WHY THE AMERICAN RULING CLASS BETRAYS ITS RACE AND CIVILIZATIONSamuel Francis   ·  August 25, 2015

The article was first published in Race and the American

Prospect in 2005.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it ought to be obvious

that the dominant powers and authorities in the United States and

other Western countries are either indifferent to the accelerating

racial and cultural dispossession of the historic peoples of America

and Europe or are actually in favor of it. Mass immigration imports

literally millions of non-white, non-Western aliens into the United

States, Canada, Australia, and Europe, yet the governments of

those nations make no serious effort to halt or restrict it, and

cultural elites either decline to notice the transformation

immigration causes or openly applaud it. Indeed, as immigration

critic Peter Brimelow argued in his 1995 book Alien Nation, the

immigration crisis in the United States has a political origin in the

1965 legislation that created it—it is not simply an ineluctable

process of history, let alone the product of popular preference, but

the result of the decisions and actions of political leaders who

either wanted it to occur or who have been unwilling to stop it once

it began.

The same is true of such policies as affirmative action, long

supported by major universities and corporations as well as by the

federal government. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the 2003 Supreme

Court ruling that upheld the University of Michigan law school's

affirmative action policies, 65 corporations filed amicus curiae

briefs endorsing the school's admission policies that discriminate

against white applicants.[1] The 1991 Civil Rights Act, a major

intensification of affirmative action enforced by the federal

government, was also endorsed by large corporations. Not only

corporations but also and even more obviously the major political

leaders of the country and the major cultural voices either explicitly

approve of affirmative action and denounce anyone who opposes it,

or refuse to resist or question it.

Similarly, most of the leading authorities in the United States—

what is popularly called the "Establishment," including political,

media, academic, and business leadership circles—oppose publicly

displaying or honoring the Confederate flag and other symbols of

the white American heritage (the Custer battlefield at Little Big

Horn, the celebration of Columbus Day, the playing of "Dixie," etc.)

and support non-white demands for the removal or transformation

of such symbols. Large businesses, foundations, and universities

are in the forefront of mandatory "sensitivity training,"

multiculturalist indoctrination, and efforts to portray white racial

and cultural identity as a source of pathology, extremism,

repression, and violence, and to instill feelings of guilt for white,

European, Christian civilization and achievements. Some years ago

the Budweiser company sponsored a series of advertisements that

helped popularize and legitimize various myths of Afrocentric

propaganda, such as the claims that the Semitic Carthaginian

general Hannibal, various kings of ancient Egypt, and the last

Macedonian queen of Egypt, Cleopatra, were all Negroes—claims

known to be preposterously contrary to historical fact. No company

of that scale in recent times has ever sponsored analogous ads

glorifying the Confederacy or the white exploration and conquest of

North America or white contributions to science, scholarship, and

letters or any other achievement of whites, even by means of more

or less accurate history, let alone by outright lies. In 2000, Wal-

Mart and most other large corporate food chains ceased selling a

barbecue sauce locally manufactured by South Carolina

businessman Maurice Bessinger, on the grounds that Mr.

Bessinger's restaurant in Columbia, South Carolina displayed the

Confederate flag and distributed pamphlets that supposedly

justified Southern slavery. Spokesmen for Wal-Mart claimed that

Mr. Bessinger's sauce was dropped because their chain did "not

condone slavery in any way"—although at the same time,

as Business Week (October 2, 2000) disclosed, Wal-Mart was

selling women's apparel known to have been manufactured by slave

labor in Communist China.

One could continue indefinitely the catalogue of how large

corporations and their executives, the federal and larger state and

urban governments and their leaders, and the major academic,

intellectual, artistic, entertainment, publishing, and journalistic

institutions and personali-ties—the dominant culture of the United

States—consistently support anti-white causes and promote the

myths, claims, and interests of nonwhites at the expense of whites.

The conventional accusation against the American Establishment

from the political left is that it is "racist" and fosters "white

supremacy" in order to perpetuate the domination and exploitation

of the nonwhite peoples of this country and the world by the largely

white ruling class. That accusation is so brazenly contrary to the

anti-white policies, rhetoric, and behavior in which the most

powerful forces in American society consistently engage that it

withstands little scrutiny. By playing on the guilt and fear of

establishment leaders, both of which reflect these leaders' shared

acceptance of the left's egalitarian values, it is an accusation that

serves mainly to push the establishment ever further and faster

down the anti-white path than it is normally inclined to go. Fixated

on a nineteenth century model of "capitalism," the Marxism from

which this accusation derives has managed to miss the realities of

twentieth and twenty-first century power that do in fact explain

what must be one of the most significant and astonishing truths of

human history—that an entire ruling class has abandoned and in

effect declared war upon the very population and civilization from

which it is itself drawn.

If Marxist theories offer no explanation of the antagonism of the

American Establishment to white racial identity, neither does

conventional democratic political thought. Mass immigration,

affirmative action policies, blatant discrimination against white

identity and those who defend it, multiculturalism in education,

anti-white brainwashing in sensitivity training, support for non-

white (and often anti-white) political and cultural causes, and other

manifestations of entrenched antagonism to whites are not the

results of democratic majority rule or popular consent. At best,

whites accept or "consent to" these onslaughts against them, their

material interests, their heritage, and their own psychic identity

and integrity because "consent" has been subtly manufactured and

shaped by the institutions of the dominant culture. Not a single one

of the measures that threaten whites has originated among whites

themselves at the popular or grassroots level. Each and every one—

mass immigration, the forced busing of the 1970s, the civil rights

rulings of the federal courts from the 1950s through today, the

affirmative action invented by invisible bureaucrats and upheld by

unaccountable courts, the mind control measures that now

permeate our schools, workplaces, and media, and the systematic

repression and exclusion of those who question or challenge these

trends—has originated from and has been imposed and enforced by

elites.

Nor does racial blackmail, frequently cited as the reason elites so

often collaborate in anti-white policies, offer an adequate

explanation. While racial extortionists like Jesse Jackson, the

NAACP, and various Hispanic lobbies threaten denunciations of

"racism," anti-discrimination lawsuits, demonstrations, boycotts,

etc. against institutions that fail to submit to their demands and

complaints, the institutions they target possess immense financial

resources, legal talents, and political and public relations influence

themselves—yet they do virtually nothing to defend themselves

against such attacks and support virtually no efforts to counter the

legal, political, and cultural conditions that allow the attacks to

succeed. It is unlikely that racial blackmail could work as well as it

usually seems to do unless its victims were already willing to

surrender to it or already inclined to accept its assumptions of

guilt.

