the Consolidation of the Ruling Class

The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi ArabiaAuthor(s): Mordechai AbirSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), pp. 150-171Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283169 .

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The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia

Mordechai Abir

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Saudi population was mainly a classless society. There was no upper class to speak of in Arabia at the time. Only a small proportion of the merchants and the ulama in the towns of Hijaz and Najd could be described as 'middle class'. The great majority of the Arabians - townspeople as well as rural nomads and agriculturalists - lived at subsistence level and could be regarded as 'lower class'. The unification of the Saudi kingdom by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in the first decades of the century, consolidated the power and authority of a new Saudi ruling class - the aristocracy. The development of the kingdom's oil industry since 1938 and the modernization of Saudi Arabia after the Second World War, produced moreover - in addition to existing regional and other differences - new classes and a relatively rigid social structure. The latter, largely a heritage of the past, depends not so much on power, wealth and education as on regional (Najd) and tribal (noble) origin. This article will examine the consolidation and composition of the Saudi aristocracy and whether it has undergone a change in recent decades under the impact of the rapid development of the kingdom and its society and due to the rise of new elites.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE SAUDI RULING CLASS

The reconquest of Riyadh in January 1902 is considered in Saudi annals as the beginning of the third Saudi kingdom. The small army of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud was composed at the time of a few score brothers, uncles, cousins, other relatives and in-laws and some bedouin followers. During this crucial stage, Abdallah ibn Jilwi was said to have twice saved the life of his 'cousin' Abd al-Aziz. Subsequently, the Jilwi family, a cadet branch of Al Saud,' gained a key position in the kingdom's ruling class. Such a development is typical of considerations which influenced the formation of that class in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, all of Ibn Saud's partners in the conquest of Riyadh, as well as members of his and other important families who helped him in the consolidation of his kingdom in the first decades of the century, were in- corporated into the Saudi aristocracy. At their side, the ulama led by Al al- Shaykh,2 and important tribal and regional amirs also won a preferential status and can be considered part of the Saudi ruling class.

Abd al-Aziz continued to expand his power-base by numerous matrimonial arrangements with traditional regional rulers and important tribal shaykhs (henceforth umara: singular amir).3 Not only could he as a Muslim marry four wives but according to custom he could frequently divorce them and marry others without casting dishonour on them and their relatives. Thus he incorpor- ated in his regime an important element of the regional and tribal umara.



RULING CLASS AND NEW ELITES IN SAUDI ARABIA 151

In contradiction to the Wahhabi-Saudi jihads in previous centuries Ibn Saud's military campaigns were to start with, not aimed at spreading the Wahhabiyya in the conquered areas but rather at re-establishing in them the authority of the House of Saud. The historical alliance between the Najdi ulama, led by Al al-Shaykh and the House of Saud, led by Abd al-Aziz, has not been automatically re-established this time. The Najdi ulama viewed Ibn Saud's government with reservation, if not with suspicion. Some, who lived under the protection of other Wahhabi rulers, even supported his enemies. Eventually, however, most of the Najdi ulama agreed to recognize the authority of the young ruler, but even then only on condition that, at least temporarily, his father Abd al-Rahman would carry the title of imam.'

The relations between Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi ulama were also somewhat soured by the fact that in this period Abd al-Aziz was not considered by them sufficiently pious. He toyed with technological innovations which they considered a bid 'ah (heretical innovation). He did not conduct jihads per se against the polytheists (mushrikun) in the region and he was known to associate with the British infidel authorities in the Persian Gulf.5

The cementing of the relations between Al Saud and Al al-Shaykh through matrimonial arrangements and the preferential treatment accorded to the ulama as a whole, undoubtedly contributed to the improvement of the relations between the king and the majority of the urban Najdi alims. Moreover, in order to establish a meaningful loyal military force to carry out his plans and overcome the natural opposition of the bedouin tribes to law and order, Abd al-Aziz established, or took under his patronage, about 1912, the Ikhwan movement. Ulama (mutawwa'in lit. volunteers) were sent to teach the bedouins the principles of the Wahhabiyya and land and funds were allocated for their settlement. By 1930 this movement led to the settlement of approximately 150,000 bedouins in more than 200 military-agricultural villages (hujar).6

The Ikhwan armies were principally responsible after 1913 for Abd al-Aziz's conquests including Jabal Shammar, the Hijaz and Asir. Thus, if Ibn Saud was not truly in the debt of the bedouin tribal amirs and the ulama until the establishment of the movement, this was not so any more thereafter. Sub- sequently, the importance of the tribal umara and mutawwa'in7 who settled in the hujar, and the Najdi ulama in general, rapidly increased.

After 1913 the Najdi ruler appeared to follow the Wahhabi code of behaviour more strictly and he frequently consulted the ulama and the Ikhwan leaders on different issues. But, as Ibn Saud became more dependent on them, the leading tribal amirs, some of whom were Abd al-Aziz's bitter enemies in the first decade of the century, and the more fanatic ulama, exploited their new leverage to coerce the imam to accept their extreme interpretation of the Wahhabiyya and their right to intervene in the running of the kingdom. Although the attitude of the Ikhwan leaders increasingly infuriated Abd al- Aziz's lieutenants, the Saudi ruler chose to overlook the Ikhwan's excesses in order to avoid an open breach with them.

In the period following the first World War Ibn Saud accelerated his efforts to establish a united centralized kingdom in the Arabian Peninsula. For this purpose he planned to introduce aspects of modern administration and Western technology which he considered essential for effective government



152 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

and not contradictory to the principles of Islam. Moreover, aware of the political realities in the region, he co-ordinated his activities, as much as possible, with the British government and its local representatives.8

Abd al-Aziz's policy was anathema to the Ikhwan and to most of the Najdi ulama. It was not only that their traditional xenophobia had been whipped up by British activities in the region but they also considered Ibn Saud's policy as betrayal of the Wahhabi principles. The fact that the ruler had also begun to consolidate his dynastic rule and had taken to himself, instead of the traditional title of the Amir of Najd, the title of 'Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies' (1921) and later (1926) 'King of the Hijaz' only added fuel to the fire.9 Indeed, both tribal shaykhs and the ulama, especially those con- nected to the Ikhwan, realised that time was working against them and if they were not to stop Ibn Saud, or at least limit his authority, at this stage they would be incapable of doing so in the future.

The Ikhwan rebellion (1927-30)'? was not only a challenge to Ibn Saud's policy but also a desperate attempt on the part of the leading Ikhwan amirs and their ulama allies to preserve their power and the traditional socio-political frameworks from which they derived it. Ibn Saud's final victory over the Ikhwan in 1929-30 and the consolidation of the power of the Saudi state thereafter by establishing a national army and a centralized administration, deprived the tribal shaykhs and the ulama of the power to intervene, on their own initiative, in the conduct of state affairs.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE KINGDOM AND THE DECLINE OF THE UMARA- ULAMA POWER

There are about 50 senior tribal amirs and a few hundred shaykhs (amirs) of secondary tribes and sub-tribes in Saudi Arabia.1' The power and authority of these amirs has been gradually declining since 1930 in relation to the consolidation of the power and authority of the Saudi kingdom and its government and the expansion of its administration. The foundations for the bedouin 'White Army' (later the National Guard) were laid already in 1930 and the armed forces were established in the early 1940s. 2 Most important, Ibn Saud's revenues increased from about ?100,000 sterling annually to about ?4-5 million after the conquest of the Hijaz and they spiralled to tens and later to hundreds of millions of pounds, following the commercial exploitation of oil in Saudi Arabia.'3

The relatively substantial funds at his disposal enabled King Abd al-Aziz to purchase armaments and means of transport and to 'buy' the loyalty of the tribesmen. Thereafter the amirs' potential to resist the concentration of power in the hands of Al Saud was literally nullified. Subsequently, when faced with the choice of either integrating in the Saudi provincial administration and enjoying royal favour, or resisting Ibn Saud and losing whatever authority was left to them, even the remnants of the Ikhwan leadership opted for the former.'4 Henceforth, the tribal amirs became part of the power-base of the Saudi regime and they have a vested interest in its continuity. They are to be considered, therefore, together with the royal house and the ulama, a component of the ruling class. Their position within this class, however, is




secondary and depends as well on the importance of each amir in the Saudi tribal structure.

