THE DELAWARE LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT€¦ · advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator,

THEDELAWARELAWYERS’RULESOFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT

[EffectiveJuly1,2003andcurrentthroughmostrecentamendmenteffectiveMar.1,2013]

Preamble:Alawyer’sresponsibilities.

Rule

1.0.Terminology.

1.1.Competence.

1.2.Scopeofrepresentation.

1.3.Diligence.

1.4.Communication.

1.5.Fees.

1.6.Confidentialityofinformation.

1.7.Conflictofinterest:Currentclients.

1.8.Conflictofinterest:Currentclients:Specificrules.

1.9.Dutiestoformerclients.

1.10.Imputationofconflictsofinterest:Generalrule.

1.11.Specialconflictsofinterestforformerandcurrentgovernmentofficersandemployees.

1.12.Formerjudge,arbitrator,mediatororotherthird-partyneutral.

1.13.Organizationasclient.

1.14.Clientwithdiminishedcapacity.

1.15.Safekeepingproperty.

1.15A.Trustaccountoverdraftnotification.

1.16.Decliningorterminatingrepresentation.

1.17.Saleoflawpractice.

1.17A.Dissolutionoflawfirm.

1.18.Dutiestoprospectiveclient.

2.1.Advisor.

2.2.[Deleted].

2.3.Evaluationforusebythirdpersons.

2.4.Lawyerservingasthird-partyneutral.

3.1.Meritoriousclaimsandcontentions.

3.2.Expeditinglitigation.

3.3.Candortowardthetribunal.

3.4.Fairnesstoopposingpartyandcounsel.

3.5.Impartialityanddecorumofthetribunal.

3.6.Trialpublicity.

3.7.Lawyeraswitness.

3.8.Specialresponsibilitiesofaprosecutor.

3.9.Advocateinnonadjudicativeproceedings.

3.10.[Deleted].

4.1.Truthfulnessinstatementstoothers.

4.2.Communicationwithpersonrepresentedbycounsel.

4.3.Dealingwithunrepresentedperson.

4.4.Respectforrightsofthirdpersons.

5.1.Responsibilitiesofpartners,managers,andsupervisorylawyers.

5.2.Responsibilitiesofasubordinatelawyer.

5.3.Responsibilitiesregardingnon-lawyerassistance.

5.4.Professionalindependenceofalawyer.

5.5.Unauthorizedpracticeoflaw;multijurisdictionalpracticeoflaw.

5.6.Restrictionsonrighttopractice.

5.7.Responsibilitiesregardinglaw-relatedservices.

6.1.Voluntaryprobonopublicoservice.

6.2.Acceptingappointments.

6.3.Membershipinlegalservicesorganization.

6.4.Lawreformactivitiesaffectingclientinterests.

6.5.Non-profitandcourt-annexedlimitedlegal-serviceprograms.

7.1.Communicationsconcerningalawyer’sservices.

7.2.Advertising.

7.3.Solicitationofclients.

7.4.Communicationoffieldsofpracticeandspecialization.

7.5.Firmnamesandletterheads.

7.6. Political contributions to obtain government legal engagements orappointmentsbyjudges.

8.1.Baradmissionanddisciplinarymatters.

8.2.Judicialandlegalofficials.

8.3.Reportingprofessionalmisconduct.

8.4.Misconduct.

8.5.Disciplinaryauthority;choiceoflaw.

Forms

IndexfollowsRules.

• Preamble:A »Del.RulesofProf'lConductPreamble:A

Preamble:Alawyer’sresponsibilities.

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative ofclients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having specialresponsibilityforthequalityofjustice.

[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. Asadvisor,alawyerprovidesaclientwithaninformedunderstandingoftheclient’slegal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. Asadvocate,a lawyerzealouslyasserts theclient’spositionunder the rulesof theadversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to theclient but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As anevaluator,alawyeractsbyexaminingaclient’slegalaffairsandreportingaboutthemtotheclientortoothers.

