THE CHALLENGE OF AGEING –PENSION REFORM, INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPERATIVES

Chris Daykin, former UK Government Actuary

Chairman, PBSS Section of IAA

Malaysian Actuarial Society

Kuala Lumpur, 6 November 2007

JOINT COLLOQUIUM OF IACA, PBSS AND IAAHS

Boston, USA – 4-7 May 2008

Pensions and social security> challenges of longevity> de-risking DB liabilities> pension investment strategies> accounting for pension costs> actuarial roles in DC world> are DB plans dead?

Health> catastrophic risks> post-retirement health care> evaluating value for money> financing health for the poor> health risk management

Consulting practice> public interest & client relationships> handling conflicts of interest> actuarial communication> new areas of consulting practice> Enterprise Risk Management> Developments in actuarial educn.

Insurance> future of solvency regulation> IFRS> mergers and acquisitions> reserve variability> predictive modelling

JOINT COLLOQUIUM OF IACA, PBSS AND IAAHS

Boston, USA – 4-7 May 2008

Global Challenges and Opportunities

facing the Actuarial Profession

Hope to see you in Boston!

INCREASING LONGEVITY

Expectation of life at age 65 on cohort basis, E&W

10

14

18

22

26

1850 1900 1950 2000 2050

Year age 65 attained

Ex

pe

cta

tio

n o

f li

fe (

ye

ars

)

10

14

18

22

26

Females

Males

Total Period Fertility Rates, 1960-2010

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

UK

USA

Germany

France

Indonesia

Malaysia

Singapore

Thailand

Japan

China

Expectation of Life for Males, 1950-2020

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

UK

USA

Germany

France

Indonesia

Malaysia

Singapore

Thailand

Japan

China

Expectation of Life for Females, 1950-2020

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

UK

USAGermany

FranceIndonesia

MalaysiaSingapore

ThailandJapan

China

Dependency Ratios, 1970-2030(numbers 65 & over for every 1000 aged 15-64)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

UK

USA

Germany

France

Indonesia

Malaysia

Singapore

Thailand

Japan

China

Percentage increase in numbers aged 65 & over1990-2030

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

% increase in nos. aged 65 & over

PENSION REFORM

What are the imperatives?> to recognise the impact of increasing longevity> to ensure sustainability of structure and financing> to ensure good coverage and adequate retirement income> to improve retirement incentive structures> to reduce intergenerational dependency> to improve incentives for saving

PENSION REFORM

Problems facing social security schemes> demographic ageing> maturing of defined benefit schemes> effective retirement age too low> poor overall levels of coverage> insufficient advance funding in system> inadequate or volatile outcomes from DC schemes> inadequate protection against longevity in DC schemes> excessive transaction costs and poor returns> perverse incentives affecting behaviour, eg retirement

PENSION REFORM

Needed reforms of social security> ensure long term sustainability> raise effective retirement age> reduce incentives to retire early and encourage deferral> increase incentives to work and to contribute> improve efficiency and reduce transaction costs> strengthen protection against individual longevity> find ways to extend coverage

PENSION REFORM

Individual account reforms> started in Chile in 1981

> by now includes most countries in Latin America

> Mexican reform in 1997

> also several countries in central and eastern Europe

> supplements or replaces DB social security pension

> competitive private sector investment vehicles

> usually mandatory for formal sector workers

> purchase of annuities at retirement…

> …or strictly controlled programmed withdrawal

PENSION REFORM

Individual account reforms - experience> coverage is still a problem…

> …individual account structure is not enough of an incentive

> transaction costs are generally still quite high…

> …competition does not bring down the charges

> churning and mis-selling have been an issue

> pension levels may not be adequate…

> …too many people will qualify for the minimum pension

> minimum pension creates incentive problems of its own

> individual accounts perpetuate inequalities

> most risks fall on individuals

PENSION REFORM

Problems with pay-out phase> uncertainty about life expectancy> programmed withdrawal has potential problems> need for more annuitisation to protect pensioners> compulsory annuitisation may be unpopular> insurance market not always receptive> high concentration of longevity risk for insurers> need for very long-dated bonds to match liabilities> preferably index-linked if backing indexed annuities> investment mis-match risk for insurers