Notwithstanding his victory over the Ikhwan and the consolidation of his power after 1930, Ibn Saud continued to pamper the ulama, and especially the al-Shaykhs. Their support was still essential for the legitimization of his regime and its policy. It was also crucial for the process of national integration through religion (Wahhabiyya), law (Shari'a) and traditional education. Yet, consultations with the ulama rank and file during the king's daily majlis"5 and with the senior ulama in the far more important weekly majlis, could no longer be considered a recognition of their supreme authority and their right to participate in the decision-making process. Indeed, in matters which he considered of secondary importance, Abd al-Aziz was still ready to accept the ulama's opinions, even when they were opposed to his own. But, on more important problems, although he consulted them when he saw fit, he made his final decision according to what he considered right and, whenever necessary, in contradiction to the ulama's opinion. 16

The ulama, who were coerced to accept the new status quo, realized that in the new phase of their alliance with the House of Saud, while Wahhabi hegemony and their special position in the kingdom were guaranteed, their power and influence were to be dependent on the ruler's goodwill. But, even as junior partners of the Sauds the ulama, led by Al al-Shaykh, enjoyed high prestige, privileges and substantial influence and they were consulted regularly by Ibn Saud. As the kingdom's government and administration developed they were given key positions in it, in addition to control of the religious services, justice and education systems.

Paradoxically, the role and authority of the ulama further declined after the rise of King Faysal whom they helped bring to the throne in 1964.17 Known for his piety and related through his mother to Al aJ-Shaykh, Faysal, who promoted the pan-Islamic movement in his struggle against pan-Arabism, nevertheless eroded the ulama's power and influence. In addition to his modernization programme, he abolished, or left vacant, key positions of (judicial) power held by the ulama. Moreover, although he entrusted his new Ministry of Justice to an Alim of Hijazi origin (usually more moderate than the Najdi ones), Faysal gradually established secular administrative (non- Shari'a) tribunals of different kinds."8 Frequently he ignored the ulama's opposition to aspects of his accelerated modernization, sometimes even in matters considered by them major issues.'9 Last but not least, he curbed the authority and activities of the 'Committes for Encouraging Virtue and Preventing Vice' (hay'at al-amr bi'l ma'ruf wa'l-nahi 'an al-munkar) and their (morality) police, a major source of power of the conservatives.

The ulama, nevertheless, remain a major factor in the Saudi kingdom and the Sauds' loyal partners, although junior ones, in its ruling class. Both the Sauds and the ulama, each for their own reasons, have a vested interest in the preservation of their historical alliance. On the one hand it contributes to the regime's legitimization, stability and to national integration. On the other hand it helps to preserve the Wahhabi character of the kingdom and the role of the ulama in its supervision.

The rise to power of King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd in 1975 signalled




a reversal of Faysal's policy. Senior members of Al al-Shaykh were appointed to the positions previously left vacant at the head of the judicial system. Hijazi ulama were no longer preferred to the more strict Najdi ones (as was the case in other fields as well). The activities of the 'morality committees' and the 'morality police' were also somewhat stepped up, although their authority was still limited.20

The Mecca incident at the end of 1979, an outcome of the revival of Wahhabi fundamentalism (neo-Ikhwan), if anything only brought the ulama and the Sauds closer together. The ulama, notwithstanding some extremist alims who sympathize with neo-Ikhwan teachings,2' considered the rise of fundamentalism not only a threat to the Wahhabi-Saudi kingdom but also a challenge to themselves as part of the Saudi establishment. They did not hesitate, therefore, to sanction the storming of the Holy Mosque and to denounce the rebels and their 'heretic' beliefs. For their part, the Saudi rulers, intimidated by the above phenomena and the rise of Iranian Shi'i fundamentalism, somewhat reinforced the ulama's control of daily life in Saudi Arabia and tried to appear more devout and pious. Yet, in matters of policy and substance, especially if concerned with the kingdom's government, development or foreign policy, the ulama, as in the past, are rarely consulted. Leaders of the Al Shaykh considered part of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, however, regularly participate in the meetings of the informal royal majlis al-shura.

Regardless of the decline in their power and influence, the ulama are still an important component of the Saudi ruling class. They come immediately after the royal house and its collateral and associated families, but above the umara, in the scale of importance of the traditional elites. Indeed, in contradiction to the umara they are organized, have a hierarchical leadership, state-supported institutions and common interests which unite them.22 The activities of the al-Shaykhs, moreover, are no longer confined to the religious and judicial hierarchies and they are to be found in key positions in the administration, educational system, security services, the armed forces and even in the private sector of the Saudi economy.23

THE MONARCHY, DECISION AND POLICY-MAKING AND THE RULING CLASS

It was generally accepted that until the 1970s the House of Saud, the ulama and the umara - the most important components of the regime's power base - were in fact the Saudi ruling class. The size of this class is difficult to determine. Al Abd al-Rahman and the other 'recognized' branches of Al Saud, not to mention their associated important families, are generally estimated to be about 5,000 strong. The number of ulama (in the wider sense) and all the members of the religious hierarchy in Saudi Arabia is probably in the tens of thousands. Indeed Al Shaykh is intermarried with all the other branches of the ruling class, by itself believed to consist of 7,000-10,000 people. As for the umara and their extended families, their number is probably equal to that of the religious establishment. Thus, the traditional Saudi ruling class in King Faysal's time (in the wider sense) was quite substantial.

Some scholars classify the Saudi kingdom as an autocracy. Others call it a 'desert democracy'.24 The more appropriate description of the Saudi regime




after the death of Ibn Saud is probably an oligarchy whose pillars are the Saudi royal house, the ulama and the umara. The conduct of its government follows, especially since the last years of King Abd al-Aziz, the golden rule of consul- tation (shura) and consensus (ijma'), within the ruling class.

The monarch has a power of veto over all the decisions of the executive system (government and administration) which rapidly developed, and gained power after Faysal became prime minister in 1958. Indeed, notwithstanding the principles of shura and ijma' the king can also veto, at least in theory, decisions of his informal majlis al-shura25 (Consultative Council), representing the Saudi oligarchy. Yet, on the other hand, in certain circumstances, the Saudi oligarchy, through its unofficial leadership (ahl al-hal wal-'aqd - those who bind and loose), may over-rule the king, limit his authority, and in extreme cases, even depose him. Such prerogatives, however, were exercised only in relation to King Saud (r. 1953-64) whose policy undermined the kingdom's economic structure, its stability and the hegemony of the House of Saud. Added to Faysal's manipulations, Saud's incompetent government united most of the ruling class against him. It is unclear, therefore, whether the authority of the king could be challenged, in normal circumstances, by a section of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, especially if the opposition to the king was to be led by someone of lesser stature than Faysal. But in abnormal circumstances if the policy of the king or a financial crisis caused by him were to threaten the stability of the kingdom and the hegemony of the ruling class, a similar coalition to that which deposed Saud in 1962-64 could again emerge.

Information concerning ahl al-hal wal-'aqd in modern Saudi Arabia is partial and vague. Most of the sources agree that membership in this author- itative and powerful body is informal and limited to about 100 members of Al Abd al-Rahman Al Saud and cadet branches of the family. Fifty additional members of this body are said to belong to the aristocratic families associated with the Sauds - Jilwi, Sudayri, Thunayan, Al-Shaykh - and some out- standing ulama, not related to the latter, and a handful of extremely important umara.26 The criteria for membership in ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, it seems, are origin, seniority, prestige and leadership qualities, according to bedouin tradition.