[3] In addition to these representational functions, a lawyermay serve as athird-party neutral, a nonrepresentational role helping the parties to resolve adisputeorothermatter.SomeoftheseRulesapplydirectlytolawyerswhoareorhave served as third-party neutrals. See, e.g., Rules 1.12 and 2.4. In addition,thereareRulesthatapplytolawyerswhoarenotactiveinthepracticeoflawortopracticing lawyers evenwhen theyare acting in anonprofessional capacity.Forexample,alawyerwhocommitsfraudintheconductofabusinessissubjectto discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit ormisrepresentation.SeeRule8.4.

[4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt anddiligent.Alawyershouldmaintaincommunicationwithaclientconcerningtherepresentation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating torepresentationofaclientexceptsofarasdisclosureisrequiredorpermittedbytheRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.

[5]Alawyer’sconductshouldconformtotherequirementsofthelaw,bothinprofessionalservicetoclientsandinthelawyer’sbusinessandpersonalaffairs.Alawyershouldusethelaw’sproceduresonlyforlegitimatepurposesandnottoharass or intimidate others.A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legalsystem and for thosewho serve it, including judges, other lawyers and publicofficials.Whileitisalawyer’sduty,whennecessary,tochallengetherectitudeofofficialaction,itisalsoalawyer’sdutytoupholdlegalprocess.

[6]Asapubliccitizen,alawyershouldseekimprovementofthelaw,access

to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of servicerenderedbythelegalprofession.Asamemberofalearnedprofession,alawyershould cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ thatknowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. Inaddition,alawyershouldfurtherthepublic’sunderstandingofandconfidenceinthe rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in aconstitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support tomaintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in theadministration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes personswhoarenotpoor,cannotaffordadequatelegalassistance.Therefore,alllawyersshoulddevoteprofessionaltimeandresourcesandusecivicinfluencetoensureequalaccesstooursystemofjusticeforall thosewhobecauseofeconomicorsocialbarrierscannotaffordorsecureadequatelegalcounsel.Alawyershouldaid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the barregulateitselfinthepublicinterest.

[7] Many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are prescribed in theRules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.However,alawyerisalsoguidedbypersonalconscienceandtheapprobationofprofessionalpeers.Alawyershouldstrivetoattainthehighestlevelofskill, toimprovethelawandthelegalprofessionandtoexemplifythelegalprofession’sidealsofpublicservice.

[8]Alawyer’sresponsibilitiesasarepresentativeofclients,anofficerofthelegal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when anopposingpartyiswellrepresented,alawyercanbeazealousadvocateonbehalfof a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done. So also, alawyercanbesurethatpreservingclientconfidencesordinarilyservesthepublicinterest becausepeople aremore likely to seek legal advice, and therebyheedtheirlegalobligations,whentheyknowtheircommunicationswillbeprivate.

[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities areencountered.Virtuallyalldifficultethicalproblemsarisefromconflictbetweenalawyer’sresponsibilitiestoclients, tothelegalsystemandtothelawyer’sowninterest in remaininganethicalpersonwhile earninga satisfactory living.TheRulesofProfessionalconductoftenprescribetermsforresolvingsuchconflicts.Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues ofprofessional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through theexercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basicprinciplesunderlyingtheRules.Theseprinciplesincludethelawyer’sobligation

zealouslytoprotectandpursueaclient’slegitimateinterests,withintheboundsofthelaw,whilemaintainingaprofessional,courteousandcivilattitudetowardallpersonsinvolvedinthelegalsystem.

[10]Thelegalprofessionislargelyself-governing.Althoughotherprofessionsalsohavebeengrantedpowersofself-government,thelegalprofessionisuniqueinthisrespectbecauseofthecloserelationshipbetweentheprofessionandtheprocessesofgovernmentandlawenforcement.Thisconnectionismanifestedinthefactthatultimateauthorityoverthelegalprofessionisvestedlargelyinthecourts.

[11] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professionalcalling,theoccasionforgovernmentregulationisobviated.Self-regulationalsohelps maintain the legal profession’s independence from governmentdomination.Anindependentlegalprofessionisanimportantforceinpreservinggovernmentunderlaw,forabuseoflegalauthorityismorereadilychallengedbyaprofessionwhosemembersarenotdependentongovernment for theright topractice.