Neither Marxism nor the democratic theory embraced nowadays by

both "liberals" and "conservatives" is therefore of much use in

understanding why the dominant elites of American and Western

society behave as they do. The model that does help explain their

behavior derives from what is usually called the "classical theory of

elites," developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by a

school of Italian and German sociologists and political scientists,

and from the application of that model to twentieth century

America, the theory of the managerial revolution as developed by

James Burnham.

THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ELITES

The classical theory of elites was formulated principally by the

social and political theorists Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. It

holds that all human societies, at least all above the primitive level,

are ruled by organized minorities ("elites" or "ruling classes"), that

the majority in any society, even so-called democratic ones, never

rules, and that these organized minorities develop out of social-

political groups that control what are known as "social forces." The

term "social force" is an admittedly vague concept that can include

virtually any idea, technique, or institution that exerts social

importance—a religion, an ideology, a technology, a weapons

system, control of natural resources, etc. As Arthur Livingston,

editor of Mosca's classic work, The Ruling Class, explains:

A "social force" is any human activity or perquisite that has a social

significance—money, land, military prowess, religion, education,

manual labor, science—anything. The concept derives from the

necessity of defining and classifying ruling classes. A man rules or a

group of men rules when the man or the group is able to control

the social forces that, at the given moment in the given society, are

essential to the possession and retention of power.[2]

What may be a significant social force in one historical epoch may

be an insignificant one in others—for example, the religion of

Mithraism in the ancient Roman Empire, which for a time rivaled

Christianity but eventually lost out and ceased to be important, or

the control of the technology of producing and using iron weapons

in the second millennium B.C., which had not been a significant

force prior to its invention but became and remained a power-

yielding technology around which dominating social groups and

conquering societies centered for thousands of years afterwards.

If a social force is efficient at wielding power or control over other

people, then the group that controls the social force and other

groups with which it is allied will constitute a "ruling class"

(Mosca's term) or "elite" (Pareto's term), and classical elite theory

assumes that normally a ruling class or elite will exercise power

mainly for its own benefits and in its own interests. It should be

understood that the control of "the state" or the formal apparatus

of government is only one means and the state itself only one

instrument by which a ruling class exercises power, and the extent

to which a particular ruling class will rely on the state depends on

its interests and the kinds of social forces it controls. It will also

make use of economic and cultural power based on its control of

economic forces, or what Marx called the "instruments of

production and exchange" (land, capital, technology, industrial

plants, commerce, financial institutions, etc.), as well as cultural

forces that essentially regulate the production and dissemination of

information, values, and ideas within a society (in pre-modern

societies, this means principally religion, but also the production of

art, literature, music, scholarship, science, and entertainment

through publishing, education, journalism, broadcasting, film, etc.).

The power of a ruling class or elite is therefore not merely political

power in the narrow sense of control of the formal state, elected

and appointive offices, the administrative agencies, and the

instruments of force (the armed forces and law enforcement

services) but is structural—imbedded in the structure of the society

it rules. A ruling class will usually tend to rely on one or another

particular segment of the social structure—the state, the economy,

or the culture—for holding and exercising power, but those

segments are never entirely separate and the particular ones on

which it tends to rely will depend on its own interests and beliefs as

well as on the level of technological and social development of the

society and on the kinds of challenges, problems, and enemies it

encounters.

In the process of acquiring and exercising power, the ruling class

will reshape the society and culture it dominates in order to

buttress, defend, and justify (or "rationalize") its dominance, and

the reshaping will reflect what the elite perceives as its group

interests. It carries out the reshaping of society first by defining

and imposing an ideology, or what Mosca called a "political

formula," that justifies its power as right or natural or inevitable.

"Ruling classes," Mosca wrote,

do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it,

but try to find a moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the

logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are

generally recognized and accepted.[3]

The ideology or political formula is imbedded in and imposed on the

subject society by means of the cultural institutions the ruling class

creates and controls, and the articulation and defense of the

formula is the main purpose of the culture with respect to the

ruling class. But, as Mosca and Pareto both acknowledged, elites

typically "really believe in" the ideologies and formulas they

espouse. Political formulas are not, Mosca insists, "mere quackeries

aptly invented to trick the masses into obedience. Anyone who

viewed them in that light would fall into grave error."

The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature;

and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that

one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual

force, but on the basis of a moral principle, has beyond any doubt a

practical and a real importance.[4]

One of the major differences between the theory of elites and

simpleminded conspiracy theories is that the latter almost always

postulate hidden groups of conspirators who do not believe in the

ideas they use to gull and manipulate the masses. In elite theory,

political formulas tend to become ideologies that take on a life of

their own and push behavior of their own accord, without conscious

or deliberate fraud or calculation of interests by those who accept

them.

The theory of elites as formulated by Mosca and Pareto can easily

be illustrated by the example of medieval and early modern

European and British society. In that society, political, economic,

and cultural power was largely in the hands of the feudal and post-

feudal aristocracies that controlled the land, which yielded both

economic wealth and political and military power through the

system of feudalism and institutions derived from feudalism. The

power of the European and British aristocracies of this era, from

the Middle Ages down to the Industrial Revolution, was mainly

based on control of the land, its agricultural wealth, and the

cultural and political system that reflected and supported landed

power.

The dominant ideology or "political formula" of the period was

expressed in the doctrine of what was later called the "Great Chain

of Being," a theory of the universe that derived from Plato and

justified hierarchy both in nature and society. It is found

throughout the literature and thought of the era.[5] Only when the

social force of land ownership and the wealth and power it

produced was displaced by the rise of a different social force in the

form of industrially and commercially based wealth and power in

the nineteenth century did the older aristocracies of Europe and

Britain begin to decline and be replaced by a new elite, based on

industrial, commercial, and financial wealth.

It is a basic tenet of the classical theory of elites that all human

societies have elites, that there is really no such thing as political or

social equality or "consent of the governed," and that what is called

"democracy" in any literal sense is largely an illusion. As James

Burnham wrote in describing the role of elites and ruling classes in

human society:

From the point of view of the theory of the ruling class, a society is

the society of its ruling class. A nation's strength or weakness, its

culture, its powers of endurance, its prosperity, its decadence,

depend in the first instance upon the nature of its ruling class.