Leading ulama participated at the side of the other components of ahl al- hal al-'aqd in consultations which preceded dramatic developments in Saudi history. For instance, the discussions concerning Ibn Saud's succession in 1952-53, the appointment of Faysal as prime minister in 1958 and as prime minister with full decision-making powers in 1962, the coerced abdication of Saud in Faysal's favour in 1964, the succeeding of Faysal by Khalid in 1975 and of Khalid by Fahd in 1982, and the crushing of the Mecca rebellion in 1979. In several such instances fatwas (the proclaiming of religious-legal opinion) were also issued by the leaders of the ulama. Yet, the ulama's participation in the informal royal Consultative Council (majlis al-shura), the kingdom's decision- and policy-making organ, is ad-hoc and conditional, it seems, on the need for religious sanction for a specific decision or action.27

The tribal shaykhs and the members of the regional dynasties (umara) provide, as mentioned above, the third leg of the tripod of the Saudi dynasty's traditional power-base. Yet, just a handful of the most important umara are




considered ahl al-hal wal-'aqd. Indeed, only a few exceptionally important amirs were invited, since Abd al-Aziz's death, to consultations of the informal royal majlis al-shura largely in times of crisis or in relation to major policy debates.28

Despite the subsidies they received from Ibn Saud and their role in the provincial government, the importance of the umara, as mentioned above, has been declining steadily since 1930 with the exception of a short period under King Saud. This process was accelerated with Faysal's rise to power and his reorganization and strengthening of the central government. That and the introduction of five-year development plans (1970-75, 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90) continuously strengthen the new Saudi elites and the central government. Conversely, the above and the extension of the government's administration and welfare services to the provinces undermined the authority of the provincial governors (umara al-manatiq), the sole representatives of the royal authority in the provinces and districts between 1930 and the 1950s, and, even more so, that of the tribal shaykhs (umara) and the regional and urban notables (a'yan).29

The decline of the authority of the umara gathered momentum from the 1960s also due to Faysal's policy and the rapid urbanization of the bedouins and settled rural population (hadr). Indeed, the average Saudi found himself increasingly turning to the central government's representatives for services and help rather than to his amir or headman.30 However, the umara regained some of their previous importance when Fahd (then crown prince) began to strengthen the authority of the traditional provincial government from about 1980.3'

The most important component of the Saudi ruling class and of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd is, of course, the royal family. Indeed the royal family dominates the government of the kingdom through the king and through its representatives in the royal Consultative Council and ahl al-hal wal-'aqd. It must be determined, therefore, who can be rightly included in the term 'Saudi royal house'.

After its meteoric rise to power in the first half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the Al Saud house split into different branches which often fought each other for power. Such wars of succession led to the decline of the power of the Sauds and the escape to Kuwait in the last decades of the nineteenth century of Al Abd al-Rahman and other branches of the family.

The term 'royal house' in modern Saudi Arabia is exclusively used to describe the descendants of Abd al-Rahman ibn Turki ibn Faysal Al Saud and foremost the offspring of his son Abd al-Aziz, as well as a few cadet branches of the family. This definition received legal sanction in 1932 when only the offspring of Abd al-Aziz, his brothers and the branches of the Sauds allied to them by common history and marriage were to be considered royalty and to receive a stipend.32

Abd al-Aziz and Faysal publicly denounced the use of royal titles and protocol which contradicted Wahhabi puritanism. In an emotional speech shortly after he came to power in 1964, Faysal said: 'I beg of you, brothers, to look upon me as both brother and servant. "Majesty" is reserved to God alone and "the throne" is the throne of the Heavens and Earth'.33 Yet it was




Abd al-Aziz who took to himself and to his family royal titles and his son Faysal enhanced them.34 Indeed, regulations instituted by the Saudi civil service during Faysal's reign demand that all the direct descendants of King Abd al-Aziz should be referred to as 'His Royal Highness'. Those of his brothers and some of his uncles should be referred to as 'His Highness', and members of other recognized branches of the Sauds as 'His Excellency', a title they share with cabinet ministers, non-royal district amirs and other senior officials.35

All in all it is estimated that 4,000-7,000 members of Al Saud are considered today to be part of the royal family, and of these about 700 are direct descendants of Ibn Saud.36 This substantial group is unquestionably the most important component of the Saudi ruling classes. Following an economic and a political crisis which brought him to power as prime minister in 1958, Crown Prince Faysal reorganized the kingdom's financial and administrative systems. He also substantially reduced the stipends allocated to members of the royal family and removed from the list members of remote branches of the family. That, inter alia, caused a large part of the aristocracy including, ironically, the young 'Liberal Princes', to support his dismissal by King Saud at the end of 1960.

At the end of 1962 Saudi Arabia again faced a major political and financial crisis as a result of the revolution in Yemen (September 1962); Faysal was requested to resume the premiership with full powers. Among other things, Faysal instructed (1963) his uncle and finance minister, Musa'id ibn Abd al- Rahman, to re-examine the royal list and to determine who among the Sauds was henceforth entitled to be considered part of the royal family and receive a stipend. Subsequently Prince Musa'id limited the recognized membership of the royal family to the offspring of Abd al-Aziz and his brothers and Saud al-Kabir, Abd al-Rahman's nephew,37 as well as the Jilwis and the less important Thunayans, Abd al-Aziz's kinsmen and companions since the beginning of his career and who were also related to him through marriage.38

The royal family (as defined above), the Sudayris39 - the powerful bedouin dynasty from northern Najd intermarried with all the branches of the Sauds - and the Al Shaykh thus consist of the upper echelon of the kingdom's ruling class. This group is estimated at about 20,000 people. Together with their other non-royal partners in the kingdom's traditional elites (ulama, umara), they probably number nearly 100,000 people.40

Some scholars are of the opinion that until the rise of Faysal the non-royal traditional elites also comprised important merchant families and urban notables.4' Yet, even if such a claim is valid, these groups are not part of the ruling class. Such differentiation is especially significant for our definition of 'ruling class' in view of the dramatic rise of the importance of the new elites in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. The crucial criteria for membership in the ruling class, we believe, should be the ability to participate in decision-making and policy formulation. In short, to be represented in ahl al-hal wal-'aqd. Wealth, education and key positions in the administration, military or the economy, proposed by some writers as additional yardsticks for inclusion in the Saudi ruling class, prove incorrect if examined against the criteria set above and the history of the new Saudi kingdom since its establishment in 1932.




Wealthy merchants, entrepreneurs or even tribal shaykhs very rarely participated during the reign of Ibn Saud in royal consultations in which important decisions were adopted or the kingdom's internal or external policies were formulated. Indeed, merchants, tribal shaykhs, notables and ulama were present (and still are) in the daily and weekly majalis of Ibn Saud, his heirs and those of senior princes. They attended the regional gatherings convened by the ruler to adopt formally decisions proposed by him.42 Occasionally individuals were requested to help in various matters and were later hand- somely rewarded for their help. Moreover, until the 1940s important merchants were frequently requested, if not coerced, to lend money to Ibn Saud. Their reward was the prestige which they gained and other advantages which enabled them, in many cases, to amass their present immense fortunes. But they were never considered ahl al-hal wal- 'aqd nor members of the king's informal majlis al-shura. Not only was their influence on decision- and policy-making limited, but their success was largely dependent on the rulers' goodwill.

NATIONALISM, THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AND THE SAUD-FAYSAL CONFLICT

In his last years, the enfeebled Abd al-Aziz ruled his country with the help of a Consultative Council. This body was made up of his eldest sons and other senior members of the royal and related families as well as a few powerful tribal amirs, helped by the expatriate Arab advisers who had served Abd al- Aziz for many years. The ulama, it should be noted, did not participate in the council's discussions other than to give their blessing to Saud's succession, nor did the merchants and notables take part in them. Somewhat disappointed with the capability of his heir Saud (appointed 1933), Abd al-Aziz attempted to counterbalance the latter's wide authority by establishing a formal Council of Ministers. Its head was meant to be Prince Faysal, the second in line of succession and universally considered the more suitable to rule.43 But on his succession Saud appointed himself temporarily prime minister and although Faysal assumed the position in the second part of 1954 the Council of Ministers remained a powerless institution.

The reign of Saud, a sickly, weak, conservative and ambivalent king, is generally considered a period of regression, economic difficulties and political fermentation. Saud ignored Faysal, the crown prince and foreign minister, and allied himself at first with the nationalist camp in the Arab world led by President Nasser. But at the same time he suppressed the nascent Saudi nationalist and trade unionist movement." Although he somewhat accelerated the modernization of the kingdom, the conservative Saud abolished some of the reforms introduced in the last decade of his father's reign, and above all he reactivated the ulama-controlled 'Committees for Encouraging Virtue and Preventing Vice' and their 'morality police'. Hence, the power of the conservatives with the ruling class, whose support the king wished to win against his rivals, increased in this period.45

Faysal's reappointment as prime minister in 1958 followed a financial and political crisis caused by Saud's incompetent government and ambivalent policy. It signalled a new phase of modernization and development in the kingdom. Besides a financial reform Faysal reorganized and expanded the




government and its services. Young Western-educated Saudis were incor- porated in key positions in the administration, modern education was more rapidly developed and many technological innovations were introduced. Saudi Arabia's foreign policy became more balanced and efforts were made to repair the kingdom's relations with the Arab nationalist camp which had dangerously deteriorated since 1957 under Saud. The dramatic success of pan-Arabism in this period and the struggle for power within the royal house, however, caused the Saudi oligarchy to split into three camps representing the differing opinions and interests which existed within the ruling class.

