tactics and the smoke screen laid by the

ships of the main force kept the battery from doing any damage.

70

Young's manoeuvre was the commando concept at its very best. Both

Young and the commander of the craft were awarded the DSO.

No. 4 Commando had better luck. Both parties landed as planned.

The first, under Major Derek Mills-Roberts, attacked the battery. The

second, under Lovat, was making for the place and stumbled into a

German counter attack group preparing to relieve the battery. Lovat's

group caught them by surprise and wiped them out. Lovat and his men

then proceeded to the battery to reinforce the first group. By this

time the battery's ammunition dump had been mortared, and the operation

was going well. One of the German soldiers in the battle had been

shot while mistreating a wounded commando. The word went around the

unit, and orders were given that no more prisoners were to be taken.

The battery was taken with bayonettes fixed. Then the demolition

crews destroyed the guns. The force withdrew to its craft and returned

home. Lovat's leadership and utter ruthlessness with regard to the

enemy paid off; the operation was skillfully executed and entirely

successful.

Dieppe was not a success for the Canadians. No. 3 Commando's

collision with the convoy raised the alarm in part of the target area,

but the Germans v/ere well prepared everywhere, whether alerted or taken

Young, Storm From the Sea, pp. 60-68; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 103-07; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, pp. 117-20; Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:360-61.

^^Derek Mills-Roberts, Clash By Niqht: A Commando Chronicle (London: William Kimber, 1956), pp. 18-19; Young, Commando, pp. 128-45; Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:363; A. B. Austin, We Landed at Dawn: The Story of the Dieppe Raid (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943), pp. 139-54.

71

by surprise. Many of the German guns had not been picked up in the

RAF reconnaissance photos. All the defenders, although they v/ere not

top quality troops, had been warned of the possibility of landings.

They were prepared, and they had the geography of the French coastline

on their side. The Canadians walked into a firing squad. The Royal

Regiment of Canada was practically destroyed on the beach. The Essex

Scottish also suffered heavy losses. The Saskatchewan and Highlander

Regiments did well, but they were the exception. Generally, the story

of the Canadian assault was one of poorly timed landings coming in

under heavy fire with heavy casualties resulting almost immediately.

Canadian losses were approximately 3,648. Nearly 2,000 of these were

captured, although a sizable number were wounded as well. This was

about half of the total of 6,100. Roberts, acting on what seemed to

be reliable information, used his reserves to try and save the situa-

tion. This consisted of two groups. The Fusilier Mont-Royal suffered

heavy losses and accomplished nothing. The Royal Marine commandos were

forced to turn back. Some did make it ashore, but to no practical pur-

pose. The frontal assault was a disaster. The heavy German fire

not only broke the assault, but it also made evacuation impossible in

12 some areas. Many of the captured were those who had to be left behind.

The Churchill tanks were successfully landed, about their only

success. The sappers could not remove the anti-tank obstacles because

of the heavy fire. Although this kept the Germans from using their own

Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:359-86; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, pp. 135-40; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 246-64.

72

anti-tank guns, it also meant that the tanks were virtually trapped.

They were either damaged by German fire or damaged themselves on the

shingle of the beach. The crews stayed at their posts, operating their

tanks as pill boxes. All the tank personnel were captured.^^

The RAF provided excellent air cover for the operation. The

Luftwaffe did not even appear until the operation had been going on

for some time; and even then, the German air force failed to make any

significant contribution to the defense. One destroyer was sunk from

air attack. A Stuka, running from two Spitfires, jetisoned its bombs

right over the Berkeley. It was purely a matter of chance, and it was

about all that the Luftwaffe could claim. In the air battle itself,

the RAF was not as successful as had been hoped. The British lost

106 planes. At the time, it was boasted that 92 German planes were

definitely shot down, and 170 more probable kills were claimed. The

grand total of a possible 262 planes proved over-optimistic. In fact,

only 48 German planes were destroyed and 24 were damaged, a much less

impressive total. In judging the success of the RAF's role, it must

be remembered that the RAF provided a wery fine air defense for the

operation and this was far more valuable than the tally of German

planes. In considering the tally itself, it is easy to say that the

Germans won. War, however, is not just the ability to fight, but the

ability to produce and supply as well. The Anglo-American Alliance

could replace its losses in men and material since both Britain and

America had organized their economies on a total war footing. Germany

13 Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:381-83; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 257-58, 262-63.

73

had not yet done this. Her economy was only beginning to be organized

in a manner that would fulfill her needs. Her aircraft production was

no exception; and by the time anything was done to increase production,

it was too late. Disaster was soon to overtake the Luftwaffe on the

Russian Front. Germany could not replace her losses as could her

adversaries. Her losses at Dieppe, while not decisive, were more

... T 14 cntical.

The initial Allied reaction to Dieppe v/as favorable. Dieppe

was a sign that the Allies would be able to invade the continent. In

the United States, the coverage was particularly sensational, and the

press caused considerable friction between the British and Americans.

Despite the fact that there were only about fifty American Rangers on

the raid, several American papers came up with headlines such as

"Americans Land in France." It was an insult to the Canadians and the

British who had formed the bulk of the force. Mountbatten and General

Robert McClure of Eisenhower's staff held a conference with the

correspondents who had been on the raid, asking them to help clarify

the situation. This was done, and the correction was made, but it

remained a rather unpleasant incident. The publicity was certainly not

appreciated in Canada. The Canadians were stunned when the figures

were released. The Canadian public was shocked and upset over the

Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 262, 266; St. George Saunders, Combined Operations, p. 143; Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:388; Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, pp. 44-47.

74

high losses and, like Prime Minister Mackenzie King, they wondered

how such losses could be justified.^^

Tactically, the raid v/as a disaster. The two commando units

were the only parts of the force that could claim real success. As at

Madagascar, they proved that they could work well in conjunction with

larger forces. Their success with the two batteries proved not only

that it could be done, but that it should be done. Even in the case

of Peter Young's group, the commandos had overcome almost hopeless

odds and had accomplished their mission. Their training and initiative

16

made them a vital part of any large force.

The real tragedy was the frontal attack. It was here that

lessons were learned at a high cost. Surprise was achieved in the

raid. The area around No. 3's objective was no doubt alerted by the

fight with the convoy, but for the most part the landings came as a

surprise to the defenders. There was no security leak as has been

rumored. The truth of the matter was that a frontal attack on a

heavily defended port was impractical without adequate air and sea

support, and then the support fire would damage the port beyond use.

A frontal attack was newer again used to capture a port. The commandos 15 /

Quentin Reynolds, Dress Rehearsal: The Story of Dieppe (New York: Random House, 1943), pp. 251-54; Raymond Daniel, "U. S. Allied Troops, Tanks, Raid Dieppe," New York Times, August 20, 1942, p. 1; "Dieppe Race Course Air Field for Allies," New York Times, August 21, 1942, p. 1; C. Cecil Lingard and Reginald G. Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, September 1941 to May 1944 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 114-17; J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie Kinq Record, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), vol. 1: 1939-1944, p. 417.

St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, p. 114.

75

participated in the capture of a number of ports later in the war,

but always with a flanking attack that took the port from the rear.