More particularly, the way in which to study a nation, to

understand it, to predict what will happen to it, requires first of all

and primarily an analysis of the ruling class. Political history and

political science are thus predominantly the history and science of

ruling classes, their origin, development, composition, structure,

and changes.[6]

Political scientist James Meisel argued that an elite must exhibit

what he called the "Three C's: Consciousness, Coherence, and

Conspiracy." This is a helpful but also perhaps confusing formula,

especially its third term. He meant that all the "members of an elite

are alert to their group interest or interests; that this alertness is in

turn caused or affected by a sense, implicit or explicit, of group or

class solidarity; and last, that this solidarity is expressed in a

common will to action.”[7]These traits may be said to establish the

common identity and unity of the elite or ruling class, but the elite

must not only be "alert" to its interests as a group and conscious of

itself as a group, but also able to make its interests prevail over

those of other, competing groups—i.e., to possess actual power. In

other words, the two essential characteristics of an elite/ruling

class are what may be called Unity andDominance—unity in that it

needs to cohere around its interests and to agree on what its

interests are and (in general) how to pursue them,

and dominance in that it must be able to make its interests prevail

over those of rival groups.

Many social theorists in the Western world today argue that the

kind of unitary ruling class that Mosca and Pareto described is no

longer really possible in the kind of advanced industrialized society

that prevails in the West and that there are too many competing

power centers for unitary elites like the old British and European

aristocracies to develop and endure. These theorists mainly support

the idea of what they call "strategic elites," a number of different

elites within the same society that may control power in certain

domains but actually compete with and against each other and

through their conflict create what is essentially political freedom.

Thus, elites in such institutions as corporations, unions, and

government exist but are said to be largely separate and distinct

and supposedly compete against each other, as do the different

political parties and their elites, as well as other institutions in the

economy, politics, and the culture.[8] However, while there are

obvious structural differences between contemporary elites today

and those of pre-industrial societies, this version of elite theory,

often called the "pluralist model," tends to exaggerate the

differences among the "strategic elites" and the degree to which

they compete or conflict with each other. It also tends to minimize

the similarities among "strategic elites" and the common interests

they share in excluding from power any groups or social forces with

antagonistic interests, ideologies, and agendas. In other words, in

my view, the basic error of the "pluralist," or "strategic elite,"

school is that it underestimates the unity of the American ruling

class. Remarks such as George Wallace's line in 1968 that "there's

not a dime's worth of difference" between the Republican and

Democratic Parties, the term "Republicrat" as a colloquialism for

the indistinguishability of the two parties, and the wisecrack that

what American politics needs is not a "third party" but a second

party all reflect the perception among the politically alienated of

the essential unity of the two major political vehicles of the

American ruling class.

Moreover, classical elite theory does not deny that different groups

and sections within a unitary ruling class can disagree, compete, or

conflict with each other, sometimes even to the point of waging

civil war. The English Wars of the Roses of the fifteenth century,

the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, and indeed the

American War for Independence of the late eighteenth century are

all instances of violent conflicts that originated and largely

remained within the elites of the day. Such conflicts occur when

different sections of a unified ruling class come to disagree on what

their interests are or on how to pursue them, with the result of

social breakdown and internal war.

Although most mainstream social scientists in the United States

today would not endorse it, classical elite theory is useful in

answering the question "who rules America," and its main

application to American society, the theory of the managerial

revolution as developed by James Burnham, was concerned to deal

with that very question.

THE THEORY OF THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION

Emerging from Marxism in the late 1930s, Burnham formulated the

theory of the managerial revolution as an alternative to the Marxist

claim that a "capitalist" ruling class held power in the United States

and would soon be displaced by a proletarian revolution along

Marxist lines. Although Burnham agreed with the Marxists that

traditional capitalism and its ruling class were dying and were on

the eve of being displaced by a social revolution, he rejected the

Marxist claim that the society of the future would be the egalitarian

socialism the Marxists predicted. Instead, he argued, the capitalist

elite would be replaced by another elite, which he called the

"managerial class."

A "manager," in Burnham's sense, is not simply someone who runs

or operates an institution on behalf of its owners, which is the

sense in which the word is often used today (e.g., the manager of a

chain restaurant), nor did he confine the term to what is today

usually called "corporate management." Using the hypothetical

example of an automobile company, Burnham held that

Certain individuals—the operating executives, production

managers, plant superintendents, and their associates—have

charge of the actual technical process of producing. It is their job to

organize the materials, tools, machines, plant facilities, equipment,

and labor in such a way as to turn out the automobiles. These are

the individuals whom I call "the managers.”[9]

Technicality, indeed, was the hallmark of the managerial function,

and the increase in the technicality of production was the

sociological basis of the managerial revolution in the economic

organizations of the twentieth century.

There is a combined shift: through changes in the technique of

production, the functions of management become more distinctive,

more complex, more specialized, and more crucial to the whole

process of production, thus serving to set off those who perform

these functions as a separate group or class in society; and at the

same time those who formerly carried out what functions there

were of management, the bourgeoisie [i.e., the old capitalist elite],

themselves withdraw from management, so that the difference in

function becomes also a difference in the individuals who carry out

the function.[10]

A "manager" in Burnham's sense, therefore, is essentially what we

would today call atechnocrat, someone who uses technical,

specialized skills to control and direct an institution, whether or not

he actually owns or has a legal right to the possession of the

institution. One reason Burnham did not use the term "technocrat"

to describe what he meant was that, in the period when he was

writing, that word (usually capitalized) already referred to a

specific social-political movement (one associated with Howard

Scott), though Burnham acknowledged that "the society about

which the Technocrats write is quite obviously [a] managerial

society, and within it their ‘Technocrats' are quite obviously the

managerial ruling class.”[11]

As Burnham used the term "manager," it included "administrators,

experts, directing engineers, production executives, propaganda

specialists, technocrats" and in general those who possessed the

technical skills by which the institutions and organizations of

modern society are operated or "managed"—not only the large

corporations of the economy but also the increasingly massive

governments and political and cultural organizations of the

twentieth century: public bureaucracies, mass labor unions,

political parties, mass media, financial institutions, universities,

foundations, and other organizations that were immense in size,

scale, and technical complexity and dwarfed their institutional

ancestors of the declining capitalist era. "Management" in the

sense of the body of technical and managerial skills that enabled

these large, complex organizations to exist and function constituted

a "social force," control of which enabled the formation of a new

elite.