PENSION REFORM

Alternatives for pay-out phase> life annuity – level or increasing> unit-linked annuity> with-profits annuity> unitised fund> partially annuitise with temporary annuity> controlled drawdown> …perhaps with eventual mandatory annuitisation

PENSION REFORM

Notional Defined Contribution> structured as defined contribution… > … but on a PAYG basis rather than funded> clear link between contributions and benefits…> …but not subject to investment risk> targets lump sum at pension age…> with ‘notional’ purchase of an annuity> permits flexibility of retirement age> passes on part of longevity risk> demographic adjustment factor needed to keep in balance

LESSONS FROM SWEDEN

Swedish NDC> DB state scheme replaced by NDC> …with fairly fast transition> revalorisation of individual accounts by average wage> credits for sickness and other absences> automatic economic regulator of pensions increase> annuity responds to improving mortality> automatic balancing mechanism

LESSONS FROM SWEDEN

Automatic balancing mechanism (‘actuarial accounting’)Annual balance sheet for scheme:

Liabilities = present value of all future outlay for pensions in payment+ accumulated individual accounts for all persons not yet in receipt of a pension

Assets =real assets in buffer fund + value of future contributions

Value of future contributions = contribution rate x wage mass x expected turnover duration

LESSONS FROM SWEDEN

Expected turnover duration

0

20

40

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 43 50 55 60 65 70 76 85 90 95

Ste

ady

stat

e pe

nsio

n lia

bilit

y

(in y

ears

of c

ontr

ibut

ions

)

= turnover duration 33 years

Age group

Expectedincome-weighted

age of income earners

Pay-in duration + Pay-out d.

Expected pension weighted age of pensioners

Expected pension-capital-weighted average retirement age

1

00 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 43 50 55 60 65 70 76 85 90 95

= turnover duration 33 years

Age group

Expectedincome-weighted

age of income earners

Pay-in duration + Pay-out d.

Expected pension weighted age of pensioners

Expected pension-capital-weighted average retirement age

LESSONS FROM SWEDEN

Individual accounts> mandatory funded individual accounts (PPM)> 2½% of earnings> contributions collected with NDC contributions of 16%> low administrative costs> choice of 700 investment funds> default arrangements if no funds selected> 90% of wage-earners covered by occupational schemes> operated largely on industry-wide basis

LESSONS FROM SWEDEN

Overall evaluation> hailed by many as a success story> sustainable PAYG system> increased level of savings achieved through PPM> but little real interest in investment choice> rising concern about expected fall in replacement ratios…> …and arbitrary effect of automatic balancing mechanism> inequality of earnings mirrored in retirement income

LESSONS FROM FINLAND

Dealing with demographic ageing> objectives of reform of earnings-related scheme> to postpone average age of retirement by 2 to 3 years> to adapt the pension system to increased expectations of life> to reduce pressures for future increases in contributions> to unify and simplify the various separate schemes> to harmonise public and private pension schemes

> average of last 10 years → career average revalued

> variable accrual rate> 1.5% a year from 18 to 52> 1.9% a year from 53 to 62> 4.5% a year from 63 to 68

LESSONS FROM FINLAND

Dealing with demographic ageing> introducing “life expectancy coefficient”

Life expectancy coefficient for year N (>2009) =

cohort life expectancy for those reaching 62 in 2009

cohort life expectancy for those reaching 62 in N

Multiply pensions of those reaching 62 in N

by life expectancy coefficient for year N

Thus adjusting a DB pension benefit for improving life expectancy

LESSONS FROM THE UK

Continuous pension reform since 1975> State earnings-related pension (SERPS) (1975)> contracting out (1975)> basic pension linked to retail price index (1980)> personal pensions for contracting out (1987)> cut back of SERPS (1988)> equalisation of pension age at 65 (by 2020) (1995)> State Second Pension replaced SERPS (2002)> pension credit with an earnings link (2003)> trend to more dependence on means-testing> longevity risk offset by revaluation and rising pension age