If COHQ's original plan, calling for a flanking capture, had been used,

Dieppe might have been a tactical success. As it was, though, the

raid changed the invasion plans. The idea of capturing harbors was

dropped, and man-made harbors ("Mulberries") were substituted. This

in itself helped assure the success of the Normandy invasion of 1944.^^

Dieppe has been called the "Sledgehammer" that might have

been. It was clear that the invasion of the continent would have to

be a large-scale operation. Dieppe drove home the realization that

such an operation would have to wait. When Normandy was invaded in

1944, the landings had adequate sea and air support. Amphibious tanks

and tanks with flails to clear mines were but two of the innovations

that came from Dieppe. The properly supported landings were part of

a flexible battle plan with enough manpower so that the landings

could be exploited. Although the British seemed to have learned more

from the mistakes made at Dieppe than did the Americans, Dieppe con-

tributed greatly to the success of the Normandy landings. The raid

has been the subject of a great deal of controversy and criticism.

It was much more costly than had been envisioned, but Dieppe was both

necessary and fruitful. Its tactical disaster was its strategic

Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, p. 116; Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, 1:399-403; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p. 182; Lacour-Gayet, Histoire du Canada, p. 524; J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), vol. 2: 1944-1945, p. 72. After the Normandy invasion, Mackenzie King talked with Churchill about the Dieppe raid and came to realize the importance of the experience gained at Dieppe.

76

success. Its justification was the realization of the Normandy

invasion. The only success at Dieppe bore fruit for Normandy--the

commandos formed the spearhead of the landing troops.^^

At first, it appeared that the inhabitants of Dieppe would have

their own losses to count. The Germans sent 750 of them to a prisoner-

of-war camp. These people were later released, however, since no one

in town had taken part in the raid. The British had taken care to see

that the French were kept out of the fighting in hope of avoiding

• H 19 repnsals.

The Germans were pleased with the Dieppe raid. It gave them

a false sense of security. Some were even convinced that a major

invasion effort had been defeated. Under Hitler's orders, work on the

West Wall was pushed to the limit^ and German strategy in France staked

everything on defeating any landing attempts on the beach, as had been

done at Dieppe. Since the Allies had tried to capture Dieppe, the

Germans assumed that they would attempt to capture a port or ports when

they invaded the continent. Dieppe seemed so important that the Germans

18 Butler, Grand Strategy, 3:638; L. K. Truscott, Jr., Command

Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1954), p. 72; Stacey, The History of the Canadian Army, p. 397; Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 109; Higgins, Churchill and the Second Front, pp. 166-67; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, pp. 266-69; "Lessons of Dieppe Now Prove Useful," New York Times, June 6, 1944, p. 5; Scott, Battle of the Narrow Seas, p. 92. Scott was a member of Captain P. V. McLaughton's Staff. McLaughton was Commander of the Light Coastal Forces on the Channel, a member of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, and responsible for the planning and execution of Light Coastal Forces' manoeuvres for the Normandy invasion.

^^Paxton, Vichy France, p. 305; Mills-Roberts, Clash By Night, p. 14; "French Kept Calm by British Radio," New York Times, August 20, 1942, p. 6.

77

took care to see that it was well fortified and defended. They

awaited an Allied tactic that would not again be used. ChurchilTs

faith in a peripheral strategy was bearing fruit. The German's spent

a great deal of time and effort on ineffective defenses. Their

attempt to fortify the coastline brought some relief on the Russian

front by sapping German resources. Thus, the secondary object of the

raid was also accomplished to some extent. For the Allies, a tactical

blunder v/as a strategic success. Likewise, for the Germans, a tactical

success v/as a strategic blunder. Dieppe v/as as important for its

effect on German strategy as it was for its effect on Allied planning.

Dieppe in its own way helped turn the odds in favor of the

Allies. The commandos reached their final stage of development at

Dieppe. They proved themselves to be not only raiders but superb

spearhead troops. They would retain this function for the rest of the

war, improving the fortunes of several large conventional armies. Both

the commandos and Combined Operations still had before them their

greatest contribution to the Allied cause.

20 Churchill, The Hinqe of Fate, p. 445; Higgins, Churchill and

the Second Front, pp. 62-63, 166-67; Lingard and Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, p. 116; Lacour-Gayet, Histoire du Canada, pp. 523-24; Germany, Oberkommando, Hitler Directs His War, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 80-81; Hitler, Secret Conversations, pp. 161-17.

CHAPTER 5

NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, ITALY, AND NORMANDY:

THE FINAL STAGES

Dieppe was the last of the great raids. World War II moved

beyond the raiding phase in 1942, the initiative passing to the

Allies and staying with them until the end of the v/ar. Raiding was

still valuable, however, as a reconnaissance tactic. Some pinprick

raids were staged in 1942, but the results were not great. A series

of raids against the coastline of France helped gain valuable informa-

tion on the German defenses in preparation for the Normandy invasion,

but their value was strategical rather than tactical. A commando

base was set up in the Dalmatian Islands off Yugoslavia in 1944 to

help the Partisans. This operation bore both strategical and tactical

fruit. The Germans in the Balkans were kept busy from the raids, which

convinced them of the possibility of an Allied invasion. The ruse

worked as well in Yugoslavia as it had in Norway. Generally, after

1942, the role of the commandos became that of the spearhead trooper.

The spearhead tactic and raiding had much in common, including the

same men, since they are really two different applications of the same

tactics. Raiding was an end to itself, but spearhead troops worked in

78

79

conjunction with larger, regular forces. Both were indicative of the

need for specialization.^

The landings in North Africa in November 1942 surprised both

the Germans and the Vichy French. The Germans may v/ell have thought

that the next Allied attack would be another Dieppe raid since they

still had it fresh in their minds. Most of the credit for the sur-

prise was due to Allied security, which masked the whole operation.

Surprise worked well for the Allies. The French defenders v/ere taken

completely off guard; they might otherwise have turned back the

clumsy, amateurish landings staged by the Allies. It is probable that

the Allies would not have had such an easy time if "Sledgehammer" had

been carried out, instead, in 1942. Commandos Nos. 1 and 6 were used

in the North African operation, known as "Torch." Commando No. 1

landed without much trouble and captured Fort Sidi Ferruch without

firing a shot. They were also able to keep the French from using the

airfield at Blida. Their third objective, Fort D'Estree, proved more

difficult. The garrison refused to surrender, and the ground forces

had to utilize air support and the threat of naval bombardment to force

its capitulation. No. 6 was organized as an Anglo-American unit of

British commandos and American Rangers. The British members were

dressed in American uniforms in the hope that the French would not

fire on them. After a difficult landing, No. 6 surrounded its objective,

Fort Duperre. As in the case of Fort D'Estree, the garrison refused to

Young, Commando, pp. 123-27; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 115-24, 205-22, 238-63.

80

surrender and was brought to reason by similar methods. Commando

tactics were adopted by one of the American groups. General L. K.

Truscott, a COHQ veteran, used men from the 60th Infantry specially

trained in commando and Ranger tactics to stage the capture of the

Lyautey airfield. In all instances, specialized tactics of this sort

were applied to the problems of a major campaign with excellent results,

The division of tasks v/as not only helpful, but vital. The need for

specialization became more and more apparent as the war continued.^

The Rangers and the commandos made a good showing in the opera-

tion, but the Tunisian campaign was somewhat of a disappointment for

the latter. The Rangers were well employed on attacks on the enemy

lines, which aided the Allied drive and saved livos. Their usefulness

as shock troops was due to the leadership of Colonel William 0. Darby,

who trained his men along commando lines with a few ideas of his own

as well. The Rangers gained the respect and praise of the superiors,

notably General George S. Patton, Jr. The commandos, on the other

hand, found themselves performing the duties of the average field

soldier. This was roughly analogous to using a Rolls Royce to carry

cattle feed. Fortunately, there were exceptions. Commando No. 1

staged a landing behind the German lines at Taraka. The presence of

2 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 472; St. George Saunders,

The Green Bere^, pp. 131-33; Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. ^32; George F. Howe, The U. S. Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, vol. 2 (1957): Northwest Africa: Seizinq the Initiative in the West (Washington: Department of the Army, 1947-), pp. 236-48; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 214-15; Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 79-98; Vincent Jones, Operation Torch (New York: Ballantine, 1972), pp. 113-15; Stacey, History of the Canadian Army, pp. 406-08.

