Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 18

EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF COAL MINING AREAS IN ORISSA, INDIA By Enrique Pantoja

The World Bank Social Development Family Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network March 2000

Working papers can be viewed at http://www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment, or obtained from:

The World Bank Social Development Department Social Capital Working Paper Series Attention Ms. Gracie M. Ochieng 1818 H Street, NW, Room MC 5-410 Washington, DC 20433, USA

Tel: (202) 473-1123 Fax: (202) 522-3247 Email: gochieng@worldbank.org

or: Social Development Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW, Room MC 5-232 Washington, DC 20433, USA

Fax: (202) 522-3247 Email: sdpublications@worldbank.org

Papers in the Social Capital Initiative Working Paper Series are not formal publications of the World Bank. They are published informally and circulated to encourage discussion and comment within the development community. The findings, interpretations, judgements, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of the Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent.

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SOCIAL CAPITAL WORKING PAPER SERIES #1 The Initiative on Defining, Monitoring and Measuring Social Capital: Overview and Program Description

#2 The Initiative on Defining, Monitoring and Measuring Social Capital: Text of Proposals Approved for Funding

#3 Social Capital: The Missing Link? (by Christiaan Grootaert)

#4 Social Capital and Poverty (by Paul Collier)

#5 Social Capital: Conceptual Frameworks and Empirical Evidence An Annotated Bibliography (by Tine Rossing Feldman and Susan Assaf)

#6 Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia (by Richard Rose)

#7 Social Capital, Growth and Poverty: A Survey and Extensions (by Stephen Knack)

#8 Does Social Capital Facilitate the Poor’s Access to Credit? A Review of the Microeconomic Literature (by Thierry van Bastelaer)

#9 Does Social Capital Matter in Water and Sanitation Delivery? A Review of Literature (by Satu Kähkönen)

#10 Social Capital and Rural Development: A Discussion of Issues (by Casper Sorensen)

#11 Is Social Capital an Effective Smoke Condenser?: An Essay on a Concept Linking the Social Sciences (by Martin Paldam and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen)

#12 Ethnicity, Capital Formation, and Conflict (by Robert Bates)

#13 Mapping and Measuring Social Capital: A Conceptual and Empirical Study of Collective Action for Conserving and Developing Watersheds in Rajasthan, India (by Anirudh Krishna and Norman Uphoff)

#14 What Determines the Effectiveness of Community-Based Water Projects? Evidence from Central Java, Indonesia on Demand Responsiveness, Service Rules, and Social Capital (by Jonathan Isham and Satu Kähkönen)

#15 What Does Social Capital Add to Individual Welfare (by Richard Rose)

#16 Social Capital in Solid Waste Management: Evidence from Dhaka, Bangladesh (by Sheoli Pargal, Mainul Huq, and Daniel Gilligan)

#17 Social Capital and the Firm: Evidence from Agricultural Trade (by Marcel Fafchamps and Bart Minten)

#18 Exploring the Concept of Social Capital and its Relevance for Community-based Development: The Case of Coal Mining Areas in Orissa, India (by Enrique Pantoja)

#19 Induced Social Capital and Federations of the Rural Poor (by Anthony Bebbington and Thomas Carroll)

#20 Does Development Assistance Help Build Social Capital? (by Mary Kay Gugerty and Michael Kremer)

#21 Cross-cultural Measures of Social Capital: A Tool and Results from India and Panama (by Anirudh Krishna and Elizabeth Shrader) #22 Understanding Social Capital. Agricultural Extension in Mali: Trust and Social Cohesion (by Catherine Reid and Lawrence Salmen)

#23 The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda (by Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen)

#24 Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis of Findings and Recommendation from the Social Capital Initiative (by Christiaan Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer)

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FOREWORD There is growing empirical evidence that social capital contributes significantly to sustainable development. Sustainability is to leave future generations as many, or more, opportunities as we ourselves have had. Growing opportunity requires an expanding stock of capital. The traditional composition of natural capital, physical or produced capital, and human capital needs to be broadened to include social capital. Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without which there can be no economic growth or human well-being. Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and today’s world presents some very sad examples of this. The challenge of development agencies such as the World Bank is to operationalize the concept of social capital and to demonstrate how and how much it affects development outcomes. Ways need to be found to create an environment supportive of the emergence of social capital as well as to invest in it directly. These are the objectives of the Social Capital Initiative (SCI). With the help of a generous grant of the Government of Denmark, the Initiative has funded a set of twelve projects which will help define and measure social capital in better ways, and lead to improved monitoring of the stock, evolution and impact of social capital. The SCI seeks to provide empirical evidence from more than a dozen countries, as a basis to design better development interventions which can both safeguard existing social capital and promote the creation of new social capital. This working paper series reports on the progress of the SCI. It hopes to contribute to the international debate on the role of social capital as an element of sustainable development.

Ismail Serageldin Vice-President

Special Programs

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THE INITIATIVE ON DEFINING, MONITORING AND MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL

STEERING COMMITTEE Ismail Serageldin (Vice-President, Special Programs) Gloria Davis (Director, Social Development Department) John Dixon (Chief, Indicators and Environmental Valuation Unit) Gregory Ingram (Administrator, Research Advisory Staff) Emmanuel Jimenez (Research Manager, Development Economics) Steen Lau Jorgensen (Sector Manager, Social Protection, Human Development Department) Peter Nannestad (Professor of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark) John O’Connor (Consultant) Charles Cadwell (Principal Investigator, IRIS Center, University of Maryland) Martin Paldam (Professor, Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark) Robert Picciotto (Director General, Operations Evaluation) Gert Svendsen (Assistant Professor of Economics, Aarhus Business School, Denmark)

STAFF Christiaan Grootaert (Task Manager) Thierry van Bastelaer (Coordinator) Susan Assaf (Consultant) Gracie Ochieng (Program Assistant)

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EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED

DEVELOPMENT

ABSTRACT

We explore in this paper the concept of social capital through two coal mining areas in the state of Orissa, India. Our interest in the coal mining areas was reinforced by the fact that the World Bank is financing, through two projects, investments to improve the profitability of 24 opencast mining operations of Coal India, and to enhance the company’s capacity to deal more effectively with environmental and social issues, including community development. The paper is based on a qualitative analysis focused on community-based development processes and structured within the broader political economy of poverty. It has been suggested that poverty alleviation strategies should support existing forms of social capital and promote the formation of new ones. In fact, there is a growing consensus that social capital represents an important new dimension of community development. In this paper, these assumptions are approached critically by looking at the various forms, dimensions and effects of social capital. We argue that if one accepts that social capital is a common resource that can facilitate access to other resources, one should also consider that under scarcity conditions – such as those prevalent in developing economies and particularly among the poor – it can also become an integral part of the structures of constraint created by gender, class, ethnicity, and in the case of India, religion and caste. Thus, in addition to issues of access (including access to social capital resources), we look in this paper at issues of control, in terms of both, control to access to resources and control of resources once such access has been facilitated. Our exploratory analysis suggests that a full valuation of social capital cannot be done unless one considers the multidimensionality of the phenomena being assessed. It would indeed be limiting to approach social capital by focusing exclusively on associational membership and norms of reciprocity and trust and by assuming that social capital always produces beneficial forms of civic engagement or that more of it is intrinsically good for a community. As our findings suggest, each form of social capital can have different, sometimes contradictory effects. Thus, there are positive and negative effects of social capital that should be identified and accounted for when evaluating the social capital resources of a given community. These findings, we contend, have direct implications for community development efforts. These implications are discussed at length in the paper’s final section.

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EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Enrique Pantoja is an urban planner and sociologist, who has been involved in development projects in Latin America and South Asia while working at the Organization of American States and the World Bank. Through his work, Mr. Pantoja has focused on community-based development, slum upgrading and disaster mitigation and reconstruction. His particular areas of interest are urban development and urban poverty, including issues of social, economic and physical vulnerability of the poor. Mr. Pantoja can be reached at: tel. 202 473-2516 or e-mail. EPantoja@Worldbank.Org

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EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................xiii

I Introduction .............................................................................................................1 - 4 Objectives of the Study .................................................................................................. 1 Outline of the Paper........................................................................................................ 4

II Data Base and Methodology...................................................................................4 - 7

III The Context............................................................................................................7 - 16 Overview of Orissa......................................................................................................... 7 Profile of the Study Areas .............................................................................................. 7 Coal India Limited........................................................................................................ 11 The World Bank-financed Projects .............................................................................. 13

IV Conceptual Approach .........................................................................................16 - 25 Conceptualization of Social Capital ............................................................................. 16 Sources (the Width) of Social Capital .......................................................................... 18

V Analysis.................................................................................................................25 - 55 Forms of Social Capital ................................................................................................ 26 Institutional and Policy Framework ............................................................................. 27 Family / Kinship – The Weaknesses of Strong Ties .................................................... 31 Horizontal Networks – Social Capital at Community Level........................................ 35 Cross-Sectional Linkages (Vertical Articulations)....................................................... 49

VI General Discussion and Implications for Future Research.............................55 - 59 Dimensions (the Depth) of Social Capital.................................................................... 55 Distribution and Access to Social Capital Resources................................................... 56 Effects of Social Capital ............................................................................................... 56 Political Variable .......................................................................................................... 58 Power Relations............................................................................................................ 59

VII Conclusions: Specific Implications for Projects and Policy ............................59 - 65 Implications for Community Development Projects.................................................... 59 Implications for Policy ................................................................................................. 64

References ........................................................................................................................66 - 72

Annexes.................................................................................................................................... 73

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EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR COMMUNITY-BASED

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper was prepared under the Social Capital Initiative (SCI) of the World Bank, which was funded by a generous grant of the Government of Denmark. Jelena Pantelic was the Task Manager for the Social Capital Study and for the Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project in India at the time the study was launched. Field research was undertaken with the collaboration of Operations Research Group (ORG – India) and Mr. Jonathan Glass, International Consultant. Christiaan Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer provided useful comments and suggestions during the research exercise and the preparation of this report. Beltrania Scarano contributed with maps and graphics for the Annexes. Susan Assaf provided extraordinary support to facilitate the management of the study’s funds. David Fissel provided invaluable support during the preparation of this paper.

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I INTRODUCTION The rediscovery of social capital1 has seemingly provided a missing – perhaps powerful – explanatory notion to understand development processes better and to strengthen related policy, programs and projects. The potential contribution of social capital, or in simple terms civic engagement and social connectedness, to development appears to be immense, as corroborated by rapidly growing empirical knowledge.2 This potential acquires greater significance under current efforts to move beyond the so-called Washington Consensus and to broaden development goals. In Stiglitz’s (1998: 31) words, to move ahead, “[w]e seek equitable development, which ensures that all groups in society, not just those at the top, enjoy the fruits of development. And we seek democratic development, in which citizens participate in a variety of ways in making the decisions that affect their lives.” Equitable, democratic development might not be possible without understanding the potential positive and negative effects of social capital, and promoting enabling environments that foster forms of social capital that facilitate democratization processes. Not surprisingly, international organizations, national governments and NGOs have enthusiastically embraced social capital as an important form of capital, indispensable to making development possible and sustainable.3 The celebratory tone surrounding the notion of social capital must be dealt with cautiously, and the concept investigated rigorously, however. The concept of social capital has been increasingly applied in many different contexts and at different levels of analysis. Many definitions have been offered and indicators developed to measure its existence and impact. Despite these efforts, the question “What is social capital?” has not yet been satisfactorily answered.4 Is it social? Is it capital? We do not know with reasonable certainty.5 In general, “…our understanding of social capital is crude” (Putnam, 1998: vii). To enhance our understanding, we agree with Putnam that more knowledge is required on how social capital works, which forms does it take under which circumstances and cultures, and how is it produced. In the context of community development, moreover, we need to understand what it means for all the actors involved in terms of challenges and possibilities. Objectives of the Study Congruently, we explore in this paper the concept of social capital through two coal mining areas in the state of Orissa, India. Our qualitative analysis is simultaneously focused on community-based development processes and structured within the broader political economy of poverty. One of the main concerns in poverty alleviation is the provision of access to sustainable income sources and reliable and safe basic services. It has been suggested that poverty alleviation strategies should support existing forms of social capital and promote the formation of new ones. In fact, there is a growing consensus 1 According to Hyden (1997), the notion of social capital may be traced as back as the nineteenth century. The notion of social capital entered development thinking with full force in 1993, after Robert Putnam published Making Democracy Work. In contemporary thinking, however, the notion had been around, implicitly or explicitly, many years before as made evident by the works of Jacobs, Homans, Granovetter, Bourdieu, and Coleman among others. 2 As Putnam (1998: v) observes, “[m]uch hard evidence has accumulated that civic engagement and social conectedness are practical preconditions for better schools, safer streets, faster economic growth, more effective government, and even healthier and longer lives.” 3 Four kinds of capital are currently recognized, if not completely understood: man-made capital, natural capital, human capital and social capital (Serageldin, 1996). Bourdieu (1986) actually distinguishes cultural capital from social capital. 4 The analytical value of the concept is not completely known or accepted, while the possibility that traditional social science categories may have been too hastily repackaged into the (still evolving) theory of social capital is still a contentious issue (Edwards and Foley, 1997). 5 See, however, valuable work by Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and Collier (1998a) in this respect.

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that social capital represents an important new dimension of community development. We argue that these assumptions should be approached critically by looking at the various forms, dimensions and effects of social capital. If we accept that social capital is a common resource (even if privatizable in certain instances) that can provide access to other resources, we should also consider that under scarcity conditions – such as those prevalent in developing economies and particularly among the poor – it can also become an integral part of the structures of constraint created by gender, class, ethnicity, and in the case of India, religion and caste. In addition to issues of access (including access to social capital resources), we need to understand issues of control, in terms of both, control to access to resources and control of resources once such access has been facilitated. The production of social capital also entails the construction and reconstruction of social meanings and identities. In this respect, we explore the concept of social capital and its relevance in community-based development by analyzing its effects considering the role it can play as part of the structures of facilitation and/or constraint that characterize a particular society as reflected at the local level. Under these circumstances, we contend that the relevance of social capital cannot be fully assessed unless one considers the power relations that mediate social interaction, or rather social exchange, and the extent to which any emerging collective action allows to shift the dynamics of access and control in a manner that increases the agency of the poor effectively. The coal mining areas represent a unique setting to undertake our research because of their sui generis ‘enclave development’ characteristics. Coal production activities in India have taken hold in remote areas where commercial reserves were most readily available and where, consequently, coal mining has become the center of economic life while bringing significant changes in terms of the local labor market structure, the social fabric and the natural environment. Moreover, after nationalization of most coal mines in the 1970s, Coal India Limited, a public sector company, was created, which along with its subsidiaries would became the most influential institutional and developmental actors in these areas.6 The social and environmental costs of developing reserves has grown considerably in the last decades, as Coal India has found it increasingly difficult to acquire land to expand its operations. The development of opencast mines in particular has demanded substantial amounts of land. In addition to environmental impacts and land use changes, by ending the relative isolation of mining areas and transforming them into de facto ‘company-controlled enclaves,’ coal production has contributed to the redefinition of the terms of social exchange and the ‘rules of the game’ that give meaning to such exchange. Associational life does not take place in a vacuum. State or external institutional actors, such as Coal India and its subsidiary companies, can provide positive incentives and/or negative sanctions for collective action, and the coal mining areas exemplify this perfectly. Coal India has increasingly acquired community development responsibilities, and become the repository of peoples’ expectations regarding employment generation and service provision. The traditional practice of the company to deal with resettlement has been to exchange land for jobs in the mines. Also, so called peripheral development activities have been undertaken in towns and villages neighboring the mines, in a way to compensate for the inconveniences generated by coal production, such as dust, noise and other environmental nuisances. The mining areas have become de facto company enclaves as direct government intervention has been reduced and presence of the State rendered almost invisible. The coal company has attempted to avoid assuming full responsibility for provision of services such as health care and basic education to surrounding communities, while State and local governments as well as the affected communities believe these are things that the company should offer. As a result, simultaneous

6 Coal India is in terms of outputs and employment the world’s largest coal company, and the largest public sector enterprise in India. It has about 630,000 employees. Forecasted production in 1996-97 was 250 million tons of coal. Coal India has eight relatively independent subsidiaries located in an equal number of states. In Orissa, the subsidiary company is Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (World Bank, 1997a).

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effects of vertical articulation and non-articulation have developed as communities have become highly dependent and highly resentful of the company. Simultaneously, friction within the communities has increased as a result of the substantive gap between the miners’ incomes (who make about ten times the minimum wage and have job security) and what people make in other occupations. And as a result, also, of the differential impacts of the coal company’s own resettlement and community development policies, which tend to create invidious comparisons between those who are entitled and those who receive little or nothing. Our interest in the coal mining areas was reinforced by the fact that the World Bank is financing, through two projects, investments to improve the profitability of 24 opencast mining operations of Coal India, and to enhance the company’s capacity to deal more effectively with environmental and social issues. The Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project deals with the former, while the Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project deals with the latter. The emphasis is on renewing and expanding opencast mines where the need for labor and production costs are low, implementation can be relatively quick, and where no major social and environmental impacts are expected. These characteristics notwithstanding, investments in these mines – as in any others across the various coalfields – are likely to affect (positively and/or adversely) traditional sources of income and employment opportunities, social networks and structures, and the form and quality of social capital. The Environmental and Social Project does not explicitly have strategies related to social capital, but it includes a myriad of social mitigation measures that are having an effect on the relations between the coal company and the communities (vertical articulations), and within the community themselves (horizontal linkages). These social mitigation measures are related directly with the Bank’s safeguard policies to avoid unnecessary social harm, and mitigate and compensate when needed to ensure that peoples’ livelihoods and overall quality of life are not drastically affected by the new investments.7 The Bank-financed projects are still under implementation, and we have not attempted to provide here an assessment of the impacts of the social mitigation measures being undertaken. It is not relevant to our research objectives to do so. In any case, it would be impossible to assess project impacts given that not enough time has passed since project implementation started.8 We do, however, consider these new measures as important elements in Coal India’s evolving interventions that might affect social capital in our study areas. The way Coal India deals with rehabilitation and resettlement, and with community development in general, has been affected by different factors throughout time, including policy changes at the corporate and state levels, nature of the projects, and financing sources and mechanisms, among others. It is, then, within the framework of these processes of interaction between the company and (positively and negatively) affected communities, and within the communities themselves, that we situate our analysis. As we explained above, we would attempt to understand how social capital is created, destroyed, and recreated along processes of community-based development that are dynamic, and where cycles of conflict and cooperation evolve as the “rules of the game” change and generalized trust implodes and explodes, is fractured and reconstituted, accordingly. The emerging structures of facilitation and constraint that we also mentioned above should, in the final analysis, help determine the room for action or (the relative) agency of the individual members that comprise these communities to come together and engage in meaningful collective actions that can further democratization.

7 For example, following Bank’s Operational Directives, reviews of environmental and social aspects were undertaken for 25 mines, and Environmental Action Plans (EAPs), Rehabilitation Action Plans (RAPs) – based in a new corporate policy, and Indigenous People Development Plans (IPDPs) – based on CIL’s revised community development guidelines – were prepared through surveys and focused group sessions in local communities. 8 The Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project was approved in May 1996 by the World Bank, but full implementation pace of social mitigation measures actually took place around the middle of 1997.

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Outline of Paper The following section provides information on the data sources and methodology used in the study. Section III provides the context of the study, and includes a brief overview of Orissa and the profile of the study areas, the coal company and the World Bank-financed projects. Section IV provides the Conceptual Approach while Section V includes the Analysis. In the former we introduce our initial understanding of social capital. In Section V we put our field observations into an analytical framework represented in a ‘virtual matrix’ whereby various levels of analysis are combined to explore different forms of social capital. Section VI provides a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues that emerge from the analysis, and of implications for future research. Section VII summarizes the main conclusions of our study in terms of implications of our findings for policy and projects dealing, partially or completely, with community-based development. Finally, a series of Annexes provide more specific details on our methodology, and several maps and graphics. II – DATA BASE AND METHODOLOGY

This is an exploratory study.9 Rather than searching for explanation and corroboration of certain assumptions, through our fieldwork we have attempted to identify hypotheses and indicators that will help in future efforts to investigate more rigorously the concept of social capital within the framework of community-based development. Moreover, we have outlined specific issues that should be considered when dealing with community development in projects whose ultimate goal is poverty alleviation. In particular, our final methodology was given form by several requirements, among which the most relevant are: (1) The need to avoid interfering with project implementation activities. The two Bank-financed projects are still under implementation, and many of the social mitigation measures included in these projects are being tried by Coal India for the first time. Also, due to their high profile nature, the projects are being closely followed by national and international NGOs. As such, our methodology needed to be as unobtrusive as possible. (2) The need to obtain and maintain the collaboration of Coal India and the concerned subsidiary. As part of the supervision team for the World Bank-financed projects, we had a point of entry to undertake the research. However, the continuous collaboration of the coal company was required to be able to do fieldwork and deploy members of the local team. Our methodology and research activities needed to be agreeable to Coal India and the concerned subsidiary. It was understood from the beginning of the study that if Coal India did not feel comfortable about the research activities, the study would have to be stopped.10 (3) Given these two previous requirements, it was necessary to find “safe” study areas. In other words, study areas with low levels of conflict and where project implementation was advancing relatively unencumbered. Particularly, there were justified concerns regarding increasingly high expectations among certain communities and fragile relations between the communities and the company. Considering these three requirements, the mines located in the Singrauli area in the State of Uttar Pradesh, and administered by Northern Coalfields Limited were discarded.11

9 Admittedly, this is a sanitized account of our methodological approach, which started up as a more ambitious and action oriented proposal but that had to be scaled down to meet what we call ‘ground realities’ and the resulting institutional and time constraints. 10 There were also legal concerns, particularly in mines under Bank financing where Coal India has certain legally binding obligations that ought to be met in order to ensure continuation of Bank financing. 11 Our first proposal was actually focused on Singrauli, which is an area were a good number of mines are concentrated, and where a process of rapid industrialization has taken place. However, it was at the time an area with high levels of conflict, and under scrutiny by the Inspection Panel due to another Bank financed project.

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There are 24 opencast mines included under the Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project (ESMP) scattered across 11 coalfields in five states of east and central India, and managed by an equal number of subsidiaries.12 After discounting Northern Coalfields, there would be 19 mines left receiving Bank financing across the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. In order to decide on the two study areas, the first criterion for selection was that the mine impacting the study area should be an opencast operation,13 given that these are the ones most likely to have more (positive and negative) effects in the social and natural environment. Second, we decided that one of the mining areas should come from the set included under the ESMP, while the other one should be from the rest of opencast mines, provided that: (i) they belonged also to any of the four subsidiaries with mines under Bank financing; and (ii) were similar in age to the mines under Bank financing. Third, we also decided that the mines should be representative of the need for resettlement and rehabilitation and community development stemming from opencast mining in a given area. Accordingly, about 13 mines receiving Bank financing and about 30 not receiving Bank financing were identified as eligible for our study. After closer analysis, the Talcher and Ib Valley Coalfields – located in the state of Orissa and managed by the subsidiary Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (MCL) – were identified as the most suitable areas to undertake the study. The final factors to decide on the study areas were geography, regulatory environment, and social, political and economic context. Consultation with Coal India and Mahanadi Coalfields representatives was also undertaken before making the final selection. Subsequently, one mining area was selected on each coalfield: Samaleswari in the Ib Valley as the study area with a mine receiving Bank financing, and Kalinga in Talcher as the area with a mine without Bank financing. It must be noted that Orissa is one the poorest states in India. Moreover, that as identified in the Environmental and Social Mitigation Project, the Talcher and Ib coalfields are the areas where most of the total project-affected people (about 73 percent) live. Each coalfield includes three mines (each surrounded by a good number of villages) receiving Bank financing. Each set of three mines are relatively close to each other, and to other mines not included in the Bank projects, including Kalinga, which clearly represent the de facto “enclave development” areas to which we referred above. The limits of the areas of study were established following the definition given in the ESMP as the mine’s zone of influence for community development, which includes all settlements within one kilometer from the boundary of the mine holding (World Bank, 1996). Ideally, it would have been better to cover the whole cluster of mines on the two coalfields in Orissa, but time and resource constraints forced us to accept these arbitrary boundaries. This assumption seems adequate, given the exploratory nature of our research. A more rigorous study should definitively cover the whole cluster and all the villages falling within the ‘company enclave.’ A major advantage of undertaking the study in Samaleswari was the existence of socioeconomic baseline data and reports prepared for the Bank-financed projects. The relative disadvantage was that Coal India did not have nearly as much information for Kalinga. Specifically for mines receiving Bank financing, reviews of environmental and social aspects had been undertaken, and Environmental Action Plans (EAPs), Rehabilitation Action Plans (RAPs) – based on a new corporate policy, and Indigenous People Development Plans (IPDPs) – based on Coal India’s revised community development guidelines – had been prepared through household surveys and focus group sessions with communities. Most of this information was collected in 1994 and 1995 during project preparation, although as part of the

12 The Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (CSRP) includes 25 mines. Only 24 mines were considered for the Environmental and Social Project (ESMP), however, since in one mine, Ananta in Orissa, nobody lives within one km of the leasehold of the mine. 13 Coal India has about 490 mines under its command, of which about 140 are opencast operations (World Bank, 1997a)

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Environmental and Social Mitigation Project, an exercise to update the information on project-affected people was carried out in 1998.14 To complement the existing information, and given the nature and focus of our study, we undertook the following research activities to collect primary data on both study areas: (1) Household survey on each of the study areas to update some of the socio-economic data and obtain a first insight into the social capital of the communities.15 (2) Focus group sessions. (3) Unstructured interviews with relevant actors, including officials of Coal India, Mahanadi Coalfields, government officials, and NGO and community representatives. (4) Stakeholders workshop (this was only carried out in Samaleswari). Many of these activities were developed in collaboration with a local team of researchers, Operations Research Group, who periodically visited the study areas between July 1998 and February 1999, to follow closely everyday life events in the communities and maintain contact with the NGO operating in Samaleswari.16 As members of the World Bank’s supervision team of the Environmental and Social Mitigation Project (ESMP), we visited Orissa in multiple occasions in 1997 and 1998, and met with Coal India and Mahanadi Coalfield officials, government officials, and community members. Furthermore, as sources of secondary data, we have looked for relevant information in: Aides-Mémoire from Bank supervision missions for the ESMP; quarterly project progress reports and other project-related documents prepared by Coal India; the market surveys undertaken in Samaleswari area; the database on the project-affected persons; and the rehabilitation action plans and indigenous peoples development plans prepared annually for Samaleswari. In terms of the analytical path followed, as we explain further below, we have developed our theoretical understanding of social capital, attempting to distinguish, as Portes (1998) advises, the definition from its alleged effects. Subsequently, we have tried through our fieldwork to test these assumptions with reference to the empirical evidence gathered through the various methods and instruments mentioned above. We do not claim that our findings have universal validity, but hope that they will be useful as building blocks for further and more encompassing research, and as an initial insight into the relevance of social capital for community-based development projects. We recognize that there are important issues in our study areas with respect to rehabilitation and resettlement of individuals and communities affected by the coal mining operations. Given our focus on social capital, we see these issues however within the specific context of community development and the broader issues of poverty alleviation. In fact, we consider that the dynamics created by the need to relocate and/or rehabilitate a number of villages enhance the research potential of the sites selected for the studies.

14 Specifically, Indian consultants undertook several surveys in 1994 and 1995 in Samaleswari as part of the preparation of the projects. Socio-economic base-line surveys were conducted in the villages directly affected by the project, in order to prepare the first resettlement and rehabilitation action plan (RAP). Another survey was conducted in 1995 in the villages located within one kilometer of the leasehold boundary of the mine, which are entitled to community development benefits. 15 See Annex 1 for details on sample design and copies of the questionnaires used on each study area. Due to the evolution of our methodological approach and research activities, we must note that the questionnaires turned out to be rather limiting vis-a-vis what in the end was identified as our specific research goals. It must also be noted that most people in the area are suffering from ‘survey fatigue,’ and many felt that they have answered enough surveys already. We are now guilty of furthering this trend, as our initial action-oriented approach raised expectations that where never fulfilled. 16 Operations Research Group (ORG) has prepared the initial indigenous peoples development plan for Samaleswari. In addition, ORG was selected in 1997 to prepare market surveys in the Bank-financed mines having project-affected persons entitled to assistance for self-employment. These market surveys were used to develop a strategy for alternative income generation.

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III – THE CONTEXT Overview of Orissa Orissa, with an area of about 156,000 square kilometers and an estimated population of 34.2 million in 1996, is one of the poorest and least developed states in India (Crook, 1997; Repetto, 1994).17 In 1990-91, the estimated per capita income of Orissa was Rs. 3,180 at current prices (Nandi and Sau, 1998). Paradoxically, Orissa possesses huge mineral resources, such as bauxite, chrome and coal. The state is located on the East Coast, bordered by West Bengal and Bihar to the north, Andhra Pradesh to the south, the Bay of Bengal to the east and Madhya Pradesh to the west. In terms of its physical features, Orissa can be divided into four regions: the Northern Plateau, the Central Table, the Eastern Ghat and the Coastal Plains. Administratively, the state is divided into 13 districts and 26 revenue districts (See Annexes – Map 1). Uneven regional development characterizes India, and Orissa is not exception. The state’s inland area, where our study areas are located, is much less developed than the coastal area, which albeit still lagging behind in terms of development, compares better to the rest of India. Orissa is also one of the most rural states in India. Urban population in 1991 was about 13.4 percent of total population (Nandi and Sau, 1998).18 About 80 percent of the population depends on the agricultural sector. Agriculture, however, despite being the chief economic activity, is one of the lowest yielding in the country. Moreover, most of the farmers in the State are landless. About one fourth of Orissa’s population are tribals, who according to the official designation belong to the scheduled tribes (STs).19 Moreover, about 15 percent are considered scheduled castes (SCs). Between 60 and 65 tribal groups have been identified in the state, mostly along an almost contiguous belt in the districts of Koraput, Kalahandi, Bolangir, Sambalpur, Phulbani, Ganjam, Sundergarh, Magurbhan, Keonjhar and Dhenkanal (Fernandes et al, 1988). The majority of this tribal population is poor and illiterate. Coal has been one of the main forces behind industrialization in Orissa. There are two major coal belts in Orissa: one crosses along the Ib Valley region, and the other through the Talcher-Angul region. These two belts comprise the “Mahanadi coal valley” mined by one of the subsidiary companies of Coal India Limited, namely, Mahanadi Coalfields. Most of this coal belt, as well as other sources of raw materials, correspond to the forest and tribal regions of the state. With the growing demand for coal, and the related need to increase production rapidly, opencast mining, which has greater social and environmental impacts due to the higher demand for land, has been favored over underground mining. Profile of the Study Areas Many different social groups live in the mining areas. Apart from one mine, Jhingurdah in the Singrauli region, all the tribal project-affected people are farmers on fixed plots, settled in mixed villages among mainly caste Hindus and scheduled caste Hindus. According to the initial base-line surveys, the total population of the mining areas under Bank financing was about 186,000 (World Bank, 1996).20 No

17 In the mid-1990s, Orissa was second in terms of poverty incidence in India after the state of Bihar. These two states, along with Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, were nearly always clustered at the low end of well-being indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy rate. Of the ten poorest regions in 1987-88, five were in either Bihar or Orissa (World Bank, 1997b). 18 In comparison, it is estimated that about 26 percent of India’s total population is urban. 19 See below in Section on Profile of the Study Areas (p.12-13) for explanation of these categories, including scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, other backward castes, and general castes. 20 The total of project affected people by the Bank financed projects has been estimated at 16,300, of which more than 9,000 are adults over 18 and thus entitled to rehabilitation assistance. About 82 percent of the latter would

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exact data exist on the total number of project affected people for opencast mines outside the Bank-financed projects. Samaleswari, Ib Valley Coalfield As mentioned above, the coalmines in the Ib Valley and Talcher fall under management of Mahanadi Coalfields Limited (MCL), which operates about 21 mines and projects across these two areas. Coal mining activities in the Ib Valley area were started over fifty years ago. The whole region was very underdeveloped before coal mining was started. Coal mining operations accelerated, however, with the nationalization of the mines in the 1970s and the implementation of opencast projects (OCPs) in the 1980s, which consequently accelerated the development of the area. About five underground mines and five opencast projects (OCPs) are under the jurisdiction of MCL in the Ib Valley. Three of the OCPs, namely Lakhanpur, Belpahar and Samaleswari, are included for financing under the Coal Sector rehabilitation and the Environmental and Social Mitigation Projects (see Staff Appraisal Reports, World Bank 1997a and 1996). The Samaleswari Open Cast Project is located in Jharsuguda revenue district, between Sambalpur and Sundargarh revenue districts (see table below for a comparison of the district vis-à-vis Orissa and India). Actual coal mining in Samaleswari started in 1993, although preparation work had been started in 1987. The mine has an estimated project life of about 23 years. In Samaleswari, 21 the study area includes four villages, which in turn comprise seven habitations: Kudapalli, Lajkura, Sukhpara, Mundapara, Ainapalli, Orampara and Karapalli.22 Total population within the study area is about 2,751 (or 470 households). About 46.7 percent of the total population belong to scheduled tribes (STs), while 12.7 fall under the category of scheduled castes (SCs). The rest belong to other backward castes (OBC) – 35.4 percent, who are the second largest group, and to general – upper – castes (5.2 percent). There is no need for resettlement at the moment. Two of these villages, however, Kudapalli and Lajkura, are simultaneously “RAP” and “IPDP” villages,23 since they include project-affected people who will need to be rehabilitated. According to the 1994 socio-economic base-line survey, it was estimated that 1,655 (398 families) would be affected by the mining operations due to land acquisition, of whom 232 were tribals (VPASP, 1994a; 1994b). Although there is no need for resettlement during the implementation period of the World Bank-financed projects, the entire project-affected people will either lose land, or their livelihoods will be significantly affected by the acquisition of land by Mahanadi Coalfields. The total number of entitled project-affected persons (EPAPs) 24 in Samaleswari is 986. We must note that land acquisition has been finalized along with payment of compensation, except in cases where the ownership of the land is under legal dispute or tenure is not clear.

need income restoration assistance, as employment in the mines or through contractors can only provide a limited number of new jobs (World bank, 1996). 21 Information on the study areas, unless specified otherwise, is derived from our household surveys and the database of project-affected people. 22 Every village has a given “revenue boundary” that comprises several habitations. In other words, a village in this report refers to a “revenue village.” 23 A “RAP village” is one where people will have to be relocated or rehabilitated in situ. Entitlements for compensations under this category are individual. An “IPDP village” is a village entitled to community development benefits. In this case, the entitlement is at the community (group) level. 24 Entitled project-affected people would include in Samaleswari those affected by the investments financed by the Bank who were above 18 years of age by 1/1/1994 (assumed as the cutting date when baseline surveys were undertaken in the area).