[12] The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it specialresponsibilitiesofself-government.Theprofessionhasaresponsibilitytoassurethatitsregulationsareconceivedinthepublicinterestandnotinfurtheranceofparochialorself interestedconcernsofthebar.Everylawyerisresponsibleforobservance of theRules of ProfessionalConduct.A lawyer should also aid insecuring their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilitiescompromisestheindependenceoftheprofessionandthepublicinterestwhichitserves.

[13]Lawyersplayavitalroleinthepreservationofsociety.Thefulfillmentofthisrolerequiresanunderstandingbylawyersof theirrelationshiptoour legalsystem. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve todefinethatrelationship.

SCOPE

[14]TheRulesofProfessionalConductare rulesof reason.Theyshouldbeinterpretedwithreferencetothepurposesoflegalrepresentationandofthelawitself.SomeoftheRulesareimperatives,castintheterms“shall”or“shallnot.”These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others,generallycastintheterm“may,”arepermissiveanddefineareasundertheRulesin which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. Nodisciplinaryactionshouldbe takenwhen the lawyerchoosesnot toactoracts

within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature ofrelationshipsbetweenthelawyerandothers.TheRulesarethuspartlyobligatoryand disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define alawyer’s professional role. Many of the Comments use the term “should.”Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance forpracticingincompliancewiththeRules.

[15] TheRules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role.That context includes court rules and statutes relating tomatters of licensure,lawsdefiningspecificobligationsoflawyersandsubstantiveandprocedurallawin general. The Comments are sometimes used to alert lawyers to theirresponsibilitiesundersuchotherlaw.

[16]Compliancewith theRules,aswithall lawinanopensociety,dependsprimarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily uponreenforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, uponenforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however,exhaustthemoralandethicalconsiderationsthatshouldinformalawyer,fornoworthwhilehumanactivitycanbecompletelydefinedbylegalrules.TheRulessimplyprovideaframeworkfortheethicalpracticeoflaw.

[17] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer’s authority andresponsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determinewhetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipexists.Mostofthedutiesflowingfromtheclient-lawyerrelationshipattachonlyaftertheclienthasrequestedthelawyertorender legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are someduties,suchasthatofconfidentialityunderRule1.6,thatattachwhenthelawyeragreestoconsiderwhetheraclient-lawyerrelationshipshallbeestablished.SeeRule1.18.Whetheraclient-lawyer relationshipexists foranyspecificpurposecandependonthecircumstancesandmaybeaquestionoffact.

[18] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory andcommonlaw, theresponsibilitiesofgovernment lawyersmayincludeauthorityconcerning legalmatters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyerrelationships.Forexample,alawyerforagovernmentagencymayhaveauthorityonbehalfof thegovernment todecideuponsettlementorwhether toappealfromanadversejudgment.Suchauthorityinvariousrespectsisgenerallyvested in theattorneygeneraland thestate’sattorney instategovernment,andtheir federal counterparts, and the samemay be true of other government lawofficers.Also,lawyersunderthesupervisionoftheseofficersmaybeauthorizedto represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal

controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not representmultipleprivateclients.TheseRulesdonotabrogateanysuchauthority.

[19]FailuretocomplywithanobligationorprohibitionimposedbyaRuleisa basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose thatdisciplinaryassessmentofa lawyer’sconductwillbemadeon thebasisof thefactsandcircumstancesastheyexistedatthetimeoftheconductinquestionandin recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain orincomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose thatwhetherornotdisciplineshouldbeimposedforaviolation,andtheseverityofasanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness andseriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have beenpreviousviolations.

[20]ViolationofaRuleshouldnotitselfgiverisetoacauseofactionagainstalawyernorshoulditcreateanypresumptioninsuchacasethatalegaldutyhasbeenbreached.Inaddition,violationofaRuledoesnotnecessarilywarrantanyother nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pendinglitigation.Therulesaredesignedtoprovideguidancetolawyersandtoprovideastructure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are notdesigned tobeabasis forcivil liability.Furthermore, thepurposeof theRulescan be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as proceduralweapons.ThefactthataRuleisajustbasisforalawyer’sself-assessment,orforsanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, doesnotimplythatanantagonistinacollateralproceedingortransactionhasstandingtoseekenforcementoftheRule.