These mass organizations are far more powerful with respect to

society than most of the older, smaller scale, and simpler ones, and

within them, managers possess the real power because only they

possess the skills by which the new mass organizations can be

directed and operated. With respect to corporations in the

economy, the stockown-ers, no matter how concentrated their

ownership of company stock may be, simply do not and cannot

perform the necessary managerial and technical functions on which

the corporation depends, unless they make a special effort to

acquire the needed managerial skills through education and

training, and not all that many stockowners from the old capitalist

upper class do so. As business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., who

substantiated much of Burnham's analysis of modern managerial

corporations, writes, although "wealthy families...are the

beneficiaries of managerial capitalism," there is "little evidence that

these families make basic decisions concerning the operations of

modern capitalistic enterprises and of the economy in which they

operate," and "members of the entrepreneurial family rarely

became active in top management unless they themselves were

trained as professional managers.”[12] As historian Geoffrey

Barraclough described the emergence of these new forces in the

economy:

The new industrial techniques, unlike the old, necessitated the

creation of large-scale undertakings and the concentration of the

population in vast urban agglomerations.... The small-scale family

businesses, which were typical of the first phase of industrialism,

[did not possess] the means to finance the installation of new, more

complicated and more expensive machinery [or indeed the skills to

manage it on the necessary scale].[13]

But the managers are by no means confined to the corporate elite;

those possessing technical and managerial skills are also dominant

within the state itself as the managerial bureaucracy and the mass

cultural institutions, and thus they become an increasingly unified

and dominant class, relying on the same managerial skills and

sharing a common perceived interest and a common mentality,

worldview, and ideology.

The major common interest that unites the managerial class is its

need to extend and perpetuate the demand for the skills and

functions on which its power and social rewards depend. The

managers pursue that interest by seeking to ensure that the mass

organizations they control, which require the skills and functions

that only the managers can provide, are preserved and extended.

Large corporations must displace and dominate small businesses. A

large, centralized, bureaucratic state must displace and dominate

small, localized, and decentralized government. Mass media and

communications conglomerates and mass universities must

displace and dominate smaller, local newspapers, publishers,

colleges, and schools. Moreover, the elites that controlled these

older and smaller institutions must also be displaced as the ruling

class of the larger society and their ideology and cultural values

discredited and rejected.

The managerial revolution therefore consists in the protracted

social and political process by which the emerging new managerial

class displaces the old ruling class of traditional capitalist or

bourgeois society. On the institutional level this process consists of

the replacement of the constitutionalist parliamentary or

congressional form of government favored by the old elite with the

new centralized state controlled by the bureaucracy of the new

class. The new kind of state that emerges takes on new functions

that increasingly require the kind of skills only the managerial

bureaucrats and technocrats can provide—economic regulation,

social engineering, public welfare, and scientific, administrative,

and cultural functions unknown to the older states of the capitalist

era. The political elite of the older state—the political class that

dominated the elected and appointed offices and their political

organizations—is increasingly displaced by the managerial

bureaucrats of the new state and the political managers who run

the new, far more complicated political parties and organizations.

The same kind of institutional displacement occurs in the economy

dominated by the mass corporations, which also take on functions

unknown to the smaller (or even the larger) firms of the earlier era

—"scientific management" of production, highly technical economic

projections and development, specialized management of personnel

and consumers, as well as social, political, and cultural functions

not directly related to their business activities and interests. And

much the same process takes place in cultural institutions as mass

cultural organizations (universities, foundations, "think tanks") and

mass circulation newspapers and magazines displace smaller,

locally owned and operated ones and new, nationally organized,

highly technical mass media like film and radio and television

broadcasting develop.

On the cultural and ideological level the struggle between the

ascending managerial ruling class and the declining bourgeois-

capitalist class has taken the form of the conflict between what

emerged as the principal managerial ideology in the United States

and the Western world, which has generally come to be known as

"liberalism," and the main ideology of the old capitalist elite, which

came to be known as "conservatism." The political fulfillment of the

managerial revolution occurred in the early twentieth century, with

a strong start under Woodrow Wilson but really culminating under

Franklin Roosevelt in the New Deal and World War II era, and the

struggle for social power between the new managerial liberalism

and the old capitalist conservatism is evident in the political and

cultural literature of the mid-century. The advertisements carried

by virtually all conservative or right-wing magazines of the 1950s

and 1960s were almost always from smaller, locally based, and

individually owned and operated enterprises. The ads carried by

the liberal or what soon became the "mainstream" magazines of the

era were almost always from the Fortune 500 or similar large,

managerially controlled companies.

The conservatism of that era emphasized states rights, the power of

Congress over that of the presidency, loyalty to and identity with

the nation and national interest rather than international or global

identities, and the interests of smaller, privately owned and

operated companies against larger, managerially controlled

corporations. It also championed traditional religious and moral

beliefs and institutions, the importance of the patriarchal family

and local community, and the value of national, regional, racial, and

ethnic identity, as well as the virtues of the capitalist ethic—hard

work, frugality, personal honesty and integrity, individual initiative,

postponement of gratification.

It is quite true that most businessmen, including the big

businessmen of the rising managerial corporations, opposed the

New Deal and hated Franklin Roosevelt intensely, but there were

also a good many big businessmen even in the New Deal era who

supported Roosevelt and the New Deal. Political scientist Thomas

Ferguson has identified a section of American business interests

that was supportive of the New Deal and the reforms it brought

about. This "multinational bloc," as Ferguson calls it, was the core

of the emerging managerial elite within the large corporations. It

favored lower tariffs, American economic aid to Europe, and

conciliation of organized labor; it included capital-intensive rather

than labor-intensive industries, companies such as Standard Oil of

New Jersey and General Electric that depended on trade with

European markets, and international banks. The corporations that

composed this "new bloc" were in the vanguard of managerial

capitalism and the construction of managerial hegemony:

The newer bloc included many of the largest, most rapidly growing

corporations in the economy. Recognized industry leaders with the

most sophisticated managements, these concerns embodied the

norms of professionalism and scientific advance that in this period

fired the imagination of large parts of American society. The largest

of them also dominated major American foundations, which were

coming to exercise major influence not only on the climate of

opinion but on the specific content of American public policy. And,

what might be termed the "multinational liberalism" of the

internationalists was also aided significantly by the spread of

liberal Protestantism; by a newspaper stratification process that

brought the free trade organ of international finance, the New York

Times, to the top; by the growth of capital-intensive network radio

in the dominant Eastern, internationally oriented environment; and

by the rise of major news magazines.[14]

Policy experts, lawyers, and managers associated with this "bloc"

supported and strongly influenced such New Deal reform measures

as the Social Security Act, the National Recovery Act, the Wagner

Act, free trade policies, and the Glass-Steagall Act.