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The per capita income of the area is relatively higher than other parts of the district and state. However, the initial survey by ORG (1995) also indicated that inequality was increasing due to the fact that those working at the mines had higher incomes and job security, while the life of those left without land and alternative income generation opportunities had been deteriorating. A change in the leadership pattern was also observed, as the Mahanadi Coalfield employees were taking power away from the traditional leadership. These changes also apply to Kalinga, which is however located in a highly dynamic area where, not only coal, but also other industrial activities have been concentrating at an accelerated pace. Kalinga, Talcher Coalfield The Talcher-Angul area is industrializing rapidly. Several large industries in the area such as National Aluminum Company (NALCO) and National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and a good number of medium and small industries depend on the coal company for their operation. Three opencast mines, also under the management of Mahanadi Coalfields, are receiving Bank financing here. The selected study area, Kalinga, is adjacent to one of them, namely Bharatpur. The first coal mine in the area opened, albeit at a very small scale, in 1926. It was only until 1960 that coal mining began to intensify, however. The Kalinga Opencast Project (OPC), located in Angul District, was begun about 8 years ago, and the expected life of the mine is 27 years.25 In Kalinga, 11 habitations fall within the study area, but 3 of them are now uninhabited. Accordingly, eight habitations are included in our study: Bramhanbahal, Danra, Kalam Chhuin, Majhika, Natada, Nathgaon,26 Nakeipasi and Solada. The study area has a population of 15,095 (or 2,351 households). The majority of the population (65.5 percent) belongs to the other backward castes (OBC). Scheduled tribes (STs) are second (15.2 percent), followed by general castes – (9.7 percent) and scheduled castes – SCs (9.6 percent). Brahmanbahal will have to be resettled completely, while Majhika and Solada will be partially relocated. The classification of villages being used in Samaleswari, namely, RAP and IPDP villages, does not apply in Kalinga.

Comparison of Jharsugda and Angul Districts vis-à-vis Orissa and India Indicators Jharsugda Angul Orissa India

Total Population (1991 Census) (‘000) 446 961 31659 835867 Percentage of SC Population 17.15 16.82 16.2 22.2 Percentage of ST Population 31.88 11.68 16.48 8.08 Population Density (per Sq. km) 203 151 203.33 273.60 Urbanization Rate 35.67 11.46 13.38 25.73 Literacy (in %) 52.64 51.53 49.09 52.21 Female Literacy (in %) 37.01 34.32 34.68 39.29 Forest area as % of total area 16.40 55.30 38.32 21.82 Net sown area as % total area 37.11 34.80 40.69 46.30 Gross irrigation area as % of GCA 18.80 26.7 23.32 30.72 Per capita food grain production (in Kgs) 215 158 162 173 Main Characteristics of Social Organization in Study Areas At the time of the survey to prepare the initial indigenous peoples development plan, the economy of Samaleswari was predominantly agrarian. With the development of mining operations, the coal company had acquired a good amount of land, and many inhabitants had lost their agricultural plots. 25 This information was provided directly by the Chief Mining Officer of Kalinga Area. 26 Nathgaon is a new settlement were a few households (12) have been moved from nearby villages.

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Over half of the male population had found employment in the mines in 1995, and some had become daily laborers in mine-related activities (ORG, 1995). However, many people had been left jobless or without access to income generation opportunities. Over time, the mining industry has created many new activities in the area, changing what was a subsistence economy into a market-driven one. Importantly, in Samaleswari many families have immigrated into the area after their native places where submerged due to the construction of Hirakud Dam.27 In general, the prevailing social order of the study areas has changed with the transformation of agriculture and the development of mining operations. Changes in occupations have also contributed to this change, especially the decline in traditional caste occupations. Consequently, the extinction of many traditional occupations has undermined to a certain degree caste differentiation.28 With the loss of land, traditional farm-labor arrangements have declined, in Samaleswari more than in Kalinga, where agriculture is still relevant to the local economy. In this case, as Jayaraman and Lanjouw (1999: 14) explain, “[w]here an area’s comparative advantage lies in agriculture…the traditional social order is less likely to change.” In general, long term relationships between employers and laborers have nevertheless decreased in both study areas, while more casual, nonpersonalized contracting and subcontracting in various sectors has increased. Historically, the caste hierarchy has been strong in Orissa. In fact, it was reported in 1872 that caste norms here were the most stringent in India (Lerche, 1991). Not surprisingly, the villages’ social structure has been, and remains, highly hierarchical. Three factors determine hierarchy within the villages in India: power, wealth and ritual prestige. These factors have never correlated perfectly, since, for instance, although the Brahmins have always been the highest in the ritual hierarchy, other castes have exercised power or have had access to wealth. Despite all the economic changes mentioned above, there are two lines of the ritual hierarchy that have proven to be more permanent: the line between Brahmin and all below, and the line between clean castes and the polluted (the untouchables or Harijans) (Neale, 1990). Inter-caste relations at the village level, and sociability in general, should thus be understood within the hierarchical order of castes. The degree of ritual purity or pollution of each caste is related to specific occupations.29 Specific exchanges of services and other obligations are derived from this, as made evident by the exchange relations that prevailed between farmers and the non-agricultural servicing castes (Lerche, 1991). A socio-religious network, the Jajmani system,30 is supposed to structure this caste-based division of labor at the village level.31 More importantly, according to Lerche, the Jajmani relations are highly impervious to change. Although changes occur due to industrial development, these are “transformational changes in the jajmani relations,” instead of complete breaks from the past. For example, land ownership was considered the cornerstone of wealth and status. Congruently, in addition to the dominance relations related to the purity-pollution caste hierarchy, Lerche identifies relations that

27 Samaleswari is actually located on the higher side of the Hirakud Dam. 28 As Jayaraman and Lanjouw (1999) report, a countertrend to the decrease in caste differentiation is a process called sankritization. This process takes place when upwardly mobile castes try to adhere more strictly to caste norms while adopting the norms of a higher caste than their own. This way, they aspire to gain a higher status, in addition to secular power. 29 The most important castes in Orissa have been the Brahmins, the Karans, the Khandayats and the Chasas. Their traditional occupations have been, respectively, priests and scholars, writers, landholders and warriors, and cultivators (Lerche, 1991). 30 The Jajmani system is not an indigenous category of Orissa. For Lerche (1991), an all-encompassing system of relations like the Jajmani system does not exist in Orissa. While some castes and some services fall within similar arrangement to this system, there are other types of relations that exist simultaneously. 31 As Lerche (1991) explains, traditional caste occupations are not an occupational straitjacket. Households may be engaged in other occupations than those assigned to them.

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centered on the dominant farming caste (or agrarian relations) between landowners – usually the dominant castes – and sharecroppers. Fixation on land ownership has diminished, and a new focus has been given in our study areas in particular to government employment and jobs in the coal company. The purity-pollution hierarchy is expressed in a number of norms regarding what a given person is allowed to do and not to do (e.g., eating rules, social interaction, etc.). The hierarchy from top to bottom establishes the Brahmins first, then the clean general castes, followed by the unclean general castes and at the bottom, the peripheral castes (including the Harijans). The strongest dividing line is between the peripheral castes and other castes. In general, the unclean general castes are considered as part of the village, while the peripheral castes are marginalized spatially and socially. They have to stay in hamlets of their own, located at an appropriate distance from the other villagers. Although untouchability practices are slowly changing, the Harijans still remain marginalized. Through the constitution of India, promulgated in 1950, the State assumed the special responsibility to promote the economic, social and educational advancement of the weaker groups in society. Those groups belonging to the lower levels of the caste system and persons of tribal origin were classified into separate and special schedules, with specific allocations to improve their lot. The scheduled castes (SCs) and scheduled tribes (STs) became thus officially identified as the most underprivileged groups in the country (World Bank, 1996). The constitution actually includes provisions for the amelioration and advancement of all ‘backward’ classes in general, although these classes are not precisely defined. In any case, in addition to the schedule tribes and schedule castes, some poor groups are thus classified as other backward classes (OBC). At the top of the hierarchy we found the general castes (GC), which do not enjoy any special provisions, as they are considered ‘socio-economically advanced.’32 Coal India Limited 33 Coal India is a public sector enterprise established in 1975. It is a large, complex and hierarchical organization, with certain imperviousness to change and obvious challenges regarding information flows and delegation of authority. It is structured as a holding company with eight subsidiaries, which operate with relative autonomy. Coal India is managed by a Board of Directors whose meetings are chaired by the Chairman of Coal India. Board members are selected by the Government and appointed by the President. Each subsidiary is managed by its own Board of Directors with a Chairman-cum-Managing Director as the Chief Executive, who reports to the Chairman, Coal India. A subsidiary has three levels of management: corporate level, area level and mine level. Respectively, each subsidiary is divided into a given number of areas under which there are a number of mines under operation and projects under implementation. For instance, Mahanadi Coalfields, which became a subsidiary company in 1992, has five areas.34 Coal India has about 490 mines under its command, of which about 140 are opencast operations. Opencast mining has been increasing relative to underground mines. Opencast mines are almost always cheaper and more efficient than underground mines for deposits that are close to the surface, and in the face of the increasing demand for coal, more practical since they can be built faster than underground ones.35 A difference relevant to our study is that opencast mines are not as labor intensive as underground ones, thus generating less direct employment opportunities for the local communities.

32 Under this category, we found the Brahmins, Kayastah and Rajput castes. 33 Unless stated otherwise, this information comes mainly from the two Staff Appraisal Reports prepared for the projects (see World Bank 1996 and 1997a) and related project preparation documents. 34 Samaleswari would fall under Ib Valley area, while Kalinga would fall under Kalinga Area in Talcher. 35 The land demand for mine infrastructure and protection against mine subsidence in an underground mine, however, is similar to that of an opencast mine that produces the same amount of coal.

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Importantly, also, is the fact that 70 percent of Coal India’s output goes to power stations, which are directly linked to specific mines. After the budget crisis of 1991, the Indian government started to phase out its financial support to Coal India, which subsequently faced a serious financial crisis. Coal India’s management decided then to restructure the company’s operations through the phasing out of loss-making mines, reduction of surplus labor and tightening of financial management. In 1992 Coal India requested World Bank’s assistance in its efforts to maintain financial viability while maintaining its investment plans in the absence of government support. In the short run, the main concern for the company was to manage to continue its investments, but in the long run there was an identified need for coal sector reform. Traditional Approach of Coal India to Communities Living in the Mining Areas Coal India is a coal company, and logically its management and officers across subsidiaries and mines see the production of coal as their primary mission. However, the company cannot ignore – at least for too long – the social and environmental issues that are intrinsic to producing coal in a given area. In the long run, the company becomes closely identified with the particular region where mining operations take place, to the extent that the mining areas themselves become implicitly company grounds, at least in the eyes of state and local government officials, and those living within their confines. The future of most of the individuals living in the mining areas becomes closely tied to the mining operations, through direct and indirect employment, or through the ways their lives are changed by the new social, economic and environmental conditions created by such operations. In turn a relationship of dependency and a sense of distrust tends to develop between the affected communities and the coal company, often simultaneously. Coal India operates across seven states, where the different subsidiary companies face particular state policies and regulations and a multitude of geographical, cultural and social contexts. Variegated social and environmental mitigation practices as well as ways to develop the coal company-community interface have emerged in response to these conditions. It has been difficult, as a result, to apply corporate-wide policies and procedures for addressing the needs of surrounding communities, including the critical issues related to resettlement and rehabilitation and community development.36 The establishment of the de facto company domain over a region starts with the decision to acquire land in areas where there are commercially exploitable coal resources. Coal India and its subsidiaries acquire the land for mining under the Land Acquisitions Act of 190437 and the Coal Bearing Areas Act of 1957.38 The greater percentage of the land, however, is obtained through the former. Acquisition of the land is compulsory, and the Land Acquisition Act requires that the company compensate all landowners, who should be timely notified that their land is going to be acquired.39 The interaction with the local population thus starts years before the actual mining operations begin. In fact, the ‘waiting’ period for many project-affected people ranges between 2 and 12 years. The District Collector – the main local authority in the area – decides on the final amount of compensation by comparing the claims of

36 Coal India formally initiated community development activities as a contribution to the national Twenty Point Program for Social Uplifting. The assistance provided has been mostly in the form of infrastructure improvements. 37 The Land Acquisition Act has been amended several times since its adoption. The last time this occurred was in 1984. 38 The Coal Bearing Areas Act is used less frequently because State Governments do not favor it. The reason for this is that it gives powers to the Ministry of Coal to acquire land without any involvement of the State Governments. 39 As per the Act, Landowners should receive as compensation the market value of their property, payment of 12 percent per annum interest on the market value from the date of preliminary notification to the date of award and a solatium of 30 percent of the market value given that the acquisition of the land was compulsory.

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landowners with more objective evidence such as records of sales of similar land in the area. Local labor is usually recruited early on by the company, mainly for semiskilled and unskilled jobs. The State and local governments tend to scale down their level of intervention in the mining areas. It is implicitly accepted by government agencies that the mining area’s development and particularly community development should be the responsibility of the coal company. The main challenge faced by Coal India and its subsidiaries is to strike a balance between the efforts to maintain, and as much as possible raise, the efficiency of the mining operations, while responding to the concerns of the communities that have fallen under their ‘administration.’40 With time, the centrality of the mine economy increases, especially since land acquisition and the demands for new services and products change dramatically the economic base of a region. Simultaneously, a number of ancillary industries develop. A more defined market economy emerges as traditional economic sectors, such as agriculture, and traditional forms of livelihood decline while more and more local people start working at the mine. Simultaneously, the company builds new infrastructure and improves the existing one to facilitate the movements of goods in and out of the mining areas, while carrying out community development activities in villages near the mines. Expectations and a sense of entitlement increase among local communities, which the company often tries to meet. Since most of these areas, at least initially, are isolated, a clear case of ‘enclave development’ takes place. As already mentioned, a relationship of dependency and sense of mistrust develops between the communities and the company. The most worrisome aspect of this outcome is that it is always known that the coal company will eventually leave the area.41 The coal company is only considered the custodian of the land acquired under either of the Acts mentioned above, not the owner. It is thus expected that the land will be returned to the respective State government after mining operations have been completed and the area has been restored, without Coal India receiving any compensation. Up to the early 1990s, Coal India’s main approach to rehabilitate fully the landowners was to offer employment in the mines, often, as we were told in Mahanadi Coalfields, ‘beyond the labor requirements of the mines.’ The most common practice has been to offer one job per two acres of irrigated land or per three acres of unirrigated land lost. With wages higher by 8 to 10 times the minimum wage, offers of employment have been readily accepted by most of the project-affected families. In the long run, this practice has led to overstaffing of unskilled workers. The phasing out of budgetary support from the government and the shift toward opencast mining have contributed to make this overstaffing critical (as we see in the next section, other means of compensation had to be identified in addition to jobs in the mines). The World Bank-financed Projects The goal of the Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (CSRP) is to assist Coal India in its efforts to make coal production more efficient and financially sound. The project was approved by the World Bank in September 1997, and its expected closing date is June 2003. Total project cost was estimated at over US$1.6 billion. The Bank is financing about US$530 million, while The Export Import Bank of Japan is providing financing for about US$500 million.42 A total of 25 opencast mines are included in the project. Specifically, through the investment component, the Bank loan is financing the cost of a large fleet of heavy earth-moving equipment for replacement at 15 mines, for expansion at 6 mines, and for completion of construction in progress in the rest of the selected mines. This is a high profile project due to concerns that India’s coal-based energy strategy might lead to local and regional pollution of

40 Just to have an idea of the magnitude of the task facing Coal India, it is worth mentioning that the mines are ‘…spread over 30 districts of different states in India, approximately covering 2000 villages…” (Singh, 1995). 41 The usual active life of an opencast mine is between 25 to 30 years. 42 Additional funds came from internal resources and local borrowing by Coal India.

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land, air and water, to long-term global climate change through emission of greenhouse gases, and to high social impacts on local communities.43 In addition to the mandatory environmental and social safeguards (included under the Social and Environmental Project), the CSRP also supports coal sector reform and the restructuring of Coal India through technical assistance and training. The Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project (ESMP), approved in May 1996, is a counter-part of the CSRP, and both projects are linked by legally binding cross-conditionalities. Implementation activities of the project should be finished by June 2001. As a complement to the CSRP, this project supports Coal India’s efforts to make its production more environmentally and socially sustainable, while ensuring that any possible negative effects of coal mining expansion are alleviated. Total project cost was estimated at US$84 million, of which the World Bank is financing US$63.3 million. Specifically, project objectives are: (i) to enhance Coal India’s capacity to deal more effectively with environmental and social issues; (ii) to assist Coal India in the implementation of appropriate policies for environmental and social mitigation; and (iii) to test the effectiveness of these policies. Accordingly, an important change induced by the project, and key for our analysis, is the adoption of a new corporate resettlement and rehabilitation policy and the revision of the community development guidelines by Coal India, which eventually should cover all subsidiaries and their respective mining operations.44 The ESMP was approved and commenced before the investment project (CSRP) was approved in order to help Coal India prepare better in dealing with the identified social and environmental mitigation issues, and to give the company enough leading time to set up all the necessary human and physical resources to carry out these type of activities. The mines under World Bank-financing can thus be considered as ‘testing ground’ for a totally new approach on the part of the company to address social and environmental issues that are inherent to coal mining, especially opencast operations. The project has basically been envisioned as a process through which Coal India should learn important lessons, and internalize them into its daily operations, while refining by practicing its revised policies and procedures regarding social and environmental matters. To put it briefly, it is a necessary process of experimentation to improve company practices and interface with the concerned communities. Although the number of mines included in the project is relatively small, the project is expected to have a broad impact across all subsidiaries and mines. During the project implementation period, however, some confusion is deemed to arise as there are areas, such as in Ib Valley and Talcher in Orissa, where World Bank-financed mines co-exist with those not selected, and neighboring communities are being treated differently under presumably similar conditions. At the same time, the mines selected under the project are not completely new operations. As such, they are not ‘greenfields’ where the company is intervening for the first time. Dealings with the communities were started many years ago under different circumstances and by following the traditional practices of the company. Again, this is deemed to have some effects in social capital resources as communities may have already developed certain expectations and ways of dealing with officers of Coal India and its subsidiaries. From the changes induced by the projects, particular interventions emerge which are likely to have also a series of effects in the social capital resources of individuals living in the mining areas with World Bank-financed mines, including Samaleswari. These are discussed below. 43 Early estimates indicated that about 16,000 persons would be affected by the project, of whom about 10,000 would have to be resettled. Total number of people entitled to rehabilitation assistance was estimated at about 9,200. 44 Traditionally, mining operations have had to comply with Indian environmental legislation and rules and conditions included in the environmental clearances given by Ministry of Environment and Forest and State Pollution Control Boards. The two Bank-financed projects had to comply also with the Bank’s Operational Directives on Environmental Assessment (OD4.20); Involuntary Resettlement (OD4.30); and Indigenous Peoples (OD4.20). The new resettlement and rehabilitation policy was approved by Coal India’s Board in 1994.

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(a) Establishment of new cadres of environmental officers and community development / resettlement and rehabilitation officers. Before, Coal India did not have staff specializing in social issues and community development, and did not use to consult systematically the affected communities or engage in any form of participatory planning or community-based project implementation.

(b) Promotion of community groups (village working groups) to undertake community

development activities, including mandatory contributions of community members in capital or labor. Before, community development was ad hoc and the assets provided by the company given to the beneficiaries absolutely free.

(c) Preparation, with community inputs, of annual resettlement and rehabilitation plans and

indigenous peoples development plans (i.e., community development plans). (d) Creation of a Community Development Council to approve the community development plans

and to allocate the budget, including representatives of the subsidiary, local government, NGO, and communities.

(e) Contracting a NGO to mediate between the company and the communities in order to facilitate

community participation and implementation of social mitigation measures. Further relevant details of the social aspects of the project are explained below: (a) The New Corporate Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation recognizes adult individuals

(over 18 years old at the moment of base-line survey – 1994 in the case of Samaleswari) as the unit of entitlement. These individuals are recognized as the entitled project-affected persons, who depending on their category will receive a compensation package. As mentioned before, in Samaleswari there are about 938 individuals recognized as such. Both landowners and landless people are considered for compensation under the policy. Landowners include individuals with legal title to their properties as well as those cultivating land under traditional rights, while landless include sharecroppers, land lessees, tenants, day laborers and tribals dependent on forest produce. Villages to be relocated are categorized as “RAP” villages. The resettlement and rehabilitation action plans or RAPs (basically implementation plans of the resettlement and rehabilitation activities) will have to be prepared every year during project implementation. The compensation package includes support for income restoration in terms of training for self-employment since now the practice of offering jobs as means of compensation has been curtailed. Employment with the coal company, however, may be offered when feasible. Moreover, the company offers the option of helping the project-affected people purchase equivalent replacement land, if they choose to do so.

(b) The intended beneficiaries of the indigenous peoples development plans are communities living

within the mine’s area of influence. In other words, all villages and their respective habitations within one kilometer from the boundary of the mine and its entire infrastructure become designated as IPDP villages. The compensation offered is at the community level. No individual entitlements are considered under the IPDP. The IPDP or community development plans should reflect community needs and priorities regarding physical and social infrastructure, and may also include community activities such as agro-forestry, afforestation, watershed management, etc. as well as training for self-employment. It is expected that the communities themselves will implement the IPDPs, which will have to be prepared annually during the project implementation period. Village working groups have been created to lead this effort, while a Community Development Council will approve the plans and allocate the budgets for their implementation.

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IV – CONCEPTUAL APPROACH Conceptualization of Social Capital Prima facie, from a sociological perspective, the concept of social capital seems to recast the long acknowledged relevance of group life and sociability for social order. Moreover, the study of social movements and collective action has long required social scientists to pay attention to issues of cooperation, social cohesion and conflict. In general, however, the tendency among sociologists has been to oversocialize individuals’ actions. Conversely, economics has tended to undersocialize these actions (Granovetter, 1985). The work on social capital of Putnam’s (1993a, 1995), Coleman’s (1990, 1988) and Bourdieu’s (1986), among others, seems to provide some new conceptual and analytical elements to balance this situation. Their work is valuable in the sense that it provides new and relevant insights to narrowly constructed economic models whose limitations in explaining social and political behavior of individuals and groups have long been evident but not dealt with properly. In fact, we believe, their work contributes significantly to the effort to overcome these limitations by integrating nonmarket factors into the analysis of political and economic life.45 Coleman’s (1988: S98) defines social capital as “a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure.” Edwards and Foley (1997) correctly state that this functional definition, which in simple terms implies that social capital would be anything that facilitates individual or collective actions, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to separate what social capital actually is from what it does. As a departure point, this definition is valuable nevertheless in that it gives us the opportunity to conceptualize social capital as a social and relational resource inherent to social networks and social organization. Moreover, by defining social capital functionally in terms of relational or structural factors, it becomes clear that social capital resources are highly context-dependent and time-bound.46 Indeed, what may be social capital in one context, may not be so in a different one; what facilitates action under some historical circumstances may not do so under different ones. The realization of social capital in any of its forms depends on specific contexts (Edwards and Foley, 1998). To put it differently, the phenomena described by the concept of social capital are not ahistorical and universal.47 Social capital phenomena are intangible, highly dynamic and in constant transformation. Given these characteristics, to operationalize and measure the concept within and across settings and time is not an easy and unambiguous task.48 Similarly, according to Edwards and Foley (1998), it would also be misleading to assume that individual traits such as tolerance, trust or membership in associations are consistent indicators of social capital independent of context. Coleman’s definition is also valuable in that it includes vertical and horizontal articulations of individuals, groups, associations and organizations. Following Coleman (1990: 302), we argue that social capital refers to social-structural resources, and that “unlike other forms of capital, social capital

45 See Lenci (1997) for a valuable discussion on the ‘reconvergence’ of economics and sociology. 46 Context understood not simply as background, but as John (1996) does, as a ‘condition of possibility’ of our initiatives. In her words, “as something constitutive” (p. 3071). 47 See Booth and Richard (1998) for a study that empirically corroborates the point that context matters. The study compares different political contexts (from less to more repressive) in six Central American countries, and finds, for example, that the political context affects the formation of social and political capital. 48 In this respect, Edwards and Foley (1998: 131) point out, “…if social capital is…context specific…then it can not be measured in extant longitudinal survey data like the General Social Survey.” They clarify that they are not arguing that fundamental questions on social capital are beyond longitudinal survey research of individuals. However, they contend that correcting the situation requires far more than writing better questions for this type of surveys.

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inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons.” Even when focused at the local level, our analysis recognizes the traces of macro-structural cultural and economic factors when exploring social capital in the “micro-processes” of everyday and associational life. Indeed, we depart from the premise that everyday (economic and non-economic) associational life and social structure are encoded in each other. This is to which, from a narrower perspective Granovetter (1985) refers to as the embeddedness of economic action in social structure. This approach makes it necessary to “…simultaneously recognize the imprint of social structure in people’s daily lives…and the intersubjectively constitutive nature of overarching structure” (Agger, 1992: 71). Social capital is nested in structures and not within individuals. Social capital fills the social space surrounding an individual or a group of people, since it is intrinsic to the social structure in which the relationships of individuals and groups are embedded. In this respect, albeit the effects of social capital may be observable at the individual level, social capital cannot be reduced to a group of properties possessed by a given individual (Bourdieu, 1986). This is a key difference that Coleman emphasized between human and social capital. The former is embodied in individuals, and is “portable” in the sense that as people move across different social contexts, their human capital goes with them, while their social capital remains embedded in its structural context (Edwards and Foley, 1998). While human capital is related to individual ability, social capital refers to opportunity (Burt, 1997). Social capital is inalienable, or as Astone et al. (1998) explain, it cannot be purposely exchanged with or given to another person. It is inherited, at least in its initial forms and levels, through the social location and the family and kinship relations one is born into.49 These assumptions clearly indicate that we cannot ignore the role of social structures in influencing the scope for individual agency in creating, recreating and accessing social capital. Social capital cannot be defined exclusively in structural terms. Social capital, even when given a structural sense, implies cultural elements (i.e., expectations, obligations, trust) that are embedded in structure, but that can not be completely explained by it (Edwards and Foley, 1997). There is an important cultural component that is in a way appropriated by individuals, but that is not an attribute of individuals.50 Norms and values may be internalized or be external (Coleman, 1990). As Coleman explains, externally, norms and values represent “guidelines” on how one must behave or claim to believe to be accepted in a given context. This is what Grief (1994) identifies as the “rational cultural beliefs” that comprise the expectations of an individual with regard to the actions that others might take under various circumstances. Due to their implicit cultural component, some memberships – albeit it cannot be argued that all – are imbued with a ‘value added’ that enables the access to social capital by individuals who identify with or are members in a group or even some more transcendent collectivity. According to Edwards and Folley (1997), this value added is the content of the relationship, that is, its meaning. This additional cultural component originates from the social context framing the relations. Hence, it constitutes a sociocultural component of social capital that “provides the context within which it acquires meaning and becomes available to individuals or groups in a way that can facilitate an individual or collective action not otherwise possible” (p.670-71). To avoid social-psychological

49 According to Bourdieu (1986), privileged groups can reproduce their privileges through the intergenerational transfer of social and cultural capital to their descendants. 50 This point is related to the central sociological issue of agency and structure, and the extent of relative freedom and room for action of individuals within a given society. As Edwards and Foley (1997) explain, it is important to avoid oversimplifying the concept of social capital by assuming that it is reducible to either structure or culture. In their words, social capital often “…has been oversimplified and reduced to an older conceptualization of culture as the ideas, values, and attitudes that get internalized through a socialization process that resembles a sponge soaking water” (p. 670). The latter is directly related to the tendency to take over-socialized views of individual behavior, whereby it is assumed that the ‘socialization process,’ through which individuals internalize ideas, values and attitudes, is more than successful in shaping social behavior. Little room for agency is thus left, under the assumption that individuals come to embody the culture, norms and values of their society, and that their responses to everyday life are mostly mechanical.