[21] The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates themeaningandpurposeoftheRule.ThePreambleandthisnoteonScopeprovidegeneralorientation.TheCommentsareintendedasguidestointerpretation,butthetextofeachruleisauthoritative.

« Rule1.0. »Del.RulesofProf'lConduct1.0

Rule1.0.Terminology.

(a)“Belief”or“believes”denotesthatthepersoninvolvedactuallysupposedthe fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred fromcircumstances.

(b)“Confirmedinwriting,”whenusedinreferencetotheinformedconsentofaperson,denotes informedconsent that isgiven inwritingby thepersonor awriting that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oralinformedconsent.Seeparagraph(e)forthedefinitionof“informedconsent.”Ifit is not feasible to obtain or transmit thewriting at the time the persongivesinformedconsent,thenthelawyermustobtainortransmititwithinareasonabletimethereafter.

(c) “Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership,professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized topractice law;or lawyersemployed ina legal servicesorganizationor the legaldepartmentofacorporationorotherorganization.

(d) “Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under thesubstantiveorprocedurallawoftheapplicablejurisdictionandhasapurposetodeceive.

(e) “Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposedcourseofconductafterthelawyerhascommunicatedadequateinformationandexplanationabout thematerial risksofand reasonablyavailablealternatives totheproposedcourseofconduct.

(f)“Knowingly,”“known,”or“knows”denotesactualknowledgeofthefactinquestion.Aperson’sknowledgemaybeinferredfromcircumstances.

(g)“Partner”denotesamemberofapartnership,ashareholderinalawfirmorganized as a professional corporation, or a member of an associationauthorizedtopracticelaw.

(h) “Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by alawyerdenotestheconductofareasonablyprudentandcompetentlawyer.

(i)“Reasonablebelief”or“reasonablybelieves”whenusedinreferencetoalawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that thecircumstancesaresuchthatthebeliefisreasonable.

(j)“Reasonablyshouldknow”whenusedinreferencetoalawyerdenotesthatalawyerofreasonableprudenceandcompetencewouldascertainthematterinquestion.

(k) “Screened”denotes the isolationof a lawyer fromanyparticipation in amatter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that arereasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that theisolatedlawyerisobligatedtoprotectundertheseRulesorotherlaw.

(l)“Substantial”whenusedinreferencetodegreeorextentdenotesamaterialmatterofclearandweightyimportance.

(m) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitrationproceedingora legislativebody,administrativeagencyorotherbodyacting inanadjudicativecapacity.Alegislativebody,administrativeagencyorotherbodyactsinanadjudicativecapacitywhenaneutralofficial,afterthepresentationofevidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legaljudgmentdirectlyaffectingaparty’sinterestsinaparticularmatter.

(n) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of acommunication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing,photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electroniccommunications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol orprocess attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed oradoptedbyapersonwiththeintenttosignthewriting.(Amended,effectiveMar.1,2013.)

COMMENT

[1]ConfirmedinWriting.—Ifitisnotfeasibletoobtainortransmitawrittenconfirmationatthetimetheclientgivesinformedconsent,thenthelawyermustobtainortransmititwithinareasonabletimethereafter.Ifalawyerhasobtaineda client’s informed consent, the lawyermay act in reliance on that consent solongasitisconfirmedinwritingwithinareasonabletimethereafter.

[2]Firm.—Whethertwoormorelawyersconstituteafirmwithinparagraph(c)candependon thespecific facts.Forexample, twopractitionerswhoshareofficespaceandoccasionallyconsultorassisteachotherordinarilywouldnotberegardedasconstitutingafirm.However,iftheypresentthemselvestothepublicinawaythatsuggeststhattheyareafirmorconductthemselvesasafirm,theyshouldberegardedasafirmforpurposesoftheRules.Thetermsofanyformalagreementbetweenassociatedlawyersarerelevantindeterminingwhetherthey

areafirm,asisthefactthattheyhavemutualaccesstoinformationconcerningthe clients they serve.Furthermore, it is relevant indoubtful cases to considertheunderlyingpurposeoftheRulethatisinvolved.Agroupoflawyerscouldberegarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should notrepresent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded forpurposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed toanother.