81

such a force endangered the German lines of communication and route of

withdrawal. The Germans immediately realized this threat to their

position and staged heavy attacks on the unit. Losses were heavy, but

the unit held out for seventy-two hours, a thorn in the side of the

Germans which weakened their position considerably. The Germans

depended on the Mediterranean to guard their right flank, which was

logical for a land-oriented army. The British were largely sea-

oriented, however, and it was just as logical for them to use the

Mediterranean to turn the enemy's flank. One man's means of defense

may be another's means of attack, especially if his country has strong

ties with the sea. No. 6 executed a similar flanking operation in

conjunction with a reconnaissance regiment. They took a point within

the German lines that had been a target before. This time they managed

to establish a strong defense. Although they were too few for the

area they held, the commandos managed to hold on, despite heavy losses,

until the Royal Sussex and Coldstream Guards regiments attacked and

forced the Germans back. In both cases, the commandos filled the role 3

of specialized shock troops admirably.

By the time that the invasion.of Sicily took place in 1943,

Comnandos Nos. 2 and 3, and Royal Marine Commandos Nos. 40 RM and 41 RM

were grouped into a brigade. The latter two participated in the initial

landings, taking batteries on the coast to help the Ist Canadian

Division. Both No. 3 and Darby's Rangers served in a similar capacity,

the latter capturing the town of Gela. Montgomery realized the value

^St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 139-45; Alteri, The_ Spearheaders, pp. 194-266. Alteri commanded Fox Company, 4th US Rangers

82

of the commandos as shock troops, and he used Durnford-Slater's No. 3

Commando for his advance to Catina. The unit executed a landing

behind the enemy lines, overcame the opposition on the beach, and

moved to its objective, a bridge over the Leonardo River ten miles

behind the lines. The bridge was taken despite stubborn resistance.

Once this was done, Commando No. 3 was established in a position that

blocked the link between the German and Italian armies. A counter

attack was inevitable. The commandos expected reinforcements from

the 50th Division of Montgomery's 8th Army, but the main body was held

up in its advance. Lacking the necessary support, Durnford-Slater's

group was forced to relinquish the bridge and to retreat as best they

could. The tactic v/as described by the commander as "the Bonnie

Prince Charlie stuff." The commando was faced with tough German troops,

a far different proposition from the Italians they had faced in the

initial invasion. The unit's losses were heavy, 153 casualties in

all, killed, wounded, or missing. No. 3 Commando's fine discipline

and training kept the casualties from being any higher, and the group

managed to maintain itself long enough to escape destruction. Despite

the retreat, German strength and resources were weakened, facilitating

the 50th Division's advance. An army in the field cannot afford to

have its lines of communication cut in such a fashion, and it was only

logical that the Germans would stage a heavy counter attack. Further-

more, the Germans could not destroy the bridge, which they would have

done otherwise. The operation was definitely a success, despite the

83

heavy losses suffered. Montgomery was elated with the results, calling

the action "a classic operation."^

The invasion of the Italian mainland was the next step. A

number of reconnaissance patrols were landed on the Italian mainland,

but they did not accomplish much. The landings staged in the Gulf of

Salerno with the main invasion were more fruitful. The invasion

force^was Anglo-American, with the American 6th Corps landing on the

right and the British lOth Corps on the left. The strategy involved a

rapid advance on Naples. Commando No. 2 captured the La Molina Pass,

one of the routes to Naples. The Rangers accomplished a similar task

for the Americans. The commandos had to overcome stubborn German

resistance and then hold off repeated attacks on the vital position.

Things improved when No. 41 RM captured the town of Pigoletti,

strengthening their hold on the pass. As could be expected, losses 5

wére high, but the objective was achieved.

A series of landings helped to speed the Allied advance up

the boot of Italy. Special Raiding Squadron, which was now part of a

brigade commanded by Durnford-Slater, landed at Bagnara on September 5

to aid the advance of the 8th Army. The commando brigade landed at

Vibo Valenti with the 231st Brigade. The port was thirty miles north

of Bagnara, further extending the Allied gains. The most successful

St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 150-69; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 132-50; Young, Storm From the Sea, pp. 76-109; Martin Blumenson, Sicily: Whose Victory? (New York: Ballantine, 1969), p. 85; Hugh Pound,~$Tc ly (Londonl William Kimber, 1962), pp. 78-79, 125-28; Alteri, The Spearheaders, pp. 262-72.

^St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 180-93.

84

operation of this type was staged against the port of Termoli on

October 1, 1943. Commandos Nos. 3 and 40 RM, Special Raiding Squadron,

and the 13th Corps of the 8th Army participated. The objective was

to hold the port until the 8th Army could reach them. This would

involve holding a port twenty miles behind the lines, a fact which

made the whole operation a considerable gamble. The port was captured

and a perimeter established to meet what was becoming the classic

German counter attack. The British force managed to hold the place

against a full Panzer division and support troops that outnumbered

them three to two. The German thrust failed. British tanks reached

the port and Allied air cover was established, making the capture

complete. The Termoli operation was a tactical and strategic coup.

The resulting advance of the 8th Army ruined German plans for a stand

at the Biferno River. Again, the British used the sea to turn their

enemy's flank.

The Normandy campaign remains the supreme effort of the Second

World War. The full effort of the Allied potential came to bear in this

campaign, which delivered the coup de grace to Germany in the west.

The Normandy invasion was a technological triumph as well as a military

victory. A great deal of "Overlord's "success stemmed from British

contributions in technology which came from COHQ. Under Mountbatten's

vigorous leadership, Combined Operations used the commando raids to

Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 154-69; Young, Storm From the Sea, pp. 110-36. Young was in command of No. 3 Commando at this time; W7~G. F. Jackson, The Battle for Italy (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 127-28; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 170-200.

85

develop amphibious warfare as an exact science. The commandos were

willing guinea pigs in the World War II test tube. The educational

process began in 1940, with the first commando raid, and continued

through the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. It v/as the

commandos' contribution to the strategy of the conflict. COHQ made

other contributions materially. Dieppe proved the difficulty, if not

the impossibility, of trying to capture a port for the invading army,

and at Normandy the Allies brought their own ports in the form of the

"Mulberry" harbors. These artificial harbors had fascinated Churchill

since the First World War, and Mountbatten and his staff developed

them despite considerable skepticism from other quarters. The Combined

Operations Experimental Center contributed the first method of making

tanks amphibious, while the parent organization made contributions in

support craft. Another of Mountbatten's ideas was also implemented at

Normandy. This was "PLUTO," or Pipe Line Under the Ocean, which

supplied some of the fuel requirements for the invasion force. Added

to this arsenal were such other British contributions as the flail

tanks which cleared wide paths through the minefields on the beaches.