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reductionism and cultural relativism, it may be analytically advisable, as Edwards and Foley (1998) also recommend, to consider norms of reciprocity and trust as part of ‘cultural capital’ in the sense described by Bourdieu (1986). Moreover, to achieve a more complete understanding of social capital, in addition to cultural capital, it should be considered along with other forms of capital, such as financial capital and human capital. For our current effort, this assumption implies the need to identify and analyze of the various sorts of social and cultural resources supporting a given political and economic system. Social capital cannot be assumed to be an exclusive quality of groups, but rather it must be defined as encompassing the wide spectrum of associational life, and including face-to-face and virtual interaction. Several problems emerge when social capital is conceptualized as an attribute of a group. As Astone and colleagues (1998) explain, the relationships that take place outside groups and the resources that these individuals can access through these relationships are neglected. This is misleading in two counts: first, because people have many relationships that are outside the context of groups; second, people keep relationships with others that they may have met in a group after the group have disappeared or they have separated from it. Many of these “weak” ties can be substantial sources of social capital (Granovetter, 1973). In this sense, participation levels, or associational membership levels, turn out to be crude measures of social capital. Moreover, even in the case of groups, these type of associational measurements do not probe into the depth given by the characteristics of the groups and the structure of the relations between their members.51 Moreover, the assumption of group-based interaction as the basis for defining social capital has the intrinsic bias of enshrining membership as always preferable to alienation or isolation (Wolfe, 1998).52 It follows from above that neither an individual nor a group of individuals ever actually “possesses” social capital. Social capital may perhaps be more precisely defined as a social (common) resource that facilitates and/or hinders individual access to other social, economic and natural resources. Through specific actions, people can achieve certain ends, which may make social capital productive and at times destructive. Social capital requires mutuality and reciprocity. However power relations that tend to be, under market conditions asymmetrical, mediate mutuality and reciprocity (Bourdieu, 1998). As such, the political variable (Tornquist, 1998) and the balance of power relations (Molinas, 1998) should be a central part of any conceptualization of social capital.53 Sources (the Width) of Social Capital A theory that satisfactorily identifies the mechanisms of production, maintenance and growth of social capital is still missing. A significant amount of research has been undertaken on the implications of possessing social capital or not,54 while much more is needed on how social capital is produced (Astone et al., 1998). Associational life certainly generates mutual trust, habits for cooperation and participation, and social networks. Retaking Edwards and Folley’s (1997) argument, however, when social capital is approached solely in structural terms, if operationalized as memberships for instance, there is a tendency

51 For an interesting ethnographic analysis focusing on this issue see Eastis (1998). 52 As Wolfe (1998: 39) puts it, “[t]the problem is not just that group membership can be bad. It is also that alienation and solitariness can sometimes be good.” 53 Precisely one of the main criticisms raised by Tornquist (1998), is that the civil society / social capital paradigm, as developed recently, has neglected the central issue of power relations. Conflicts over power, however, with respect to class and gender for example, and differences related to ethnicity or religion are, according to Tornquist, “absolutely fundamental.” Issues of power were already central to Bourdieu’s (1986) original definition of social capital. 54 A significant amount of work has been carried out in this respect in the area of ethnic entrepreneurship and immigrant studies. See, for example, Portes and Zhou (1996).

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to assume that membership in itself is what produces social capital.55 It would also be too simplistic to assume that association is what makes social capital available to individuals and collectivities, “as if simple dyadic relations themselves “produce” social capital” (p. 670). An obvious difficulty is that many formal and informal interactions between members of a society can foster social capital, even though the full spectrum of these interactions is not readily observable (Stolle and Rochon, 1998). Putnam’s (1993a: 170) assertion that “trust is an essential component of social capital” given that it “lubricates cooperation” may be a valid yet still too general departure point in the search for the sources of social capital. Putnam’s analysis and the analyses of those following his approach have mostly focused on trust among persons (e.g., interpersonal trust). Nevertheless there are other kinds of trust that are also as relevant (Levi, 1996; Williamson, 1993). Williamson, for instance, without being exhaustive, distinguishes among three types of trust: calculative trust, personal trust and institutional trust. Personal trust may be a pre-requisite of cooperative relations and related collective action, but particular forms of government intervention for example can give way to economic cooperation, often independent of trust (Edwards and Foley, 1997).56 When traditional social structures are weak, the socializing role of state institutions to generate trust is of even more particular relevance. In this case, the state may be needed to instill norms and values regarding community and democratic participation that can be shared by members of civil society and foster associations (Whittington, 1998). Social capital, as defined here, is intrinsic to and – to varying degrees – an outcome of the institutionalization of social relationships in social structure. Most of social capital can be considered a common resource. As a result, although specific social actors (e.g., business organizations or voluntary associations) might intentionally create social capital, it may also be produced or destroyed as a result of other activities.57 It is not costless to produce social capital, however there are few data on the cost to individuals of purposely “producing” it. Moreover, the need and the cost to produce it – to invest in social capital (Astone et al., 1998) – is not universally the same. The capacity of civil society in general to produce (and destroy) social capital is influenced in many important ways by the sociopolitical and economic context and the opportunities it affords to different actors (Booth and Richard, 1998; Fox, 1996). In this respect, the presence and density of networks of connections and of civic associations is not a social given (Bourdieu, 1986). Rather, as Bourdieu argues, these are the products of continuous efforts, of willing and unwilling individual and collective “investment strategies” directed at producing or reproducing social relationships that maybe useful in the short or long term. The result is that the contingent element of relations (such as those of neighborhood, village, workplace) is transformed into relationships that are simultaneously necessary and elective. Greif (1994) presents an interesting argument in this respect: based on empirical evidence indicating the high correlation between societal organization and per capita income, most developing countries would tend to be “collectivist” while most developed countries would be “individualistic.”58 In a collectivist society, the social structure is highly fragmented, with individuals interacting socially and economically

55 There is another analytical limitation implied by this assumption, in the sense that associational membership is given a major socialization function in the production of “good” citizens. 56 This issue is further complicated by the fact that the role and reach of the state, which is a key structural arena within which collective action is situated and carried out, is undergoing a major transformation due to globalization and decentralization trends (Cerny, 1995). As Cerny explains, such transformation has dramatic implications for the logic of collective action. 57 To quote Coleman (1990: 317), “Social capital is an important resource for individuals and can greatly affect their ability to act and their perceived quality of life. They have the capability of bringing such capital into being. Yet because many of the benefits of actions that bring social capital into being are experienced by persons other than the person so acting, it is not to that person’s interest to bring it into being. The result is that most forms of social capital are created or destroyed as a by-product of other activities.” 58 As is the case with any category, any society will have individualistic and collectivist elements, but some type of elements may be more prevalent.

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mainly with members of a particular ethnic, religious or familial group, and where contract enforcement is primarily expected through informal institutions. Noncooperation is the main characteristic of inter-group horizontal interaction. In an individualistic society, the social structure is more integrated, with people conducting social and economic transactions across different groups. There is also higher mobility across groups, and contract enforcement is achieved mainly through specialized organizations. Individual self-reliance is highly valued. With this in mind, it is possible to argue that the supply and demand of social capital will change with time, as it is heavily dependent on the organization of a society.59 As Grief explains, “[t]he organization of society…determines the cost of various feasible actions as well as wealth distribution” (p. 913). The conditions for social interaction would be different at various stages of development, and so would be the need for specific forms of social capital, the capacity to produce them, and the effectiveness of the investment strategies referred to above. Similarly, the need for and the terms of cooperation, as well as the costs and benefits of collective action would also vary. Arguably, as individual self-reliance increases and contract enforcement mechanisms (i.e., social trust) become more reliable, social interaction in the context of groups will acquire a pure voluntary meaning, and the need to invest intentionally in social capital will most probably lessen.60 This, on the other hand, does not mean that the need for collective action diminishes. Since it is not feasible to establish with certainty what the optimum levels of social capital for the well functioning of a society should be at a given time, it would be very difficult to establish whether a decline in associational activity is a positive or negative sign in itself. It may be possible, for instance that an apparent low level of social capital is what is needed under certain historical circumstances. It may also be the case that the more social capital available the better (Woolcock, 1997), although as Rose et al. (1997) show, it is also possible to have too much of it. What is certain to exist is a gap given that some of the primordial forms of social organization tend to disappear, but all the needed new and more adequate forms will not be spontaneously constructed (Coleman, 1993). The critical issue is to determine what are the factors and agents that help create or that destroy social capital, and what are the policies and actors best suited to promote social capital.61 Putnam (1993a), in particular, emphasizes the historical and society-driven nature of the process of social capital accumulation by asserting that social capital results from ‘path-dependent’ historical legacies. In a way, according to this assertion, social capital is a “natural” socio-historical by-product, especially since no agents of change are evident in Putnam’s initial study of Italy (Tornquist, 1998). For Fukuyama (1995), the roots of social capital seemed to lie in centuries of cultural evolution. By this rationale, however, deliberate strategies and intervention would not create social capital (Fox, 1996).62

59 Grief (1994: 913) defines the organization of a society as “its economic, legal, political, social, and moral enforcement institutions, together with its social constructs and information transmission and coordination mechanisms.” 60 Interestingly, Grief’s findings indicate that the individualistic system is more efficient in the long run. Individualistic cultural beliefs foster the development of formal enforcement institutions, which support anonymous exchange that facilitates economic development. Moreover, an individualistic society translates into less social pressure to conform to social norms of behavior thereby fostering initiative and innovation. 61 These are important assumptions that must counteract the romantic idealism that underlies the notion of social capital, which is the yearning for “community” and its mediating structures that together maintain the social fabric. This idealism can justify different, and indeed contradictory policy measures (Woolcock, 1997). Arguments such as Fukuyama’s (1995), for instance, imply that the degree of state intervention in the economy is inversely proportional to the levels of social capital in a society. Not only is the state a major contributor to the destruction of social capital under this notion, but also completely unsuited to foster it. Conversely, Putnam (1995a) argues that social capital is, if anything, correlated positively with the size of the state. 62 Fox’s (1996) research in rural areas in Mexico indicates that the process through which social capital thickens in a society is actually highly dynamic. In the case of Mexico, “[f]or more than two decades, indigenous

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In addition to Fox, several authors (e.g., Tendler and Freedheim, 1994) argue that social capital can be intentionally created to foster political and economic development. Fox, based on empirical research in Mexico, found various causal pathways for social capital accumulation, through the joint production or coproduction by different actors such as state reformists and local societal groups and local groups and external allies (religious, developmental, political, etc), and independent or bottom up production through autonomous local social, civic or political/electoral initiatives (in the absence of external support). In the end, Fox concludes, “…historical legacies are woven deeply into social fabrics, but those imprints are not necessarily fixed by history” (p.1098). In this respect, Tornquist (1998) provides the example of Kerala, India. Here, a strong (leftist) movement has its roots in the former British Malabar in the North, which is a region with much less civil society and social capital than in the former princely states of Cochin and Travancore in the South. Through a combination of state intervention and popular pressure, this movement has managed to implement the most consistent statewide land reform in India, and facilitated the creation of more civic communities in the formerly feudal North than in the South, which had historically had higher levels of social capital. One of the main issues to be grasped is how social trust – trust among people lacking intimate knowledge of each other – develops and is maintained in a society. Allegedly, a crucial benefit of interpersonal trust generated by associational membership is that it fosters a society in which all kinds of cooperation are made possible thanks to the emergence of a generalized social trust. This generalized trust is supposed to extend beyond the boundaries of kinship and friendship, even beyond acquaintances. For Putnam (1993a), trust has two sources: norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Participation in dense networks that allow horizontal interaction of relative equals would engender norms of reciprocity, would help define sanctions, would facilitate dissemination of information about others, and would create a ‘culturally-based template’ for future cooperation. As Putnam (1993a: 111) explains, “[c]ollective life in the civic regions is eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others will, you are more likely to go along, too, thus fulfilling their expectations.” The focus of many studies, however, has been participation on secondary (or rather tertiary) associations such as soccer clubs, bowling leagues and bird watching societies. It has been difficult, as a result, to determine the connection between these types of memberships and the emergence of generalized trust. Granovetter (1985) argues that trust in society emerges also – and according to him, mainly – from social relations. Indeed, for Granovetter, most behaviors are tightly embedded in networks of interpersonal relations. Concurrently, his ‘embeddedness argument’ emphasizes the role of concrete personal relations and the structures of these relations in engendering trust and discouraging or facilitating malfeasance. Conversely, for Levi (1996), the trust that emerges at the level of intermediate associations may not be sufficient to produce generalized social trust, while it is likely that state institutions can also provide the basis for generalized trust.63 In their search for the causes and consequences of social capital, Brehm and Rahn (1997) allow the “flow of causality” between trust and confidence in institutions to be bi-directional. For these authors, trust in government may be either a special case of trust in humankind – a generalization of interpersonal trust that breeds confidence in government – or as Levi (1996) argues, confidence in governmental institutions can potentially generate, restore (or undermine) levels of interpersonal trust. Evidence from comparative research indicates strongly that trust in other people and democratic institutions go hand in hand, 64 while Brehm and Rahn’s findings tend to support Levi’s argument.65 At

organizations have been coming together from below and then been dismantled from above…” (p. 1093). A very uneven map has resulted, with extreme variations of the relative ‘thickness’ of civil society in indigenous areas. 63 Under certain circumstances, state institutions can provide if not better, at least the required complementary basis for the emergence of generalized trust. 64 See for example, Muller and Seligson (1994).

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the same time, there are associations that develop trust and cooperation within the group, but do not increase generalized trust in other members of society and may actually increase in-group solidarity at the expense of public civicness (Stolle and Rochon, 1998).66 The Mafia in Italy would be a good example of this type of association (Lenci, 1997).67 For Stolle and Rochon, those associations which foster trust, cooperation and norms of reciprocity beyond the boundaries of the group itself, generating what they call ‘public social capital’ (i.e. generalized interpersonal trust) are the most relevant ones. It would be advisable, in this regard, to measure the degree to which different associations contribute to foster generalized trust, especially since not all associations have the same capacity to contribute to social capital. Correspondingly, it can be expected that associations that bridge major social categories will foster generalized social trust more effectively (Putnam, 1995a).68 Some degree of general trust must operate in society, since institutional arrangements alone would not curtail force or fraud. The source of trust is often found in the existence of a ‘generalized morality.’ Kenneth Arrow (cited in Granovetter, 1985: 489) states that societies “have developed implicit agreements to certain kinds of regards for others, agreements which are essential to the survival of the society or at least contribute greatly to the efficiency of its working.” Similarly, morality, from the perspective of contractualism, “represents a social contract of some kind, an agreement to abide by various rules for the regulation of communal behavior” (McGinn, 1999: 34). We thus agree that a sense of generalized morality must be present in most societies, which in conjunction with institutional arrangements, engenders trust and facilitates social exchange. There is certainly a process of value introjection, as Portes (1998) explains. It must be noted, again, that human beings are not over-socialized to the extreme that they obediently follow the dictates of available systems of norms and values internalized through the process of socialization that results in a generalized morality that presumably maintains social order (Granovetter, 1985). However, at the level of a specific collectivity, it is possible to argue that there is a significant degree to which trust is enhanced by the power of generalized morality and supported by existing institutions.69 Following Grief (1994: 943), institutions can be defined as composed of two interconnected elements: cultural beliefs (“how individuals expect others to act in various contingencies”) and organizations (“endogenous human constructs that alter the rules of the game”). At the same time, generalized social trust cannot be assumed to be the necessary condition for a healthy society. Depending on the context, distrust in government and particular institutions may be essential to ensure democratic outcomes. Recognizing the conflictive or even divisive tendencies of certain groups should not translate in the assumption that associational 65 Brehm and Rahn, however, conclude that “social capital may be as much a consequence of confidence in institutions as the reverse.” (p. 1018). 66 These authors distinguish between public civicness (outward orientation that facilitates generalized interpersonal trust in society at large) and private or personalized civicness (inwardly directed to one’s immediate circle such as family or fellow members of a voluntary association). It is possible that associations generate both kinds of civicness in different degrees. 67 According to Lanci (1997: 3), social capital can be based on trust, and can also be the “…the last resort in an environment where there is a lack of it.” Based on Gambetta’s analysis of the Mafia in Italy, Lanci explains how “…the mafioso acts as a broker between the seller and the buyer, thus replacing mutual trust” (pp. 3-4). The mafioso provides a guarantee to the buyer that she or he will not be cheated in her transaction. Simultaneously, this guarantee would not exist without a certain degree of social capital. That is, without a connection with the right person (e.g., the mafioso). As Gambetta concludes, the mafioso is interested in ‘regulated injections of distrust’ into the market, which increases the demand and value of the product he offers – protection. 68 Putnam actually distinguishes between bridging and bonding social capital (1993a). Bonding capital is limited to groups with similar characteristics and may enhance social divisions. 69 This is similar, in a broader way, to what Portes (1998) calls “enforceable trust” whereby the expectation of the repayment of a deed or good is not based on intimate knowledge of the recipient, but on the embeddedness of both actors in the social structure. As such, the donor’s returns, instead of always coming directly or totally from the recipient, come also from the collectivity-at-large in the form of status, honor, and approval (incentives) and the risk of possible dishonor, loss of status and disapproval (disincentives or negative incentives).

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membership in those groups bringing stability and harmony to the system is beneficial in itself, or that these latter groups are the main source of “good” civic engagement (Wolfe, 1998).70 According to Levi (1996: 47), trust, from a behavioral approach, could be defined as “an action taken in a risky situation but in which there is a reason to believe in the person being trusted. The sources for this belief are varied (actual knowledge, institutional sanctions, faith in one’s own judgements, etc.), but all entail relatively light costs to the individual who decides to trust.” Cognitive mechanisms certainly would play a role in this. For Dunn (1988), trust is both a ‘human passion’ and a ‘modality of human action.’ As a human passion, it represents the confidence placed on the expectations regarding the benign intentions of other social agents. As a modality of action, trust is always strategic, and entails a more or less consciously decided policy for dealing with the freedom of others. These categories would correspond to what Williamson (1993) refers to as ‘personal trust’ and ‘calculative trust.’ However, Levi (1996) clarifies, it is more likely that generalized trust will emerge more as a result of the experiences and institutions outside the small associations than from membership to them. Ethnicity, religion, or some other shared value usually defines interactions among groups. The dispositions of social actors are not completely universal, but tend to be bounded by the limits of their communities. Identification with one’s group, sect or community can be a powerful motivational force (Portes, 1998).71 In Levi’s words, however, “[s]hared values signal who to trust and distrust, institutions ensure that commitments are credible by making sanctions quasi-automatic, and incentives structure the choices of the players” (p. 48). In other words, the existence of consistent and well-designed political, social and economic institutions allow individuals to economize in personal trust (Dunn, 1988). Expressed in simple terms, confidence in ‘the system’ will most probably enhance trust in others, as it would seem less risky (i.e. less costly) to cooperate with others. State institutions can play a crucial role in laying out the basis of generalized trust (Levi, 1996). 72 Civil society has often been used as a descriptive and a prescriptive term, containing both everything that is not the state and a paradigmatic set of inherently democratic values (Whittington, 1998; Tornquist, 1998; Hyden, 1997). Underneath this belief lies the notion that robust civic societies (or in Putnamian sense, dense networks of civic engagement) alone make for good government and democratic participation in development, and more importantly, that institutions of civic society, and organizations such as NGOs, are independent of government.73 In the words of Rieff (1999, 14), “[w]hat has been misplaced is the belief that a network of associations could accomplish what states could not.” 74 The room for agency of civic associations soon reaches a limit, however, since in the final analysis it is the

70 In the words of Wolfe (1998: 40), “[w]hat matters is not the quantity of private associations in civil society. What matters is what those associations do.” 71 This is a source of social capital described by Portes (1998) as bounded solidarity. 72 It is clear, however, that with globalization a significant transformation has occurred regarding the structure of public goods, which makes their pursuit and provision by the nation-state highly problematic (Cerny, 1995). The state faces different challenges and opportunities regarding the supply or fostering of any kind of public goods, especially regulatory public goods, through which a ‘workable market framework’ is established to facilitate the operation of the system as a whole and to foster generalized trust. Of course, as Cerny adds, the state also faces problematic issues regarding productive/distributive and redistributive public goods. 73 This is one of the most prevalent views of civil society that Hyden (1997) identifies with the ‘Associational School’ that is so popular in the United States. Advocates of this school possess a high expectation regarding the role that civil society can play in achieving democracy and supporting development, a point also reflected in Putnam’s work. Hyden groups the views on civil society into three other schools: the Regime school, the Neo-liberal school and the Post-Marxist school. 74 Much more analysis, beyond the limits of this paper, is required regarding the requirements and concomitants of organization outside the state. We agree with Harriss and De Renzio (1997: 931), however, that “only more substantial investigation would show up what the directions of causality are between local organization and government.”

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state that has the ability or the potential to establish the rule of law or democracy through elections and legislation.75 Social capital is not merely limited to dense networks of strong (face-to-face) relationships (Edwards and Foley, 1997).76 As they explain, membership may refer to formal memberships in specific groups or intermediate associations, and to the “symbolically mediated affiliations or identification” engendered by a more abstract type of trust, which Newton (1997) specifically refers to as “abstract trust.” Under this assumption, the content or meaning of affiliations is influenced, perhaps to a large degree, by the historical context in which these affiliations are embedded, including myriad social, economic, political and cultural elements. This type of membership, informal and undeclared in many cases, transcends geography and face-to-face interaction, as it is linked with the existence of national and/or global ‘imagined’ communities.77 This type of trust Edwards and Foley clarify, is not based on shared identity, but on the appropriation of similar ‘cultural reserves.’ This is an intersubjective practice in which similar sociocultural capital and the experience of accessing common symbolic resources are shared to build individual identities with an affiliation to an imagined community.78 Community is both a contested concept and a utopia. As such, it has two connotations. A semantic sense, in which the definition of community describes a type of human association. And, a poetic sense that constitutes an ideal mythical form (Gustfield, 1975). The concept is given various emphases: territorial – when given a spatial location – and/or relational – when based on the nature of human relationships. Underpinning the tendency to assimilate community to a particular territory is the notion that the small and local geographical setting is the ideal locus for communal relationships. A “common territory” has been assumed to be instrumental for the development of “communal sentiment” (Gusfield, 1975), or “the basic harmony of interests and opinions” (Conyers, 1982), especially since the existence of the latter has been assumed as essential to the emergence of “community.” Consequently, community has been defined as “…the strong bond of human connection and identity that people experience with respect to neighborhood and place” (Plotkin, 1991: 8). There are several problems with the assumption that face-to-face relations are so fundamental to the emergence of community. This assumption misleadingly provides the illusion of unmediated social relations, while implying an ideal society of small decentralized units (Young, 1986). Much social interaction takes place over time and space. As such, face-to-face interaction cannot be privileged over non-face-to-face interaction. Face-to-face relations have some particular value, and that should be recognized. Nevertheless this value cannot be taken for granted or given a priori primacy. Communities can be timeless and placeless (Fisher, 1992). Granted, physical space encourages community “creation.” But the localism-globalism dichotomy implicit in this notion is at best contradictory.79

75 For Harriss and De Renzio (1997: 934), “[t]hose policy arguments which pose civil society against the state, or which rest on the view that a ‘robust civil society’ (read ‘high level of civic engagement’ and therefore rich endowment of social capital – according to Putnam) is necessarily a precondition for ‘good government’ are almost certainly misconceived.” 76 Similarly, according to Bourdieu (1986: 249), relationships between social actors are “partially irreducible to objective relations of proximity in physical (geographical) space or even in economic and social space.” 77 By virtue of membership in any of these imagined communities, one may be able to appropriate the abstract trust intrinsic in the symbolically mediated relations that exist between their members. The meaning makes it possible to transform potential trust into actual trust (Edwards and Foley, 1997). 78 This assumption, however, does not deny that the same sociocultural context that can facilitate trust within imagined communities could also generate distrust across them. 79 Considering current globalization trends, the local community that does not place itself in global terms will not fully comprehend local conditions. Increasingly, social change demands the articulation of interests that transcends local and national polities (Smith, 1998).

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Social capital has increasingly been equated to the “level of civicness” in “communities” such as towns, cities and countries. The stock of social capital is considered to be equivalent to the level of associational involvement and participatory behavior in a community (Putnam, 1993a). The problem with this argument is its logical circularity. According to Portes (1998: 19), “[a]s a property of communities and nations rather than individuals, social capital is simultaneously a cause and effect. It leads to positive outcomes, such as economic development and less crime, and its existence is inferred from the same outcomes.” Under this assumption, one could argue that a city that is well governed and enjoys good economic health is so because it has high social capital. Conversely, poorer cities are lacking in their civic virtues. In conclusion, if a community is civic it does civic things, if it is not, it will not do civic things. The main problem with this assumption is not the logical circularity in itself, but rather that it does not provide any insights into the process of change from an “uncivic” to a “civic” community (Miller, 1997). The critical issue, the role that social capital plays in transforming a community from uncivic to civic, remains largely unexplained. Finally, there is an intrinsic bias when the concept of social capital is transformed from being a resource into a paradigmatic entity, civil society. As Rieff (1999:11) explains “we use civil society to apply to groups, societies and social trends of which we approve: societies based on diversity and tolerance, in which mutual assistance and solidarity are deeply established and the state is responsive rather than repressive.” It is implicitly accepted, through this view, that civil society, if left to its own devices will reach positive outcomes in terms of democratization and development by strengthening democracy and complementing the market (Hyden, 1997). The experience of Rwanda, which, according to Peter Uvin (cited in Rieff, 1999: 15), was considered by development experts to have one of the most developed civil societies in Africa before the genocide, should serve as a sobering lesson. Importantly, also, is the fact that unprecedented achievements in capitalist economic growth have taken place in the more authoritarian political systems of East and Southeast Asia (Putzel, 1997).80 As Putzel states, the patterns of social capital accumulation that have fostered this growth have had close to nil democratic content (for example, Singapore). V – ANALYSIS The coal mining areas in Orissa provide an excellent opportunity to explore the concepts explained in the previous section. Our study areas, Samaleswari and Kalinga, as part of what we called de facto ‘company enclaves’ represent a scale down model of the working of social capital in Indian society at large. To clarify, we do not pretend that any findings regarding social capital in these areas would be generalizable for India as a whole. However, given their relative systemic enclosure, it does permit us to see certain dynamics more clearly, and to identify issues that are critical to improve our understanding of social capital in general, and at the community level in particular. Specifically, the dynamics that we focus on are: (a) the vertical articulations and non-articulations, between the coal company, represented in Mahanadi Coalfields, and the concerned communities, which we see as a replication of State-civil society relations. And (b) the horizontal interactions among community members, that is the localized civil society. Our focus is on community-based development, but within the broader framework of the political economy of poverty. Accordingly, through our analysis we explore the width and depth of social capital, how the issues of power and politics weigh in to give social capital a relative use value depending on who is assessing this value, and the relevance, in the 80 Putzel (1997) also emphasizes the fact that the Po Valley, identified by Putnam as the site of ‘vibrant social capital’ was referred by Mussolini himself as the ‘cradle of the Fascist movement.’ Apparently, the associational legacy of northern Italy could not prevent the rise of fascism, which is the complete opposite of democratic governance (Tornquist, 1998). More recently, it is precisely in the prosperous and civic North where racism and anti-immigrant campaigns have been more vocal and violent (Randall, 1999).

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final analysis, of social capital for community-based development. Our analysis is thus multi-level and multi-dimensional, targeting what we referred to as the ‘structures of facilitation and constraint’ that affect access to resources, including social capital resources, control of access to resources, and control of the resources once access is obtained or granted.81 In congruency, our analysis is developed as a virtual matrix whereby we take an identified form of social capital, look at its various dimensions – its depth – and try to understand if and how issues of power and politics affect it, and how the resulting form influences them. As we construct this matrix, we iteratively test the main assumptions that emerged from our review of the literature with the findings of our exploratory study. To proceed with this virtual matrix, we first distinguish among different forms of social capital, and then address separately those forms that are more relevant in an analytical sense for the objectives of our study. Forms of Social Capital All of the forms of social capital that we identify here can affect collective action, governance and/or economic performance in many ways, and all of them have a role to play in the creation and maintenance of generalized trust as well. It is assumed, also, that these forms, and even the existence of different forms, will vary depending on the socio-organizational settings (Eastis, 1998). These forms do not exist in isolation, and many do not have clear or real boundaries either. In fact, many of them are embedded in other forms of social capital, or are necessary inputs for or outputs of other forms of social capital. Following Putnam (1998; 1993a); Portes (1998), Harriss and De Renzio (1997), and Rose et al. (1997) we specifically distinguish among the following forms of social capital: (a) Family and kinship connections, which would include the single household, the extended family, or

the clan, based on ‘strong’ ties of blood and affinity. An important factor is that family / kin relationships are mainly created by birth, not by choice.

(b) (Wider) social networks or ‘associational life,’ which would include networks of individuals,

groups and organizations that link individuals from different families or groups in common activities for various purposes. This would be the form of social capital closer to the definition in terms of ‘networks of civic engagement’ or ‘local associations.’ This form of social capital covers a full range of formal and informal horizontal arrangements.

(c) Cross-sectional linkages or ‘networks of networks,’ which would include the networks linking

together organizations from various sectors of society (i.e., NGOs, grassroots organizations, government agencies, private firms) that allow to combine resources and different types of knowledge to find solutions to complex problems. Through these networks, public-private cross-sectoral linkages, and mutually supportive and complementary relations are established. This form of capital provides the articulations between horizontal and vertical associations and organizations.

(d) Political Capital, which would include the norms and networks shaping relations between civil

society and the state thereby allowing a society to mediate conflict by effectively responding to multiple citizen demands. Political capital is related to informal institutional arrangements that may result in clientelism, rent seeking and exclusion, or in effective representation, accountability and participation. This is a form of social capital that lies in the realm of ‘political society.’ Such

81 A central concept in the literature on poverty is access. Accordingly, “analysis of the structure and causes of poverty is…the study of access and of constraints to access. The flow of productive resources, the creation of capabilities, the consumption of bundles of goods – all the intertwined determinants and outcomes of socioeconomic differentiation among individuals within the family, groups within the community, and regions within the country – can be mapped in terms of access” (World Bank, 1991: 1, emphasis in original). However, as Kapadia (1997) argues, another crucial issue is control over resources, once access to them has been achieved.

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political society comprises the institutions and actors who mediate the civil society-state relationships, and depends on the embeddedness of civil society and state.

(e) Institutional and policy framework, which would include formal rules and norms (constitutions,

laws, regulation, policies) that regulate public life. This is what has generally been identified as macro-level social capital. It has a sort of double nature, since it may induce the creation of other forms of social capital, while it constitutes in itself a resource that facilitates coordinated actions.82 Moreover, as we stated before, existence of a consistent institutional framework is necessary to generate and strengthen generalized social trust.

(f) Social norms and values, which would include widely shared cultural beliefs and the effects such

beliefs have on the functioning of society at large. Norms and values support other forms of social capital as well as representing the most general and most difficult form of social capital.

Institutional and Policy Framework (The Extent of Generalized Social Trust) Hatti and Heimann (1992: 62) explain that “[o]ne of the most important concepts in the Indian value system is the one of trust.” Accordingly, trust or the lack of trust is critical in the evaluation of relationships among Indian people. Descriptions of family members, friends, or strangers, always include an assessment of the specific individual’s trustworthiness, which, according to Hatti and Heimann is usually assumed to be lacking. In short, mistrust is the main assumption framing daily social interactions. Historical and contemporary forces, at the same time, have exacerbated ethnic, class, gender, and familial tensions in India, which combined with the scarcity of resources, have made access, distribution and use of the existing social capital highly contested, and social capital resources themselves fragmented. In India, ‘Communalism’ has emerged strongly, translating into conflict and violence across religion-based communities, such as Muslims, Hindus and now Sikhs. Indeed, in the aftermath of the traumatic events of the mid-1980s and 1990s, the major change in Indian politics has been the emergence into prominence of another politico-religious phenomenon, the “Hindutva” movement (Basu and Subrahamanayam, 1996).83 Generalized social trust has been weakened by the deeply ambivalent relationship between secularism and religious representation facing the State. A high level of ‘abstract trust’ has resulted in strengthened identities based on inclusion / exclusion mechanisms. In turn, according to Naviakha (1995: 369), “…the policies and pronouncements of the government have played a preponderant role in perpetuating and promoting community differences.” Diversity of voices and interests has resulted in India in a pluralist democracy that with all its limitations may be its greatest strength. On the other hand, the modus operandi of this pluralism may be India’s greatest weakness. Without a capable state, Indian civil society may crumble under the weight of divisions based on religion, ethnicity or region and the self-interest of many single-issue groups that comprise the core of civil society.84 It is important to pay attention to the networks of individuals and

82 In this respect, an important point made by Putzel (1997) is the need to distinguish clearly between institutions and organizations. Based on the work of Douglas North, Putzel defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ of a society, and more formally, as the manmade constraints and enablers that structure human interaction. Institutions comprise formal rules (statue law, common law, regulations), informal constraints / enablers (such as conventions, norms of behavior, self-imposed codes of conduct), and the ways in which both are enforced. Organizations, on the other hand, are ‘the players,’ that is the groups of people who come together to achieve certain objectives. 83 Hindu right-wing movement for ‘Hinduvta’ (literally, ‘hinduness’), used to describe the movement of Hindu self-assertion for ‘Hindu’ rights and Hindu ‘nationhood.’ 84 This does not mean that diversity in itself is always a negative attribute. According to Collier (1998b), diversity has various detrimental macroeconomic effects (affecting growth and overall economic performance) and microeconomic effects (tending to reduce public sector performance, increase patronage, and lower the level of trust among individuals). Collier clarifies, however, that although there is a relationship between ethnic diversity and the risk of violent conflict, such relationship is nonmonotonic.