LESSONS FROM THE UK

Expenditure from National Insurance Fund as % of GDP

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060

Past data and future price uprating Future earnings uprating

1950

LESSONS FROM THE UK

Pensions by year of award as % of earnings (at average earnings levels)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060

Basic Serps Increase due to S2P

1950

LESSONS FROM THE UK

Issues to be addressed> declining value of Basic Pension (and State Second Pension)

> shift to dependence on means-tested benefits

> residual problem of coverage for older women

> declining significance of defined benefit plans

> defined contributions generally low

> individuals shouldering more of the risk

LESSONS FROM THE UK

Government proposals – Pensions Act 2007> restore earnings link for basic pension (from 2012 or later)> raise pension age to 68 by 2046> reform contribution conditions (now only 30 years needed)> simplify home responsibilities protection> State Second Pension to become flat-rate> abolish contracting-out on a defined contribution basis> individual accounts with auto-enrolment

LESSONS FROM THE UK

Occupational pension schemes> new stronger pensions regulator> the Pensions Protection Fund> the Financial Assistance Scheme> emphasis on improving funding levels> …but already too late for many company schemes> new attempts at simplifying regulatory requirements> defined benefit schemes unlikely to be resuscitated> problems of perceived privilege of public sector workers

PENSION REFORM FRAMEWORK

Goals of a pension system

Primary goals

> To provide adequate, affordable, sustainable and robust old-age income

Secondary goals

> To create developmental effects by> minimizing negative impacts> leveraging on positive impacts

PENSION REFORM FRAMEWORK

World Bank framework (1994)

1st Pillar

Mandatory unfunded public defined benefit social security

2nd Pillar

Mandatory funded and privately managed defined contribution

3rd Pillar

Voluntary savings retirement plan (or occupational pension plans)

PENSION REFORM FRAMEWORK

World Bank framework (2005)Pillar zero

Non-contributory scheme providing minimal level of protection

1st Pillar

Mandatory unfunded publicly managed DB or NDC providing some longevity insurance

2nd Pillar

Mandatory funded and privately managed DC (or DB)

3rd Pillar

Voluntary savings plans – regulated and privately managed

4th Pillar

Informal intergenerational financial and non-financial support

SOME GENERAL LESSONS

Sharing longevity risk

1. target lump sum at retirement…> …and convert to pension using current annuity value> …funded individual accounts or NDC

2. index retirement age based on cohort expectation of life...> …or maintain ratio between working and retired life periods

3. raise retirement age at intervals to offset rising cost

4. overall adjustment mechanism such as> life expectancy coefficient> sustainability factor> automatic balancing mechanism

5. risk-sharing between contributors and pensioners

SOME ISSUES FOR MALAYSIA

Provident Fund based system> already DC individual accounts – single institution> normal shortcomings of DC> coverage> underpin> investment constraints> investment dominance> retirement age> annuitisation

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Wide range of solutions – defined contribution favoured> each country has a different solution> …but all are starting from different points> DC widely favoured for its incentive structure…> …but lacks basic characteristics of protection> …unless in with-profits form or with strong underpin> …exposes members to investment risk> …and also collectively to longevity risk> minimum pension or DB underpin is desirable…> …but care is needed to avoid this having a dominant effect

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Wide range of solutions – new defined benefit thinking> DB mostly moving to career-average revalued…> …which is equivalent to a type of DC> …or to NDC - really a DB structure dressed up as DC> focus on fund at retirement facilitates longevity solutions> indexing retirement age also a possibility> cash balance is another alternative DB/DC hybrid

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Wide range of solutions – encourage later retirement> need stronger incentives to later retirement> a reason for DC but possible also with DB> higher pension age for unreduced pension forces trade-off> target lump sum at retirement instead of pension> annuitisation is needed – with innovative solutions> need better risk-sharing in decumulation phase

THE END

Questions and discussion