There were other special tanks to deal with obstacles. These innova-

tions arose from the Dieppe raid, which proved that engineers could not

function effectively under fire. Thus, the British and Canadians

avoided the carnage of Dieppe, as well as the carnage of Omaha. The

wery landing and support craft used in the Normandy invasion were

largely British in design with American improvements. The contribu-

tions made by the British in general, and COHQ in particular, has not

86

been fully appreciated by historians, despite the fact that these

contributions were so vital.^

The motion picture industry has done much to portray the

Third Reich as the technological wizard of World War II, but it is

hard to imagine the Germans planning and executing anything approaching

the Normandy invasion. With the exception of the Me 262 jet fighter,

the Germans were sorely lacking in applied technology, that is,

technology applied to long-range strategy. They produced some interest-

ing and terrifying weaponry, but their effort was not in tune with

long-range strategy. The Allies created an applied technology that

was strategically oriented and directed toward victory. "Overlord"

is a case in point. "Mulberry" harbors were not impressive in appear-

ance, but they worked technically and strategically.

It is ironic that Mountbatten was not on the beach to see the

Allied effort. In 1943 he was appointed Supreme Corrmander of the

South East Asia Theater. By 1944 he was far from Normandy, with a

whole new set of concerns. He did, however, receive a telegram

personally congratulating both him and his associates for their part

in the success of "Overlord." It was signed by Marshall, King, Brooke,

Dwight D. Eisenhov/er, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Double-day, 1948), p. 235; Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 97; Stamps and Esposito, A Military History of World War Two, 1:310, 324-25; L. F. Ellis et al., Victory in the West, 2 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), vol. 1: The Battle of Normandy, pp. 11-12; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 296-306; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p. 455; Albert Norman, Operation Overlord, Design and ReãTTty: The Allied nvasion of Western Europe (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1952), pp. 46-52. Norman was a member of General Omar Bradley's staff as historian of 12th Army Group Head-quarters; Swinson, Mountbatten, pp. 55-57.

87

Smuts, and Churchill. It was a further irony that Eisenhower had

suggested Mountbatten for the projected invasion in 1942.^

The commandos had a tactical contribution to make in addition

to the strategic contribution that they had been making for four

years. Their great moment as spearhead troops came at Normandy,

where they formed the left flank of the British army. Now organized

into Special Service Brigades (later Commando Brigades), they formed

a vital part of the British strategy. No. 1 Brigade (Commandos Nos.

3, 4, 6, and 45 RM, plus two French troops from No. 10 Inter-Allied)

under Lord Lovat was assigned the task of landing at Lion-sur-Mer,

capturing Ouistreham, and then moving inland to link up with the 6th

Airborne at the bridges 'over the Orne River and the Caen Canal. No. 4

Brigade (Commandos Nos. 41, 46, 47, and 48 RM) under Brigadier Dudley

Lister were assigned the capture of several strong points along the

9 coast.

After the St. Nazaire and Dieppe raids in 1942, the Germans

had embarked on an energetic program of coastal defense. Hitler was

convinced of the virtue of the fortress concept. Just before the

Vaagso raid in 1941, he had ordered an increase in the Norwegian

defenses. On March 24, 1942, he ordered that future Allied landings

o Swinson, Mountbatten, p. 57; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe,

pp. 66-67; Robert Musel, "The Unsinkable Mountbatten," Saturday Eveninq Post 216 (April 1, 1944): 20; "Lord Louis to Bat," Time 42 (September 6, 1943): 38; "Role of Soviet Still Cryptic After the Quebec Conference," Newsweek 22 (September 6, 1943): 21.

St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, p. 266; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 288-89.

88

must be defeated in the waters offshore or on the beach itself. As

the war progressed, his worries over the west increased. The result

was the West Wall, a futile attempt to fortify the entire Western

European coastline. The result was another Maginot Line with its

inflexibility and lack of depth. The two men in charge of western

defenses, General Gerd von Rundstedt and Field Marshall Erwin Rommel,

had differing ideas on the subject. Rundstedt remembered the Maginot

Line and preferred a more flexible defense with armored reserves.

Rommel remembered his experiences in the African desert, when his

opponent had air superiority. Armored reserves would be destroyed

without air cover. The Allied invasion had to be destroyed on the

beach before it could establish itself. As it turned out, both were

right. The Fuhrer's orders were followed, and the Germans paid tribute

to ChurchilTs peripheral strategy with their West Wall, especially

in the Pas de Calais area where they thought the invasion v/ould come.

Especially after the Dieppe raid, they were convinced that the fortress

concept would be their salvation. Hitler came to believe his own

propaganda that Dieppe was an attempted invasion. Rundstedt knew

better. He knew that the Allies would learn from their mistakes.

Fred Majdalany, The Fall of Fortress Europe (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 6, 30, 75, 298, 303, 312; Irving M. Gibson, "The Maginot Line," Journal of Modern History 17 (June 1945): 139; Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 543; "Facing the Channel," Time 40 (August 31, 1942): 29-30; Cornelius Ryan, The Lonqest Day (Greenwich, Conn.: Crest, 1960), pp. 24-30; Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950), pp. 43-50; Eversley Belfield and H. Essame, The Battle for Normandy (Philadelphia: Dufour Editions, 1965), pp. 26-36.

89

The commandos realized the weakness of fixed defenses as read-

ily as Rundstedt did, and they were ready to exploit this weakness.

The defender in a fortification has a false sense of security. He

feels safe where he is, having no call to expose himself since he is

in a fixed position. This puts the advantage in the hands of the

invaders. The idea was therefore not to attack, but to penetrate.

Direct contact with the enemy was to be avoided. The idea was to get

through the advance inland. It wâs just the thing for specialized

troops. The concept worked.

On D-Day, June 6, 1944, the first Allied troops to advance

inland were the American Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. When the commandos

from No. 1 Brigade landed, they found the 8th Infantry Brigade pinned

down on the beach. They moved in, wiped out the pill box, and pro-

ceeded inland to their targets. No. 6 took the lead while No. 4

took care of a battery at Ouistreham. Nos. 3 and 45 RM landed after-

wards as follow-up troops. The advance through the countryside had

to be made as quickly as possible. The 6th Airborne was one of many

Allied paratroop units that had been dropped behind the West Wall the

night before, and they had been causing incredible confusion among the

defenders. The 6th Airborne was in position; but, as the day progressed,

their need for reinforcements became critical. Lovat's men were aware

11 George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, ed. Beatrice Ayer

Patton and Paul D. Harkins (New York: Pyramid, 1966), pp. 299-306. Patton, a great believer in mobility in warfare, had little use for fixed defenses. He advocated heavy support fire not only to damage defenses, but to make the enemy go into his pill box where he would present less of a threat. Norman, Operation Overlord, pp. 155-56; Mills-Roberts, Clash by Night, pp. 91, 96-97.

90

of this, and they avoided all unnecessary contact with the enemy that

might delay them. The force reached the bridges in 3 1/2 hours,

having covered a distance of 6 1/2 miles from the beach. As far as

the paratroopers were concerned, they did not arrive too soon.

No. 4 Brigade landed to the right of No. 1 Brigade. Sea

support had not been as effective here as had been hoped, and the unit

suffered heavy casualties getting ashore. The German resistance was

stiff, and several objectives proved difficult to capture. No. 41 RM

captured all of its objectives except Lion-sur-Mer which held out for

eleven days. No. 46 had an easier time with the support of Sherman

tanks. No. 47 captured Port-en-Bessin on June 8 after a rough fight.