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local associations and the conditions of civil society at the local level, as we do in this study, without loosing sight of the larger institutional framework required for effective governance and legal systems that affect the emergence of generalized social trust. Social capital is not evenly distributed across a society, and India is not exception.85 India, similarly to many other developing countries, is characterized by populations divided by the equation of power (Parajuli, 1991). Even from within groups and communities, there are many voices that cannot be heard due to sexism, and religious and/or ethnic segregation. Groups have gained legitimacy and influence at different levels, achieved bargaining power differently and discontinuously, within different bargaining arenas. The state-civil society synergy is also more actualized in certain regions, through what Fox (1996) describes as iterative and cumulative cycles of conflict and cooperation. Although more research is needed at the national level, available evidence indicates that many different patterns of state-society interactions and processes through which social capital thickens coexist in India, across regions (with probably significant differences between the North and the South) and within regions and states. 86 As the renown case of the State of Kerala makes clear, India is characterized by a highly uneven distribution map with dramatic variations in the relative thickness of civil society and the width and depth of social capital resources. For Tornquist (1998: 116) the State of Kerala represents the “…most impressive case of attempts to renew the radical and democratic nation-state development project from below through popular movements and government policies…” Kerala is considered “different” to the rest of India in terms of its success in achieving high levels of education, health and social welfare, although it has a GNP per capita lower than the country as a whole (Tharakan, 1998).87 This success is likely correlated with the existence of a vibrant civil society and high levels of social capital that has resulted in broad, radical and politicized popular movements that have transcended Communalism and have materialized into effective cooperation and sustainable community development processes. Currently, adds Tornquist, a process of decentralization is taking place in conjunction with a process of ‘planning from below’ that involves extensive popular participation. Studies by Heller (1996) and Lam (1996) provide further support to the assumption that social capital and state institutions, when mutually reinforcing each other, can increase the effectiveness of broad-based development. For Heller, as it does for Tornquist, the synergy between the state and civil society also helps explain to a large extent the strong social development performance of Kerala. The complex interaction between social capital and development in a country such as India is reflected too in the problems facing Kerala today. Even in this state, with a highly vibrant civil society and most likely with impressive levels of social capital, the government still faces immense difficulties in dealing with divergent popular interests, ideas and well intended groups and actions. In this respect, according to Tornquist (1998), policy and project outcomes should not be expected to be consistent over time, as

85 Morris’ (1998) work addresses the distribution of social capital resources across India in his attempt to test the hypothesis that “…those states which have been relatively well endowed with social capital have had greater success in reducing poverty” (p.3). Morris uses panel data for 1960 and develops an econometric model that integrates his conceptualization of social capital into the broader model of poverty. Among other problematic assumptions, Morris assumes that social capital is a determinant of poverty, and defines it in terms of the extent of civil society by using variables such as extent of the press, local organizations, social demographics, rural-rural linkages and voting patterns. Methodological problems notwithstanding, this is a valuable first step toward understanding the dynamics of social capital processes and poverty alleviation strategies in India. 86 Available evidence from other countries helps corroborate this assumption. What Fox (1996:1093) found in Mexico, for instance, was that “[c]ivil society is very thin in some regions, with citizens subordinated and divided by vertical authoritarian clientelistic power relations, while other regions have vibrant civic movements for local-level political democracy and sophisticated producer and consumer cooperatives with thousand of members.” 87 It must be noted that according to Tharakan (1998), Kerala’s economic performance may not have been as bad as generally assumed. Nevertheless, in general terms, Kerala’s case constitute an “exception to the rule” vis-à-vis the rest of states in India.

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they tend to fluctuate with popular politics and government policies perhaps more than with the apparently more stable degree of social capital levels. In Tornquist’s (1998: 122) assessment, “[d]espite an otherwise impressive land reform…stagnant growth and civic cooperation now constitute a major problem” in Kerala. For Tornquist, the main factors affecting these outcomes are privatization and atomization, which have tended to discourage cooperation among producers and the citizens at many different levels. A positive outcome of the democratization process, which is an implicit goal of the community development efforts that we study in Orissa’s coal mining areas, has been the emergence of a large amount of independent and more self-reliant citizens. On the negative side, this outcome has led to economically non-cooperative individuals and families. The poorer groups, whose social capital resources have grown through state-induced processes, still suffer from deprivation in relation to the rest of society in Kerala, and significant disparities regarding literacy, basic education and other social and economic indicators are evident across castes, communities and/or occupational groups (Tharakan, 1998). This does not deny that in comparative terms, the achievements of Kerala in terms of human and social development are extraordinary. However, it does indicate as well that many other factors in addition to a strong civil society and social capital intervene in the development process. Another relevant case in India is the state of Karnataka, where regional, linguistic, religious, and caste tensions have surfaced recently, despite that historically this state has displayed a high level of social cohesiveness. For some researchers such as Madsen (1993), this outcome reflects divisive tendencies that have long been embedded within the State’s social and economic structures, despite the high level of social cohesiveness. An important aspect of Kerala’s experience is that contemporary events of caste violence have revealed, as Madsen indicates, that social cohesiveness and high levels of social capital have concealed high levels of structural subordination. The most relevant conclusion from Madsen’s analysis for our study is that social relations that are cohesive, at least on the surface, might actually be unfavorable to some groups, who are pressured – and often forced – to accept their social and economic location and enter into unfair terms of ‘cooperation.’ However, facilitated by the State, scheduled castes in Karnataka, traditionally the lowest groups in the village hierarchy, have managed to improve their position. The structures of facilitation have been activated while the structures of constraint have been simultaneously weakened by active state intervention, which has provided disadvantaged social actors with room for more democratic forms of interaction. This process has not taken place without conflict, specifically triggering casteism as the dominant castes feel threatened and react with violence. In the case of the State of Orissa, where our study areas are located, there is not sufficient information that would allow us to provide a general view of the distribution of social capital resources. However, according to Panda (1995), political instability would seem to indicate high levels of fragmentation of caste and regional interests across the state. Civil Society in the Study Areas In terms of generalized social trust, what makes the situation in our study areas more complicated is the fact that both civil society and state institutions are weak. The institutional and policy framework that could foster generalized trust and promote cooperation across individuals and social groups lacks cohesiveness and consistency. Moreover, the coal company’s influence is so strong in the study areas that their policies and programs are perceived by local residents as integral to, if not as a replacement of the larger institutional and regulatory context enabling social exchange in Indian society. The small presence of state institutions is mediated by the coal company to a large extent, while other elements of civil society are lacking. 88 For instance, we did not find any NGOs operating continuously in either of

88 As stated in the Staff Appraisal Report for the ESMP (World Bank, 1996), “[p]articularly in remote areas, mine managers are often viewed by the people living in the surrounding communities as the representative of government authority and people bring requests for assistance to him.” In Kalinga, where no NGO existed to facilitate the community participation process, in one of our visits we observed that the Area manager had actually

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the study areas, except for CART, the NGO brought in by Mahanadi Coalfields to Samaleswari as part of the World Bank-financed projects.89 In turn, even the presence of NGOs is perceived as having been granted by the coal company, at least in the mines under Bank financing. The new village working groups created in the Bank-financed mines to implement community development activities become official by signing an agreement with the company. As a result, these groups tend to be perceived as a ‘contracting agency’ for the company. Moreover, as far as we could observe, the majority of the new leaders in the villages are employed by, and tend to identify themselves strongly with the coal company’s interests. This situation is made even more problematic by the fact that, as many people perceive it, the leaders of local associations, pressure groups and NGOs are accountable only to their members and/or those who provide them with funds. It could be argued, then, that at least indirectly or implicitly, the interests of the company have permeated civil society in the mining areas. The extent of this phenomenon is not fully clear, but it is likely to influence social capital processes and resources. More importantly, these circumstances should be kept in mind when reading our analysis below as they provide the specific context for the horizontal and vertical linkages available in the study areas. The coal company’s capacity to address all the demands of the surrounding communities, let alone to fulfill its promises regarding resettlement and rehabilitation, is limited. Its intervention capacity is severely constrained to the de facto boundaries of its development enclave area, which already seems to be more than what the company can handle on its own. The idea of comprehensive environmental and resettlement and rehabilitation action plans with regional coverage, for instance, seemed to make sense to some of the officials at Mahanadi Coalfields, particularly in the more industrial area of Talcher-Angul where Kalinga is located. However, this endeavor requires strong State and local government support, which the company lacks, to reach agreement among the various entities involved, including other industries operating in the region. Neither institutional and policy framework, nor legal bases are available to take the first step. In the final analysis, only the State authorities would be in a position influential enough to achieve the implementation of a regional plan. But the state wants to intervene as little as possible in the mining areas. At the end, a vicious cycle is engendered. Another relevant example is the case of granting compensation to project-affected people without a clear legal status but who are considered ‘landowners’ by tradition. Specifically, the company has committed itself under the new resettlement and rehabilitation policy to compensate people loosing land without legal ownership status, such as those cultivating land under customary rights. However, without an appropriate legal framework, that lies also in the hands of State governments, the company can not meet this commitment.90 As a result, distrust from the affected people has increased. The possible community development impacts of the networks of individuals and of groups that we found in Samaleswari and Kalinga may thus be better understood within the constraints of a weak civil society, a weak State, and a weak state-civil society synergy, all of which is strongly mediated by a highly bureaucratic, justifiably profit-oriented, and complex organization. Considering this, we would argue that the local civil society of the mining areas has grown more and more devoid of badly needed vertical articulations. Simultaneously, local civil society has become increasingly disconcerted taken over the leadership of the community, and was organizing community meetings and facilitating the decision-making process related to the new sites for one of the villages to be relocated. 89 Several international NGOs have been following the operations of Coal India and the implementation of the World Bank-financed projects very closely, particularly in Singrauli and the Talcher area in Orissa. These NGOs have assumed an advocacy role, without becoming involved ‘on the ground’ in the strengthening of the regional civil society. It is granted , however, that the relationship between the coal company and the international NGOs is tense, given a generalized lack of trust. 90 There are certain less complicated cases, such as Gair Mazurwa Khas and Bhudan lands where ownership rights may be recognized in a relatively short time. Otherwise, recognizing legal ownership of traditional forms of tenure can be time-consuming. It is then up to each subsidiary to engage the State government to achieve this objective.

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regarding the ‘rules of the game’ that are supposed to provide a coherent meaning to social interaction. We would therefore conclude that generalized social trust is minimal, if not completely lacking, in the study areas. Under this situation, project-affected people often attempt to obtain the ‘best deal’ that they can from the coal company, and agreements to relocate for example are often broken when the opportunity appear to be at hand to pressure the company. The major problem in Samaleswari and Kalinga at this general level is the lack of continuous and stable linkages to enable democratization, understood in its broadest sense to include community development processes. These linkages include those between the different efforts of civil society groups and those between these groups and state and local authorities and other members of civil society at large. The possibility and usefulness of social conflict should not be minimized either, and most particularly in community development processes that presumably should empower individuals and their communities. In the mining areas, social capital that triggers collective actions which seems to interfere with the company’s interests or that, at a more simple level, interfere with daily operations, is perceived by mining officials as counterproductive. Hence, this type of collective action is discouraged, and the conditions to facilitate the emergence of bridges between groups are not promoted adequately. On the other hand, community-based goals to achieve democratic development do not always stem innocently from a harmonious civil society. Often, they have to be developed through political conflict. Whittington (1998) correctly advises in this respect that “[g]iven the possibility of social conflict, distrust of government and of others can be a reasonable political choice and not simply the product of a weak society” (p. 30). As we stated above, the structure and strength of government are essential to provide a democratic process to the resolution of these conflicts.91 In the absence of well-functioning political institutions and regulatory frameworks to channel social conflict, social capital can be used perversely. 92 However, without careful analysis, it would be misleading to disregard associations that appear to promote political struggles and foster conflict. Nor can we exclude the possibility that mass-membership advocacy organizations, including national social movement organizations and international NGOs, may also be sources of social capital that could provide useful vertical ties to strengthen otherwise weak local civic societies such as the ones that prevail in Samaleswari and Kalinga. Under current circumstances, we would not expect that the ongoing processes of community development would enable democratization in the study areas, nor are they likely to effect democratic development. Family / Kinship – The Weaknesses of Strong Ties According to Buckland (1998), in South Asia cooperation beyond the joint and extended family unit is relatively uncommon. As Hatti and Heimman’s (1992: 62) study in Karnataka also corroborates, there is in the study areas “…a general distrust of the motives and trustworthiness of anyone not of the household and, often also of other household members.” Despite the changes brought about by development, the household continues to be central to an individual’s life. As such, it appears that, in general terms, social capital most usually takes the form of strong ties. This form of social capital, nonetheless, should not be idealized, in the sense that it may not be, as it is often assumed, the most productive site of social capital and the pillar of civic virtue and democracy (Putzel, 1997). A key issue that makes it difficult to transform informal institutions – of norms and values – is precisely that they are constantly reproduced within the family realm. Any assessment of the nature of social capital in a given community must probe into the strong ties granted by family and/or kinship relations, and the extent to which these ties influence the access to and control of resources, including social capital itself.

91 Indeed, state weakness may exacerbate or create social conflict by its apparent unwillingness to address pressing issues and alter social dynamics (Whittington, 1998). 92 This view falls within the Regime school, which does not view civil society as automatically democratic.

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Family structure in both Samaleswari and Kalinga has changed significantly with the development of coal mining. There is a tendency in mining areas with resettlement and rehabilitation components such as our study areas – likely due in part to the individual nature of compensation entitlements – toward an increase in the nuclear type of families. The 1994 survey of project affected persons in Samaleswari, for instance, indicated that due to household disintegration, the number of nuclear families had increased from 39.70 percent before mining operations to 47.70 percent at the moment of the survey.93 Correspondingly, the percentage of joint families had decreased from 60.30 percent to 52.50 percent (VPASP, 1994b). The nuclear family has generally been more prevalent among scheduled tribes and castes. It is actually customary for the male children among scheduled tribes, and to certain degree among scheduled castes to disassociate from the parents soon after getting married, which diminishes pressure from the extended family. The majority of households in these categories in the study areas followed this pattern. The higher castes groups have, on the other hand, maintained their traditional type of joint family. Importantly, incidence of female-headed households in the study areas is very low.94 Power of decision – that is ‘the room for agency’ of particular social actors – can be highly constrained within the family group.95 When the family group is relatively small, as with the nuclear family, power relations are more defined since the level of dependency would tend to be higher. One of the main variables affecting this is gender, as corroborated by our fieldwork as well. As Kapadia (1997: 3329) asserts, “…gender relations within households may be very inequitable.” We agree, then, that “[e]vidence is overwhelming that in Indian life, access – who gets what – is closely tied to gender” (World Bank, 1991: i). Under these circumstances, collective action for community development may not based completely on voluntary participation or may not be as collective as it seems.96 Due to historical reasons, the strength of and the balance between the structures of facilitation and constraint regarding gender tend to vary spatially. In India, for example, barriers to access to resources for women tend to be greater in the North than in the South (World Bank, 1991). Furthermore, as we also observed in our study areas, structures of constraint at the family / kinship level tend to be stronger among caste Hindus than among scheduled tribes and castes. They tend to be stronger too among landowning cultivators than among landless laborers or marginal farm families.97 In general, as Fernandes and Raj (1992) also conclude, women have a higher status among the scheduled tribes and scheduled castes than among the middle and higher castes.98 Among scheduled castes and tribes, women are appreciated as an economic asset. In fact, our observations substantiate that “…the poorer the family, the greater its dependence on women’s economic productivity” (World Bank, 1997: 1). This higher status translates into the relative freedom often granted to scheduled tribe and caste women in the choice of marriage partners, bride price, widow remarriage and control over the family economy. Tribal and lower caste women, however, are not completely equal to the husband, who often continues to represent the family in the main social organizations and tend to have control over the resources, at least in our study areas.

93 Actual mining operations in Samaleswari started in 1993, although preparation of the mine was initiated in 1987. 94 According to the 1994 base-line survey to prepare the resettlement and rehabilitation action plan for Samaleswari, there were only 9 female-headed households among the identified project affected families (VPASP, 1994b). 95 The extent to which the power to constraint or to force one’s will on others within the family / kinship group is originated from outside forces (social, cultural and economic) and/or individual dispositions and predispositions (due to internalization of these forces and/or biological / natural tendencies) has been a matter of theory and research in the social sciences for years. Several schools exist, and even within the feminist camp, no clear consensus seems reachable in the near future. 96 As we see below, community pressure may also force a given family to agree to take part in collective activities. 97 Similar findings can be found in Fernandes and Raj (1992); World Bank (1991). 98 These observations are mainly based on unstructured interviews and focus groups with men and women. Our questionnaire did not include questions that would allow assessing this status more rigorously.

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Tribal women, for example, regardless of the dominant place that they occupy in agriculture and in domestic labor, are not perceived as producers, and when what they produce enters the household, it is still mediated by men (Singh, 1995). They do nevertheless seem to have greater freedom than the middle and upper castes where a woman might go through life subordinated to her father, to her husband and to her son after widowhood.99 The inside/outside dichotomy (representing the private and public spheres) has been proposed to understand the contingent nature of accessing resources (World Bank, 1991). It is argued that women are left in the private “inside” sphere while men interact with the public “outside” sphere – the market, the government and courts, etc. In this sense, their access to certain valuable forms of social capital and other resources would be highly constrained. This generalization, however, might break down when the social location of both women and men are considered. Women in poor households often have to leave the “private” sphere and work to increase the family income or engage in activities not perceived traditionally as productive to supplement the family income. The same way that it is misleading to associate women exclusively with the inside a priori, it is misleading to associate men as a general category with the outside world. Not just gender, but also caste and class have to be considered as well. Many individual male members of scheduled tribes and castes are also dramatically marginalized from the outside world, often as much as their women. In the case of women, the possibilities to link themselves to the outside world and the ability to engage in collective action are intricately connected simultaneously to their social and economic location in the household and in their communities. Economic opportunities for women in the mining areas are limited, particularly because the coal mining economy does not have many “suitable” occupations for them.100 Overall, mining operations have had an adverse impact on women’s position within the household and the community (Singh, 1995). The rate of female employment is dramatically lower than male employment. Self-employment is also practically nonexistent among women. Illiteracy is also significantly higher among women. Females were more dependent on agriculture than males at the beginning of the mining development in the area, and still were at the time of the 1995 survey in Samaleswari (see ORG, 1995). Previously, women used to get more work as agricultural workers and earned from collecting forest produce. Access to the forests is currently more restricted, and agricultural work has decreased significantly. Overall, most women in the mining areas do not have property rights, and as such, access to job in the mines has been historically denied to them. Seventy percent of females over 18 years old in our sample in both study areas were described by their husband or relative as “housewives.” This is certainly biased since not many women would exclusively associate themselves with the private realm, as made evident in our focus groups, and not many men seem to oppose women engaging in gainful employment, if opportunities were available.101 Overall, however, women’s access to the community has increasingly been mediated by their male relatives, and their power of decision diminished. Some women, albeit not many in Samaleswari or Kalinga, are able

99 In Samaleswari, for example, although the lady gram Pradham (village head) is very active and influential, her husband, the former Pradham, is the one still attending the major meetings and interacting with government officials. 100 After nationalization of the coal industry there was a steep decline in female employment (Singh, 1995). In 1994, only 7% of the total coal miners (550,000) in Coal India were women. More specifically, from our own survey, out of a total sample of 273 females over 18 years of age living in Samaleswari, only four females were regular employees of Mahanadi Coalfields, and none was working either as daily wage worker for the company or for one of its contractors. In Kalinga, out of 399 females, only 5 were regular employees and 6 were working for some of the mine contractors. 101 In this area, 66.7 percent of head of households interviewed agreed that women should participate in gainful employment. Interestingly, income level appears to have more relevance in the decision whether to allow women to work than caste itself.

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to escape “the inside,” and manage to access other forms of social capital that allows accessing other resources, and also accessing other resources than social capital directly. However, as we see below, those resources only go so far. At the same time, they mainly built networks or organized groups with other women, and mostly from their own caste, thus failing to establish bridges that would allow them to diversify and strengthen their own social capital. At the same time, and particularly for a poor household, this form of social capital may not be as valuable in terms of improving quality of life. As we explained in our definition of social capital, it refers basically to opportunity. It is in a way inherited, at least in its initial levels and forms (Burt, 1997; Bourdieu, 1986). A family in itself and the community to which they belong may have plenty of social capital resources, without these resources providing access to resources that will help women overcome poverty, or that will benefit women directly. Quite the contrary, this social capital, by acquiring a gender-mediated form, may affect women adversely. This has serious implications not only for policy, but also for the analysis of social capital itself. In the words of Portes (1998: 5), “equating social capital with the resources acquired through it can easily lead to tautological statements.” In his view, for example, it would be misleading to say that person A has social capital because she managed to obtain a large tuition loan from her kin, and that person B does not because he did not succeed. It is possible that B’s kin network is as motivated to help him as A’s kin network is, but it simply lacks the ability to do so. In other words, “defining social capital as equivalent with the resources thus obtained is tantamount to saying that the successful succeed” (p.5). A group of women may come together, or may develop a closely tied network, and that is valuable in itself. However, in that sense their social capital offers significant instrumental potential not so much as concrete opportunity yet. Even if one understands Portes’ concerns, though, the question still remains “How would we assess the use value of these women’s social capital?” The fact is that their room for action is highly constrained, since for the most part they do not have access to and/or control of sufficient resources to actualize their desire to act collectively and improve their wellbeing. Another critical issue to understand the nature of social capital in the study areas is the fact that it might undergo cycles of contraction and expansion, depending on historical, social and economic circumstances. Following Moser’s work (1996), it is possible to argue that in conditions of economic stress such as the ones found in Samaleswari and Kalinga, social capital resources and/or reserves are likely to implode. Furthermore, it is as well possible that the negative aspects of social capital may gain prevalence over the positive ones. For example, as the households’ ability to cope diminishes, community trust may break down further. Under strenuous circumstances, people are forced to be more selective in the type of community-based activities that they may be involved, and it becomes more difficult to honor unstated agreements and follow through the generalized morality. In general, people tend to withdraw scarce resources from the larger social group, and reciprocity is scaled down from the community level to the immediate family. In short, “[i]n the face of adversity, social capital…is at once withdrawn from circulation and re-channeled in ways that break down the ability of a society to organize itself for collective action” (Edwards and Foley, 1997: 675). This is congruent with Woolcock’s (1997) argument that extreme poverty tends to hinder collective action, by limiting time horizons and social interaction while augmenting self-interest and distrust toward outsiders. Scarcity, in general, increases the “risks of misplaced trust,” and people tend to see others, particularly those under similar conditions, as competitors (Brehm and Rahn, 1997).102 Due to these factors, it may be expected that social capital will recede back into the family circle.103 This is important, particularly considering

102 On the other hand, according to Brehm and Rahn’s (1997) findings, general life satisfaction is strongly related to higher levels of interpersonal trust. 103 According to Singh (1995), for example, the associational life that cemented solidarity of tribals, such as religious rituals, social activities such as festivals and its concomitant community singing and dancing, has increasingly been curtailed and many of these practices have been confined to the family circle. This, of course, is

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the situation that prevails in the mining areas, where many women have been ‘displaced’ from the labor market back into the domestic sphere, while the social capital of males allows them to mediate ‘their’ women’s social interactions. In summary, at the family level, we may hypothesize that in general the use value of social capital will vary for each member of the group depending on their gender. Across family groups it will vary depending on caste, class and cultural background. Second, that access to forms of social capital outside the household and to other resources will depend on the level to which one’s linkages with the outside world is mediated by other family members. It is likely, then, that availability of social capital resources is independent of opportunities for access and control of resources. As such, focusing on individual members might be a better way to assess social capital within the framework of community-based development for poverty alleviation. Third, that social capital is not equal to the resources made available by accessing it. And, finally, that social capital is not an immutable endowment, but suffers contractions and expansions, particularly under conditions of stress, scarcity and poverty conditions. These contractions, at the same time, most likely affect women and other vulnerable members of the community whose social capital is mediated by some of the male members of their closed family circle. It is as well possible that these contractions simultaneously increase the power of mediation of these males and/or more powerful members. Horizontal Networks – Social Capital at the Community Level There is an emerging consensus that at the community level, particularly among poor communities, social capital is rather scarce in South Asia (Woolcock, 1997), and upon a cursory look, India does not seems to be an exception. This generalization is in part derived from the more general contention that societies lagging in economic development are characterized by a lack of mutual trust that hinders “mutually beneficial” collective action.104 Our initial hypothesis was based on this assumption, and we have suggested in our original proposal for the study that it was likely that social capital was scarce in the mining areas. Contrary to this assertion, and based on our fieldwork, we would now argue that mutual trust exists in abundance, but that it is highly fragmented, as a mechanism of inclusion / exclusion tends to operate strongly among residents of the study areas to create very closed groups. It is likely, as we were able to gather from our fieldwork as well, that there might actually be an oversupply of certain forms of social capital. Specifically, we did not find any large, continuous and interlocking networks of support. Nor we would describe the village communities as integrated units. Similarly to what Rose at al. (1997) describe, an apparent generalized state of social failure seems to prevail, which is hindering cooperation and the production of collective goods. To put it differently, our exploratory effort indicates that there exists a highly fragmented social structure with a considerable lack of horizontal linkages, while plenty of closed groups with high entry costs can be identified. The pattern of segregation that emerges is both social and spatial. Community Life The ‘village system,’ although certainly in flux due to the changes triggered by the mining industry, has a set of structural rules (i.e., guidelines or external norms and values) that influence “…within wider or

not primarily due to a stressful situation and conditions of scarcity, but also due to cultural changes brought about by development of the mine economy. 104 This was already premised in Banfield’s The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, where he concluded from his study of underdevelopment in a village in Southern Italy in the 1950s that the extreme poverty and backwardness of the village was explained – albeit not completely – by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good (Lemann, 1996).

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narrow latitude, who does what and who receives what” (Neale, 1990).105 Historically, these rules have specified who was eligible for the different roles available in the community, while also relating a series of attributes or achievement, according to Neale, to each ascribed role. Accordingly, each component of a village economy has traditionally been differentially linked to the resulting social organization. In other words, these components have been embedded in the institutional framework comprised of the values, rules, rewards, and punishments of non-economic institutions that mark community life. The challenges for community based development under these circumstances go beyond improvement of the quality of life. As it comes clear from our field observations, democratization of community life is as important. This makes it an imperative to understand the nature of and the possibilities that social capital resources in these areas offer for effective participation and collective action. A distinct social stratification pattern characterizes the villages surveyed in both of our study areas. To recapitulate, in Samaleswari the study area (with a total population of 2,751 or 470 households) includes four villages, comprised of seven habitations: Kudapalli, Lajkura, Sukhpara, Mundapara, Ainapalli, Orampara and Karapalli. About 46.7 percent of the total population here belong to scheduled tribes (STs), while 12.7 fall under the category of scheduled castes (SCs). The rest belong to other backward castes (OBC) – 35.4 percent, who are the second largest group, and to the general – upper – castes (5.2 percent). Importantly, social and spatial segregation is high. Three habitations are entirely inhabited by the scheduled tribes: Sukhpara, Orampara and Mundapara. Incidentally, each of these settlements is inhabited by a particular tribal community.106 In the rest of the habitations, however, the upper castes were the dominant groups and thus, their notion of the appropriate community norms and values tended to prevail. Despite being the minority in terms of population, the area is dominated by the Dixits (Brahmins) mainly due to their large landholdings and political strength. These upper caste groups are the most influential in the local politics and village management. They were the main landholders and have traditionally been the major decision-makers of the area. All of this is not uncommon in other parts of India, but it does not have the same intensity or characteristics across all regions. Lajkura, in particular, has the highest concentration of scheduled caste population. They are, however, restricted to live in an isolated hamlet and are still treated as untouchables by the upper caste group. Rigid social norms and values prevalent in the community-at-large have thus been imposed on them. As a result, scheduled castes are not allowed to enter the temple of the main village or to use the bathing platform (ghat). In fact, a separate ghat has been built for them in the village pond, strategically located at a distance from the upper castes’ ghat. Nor are they allowed to participate in the main village functions.107 According to our initial assessments, scheduled castes in Lajkura play an insignificant role in the every day decision-making process of village life. This group of scheduled caste displayed high degrees of internal social connectedness and relative cooperation; nevertheless, they were economically far more disadvantaged than the rest of the villagers. Overall, and despite their relative degree of individual access to social capital at the in-group level, they were highly dependent on the higher caste group. It was evident that access to market opportunities – and especially employment and credit – has been made very restricted to them. As a group, both men and women belonging to the scheduled caste in Lajkura found themselves marginalized in many ways by the upper castes, and consequently did not express much sympathy for them. A positive change brought about by the mining operations, however, is that the level of dependency has diminished, as they were not working any more as agricultural day laborers for the landowners, most of whom belonged to the higher caste groups. The scheduled tribes,

105 These rules, of course, are influenced negatively or positively by official laws, civil service operating rules, and rules emanating from the caste system (Neale, 1990). 106 The Kharia live in Sukhpara, the Oram live in Orampara and the Munda live in Mundaparam. 107 It is interesting to note that in the village school it was not possible for the higher cast groups to restrict the access of schedule caste children.

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on the other hand, have been allowed to assimilate with the mainstream Hindus as they have found better acceptance from the higher castes than the scheduled castes.108

Total Population by Category – Samaleswari Site SC ST OBC General TOTAL Kudapalli 41 345 260 77 723 Lajkura 219 190 254 61 724 Sukhpara 0 130 0 0 130 Mundapara 7 229 27 0 263 Ainapalli 48 183 200 0 431 Orampara 0 112 0 0 112 Karapalli 34 96 232 6 368 TOTAL 349 1285 973 144 2751 A higher level of social cohesiveness appears to exist in Kalinga. This is in part related to the fact that the traditional power groups have managed to maintain more traditional ‘cooperative’ arrangements, and that agriculture is still a relevant economic sector. To repeat, in Kalinga, there are 11 villages within the study area (which includes a total population of 15,095 or 2,351 households), but three are uninhabited. Accordingly, eight villages were included in our study: Bramhanbahal, Danra, Kalam Chhuin, Majhika, Natada, Nathgaon,109 Nakeipasi and Solada. The majority of the population (65.5 percent) belongs to the OBC (other backward castes) category. Scheduled tribes are second (15.2 percent), followed by general (9.7 percent) and scheduled castes (9.6 percent). The higher level of social cohesion might stem from the existence of groups that have a strong social connectedness within themselves and other (economic and institutional) resources at hand as to be able to impose themselves over the rest of the community. In Kalinga, the Chasa (farmers) category is largest among the other caste population. They have traditionally been the main landholders of this area and have high social and economic status. They are perceived as the main ‘power group.’ They appear to dominate the decision-making process in the community development process, and to bring consensus around their own priorities due to their power yielding status.