1. The progressives: mainly a small group of Abd al-Aziz's younger sons led by Prince Talal, some of their young kinsmen and other liberal members of the ruling elite. This camp wished to bring about a revolutionary change in the Saudi government and society (above all a constitutional monarchy) and were unwilling to await their turn to reach a position of power and influence according to the seniority system. Naturally they were dissatisfied with Faysal's conservatism and limited reforms aimed at consolidating the Sauds' patriarchal regime.

2. The modernists: this camp was composed of many of the senior members of the royal family and the ruling elite as a whole, led by Crown Prince Faysal. They wanted to accelerate, through evolutionary means, the hesitant modernization of the Saudi state and society introduced by Abd al-Aziz. They also wished to reform the archaic character of the Saudi government while preserving the Sauds' hegemony on power and decision-making and the alliance between the Sauds and the ulama.

3. The conservatives: the older and less enlightened members of the royal family and Saud's numerous sons, the tribal amirs and most of the ulama. All wished to preserve the status quo and above all their privileges and the puritan character of the Saudi-Wahhabi society. They rejected, therefore, any aspect of modernization and change. Naturally they opposed Faysal's tendency for reforms and innovations and wholeheartedly supported the conservative and xenophobic Saud until 1958 and somewhat less so thereafter.

The flow of oil wealth into Saudi Arabia since 1946 and the impact of modernization, accelerated by Faysal since 1958, were a turning-point in the process of social change in the kingdom. A new middle class, composed of the Western-educated bureaucrats, members of the professions, successful businessmen, as well as many self-made men with traditional background, began to emerge in the late 1940s. This process and the rise of the Saudi 'new men' in its wake, was here a serious influence on developments in Saudi Arabia in the coming decades.'

The rise of a new middle class in Saudi Arabia coincided with the emergence in the kingdom, between 1952 and 1956, of Arab nationalism and socialism (the latter surfaced in the early 1950s among Aramco's work-force in the oil- rich Eastern Province - al-Hasa). In addition to the return to Saudi Arabia of graduates of Arab and Western universities, it was related to the development of the oil industry, the influence of foreign Arabs employed in the kingdom and the political fermentation in the Middle East as a whole.47 It was only to be expected that the nascent nationalist movement and new middle




class as a whole would become involved in the struggle for power within the ruling class which had surfaced in this period.

As support for Faysal waned within the ruling class due to his stringent financial reforms and modernizing policy (1958-60), the new educated technocrats, many of whom were appointed and promoted by the crown prince, paradoxically also turned their back on him. Faysal's evolutionary approach meant to consolidate the Saud regime was contrary to the hopes of the young nationalists who, encouraged by Nasser's achievements, were aiming at a constitutional monarchy or possibly a republican government. Thus, when Saud seemed to agree to promulgate a new constitution and to accelerate reforms, they followed the 'Liberal Princes' and joined the king's camp.48 When Saud deposed Faysal at the end of 1960 and formed a 'liberal government' it appeared for a short while that a new era would begin and the composition of the Saudi ruling class would soon change. Indeed, the new government, in which Prince Talal assumed a key role as Minister of Finance and National Economy and 'progressives' held five ministerial posts,49 announced on 25 December 1960 that it had approved the election of a National Council and ordered the draft of a constitution. Three days later, however, these announcements were denied on the orders of King Saud. After additional disagreement with the king Prince Talal was coerced in September 1961 to resign from the government.

The struggle for power within the royal family was exacerbated by Saud's reassumption of power at the end of 1960 and his mishandling of the kingdom's affairs. The crisis climaxed again in 1962 as a result of the revolution in Yemen and the Egyptian intervention there, not to mention a renewed financial crisis. While Saud's refusal to grant the promised constitutional reforms completely disillusioned his progressive allies, his conservative supporters, disenchanted by his meddling with the former, became apprehensive of the outcome of events in Yemen, and many joined the powerful camp of Faysal's supporters. Under pressure from most of the senior princes, supported by the leading ulama, Saud agreed in October 1962 to surrender his authority to Faysal as acting prime minister. Two years later (October 1964), after obtaining afatwa from 12 leading ulama, ahl al-hal wal-'aqd coerced Saud to abdicate in Faysal's favour.50

Even earlier the progressive-nationalist camp lost heart when its leaders were dismissed from the government. A few liberal princes led by Talal and a number of radical-nationalist commoners found it prudent to leave the country and seek refuge in Cario. There at the end of 1962 they formed the Arab National Liberation Front ('Free Saudis Movement'); except for some air force officers who deserted with their planes to Egypt the ANLF failed to gain significant support in Saudi Arabia and soon disintergrated. The repentant 'Free Princes' were pardoned by Faysal in 1964 and 1965 and were eventually appointed to important-sounding positions devoid of power.

Some nationalist commoners were also pardoned and returned to the country. Others established several insignificant radical socialist opposition organizations in Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad with a small following in the kingdom. Thus, the first bid of the Saudi new elites to challenge the monopoly of power held by the traditional ruling class, failed. The large majority of still




relatively small Saudi intelligentsia chose anyway to serve in, or co-operate with, Faysal's modernist government. Those who did not were cruelly persecuted by Faysal in the 1960s and early 1970s.

NEW ELITES, GOVERNMENT AND RULING CLASS

During his first term as prime minister and after his return to power in 1962, Faysal courted the new elites. Inasmuch as he wanted their support in his conflict with Saud and needed their co-operation in his struggle against pan- Arabism, he could not accept in June 1960 the demands of the liberal princes and nationalist commoners for constitutional reforms. Yet, at the end of 1962, facing the Egyptian threat and Saud's intrigues, he was ready, for tactical reasons, to meet partially their pressure for constitutional reforms and accelerated development.

In his ten-point programme of November 1962 Faysal promised constitutional reforms 'in accordance with the Koran and within the framework of the Shari'a'. He also declared his intention to form a national Consultative Council similar to the one which operated in Hijaz between 1926 and 1953, to reorganize the local government and create provincial consultative bodies and to develop the central government.5' Once solidly in power, the promised reforms were forgotten. In 1963 Faysal declared that Saudi Arabia has its own style of government, its constitution is the Shari'a and its ruler is the king- imam. 'Whoever wished to be a slave and imitate others let him become a slave. Saudi Arabia has no need for foreign systems'.52 By 1964 Faysal was con- vinced that if permitted to participate in the country's government and modernization and if enabled to share in its wealth, the new elites will co- operate with his regime.53

Shortly after assuming full authority at the end of 1962, Faysal began to reform the government and accelerated the pace of modernization. Because of the shortage of suitable Saudi manpower he substantially expanded the education system, promoted schools for women, and rapidly increased the number of Saudis trained abroad.54 Despite his bitter experience with the Saudi 'new men' in the 1959-62 period, Faysal appointed Western-educated technocrats to key positions in his government. In fact every graduate of foreign and local institutions of higher learning who wished to join the administration was welcomed irrespective of his previous political opinions. Thus modern-educated bureaucrats replaced expatriate Arabs and increasingly eroded the monopoly of the conservatives in the Saudi government service.

After he was officially enthroned (1964), Faysal reorganized his cabinet and entrusted some of the new ministries which he created and many key positions in his administration to university-trained commoners. In 1969 he launched Saudi Arabia's first (1970-75) five-year development plan (with others to follow) which further necessitated the expertise and involvement of the new elites. By 1975, the year Faysal was assassinated, about half of the kingdom's cabinet ministers were university graduates, most of them commoners."5 The civil service, with the exception of the ulama-controlled ministries, was also largely dominated by bureaucrats with modern education.

Oil wealth and the rapid development of the kingdom created opportunities




which attracted many educated Saudis to the private sector of the economy. They could not but succeed in the 1960s and 1970s, a period of continuous prosperity. Those who turned to the professions also became highly successful because of the insatiable demand for their services.

As time progressed, it became increasingly evident that the king had no intention of proclaiming a constitution and of establishing an official consultative assembly. Inasmuch as he was more than willing to entrust most ministries (excepting security, foreign policy and religion)56 to teclhnocrats, and to enable the middle class, and Saudis in general, to participate in the country's wealth, Faysal adamantly refused to allow the new elites to participate in decision-making and policy formulation. Indeed, he ruthlessly persecuted members of the intelligentsia, the military and workers' activists who agitated against, or attempted to subvert the regime dominated by the Sauds.