This gave the Allies a fine port and completed the link between the

13 American and British sectors of the beachhead.

The British commandos did excellent service on D-Day, as did

the American Rangers. In comparing the British and American efforts

on the whole, however, the British did much better. The superior

organization and technology of the British forces paid off. The

Americans came in second in these fields of military endeavor, and

they paid for their mistakes, particularly in the landings at Omaha,

which bore a remarkable resemblance to the Dieppe raid. The British

made better use of their paratroops, fire-support, and weaponry. As a

^ Mills-Roberts, Clash By Niqht, pp. 84-98; Young, Storm From the Sea, pp. 143-49; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 176-79, 186-90; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 266-67; Ryan, The Longest Day, pp. 93-151.

"•^Ellis, Victory in the West, 1:175, 183, 186, 202, 208, 213; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 270-75.

91

result, they advanced farther than the Americans and took some of the

pressure off the Omaha beachhead. This is not to belittle the

American effort, which was heroic. It is to give credit to the

British where it is due, but has not always been given.^^

After the beachhead was established, the Ist Brigade defended

the left flank of the British position. The heavy German counter-

attacks were successfully resisted, and the front became static in

a fashion similar to the Western Front of the First World War. The

commando troops took ewery opportunity to keep the initiative with

sniping and raids on the enemy lines. The hedgerow country of Normandy

was the type of country that taxed the individual soldier and forced

him to improvise and depend on his own intelligence. The commandos

15 were in their element.

Withthe Caen breakout, the Germans had little hope of defend-

ing France. The Allied advance was swift and determined; but as the

armies neared Germany, the problem of supply grew greater. The port

of Antwerp was captured in the hope that it would ease the problem, but

it was an empty victory as long as the Germans held Walcheren at the

mouth of the Scheldt River. This large, saucer-like island blocked

any Allied attempt to use Antwerp. Unless the island was captured.

^ Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 308-332; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp. 456-57; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, 336-38; R. W. Thompson, Spearhead of Invasion: D-Day (New York": BiTllantine, 1968), p. 41.

^^Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 190-99; Young, Storm From the Sea, pp. 150-78; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 284, 297; Murdoch C. McDougall, Swiftly They Struck: The Story of No. 4 Commando (London: Odams Press, 1954), pp. 159-62.

92

Allied land forces would continue to depend for their supplies on

LSTs (Landing Ship Tank), which is not adequate for the purpose.

Antwerp would have to be secured as a usable port, as well as an

objective, or the Allied armies could not maintain themselves in the 1 c

invasion of Germany.

Capturing Walcheren involved an amphibious operation. The

commandos had been aiding the AUied advance across France, and as

amphibious troops they were the logical answer. The RAF bombed the

dykes on the island, and its low center was thereby flooded, greatly

facilitating any attempt to capture it. The commandos landed on

November 1, 1944. The operation was a costly affair. Casualties were

particularly high among the crews of the special support craft, which

contributed so much to the success of the operation. The casualties

totaled 7,700. No. 4 sailed through a hole in the Westkapelle dyke

and captured Flushing, the main city on the island, from the rear.

No. 41 RM landed at Westkappell, while no. 48 RM landed south of the

breech. No. 47 RM landed and linked up with No. 4. Also participating

were two troops from No. 10 Inter-Allied, tanks from the Lothian Tank

Regiment, an assault regiment, Royal Engineers, and a medical team.

By November 8 the island was in Allied hands. Gaining full use of

Antwerp helped make up for the heavy Tosses. The commandos performed

their task well, using special knowledge and modern equipment in a

^ S . W. Roskill, The War at Sea (London: Her Majesty's Station-ery Office, 1961), vol. 3, pt. 2: The Offensive, Ist June-14th August 1945, p. 145; George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 294-95; H. Essame, The Battle for Germany (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), pp. 30-31, 47-48.

93

combined operation to defeat a formidable opponent. The result was a

major stroke for the Allied strategy. As Churchill stated: "The

Commando idea was once again triumphant."

All that was left in the European Theater was the final move

into Germany. Commando Brigades Nos. 1 and 4 played an important role

in this final stage of the conflict. Raiding was still wery much a

commando tactic. From December 1944 to April 1945, 4th Commando

Brigade executed twenty fighting patrols, fourteen short reconnaissance

patrols, and six patrols lasting from two to three days. By this time,

the commandos had become the finest fighting troops in the world.

Ambushes and surprise night attacks against enemy positions were the

favored methods. Being highly mobile infantry troops, the commandos

also worked well with armored units. This versatility added to their

18 value as spearhead troops.

Although the commandos were participating in a land campaign,

their training and background as amphibious troops paid unexpected

dividends. The Germans used rivers as a natural defense rather than

wasting precious manpower on rear-guard actions. The commandos were

'^Roskill, The War at Sea, 3:147-52; Durnford-Slater, Commando, pp. 208-11; Winston S. Churchill, The History of the Second World War (New York: Bantam, 1962), vol. 6: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 175-76; "Dieppe Losses Topped on Dutch Island," New York Times November 6, 1944, pp. 1, 4; "The Importance of Antwerp," Times (London), November 1, 1944, p. 3; "Little Ships at Westkapelle," Times (London), November 7, 1944, p. 3; St. George Saunders, The Green Bêret, pp. 294-308; McDougall, Swiftly They Struck, pp. 188-204; Essame, The Battle for Germany, pp. 33, 35-36, 42-44.

^^St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 319-21; Mills-Roberts, Clash By Night, pp. 151-52.

94

a logical counter move to this strategy. The capture of Wesel was a

case in point. Wesel was an important German communications center

on the east bank of the Rhine. The Ist Commando Brigade, under the

command of Derek Mills-Roberts, was assigned to capture it. The

Brigade crossed the Rhine on the night of March 23, 1945, in amphib-

ious tracked vehicles called "Buffalos." The craft came under fire

about half way across, but the force made it to the other side at a

point to the left of the town. The landing area had been hit with

artillery fire to help the commandos in landing. Once there, they

waited while the RAF pulverized the town, and then they took it from

the rear. It was one of three assaults which established a bridge-

head on the Rhine. By the next day, the town was ready for occupation

by the 18th U. S. Airborne.^^

Again, the German method of defense had proved to be the

British means of reaching an objective. The capture of Wesel was one

of a number of inland amphibious operations staged by the commandos in

the European Theater. The capture of Wesel was of great importance

since the Rhine was the most formidable barrier of its type in Europe.

Similar tactics were used against German defenses on the Maas in

January 1945 and against the town of Lesse on the Weser River in

19 Mills-Roberts, Clash By Night, pp. 156-68; James W. Stock,

Rhine Crossing (New York: Ballantine, 1973), pp. 116-26; Stamps and Esposito, A Military History of World War Two, 1:578-91; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 353-59; L F. Ellis and A. E. Warhurst, Victory in the West (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968), vol. 2: The Defeat of Germany, p. 289; "Commandos in Wesel," and "30-Mile Bridgehead," Tjmes (London), March 26, 1945, p. 4; St. George Saunders, The Green Berêt, pp. 326-32.

95

Germany in April 1945. The method also worked against German defenses

on a strip of land between Lake Comachio and the sea in Italy in

April 1945.^°

The end of the war in Europe was not the end of the war for

the commandos, however. The Burma campaign remains a forgotten epic

for the British Army. The British forces in this theater distinguished

themselves against a determined enemy. There, too, commandos were

used as spearhead troops. Commando Brigade No. 3 (Commandos 1, 5,

42 RM and 44 RM ) under the command of Brigadier C. R. Hardy saw

service there. Peter Young, who had been with the organization from

its earliest days through the Vaagso and Dieppe raids and the campaigns

in Sicily, Italy, and France, was Hardy's second-in-command. The

Brigade staged a landing at Agnu to force a Japanese evacuation from

Kantha, an area that was important for the maintenance of their forces.