Total Population by Category – Kalinga Site SC ST OBC General TOTAL Bramhanbahal 140 240 190 160 730 Danra 610 280 3000 110 4000 Kalam Chhuin 420 60 2825 55 3360 Majhika 70 25 655 0 750 Natada 280 430 1150 15 1875 Nathgaon 0 0 63 7 70 Nakeipasi 125 65 80 980 1250 Solada 650 350 1925 135 3060 TOTAL 2295 2295 9888 1462 15095

108 The scheduled tribes had their own dialects, but today they speak Salbampuri, the local language of Western Orissa. Many also speak Oriya and Hindi. The latter has been imported by the large influx of people from the neighboring Madhya Pradesh and Bihar states. As stated above, however, there were three settlements exclusively inhabited by tribals. 109 Nathgaon is a new settlement were a few households (12) have been moved from nearby villages.

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Similarly to other areas in India, community life is still characterized in both study areas by a three layered hierarchy: power, wealth and ritual prestige.110 They do not always coincide but there is probably a high correlation between them. As such, as Neale (1990) correctly states, the main problem in this context is not economic, although this is important too. The critical issues to understand social capital at this level would thus be the structure of power that facilitate and or constraint the actions of each member of the community at large, and the room for agency, individual and collective, to move within the rigidities of the existing social hierarchy. Based on these observations, it is possible to argue that horizontal asymmetries in power relations affect the effectiveness of social capital resources. Hence, the existence of a “community” and of “cooperation” does not in itself imply egalitarianism and full and voluntary participation of all its members in collective action. As we could observe, the internal relations of a group of local actors may be characterized by asymmetrical relations of dominance along the lines of class, caste, gender, etc. These horizontal power relations might also mediate inter-group interaction. Power relations are therefore key to understand the quality of social capital and the effectiveness of collective action. Power relations may need to be renegotiated for action to become fully “collective” (Sinha, 1996). According to Grootaert (1997: 80), “…the creation of trust and reciprocity is more likely in horizontal groups, especially those based on kinship or other dense networks (for example, based on gender, ethnicity, or caste.)” We would thus argue that there are plenty of social capital resources in the study areas, however fragmented and not always conducive to the cohesiveness of the community-at-large. Portes (1998), in particular, identifies four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedom, and downward leveling norms. We detected the existence of all of these consequences in our fieldwork, except the last one.111 Communal consciousness may be defined as the “we” feeling thorough which we acknowledge particular obligations and rights toward those who presumably belong to our social group (Gustfield, 1975). Fowler (1991: 3) points out that in general the concept of community implies the idea of “…commonality, of sharing in common, being and experiencing together.” In this respect, the emergence of the inclusion-exclusion mechanism seems to be inherent to the emergence of community feeling. Samaleswari and Kalinga communities represent good examples of what Plotkin (1991) refers to as “enclave consciousness.” The resulting ‘exclusion problem’ indicates tentatively to us the possibility that under certain circumstances, social capital can become an anti-democratic and potentially disruptive force. When communal alienation grows deeper, as was the case with the scheduled castes in Lajkura village for example, the sense of suspicion can turn into hostile relationships toward ‘foreign’ neighboring communities or individuals. Conversely, as the example of Karnataka helps illustrate, changes in the social structure that allow these groups to improve their room for action triggers the negative effects of social capital among the more influential social actors, whose power is threatened. It is then likely that enclave consciousness in the study areas has tended to discourage horizontal linkages between groups, and to promote the creation of closed groups. These close groups at the same time have tended to exercise excessive claims on some of their members, particularly women as we discussed above.112 Congruently with Collier’s (1998b) assumptions, we would argue 110 See for example Neale (1990). 111 Downward leveling norms, according to Portes, take place in cases when group solidarity is based on shared adversity and opposition to mainstream society. Under these circumstances, individual success stories are seen as negative because they threaten group cohesion, especially since this cohesion is based precisely on the alleged impossibility of the individual success of any group member. Downward leveling norms tend to develop throughout years of felt outside discrimination. The resulting downward leveling mechanisms tend to maintain members in place, perpetuating their disenfranchisement. 112 Restrictions on individual freedom reflect the old age dilemma between community solidarity and individual freedom. Community or group participation demands conformity. The level of social control may be so high that personal freedoms become highly restricted. As a result, the privacy and autonomy of individuals may be reduced dramatically (Portes, 1998). Moreover, in general, initiative and innovation may be curtailed.

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that ethnic / caste divisions represent an additional factor affecting social interaction in the study areas, which further hinders the emergence of generalized trust and increases the transaction costs of social and economic exchanges. When identity politics are overemphasized, as has happened in India for various reasons, individuals tend to base their identity more on differences with other groups than in commonalties with others in their own group. Adding to the complexity of the resulting fragmented nature of social capital at the horizontal, interpersonal level, is the fact that both jobs in the mines and compensation given to those affected by the development of the mining operations have created new relations of power and inequality. New identity layers and inequality levels have been created by designating people as formal employee or daily wage worker of the coal company, or as an entitled project affected person, or as a member of an “IPDP” village, to mention a few. In fact, the first notable difference that we observed was when people identified their villages as ‘ESMP’ or ‘non-ESMP’ – i.e. under a mining area receiving Bank financing or one not receiving such financing – and felt that they were not being treated similarly, despite the fact that they were experiencing the same problems. Importantly, too, is the fact that many divergent interests are deemed to emerge across individuals, between groups, and between and among communities that are affected in completely different ways by the changes brought about by the development and expansion of mining operations, the opportunities that the mine economy offers, and the various forms of compensation made available to those directly affected by these operations.113 As stated before, according to ORG’s survey in 1995, inequality in the Samaleswari area for instance was increasing rapidly. This was, and to a great extent still is due to several factors: first, those working at the mines enjoy higher incomes and job security, while the life of those left without land and alternative income generation opportunities tends to deteriorate. Second, offer of employment, which has been critical to land acquisition by the coal company, has historically been linked to land ownership. Not all the people occupying or using land required by opencast mine operations are landowners, however. Many of them are tenant farmers, sharecroppers, squatters and agricultural laborers, who had traditionally been left out.114 Given that (legally secured) land ownership tended to be concentrated among certain castes, many community divisions were unwillingly strengthened.115 Moreover, newcomers in general (including officers and many skilled laborers of the coal company) have not tried to become a part of the community in the mining areas, thus remaining as a group of outsiders. These ‘outsiders’ are not well integrated either, as they are likely to come from different regions and belong to different ethnic or religious groups.116 Some employees live in colonies built by the company, and enjoy adequate access to health and education services. The local male population, for the most part, is employed as semiskilled or unskilled labor, or has found employment in services connected to the mine economy.

113 For example, most of those interviewed by Singh (1995: 106) who were not working in the mines were of the opinion that it would be better if the mines closed down, “…[to] be able to live a life free of dust and pollution, of blasting and alcohol.” 114 In addition to landowners, under the new corporate policy, the definition of project-affected people includes now all the people whose livelihood would be affected by land acquisition, especially the landless. 115 Another key factor, which has probably more relevance in Kalinga, is that areas that fell within municipal limits of townships have received more compensation than other, more ‘rural’ areas (Singh, 1995). This has created resentment, and has led to some court disputes. 116 According to Singh (1995), as the coal industry has developed in India, a large amount of people from specific regions such as Bengal and Bihar have tended to monopolize particular occupations. For example, the Bangalis formed the core of the clerical staff while the Biharis worked mainly as guards. Oriyas – the natives from Orissa, on the other hand, have entered mainly as loaders while the Punjabis as operators of heavy equipment. The pattern remains in general terms unchanged despite of the expansion of coal mining into other areas of the country. Local labor in new mines is usually given semiskilled or unskilled jobs, with little opportunity of entering into certain occupations.

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According to our observations, occupation, workplace and the organization of production are likely to play a key role in the development of social ties and horizontal linkages between individuals and groups of individuals. Given the relative dependence of the economy on mining activities, these factors may be even more relevant in our study areas – although most probably they are more significant in Samaleswari than in Kalinga, where agriculture is still an important sector. Importantly, a change in the leadership pattern had been observed in 1995, with the company employees taking over from the traditional leadership (ORG, 1995). This is also important, in the sense that granting of a company job is to some extent still tied to political lobbying. In the case of company employees in both study areas, we detected a sense of ‘fictive kinship,’ to apply Kapadia’s (1997) term, as mine employees tended to address each other as if they were part of a large family, the coal company “kin.” Ties of fictive kinship, however, did not cross gender and/or caste divisions, especially since, as we already mentioned, not many women are regular employees and certain castes tend to concentrate in certain activities. Many males seemed to have acquired a strong sense of identity with the company, while the prevalent aspiration of males – and not surprisingly many females – not yet working for the company was to become a ‘Mahanadi Coalfields employee.’117 Although more research is required in this respect, it seems that the strong sense of identity with workplace and occupation stems, first, from the status given to mine jobs (related directly to the higher income level), and second, from the fact that employment is not only generally for life, but also that it often becomes a family asset. A common practice, accepted by the company, is to pass on jobs to male relatives. When unskilled or semi-skilled jobs become available through old age, death or illness, they are taken over by a member of the family of the individual who possessed the job previously. 118 Often, however, this person is a project-affected person from previous land acquisitions or one of his descendants. In 1995, in the IPDP villages in Samaleswari, for instance, 60 percent of general caste males, 50 percent of scheduled caste males and 54 percent of scheduled tribe males were already working in the mines or mine related jobs. General caste males had in general more and better employment in the mines because the majority of the land holdings were in their hands when land acquisition by the company started. Moreover, they possessed more competitive advantage in terms of education and skills, and better political connections (ORG, 1995). The relevance of the mine economy, at same time, has continued to grow as other economic sectors have declined. The dependency on agriculture has been decreasing rapidly. Due to the acquisition of land by the mining company and the lack of irrigation facilities, agricultural production has diminished substantially in the area. In 1995, only seasonal agriculture was found to be practiced in the remaining land, while among the schedule tribes nobody was fully dependent on agriculture anymore (ORG, 1995). In our own survey, we found that in Samaleswari as a whole including RAP and IPDP villages, about 50 percent of males between 18 and 55 years of age were employed in the mine. Given that historically the company has exchanged land for jobs in the mines as a means of compensation for resettlement, it is logical to find a higher percentage of males that are regular employees of the coal company in the “RAP” villages (65 percent) than in IPDP villages (56 percent). Moreover, Mahanadi Coalfields has continued to follow the recommendations contained in the rehabilitation guidelines of the State of Orissa, which emphasize jobs in the mines as compensation for land. Correspondingly, out of 986 persons entitled to rehabilitation under the World bank-financed projects, 338 (almost 35 percent) have been given employment in the mines while 20 others have found jobs with mine contractors. On the other hand, considering that Kalinga has a more diversified

117 This had been corroborated during the preparation of the initial resettlement and rehabilitation action plans, when almost all project-affected people expressed a preference for employment in the mines. 118 To refer back to our analysis of social capital at the household level, we can see clearly from this case how what for some family members and specific families means an opportunity (i.e. ‘access to jobs’) brought about from the family’s social capital, for others – those who aspire to obtain a job under current lower labor demand – it means a constraint.

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economy, our survey indicated that only about 20 percent out of 488 males over 18 years of age in the sample were regular Mahanadi Coalfields employees. It is possible that occupation provides linkages across villages of similarly socially and economically positioned male individuals, whose interests, due to identification with the coal company were greatly different from the rest of their particular communities, and even members of their own ethnic and/or caste groups who were not part of the ‘company family.’ It is also likely that even within a family, employment in the mines can be divisive. For instance, often when one brother gets a job and others do not get this chance, tension and a diversion of interests develop. This is perhaps more pronounced in Orissa, where the resettlement and rehabilitation guidelines stipulate a ‘one-family-one job’ approach. Considering the lack of voluntary associations in the study areas, particularly in Samaleswari, it seems clear that not all social interaction takes place in community-based groups and that associational life is minimally group based. Networks of fictive kinship based on work identification were present in the study areas, as we could intimate in some of our unstructured interviews. Simultaneously, it appears that a sense of collective interests has not emerged across these networks. This is an issue, however, for which we do not have sufficient information, but one which we found particularly relevant, especially since it was the company employees or their male relatives who were taking a more leading role within their own community. We would argue, as Howard (1988) did, that we might find significant differences between company and non-company workers with regard to social interconnectedness and community relationships. Specifically, Howard (1988) found, ceteris paribus, a dramatic difference between factory and non-factory workers in Ranchi (State of Bihar) with respect to the character of their sociability strategies and community interactions. As he observed, factory workers “draw more of their relationships from communal contexts apparently conducive to the formation of richer, more complex bonds” (p. 194). The main factor influencing the “symmetric interdependency” of these bonds appeared to be based on whether each participant had a relatively secure resource base (e.g., whether their land or jobs were not subject to a patron’s favor or they could influence other peoples’ allocation of resources). Non-factory workers had to invest their labor and discretion in the source of sustenance – the patron – to the detriment of reciprocal assistance within the communal context. Given the hierarchical nature of patronage structures, the emergence of elaborate structures of supportive interpersonal bonds were also inhibited. Indeed, patronage becomes both the basis of organization of work life and the organizing principle for overall relational structures. Conversely, factory workers, less dependent on patronage for accessing critical resources, tended to rely more on reciprocal assistance with similar, albeit differently situated friends and acquaintances, and even more on institutional channels of resource access like education, organizational membership, radio listening and newspapers.119 In this sense, we agree with Howard’s recommendation that we should look closely in future research at the specifics of “the organization of interdependence” to establish who depends on whom for what in order to understand better the differences in solidarity and cooperative relationships. In addition to a possible high level of identification with work, which would in this case increase community cleavages, even within similar caste or tribal groups, identity categories granted by Mahanadi Coalfields to allocate compensation packages for resettlement and rehabilitation might also contribute to fragment the social fabric even further. In Samaleswari, two villages are categorized as RAP villages, while all the villages, including these two, are IPDP villages, which means in other words that they are entitled to community development. As we explained before, entitled project affected people receive individual compensation, even though a RAP plan is prepared with the facilitation of an NGO. Each category of project affected people provides a different package of entitlements, which

119 While it is true that factory workers lack control over their means of subsistence, their dependence on employment for subsistence is framed by an institutional nexus instead of an interpersonal nexus (Howard, 1988)

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create different interests among “RAP villagers.” Incentives for cooperation among project affected people are not intrinsic to this justifiable manner of addressing issues of compensation in the context of resettlement and rehabilitation.120 Simultaneously, given the expectation that becoming an entitled project-affected person or “EPAP” entails compensation, and most probably a stable job at the mines, many individuals aspired to become one. Being recognized as an IPDP village, on the other hand, meant to a good number of people, to become “formally” a part of the company grounds. For reasons we explore in the following section, however, motivation to take part in community development activities as part of an IPDP village was not as high. The development of a market economy certainly influences the emergence of more individualized private interests. This factor may be even more influential than the difference between individual and collective entitlements that we have addressed in the previous paragraph. As we discussed above, in the more traditional village economy, the sense of community is not only tied to the place where people live but also to a system of traditional economic production and transactions. However, as the market increasingly provides access to the same goods that had to be obtained before through collective action, individuals feel less compelled to cooperate beyond the limits of their close-knit groups. Increasing commercialization of agriculture (in Kalinga) or almost disappearance of agricultural activities (in Samaleswari), coupled with the monetization of the economy and the provision of infrastructure and certain services – at least for some people – by the coal company, have affected dramatically the traditional ways of cooperating to provide collective goods. As the traditional system of resource sharing and service obligations have weakened in the transition to a more market-based economy, for instance, the old reciprocal caste-based relationships between landowners and laborers has been replaced by market relations. Lower caste groups are not compelled to interact with the landowner castes as much. Social cleavages are simultaneously strengthened as the more powerful groups feel threatened and lower groups become more independent of them, albeit more dependent on the coal company. Group-based Associational Life An important issue that we have already identified above is that not all social interaction takes place within groups. In the case of women in our study areas, many of them had developed very informal yet relatively strong “support networks” with other women outside their households, although within the confines of their social and economic, and often, spatial location. As much as males were isolated in their social interaction by caste, class (and related issues such as occupation and identification with work), women also tended to separate themselves by caste and class. Not only do women continue to occupy a completely separate social dimension from men, even when facing the outside world, but also did not attempt to build bridges across networks or groups of women different to those of “their own kind.”121 The only visible groups in the villages comprised of women were the mahila mandals (women’s clubs),122 most of which have died out due to lack of interest and/or resources. In Samaleswari, women in four villages have organized mahila mandals, but only three were relatively 120 As Eyben and Ladbury (1995) explain, if a project, or an entitlement in this case, is something that benefits individuals, as individuals, instead of as community members, the probability for cooperation and collective action is very low. 121 In India, social interaction across women of different class / caste and/or religion is further complicated by the fact that women’s lives are framed by different institutional frameworks. For example, personal laws are different depending on your religious community (see Hasan, 1998, for an informative discussion on the various legal frameworks differentiating women’s access to resources and room for action). 122 These organizations have been promoted by the government to increase women’s participation in community development across villages in India. The official objective is to ensure social equity, economic empowerment and self-reliance of women. Few of these clubs were found to be formally registered under the Society Registration Act in the study areas.

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active.123 In Lajkura, where scheduled caste women had organized the club in 1987, this was inactive. As told to us by its members, the objective of the club was ‘uplifting the social recognition’ of scheduled caste persons. However, due to lack of guidance, funding and internal power conflicts it had soon became defunct. In Kalinga, the situation was similar, if not worse. Most of the women’s clubs found in four of the villages (Majhika, Kalamchhuin, Natada and Danara) were inactive.124

Samaleswari Area – Community-based Groups Village Mahila Mandal Youth Club Village Working Group

Lajkura Inactive Active Active Sukhpara Nonexistent Nonexistent Active Kudapali Active Inactive Active Orampara Nonexistent Nonexistent Active Ainapali Active Inactive Active Kantapali Active (*) Inactive Active Mundapara Active Nonexistent Active (*) The Mahila Mandal of Mundapara also covers Kantapali

Kalinga Area – Community-based Groups125 Village / Town Mahila Mandal Youth Club Village Management

Committee Solada – 4 – Bramhanbahal – – – Nakeispasi – 2 – Majhika 1 1 1 Kalamchhuin 3 5 3 Natada 1 1 1 Danara 1 3 1 If we were to assess the levels of social capital available in the community by the number and type of community-based groups, we would have to conclude that these levels are very low. As we have seen, however, social capital is high but simultaneously fractured by gender, caste and class. The low number of groups seems to indicate to us rather that a good amount of social interaction takes place outside group life, but within the divisions established by the existing social hierarchy.126 Although survey

123 The active women’s clubs met regularly once a month. All the secretaries of the clubs were Anganwadi workers for their respective villages under Integrated Child Development Services. All members contributed Rs. 5 per month as membership fees. The clubs are undertaking similar activities, such as meetings to raise awareness among women regarding health, family planning and nutrition. The members of one village, Kudapalli, had initiated an anti-liquor movement including demonstrations in front of the District Collector’s Office. The lady village head proudly reported that the drinking problem has diminished thanks to the club’s initiative. 124 In Kalinga, none of the women’s clubs have their own building, which made it difficult to conduct meetings and keep records. 125 Community-based groups were found in all villages except Nathgaon, which is a new settlement were all households were recent residents who were still dependent on their respective “mother” villages. 126 Correspondingly, given the characteristics of the mining areas, we do not believe that per capita membership in these types of groups, ratio of number of groups vis-a-vis total population (‘density of association’), or number of households with members would provide any meaningful insights into the quantity and quality of social capital available to community members. Given the one-dimensionality of these groups, we did not think, as well, that respondent’s ratings of the most important group in their lives at the moment or the “wish list” of groups they would like to join were too relevant either. We must note, however, that we have initially considered these indicators.

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respondents in both study areas indicated to be relatively aware of the existence of the community-based groups discussed below, they were not sure about the functions of the groups. The high percentage of unaware respondents would also indicate a low level of interest in getting involved in these types of associations. Through the survey and meetings with members of the various groups, we could intimate that the decision making process is usually dominated by the most powerful members, with the exception perhaps of the youth clubs. Youth clubs, also commonly found across other places in India, have been formed in the study areas with the purpose of promoting participation of youth in social and economic affairs of the villages. Youth clubs were involved in a broad range of issues, including, inter alia, sports, cultural activities, literacy program, health awareness, and community development activities. In Samaleswari, four villages have youth clubs, but only one – in Lajkura – was registered and active. The other clubs were not functioning according to the expectations of their members. Some of the reasons given by members for the low level of activity of the clubs were the lack of interest and the lack of any ‘binding’ force. In Kalinga, youth clubs were found on each village or town except Bramhanbal and Nathgaon. Here, youth clubs were found to be much more active than in Samaleswari. In general, clubs in the study areas have between 40 to 50 members, especially in Kalinga where population density is higher. Most of the members are educated and young. Membership in a club is restricted to residents of a particular village or hamlet. A very important difference between the two study areas is the fact that in Kalinga the traditional Grama Parichala Samiti (Village Management Committee) has survived while in Samaleswari it has become extinct. Traditionally, before the legislation of the Panchayat system,127 the villages were managed by the Grama Parichalama Samiti or Village Management Committee. The relevance of these village committees was reduced significantly under the Panchayat system, especially since several villages were brought together to establish this form of local government. These committees have, as a result, disappeared in most villages across India. Interestingly, in Kalinga all but one village has active village management committees.128 Due to the nature of our exploratory study we did not manage to establish with confidence the main reasons why this might have happened. Some of the reasons might be, first, that most of the villages in Kalinga are much older that the ones in Samaleswari. Second, villages in Kalinga are highly populated and consisting of various caste groups. Initially, the village management committees emerged mainly as conflict resolution bodies. The presence of village management committees might indicate a qualitative difference in social capital resources between the two sites. More research is however required in order to corroborate this assumption. These committees continue to thrive even though the Talcher area. One of our hypotheses is that community identification and dependency on the coal company is less in Kalinga than in Samaleswari, while dependency on agriculture and land-based employment is still significant in Kalinga, and that as such, more traditional forms of community thus tend to survive here. The fact that even youth clubs are more active in Kalinga seems to corroborate this assumption. Another important fact is that there are more common property resources available among the villages in Kalinga, and one of the traditional responsibilities of the management committees has been to protect and manage these resources. In both study areas, on the other hand, people seemed to have lost trust in the Panchayats, which are the only “grass roots” institutions with an inter-village character. All the villages, with the exception of Lajkura and Sukhpara, came in Samaleswari under the Gram Panchayat of Kudapalli.

127 The Panchayati Raj consists of a three-tiered system of local self-government to administer community development in India: (i) a Panchayat in each village; (ii) a council for each community development block; and (iii) a council at the district level (or Zila Parishad). 128 The village is Nathgaon, and that is due to its recent creation

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Lajkura and Sukhpara fall under the Brajrajnagar Notified Area Council.129 The Panchayat, in general, tends to reflect the villages’ social structure and its related cleavages. These committees are primarily involved in dispute and conflict resolution within the community, management of common property resources and in organizing cultural events in the villages. Senior people of the village comprise the committees, following traditional arrangements. The committees follow a very informal type of organization, headed by a senior male, who in the Kalinga area was referred to as Sabhapati (president). Most of the Presidents and other senior members of the committees are from the upper caste ‘farmers group.’ Participation of scheduled tribes and castes representatives is, as it has historically been, very low. According to group discussions with members of these groups, however, they in general trusted the decision making process of the committees and the elders. However, there is also discontent, since there does not appear to be a great deal of concern for their needs.130 These senior persons continue to be influential leaders, and even the newly elected members of Panchayati Raj pay respect to the management of the committees. As indicated in other studies (see, e.g., Lerche, 1991), the village committees are consulted by the local Gram Panchayat in the selection of beneficiaries for government programs. No horizontal linkages exist between the management committees of the villages. As a community-at-large committee, however, its members are entrusted with internal matters of their respective villages. In case of a dispute between two villages, a joint meeting is often called to settle the matters. Major cases, however, are taken to the court of law. A major responsibility of the committees is to protect the common property resources of each village. The fact that we found higher awareness levels among people in Kalinga than in Samaleswari on the usefulness of protecting these resources might be related to the existence of the committees and the availability of more common property resources. The villagers themselves in Kalinga protected the nearby forests. There were agreements in certain villages for people to guard the forests in a turn basis. Management of temples, where available, was also an important responsibility of the management committees. The temples appeared to be well maintained, and there was a sense of generalized pride on having ‘showcase’ temples. Most of the villages have their own ponds. These ponds are used for bathing, pisciculture and in some cases for irrigation. Once a year, these ponds are auctioned and leased out for fishery. The village committee also makes sure that during the drought season the pond water can be equally shared among villagers for irrigation. Sources of funds for the committees included leasing out the village ponds for fish cultivation, charging fines during dispute settlement and collections during village festivities. These funds were deposited in a common village fund managed exclusively by the members of the management committee. Under the new community development guidelines of Coal India, village working groups are promoted in the communities to ensure participation and enhance the sense of ownership of the assets provided among beneficiaries. Correspondingly, a village working group had been established in each village within the study area in Samaleswari by July 1997. These working groups are intended to have a village-wide membership, representative of all castes and tribal population, and to be concerned with the development needs of all the habitations within the boundaries of the so-called IPDP villages. Given their implementing role, the working groups have to interact more closely with the coal company, and that interaction is facilitated by a NGO that has been hired to facilitate the community participation process in general. The village working groups, however, have tended to reproduce the existing social structure and power relations. To organize the village working groups, all villagers were expected to

129 A Notified Area Council (NAC) comes under a Municipal Council, and is considered part of a small urban area. 130 This lack of concern is also motivated, according to Lerche (1991), by the fact that scheduled castes are seen as ‘outsiders’ or peripheral to the centrality of village life, which is reinforced by the fact that spatially they often live in hamlets of their own, separated from the rest of the village.

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select between 10 to 15 representatives, including members of all castes, of all village clusters and at least two female members. Moreover, for those villages with an Anganwandi center (Crechés), the Anganwadi workers were to be included in the group. A President, a Vicepresident, a Secretary, a Treasurer and an Assistant Treasurer are expected to direct the village working group. As we observed, only three working groups have female members. The reason offered by the villagers is that there were no suitable women candidates. We could not ascertain what was meant by this statement. Clearly, an equal representation of all social casts and village clusters was not taken into consideration when the groups were formed. In Lajkura, where as we saw before scheduled castes are marginalized, only one out of the 17 members of the working group belongs to this category, which actually corresponds to about one-third of the total village population. Depending on the situation, traditional institutions can be used as a foundation to foster and/ors strengthen civil society (Esman and Uphoff, 1984) or they can become obstacles to achieve such an objective and therefore new organizations may be needed (Fisher, 1994). However, a priori determination is not possible. Contrary to Fisher, who found that new organizations created from below are not as likely to be dominated by the already powerful, most village working groups in Samaleswari seems to be experiencing this. Further investigation and analysis of this matter, however, is required to conclude with certainty.131 The challenge facing the facilitating NGO is to promote participatory structures in a context of strongly hierarchical social forms, and where mutual dependence and formal and informal cooperation across groups and between individuals is fragmented, if not almost extinct.

Samaleswari – Composition Profile of Village Working Groups (VWGs) By Gender By Group % of SCs and

STs Village Total

members Male Female SC ST OBC Others % SC

in village

% ST in

village Ainapali (431)

14 12 2 1 2 11 – 11 42

Katapali (368)

10 10 – – – 10 – 9 26

Orampara (112)

11 11 – – 11 – – – 100

Mundapara (263)

12 9 3 1 7 4 – 2.6 87

Lajkura (724)

17 17 – 1 6 9 1 30 26

Sukhpara (130)

10 10 – – 10 – – – 100

Kudapali (723)

18 13 5 – 5 6 7 5.7 48

Note: total population of village is given in parenthesis. To conclude this section, we agree with Hyden (1997) that in order to capture the processes of social capital fully, it would be relevant for future efforts to measure how democratic the existing associations are, what kind of norms and values are they fostering, and how do they relate to other associations. Social capital is most likely affected by the characteristics of a community, including economic

131 Work by Mosse (1995) support the observation that new organizations tend to reproduce existing power structures. According to Mosse, however, participatory institutions in the Indian context (such as the village working groups) “are neither as new as they appear, nor a reproduction of the idealized past. They are constituted, negotiated and challenged in the context of existing structures of power which may simultaneously be supported and challenged by powerful project mediators…” (p.144).

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performance and distribution of resources. A key issue in community-based development under the conditions we found in the coal mining areas in Orissa is that any intervention to “build” social capital would mean establishing cooperation among very unequal partners. Impact of social capital may depend on the nature of the association, particularly membership principles and barriers to entry which influence to a large extent who benefits and who does not benefit from a group’s activities. When thinking about effective ways of building social capital, it is crucial to recognize that it would be misleading to ‘put the blame’ for contemporary economic and political failings on the decline of secondary associations and traditional family structure. New forms of social networks and norms of reciprocity may be needed simultaneously in order to facilitate sustainable socio-economic change among communities. Interpersonal Trust and Perceptions on the Need for Cooperation Most survey respondents (84.9 percent) in Samaleswari were aware of the relevance of collective action to improve their communities’ quality of life, although village-wide activities have decreased to a minimum in recent years. This level of awareness was most probably due to the efforts of the facilitating NGO. About 84 percent of survey respondents in Samaleswari also expressed their willingness to contribute either time or money toward activities to improve the quality of life of their communities. What prima facie appears to be cognitive dissonance if one consider the level of social fragmentation, is rather, as we learned through the focus groups and interviews with community members, that “community” means something different to each respondent. Moreover, although people were willing to contribute time or money, they were reluctant to actually do this given the expectation that the coal company would provide for many of the needed public goods. Our fieldwork also revealed that the majority of survey respondents and participants to the workshop and focus group sessions very rarely interacted with those from other social groups and village clusters, and felt that other people of their villages were self-centered and did not care about the welfare of others. Levels of generalized interpersonal trust across different social groups appeared to be rather low, while a sense of mistrust tended to prevail. Not surprisingly, despite the high level of awareness on the importance of collective action, confidence in the sustainability of group effort was low (about 59% of respondents were relatively confident that group effort could be sustained in their villages.) In Kalinga, about 74 percent of respondents felt that collective action was relevant to improving the quality of life in their communities. Interestingly, only 22 percent of respondents here were confident that collective action would be sustainable in their villages. The survival of more traditional village institutions and hierarchical norms are likely to have influenced the perception of respondents. We also included in our survey the following variables to obtain an idea of the willingness of the community-at-large to act together: (a) Willingness to participate in the management of common property resources (which we also

consider to be a good proxy for community cohesiveness). In Samaleswari, there was no structured management system of common property resources in any of the villages surveyed. A good number of these resources have disappeared with the expansion of mining operations, but some forest areas are still available. Although a good number of survey respondents recognized the need to establish a community-based management system for the common property resources, only 27.7 percent of respondents were willing to participate in the integrated management of them. As commented before, in Kalinga, respondents were more willing to share responsibility to take care of common property resources, and they were actually doing it. The survival of the village management committees is definitively an influential factor in increasing this level of awareness. The directionality of causality regarding requires, however, a more rigorous analysis.