Like any new elite, the managerial class needed a political formula

that expressed and justified its group interests against those of its

older rivals in the capitalist elite. What has come to be known as

"liberalism" performed that function for the new class, although it

has been known under other names as well ("modernism,"

"progressivism," "humanism," and what Burnham himself called

simply "New Dealism”).[15] Managerial liberalism justified the

enlargement and centralization of the state under executive rather

than congressional leadership, the primacy of the central rather

than state and local government, regulation of the economy by the

central state, a foreign policy of global interventionism and

international organization rather than the nationalism and

isolationism favored by the older capitalist class, and the

development of a new culture that claimed to be more

"progressive," more "liberated," more "humanistic," and more

"scientific" and "rational" than the culture defined by the older

social and moral codes of traditional capitalism. The managerial

ideology also demonized the old elite and its institutions and values

as "obsolete," "backward," "repressive," "exploitative," and

"narrow-minded."

There was therefore an increasingly significant cultural and

ideological schism between the new elite and the old and their

respective adherents. The old elite was more or less rooted in

traditional social institutions, which both served its material

interests and reflected its formulas and values. It passed on its

property and wealth, the basis of its power, through inheritance,

and therefore it had a strong vested interest in maintaining both

property rights and what are today called "family values." The

family indeed, as well as the local community, religious and ethnic

identities, and the cultural and moral codes that respected and

legitimized property, wealth, inheritance, social continuity, the

personal virtues that helped people acquire wealth and property,

and small governments that lacked the power to threaten these

things, all served as power bases for the traditional elite and as

major cultural and ideological supports for its interests.

THE MANAGERIAL DISENGAGEMENT

This was not the case with the new managerial elites. Depending on

the technical skills that enable it to gain and keep power inside

mass organizations, the new elite possesses a major structural

interest in preserving and extending the organizations it controls

and in making sure those organizations are perpetuated. The moral

and social bonds of the old elite mean virtually nothing to

managers, who are unable to pass on their professional skills to

their children in the way that the progeny of the old elite inherited

property and position. Hence, managers tend to depend on families

far less than the older elite and therefore to value the family and

the moral codes that reflect and reinforce it far less also. The

culture the managers seek to build places more value on individual

achievement and "merit" (defined largely as the ability to acquire

and exercise managerial and technical skills) than on family

inheritance, on sexual fulfillment than postponement of

gratification and the breeding and rearing of children, on social

mobility and advancement rather than identification with family,

community, race, and nation.

But in addition to the family, the managerial class simply does not

need other traditional institutional structures to maintain its power

— not the local community, not religion, not traditional cultural and

moral codes, not ethnic and racial identities, and not even the

nation-state itself. Indeed, such institutions merely get in the way

of managerial power. They represent barriers against which the

managerial state, corporations, and other mass organizations are

always bumping, and the sooner such barriers are leveled, the

more reach and power the organizations, and the managerial elites

that run them, will acquire. Corporations depending on mass

production and mass consumption need a mass market with

uniform tastes, values, and living standards that will buy what

consumers are told to buy; diverse local, regional, class, and ethnic

identities impede the required degree of uniformity. The same is

true for the state and the mass obedience it requires and seeks to

instill into the population it governs and for the mass cultural

organizations and the audiences they manipulate.[16] Journalist

David Rieff has pointed to the similarities in interests and

worldview between "noted multiculturalist academics," supposedly

on the political left, on the one hand, and corporate officers,

supposedly on the political right, on the other:

Far from standing in implacable intellectual opposition to each

other, both groups see the same racial and gender transformations

in the demographic makeup of the United States and of the

American work force. That non-white workers will be the key to the

twenty-first-century American labor market is a given in most

sensible long-range corporate plans. Like the multiculturalists, the

business elite is similarly aware of the crucial role of women, and of

the need to change the workplace in such a way as to make it more

hospitable to them. More generally, both CEOs and Ph.D.'s insist

more and more that it is no longer possible to speak in terms of the

United States as some fixed, sovereign entity. The world has moved

on; capital and labor are mobile; and with each passing year

national borders, not to speak of national identities, become less

relevant to consciousness or to commerce.[17]

In the 1970s, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted the emergence of what he

called "transnational elites" throughout the developed world:

Today we are again witnessing the emergence of transna-tional

elites, but now they are composed of international businessmen,

scholars, professional men, and public officials. The ties of these

new elites cut across national boundaries, their perspectives are

not confined by national traditions, and their interests are more

functional than national.... The creation of the global information

grid, facilitating almost continuous intellectual interaction and the

pooling of knowledge, will further enhance the present trend

toward international professional elites and toward the emergence

of a common scientific language.... This, however, could create a

dangerous gap between them and the politically activated masses,

whose "nativism"—exploited by more nationalist political leaders—

could work against the "cosmopolitan" elites.[18]

The late Christopher Lasch made a similar point about the

"managerial and professional elites," though he denied that these

elites constituted "a new ruling class":

Their fortunes are tied to enterprises that operate across national

boundaries. They are more concerned with the smooth functioning

of the system as a whole than with any of its parts. Their loyalties—

if the term is not itself anachronistic in this context—are

international rather than regional, national, or local. They have

more in common with their counterparts in Brussels or Hong Kong

than with the masses of Americans not yet plugged into the

network of global communications.[19]

And most recently Samuel P. Huntington has discussed and

documented in some detail the "denationalization of the elites" into

what he calls "Dead Souls" who "abandon commitment to their

nation and their fellow citizens and argue the moral superiority of

identifying with humanity at large," a trend distinctive of economic

elites with a strong material interest in economic globalization as

well as of academic and intellectual elites:

Involvement in transnational institutions, networks, and activities

not only defines the global elite but also is critical to achieving elite

status within nations. Someone whose loyalties, identities,

involvements are purely national is less likely to rise to the top in

business, academia, the media, the professions, than someone who

transcends these limits. Outside politics, those who stay home stay

behind.[20]

Long before these writers, however, Burnham himself was quite

specific about what he called the "world policy of the managers,"

their rejection of the sovereign nation-states that had prevailed in

the capitalist era as obsolete units that were simply obstacles to

their group interests and the needs of the global order they sought

to create.