In January 1945 the force landed at a point near Kangaw to cut the

Japanese retreat to the An Pass. It was impossible to cut the

Japanese retreat, but the force constituted a considerable threat to

the Japanese. The British force stood off some vicious counter attacks

which were staged with more determination and ferocity than skill and

21 strategy.

^^Mills-Roberts, Clash By Night, pp. 153-54, 176; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 310-18.

21 Young, Storm From the Sea, pp. 210-19; St. George Saunders,

The Green Beret, pp. 337-49; Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p. 467; Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 373-76.

96

The Far East was a paradise for British amphibious warfare.

The possibilities remained largely unexplored, however. The use of

the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the Second World War in

August 1945, closing a complex chapter in the history of modern

22 warfare.

22 Fergusson, The Watery Maze, pp. 370, 380-81.

CHAPTER 6

EPILOGUE

The effectiveness of the British commando units can be assessed

by examining their effect on both the German and Allied armies. The

Germans first discouraged and then imitated the commando concept. The

Allies were also skeptical at first, but eventually commandos were

used by the Allies in several theaters. Both sides recognized the

need for specialist shock troops to achieve certain military objec-

tives. The implementation of the concept began with Dudley Clarke in

1940.

In October 1942 Hitler issued his famous "Commando Order,"

which called for the execution of all Allied commandos and para-

troopers captured by the German Army. Failure to obey this order was

punishable by court-martial. No specific penalty was specified, but

disobeying the order amounted to disobeying a direct order from the

commander-in-chief. It was obeyed in all theaters except North Africa,

where Rommel was the commander. The members of these special forces

were entitled to full rights as prisoners of war by the Prisoner of

War Convention of 1929, and a number of Germans who obeyed the order

faced war crimes charges at the end of the war. Hitler's order

amounted to an official German recognition of the commandos and

97

98

their potential to damage the German cause. The commandos were quick

to realize this.^

Hitler soon, however, saw the advantages of a German special

force, and he ordered the creation of German commandos in 1943. The

German High Command was ruffled at this departure from traditional

military organization, but was forced to go along with the idea. A

suitably obscure man was picked to implement what was considered to be

a foolish concept. He was Otto Skorzeny, a huge scar-faced Austrian,

who had been invalided home from the Russian front. Skorzeny proved

to be a capable and imaginative leader, despite opposition from the

German military establishment. As a special force, Skorzeny's group

was given tasks of both a political and military iiature. It was

Skorzeny who freed Mussolini after his fall from power and subsequent

confinement. Although he was assigned other tasks—the kidnapping of

the son of the Hungarian regent, an attempted assassination of Tito,

a projected kidnapping of ^^1:^^^--^^^ most famous exploit was the

infiltration of the Allied lines during the Battle of the Bulge in

1944. Although Skorzeny did not participate in the operation, his men

caused considerable panic behind the Allied lines. Together with his

British counterparts, Skorzeny tried to develop the individual initia-

tive of his men. He also suffered from sensational press coverage,

being billed as "the most dangerous man in Europe," and having a

Lord Russell of Liverpool [Edward Frederick Langly Russell], The Scourqe of the Swastika: A Short History of the Nazi War Crimes (New York: Ballantine, 1956), pp. 16, 27-37; St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, pp. 123-24.

99

whole series of mythical exploits added to his list of actual

accomplishments.^

Following the success of the commandos, the British estab-

lished special forces in other theaters, specifically the SAS and the

Chindits. The SAS specialized in desert warfare in North Africa.

Originally intended as a decoy regiment, the Special Air Service was

the idea of Dudley Clarke, the man who had put forward the original

commando idea. David Stirling, a veteran of No. 8 Commando of

Layforce, took the decoy unit and made it a reality. Despite the

skepticism of the military establishment, Stirling created a force

which infiltrated the German lines. Using ground transport rather

than planes, the men of the SAS went behind the German lines, plant-

ing explosives on German planes, aircraft hangars, trucks, and railway

lines. The force suffered few casualties and was inexpensive to equip,

yet it achieved impressive results. The SAS accounted for 250 German

planes in the North African Theater, as well as other supplies impor-

tant to the Germans. Perfecting his own tactics, organization, and

strategy, Stirling made the SAS into a disciplined and effective threat

2 Charles Foley, Commando Extraordinary (New York: G. P.

Putnam's Sons, 1955), pp. 20, 27-41, 63-67, 90-100, 166-82; Flower and Reeves, The Taste of Couraqe, 3:58-65; Charles Whiting, Skorzeny (New York: Ballantine, 1972), pp. 13-21, 49-111; "'Rescued' Mussolini Reappears as Nazi's Newest Puppet Ruler," Newsweek 22 (September 27, 1943): 28-34.

100

to the Axis in North Africa. The SAS allowed the British to take the

initiative at a time when it was important for them to do just that.^

The concept of special forces was also applied in the jungle

terrain of Burma. The use of long-range penetration forces was proven

feasible by the 77th Brigade, and a force known as Chindits was raised

from that unit and placed under the command of Brigadier Orde Wingate.

The Chindits penetrated the Japanese lines and set up fire bases

which could be supplied from the air. From these bases, the Chindits

threatened the Japanese communication and supply lines. Because the

Japanese forces in Burma were threatening the British lines of communi-

cation and supply between China and India, eyery Chindit success

improved the British position. The Chindits were quite successful,

and the Japanese suffered heavy losses in attempting to counter the

threat. Their American counterpart, MerrilTs Marauders, performed

similar tasks for Stillwell. The Chindits were not wisely used after

Wingate's death, but they continued to be of help to the British effort

in Burma. Their worst enemies, disease and the jungle, finally

decimated them, and Mountbatten was forced to order their disbandment.

The Chindits had allowed Britain to take the offensive against her

adversary, however, and the force developed the concept of jungle

3 Arthur Swinson, The Raiders: Desert Strike Force (New York:

Ballantine, 1968), pp. 42-159; Virninia Cowles, The Phantom Ma.ior: The Story of Dayid Stirlinq and His Desert Command (New York: Harper and Bros., 1958), pp. 11-23, 65-124, 166-69, 196-216, 295; Foley, Commando Extraordinary, pp. 237-38; Gordon GaskiU, "Toughest Job in the War," American Maqazine 134 (July 1942): 11, 101-02; Frederick Snodern, Jr., "Confusion is Their Business," Reader's Diqest 46 (January 1945): 23-26.

101

warfare which was passed on to the regular forces, an achievement sim-

ilar to that of the commandos in amphibious warfare.

Another variant of the special forces came from the rich

imagination of novelist lan Fleming. An assistant to Admiral John H.

Godfrey of British Naval Intelligence, Fleming noticed that the Germans

had used intelligence units to capture enemy headquarters and, with

it, important documents and material. Fleming believed that Naval

Intelligence should do the same thing. With the help of two veterans

of the St. Nazaire raid, R. E. D. Ryder and Dunstan Curtis, Fleming

organized Assault Unit No. 30. Fleming's "Red Indians" were a group

of Royal Marines who captured enemy material from lists prepared by

Fleming. The unit distinguished itself in North Africa and Europe by

capturing a variety of important documents and weapons, which were 5

invaluable for British Naval Intelligence.