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(b) Willingness to participate in Operation and Management (O&M) of village infrastructure. In Samaleswari, willingness to contribute money for future infrastructure maintenance was even lower than the willingness to participate in the management of common property resources. This behavior is heavily influenced by the fact that most people feel that O&M is the responsibility of Mahanadi Coalfields, or the government in the last instance. As we see below, the Coal company has been providing infrastructure for years, and many people did not agree with the new ‘rules of the game,’ particularly since the old rules were still being applied in nearby villages. It is clear from the survey and group discussions in Kalinga that people felt stronger about participating in the O&M activities of village infrastructure. Among the factors affecting this response in Kalinga may be, again, the fact that a traditional institution such as the village management committee was still alive in the area; and that there has been less intervention from the mine authorities regarding the offering of specific entitlements for community development to villages. No concept of RAP or IPDP has been applied in the Kalinga area. However, the Periphery Development Program, that is, the traditional form of community development implemented by Mahanadi Coalfields, continues to operate, and the villages in Kalinga continued to receive benefits from it without having to organize for or contribute to it.

Attitudes Toward Management of Common Property Resources and Village Infrastructure

Attribute Samaleswari (n=141)

Kalinga (n=235)

Felt that community based management is necessary

58.2 88.1

Willing to participate in the management of common property resources

27.7 60.0

Willingness to contribute money for management of common property resources

75.9 62.6

Community based O&M of village infrastructure perceived to be necessary

31.2 74.0

Willing to participate in O&M 25.5 28.5 Willingness to contribute money for O&M 25.5 43.0 Note: Figures in percentages An interesting finding is that in Samaleswari, most respondents were willing to contribute money for the management of common property resources (CPR), while a very low percentage (27.7) were willing to participate directly in the management of these resources. The general sense of mistrust that prevails across various groups seemed to combine with the realization that collective goods can be provided by others, i.e., the coal company or the government. Perhaps more important, many people would not mind paying for provision of collective services, if the could afford it, because traditionally collective action in this respect has not been very democratic. For example, in collective activities, such as management of common property resources, higher caste groups in the past would assume the role of supervisors while the actual work was done by those individuals assigned by tradition the heavy work of the village tasks. This ‘forced labor’ has tended to disappear with the increased influence of the mine economy and the related demise of the agricultural sector. It appears, as we can see in the table below, that interpersonal trust was more generalized in Kalinga. We could observe from these indicators and the focus group sessions, that social interaction with other villages was maintained at a minimum level in both study areas.

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Degrees of Generalized Interpersonal Trust (Indicator: Who would people count on in case of various events)

Type of event Social Unit / Institution

Samaleswari (n=141)

Kalinga (n=235)

Festivals Within family Neighbor Caste group Entire village Neighboring village

15.0 6.8 7.5 68.7 2.0

5.5 6.8 3.8 82.6 1.3

Economic loss No one Relatives Neighbors Village money lender Rural bank

9.3 30.5 43.7 15.2 1.4

13.2 28.5 48.5 8.5 1.3

Dispute between two individuals / families

Among themselves Neighbors Caste group Entire village No response

18.8 9.4 2.7 66.5 2.7

1.7 3.8 0.4 92.3 1.8

In case of any death No one Relatives Neighbor Caste group Entire village

5.2 12.3 26.6 7.8 48.1

– 26.4 30.6 7.2 35.7

Cross-Sectional Linkages (Vertical Articulations – The Company and “its” Communities) It has been increasingly recognized that the State alone cannot solve by itself many of the development problems facing Indian society. Nor can civil society by itself. In many respects, the coal company has been transferred many of the roles of the State in the mining areas, while civil society has been weakened. As we have already stated, what emerges is a de facto company enclave. Many of the challenges of community development in the mining areas go beyond the capacity of this single entity, or any single government agency for that matter. The company does not have the capacity to establish, let alone implement a strategy to develop inter-organizational cooperation that would go beyond the limits of the ‘company enclave.’ State and local governments do not seem to participate actively in the development issues of the villages, attempting rather to pass on the responsibility for their well being to the coal company as much as possible.132 Conversely, it does not appear that the coal company puts the necessary pressure back on State governments, and actually has very limited interaction with them, as we could corroborate during the stakeholders workshop that we organized in Samaleswari. In general, regional and community-based development activities from the district to the village level are largely disconnected. Simultaneously, there is no real meaningful space for participation of the communities themselves in the incipient civil society that prevails in the region. State and/or external society actors such as Coal India and Mahanadi Coalfieds in this case, have provided positive incentives and/or negative sanctions for collective action through their interventions in the area. Increasingly, the coal company has absorbed the social and political pressures transferred to it by State and local governments. Through their projects and programs Coal India has enhanced and/or 132 “…State Governments often feel that the welfare of these communities, in particular the provision of services such as health care and basic education, is the responsibility of Coal India” (World Bank, 1996: 10). Coal India has reluctantly opposed to assume these particular responsibilities. It has, however, engaged in community development activities such as provision of infrastructure, etc.

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deflated the use value of the existing social capital in the mining areas when it has either facilitated or obstructed – wittingly or unwittingly – the creation of bridges across horizontal networks. Also, when it has neglected and/or promoted the vertical articulations available to the company and communities. In this context, some aspects of community development might work in the short run by directly strengthening the communities’ capacity to implement development activities. Others, such as alternative income generation options in lieu of mine jobs will not likely materialize in a large scale unless, for example, the company manages to get the attention of the State government to target certain programs into the area. However, there was, and still is a need for broader facilitation and coordination that should involve the coal company, the State, from the central to the local level, and private sector actors such as rural development banks, credit institutions and so forth. It is highly unlikely that this need is going to be met any time soon, however. Meanwhile, the project-affected people do not feel that they can trust the company completely regarding rehabilitation via self-employment, even if linked to the mine economy. One of the main issues looming behind the relationship between the coal company and the ‘intended beneficiaries’ of its community development activities is the fact that the same agent that is impacting the social and natural environments is also in charge of helping those affected to cope with the consequences of that transformation. In the case of resettlement and rehabilitation, in particular, the displacing agency is also the one in charge of the rehabilitation and resettlement activities. Through its various community development and resettlement and rehabilitation policies, strategies, and action plans, Coal India and its subsidiaries have accepted, at times reluctantly and at times unwittingly, responsibility for development in the mining areas surrounding their operations.133 The relation of dependency and sense of mistrust, however, give specific content to the ways these policies get finally applied in reality. This reality, at the same time, makes this application contingent to external factors such as community pressure, government level of intervention or rather no intervention in the mining areas, individual predispositions of mine officials, etc. Traditionally, most mine managers have made a concerted effort to establish and maintain good relationships with surrounding communities. On the one hand, there are those community members who have become a part of the company, whose welfare should be under the company’s purview.134 On the other hand, there is always the possibility that some communities will put pressure on the company through local politicians or by legal means that can halt some of the mining operations. To some extent, they must be heard and their needs addressed, but without empowering them too much. 135 In this sense, certain limits to cooperation between the company and the communities are always already present in their attempts to build vertical linkages. On the other hand, many groups are quite aware of their dependence on the mines and of the extent to which the development of opencast mining has affected their lives.136 The social environment that prevails in the study areas is not conducive to generalized social trust. Granted, given the larger conditions affecting generalized trust in India, promoting an enabling

133 Resettlement sites, for example, under the new corporate policy have to be provided with basic amenities, such as access roads, schools, health clinics, water supply and electricity (street lights), drains, ponds, community centers, places of worship, grazing land for cattle and playgrounds. Moreover, where applicable, these facilities are to be provided to the ‘host communities,’ or in other words, the communities living near the new resettlement site (Word Bank, 1996). 134 Not much attention was paid to welfare of workers before nationalization of the coal industry. 135 This is understandable to some degree as, according to Singh (1995: 3), “[t]he fringe population was constantly used by local political leaders to pressurize the mine officials for undue favors, in spite of the fact that the mines paid over Rs 2000 crores annually to various State governments as cess and royalty.” 136 The following quote, from a member of the tribal population interviewed in Kanhan, a mining operation located in the state of Madhya Pradesh, interviewed by Singh (1995: 98) is relevant in this respect: “It has been harmful for us, [while] we have become totally dependent on the mines to feed us…” Paradoxically, Singh found “constant references of the tribal starving if the mines close down.”

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environment where generalized trust can grow and solidify is not an easy task, or an effort that can render immediate results. Nor can all be solved at the community level by promoting associations. At a minimum level, however, and within its capabilities, “[a]ny institution with a development agenda must be at once engaged with the communities it seeks to serve and capable of maintaining its own credibility and effectiveness” (Woolcock, 1997: 30). Cementing trusting relationships with the communities, and facilitating the emergence of generalized social trust, on the other hand, have proven to be elusive goals. We have already commented in the previous section the simultaneous relationship of ‘fictive kinship’ and dependency / mistrust that tends to develop between the company and the communities living near its mines. Moreover, levels of commitments and intervention strategies, the ‘rules of the game’ to put it simply, have constantly been redefined. Multiple rules of the game actually co-exist, as financing requirements, state policies, and the relative autonomy of the subsidiary make it almost impossible to come out with a single, consistent, and clear way to respond to the responsibility assumed by the company vis-a-vis community development and resettlement and rehabilitation. Before 1980 there were no clear guidelines on community development for example. As Hyden (1997) explains, it is not feasible to induce individuals to cooperate genuinely or respect each other if the institutional framework is neglected. By institutional framework we mean at this level, first, the vertical articulations between the concerned social and institutional actors (e.g., Coal India, Mahanadi Coalfields, various levels of government, private sector agencies – banks, etc. – and the horizontal associations, networks, and individuals themselves). Second, the policies, strategies, and instruments that provide a sense of generalized social trust independent of – and that may actually enable the expansion of – interpersonal trust. The notion of consulting project-affected people, target communities at large, local state authorities, and NGOs is entirely new to Coal India and its subsidiaries. The various social and institutional actors involved in the community development and resettlement and rehabilitation activities in our study areas have not had a long history of cooperation, nor have they managed adequately their conflicts in the past. Previous interface between the key social and institutional actors in the mining areas – due partially to issues of power, equity and access to resources – has not always developed under cooperative terms. As a matter of fact, intermittent conflict and cooperation cycles have been a central feature of their mutual interaction. The main problem with the resulting situation is that collective experiences do affect levels of trust. Common sense and research (see for instance Brehm and Rahn, 1997) indicates that interpersonal trust is likely to be affected by real life experiences.137 In the long run, those who learn to distrust are supported in their beliefs that the risk implied by trusting is too costly, and a vicious circle begins. Simultaneously, different expectations and levels of expectation are generated through inconsistencies that are systematically applied and not completely solved, as we will see below. The vicious circle may be broken, though, through institutions and processes that ensure that the commitments of the development entity are believable, and that future interventions will be more consistent. Traditionally, Coal India’s and its subsidiaries maintain a close relationship with the communities that fall within the compounds of its implicit domain. Such domain actually extends beyond the one kilometer radius from the mine’s leasehold given in the new corporate community development policy as the mine’s area of influence. This relationship actually begins long before a coal mine is developed, since the company has to start hiring local labor, and has to notify the residents of the area that a mine will be built and that some of their land will be acquired. Mahanadi Coalfields has had a program for community development called “peripheral development,” which has been of a very ad hoc nature and

137 Despite the dependency on the mine economy, we found that many local residents are dissatisfied with living conditions in the mines, but more frequently these are the ones who have not managed to get employment in the company or who feel ‘betrayed’ in some manner by it.

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definitively not community-based.138 Most of the benefits provided to this program have been free of charge, without any intervention of the community during preparation, implementation or operations and maintenance of the projects. As a result, many community members that we interviewed have developed a sense of entitlement in this regard. With the Bank-financed projects, Coal India prepared more coherent guidelines on community development, to guide the actions of company officers and inform communities about what to expect from the company in a consistent manner. Based on this new, demand-based approach, and with collaboration of NGOs, indigenous peoples development plans (IPDPs) are to be prepared annually.139 To ensure that the infrastructure facilities provided through the IPDPs will be maintained, it was considered necessary to build up the commitment and the organizational capacity of the affected communities, as the company only plans to assist with initial operational costs during a two-year transitional period. Under these plans, communities are now expected to contribute in kind (labor and/or materials) or cash. It is also expected that operation and maintenance (O&M) will become each community’s responsibility, with support from the state and local governments. The policy, currently being applied only to mines receiving World Bank financing, requires as well the establishment of the ‘village working groups’ – mentioned in the previous section – to assume responsibility for implementing the community development plans (i.e., IPDPs). CART, the facilitating NGO in Samaleswari organized several meetings with the villagers, along with officials from the company, to convince them of the need to organize the village working committees and to take full responsibility of community development efforts. According to CART, the villagers were not interested initially in organizing such a committee, particularly since now they were required to contribute labor or capital. Each village working group has a signed agreement with Mahanadi Coalfields whereby they are made responsible of implementing community development activities in their respective IPDP villages. Each one has a Bank account in the State Bank of India, which is jointly managed by the President and the Secretary of the village working group. To open the account, people from each village had to contribute with 500 rupees. In a way, community development activities had been undertaken in recent years by the coal company without any saying from the local population, but also without requiring anything from them. One of the main constraints still faced by the NGO is that the new community development guidelines and the IPDPs are being applied in certain mines and villages, while other neighboring villages, often located next to each other, continue to receive the benefits of the free-of-charge and ad hoc peripheral development program. Many of our interviewees did not understand how one village was simply being given these infrastructure assets, while they were supposed to demand them and prove that they ‘deserve’ them by contributing to the program.140 Hence, building a generalized sense of trust among the residents of the IPDP villages continues to be a challenge. At the same time, standards and approaches to the more sensitive issues of resettlement and rehabilitation have also changed due to the nature of projects, regional differences in policies and their implementation, and variations in the approaches and applications across mines (World Bank, 1996). A national resettlement and rehabilitation policy has not been agreed upon in India. However, the State of Orissa has issued guidelines for rehabilitation measures, mainly based on the size of the expropriated land. These measures under Orissa guidelines are given as entitlements for jobs in the coal company for

138 This ‘peripheral’ development’ usually extended around an eight kilometers radius from the mine. 139 To prepare the initial IPDPs, base-line surveys were prepared and participatory planning methods applied for the first time by Coal India. NGOs were hired to undertake these preliminary activities. 140 Of course, under this demand-based approach, communities also have the option to opt out. Considering that this might provide an avenue to become eligible for the other program, it is not surprising that it takes time to convince the communities to accept the allegedly improved community development program.

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the families of the titleholders. Moreover, several resettlement and rehabilitation policies have been developed for other projects in the state that have been implemented with international financing. Many ‘rules of the game’ then seemed to co-exist in the study areas, and project affected people, at least the ones we interviewed, appeared, naturally, to be looking for the one with the most benefits. The co-existence of several policies and entitlements and compensation packages is not problematic in itself when they are applied to different industries or sectors, which may have different impacts on the affected population. What most likely has broken down the sense of trust among project affected people is when coterminous mining areas and specific villages end up being covered by different “rules of the game” in terms of resettlement and rehabilitation.141 Even at the simple level of categories of project-affected individuals, it becomes disconcerting when one policy talks about individual entitlements per se (entitled project-affected persons or EPAPs) and the other one refers to project-affected families (or PAFs). The new corporate resettlement and rehabilitation policy has established many positive changes in relation with past practices. Closer consultation with the project-affected people is required, facilitated by a NGO, and the definition of affected people has been extended to the landless population. On the other hand, Coal India’s decision to curb new employment and stop the practice of providing jobs as entitlements has further diminished levels of trust. People have continued to insist on getting a job in the mines as compensation for loss of land. To make matters more confusing, Mahanadi Coalfields has continued to apply the Orissa guidelines, and tried to give jobs as much as possible. As such, in the eyes of many project affected people in Samaleswari, the possibility of obtaining a job in the mines continues to be very real; an expectation, however, that has turned into frustration and distrust as time passes by. Given that the company has had, or will have in any case, to reduce its offers of employment in exchange for land, the emphasis in Samaleswari is on assisting the project-affected people in developing sustainable opportunities for self-employment. In Kalinga, which is located next to a mine project with Bank financing, the situation of the project-affected people is even more confusing to them since here many of the new requirements of the corporate policy do not apply. For example, no NGO, hired by the company or on its own was found to operate in the area, no community development / resettlement and rehabilitation officer was posted (since it is not yet needed outside Bank-financed projects), and no base-line survey or participatory planning exercises have ever been undertaken. It follows that villages in Kalinga have not been categorized as RAP or IPDP villages, communities did not need to assume any responsibilities for community development, and the concept of village working groups was not known. Moreover, no effort was being undertaken in Kalinga (again, because it was not necessary under Orissa guidelines) to help project-affected people understand that jobs in the mines as means of compensation would not be an option eventually. A critical matter that put the trust in the company, and the system as a whole, into test is the estimation of a ‘fair’ cash compensation amount for landowners loosing their land. This represents a paradox that reflects the complexity of the civil society-state-coal company relation. As we stated in Section III, under the Land Acquisition Act, landowners should be compensated according to the market value of their property. The final decision on the amount of compensation lies with the District Collector, who determines this amount based on claims of the landowners and objective evidence such as reported sales records of similar land in the area. A common practice across many countries is that landowners underreport the sale amount to reduce their tax liability, more so when they do not have much confidence in ‘the system.’ People in Samaleswari and Kalinga are not exceptions to this trend. By their own making, landowners are given a deflated compensation amount, which they often reject. Conflict and lack of trust plague the process of compensating landowners and a whole parallel process

141 Not surprisingly, conflict has grown, and in some RAP villages under Mahanadi Coalfields’ responsibility cases have been taken to court and project-affected people have decided not to accept even the photo identification cards that recognizes them as such.

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of judicial appeals develops. Furthermore, according to surveys undertaken in the Ib Valley area, the process of calculation of compensation is not clear to many of the project-affected people. Simultaneously, the coal company has no jurisdiction over this, given that the process of estimation and disbursement is in the hands of the State government. Collaboration among project-affected persons to find collective solutions to their search for new sources of income and/or employment has not emerged. It is not only that a few people have come forward to join self-employment rehabilitation efforts due to the expectation that a mine job may materialize at any moment, and that many of them do not trust the coal company. It is also a matter of the individualized nature of the compensation offered. This, of course, is understandable since the idea is to compensate each single household according to their losses to ensure individual self-sufficiency. At the same time, even if some of the project-affected people were to access their social capital resources, such decision may not take them too far, as many of them lack enough financial resources to manage to start a cooperative or small business as a group. One of the main challenges faced by anyone interested in preserving existing social capital or developing new forms of social capital in this situation is the fact that income generation strategies have to rely on market mechanisms. Markets, however, reward individual self-interested behavior, simultaneously eroding the shared concerns and responsibilities present in the communities of the project beneficiaries. On the other hand, markets are also selective when allowing access to credit or other resources, and on their own, most project-affected people do not have creditworthiness. The lack of generalized social trust combined with the existing fragmented social capital creates an environment where vertical articulations are minimal and tenuous, and horizontal ones nonexistent. Despite being neighbors, RAP villages and IPDP villages do not seem to find anything in common. We could not detect the existence of any networks of horizontal associations between them, despite the presence of high levels of in-group caste / ethnic solidarity within the habitations. Similarly, no horizontal linkages among the various village working groups has developed in Samaleswari, despite the proximity of the villages, and of the coalmines themselves. Under these circumstances, community-based development is likely to achieve very modest results in Samaleswari. Bargaining power is fundamental to establish respect for freedom of association, which in consequence demands a degree of “scaling up” of organization that must transcend the local level. Regional networks and organizations are an option for scaling up, since they provide opportunities for linking dispersed solidarities, increase bargaining power and facilitate access to information. None of this is present in Samaleswari, or the nearby mining areas that comprise Ib Valley.142

To assess social capital in the context of community development, it is essential to look at the actual and potential ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in transactions mediated by social capital. Social capital does not have an absolute value, but a relative one. The ascribed beneficial or detrimental nature of social capital will vary depending on the social or institutional actor’s stake in the process of community development, which makes it very difficult to avoid value judgements. The valuation of social capital is made difficult by this characteristic. What we found in the study areas is that in the few occasions when some communities came together and their bargaining capacity vis-a-vis the coal company increased (so that they opposed certain decisions of the company, regardless of the fact whether it was ‘justified’ or not), social capital development was perceived by mine officials as not advisable. When the resulting social capital, in the form of village working groups for example, appeared to be compatible with the goals of

142 A Community Development Council has been created in Samaleswari as part of the new corporate policy in an attempt to bring together various sectors of civil society, government and the coal company representatives. The CDC includes the president of the Village Panchayat, Tribal Chief, school teacher, Block Development Officer, the community development / resettlement and rehabilitation officer of the company, Union leader if applicable, NGO representatives when available, and Mahila Mandal representatives.

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the company policy it was well received. In fact, the notion of building bridges among RAP villages and among IPDP villages, and between RAP and IPDP villages, was perceived by many mine representatives as counterproductive and as a threat for the smooth operations of the mines. VI – GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH Dimensions (the Depth) of Social Capital As our exploratory study suggests, a full valuation of social capital cannot be done unless one considers the multidimensionality of the phenomena being assessed (Eastis, 1998; Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1997). It would indeed be limiting to approach social capital by focusing exclusively on associational membership and norms of reciprocity and trust and by assuming that social capital always produces beneficial forms of civic engagement (Edwards and Foley, 1998) or that more of it is always better (Woolcock, 1997). The value added by social capital is not always limited to “good deeds” or the access to “good” or sufficient resources. Given the embeddedness of social relations in social, cultural and economic structures, understanding the “value” of social capital demands, on the one hand, an analysis of the overall distribution and accessibility of social capital resources. On the other hand, it also demands a careful scrutiny of the effects of the nature of distribution and accessibility of these resources on equity – in terms of control of resources and control of access to resources – and democratic outcomes in a community. It follows then that social capital has a relative and contingent nature. Social capital can facilitate all kinds of individual and collective efforts, ranging from community development organizations to death squads (Edwards and Foley, 1998). As Edward and Foley point out as well, “not all social capital is alike in its impact on either group or individual fortunes” (p. 132). In other words, the effects of social capital are not homogeneous, especially since certain associations and/or networks of individuals can have more spill over effects (positive and/or negative) than others (Fox, 1996). Depending on the context, a given form of social capital may have a different meaning and use value for the concerned individual and groups. Associating lack of social capital directly with poverty status would thus be a mistake, since it is possible that a poor individual may have access to plenty of social capital resources as our exploratory study suggests.143 In the process of community development, the ascribed beneficial or detrimental nature of social capital will vary depending on the stakeholder, which makes it very difficult to avoid value judgements. Two issues should thus be separately approached in any attempt at constructing a ‘balance sheet’ of social capital resources: first, the full range of possible effects of social capital; second, the particular costs and benefits of social capital for the concerned stakeholders. These issues are intertwined, since we cannot completely separate the local(ized) effects of social capital from its ripple effects on the larger political economy. Vice versa, we cannot completely delink the larger social and economic context from the local effects of social capital. Finally, we cannot assume that by aggregating individual social capital we could estimate the overall social capital resources available to a community, a city or a society-at-large (Edwards and Folley, 1998). As stated before, social capital is better approached analytically as a resource of individuals and of groups of individuals. Collective social capital cannot simply be assumed to be the sum of “individual” social capital (Portes and Lindolt, 1996). Thus, access to social capital is differential while its use value is context dependent. Accordingly, the value added of social capital resources to community development can be positive or negative. Associations are not all the same regarding the amount and kinds of social capital “produced,” and their “productivity may change over time” (Stolle and Rochon, 1998). 143 See also Junho Pena and Lindo-Puentes’ (1998: 20) study of social capital among rural and urban communities in Panama. According to their findings, “…the poor and the extreme poor account for a disproportionate share of those living in communities with high social capital.”

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Distribution and Access to Social Capital Resources Access to and control of social capital resources is not equally distributed throughout a community (Fox, 1996). Similarly to other forms of capital, access to the reserves of social capital is also differential.144 To put it in Granovetter’s terms, “networks of social relations penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees in different sectors of economic life” (1985: 491).145 To a certain degree, social capital is valuable due to its scarcity and exclusivity (Whittington, 1998). In particular, access to social capital will depend on one’s social location, and will be constrained by various factors such as the level of geographical and social isolation, lack of financial resources, and the specific institutional arrangements that structure everyday life (Edwards and Foley, 1997).146 On the other hand, the “use value” of social capital is affected by its own social location, independent of who appropriates it (Edwards and Foley, 1997). To quote Edwards and Foley, “…not all social capital is created equal” (p.673). The value of a given form of social capital for enabling some action depends – perhaps to a large extent – on the social and economic location of the social capital in a community. The resources made available by accessing the social capital at hand, can be simultaneously limited and constraining. While some social capital may be nested within dynamic sectors, for instance, others may be connected to declining or contracting ones. By appropriating the latter ones, a group of individuals may obtain some benefits, but these will be short lived. Even worse, in the long run, the actors’ future becomes closely linked to that of the particular sector.147 At the group level, it does not always hold that the resources a person obtains through his or her relationships within a group are available to all members of the group or that all members of a group have equal access to the group’s resources (Astone et al., 1998). Effects of Social Capital Our findings in Samaleswari and Kalinga clearly suggest that each form of social capital can have different, sometimes contradictory effects. There are positive and negative effects of social capital that should be identified and accounted for when evaluating the social capital resources of a given community (Putzel, 1997; Rose et al., 1997). In the notion of social capital that has developed on the basis of Putnam work, there has been a tendency to romanticize the image of community, and to neglect some of the adverse effects of sociability (Portes and Lindolt, 1996). Our fieldwork supports the conclusions emanating from recent research on social capital, which has corroborated that sociability has desirable and not-so-desirable consequences (Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1997). The implicit mistake in many cases has been to assume that social capital is not just a public good, but intrinsically for the public good (Putzel, 1997). The normative underpinnings of what is desirable or not so desirable notwithstanding, it is safe to assume that social capital can be a public good and a public bad, alternatively or even simultaneously. In other words, as a common property (social) resource, social

144 As Fox (1996: 1099, Endnote no. 2) puts it, “…social capital is not necessarily “continuously distributed” either horizontally “across” often segmented societies, or vertically from local to broader levels of organization.” 145 This is congruent with Bourdieu’s (1986: 249) assertion that “[t]he volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent…depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.” 146 For example, Edwards and Folley (1997: 672) explain, “ increased educational attainment generally enables one to experience more diverse social relations and gain access to wider networks of weak ties than their former peers who went directly from high school to full-time employment.” 147 Edwards and Foley (1997) provide as an example the case of low-income inner-city youth, where the white peer group would gain employment by accessing a long-standing network of connections. Such social capital provided most Whites in the neighborhood, including those with criminal records, drug problems or low educational attainment with blue-collar jobs. However, despite the access to relatively abundant social capital resources, their long-term prospects were limited since the social capital that they accessed connected them increasingly stronger with a declining economic sector. The jobs offered were mainly under the table and without opportunities for advancement, as the particular sector became stagnant and unstable throughout the 1980s.

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capital may have positive and/or negative externalities. Social capital can certainly enhance the efficiency of physical and human capital, and can facilitate economic exchange and coordination. It can be useful to an individual by providing a form of insurance, reliable information about others, and reduction in transaction costs through norms and effective sanctions. Social capital does have an important role to play in the achievement of social goals in general and community development objectives in particular. But there are forms of social capital that had been or are illiberal and socially exclusivist, as we could also observe in our two study areas. In the words of Putzel, “…the mere existence of networks and norms that facilitate economic exchange says little about whether such networks will ‘make democracy work’” (p. 943). Certain civic society groups, thanks to a large degree on their social capital resources, can manage to secure a considerable share of community resources (Woolcock, 1997). Even though social capital is not completely fungible, it is often so, to the extent that a form of social capital that may have been critical in facilitating certain actions, may be conversely useless or even harmful in other cases (Harriss and De Renzio, 1997; Coleman, 1990; 1988). Associations can be created to achieve a wide range of objectives, some of which may have adverse impacts on other individuals or groups (Grootaert, 1997). Social capital represents a potential for action, or opportunity, which can be actualized in many different ways. Some forms of social capital allow certain individuals and groups to claim resources at the expenses of others. Importantly, as Granovetter (1985) puts it, although social relations are often a necessary condition for trust and trustworthy behavior, they are not sufficient to ensure these. On the contrary, social relations may actually provide opportunities and means for malfeasance and conflict, perhaps larger than if they did not exist at all. In other words, a group may actually have access to too much social capital. According to Granovetter, the trust created by personal relations provides, by its very existence, increased opportunity for malfeasance.148 Putnam (1993a: 221) concedes that “[n]ot all associations of the like-minded are committed to democratic goals nor organized in an egalitarian fashion. Consider, for example, the Ku Klux Kan or the Nazi Party. In weighing the consequences of any particular organization for democratic governance, one must also consider other civic virtues, such as tolerance and equality.”149 Furthermore, Putnam (1993b) has identified the challenge that still waits in front of researchers of social capital in this respect. As he explains, social inequalities may be embedded in social capital. “Norms and networks that serve some groups may obstruct others, particularly if the norms are discriminatory or the networks socially segregated.” This is a critical observation that makes India a dramatic example of what usually prevails in many developing countries. Social capital in the context of tight community and fragmented networks, as it has traditionally been in Samaleswari and Kalinga, might be more useful to those seeking to maintain discipline and to promote compliance among those “under their charge.” For example, social organization in our study areas has given way to specific structures of facilitation and constraint that make certain forms of social capital more valuable (in terms of use value) for specific groups and individuals. In Samaleswari and Kalinga, the ‘darker’ side of social capital may include, inter alia, interest-group maneuvering, divisive identity politics and social fragmentation. Conflict has a central role in the construction of collective identities not just in our study areas, but in India as a whole. One imagined 148 For example, in the business world, crimes such as embezzling would not be possible were it not for the relationships of trust that present an enhanced opportunity to certain individuals of manipulating accounts. Secondly, fraud and force are most efficiently carried out by groups of individuals. Not surprisingly, a social network with a good level of internal trust can easily turn into a ‘network of malfeasance.’ In the end, the scale of disorder created by force and fraud will depend heavily on the way the network of social relations is structured. When there are insufficient crosscutting ties, coalitions can emerge calling in allies that are more connected to the respective channels of the social network to block the access to resources from other competing parties (Granovetter, 1985). 149 Although, according to Putzel (1997), the indicators used by Putnam do not exactly look comprehensively to the various dimensions of social capital implied in this quote.