Regardless of his image as a modernist and administrative reformer, Faysal was a conservative whose government was extremely centralized and patriarchal. He hardly delegated authority, constantly supervised the running of the ministries by the commoner-technocrats and intervened in matters of minute importance.57 On the whole his reforms in fields that were not technical were at best minimal and in matters not considered by him of primary importance to the kingdom's development (such as the status of women and the control of modern education), he tended to compromise with the ulama.

Notwithstanding unrest related to the civil war in Yemen and two abortive coups in 1969, the Saudi middle class, intimidated by Faysal's powerfully based regime and merciless suppression of the opposition, tempted by high government posts and by wealth, largely chose to co-operate with the regime. Thus, without compromising the authority of the traditional ruling class, Faysal succeeded in stemming the revolutionary potential of the new elites and even enticed the majority to join the regime's power base.58

The development of the Saudi government, its administration and agencies and the rapid growth of the kingdom's economy since 1970 increasingly contributed to the importance of the new elites. Some scholars, impressed by the expansion of their ranks and the growth of their authority, prestige and wealth, believed that they had become one of the pillars of power of the Saudi regime.59 Yet, despite their impressive achievements, the new elites failed to gain a foothold in the Saudi ruling class. Indeed, on the rare occasions in which leading technocrats, even cabinet ministers, openly criticized the government's policy or irresponsible acts of senior princes, they had to resign, were dismissed or 'exiled', even though they voiced popular sentiments.61

It is claimed that some leading technocrats and the wealthy merchants and entrepreneurs, of Najdi origin, succeeded recently in penetrating the Saudi 'upper class'. But 'upper class' should not be confused with ruling class. Hence, although they may have achieved international fame (Zaki Yamani) and control enormous economic power, the technocrats and the merchant entrepreneurs are still not members of the Saudi oligarchy. The Saudi nouveaux riches depend on the goodwill of the rulers and are frequently coerced to take princes as 'partners' or pay them substantial commissions,61 whereas the technocrats can be fired at the whim of the ruler.




The modernization and the expansion of the Saudi armed forces since the 1960s made the House of Saud even less dependent on the traditional power brokers. It also reduced the importance of the National Guard (the bedouin militia), a source of power for the Saudi conservatives. Yet, despite the enormous investment in it the Saudi armed forces are still (1985) believed to be weak and inefficient. Moreover, their officers, unless from the ranks of the oligarchy, are not 'a component of the ruling class', as some authors claim, nor can they be considered a 'power group'.62

Younger members of the ruling elites are increasingly encouraged to join the armed forces, especially the air force; many hold key positions in the latter.63 This, the regime hopes, will reduce the possibility of the armed forces becoming a threat. An endemic shortage of manpower, especially of skilled manpower, makes the Saudi armed forces heavily dependent on a host of foreign experts and mercenaries.' The pressing need for skilled manpower to handle the increasingly sophisticated weapon systems acquired by Saudi Arabia, nevertheless, required the enlistment of educated manpower from Hijaz and Al-Hasa, rather than the traditional illiterate Najdi-bedouin volunteers.65 The inhabitants of the former provinces are not known for their support for the House of Saud and the rise of their numbers among officers and NCOs of the technical branches of the army and in the air force could lead eventually to the emergence of 'Young Turks' (as in 1969) in the Saudi armed forces. Such a likelihood seems at present relatively insignificant in view of the system of checks and balances instituted in the armed forces, the substantial benefits enjoyed by officers and ranks and the elaborate security services established by the regime. Yet the non-royal officers should be considered another component of the expanding ranks of the new elites.

The new Saudi elites (made up of technocrats, professionals, entrepreneurs, merchants and officers), despite their substantial personal achievements, are not in a position to challenge the monopoly in decision-making of the traditional ruling class. They would be satisfied with the establishment of the often promised, partly elected, partly appointed, national Consultative Coutncil (majlis aI-shura);' but, despite repeated undertakings by all the monarchs, starting with King Saud, the ruling class still refuses to authorize such a concession fearing that such an institution would serve as a springboard to the new elite to advance their demand for participation in decision-making.

At the end of 1984 the Saudi government issued a tender for the construction of the building for the majlis al-shura in Riyadh. On this occasion King Fahd announced that preparations were being made for the appointment and election of members of this institution in the near future, according to the recommendations of the royal commission established for this purpose at the end of 1979.67 The establishment of the planned 'National Council' was delayed because.it met with the strong opposition of the different components of the traditional elites fearing an erosion of their power. The more conservative ulama and umara were also apprehensive lest a platform provided for the Western-educated and liberal new elites might corrupt the character of the Wahhabi-Saudi kingdom.




THE 'LOWER CLASS' AND THE SAUDI HUKUMA-DAWLA

The Saudi 'lower class', with the exception of an inconsequential element,68 faithfully support the regime, its policy and the conservative-Wahhabi character of its kingdom. Their allegiance to the government (hukuma) of the Sauds goes back to the pre-kingdom era and has been maintained through a network of traditional socio-political institutions. Even after the establishment of the modern Saudi kingdom in 1932, townspeople, nomads and agriculturalists, were still governed through their respective hierarchy of village, town, district and provincial amirs and tribal shaykhs (amirs). The leadership of the rural population was integrated in the regime's power base through numerous matrimonial arrangements.69 The Saudi patriarchal system, moreover, provided for the meagre needs of the largely nomadic rural society through stipends and employment of many in the National Guard, the armed forces and the internal security services.

The accelerated development of the kingdom since the 1960s and the first and second five-years development plans (1970-80), although they sparked off rapid changes in the rural society, mainly benefited the urban population. They created, nevertheless, attractive opportunities in the towns and accelerated the urbanization of the bedouins and agriculturalists. This, and the development of a centralized government, caused an erosion of the traditional socio-political institutions of the tribal society. Yet, the newly urbanized, on the whole, maintained their ties with their tribes, villages and amirs.70 The third five-year plan (1980-85) already gave the highest priority to the rural population with the aim of equating their standard of living to that of the townspeople.

The distinction made by the Saudi 'lower class' between hukuma and dawla, both of which they commonly take to mean government, is quite significant. To the simple Saudi, dawla is a synonym of the modern central government and its agencies, largely controlled by Western educated bureaucrats of urban origin. The development of the central government and the expansion of its services and rapid urbanization brought the Saudi lower middle and lower classes, both largely of bedouin origin, into daily contact with the dawla and made them dependent on services and subsidies provided by it. Notwithstanding, the new townspeople usually dislike the bureaucrats whom they consider inferior and crafty and who despise them. On the other hand the Sauds' paternalistic hukuma, which retains personal contact with them, they believe, respects them, understands their problems and, as befits a (paternalistic) government, provides all their requirements whenever the need arises.7'

The 'personal relationship' between the royal family and the tribal rural and newly urbanized population is maintained through the different levels of amirs and other traditional institutions. Most important are the majalis (singular, majlis) held by the king, all the senior princes and their offspring, the leaders of the aristocratic families and the provincial and district amirs. The royal family up to the monarch is thus accessible, at least in theory, to the lowliest of citizens. He can petition for, and receive, financial and other help, or may bring before the ruler for consideration any grievance or any




injustice suffered by him. Individuals and groups, moreover, also use the majalis to lobby 'worthy' public causes.72

Some authors espousing radical ideologies73 lament the fact that the Saudi 'lower class' is not really a lower class per se because the poorer Saudis have already elevated themselves to the middle class, or are in the process of doing so, and hence are not proper 'revolutionary material'. The rapid expansion of modern education among the rural and recently urbanized Saudis and the rise in their standard of living may eventually bridge the differences between the Saudi 'lower class' and the new elite. But at present the new elites, mainly of urban middle-class origin, can expect little sympathy or support from the lower middle and lower-class Saudis in their bid to penetrate or overthrow the Saudi ruling class.

As Crown Prince, King Fahd began to reinforce and reorganize the provincial administration; young, educated and active princes replaced many of the ineffective provincial governors of the older generation. They were given additional responsibilities and their authority was soon to be expanded by law. Substantial funds were also allocated for the development of the rural areas and the umara were made responsible for the co-ordination of such projects in their respective provinces. The Saudi king believes, it seems, that the modernized patriarchal provincial government may offset the increasing influence of the constantly growing new elites derived from the power of the central government.