The Americans produced tv/o special forces variants of their

own, both organized under the tutelage of Combined Operations. The

first was the American Rangers, a special force organized and trained

as an American version of the British commandos. Being American, the

group needed a name connected with Ainerican history. Lieutenant-

General L. K. Truscott, Jr. suggested the name "rangers," a name

^Michael Calvert, Chindits: Long Ranqe Penetration (New York: Ballantine, 1973), pp. 9-83, 95-97, 149-59. Calvert was one of the Chindit leaders, and he appears frequently in his own narrative in the third person.

John Pearson, The Life of lan Fleming (New York: Bantam, 1965), pp. 79-126; Henry A. Zeigler, lan Fleming: The Spy Who Came in With the Gold (New York: Popular Library, 1965), pp. 59-72.

102

associated with Roger's Rangers and the Texas Rangers. The group was

trained by the British and, starting in 1942, the Rangers were sub-

jected to the kill-or-cure training methods of the commandos. The

result was an excellent body of spearhead troops. The British at

first had doubts as to whether the Rangers would meet the high

standards of the commandos, but as Colonel Charles Vaughn of Achna-

carry Depot put it: "A cracking good bunch, you Rangers."^

An equally impressive American group was the Ist Special

Service Brigade, the basis of the much-publicized Green Berets. The

idea originated with Geoffry Pyke, an eccentric and obnoxious member

of Mountbatten's brain-pool at COHQ. Pyke envisioned a unit of Arctic

troops which would operate behind the German lines in Norway. A

Canadian-American force, made up in part of rejects from the stockade,

was raised and put under the command of General Robert T. Frederick.

After a great deal of Arctic training, the force was sent to Italy

instead of Norway, where it nevertheless earned an incredible combat

record. The gangster image, which haunted the British commandos,

served the Ist Special Service Brigade very well. Under Frederick's

superb leadership, it became one of the most feared and respected units

of shock troops in the war.

r

Alteri, The Spearheaders, pp. 32-61; Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 38-40; Meyer Burger, "U. S. Rangers in Commando Raid Were Pupils of Commandos," New York Times, August 20, 1942, pp. 1, 6; Rice Yahner, "Taught by Commandos," New York Times, August 20, 1942, p. 6. The raid mentioned in the headline is the Dieppe raid. It was at this time that news of an American commando-type force was made public.

Robert A. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil's Briqade (New York: Bantam, 1967), pp. 1-69, 103-34; 153-85, 226-31.

103

World War II was the war of the irregular trooper, being far

too diversified in its scope to be fought without the irregular,

specialist soldiers. The range of the conflict demanded specialists

to meet the needs of combat, whether that combat was carried out on

the coast of Europe, in the deserts of North Africa, or in the jungles

of Burma. Whether the other special forces cited here were direct or

indirect variants of the original commando idea, the concept of the

specialist soldier v/as first established by the commandos, and its

further application was an acknowledgment of the validity of that

concept.

The commando concept itself was never static; it developed

with the war. The commandos began in 1940 as enthjsiastic amateurs,

but by 1945 they were among the most sophisticated shock troops in the

world. In 1942 the Royal Marines entered the commando organization to

form the RM commandos. The Marines were actually closer to the soldier-

sailor concept of the commandos; but they had been held back for home

defense in 1940, and the task had gone to the Army commandos. Despite

some initial rivalry, the two groups worked well together in brigade

formations. By the end of the war, they were both part of a homo-g

geneous fighting unit that was well equipped and properly deployed.

The commandos' tactical and strategical contributions have

already been covered in some detail. Aside from the purely tactical o

Whiting, Skorzeny, pp. 150-52; Mason, The Commandos, pp. 37-39, 9 St. George Saunders, The Green Beret, with a Foreword by

Mountbatten, pp. 7, 149-50.

104

success achieved by the raids, the raiding program allowed Britain

to resume the initiative that she needed to wage war. The raids

also helped to develop the technique of amphibious v/arfare. Because

Allied strategy was largely amphibious, this was a considerable

contribution. The commandos also developed many new ideas in the area

of field tactics and fighting, which were passed on to the regular

. 10 forces.

Aside from all this, the commandos made an enormous contribu-

tion to the concept of the soldier in modern warfare. They stressed

the development of the intelligent, independent, motivated soldier,

not the mass production of mindless killing machines. What the

commandos tried to cultivate was the intelligent, self-reliant indi-

vidual. COHQ did not want a group of half-wits who had to wait for an

order before they could act. The responsibility given to the commandos

was gladly received by the young men of the British Army, who were

tired of inertia, incompetence, and a defensive attitude. Peter

Young, who has served this work so well as soldier and historian, sums

up the commando idea in this way:

Intelligent men knew the object of the operation; if things went wrong, if leaders fell, they could use their training, and their native wit, to improvise and carry on. Battle tac-tics are no longer the "Load! Present! Fire!" business of Wellington's day. Happy the commander v/ho has keen, literate men to carry out his plans! And that is exactly what we had in the commandos long ago.ll

Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, 378 (24th February-26th March 1942): 915, 1143-44; Durnford-Slater, Commando, p. 91.

Young, Commando, pp. 158-59.

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Primary Sources

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Churchill, Winston S. The History of the Second World War. 6 vols. Vol. 1 (1961): The Gatherinq Storm. Vol. 2 (1962): Their Finest Hour. Vol. 3 (1962): The Grand Alliance. Vol. 4 (1962): Thê Hinqe of Fate. Vol. 6 (1962): Triumph and Traqedy. New York: Bantam, 1961-62; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-52.

. My Early Life: A Roving Commission. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

. The World Crisis. 5 vols. Vol. 2: 1915 (2nd ed. 1923). Vol. 4: 1916-1918, pt. 2 (1927). London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923-29.

Clarke, Dudley. Seven Assiqnments. London: Jonathan Cape, 1948.

Cooper, Duff. The Second World War: First Phase. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939.

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110

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INDEX

Achnacarry, 28, 102 Admiralty, 20, 45, 47 Air Force, Royal, 5, 35, 42-43,

50-52, 58, 64, 72, 94 amphibious warfare, 9-14, 16, 56,

74-75, 80-81, 84-85, 92-95 Antsirane, 62 Antwerp, 12, 91-92 Arctic convoys, 38, 59, 68 Ardennes, Offensive, 3 Army, American, Ist Special

Service Brigade, 102 Army, British, Home Forces,

65; 6th Airborne, 87, 89-90; 8th Army, 83-84

Army, Canadian, 32, 66, 71 Asquith, Herbert Henry, 6 Assault Unit No. 30, 101

Bardia, 33 Battenberg, Prince Louis of, 24 Beattie, Samuel H., 49 Belleville, 67 Bismarck, 45 Boer War, 6 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 5 Boulogne, 15 Bourne, Alan, 8 Boxer Rebellion, 21 Bruges, 13 Bruneval, 41-43 "Buffalos," 94 Bulge, Battle of, 98 Burma Campaign, 95, 100

Cadiz, 12 Calvert, Michael, 28, 101 n. 4 Campbeltown, 47-53, 55-56, 58-59 cavalry, British, 2, 7 Chamberlain, Neville, 1 Cherbourg Peninsula, 63 Chindits, 99-101 Churchill, J. M. T. F., 35

Churchill, Winston S., 1, 6, 12, 20, 43-44, 64, 68, 77, 85, 93

Clarke, Dudley, 5-6, 97, 99 Clausewitz, Carl von, 5 Combined Operations, founding of, 8; 9, 20; opposition to, 21; 22, 43-44, 57, 65, 75, 84-86, 101

commandos, Boer, 5-6, 9 commandos, British, formation of,

7-8; 9; organization of, 10, 36 n. 25; opposition to, 21; type of individual sought, 26-27, 48-49; soldier-sailor concept, 27; deployment of, 67, 77-80, 87, 93-95, 103; formation of RM units, 103; concept of the soldier, 104