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community, as described before, tends to be defined in opposition to what is not to be another one. Not all community-based efforts are intrinsically democratic or socially responsible, however. Similarly to the conceptualization of social capital, theories of community have tended to focus on the positive qualities ascribed to the concept, neglecting that “[t]he history of a community includes sorrow and tragedy, as well as progressive development in terms of its purposes and shared beliefs” (Cochran, 1989: 434). Interactions within the household, between household members and the outside world, and among community members take place in a context of fractured social worlds and conflicting demands.150 Certain networks of civic engagement may be a source of trust, but they can also be a source of distrust. As much as they promote trust within, they elicit mistrust without. Social interaction that “produces” social capital may as well intensify conflicts, instead of ameliorating them. Two key set of variables that need to be investigated more intensively in the future are political factors and power relations. These are critical variables whenever the social organization, such as the one that prevails in the study areas, and the resulting social capital resources, do not allow to access equally all individual members through community development, or do not guarantee that collective action is completely voluntary and will benefit everybody equally. In the case of village life in India, Neale (1990: 154) concludes “[s]ecurity of status and manipulation of ritual-ranking and or sources of political power remain central to the management of the village as an economic unit and to the distribution of income and wealth within the village” Political Variable The wider political and economic context and the way in which inequalities of power and resources are played out in this context will affect the role played by, and the impact of civic society organizations. This is made clear by the conditions, described in the previous section, that characterize both of our study sites. While certain studies (e.g., Putnam, 1993a) have indicated that ‘civic engagement’ leads to good governance, it is as likely that causality may also work in the opposite direction, as historical evidence seems to indicate. The networks and relationships created by association do not guarantee by themselves political outcomes (Putzel, 1997). There are significant differences across various kinds of social clubs and organizations regarding levels of political mobilization and community action. An individual’s rich social life may not necessarily translate in political competence (Almond and Verba, 1963). Furthermore, differential mobilization of the population can lead, and has effectively led in many cases, to the emergence of very particularistic demands. Indeed, mobilization of groups on the basis of ethnic, racial, religious or other ascriptive criteria may undermine more than enhance democracy. Simply put, one person’s civic society’s group can be another person’s pressure group. It is relevant for future research, therefore, to distinguish between the ‘mechanics of trust’ (the operation of networks, norms, etc.) and the ‘political content and ideas’ disseminated through these networks and reflected in the shared norms (Putzel, 1997). Networks and norms underlying trust between individuals and groups may facilitate exchange. Nevertheless, the effective contributions of these networks to the community-at-large will depend on the political ideas and programs channeled through them.151 At the same time, the capacity of well-mobilized groups to make effective demands on government can remain limited. Civic associations, adds Whittington (1998), can foster social capital that can be transformed 150 Coleman (1993), in this respect, explains that the normative systems of small close communities have many unpleasant aspects, as they rely more on constraints and coercion than on incentives and rewards; they are inegalitarian and discriminatory; and thus inhibit innovation and creativity. 151 Putzel (1997) provides the example of the overseas Chinese business networks in East Asia and Southeast Asia, which have managed to gain an advantageous position in the market by establishing solid networks of trust. However, the trust built within these networks runs parallel to other networks of trust in the host society, thereby remaining civically disengaged. It is a resource available to the Chinese minority communities, which has certainly contributed to economic growth. On the other hand, by the very success, the Chinese minority has reserved for themselves a profitable sector of the market.

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into economic and political success, but they can also foster resentment that can engender political turbulence and distrust. Moreover, there is no guarantee that demands will always be of a democratic nature, or that when these demands are of a democratic nature, they will not conflict with the social order, or in our specific case, with the stated objectives of a development project. Three key points related to this, which we think are critical for future research, are: (i) horizontal organization in civil society cannot be assumed to be always in the interests of society at large; (ii) a differentiation between different types of organizations must be made (football clubs and choirs, for example, are not the same as labor unions in terms of their implications and effects); and (iii) power relations should enter the evaluation of social capital – social capital can have adverse effects for many members of society, particularly those who are relatively powerless (Harriss and De Renzio, 1997). In short, one of the main evaluation factors of social capital resources ought to be the level and reach to which associational life and the concomitant collective action promotes democratization through community development. Power Relations A full understanding of social capital demands that we analyze the exercise of power and strategies of resistance that take place at the moment of social interaction. Social interaction involves – or to be more precise, produces and reproduces systematically – relations of inequality intrinsic in power relations. In a Foucauldian sense, power is dispersed, omnipresent and immanent (Foucault, 1980). People are positioned differently with respect to the resulting power structures, which are constituted by various axes of identity (e.g. gender, class, ethnicity) (Kapadia, 1997). Social capital resources exist within the same social space where power relations are effected. As Foucault explains it, power is co-extensive with the social body; power relations are, as such, intricately woven into other kinds of social relations, such as production, kinship, family, or sexuality. Social relations play a conditioning role for, while being simultaneously conditioned by, power relations. This assumption, which implies, in Foucault’s (1980) words, that ‘power is always already there’ in social exchange, does not mean that it would be useless to promote social capital. As Foucault puts it, “…there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised…[Resistance] exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies” (p.142). Foucault’s analysis help bring focus on what he called ‘micro-processes of power’ that are exercised at the level of everyday life, that is of sociability. It does this by also helping us to reinforce the argument presented in the previous section on the political variables influencing social capital. Indeed, Foucault understood the extent to which government institutions mattered, but also realized that the dispersed mechanisms of power that existed outside the state, in civil society – below and besides the State apparatuses – were as important. All together, they constitute, as stated above, structures of facilitation and constraint to access resources and to control the access and resources available in a society.

VII – CONCLUSIONS: SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECTS AND POLICY Implications for Community Development Projects Lack of village cohesion represents a major challenge for successful implementation of community development in India. Community development strategies, at the same time, have increasingly become dependent on the social capital of the target communities. By now, a relatively standard approach to community development, applied to a great extent in the most recent efforts of Coal India in the mines under World Bank financing, has emerged. This standard approach includes community consultation during project preparation, and participation during implementation. Accordingly, local problems and

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priorities are to be identified by the communities themselves, under the constraints determined by the promotion of low cost investments and minimal subsidies, and the emphasis on cost recovery. More importantly, this standard approach is demand-based, requiring a high degree and actual demonstration of commitment by the communities. The latter rationale is based, moreover, on the emerging consensus that sustainability of the expected benefits can only be ensured by continued involvement of the communities, present and future. All these assumptions lead to one logical conclusion: the standard approach can only work through community-based groups, that is through the promotion of existing social capital or by building the needed social capital. However, the standard approach to community development has been based, at least in the Indian context, on unrealistic notions of the nature of community in the villages and of the possibilities and democratic content of collective action. As we have already mentioned in the sections above, there are three critical issues missing from these assumptions: (a) social capital is not inherently beneficial to all members of the community; (b) horizontal forms of social capital are important, but without proper vertical articulations the impact of community development efforts will be very constrained; and (c) external agents can help in facilitating the creation of social capital, but their presence can create dependency on the communities. For example, when the associational life required for project implementation becomes heavily dependent on the intermediation of these agents, sustainability of induced social capital may be low. Community development cannot be exclusively limited to the improvement of the economic situation of the target population. It should include interventions to democratize community life, and it is in this area where the standard community development approach is lacking. It has been assumed that communities are inherently democratic, or that by simply promoting new groups that include representatives of all groups in a community, ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’ is guaranteed. The fundamental constraint is that, as we could corroborate during our fieldwork, communities – ‘village civic society’ in our case – are not structured in a way that will facilitate the absorption of external resources or any kind of aid equally across the intended beneficiaries. In the specific case of India, village civic society remains extremely hierarchical, despite many positive changes brought about by development. A critical insight from our fieldwork is that the design of projects partially or completely dealing with community development should pay attention to the social relations prevalent in the target community, and specially to the nature and forms of available social capital. The issue at hand is not to identify these relations to attempt to maintain them, as many of them can engender non-democratic forms of participation and collective action. Rather, what should be understood during project preparation is the ways these relations and concomitant social capital may function as ‘regulators’ of the relationships between groups and within groups in the target community, on the one hand, and of the access to resources and control of those resources once access has been facilitated, on the other.

In the context of village life in India, village-wide groups, as indicated by our study and corroborated by previous research (e.g., Jayaraman and Lanjouw, 1999; Mosse, 1996; 1995), are not effective mechanisms for democratic planning and decision making. Most village-wide groups tend to ignore certain sections of the population, and are dominated by the most powerful groups, while women are given a very limited role, if any. New village-wide groups most likely will fall within this pattern. Moreover, when the new groups are created to become ‘implementators’ of community development, they are perceived mainly as part of the development agency’s system. This was reinforced in our study areas, for instance, by the fact that the village working groups had to sign a contract with the coal company. As a result, although these groups have been formed in all the villages, they do not as yet have a social existence. A fundamental issue in community development is the definition of ‘community.’ Most community development programs have assumed that the village is the community and as such it should remain or made self-sufficient. As we have emphasized, the existence of community does not often correlates with the physical space ascribed to it. In rural India, the issue is even more complex. Although the unit

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of territorial organization is the village, the village itself does not have a clear physical identity. Community is usually associated with the official boundaries of the ‘Revenue Village,’ as is the case under the new community development guidelines of Coal India. However, the villages are comprised of distinct hamlets or habitations, which usually correspond to specific castes or tribal groups. Scheduled castes are usually peripheral to village life spatially and socially. Many of these hamlets have more in common with hamlets of other Revenue Villages than with the village community where they are assumed to belong. In reality, the hamlet is the center of day-to-day social exchange. The village does have a social identity as community, but this is a dynamic process shaped by the various forms of dependence, competition, and factional conflict that characterizes hamlets’ relations (Mosse, 1996). Even though social capital does not come into being exclusively at the moment of being used (Astone et al., 1998),152 its “use value” will vary according to the possible usages ascribed to it. An implicit bias can be found in the research on social capital in developed societies due to the emphasis given to sociability or social interaction in the realm of peoples’ leisure time. In other words, the focus has been on the pattern or networks of voluntary social interaction (e.g., secondary, or rather tertiary associations such as soccer clubs or birdwatching societies) that takes place outside more or less compulsory social interaction such as the family or the workplace. This ‘level of civicness’ – to borrow Putnam’s (1993a) terminology – translates somehow in enhanced democratic processes and good governance. In the context of developing countries, and particularly in reference to poor communities, social capital has been given a more encompassing role. The search has been for ‘developmentally valuable forms of social capital’ and the recommended strategy to promote ‘desirable forms of social capital’ (Beall, 1997). The underlying questions of "valuable for what" and "desirable for whom", Beall points out, have not been addressed adequately. Association among community members is assumed to be essential in achieving development goals and sustainability of services delivered or benefits accrued through particular programs and projects. Association is taken to be necessary to achieve community development goals, in the sense that social capital makes it possible to provide collective goods more extensively and cheaply (Stolle and Rochon, 1998). Distinctions between “voluntary” and “non-voluntary” cooperation (i.e. association and cooperation), and between leisure time and working hours become moot as people are expected to help themselves and compensate for the lack of services and resources in the face of the government’s fiscal incapacity. In other words, associations are identified as essential elements for the successful solution of “common” problems since other service – mainly public – providers are too weak or nonexistent. In this context, the value of social capital is seen to lie in its compensatory role for the deficiencies prevalent in society that arises from unmet social needs.153 Civic cooperation, under these circumstances, becomes a matter of collective action to implement development programs and plans, while organizations and activities associated with advocacy and political action are excluded or not so strongly promoted. The “use value” of social capital is thus restricted to cooperative and voluntary social relations demanding leisure time, while the potential “use value” of translating these relations into political resources is neglected.154

152 By this Astone et al. (1998) imply that just by “having” stocks of social capital individuals may behave different, so that the effects of social capital are felt regardless of the fact that the holders of social capital actually use their resources. 153 This fact points out back to the relative nature of social capital, because if these social needs were met – as it often is for certain groups in society – the value of social capital represented in associations is deemed to change. 154 Buckland (1998) offers a useful distinction in this respect. At the simplest level of analysis, social capital may be seen as central to facilitate cooperation and community participation as a means to reduce project implementation costs and achieve immediate results. However, when the “use value” of social capital is seen as ‘empowerment,’ the implication is that social capital in the community will facilitate social and political organization that, in the long term, will provide wider access to other resources.

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In relation to above, it should be understood that as much as sociability and collective action have benefits, they also have costs. Investing in social capital, particularly in voluntary associations to implement community development activities, or manage certain community affairs (e.g., operations and maintenance of community infrastructure assets) can create additional demands for certain individuals and groups in the community. Most poor households are already paradoxically overworked and underemployed in India. Unemployment and underemployment coupled with low and irregular incomes are major factors affecting the poverty levels of most of these households. The considerable growth of poverty-induced employment is an expression of the fact that, in the face of a non-existent safety net, the poor can not afford to remain idle. Indeed, it is only by sending a larger number of household members to work that poor households manage to survive. It is in this context that the promotion of social capital for community development must be understood in order to avoid overburdening the intended beneficiaries with ‘voluntary’ membership in community groups. As our study also suggests, vertical relationships and connections to broader networks matter more than it has been normally realized. In the context of Indian society, this realization is key to avoid perpetuating the notion of self-sufficient, decentralized village-communities. Sustainable community development, even if supported by the existing social capital resources, can not be realized solely from within the communities themselves. In a study of community-based solid waste management efforts in Bangalore, Beall (1997), for example, found that differences in access to resources and the existing power structures affected the process and final outcome significantly. Accordingly, “[t]heir experience showed that by simply coming together, these horizontally organized neighborhood associations were unable to promote trust and reciprocity beyond the group and in one case, even within it” (p. 957). Issues of power of dealers over children, householders over waste collectors and rich neighborhoods over poor hindered the emergence of trust. It was also impossible to ignore the broader structural issues,155 and – despite the urban setting – the caste system itself that still determined who was supposed to do the ‘dirty’ jobs. Unfortunately, Beall concludes, “…existing inequalities in the distribution of urban services across the city were simply reinforced by community organizations mobilizing and using connections to achieve improved solid waste management” (p. 960). As Miller (1997) also concludes in her study of Boston – a city located in a developed country such as the United States – at the community level, “simply building relationships is not enough.” It is often taken for granted that NGOs should act as bridges between vertical and horizontal networks. And this is indeed a reasonable assumption. The NGO, however, is often an external agent operating in the middle of the delicate balance of interests and power existing in the communities. Congruently with Buckland’s (1998) findings, we observed that due to the necessary emphasis on short-term objectives, such as income generation and provision of social services, the NGO and other agencies working in the study areas have tended to neglect longer-term issues such as social organizing to maintain and build social capital. Promotion of community networks and extended normative behavior (generalized trust) has been lacking, while the emergence of new forms of civic engagement has been hindered by cultural patterns and social and economic trends. A key issue, also identified by Buckland (1998) in the context of community development in Bangladesh, is the fact that social capital promotion, mostly undertaken by the NGO in Samaleswari in our case, generally introduces new norms and incentives for interaction. However, the new forms of social interaction tend to be heavily mediated by the NGO. As a result, the associational mechanism established and the ‘strategic alliances’ are sustained mostly by the NGO’s intermediation.156 Thus, the issue of sustainability of new associations and partnerships promoted under

155 For example, citywide level competition between organizations representing the strong over organizations representing the weak that resulted in strengthened relationships of patronage and clientelism 156 Buckland (1998) explains this similar finding in the case of an irrigation program developed by the Proshika Unnyan Kendra, an NGO in Bangladesh. Their approach is to establish irrigation associations mostly comprised by landless laborers from the vicinity of the irrigation pump, who sell the water to local farmers located in the

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community development programs should be monitored carefully. NGOs and other external agents should not be expected to continue being the intermediary of these social relations over a long time period. In summary, based on our findings and analysis of the two study areas, we offer below some tentative thoughts for further discussion regarding the implications of social capital for community development. (1) Social capital cannot be built, promoted or transformed exclusively from within the community. (2) New types of community organizations should often be promoted, but these cannot be designed

in isolation from the social and economic context of the community, and from the wider institutional framework facilitating or constraining the generalization of trust.

(3) Instead of one particular model of local organization (e.g., village working groups), a wide

variety of community organizations should be promoted, according to the various objectives and activities of the community development strategy. Reliance on group-based activities should be compensated with other associational forms such as networks of individuals, which ideally should reach outside a particular community.

(4) Building social capital through community development requires triggering a process of social

re-organization that takes advantage of informal, often invisible forms of association. New organizations are unlikely to change existing social relations immediately or in a short period of time.

(5) When feasible, it may be better to start promoting the creation of small groups within existing

social solidarities. In other words, it is critical to start working the existing social structure from the inside out. However, creation of small groups in isolation might exacerbate social cleavages in the long run. Parallel to this, horizontal linkages across these groups should be facilitated, and vertical articulations with state and private organizations purposely sought. The initial benefit of intensive intra-community integration should be transformed into extensive extra-community linkages. This is important in the light of the increasing popularity of poverty alleviation and community development strategies based on the promotion of small groups for microfinance, agricultural and environmental management programs, among others.

(6) Promotion of social capital must be complemented with concerted efforts to generalize social

trust. A critical step is to avoid inconsistencies regarding the application of procedures, regulations and requirements that affect the institutional framework supporting the existence of generalized social trust. As we saw in our study areas, the co-existence of many old and new ‘rules of the game’ contribute to generalize mistrust. Simultaneously, credibility of the development agency – in this case the coal company – is adversely affected when beneficiaries are treated differently under similar conditions.

(7) Excessive reliance on community-based groups to achieve the objectives of community

development might create unidentified dependency relations of individual members, in particular the most vulnerable ones, with respect to the community. It must be kept in mind, as

command area. Some members of the association include medium farm households under the assumption that their inclusion is required to obtain other upper class members’ support of the program. The scheme was successful in the sense that the better off farmers collaborated and did not benefit disproportionately. However, the associational mechanism that provided the strategic alliance between landless laborers and elites, and that ensured the scheme’s sustainability, depended heavily on the NGO’s intermediation.

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we could observe in our fieldwork, that the greater the benefits expected from the community group, the greater people are ‘willing’ to tolerate excessive obligations. If the interpersonal bonds of dependency that may already prevail in a given community are transferred into the newly created groups by making them the main or only providers of certain services or public goods, chances are that these relationships of dependency might be strengthened rather than weakened. As Hechter (1987: 46) explains it, if careful attention is not paid to this issue, “…at the end, members may become beholden to [the group] for their very survival.”

(8) Sociability has benefits but also costs, which may be higher for the poor who do not have as

much leisure or idle time to invest in building social capital purposely. (9) The external social actors, be it an NGO or other type of organization, should have as an

objective to make itself redundant in a reasonable time period. Implications for Policy Social capital does matter for community-based development. However, it might be better understood as one of a variety of assets available in different degrees to each member a community, particularly a poor one (Moser, 1998). Exclusively mobilizing their internal “communal” resources may not reclaim the social and economic health of a community. Social capital by itself cannot provide the solutions to major social and economic problems. First, social capital may be of limited value if not combined with other forms of capital, namely, natural, physical and human. As such, the concept has to be understood as one, perhaps critical, element within the comprehensive view of development. Moreover, it has to be assessed in its complexity to avoid value judgements of communities, cities and entire countries. Second, the structures of facilitation and constraint that characterize a society demand that social capital be promoted simultaneously at the local level through networks of individuals and groups, and at the institutional and policy level. The State still must play a role in diminishing the close and often risky ‘personalized dependencies’ of people on each other. Certain traditional associations which may have been necessary under certain circumstances, and that perpetuated certain roles on women and other vulnerable groups, may be bound to disappear, and perhaps should be replaced by larger collective state institutions. The enthusiasm surrounding the concept of social capital stems from the acceptance that it is a resource or asset that provides an alternative to the heavy hand of the central government, and an effective tool to improving governance. It is a concept that fits perfectly into the current promotion of decentralization. However important the features of social organization are to community development policy and projects, they are significantly affected by political institutions and their capacities, including the State. Attempting to create social capital without recognizing this fact, is to attack “the symptoms not the causes of the problem” (Tarrow, 1996: 396). There are societies and communities, such as those in our study areas, where social capital may be abundant – even if fragmented – but which lack other key resources and assets to allow certain groups to escape poverty or to make significant progress in terms of democratic political participation (Warren, 1998; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997). Social capital matters, but its promotion should be framed within a process of democratization that should be an integral objective of community development. In short, civic society and its social capital matter for community development, but in the context of government institution and the general institutional framework of society-at-large. Associations, albeit not all, may be built up with the support of the state. As Putzel (1997: 947) concludes, “a strong state and strong civil society must go together.” It is key to introduce in the analysis and approaches to building social capital the possibility of supportive relationships between state and civic society. In general, it appears that all communities are endowed with at least a minimal stock of social capital (with negative ands positive effects), from family and kinship ties to cooperative arrangements among friends

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and neighbors. The difference would lie in how social capital is scaled up, or whether it is scaled up through the interaction between the state and private and voluntary organizations in order to create solidarity ties and social action that reaches levels of political and economic efficacy. Finally, if the main objective of community development is to empower individuals, to foster autonomy, to promote personal growth and self-realization through market processes, the notion of social capital is relevant in the sense that it underscores the importance of other necessary means of empowerment to support market processes and facilitate the emergence of democratic, civic communities.

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ANNEXES

MAP 1

Samaleswari area is located in the District of Jharsuguda; Kalinga is located in the District of Angul.

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ANNEX 1

SAMPLING DESIGN AND COVERAGE

SAMALESWARI STUDY AREA Sampling Design and Coverage There are four villages comprising of seven habitations within the area of influence of Samaleswari Open Cast Project (SOCP). There has been no physical displacement from any of the villages, although lands have been acquired from two villages, namely Lajkura and Kudapalli. The habitations have not been relocated due to cost effectiveness reasons. Hence, following the definition of ‘RAP’ and ‘IPDP’ villages, two villages would be RAP villages, while all the villages are considered under IPDP (community development). In order to draw the sample households from these villages the following steps were used:

(i) house-to-house listing of all the households (details shown in Table 1.1)

(ii) stratifying the list according to castes

(iii) drawing total of 30% sample from each stratum by following systematic Random

sampling technique and thereby arriving at an overall sample size of 30%

Table Demographic Profile of the Villages coming under SOCP (1 km radius) Total households Population Sl.

No. Village

Total SC ST OBC General Total Male Female SC ST OBC General 1 Kudapalli 126 8 62 43 13 723 357 366 41 345 260 77 2 Lajkura 136 46 35 44 11 724 379 345 219 190 254 61 3 Sukhpara 23 0 23 0 0 130 53 77 0 130 0 0 4 Mundapara 44 2 37 5 0 263 130 133 7 229 27 0 5 Ainapalli 64 8 25 31 0 431 227 204 48 183 200 0 6 Orampara 18 0 18 0 0 112 65 47 0 112 0 0 7 Karapalli 59 6 15 37 1 368 190 178 34 96 232 6 Total 470 70 215 160 25 2751 1401 1350 349 1285 973 144

Accordingly, a total of 141 households, i.e., 30 percent of the total households, were selected for the survey out of 470 households living within the study area.

Table Sample Coverage for Samaleswari Study Area

Sample coverage Sl. No.

Village S.C. S.T. OBC Others Total

1. Lajkura 15 11 13 3 42 2. Kudapalli 2 19 12 4 37 3. Sukhpara - 7 - - 07 4. Orampara - 5 - - 05 5. Ainapalli 2 8 9 - 19 6. Katapalli 2 5 11 - 18 7. Mundapara - 11 2 - 13 Total 21 66 47 7 141

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As shown in Table 1.2, the sample households were selected so as to represent all the caste groups of the villages. This has been done in order to obtain a more clear assessment of the intra- and inter-group relationships and interactions prevailing in the area.

Household category The respondents of RAP villages were selected from:

(i) those who were directly affected as their lands were acquired by MCL.

(ii) Those who were affected due to typical land-labor linkages prevailed in these village

(iii) Households of IPDP villages

Table Household Category according to Affected Type

Affected type SC ST OBC Others Entire land 8 10 12 3 Partial land 1 6 - 2 Affected due to land-labor linkage 8 14 13 2 IPDP 4 36 22 - TOTAL 21 66 47 7

KALINGA STUDY AREA Sampling Design and Coverage The area of influence of Kalinga OCP consists of 11 villages out of which 3 villages are uninhabited. All these villages are affected due to one or a combination of the following factors :

(a) only agricultural lands have been acquired or going to be acquired (b) both homestead and agricultural lands have been acquired or going to be acquired (c) only homestead lands have been acquired or going to be acquired The survey has been conducted in 8 inhabited villages. The following three steps have been followed for drawing the samples

(i) collection of listing of all the households from the primary schools (details shown in

Table-1.4

(ii) stratifying the list according to the castes, i.e., scheduled castes and others.

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(iii) drawing total of 10% sample from each stratum by following Systematic Random Sampling technique and thereby arriving at an overall sample size of 10%

Table Demographic Profile of the Villages coming under KOPC

Households Population Sl.No.

Village Total SC ST OB

C General Total SC ST OBC General

1 B. Bahal 120 20 40 30 30 730 140 240 190 160 2 Danra 584 100 40 428 16 4000 610 280 3000 110 3 Kalam

Chhuin 560 70 10 470 10 3360 420 60 2825 55

4 Majhika 95 10 3 82 - 750 70 25 655 - 5 Natada 260 40 60 158 2 1875 280 430 1150 15 6 Nathgaon 12 - - 11 1 70 - - 63 7 7. Nakeipasi 210 20 10 12 168 1250 125 65 80 980 8 Solada 510 100 60 328 22 3060 650 350 1925 135 Total 2351 360 223 1519 249 15095 2295 1450 9888 1462

Accordingly, a total of 235 households, i.e., 10 percent of the total households, were selected out of 2351 households for the survey.

Profile of the Sample Households Table 1.5 shows the sample distribution according to the caste groups across the seven villages of the control site for the study. The profile of the sample households will reflect the existing social pattern prevailing in the area.

Table Sample Coverage in Kalinga Study Area

Sample coverage Sl. No.

Village S.C. S.T. OBC Others Total

1. B. Bahal 2 4 3 3 12 2. Danra 10 4 42 2 58 3. Kalam

Chhuin 7 1 47 1 56

4. Majhika 1 1 8 - 10 5. Natada 4 6 16 - 26 6. Nakeipasi 2 1 2 17 22 7. Solada 10 6 33 2 51 Total 36 23 151 25 235

Household category

In KOCP, the sample households were of four types as per their affected categories (Table 1.6). These are:

(i) households whose total homestead and agricultural lands were affected (ii) households whose entire agricultural lands were affected (iii) households whose partial lands were acquired by MC

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(iv) households affected due to land-labor linkage

TABLE Household Category as per Affected Type of Household

Affected type SC ST OBC Others Homestead and Entire Land 2 4 3 1 Entire land 7 3 44 6 Partial land - - 6 5 Affected due to land-labor linkage 27 16 98 13 TOTAL 36 23 151 25

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ANNEX 2 – HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRES

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

Samaleswari Study Area A. GENERAL INFORMATIONS : A.1 Habitation - Village - Gram Panchayat. - Police Station - Block - District - Village type - 1. RAP 2. IPDP 3. Partially affected A.2 Name of the Respondent : A.3 Father's/Husband's Name : A.4 Caste - 1. SC 2. ST 3. OBC 4. GENERAL A.5 Religion 1. Hindu 2. Muslim 3. Christian 4. Others (Specify) A.6 Type of Family 1. Joint 2. Nuclear 3. Extended A7. Household category, as affected 1. Only house 4. Entire land 2. House and total land 5. Only part of land 3. House and part of land 6. Adversely affected due to land labor work B. FAMILY PARTICULARS :(Members above 14 yrs. of age)

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B1.

Name of the member Sex 1.M 2.F

Age in years

Occupation

Skill

Primary Secondary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

CODE FOR OCCUPATION : 1. Agriculture 10. Daily labor working with MCL contractor 2. Agricultural labor 11. Traditional occupation (Priest, barber etc.) 3. Non-agril. Labor 12. Artisan 4. HH Industry 13. Unemployed (14 yr and above) 5. Service Mines 14. Old/unable to work 6. Petty business 15. Wood collection 7. Medium/large business 16. House wife 8. MCL employee (Regular) 17. Others ........................... 9. MCL employee (daily wage)

B2. Has there been any seasonal migration from your HH? Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , ask Details related to migration

No. Name Place (Distance) Months Reason

NO T E : Sl.No. of B2 will be same as in B1

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Code for Reason

1. To earn more 2. No earning opportunity during lean season 3. Due to seasonal type of work 4. Education 5. Any other ..............

B3. Status of displacement/relocation 1. Already displaced 2. Going to be displaced 3. Not to be displaced If 1 in Q No. B3. a. Year of displacement b. place of resettlement c. Resettlement type i) Self ii) Resettled in resettlement colony d. Whether the selected resettlement cite by the authority is of his own choice

Yes 1 No 2 if 2 in Q no. b3 a) when they are going to be displaced year ........... month ........... b) Whether they are going to be resettled in i) Place of their own choice (self resettlement) ii) Resettlement colony iii) Whether the cite selected for resettlement colony is of their choice Yes 1 No 2 B4. Whether you have filed any suit against the project authority Yes 1 No 2 If yes, a) what are the reasons for filing the case ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________

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b) What is the status of the case 1. Pending 2. Received any verdict c.) If received the verdict, the verdict went i) in his/her favour ii) in favour of the project authority C. LAND HOLDING C1. Do you operate any land ? Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , please indicate (Acres)

Particulars Total Irrigated A. OWN LAND 1. Cultivated 2. Cultivable fallow 3. Uncultivable fallow 4. Leased out B. LAND OPERATED OTHERWISE 5. Encroached and cultivated 6. Encroached and leased out C. TEMPORARY HOLDING 7. Share cropping 8. Leased in. 9. Mortgaged. 10. Mortgaged and leased out. D. OPERATIONAL HOLDING (1+5+7+8+9)

C2. Whether the HH lost any land due to the project ? Yes 1 No 2 If yes, please indicate quartum of loss

Type of land Total Irrigated 1. Agril. Land 2. Homestead

C3. Do you have any tank / pond ? Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , i) What is the area of the tank / pond ? _______ acres

ii) Do you practice fishery ?

Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , ask What is the annual production ? _________ Kg..

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D. LIVING CONDITION

D1. House Type 1. Pucca 2. Semi-pucca 3. Kutcha D2. No. of rooms : _____________ D3. Detail of ownership 1. Own house 2. Joint ownership 3. Rented 4. Any other __________ D4. Area of the homestead land ___________ acres D5. Latrine - Yes 1 No 2 D6. Drinking water 1. Tubewell 4. Spring/stream 2. Protected well 5. Piped water 3. Openwell 6. Pond 7. Others ................. D7. Do you have electricity ? Yes 1 No 2 E. ASSET POSSESSION E1. Agricultural Implements Y/N(1/2) Y/N(1/2) 1. Tractor 5. Seed sowing machine 2. Tiller 6. Sprayer 3. Plough 7. Kudal 4. Bullock cart 8. Any other E2. Livestock

Livestock Y/N (1/2)

1. Cow 2. Buffalo 3. Bullock / He-buffalo 4. Goat 5. Sheep 6. Pig 7. Poultry Bird 8. Others

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E3. Household Goods Y/N (1/2) 1. T.V. _____ 2. Radio / Tape recorder _____ 3. Scooter / Motor cycle _____ 4. Bicycle _____ 5. Jeep / Car _____ 6. Truck _____ 7. Fan _____ 8. Any other _____ F. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURE F1. Income From Agricultural And Allied Sources

Source Self Consumption

(qty) Selling (qty)

Total income

1. Agriculture a. Paddy b. Pulses c. Vegetables d. Others 2. Fishery 3. Animal husbandry 4. Coal 5. Forestry a. Fuel wood b. MFPs

F2. Income From Other Sources

Source Income 1. Trade/business related to MCL 2. Other Trade/Business 3. Services in MCL 4. Services other than MCL 5. Daily labor with MCL contractor 6. Daily labor other than the above 7. Rent i) House ii) Land iii) Agri. Implements iv) Truck / other vehicle v) Any other

________ ________ ________ ________

8. Pension 9. Household Industry 10.Others (Specify)

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F3. Annual Expenditure Items Amount A. Food B. Fuel C. Clothing D. Health E. Education F. Transport and Communication G. Rent (House land, agri./ other implementation) H. Social Functions I. Repayment of loan J. Others .........

G. INDEBTEDNESS G1. Have you taken any loan from somebody/some agency ?

Yes 1 No 2

Please give the details of your indebtedness Agency/ Source (A)

Location (Distance)

Amount Purpose of loan (B)

Borrowed Repaid Outstanding

Code for A : Bank 1 Cooperative 2

Private money lender 3 Govt. agency 4 Relative/Friend 5 ny other 6

Code for B :

for investment in agriculture 1 for investment in business/industry 2 for usual consumption 3 for social function 4 to repay old loans 5 for treatment 6 for housing 7 for purchase of cattle 8 any others 9

H. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ASSOCIATIONS H1. SOCIAL CAPITAL – GENERAL

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H1.1 Are there any groups, clubs, association in this village or a nearby village ? (Multiple response) Y/N(1/2) Within

Village(1/2) 1. Women’s group (Mahila Mandal) ________ ________________

2. Farmers Group ________ ________________

3. Youth club ________ ________________

4. Political organization ________ ________________

5. Milk cooperative ________ ________________

6. Cultural group ________ ________________

7. VWG ________ ________________ 7. Others ________ ________________

H1.2. What are the functions of the group(s) ?