CONCLUSION

Following in the footsteps of their father the great Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi monarchs carefully adhere to the golden principle of shura and ijma'. Until today, however, they apply this principle exclusively to the royal family and its traditional partners in the ruling class. Yet, the monarch's 'absolutism' is tempered by the fact that he consults with the informal majlis al-shura representing ahl al-hal wal-'aqd on every important issue and whenever policy decisions are required. In the case of a major crisis, moreover, a larger forum of ahl al-hal wal- 'aqd is convened. The centralization of the government, the expansion of the administration and the rapid modernization of the kingdom, nevertheless, eroded the power of the non-royal traditional elites (tribal umara and ulama), and, to a lesser degree, that of the important families, such as the Jilwis, Al al-Shaykh and the Thunayans.

Again, following Ibn Saud, Faysal, Khalid and Fahd adopted a policy aimed at pre-empting the consolidation in the kingdom of any power centre with a potential to challenge the Sauds' regime. Hence, they did and still do their best to incorporate the new elites in the royal family's power base. Yet, regardless of their wealth and their impressive achievements the technocrats are excluded from any position of power in the cabinet and although more authority is delegated to them since Faysal's death, they enjoy only an executive power. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs and merchants, despite their wealth, still depend on the goodwill of the rulers and have been badly hit by the stagnation since 1982 of the kingdom's economy and government spending74 due to the decline in its oil revenue. Thus, after about 20 years of faithfully




serving the regime the new elites have failed to penetrate the ruling class, and decision- and policy-making in Saudi Arabia remain exclusively in the hands of the traditional elites.

Notwithstanding all the above, the ruling class cannot continue to exclude the new elites from participating in policy-making much longer. The ranks of the latter are constantly increasing and so is their frustration. The many new officers of non-royal origin who have joined, and will be joining, the armed forces add a new dimension to this challenge. Moreover, the rural population in Saudi Arabia, a major source of support for the regime, has declined sharply in size in the last decade. In so far as the urbanized masses increasingly become more educated and sophisticated, their support for the House of Saud can no longer be taken for granted. This process may gather momentum if the decline in the oil revenues and the recession in Saudi Arabia causes hardship to the less affluent Saudis.

The announced decision in principle by King Fahd in 1985 to establish a largely appointed, but partly elected, Consultative Council (majlis al-shura) could have been a step towards granting the new elites a measure of participation in the kingdom's government. As it turned out it was a delaying tactic, as were similar announcements in the past necessitated by traumatic developments in Saudi Arabia. If eventually created such a majlis al-shura could become a stepping-stone towards fuller participation of the new elites in decision-making, if not a means, for a complete change in the Saudi government. Indeed the conservatives in the ruling class who strongly oppose the establishment of the 'National Assembly' have the example of the militant parliament of Kuwait before their eyes and are well aware of such a possibility. Thus, the likelihood of a change in the monopoly on decision-making by the old elites in the near future seems remote.

NOTES

The author wishes to thank the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for a fellowship (1982-83), which facilitated the research for this article.

1. Al meaning family or clan (or tribe). Until recently the Jilwis governed the oil rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

2. The most important families associated with Al Saud are: Jilwi, Sudayri, Thunayan and Al Shaykh (the descendants of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabiyya).

3. For example with the defeated house of Rashid of Jabal Shammar. The mother of Crown Prince Abdallah was a Rashid. Amir, a common title in Saudi Arabia, could denote prince, provincial or district governor, tribal shaykh or village headman.

4. On Abd al-Aziz and the Wahhabi ulama in the first years of the reconquest of Najd, see B. 0. Kashmeeri, 'Ibn Saud: The Arabian Nation Builder', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Howard University 1973, p. 168; J. Goldberg, 'Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud and the Wahhabi Doctrine: Thoughts about a Paradox' (in Hebrew), Hamizrah Hahadash, Vol. 30 (1981), 100-2; R. Lacey, TheKingdom (London, 1981), pp. 66-7. On Abd al-Rahman's imamship see H. St. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (Beirut, 1968), p. 240.

5. G. De Gaury, Faisal King of Saudi Arabia (New York/Washington, 1966), p. 18. Of Ibn Saud destroying his beloved wind-up gramophone see Lacey, p. 144.

6. J.S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam (Leiden, 1978), p.222; C. Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (London, 1981), pp. 137-8. Also Philby, p.265.

7. Lit. volunteers. Mostly, it seems, of tribal origin.




8. Ibn Saud planned modernization in the fields of administration, communications and military technology.

9. See Al-Rihani's evidence from 1922 (Lacey, p. 178) on tension between Ibn Saud and the ulama and the reaction to the titles mentioned above. Also H. Wahba, Arabian Days (London, 1964), pp.127, 129, 131-4. On Ibn Saud's new titles, see Wahba, pp.135-6; G. Rentz, 'The Saudi Monarchy' in W. A. Beling (ed.), King Faisal and the Modernisation of SaudiA rabia (London, 1980), pp.27-8. (henceforth Rentz); F. Hamza, Al-bilad al-A rabiyya al-Saudiyya, (Mecca 1335 A.H., 1937 A.D.), pp.90- 1; A. Bligh, 'The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom', International Journal of MiddleEastern Studies, 17, 1 (February 1985), 38.

10. On the Ikhwan rebellion see Habib; Moss Helms; Philby. 11. 0. Al-Rawaf, 'The Concept of the Five Crises in Political Development: Relevance to the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University 1981, p.329. 12. M. Abir, 'Saudi Security and Military Endeavor', The Jerusalem Quarterly, 33, Fall 1984, 81. 13. Philby, p.333; Ibn Saud's revenues in 1922 amounted to $780,000: M. E. Faheem, 'Higher

Education and Nation Building. A Case Study of King Abdul Aziz University', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1982, p.98.

14. A. H. Said, 'Saudi Arabia: The Transition From a Tribal Society to a Nation', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Missouri 1979, pp. 126, 138; Wahba, p.299.

15. Majlis (audience or reception) - a forum for discussion and for petitions, held by every Saudi of consequence. Royal majalis are theoretically open to every Saudi but in reality limited by the size of the room and admittance frequently depends on the rank of the applicant or his patron.

16. Wahba, pp. 50-2, 170-1; T. Niblock, 'Social Structure and the Development of the Saudi Arabian Political System', Chapter 5 in T. Niblock (ed.), State, Society and Economy in SaudiArabia (London, 1982), p.95 (henceforth Niblock); F. A. Shaker, 'Modernization of the Developing Nations. The Case of Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Purdue University, 1972, p. 138.

17. See below. 18. Grand Mufti and Chief Qadi. Faysal established instead in 1971 the Council of Grand Ulama

(Majlis Hay'at Kibar al-Ulama): A. Layish, 'Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia', in M. Heper and R. Israeli (eds.), Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (New York, 1984), p. 30, and entrusted the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Awqaf to a Hijazi belonging to a merchant family: W. Rugh, 'Emergence of a New Saudi Middle Class in Saudi Arabia', The Middle East Journal (1973), 14-15; Also: F. A. S. Al-Farsy, A Case Study in Development (London, 1982), p.68, on non-Shari'a judicial tribunals; F. M. Zedan, 'Political Development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1932-1975', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School 1981, pp. 50-53; S. A. Solaim, 'Saudi Arabia's Judicial System', Middle East Journal, 25 (Summer 1971).

19. Women's education, radio and television. Rioting sparked in 1960 by the establishing of schools for women and in 1965 against the establishment of TV service were suppressed by the National Guard. Among demonstrators killed in 1965 was Prince Khalid ibn Musa'id, whose brother Faysal assassinated in 1975 his uncle King Faysal.

20. On the reversal of Faysal's policy by Khalid-Fahd after 1975 see W. Ochsenwald, 'Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 13 (1981), 278; M. Field, Financial Times(London), 24 April 1984, supplement, Saudi Arabia; J. Buchan, 'Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia' in Niblock (ed.), p. 108 (henceforth Buchan).

21. Abd al-Aziz al-Baz, one of the leading Saudi ulama and an arch reactionary was known to harbour such sympathies before 1979. The Islamic universities in Al-Madinah and Riyadh were, and possibly still are, centres for neo-Ikhwan activities. D. Holden and R. Johns, The House of Saud (London, 1982), p.517; Buchan, pp. 122-3; M. Field, 'How the power of Islam ...', Financial Times, 28 September 1982; Al-Rawaf, pp.359, 527; AIMawqif al-A rabi (Beirut), 20 April 1981.