The complex division of labor, the flow of trade and raw materials

made possible and demanded by modern technology, were

strangled in the network of diverse tariffs, laws, currencies,

passports, boundary restrictions, bureaucracies, and independent

armies. It has been clear for some while that these were going to

be smashed; the only problem was who was going to do it and

when.[21]

Hence, the managers will seek to replace sovereign nation-states

with new imperial or transnational states (Burnham saw National

Socialist Germany, Imperial Japan, and the New Deal United States

—mistakenly in the case of the first two—as the "nuclei" of the

three managerial "super-states" of the future), and

Everywhere, men will have to line up with one or the other of the

super-states of tomorrow. There will not be room for smaller

sovereign nations; nor will the less advanced peoples be able to

stand up against the might of the metropolitan areas. Of course,

polite fictions of independence may be preserved for propaganda

purposes; but it is the reality and not the name of sovereignty about

which we are talking.[22]

Just as the managerial ruling class rejects independent nationhood

and national sovereignty as organizational forms, so it will also

reject ideologies such as nationalism that justify and reflect

national sovereignty, independence, and identity, as well as any

ideology or belief that justifies any particular group identity and

loyalty—national, regional, racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious. The

managerial class therefore tends to disengage from the nation state

as well as from these other identities. Its interests extend across

many different nations, races, religions, and cultures and are

transnational and supra-national, detached and disengaged from—

and actually hostile to—any particular place or group or set of

beliefs that supports particular identities.

Hence, the managerial elite has a proclivity toward as well as a

material interest in adopting and promoting ideologies of

universalism, egalitarianism, cultural relativism, behaviorism, and

"blank slate" environmental determinism. As Rieff writes:

If any group has embraced the rallying cry "Hey, hey, ho, ho,

Western culture's got to go," it is the world business elite...for

businessmen, something more is at stake than ideas. Eurocentrism

makes no economic sense in a world where, within twenty-five

years, the combined gross national product of East Asia will likely

be larger than Europe's and twice that of the United States. In such

a world, the notion of the primacy of Western culture will only be

an impediment to the chief goal of every company: the

maximization of profits.[23]

Indeed, the social engineering and social reconstruction policies

that have always been closely associated with managerial

structures in the state, the economy, and the culture depend on

ideological rationalizations that seek to justify the idea that an

innate human nature does not exist, that sexual and racial

differences are merely "social constructs" and products of the

social environment, and that scientifically informed "management"

can engineer both human society and human beings themselves. As

intellectual historian Donald Atwell Zoll wrote, the

environmentalist thesis,

at its simplest level, contended that (1) man's nature and his

subsequent behavior was largely, if not totally, determined by his

experiences in confronting his immediate environment; and (2)

prospects for improving human behavior, social relation-ships, and

society in general rested upon "reconstructions" and modifications

of his environment as the controlling factor.... On the one hand, the

resources of social science were seen as a response to more or less

explicit social problems such as crime, poverty, mental illness, or

the reform of political institutions. In yet another context, social

engineering saw as its object the construction of a model society.[24]

The projects of social reconstruction and social engineering

required the managerial and technical skills that the rising elite

possessed as well as the vastly increased scale and power of the

state they were constructing and controlling for the purpose of

realizing these projects. The new managerial elite therefore

became closely wedded to the doctrine of social environmentalism

as a rationalization of its own role, power, and social rewards in the

system it constructed, and this powerful vested interest in

environmentalist theory by itself helps account for the persistent

strong attachment of the elite to the theory and its applications in

social policy.

Academic theorists of environmentalist doctrines such as Lester

Frank Ward, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, Franz Boas and

his school in anthropology, and behaviorist John B. Watson in

psychology were essential ideological architects of the new

managerial system of social control. Watson in a famous remark

boasted that if you gave him an infant at birth, he could train him to

become "any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer,

artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even beggarman and thief,

regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations,

and race of his ancestors.”[25] By the end of the 1920s, Watson's

behaviorism, wrote sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, "was not only the

most fashionable school of psychology in this country but also

became the central theory of human nature upon which the great

industry of advertising was being built.... Faith in conditioning

became the basis of social control in the new manipulative society,

composed of citizen comrades in the U.S.S.R. and citizen

consumers in the U.S.A.”[26]

Managerial reliance on what is now known to have been pseudosci-

ence in state-managed social engineering was paralleled in the

managerial economy through "industrial sociology" under the

influence of Elton Mayo and reflected, as Daniel Bell wrote, "a

change in the outlook of management, parallel to that which is

occurring in the culture as a whole, from authority to manipulation

as a means of exercising dominion...the older modes of overt

coercion are now replaced by psychological per-suasion.”[27] Watson

himself, as historian Stuart Ewen noted:

provided psychological avenues by which home life might be

supplanted by the stimulation of the senses—a direction toward

which business in its advertising was increasingly gravitating.