Gr. Code -------- Gr. Code --------- Gr. Code ---------

H1.3. Are you or someone of your family a member of any of these groups ?

Yes 1 No 2 If yes, Code as in QH1.1

If ‘2’ in H1.3 skip to H1.12

H1.4. Since when is ................(name) a member of the group(s) ? Gr. Code Year code ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ Less than one year 1 2-3 years 3 One year 2 More than 3 years 4

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H1.5. Is there any membership fee ? Yes 1 No 2

If Yes, ask Gr. Code Amount/Year ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ H1.6. Criteria for membership

Gr. Code -------- Gr. Code --------- Gr. Code ---------

H1.7 How frequently do the groups(S) meet (S) ? Every week 1 Twice every month 2 Once a month 3 Infrequently 4 Accourding to the need 5

DK/CS 8 Gr. Code Frequency ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

H1.8 Who convenes the meeting ? Group Code Responsibility The president 1 __________ _____________ The Secretary 2 __________ _____________ Others 3 __________ _____________ DK/CS 8 H1.9 In majority of the cases who takes the decision within the group (s) ? Group Code Responsibility The president 1 _________ _______ President & Secretary 2 _________ _______ Secretary 3 _________ _______ Only the powerful members 4 Unanimously 5 Any others 6

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H1.10 If the group is having both male and female members, ask What is the role of the women members of the group ? Group Role Very active and influence the decisions 1 _____ ____ They are vocal but decision making is male prerogative 2 _____ ____ The women members are passive participants 3 _____ ____ Women hardly attend the meetings 4

H1.11. What benefits does .............(name) receive as a member of the group (s) ? Group Code Group code Group code

H1.12 What are the expectations from the groups (s) ?

Group code Group code Group code

H1.13 How would you rate the functioning of the group (s) ? Group Rate

Very Poor 1 _____ ____ Poor 2 _____ ____ Average 3 _____ ____ Good 4

H1.14 Would you or anybody of your family prefer to join any other group (s) ?

Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’ , which group ? Code : ____ ____ ____ H.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL : COGNITIVE H.2.1. If there were a death somewhere in this village, who do you think will turn out to assist the afflicted

household ? No one 1 Close relatives 2 Neighbors 3 The entire village 4 Caste group 5 DK / CS 8 Refused to reply; no response 9

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H.2.2. Suppose your neighbor suffered some economic loss, say his crop failed or his bullock died. In that situation who do you think would he/she ask for financial assistance ?

No one 1 Close relatives 2 Neighbors 3 Village Money lender 4 Rural Bank 5 DK / CS 8 No response / refused to reply 9 H.2.3. During festival times, who do people in this village get together with to celebrate ? Within family 1 Neighbors 2 People of same caste 3 Entire village 4 Neighboring Villages 5 DK/CS 8 No responses / refused 9 H.2.4. Suppose two people in this village had a dispute with each other. Who do you think would resolved this dispute ? Among themselves 1 Neighbors 2 Caste groups 3 Entire village 4 Village panchayat 5 DK/CS 8 No responses / refused 9 H3. MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES H3.1 What are the common property resources available in your village? Yes 1 No 2

i) Forest Land _____ ii) Pasture and Grazing Land _____ iii) Cremation Ground _____ iv) Village Tank _____ v) Others ............... _____

If code 1 in some or any of the above resources, then ask Q2. H3.2 Is there any committee for the management of CPRs ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’ in Q2. then ask Q3.3 to 3.5 and skip to 3.9 H3.3. Are you or anybody of your family actively involved in the management of any of the resources? Yes 1 No 2 i) Forest Land ____ ii) Pasture and Grazing Land ____ iii) Cremation Ground ____ iv) Village Tank ____

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H3.4. What are the roles and responsibilities of the organisation(s)? H3.5. What are your (or the concerned member of the HH) roles in the management ? No specific role 1 To resolve any dispute, whenever arises 2 To ensure proper use 3 To attend the meetings 4 If ‘No’ in Q2, ask Q 3.6 H3.6 Do you feel that for proper use and maintenance of these resources some management structure should be evolved involving the community ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’, in Q 3.6, continue, if no go to Q 3.9 H3.7. Would you or anybody like to be an active member of the community based management system of the

CRPs?

Yes 1 No 2 If yes, continue, if no go to Q H 3.9

H3.8. Are you willing to involve the female members of your family in the management committee ?

Yes 1 No 2 If Yes, please tell what type of role and at what capacities the women can play in this type of management ?

Capacity Role

H3.9. What benefit do you expect to get from management of CPRs ?

These resources will be protected 1 There will be no misuse of the resources 2 It will help in maintaining good Environment 3 Everybody will enjoy equal right 4 Others 5 DK / CS 8

No response / refused to reply 9

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H3.10. Are you willing to contribute some money for the management of CPRs ? Yes 1 No 2

If Yes, how much ? Rs.____________ per annum H4. MANAGEMENT OF FACILITIES H4.1. What are the various facilities available in your village? (with probing) Tubewell (IM II/III) 1 Piped Water Supply 2

Primary School 3 Village Drain 4 G.P. / Village Road 5 Any other (Specify) 6 H4.2. Who is responsible for the maintenance of these infrastructures ?(Multiple response) The respective departments/agencies 1 MCL 2 The village panchayat 3 User committee 4 Youth club 5 Standing committee of village panchayat 6 VEC 7 Any other 8 H4.3. Are you or anybody of your HH a member of any of the above committees ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’ , which committe _________ Who (same code as in family list) _________ H4.4. What is/are the role (s) of the committee (s) ? (Multiple response) To ensure proper use 1 To maintain the infrastructure 2 To collect contribution/tax from the users for maintenance 3 To coordinate with the implementing agency for better maintenance 4 Any other ................... 5 H4.5. Are you satisfied with the performance of the committee (s) ? Yes 1 No 2 H4.6. If ‘No’ in Q5, ask Why are you dissatisfied with its performance ? Infrastructure is not well maintained 1 Only one/two members are active 2 Nobody takes interest in the committees work 3 Committee never consults the users 4 Any other ......................... 5

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H4.7. Do you perceive that the village infrastructures should be managed by the community / users? Yes 1 No 2 Reasons : _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ H4.8. Are you or anybody of your HH willing to be a member of that committee ? Yes 1 No 2 H4.9. Will you agree to involve the women of your family in the management ? Yes 1 No 2 If Yes, in what capacity ? H4.10. Will you be willing to contribute money for the maintenance of the infrastructures ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’, amount in Rs.____________ per annum H5. TRUST H5.1. Do you feel that the collective action is essential for improvement in the quality of life ? Yes, absolute necessity 1 Necessary but not possible in this village 2 There can not be any collective action because of group dynamics 3 Do not know / can not say 8 Refused to reply/ no answer 9 H5.2. Compared to other villages, how much do people of this village trust each other in matters of lending and

borrowing ? No Trust 1 Less than other villages 2 Trust within same caste group 3 Villagers trust each other 4 DK / CS 8 Refused to Reply; no answer 9 H5.3. Do you have total faith in the leadership of this village ? Yes 1 No 2

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H.6 PRIOR EXPERIENCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION H.6.1 How often in the past one or two years have members of this village unitedly took some easures that

aimed towards overall development of the entire community ? Never 1 Once 2 A couple of times 3 Frequently 4 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9 H.6.2. If code 2//3/4, ask, can you mention those instances. 1. _____________________________________ ______________________________________ 2. ______________________________________ ______________________________________ 3. ______________________________________ ______________________________________ 4. _____________________________________ ______________________________________ H.7 RECIPROCITY, COOPERATIONS AND PARTICIPATION H.7.1. People here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families, and they are least concerned with

society’s welfare. Do you agree or disagree with this statement ? Strongly agree 1 Agree 2 Disagree 3 Strongly disagree 4 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9 H.7.2. If some community scheme does not directly benefit you but has benefits for others in the village, then

would you contribute time or money for this scheme ? Will contribute 1 Will not contribute 2 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9

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H.7.3. If some decision needs to be taken related to some community development, then do you think the entire village would be called for this purpose or would the village chiefs take the decision ?

The village chiefs (Panchayat members and Sarpanch) would decide 1 A village meeting would be convened where all invited 2 Only sarpanch and a few powerful people would decide 3 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9 H.7.4 Being in the mining area, your village has some specific issues/problems which need attention. Do you

think a separate body is essential to address those issues ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’, ask, Q5 -6 H.7.5 Do you think the followings should be members of the body - Yes/No (1/2) a. Affected community ____ b. Gram Panchayat at members ____ c. Members of Youth Club ____ d. Members of Mahila Mandal ____ e. NGO representative ____ f. Representative of MCL ____

g. Representative of govt. line departments ____

H.7.6 Do you think this participatory approach will facilitate the socio-economic development of the village

? Yes, definitely 1 To some extent 2 Yes, only if MCL and the line departments cooperate with us 3 DK/CS 8 No response/ refused to reply 9 H.8 SUSTAINABILITY OF COMMUNITY EFFORT

H8.1 Do you think that the community effort will improve the quality of life will sustain in the long run?

Yes, it Will sustain 1 Can sustain, but Some cursory external cooperation is essential 2 Will cease to exist without continuous external support 3 It will be difficult to maintain unity among the community and 4

hence will not exist in the long run DK/CS 8 Refused to reply / no response 9 H8.2 What role do you perceive for yourself in sustaining the community effort?

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

Kalinga Study Area B. GENERAL INFORMATIONS : A.1 Habitation - Village - Gram Panchayat. - Police Station - Block - District - Village type - 1. RAP 2. IPDP 3. Partially affected A.2 Name of the Respondent : A.3 Father's/Husband's Name : A.4 Caste - 1. SC 2. ST 3. OBC 4. GENERAL A.5 Religion 1. Hindu 2. Muslim 3. Christian 4. Others (Specify) A.6 Type of Family 1. Joint 2. Nuclear 3. Extended A7. Household category, as affected 1. Only house 4. Entire land 2. House and total land 5. Only part of land 3. House and part of land 6. Adversely affected due to land labor work

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B. FAMILY PARTICULARS :(Members above 14 yrs. of age) B1.

Name of the member Sex 1.M 2.F

Age in years

Occupation

Skill

Primary Secondary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

CODE FOR OCCUPATION : 1. Agriculture 10. Daily labor working with MCL contractor 2. Agricultural labor 11. Traditional occupation (Priest, barber, etc.) 3. Non-agril. Labor 12. Artisan 4. HH Industry 13. Unemployed (14 yr and above) 5. Service Mines 14. Old/unable to work 6. Petty business 15. Wood collection 7. Medium/large business 16. House wife 8. MCL employee (Regular) 17. Others ........................... 9. MCL employee (daily wage)

B2. Has there been any seasonal migration from your HH? Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , ask Details related to migration

No. Name Place (Distance) Months Reason

NO T E : Sl.No. of B2 will be same as in B1 Code for Reason

6. To earn more 7. No earning opportunity during lean season 8. Due to seasonal type of work 9. Education 10. Any other ..............

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B3. Status of displacement/relocation 1. Already displaced 2. Going to be displace 3. Not to be displaced If 1 in Q No. B3. a. Year of displacement b. place of resettlement c. Resettlement type

i) Self ii) Resettled in resettlement colony d. Whether the selected resettlement cite by the authority is of his own choice Yes 1 No 2 if 2 in Q no. b3 a) when they are going to be displaced year ........... month ........... b) Whether they are going to be resettled in i) Place of their own choice (self resettlement) ii) Resettlement colony iii) Whether the cite selected for resettlement colony is of their choice

Yes 1 No 2 B4. Whether you have filed any suit against the project authority Yes 1 No 2 If yes, a) what are the reasons for filing the case ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________ b) What is the status of the case 1. Pending 2. Received any verdict c.) If received the verdict, the verdict went i) in his/her favor ii) in favor of the project authority

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C. LAND HOLDING C1. Do you operate any land ? Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , please indicate (Acres)

Particulars Total Irrigated A. OWN LAND 1. Cultivated 2. Cultivable fallow 3. Uncultivable fallow 4. Leased out B. LAND OPERATED OTHERWISE 5. Encroached and cultivated 6. Encroached and leased out C. TEMPORARY HOLDING 7. Share cropping 8. Leased in. 9. Mortgaged. 10. Mortgaged and leased out. D. OPERATIONAL HOLDING (1+5+7+8+9)

C2. Whether the HH lost any land due to the project ? Yes 1 No 2 If yes, please indicate quartum of loss

Type of land Total Irrigated 1. Agril. Land 2. Homestead

C3. Do you have any tank / pond ? Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , i) What is the area of the tank / pond ? _______ acres

iii) Do you practice fishery ?

Yes 1 No 2 If 'Yes' , ask What is the annual production ? _________ Kg..

D. LIVING CONDITION

D1. House Type 1. Pucca 2. Semi-pucca 3. Kutcha D2. No. of rooms : _____________

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D3. Detail of ownership 1. Own house 2. Joint ownership 3. Rented 4. Any other __________ D4. Area of the homestead land ___________ acres D5. Latrine - Yes 1 No 2 D6. Drinking water 1. Tubewell 4. Spring/stream 2. Protected well 5. Piped water 3. Openwell 6. Pond 7. Others ................. D7. Do you have electricity ? Yes 1 No 2 E. ASSET POSSESSION E1. Agricultural Implements Y/N(1/2) Y/N(1/2) 1. Tractor 5. Seed sowing machine 2. Tiller 6. Sprayer 3. Plough 7. Kudal 4. Bullock cart 8. Any other

E2. Livestock Livestock Number 1. Cow 2. Buffalo 3. Bullock / He-buffalo 4. Goat 5. Sheep 6. Pig 7. Poultry Bird 8. Others

E3. Household Goods Numbers 1. T.V. _____ 2. Radio / Tape recorder _____ 3. Scooter / Motor cycle _____ 4. Bicycle _____ 5. Jeep / Car _____ 6. Truck _____ 7. Fan _____ 8. Any other _____

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F. ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURE F1. Income From Agricultural And Allied Sources

Source Self Consumption

(qty) Selling (qty)

Total income

1. Agriculture a. Paddy b. Pulses c. Vegetables d. Others 2. Fishery 3. Animal husbandry 4. Coal 5. Forestry a. Fuel wood b. MFPs

F2. Income From Other Sources

Source Income 1. Trade/business related to MCL 2. Other Trade/Business 3. Services in MCL 4. Services other than MCL 5. Daily labour with MCL contractor 6. Daily labour other than the above 7. Rent i) House ii) Land iii) Agri. Implements iv) Truck / other vehicle v) Any other

________ ________ ________ ________

8. Pension 9. Household Industry 10.Others (Specify)

F3. Annual Expenditure

Items Amount A. Food B. Fuel C. Clothing D. Health E. Education F. Transport and Communication G. Rent (House land, agri./ other implementation) H. Social Functions I. Repayment of loan J. Others .........

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G. ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

G1. Apart from what you are doing, are you interested to engage yourself in any other economic activities ?

Yes 1 No 2 If yes, ask Q 2

G2. In what alternative activity would you like to engage yourself /other members of your HH? G3. If you need money to initiate the above activity, to whom would you approach ?

(Multiple Response)

Private money lender 1 Block office 2 Bank 3 Gram Panchayat 4 Cooperative 5 Relative/Friend 6 Any other 7

G4. Whether you have ever been approached for income generation and restoration scheme

Yes 1 No 2 if ‘Yes’ in Q.G4 ask the following questions G5. You are approached by whom 1. NGO 2. MCL Authority 3. Govt. agencies 4. Others G6. Whether you were tried to participate Yes 1 No 2 If ‘No’ Please give your opinion for non-participation ___________________________________ ___________________________________ H. WOMEN AND WORK H1. What are the various activities in which the women of your households are engaged ?(Multiple Response)

Household chores 1 Collection of forest produce 2 Collection of coal 3 Work as wage earner 4 Agricultural laborer 5 Non-agril. Labor 6 Engaged in HH industry 7 Involve in community activities 8 Others 9

H2. If engaged in economic activities, please indicate no. of days of employment and earnings.

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No. Of days Earning (Rs.) 1 Wage earning 2 Agril. Lab 3 Non. agril. Lab 4 HH Industry 5 Collection of MFPs 6 Others

H3. Do you think that in order to supplement the family income, women should be gainfully engaged in

economic activities ? Yes 1 No 2 H4. How much time does a female can give for the income generating activities ? ............... hours per day H5. Does she have any problem if the activity is groupbased (women’s group) ?

No problem 1

Should be of same caste group 2 Women’s group cannot sustain 3 Should be individual activity 4 No preference 5 DK/CS 8 No Response 9

H6. What kind of support does she require? Technical Training 1 Financial 2 Both, technical and financial 3 Others .......................... 4 I. INDEBTEDNESS I1. Have you taken any loan from somebody/some agency ?

Yes 1 No 2 I2. Please give the details of your indebtedness

Agency/ Source (A)

Location (Distance)

Amount Purpose of loan (B)

Borrowed Repaid Outstanding

Code for A : Bank 1 Cooperative 2

Private money lender 3 Govt. agency 4 Relative/Friend 5 Any other 6

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Code for B : for investment in agriculture 1

for investment in business/industry 2 for usual consumption 3 for social function 4 to repay old loans 5 for treatment 6 for housing 7 for purchase of cattle 8 any others 9

J. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ASSOCIATIONS J1. SOCIAL CAPITAL – GENERAL

J1.1 Are there any groups, clubs, association in this village or a nearby village ? (Multiple response) Y/N(1/2) Within

Village(1/2) 1. Women’s group (Mahila Mandal) ________ ________________

2. Farmers Group ________ ________________

3. Youth club ________ ________________

4. Political organization ________ ________________

5. Milk cooperative ________ ________________

6. Cultural group ________ ________________

7. VWG ________ ________________ 7. Others ________ ________________

J1.2. What are the functions of the group(s) ?

Gr. Code -------- Gr. Code --------- Gr. Code ---------

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J1.3. Are you or someone of your family a member of any of these groups ? Yes 1 No 2

If yes, Code as in QJ1.1

If ‘2’ in J1.3 skip to J1.12

J1.4. Since when is ................(name) a member of the group(s) ? Gr. Code Year code ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ Less than one year 1 2-3 years 3 One year 2 More than 3 years 4 J1.5. Is there any membership fee ? Yes 1 No 2

If Yes, ask Gr. Code Amount/Year ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ J1.6. Criteria for membership

Gr. Code -------- Gr. Code --------- Gr. Code ---------

J1.7 How frequently do the groups(S) meet (S) ?

Every week 1 Twice every month 2 Once a month 3 Infrequently 4 According to the need 5

DK/CS 8 Gr. Code Frequency ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

J1.8 Who convenes the meeting ? Group Code Responsibility The president 1 __________ _____________ The Secretary 2 __________ _____________ Others 3 __________ _____________ DK/CS 8

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J1.9 In majority of the cases who takes the decision within the group (s) ? Group Code Responsibility The president 1 _________ _______ President & Secretary 2 _________ _______ Secretary 3 _________ _______ Only the powerful members 4 Unanimously 5 Any others 6 J1.10 If the group is having both male and female members, ask What is the role of the women members of the group ? Group Role Very active and influence the decisions 1 _____ ____ They are vocal but decision making is male prerogative 2 _____ ____ The women members are passive participants 3 _____ ____ Women hardly attend the meetings 4

J1.11. What benefits does .............(name) receive as a member of the group (s) ? Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

J1.12 What are the expectations from the groups (s) ?

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3

J1.13 How would you rate the functioning of the group (s) ? Group Rate

Very Poor 1 _____ ____ Poor 2 _____ ____ Average 3 _____ ____ Good 4

J1.14 Would you or anybody of your family prefer to join any other group (s) ?

Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’ , which group ? Code : ____ ____ ____

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J.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL : COGNITIVE J.2.1. If there were a death somewhere in this village, who do you think will turn out to assist the afflicted

household ? No one 1 Close relatives 2 Neighbors 3 The entire village 4 Caste group 5 DK / CS 8 Refused to reply; no response 9 J.2.2. Suppose your neighbor suffered some economic loss, say his crop failed or his bullock died. In that

situation who do you think would he/she ask for financial assistance ? No one 1 Close relatives 2 Neighbors 3 Village Money lender 4 Rural Bank 5 DK / CS 8 No response / refused to reply 9 J.2.3. During festival times, who do people in this village get together with to celebrate ? Within family 1 Neighbors 2 People of same caste 3 Entire village 4 Neighboring Villages 5 DK/CS 8 No responses / refused 9 J.2.4. Suppose two people in this village had a dispute with each other. Who do you think would resolved this dispute ? Among themselves 1 Neighbors 2 Caste groups 3 Entire village 4 Village Panchayat 5 DK/CS 8 No responses / refused 9 J3. MANAGEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES J3.1 What are the common property resources available in your village? Yes 1 No 2

i) Forest Land _____ ii) Pasture and Grazing Land _____ iii) Cremation Ground _____ iv) Village Tank _____ v) Others ............... _____

If code 1 in some or any of the above resources, then ask Q2.

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J3.2 Is there any committee for the management of CPRs ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’ in Q2. then ask Q3 J3.3. Are you or anybody of your family actively involved in the management of any of the resources? Yes 1 No 2 i) Forest Land ____ ii) Pasture and Grazing Land ____ iii) Cremation Ground ____ iv) Village Tank ____ J3.4. What are the roles and responsibilities of the organization(s)?

J3.5. What are your (or the concerned member of the HH) roles in the management ? No specific role 1 To resolve any dispute, whenever arises 2 To ensure proper use 3 To attend the meetings 4 J3.6. If ‘No’ in Q2, ask Do you feel that for proper use and maintenance of these resources some management structure should be evolved involving the community ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’, why do you feel so ? J3.7. If ‘Yes’ in Q6, ask,

Would you or anybody like to be an active member of the community based management system of the CRPs?

Yes 1 No 2

J3.8. Are you willing to involve the female members of your family in the management committee ? If Yes, please tell what type of role and at what capacities the women can play in this type of management ?

Capacity Role

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J3.9. What benefit do you expect to get from management of CPRs ?

These resources will be protected 1 There will be no misuse of the resources 2 It will help in maintaining good Environment 3 Everybody will enjoy equal right 4 Others 5 DK / CS 8

No response / refused to reply 9

J3.10. Are you willing to contribute some money for the management of CPRs ? Yes 1 No 2

If Yes, how much ? Rs.____________ per annum J4. MANAGEMENT OF FACILITIES J4.1. What are the various facilities available in your village? (with probing) Tubewell (IM II/III) 1 Piped Water Supply 2

Primary School 3 Village Drain 4 G.P. / Village Road 5 Any other (Specify) 6 J4.2. Who is responsible for the maintenance of these infrastructures ?(Multiple response) The respective departments/agencies 1 MCL 2 The village Panchayat 3 User committee 4 Youth club 5 Standing committee of village Panchayat 6 VEC 7 Any other 8 J4.3. Are you or anybody of your HH a member of any of the above committees ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’ , which committee _________ Who (same code as in family list) _________ J4.4. What is/are the role (s) of the committee (s) ? (Multiple response) To ensure proper use 1 To maintain the infrastructure 2 To collect contribution/tax from the users for maintenance 3 To coordinate with the implementing agency for better maintenance 4 Any other ................... 5

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J4.5. Are you satisfied with the performance of the committee (s) ? Yes 1 No 2 J4.6. If ‘No’ in Q5, ask Why are you dissatisfied with its performance ? Infrastructure is not well maintained 1 Only one/two members are active 2 Nobody takes interest in the committees work 3 Committee never consults the users 4 Any other ......................... 5 If there is no village / community / user level committee in the village, then ask Q7 to Q10. J4.7. Do you perceive that the village infrastructures should be managed by the community / users? Yes 1 No 2 Reasons : _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ _______________________________________________ J4.8. Are you or anybody of your HH willing to be a member of that committee ? Yes 1 No 2 J4.9. Will you agree to involve the women of your family in the management ? Yes 1 No 2 If Yes, in what capacity ? J4.10. Will you be willing to contribute money for the maintenance of the infrastructures ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’, amount in Rs.____________ per annum J5. TRUST J5.1. Do you feel that the collective action is essential for improvement in the quality of life ? Yes, absolute necessity 1 Necessary but not possible in this village 2 There can not be any collective action because of group dynamics 3 Do not know / can not say 8 Refused to reply/ no answer 9

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J5.2. Compared to other villages, how much do people of this village trust each other in matters of lending and borrowing ?

No Trust 1 Less than other villages 2 Trust within same caste group 3 Villagers trust each other 4 DK / CS 8 Refused to Reply; no answer 9 J5.3. Do you have total faith in the leadership of this village ? Yes 1 No 2 J.6 PRIOR EXPERIENCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION J.6.1 How often in the past one or two years have members of this village unitedly took some easures that

aimed towards overall development of the entire community ? Never 1 Once 2 A couple of times 3 Frequently 4 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9 J.6.2. If code 2//3/4, ask, can you mention those instances. 1. _____________________________________ ____________________________________ 2. ______________________________________ ______________________________________ 3. ______________________________________ ______________________________________ 4. _____________________________________ ______________________________________ J.7 RECIPROCITY, COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION J.7.1. People here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families, and they are least concerned with

society’s welfare. Do you agree or disagree with this statement ? Strongly agree 1 Agree 2 Disagree 3 Strongly disagree 4 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9

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J.7.2. If some community scheme does not directly benefit you but has benefits for others in the village, then

would you contribute time or money for this scheme ? Will contribute 1 Will not contribute 2 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9 J.7.3. If some decision needs to be taken related to some community development, then do you think the entire

village would be called for this purpose or would the village chiefs take the decision ? The village chiefs (panchayat members and Sarpanch) would decide 1 A village meeting would be convened where all invited 2 Only sarpanch and a few powerful people would decide 3 DK/CS 8 Refused to reply/no response 9 J.7.4 Being in the mining area, your village has some specific issues/problems which need attention. Do you

think a separate body is essential to address those issues ? Yes 1 No 2 If ‘Yes’, ask, Q5 -6 J.7.5 Do you think the followings should be members of the body - Yes/No (1/2) a. Affected community ____ b. Gram Panchayat at members ____ c. Members of Youth Club ____ d. Members of Mahila Mandal ____ e. NGO representative ____ f. Representative of MCL ____

h. Representative of govt. line departments ____

J.7.6 Do you think this participatory approach will facilitate the socio-economic development of the village

? Yes, definitely 1 To some extent 2 Yes, only if MCL and the line departments cooperate with us 3 DK/CS 8 No response/ refused to reply 9

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J.8 SUSTAINABILITY OF COMMUNITY EFFORT

J8.1 Do you think that the community effort will improve the quality of life will sustain in the long run?

Yes, it Will sustain 1 Can sustain, but Some cursory external cooperation is essential 2 Will cease to exist without continuous external support 3 It will be difficult to maintain unity among the community and 4

hence will not exist in the long run DK/CS 8 Refused to reply / no response 9 J8.2 What role do you perceive for yourself in sustaining the community effort?

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ANNEX 3

PROFILE OF SAMPLE POPULATION

SAMALESWARI STUDY SITE Family Type The majority of the households were of nuclear pattern across all caste groups except for the higher castes groups, who were found to have maintained the traditional family bondage (see Table below) should also be mentioned that traditionally among schedule tribes and to some extent among schedule castes, the family pattern is mostly nuclear as the sons get dissociated from their parents as soon as they get married.

TABLE Family Pattern of Sample Households

Caste Family Type SC ST OBC General

Total

Joint 9 42.9%

23 34.8%

16 34.0%

5 71.4%

53 37.6%

Nuclear 11 52.4%

42 63.6%

27 57.4%

1 14.3%

81 57.4%

Extended 1 4.8%

1 1.5%

4 8.5%

1 14.3%

7 5.0%

Total 21 66 47 7 141

Occupational Pattern The details regarding occupation of the household members above the age of 14 years were collected from the sample households in order to ascertain the present occupation of the eligible workforce (age group 18-55 years). The tables below show the occupational pattern across caste, sex and age for RAP and IPDP villages, respectively. These figures indicate that in case of RAP villages almost 84 percent males in the age group of 18-55 years are employed with majority of them working in the mines (65.3%). In IPDP villages 76 percent males in the 18-55 years age group were found to be employed in various sectors. Interestingly as many as 56 % males of the IPDP villages were found to be engaged in various coal mines of Ib valley area. It can further be seen from the tables that only 14 percent and 10 percent females of RAP and IPDP villages respectively, were engaged in economic activities and the majority of the eligible workforce were engaged in their household chores.

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Annual Household Income The table below depict the income level of the households across various caste groups for RAP and IPDP villages.

TABLE Annual Household Income (Village Type - RAP)

Caste Income Range SC ST OBC General

Total

< Rs. 15000 3 17.6%

6 20.0%

3 12.0%

1 14.3%

13 16.5%

Rs. 15000-24999 4 23.5%

5 16.7%

1 4.0%

- 10 12.7%

Rs. 25000-39999 5 29.4%

12 40.0%

10 40.0%

- 27 34.2%

Rs. 40000-59999 2 11.8%

5 16.7%

6 24.0%

4 57.1%

17 21.5%

> Rs. 60000 3 17.6%

2 6.7%

5 20.0%

2 28.6%

12 15.2%

Total 17 30 25 7 79 It can be observed from the tables that as expected the vulnerable caste groups (in this case SCs and STs) have a lower average annual income than the other higher castes.

TABLE Annual Household Income (Village Type - IPDP)

Caste Income Range SC ST OBC

Total

< Rs. 15000 2 50.0%

5 13.9%

6 27.3%

13 21.0%

Rs. 15000-24999 -

4 11.1%

2 9.1%

6 9.7%

Rs. 25000-39999 2 50.0%

13 36.1%

7 31.8%

22 35.5%

Rs. 40000-59999 -

13 36.1%

4 18.2%

17 27.4%

> Rs. 60000 -

1 2.8%

3 13.6%

4 6.5%

Total 4 36 22 62

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KALINGA STUDY AREA Family Type

Caste Family Type SC ST OBC General

Total

Joint 7 19.4%

10 43.5%

53 35.1%

12 48.0%

82 34.9%

Nuclear 29 80.6%

13 56.5%

97 64.2%

13 52.0%

152 64.7%

Extended

1 0.7%

1 0.4%

Total 36 23 151 25 235 Annual Household Income Analysis of the annual household income from various sources in Kalinga reveals that the economic status of all the caste groups was better than that in Samaleshwari. Nearly 18 percent households were found to have annual income below Rs. 15000/- (Table 2.6). The average annual income of the general caste households was found to be the highest, followed by the STs.

TABLE Annual Household Income

Caste Income Range SC ST OBC General

Total

< Rs. 15000 11 30.6%

6 20.0%

3 12.0%

1 14.3%

13 16.5%

Rs. 15000-24999 12 33.3%

5 16.7%

1 4.0%

- 10 12.7%

Rs. 25000-39999 5 13.9%

12 40.0%

10 40.0%

- 27 34.2%

Rs. 40000-59999 4 11.1%

5 16.7%

6 24.0%

4 57.1%

17 21.5%

> Rs. 60000 4 11.1%

2 6.7%

5 20.0%

2 28.6%

12 15.2%

Total 36 23 151 25 235 Average Income (in Rupees)

31297.00 44803.00 36389.00 51798.00 38071.00

Occupational Pattern According to the Table below, many households still depend on agriculture as their primary occupation. Also a good proportion of the households members in 18-55 years’ age group were found to be working in the coal mines. The economy of that area was found to be driven by both agriculture and industrial sectors.