22. For instance, the most distinguished ulama who hold the senior positions in the religious establishmeift: The Council of Grand Ulama (Hay'atKibar al-Ulama), The Department of Legal-Religious Opinion (Dar al-Ifta'...) and the Central Committee for Encouraging Virtue and Preventing Vice. See Al-Rawaf, pp. 323, 326; Layish, p.30.




23. Representation of al-Shaykh among the ulama declined sharply Bligh, p. 39. Three al-Shaykhs served as cabinet ministers in 1984. The head of the Saudi general security services is General Abdallah ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Shaykh. The commander in chief of the army in 1982 was General Muhammad al-Shaykh - T. R. McHale, 'The Saudi Arabian Political System - its Origins, Evolution and Current Status', Virteljahresberichte, 89 (September 1982), 203. See also L. Blandford, Oil Sheikhs (London, 1976), p. 79 on their place in society. On al-Shaykhs active in the economy: Al-Rawaf, pp. 331-2.

24. Shaker and Al-Farsy - 'desert democracy'. Wenner (M. Wenner, 'Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites' in F. Tachau (ed.), Political Elites and Political Development in theMiddle East, New York, 1975 (henceforth Wenner)) - 'modernizing autocracy'. Alyami (A. H. Alyami, 'The Impact of Modernization on the Stability of the Saudi Monarchy', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1977 - 'almost absolute autocracy'.

25. Called also Al-lajnah al-'ulyah - The Supreme Committee. 26. The principle of representation, according to the Shari'a can only be selective: only the elite can

represent the people in Islam. Muslim interpreters refer to such an elite as ahl al-hal wal- 'aqd. Ibn Taymiyya, a forerunner of Wahhabism, limits membership in this body to amirs and the ulama. Other eminent interpreters of Wahhabism include in it also the notables (wujuh al-nas). The oath of allegiance (bay'a) of ahl al-hal wal-'aqd confers legitimacy upon the ruler on condition that he consults them since they are supposed to speak for the people; Georges Assaf, 'A Constitution for Saudi Arabia', Plus (Paris), 1985/1, p. 40. Also Prince Fahd to Al- Hawadith, 7 September 1973. Of the hundred Sauds, who are ahl al-hal wal-'aqd, fifty are said to be the descendants of Abd al-Aziz. The document sanctioning the deposition of King Saud and Faysal's enthronement was signed by 68 princes, of whom 38 were Ibn Saud's sons: Al- Rawaf, p. 320. Of 12 distinguished ulama who signed this document four were al-Shaykha: ibid, p. 326; Ochsenwald, p. 274. According to Dawisha (A. I. Dawish, 'Internal Values and External Threats' Orbis (Spring 1979), 130), the above body is made up of 100 princes and more than 60 leading ulama. See also D. E. Long, 'Inside the Royal Family' (a short survey), The Wilson Quarterly (Winter 1979), 66-7.

27. Dawisha, Orbis, 129-30; Ochsenwald, pp. 274, 277; Holden and Johns, pp. 173, 517-8, 522; Long, 'Inside ...', pp. 66-7; Al-Rawaf, p. 320; M. B. T. Al Saud, 'Permanence and Change: An Analysis of the Islamic Political Culture of Saudi Arabia With a Special Reference to the Royal Family', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1982, pp. 161-2. The last source is of special interest because the author belongs to a cadet (unprivileged) branch of the Sauds, but has, nevertheless, contacts in the ruling class.

28. Leading tribal amirs participated in the majlis al-shura before Abd al-Aziz's death. They were courted and consulted by Saud. They were consulted in 1979 and they are again courted by King Fahd (J. Kraft, 'Letter from Saudi Arabia', The New Yorker, 4 July 1983, 51).

29. On provincial and district umara (1930-1950s and 1960s) Said, pp. 107-8; A. N. Abussuud, 'Administrative Development in Saudi Arabia: The Process of Differntiation and Special- ization', unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Maryland 1979, p. 45. On urbanization, rise of central government and decline of umara and a'yan see ibid, pp. 104-5, 126. Also T. R. McHale, 'A Prospect of Saudi Arabia', International Affairs (Autumn 1981), 640; Al-Rawaf, pp. 428, 429, 483, 503.

30. Said, pp. 164-5, 132, 175-8; M.M. Deij, 'Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy 1953-1975', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Idaho 1979, p. 26; A. M. Al-Selfan, 'The Essence of Tribal Leaders' Participation, Responsibilities and Decisions in Some Local Government Activities in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of the Ghamid and Zahran Tribes', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School 1981, pp. 151, 192. According to Saudi Arabia Ministry of Planning Employment by Sector, (Riyadh, 1982), farmers make up about 20-25 per cent and nomads about 10 per cent of total population in 1981. Shaker (p. 186) claims that they made up 75 per cent in 1970. See also A. A. Shamekh, 'Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settle- ment in Al-Qasim Region Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, the University of Kentucky 1975, p. 149.

31. J. A. Shaw and D. E. Long, SaudiArabian Modernization. The Impact of Change on Stability, The Washington Papers/89, Vol. X, 1982, pp. 64-5; J. Buchan, Financial Times, 5 May 1981, supplement, p. V; M. Collins 'Riyadh: The Saud Balance', The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1981) 202-3; N. H. Hisham, 'Saudi Arabia and the Role of the Imarates in Regional Develop- ment', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School 1982, pp.537, 543. On




appointment of younger, more vigorous princes to the emirates. On the appointment of Mohammad, the son of King Fahd acting governor of the oil-rich Eastern Province, see M. Field, Financial Times, 9 September 1982; and 15 February 1985.

32. See below. 33. Al Saud, p. 129; Faisal Speaks, Ministry of Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jeddah

1965, p. 17. 34. Instead of imam and amir Ibn Saud took in 1921 the title 'Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies',

in 1926 the title 'King of Hijaz' and in 1927 'King of Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies'. 35. Hisham, p. 9. 36. R. Braibanti and F. A. S. Al-Farsy, 'Saudi Arabia: A Development Perspective', The Journal

of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 1 (Fall 1977), 27: 2,000-7,000; Al-Rawaf, p. 319: 3,500-5,000 with the Abd al-Aziz branch alone accounting for 700; Al Saud, p. 131: 4,000- 5,000; Sunday Times (London), 2 December 1984: no fewer than 5,000.

37. Muhammad Saud al-Kabir, the son of Saud, Abd al-Rahman's elder brother who challenged Ibn Saud's leadership was married to his sister Nura.

38. Al Saud, pp. 136, 146, fn 26; Al-Rawaf, pp. 318-9; Dawisha, Orbis, p. 131; Holden and Johns, p.461; Lacey, p.432.

39. Ibn Saud's mother was a Sudayri. Of his two Sudayri wives Hassa bint Ahmad al-Sudayri, was the mother of the 'Sudayri Seven', one of whom is King Fahd.

40. A very different situation from Iran, where the Shah could depend only on his immediate family.

41. Niblock, pp.94-5 (1926-47); Buchan, pp. 108-9; Merip Reports, (October 1980), 16; Gh. Salameh, 'Political Power and the Saudi State', Merip Reports (October 1980), 18; Lacey, p.443.

42. For example the gathering at the oasis of Murat in 1944 before Ibn Saud met with President Roosevelt: D. Van Der Mullen, The Wells of Ibn Saud (London, 1957), p. 158.

43. Saud was appointed heir apparent in 1933. Holden and Johns, pp. 172-3; M. A. Saati, 'The Constitutional Development in Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School 1982, pp. 106-7; Deij, pp. 15-16.

44. Shaker, pp. 175-7; Buchan, pp. 111-13; Holden and Johns, p. 183; Alyami, pp. 101-2; M. Cheney, Big OilMan From Arabia (New York, 1958), pp.222-4,227-9; J. Arnold, Golden Swords and Pots and Pans (New York, 1963), p.205; H. Lackner, A House Built On Sand. A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London, 1978), pp. 96-8.

45. The bedouin royal guard regiments were directly under the command of the king. On subsidies to tribal chiefs, see T. 0. El Farra, 'The Effects of Detribalising the Bedouins on the Internal Cohesion of an Emerging State: the Case of Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1973, pp. 172-3. On the 'morality police' and Saud's relations with the conservatives, see Buchan, p. 108; Shaker, pp. 170-1.

46. Rugh, 'Emergence'. The term 'new men' usually refers to technocrats whose achievements were due to their abilities and Western education rather than to social and familial affiliations no longer satisfied with the government of the traditional elites. Their rise in the Middle East was normally associated with anti-Western nationalism. On 'new men' see S. E. Ibrahim, The NewArab Social Order. A Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth (Westview Press, 1982), p. 149; S. Duguid, 'A Biographical Approach to the Study of Social Change in the Middle East: Abdullah Tariki as a New Man', International Journal of Middle East Studies, I, 3 (1970) (henceforth Duguid), 195-220; Wenner, pp. 172-7; M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, 1965), pp. 51-6.