Pleasure that could be achieved by the individual within the home

and community was attacked and deem-phasized, as corporate

enterprise formulated commoditized sensual gratification.[28]

The ideological reconstruction of American society to suit the needs

and interests of the emerging managerial class thus involved a

repudiation of the older values, codes, and belief-systems of the old

elite and a cultural conflict with those who continued to adhere to

them. "Slowly at first, but with increasing momentum in each

decade after 1880," wrote Baltzell,

a naturalistic, urban, environmentalist, egalitarian, collectivist, and

eventually Democratic ethic finally undermined the Protestant,

rural, hereditarian, opportunitarian, individualistic, and Republican

ethic which rationalized the Natural Right of the old-stock business-

gentleman's rule in America between 1860 and 1929.[29]

THE AGENDA OF DISPOSSESSION

The rise to power of the new managerial elite in the United States

(and in other Western states as well) in the early and mid-twentieth

century and the need of the new elite to formulate a new ideology

or political formula and reconstruct society around it provides an

explanation of why the dominant authorities in these countries

today continue to support the dispossession of whites and the

cultural and political destruction of the older American and

Western civilization centered on whites and of why they not only

fail to resist the anti-white demands of non-whites but actively

support and subsidize them. These policies on the part of the new

elite are not the result of "decadence" or "guilt" but of the group

interests of the elite itself, imbedded in and arising from the

structure of their power and position and rationalized in their

consciousness by the political formula of managerial liberalism. It is

in the interests of the new elite, in other words, to destroy and

eradicate the older society and the racial and cultural identities and

consciousness associated with it (not race alone, but also virtually

any distinctive traditional group identity or bond, cultural,

biological, or political). To those ("conservatives") who continue to

adhere to the norms of the older society, of course, managerial

behavior appears as decadence, degeneracy, cowardice,

appeasement, pandering, or guilt, but what is an evil, misguided, or

suicidal pathology to the "conservative" forces who are still shaped

by the older codes and institutions in fact reflects the interest and

the health of the forces centered around the creation and control of

the new society. The interests of the managerial elite, in other

words, are antagonistic to the survival of the traditional racial and

institutional identity of the society it dominates.

The emergence of the managerial elite promotes the dispossession

and even the destruction of whites in the United States in two

major ways. First, as this essay has tried to argue, it does so

directly because the structure of managerial interests and power is

in conflict with any strong sense of racial as well as with strong

national, religious, or other group identity. These interests,

entering into the very mentality of the managerial class, push the

leadership of the new society toward the rejection of the racial and

cultural fabric of traditional white Western civilization, and the new

culture they try to create is one that rejects and denies the value of

such identities and values.

Second, however, because the new managerial elite rejects and

destroys the mechanisms of the old elite that excluded other ethnic,

racial, and religious groups, such groups are often able to permeate

the managerial power structure and acquire levels of power

unavailable to them in pre-managerial society and to advance their

own interests and agendas by means of the managerial instruments

of power. These ethnic forces, articulating their own strong racial,

ethnic, cultural, or religious consciousness, invoke managerial

liberal slogans of "equality," "tolerance," "diversity," etc., to

challenge traditional white dominance but increasingly aspire to

cultural and political supremacy themselves, excluding whites and

rejecting and dismantling the institutional fabric of their society.

Kevin MacDonald has documented in immense detail how Jewish

groups seeking to advance their own ethnically based agendas have

accomplished this,[30] and since a central part of those agendas

include the eradication of the historic ethnic, racial, and religious

barriers and beliefs that excluded Jews and were perceived as

leading to their persecution, the Jewish agenda and that of the

managerial elite are in this respect perfectly congruent with each

other. Indeed, so prominent have Jews become within the elite

(especially its cultural sector) that it is fair to say that Jews within

the managerial elite serve as the cultural vanguard of the

managerial class, providing ideological justification of its structure

and policies, disseminating its ideological formulas to the mass

population, formulating and often implementing specific policies,

and providing much of the specialized educational training

essential to the transmission and perpetuation of the technocratic

skills of the elite. In this respect, Jews perform a support function

(in this case, a cultural and ideological one rather than tax-

collecting or money-lending) for the largely non-Jewish elite similar

to those they performed for various European aristocracies in the

past (e.g., in early modern Poland). Thus the emergence of "neo-

conservatism" in recent decades reflects not only the Jewish

interests and identities of its principal formulators and exponents

but also, unlike the older conservatism of the pre-managerial elite,

the interests of the managerial class as a whole in conserving the

new political and cultural order that class has created but rejecting

and dismantling the pre-managerial order the older conservatism

sought to defend.[31]

The managerial elite, however, also has allied with other ethnic and

racial groups, most of which share its interest in eliminating white

racial identity and the cultural forces that support it. Like the

Jewish allies of the elite and the elite itself, these non-white groups

seek to eradicate white racial identity and its institutional

expression, but unlike the elite, they also often seek to promote

their own racial consciousness and identity. Thus, while explicitly

white racial identity is virtually forbidden and strictly punished by

the managerial elite, institutions that reflect explicit nonwhite or

anti-white identities are tolerated and encouraged. Groups such as

the NAACP, the Congressional Black Caucus, the National Council

of La Raza ("The Race"), and any number of professional, student,

and political organizations, the names, membership, and agendas of

which are explicitly racial, are not only tolerated but are often the

recipients of millions of dollars in grants and philanthropy from the

managerial state and managerial corporations and foundations.

In effect, the alliance between racially conscious non-white forces

and the rising managerial elite in the last century represents a

managerial partnership with a historical process that originally was

entirely separate and different from the managerial revolution,

what Lothrop Stoddard called "The Rising Tide of Color," the

emergence of racial consciousness and identity and the political

aspirations shaped by race among the non-white peoples of the

non-Western world and the subordinate non-white populations

within the West. What Stoddard was describing is virtually identical

to the world-historical process that the late sociologist and

historian Robert A. Nisbet called the "racial revolution," the

replacement by "color" of "nationality and economic class as the

major setting for revolutionary thrust, strategy, tactics, and also

philosophy.”[32] While the new elite rejected "white racism" and all

vestiges of white racial and cultural identity and heritage in order

to displace its rivals in the older elite and to engineer and manage

a new, culturally and racially homogenized global social order that

reflected its own interests, the non-white racial forces with which it

allied rejected white racial supremacy and identity in part to revolt

against and overthrow ("liberate" themselves from) white

domination (a phase of the racial revolution generally called by the

benign label of the "civil rights movement") but in part also to

pursue their own racial power and aspirations. While for several

decades there appeared to be a conjunction of interests between

the elite and its non-white allies in the elimination of all racial

identities and consciousness, today, as non-whites increasingly

assert their own racial identities, aspirations, and ambitions for

power, serious conflicts between the elite and non-white racial

movements may occur, and such conflicts may eventually

destabilize the managerial elite or even displace it from power as a

new social force—non-white racial consciousness and the energies

it mobilizes—challenges the social force of the managerial class. As

historian Paul Gottfried comments, "Hispanic racialists, Third

World patriarchs, and Mexican irredentists will likely eat up the

present regime, if given the demographic chance.”[33]