"Commando Order," 97-98 commando units,

Commando No. 1, 79-81, 95 Commando No. 2, 35, 48, 54,

81, 83 Commando No. 3, 35-36, 66-67,

70, 74, 81-82, 84, 89 Commando No. 4, 35, 66-67, 70 Commando No. 5, 62-63, 67, 95 Commando No. 6, 79-81, 89 Commando No. 10 (Inter-Allied),

67, 92 Commando No. 12, 36 Commando A, RM, 67 Commando No. 40 RM, 81, 84 Commando No. 41 RM, 81, 83,

87, 90, 92 Commando No. 42 RM, 95 Commando No. 44 RM, 95 Commando No. 45 RM, 87, 89 Commando No. 46 RM, 87, 90 Commando No. 47 RM, 87, 90, 92 Commando No. 48 RM, 87, 92 Commando Brigade No. 1, 87,

89-91, 94

118

119

Commando Brigade No. 3, 95 Commando Brigade No. 4, 87,

90, 92 No. 11 Independent Company, 15 Special Raiding Squadron, 83-84

Commons, House of, 2, 43 Cooper, Duff, 2 C. 0. X. E. (Combined Operations

Experiment Center),85 Crete, 33

Dalmation Islands, 78 Darby, William 0., 80 Diego Suarez Bay, 62 Dieppe, 41, 65-77, 85, 87-88, 90 Dill, John, 5 Dunkirk, 3 Durnford-Slater, John, 35-36, 66,

69, 82-83

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 87

Fleming, lan, 101 Flushing, 92 Forbes, Charles, 45, 60 n. 25 France, occupied, 60 France, Vichy, 60 Frederick, Robert T., 102 Frost, J. D., 42 Fuller, J. F. C , 2, 5

Gallipoli, 6, 8, 11, 13, 20 Green, A. R., 49 Green Berets, 102 Guderian, Heinz, 2-3 Guernsey, 15

Hardy, C. R., 95 Harrison, S. S., 36 Hi t le r , Adolf, 1 , 38-39, 76,

87-88, 97-98 Holman, Gordon, 18 Hughes-Hallet, J., 65

Inveraray, 28, 32 I. S. T. D. C. (Inter-Services Training and Development Center), 14

Ismay, Hastings Lionel, 7 Italian Campaign, 83-84 Italy, 23

Keyes, Geoffry, 33 Keyes, Roger, 8, 13-15, 20,

22-24, 45-46 kleinkreiq, 10 King, W. L. Mackenzie, 74,

75 n. 17

La Molina Pass, 83 landing craft, 8, 21-22, 85, 94 Laycock, Robert E., 33 Layforce, 33-34 Leigh-Mallory, Trafford, 65 Leonardo River, 82 Lesse 94 Liddeil Hart, B. H., 2, 5 Light Coastal Forces, 47 Lion-sur-Mer, 87, 90 Lister, Dudley, 87 Lloyd George, David, 6 Lochailort Castle, 28 Lofoten Islands, 23, 30-31, 36-37 Loire River, 44, 46, 48, 51 Lovat, Shimy, 28, 66, 70, 87 Luftwaffe, 30, 35, 37, 64, 71-72

Mass River, 94 Madagascar, 62-63, 74 Maginot Line, 4, 88 Maquis, 56-58 Marlborough, Ist Duke of (John

Churchill), 6 Marines, Royal, 27 Maund, L. E. H., 14 mechanization, 2 MGBs (motor gun boats), 47-48 MerrilTs Marauders, 100 Mills-Roberts, Derek, 70, 94 MLs (motor launches), 47-48,

53-54, 58 Montgomery, B. L., 68, 81-82 Mountbatten, Louis, 9 n. 10,

24-25, 34, 40, 43, 43-45, 65, 73, 84-86, 100

fTTBs (motor torpedo boats), 47-49, 53-54, 60

"Mulberries," 75, 85-86 Munich, 1

Navy, B r i t i sh , 5; t radi t ional use of, 11; 19, 31-32, 38, 59, 65

120

Navy, German, 38 Nazi-Soviet Pact, 2 New York Times, 15 Newman, A. C , 48, 54 Niven, David, 28 n. 16 Normandie dry dock, 44, 46, 50,

52; damage to, 55, 59-60 Normandy Campaign, 11-12, 75-76,

84-91 North African Campaign, 79-81 Norway, 3, 14, 29

Old Mole, 52-53 Omaha, 85, 90 Ostend, 13 Ouistreham, 87, 89 Overlord, 84-87, 89-91

Pantelleria, 23 Pas de Calais, 88 paratroopers, 22-23, 42, 66-67,

87, 88-90 Patton, George S., Jr., 80, 89

n. 11 Petit Bruneval, 67 petite querre, la., 10 Pike, F. C , 49, 52 "PLUTO" (Pipe Line Under the Ocean), 85

Port-en-Bessin, 90 Prisoner of War Convention of

1929, 97 Pritchard, W. H., 49 publicity, 15-16, 57, 73, 98-99 Pyke, Geoffry, 102 ^

Quebec, 11 Quislings, 31, 37

radar, 42 raiding, 5-10, 18, 39-41, 56-57,

60-61, 64, 78-79, 91-93, 104 Rangers, American, 67, 69, 80-83,

89, 101-02 reprisals, 37-38, 56-58, 60, 76 Rhine River, 94 Roberts, J. H., 66, 71 Rommel, Erwin, 33, 88, 97 Roosevelt, Franklin, 47 R. T. U. ("Returned to Unit"), 29

Rundstedt, Gerd von, 88 Ryder, R. E. D., 49, 51, 54, 101

S. S. Waffen, 25-26 Salerno, Gulf of, 83 S. A. S. (Special Air Service),

34, 99-100 Scheldt River, 91 Scott, Peter, 76 n. 18 Second Front, 63 Section M09, 6 Sicily Campaign, 81-83 Skorzeny, Otto, 98-99 "Sledgehammer," 63, 75, 79 Spitzbergen, 32 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 St. Malo, 12 St. Nazaire, 13, 37, 41, 44-62,

66, 87 Stirling, David, 28, 34, 99 strategy, American, 63 strategy, British, 19, 30, 34,

39-41, 57, 61-64, 74-75, 77 strategy, German, 17, 38, 41,

57, 59, 61, 76-77, 87-88 support, air, 59, 65-66 support, sea, 65, 90 Syria, 33

tank warfare, 2, 4-5, 71-72, 85 Taraka, 80-81 technology, 25, 75, 84-86, 90-91 Termoli, 84 Tibbits, Nigel, 49 Times, The (London), 15 Tirpitz, 44-45, 50, 59 Tobruk, 33 Tod, Ronnie, 15 "Torch," 64 training, 20, 22, 26-29, 48, 60 Truscott, L. K., 80, 101

U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Social-ist Republics), 68

Vaagso, 34-37, 49, 87 Varengeville, 67 Vaughn, Charles, 28, 102

121

Walcheren, 91-93 Wingate, Orde, 100 war crimes, 97 Wynn, R. C M. V., 49, 53 Waugh, Evelyn, 34 n. 22 Wesel, 94 Young, Peter, 31 n. 20, 46 n. 7, Weser River, 94 69-70, 74 n. 6, 95, 104 Westkapelle, 92 Yugoslavia, 78 West Wall, 76, 88-89

Zeebrugge, 8, 13, 21, 46