47. Any kind of organization was, and is, prohibited in Saudi Arabia. G. M. Baroody, 'The Practice of Law in Saudi Arabia', in Beling (ed.), pp. 121-2. (henceforth Baroody); Shaker, pp. 170-7 (on the rise of nationalism); Rugh, 'Emergence'; Duguid; Lackner, pp. 94-8; De Gaury, pp. 90-3. On strikes in the oil fields (1953-1956) see Shaker, pp. 175-7; Cheney, pp. 222-4; Holden and Johns, p. 183; Alyami, pp. 101-2.

48. Duguid; Lackner, pp. 62-4, 96-8; Shaker, pp. 179-80; De Gaury, pp. 98-100. On the impact of Faysal's austerity programme, see also A. Lateef, 'King Faisal: From Obscurity to Inter- national Status', Pakistan Horizon, 28, 4 (1975), 120.

49. Wenner, p. 177; Al-Rawaf, p. 365. 50. Some leaders of the ulama, mainly of the Al al-Shaykh, participated in the final discussions

which led to Saud's dethronement. Though an extreme step, Saud's removal from office




was not contradictory to tribal and Muslim customs. Faysal wished, nevertheless, to legalize the procedure by afatwa from the ulama: Zedan, p. 24; McHale, 'Political System', p. 201; A. Assah, Miracle of the Desert Kingdom (London, 1969), p. 133. Layish (p. 30) identifies the 12 leading ulama who signed thefatwa as being part of the Saudi religious hierarchy. See also: Lateef, p. 120; De Gaury, pp. 130-5. For text of thefatwa see: W. Khalidi and Y. Ibish, Arab Political Documents, Beirut 1964, p.441.

51. Full text of ten points in De Gaury, Appendix I, according to Al-Madinah (Saudi Arabia), November 1964, p. 1. Also De Gaury, p. 148; Said, pp. 91-2; M. Khadduri, Arab Con- temporaries, the Role of Personalities in Politics (Baltimore, 1973), p. 97; Lackner, pp. 65-6, 94; Lateef, p. 121; Shaker, pp. 306-7, 314.

52. Faisal Speaks, p. 12. 53. Shaker, p.314; Lackner, p.66. 54. Especially in the United States. In 1983 the number of Saudi students in the United States alone

was estimated at more than 15,000. Middle East Business Exchange (June 1980), 49; Washington Post, 22 July 1980 claims 13,000 students.

55. Salameh, Merip Reports 1980, pp. 19-20; Dawisha, Orbis, 1979, 131-2; Al-Farsy, pp.73-7; Lacey, pp. 435, 439; Al-Rawaf, pp. 365-6.

56. Faysal frequently reiterated that the Koran was Saudi Arabia's constitution, see N. 0. Madani, 'The Islamic Content of the Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia. King Faisal's Call for Islamic Solidarity 1965-1975', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, the American University, 1977, p.57; Shaker, pp. 308, 311.

57. Shaker, pp. 312-3; Lackner, p. 73; Al Saud, p. 146, ibid, fn 23; Holden and Johns, p. 459. 58. On submissiveness of the new elites to the regime after the 1969 abortive coups, see Shaker, pp.

3 12-4. See also Al Saud, p. 116 (1980). On the 1969 coups see Shaker, pp. 306-9; Alyami, pp. 201, 523; Buchan, p. 115; Holden and Johns, p. 271. About 2,000 people are said to have been arrested. Many were ieleased by Crown Prince Fahd in 1975.

59. See Wenner, pp. 166-7; Braibanti-Farsy, p. 38; Al Saud, pp. 106-7; A. McDermot, Financial Times, 20 March 1978. According to Al Saud (p. 115) the number of Saudi bureaucrats (?!) in 1980 was 173,290. About 10,800 students graduated from Saudi universities in 1982: Faheem, pp. 114-15.

60. Abdul Aziz al-Quraishi, head of Saudi Arabia's Monetary Agency (SAMA) resigned in April 1983 after disagreement over the 1983-84 budget. Minister of Information, Muhhamad Abdu Yamani, was dismissed and, it is claimed, arrested in 1983 when he angered some leading princes. Dr Ghazi al-Gosaibi, Minister of Health and former Minister of Commerce and Industry, considered the doyen of Saudi intellectuals (leftists, recruited by Faysal), was dismissed in 1984 after indirectly accusing Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defence, of corruption, and King Fahd of not backing him. He was later appointed ambassador to Bahrain.

61. 'Only the heads of a few of the most distinguished merchant families can meet the senior princes in private ...'. M. Field, Financial Times, 12 August 1982; M. Field, The Merchants (London, 1984), pp.40, 97-120; Buchan, p. 109. Also Rugh, 'Emergence', p. 19; Shaw and Long, pp. 79-80.

62. Al-Farsy, p. 70; Wenner, p. 174; R. Kavoussi, A. R. Sheikoleslami, Political Economy ofSaudi Arabia, University of Washington 1973 (mimeographed), p. 3; despite coup attempts by air force officers in 1969 and 1977, the modernization progressed.

63. The Saudi ambassador to the USA, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan was an air force officer. Other sons of Sultan and his Sudayri brothers are also serving in the air force and other elite units. Of different princes beginning their career in the air force in the late 1970s: Holden and Johns, p. 463. The director of air force operations is Colonel Fahd ibn Abdallah whose father was Ibn Saud's paternal uncle. All 20-25 colonels of the Saudi air force are princes: Contemporary Mideast Background, Media Analysis Center, Jerusalem, 171 (2 October 1983). See also Salameh, Merip Reports 1980, 10; McHale, 'Political System', p. 203.

64. Abir, pp. 87-91. 65. On the above see: Abir. The Shi'is of Al-Hasa, 7-10 per cent of the kingdom's total citizens,

are excluded from service in the armed forces. 66. Similar to the situation of the parliament in Kuwait and to a lesser degree in Bahrain. 67. MiddleEastEconomicDigest (MEED), 28 September 1984, 32; Sunday Times (London), 2

December 1984.




68. This minor element in the lower class, together with similar elements in the lower middle class largely supports ultra-fundamentalist ideologies.

69. The most important are considered ahl al-hal wal-'aqd and occasionally participate in the consultations of the informal royal Consultative Council.

70. Said, p. 103; M. Field, Financial Times, 10 September 1982; Al Saud, p. 114; F. M. Al-Nassar, 'Saudi Arabian Educational Mission to the US', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Oklahoma (Norman) 1982, p. 60.

71. On the attitude of the population to the bureaucracy see: A.D. Al-Mizjaji, 'The Public Attitudes Towards the Bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, the Florida State University 1982, pp.V, 73-80; Also: Said, pp. 153, 165-6; Al Saud, p. 138; Holden and Johns, pp. 460-1; M. Field, Financial Times, 10 September 1982; Lacey, p.94.

72. According to a royal decree issued by King Abd al-Aziz in 1952 'every subject has the right of access to his ruler, whether the ruler is a tribal sheikh, a governor or the monarch, to present petitions or complaints or pleas for help' - Al-Rawaf, p. 363. Also ibid, p. 361. Al Saud (pp. 135, 155) claims that the stipends provided by Ibn Saud to members of the royal family (in the wider sense) were meant to help them exercise their role in grassroot politics. On King Fahd's Majalis: ibid, p. 137; M. Field, Financial Times, 12 August 1982, supplement, 'The Balancing Act ...'; ibid, 23 May 1984, 'Saudi Arabia ... The Pressure For Change'; Niblock, pp. 82, 89; McHale, 'Political System', 204; McHale, 'A Prospect of Saudi Arabia', 639. On King Khalid's majlis: Lacey, pp. 510-20; Lackner, p. 174. See also above, note 15.

73. Kavoussi, pp.32-5, 54-5; Lackner, p.211. Fred Halliday's (Arabia Without Sultans (Manchester, 1974), p. 69) explanation for the failure of the 1969 coups is most enlightening in relation to the attitude of the masses to the Saud hukuma.

74. From a high of 91.3 billion dollars for 1982-83, the Saudi budget declined to about 40 billion in 1985-86. Revenue from oil in that year was less than 30 billion dollars.