But there is little sign of an emerging white racial identity capable

of challenging either the managerial power structure, its anti-white

universalist ideology and agenda, or the direct racial threat whites

face from non-white and anti-white enemies. The new elite and its

non-white allies have weakened or destroyed the belief systems,

moral values , cultural legacies, and social bonds and institutions

that made whites conscious of who and what they are and sustained

within them a determination to survive and prevail. Until such

mechanisms can be rebuilt, there appears to be little prospect of

whites overcoming or even adequately recognizing the threats and

challenges they face today, and those mechanisms cannot be

rebuilt as long as the managerial elite remains in power, as long as

its universalist and egalitarian ideology remains the dominant

political and cultural formula, and as long as the anti-white allies of

the elite share power with the elite. What whites must recognize, if

they wish to survive at all, is that the forces that have destroyed

their civilization are the same forces that rule its ruins and whose

rule brought it to ruin. Not until those forces are themselves

displaced from power will the whites of the future be able to

recover the legacy their ancestors created and left for them.

1. Steven Greenhouse and Jonathan D. Glater, "Companies See Court

Ruling As Support for Diversity," New York Times, June 24, 2003. ↩︎�2. Arthur Livingston, "Introduction," in Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling

Class(Elementi di Scienza Politica), ed. and rev. by Arthur Livingston,

trans. by Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,

1939), p. xix. ↩︎�3. Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 70. ↩︎�4. Ibid., p. 71. ↩︎�5. The definitive account remains Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of

Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1936). See also E.M.W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan

World Picture (New York: Macmillan, 1944) and Lawrence

Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1965), chapter 3 passim, for its use by the ruling class of

Elizabethan England. ↩︎�6. James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (New

York: John Day Company, 1943), pp. 91-92. This book remains

probably the best introduction to the classical theory of elites. ↩︎�7. James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and

the "Elite”(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p.

4. See also Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Praeger, 1970),

pp. 31ff., for the "unity" of an elite. ↩︎�8. Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern

Society(New York: Random House, 1963), is a classic expression of

the theory of strategic elites. See also Arnold M. Rose, The Power

Structure: Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1967). ↩︎� � ��

9. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in

the World (1941; reprint ed., Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana

Press, 1960), p. 82. ↩︎�10. Ibid. ↩︎�11. Ibid., p. 203; for the "technocracy" movement of Howard

Scott, see Daniel Bell,The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A

Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 349,

n. 8. ↩︎�12. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial

Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1977), p. 584, n. 3, and p. 491. ↩︎�13. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary

History (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 50-51. ↩︎�14. Thomas Ferguson, "Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the

New Deal: The Triumph of Multinational Liberalism in America," in

Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New

Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

1989), p. 9. Ferguson sees the conflict over the New Deal as being

centered in Morgan (anti-Roosevelt) vs. Rockefeller (pro-Roosevelt)

groups. ↩︎�15. Burnham, Managerial Revolution, pp. 196ff. ↩︎�16. The managerial need for uniformity might seem to contradict

the current cant about "diversity" and its benefits (usually

unspecified), but "diversity" is mainly a slogan for the eradication

of white identity and is seldom invoked to challenge non-white

identity. "Diversity" as practiced is thus entirely consistent with the

uniformity of economic, cultural, political, and psychological and

personal mentality and behavior that managerial hegemony demands

and enforces. ↩︎�17. David Rieff, "Multiculturalism's Silent

Partner," Harper’s (August, 1993), pp. 66-67; Rieff of course

approves of the phenomenon he is describing. ↩︎�18. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in

the Technetronic Age (1970; reprint ed., New York: Penguin Books,

1976), p. 59. ↩︎�19. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal

of Democracy(New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 34-35. ↩︎�20. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Cultural Core of

American National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004),

pp. 267 and 263-72 passim.↩︎�21. Burnham, Managerial Revolution, p. 173. ↩︎�22. Ibid., p. 181; "mistakenly" because Burnham at the time

(1940) believed Germany and Japan would be victorious in World War

II. The existence of such managerial regimes as those of Nazi

Germany and Imperial Japan and their use of ideologies of extreme

racial hegemony and nationalism suggests that not all forms of

managerial dominance are necessarily wedded to ideologies of

universalism, egalitarianism, and environmentalist determinism. But

of course Germany and Japan lost the war, and the form of

managerial power they represented did not survive, raising the

possibility that their brief existence may have been merely an

anomaly. ↩︎�23. Rieff, Harper’s, pp. 68-69; "maximization of profits" may be

the major specific goal of corporate managers, but for the elite in

general the major consideration, as with any ruling class, is

perpetuation of power and position. ↩︎�24. Donald Atwell Zoll, Twentieth Century Political

Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 80. ↩︎�25. Quoted in Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial

of Human Nature (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 19. This book helps

expose the ideological and pseudoscientific roots of environmentalist

theory. See also Carl N. Degler,In Search of Human Nature: The

Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1991), especially chapter 8, for the

political and ideological motivations of environmentalist social

theory. ↩︎�26. E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy

and Caste in America (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 270. ↩︎�27. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,

1960), p. 244.↩︎�28. Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the

Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill Book

Company, 1976), p. 83.↩︎�29. Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment, p. 158. ↩︎�30. Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism

As a Group Evolutionary Strategy, Separation and Its Discontents:

Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, and The Culture of

Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in

Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, 1994, 1998, and 1998), especially the last volume.

The first volume, chapter 5 and pp. 121-123, discusses the alliance

between Ashkenazi Jews and the early modern Polish nobility, and

see also MacDonald's essay in this volume; see also Benjamin

Ginsberg, The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 11ff. for similar Jewish-gentile

elite alliances. ↩︎�31. On the managerial functions of neo-conservatism, see my

essay "Neoconservatism and the Managerial Revolution," in Samuel

Francis,Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American

Conservatism (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1993),

pp. 95-117. In recent years, neo-conservatives have tended to reflect

Jewish and Zionist interests far more than they do the general

interests of the managerial class. ↩︎�32. Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers: Community and

Conflict in Western Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), p.

306. ↩︎�33. Paul Edward Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of

Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, Mo.: University of

Missouri Press, 2002), p. 147. ↩︎� � ��