[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including thegovernment,thereisordinarilynoquestionthatthemembersofthedepartmentconstituteafirmwithinthemeaningoftheRulesofProfessionalConduct.Therecanbeuncertainty,however,astotheidentityoftheclient.Forexample,itmaynotbeclearwhetherthelawdepartmentofacorporationrepresentsasubsidiaryoranaffiliatedcorporation,aswellasthecorporationbywhichthemembersofthedepartmentaredirectlyemployed.Asimilarquestioncanariseconcerninganunincorporatedassociationanditslocalaffiliates.

[4]Similar questions can also arisewith respect to lawyers in legal aid andlegal servicesorganizations.Dependingupon the structureof theorganization,the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm orfirmsforpurposesoftheseRules.

[5]Fraud.—When used in these Rules, the terms “fraud” or “fraudulent”refertoconductthatischaracterizedassuchunderthesubstantiveorprocedurallawof the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.This does notinclude merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to appriseanotherofrelevantinformation.ForpurposesoftheseRules,itisnotnecessarythatanyonehassuffereddamagesorreliedonthemisrepresentationorfailuretoinform.

[6]InformedConsent.—ManyoftheRulesofProfessionalConductrequirethe lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., aformer client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) beforeacceptingorcontinuingrepresentationorpursuingacourseofconduct.See,e.g.,Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain suchconsentwillvaryaccording to theRule involvedand thecircumstancesgivingrise to theneed toobtain informedconsent.The lawyermustmake reasonableeffortstoensurethattheclientorotherpersonpossessesinformationreasonablyadequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will requirecommunicationthatincludesadisclosureofthefactsandcircumstancesgivingrisetothesituation,anyexplanationreasonablynecessarytoinformtheclientor

other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposedcourseofconductandadiscussionoftheclient’sorotherperson’soptionsandalternatives.Insomecircumstancesitmaybeappropriateforalawyertoadviseaclientorotherpersontoseektheadviceofothercounsel.Alawyerneednotinform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to theclientorotherperson;nevertheless,alawyerwhodoesnotpersonallyinformtheclient or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person isinadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether theinformationandexplanationprovidedare reasonablyadequate, relevant factorsinclude whether the client or other person is experienced in legal mattersgenerallyandinmakingdecisionsofthetypeinvolved,andwhethertheclientorotherpersonisindependentlyrepresentedbyothercounselingivingtheconsent.Normally,suchpersonsneed less informationandexplanation thanothers,andgenerally a client or other person who is independently represented by othercounsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informedconsent.

[7]Obtaining informed consentwill usually require an affirmative responsebytheclientorotherperson.Ingeneral,alawyermaynotassumeconsentfromaclient’sorotherperson’ssilence.Consentmaybeinferred,however,fromtheconduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate informationaboutthematter.AnumberofRulesrequirethataperson’sconsentbeconfirmedin writing. See Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For a definition of “writing” and“confirmed in writing,” see paragraphs (n) and(b). Other Rules require that aclient’s consent be obtained in awriting signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules1.8(a)and(g).Foradefinitionof“signed,”seeparagraph(n).

[8]Screened. — This definition applies to situations where screening of apersonallydisqualifiedlawyerispermittedtoremoveimputationofaconflictofinterestunderRules1.10,1.11,1.12or1.18.

[9]Thepurposeofscreeningistoassuretheaffectedpartiesthatconfidentialinformationknownbythepersonallydisqualifiedlawyerremainsprotected.Thepersonally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not tocommunicatewithanyoftheotherlawyersinthefirmwithrespecttothematter.Similarly, other lawyers in the firmwho areworking on thematter should beinformedthatthescreeningisinplaceandthattheymaynotcommunicatewiththe personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additionalscreeningmeasuresthatareappropriatefortheparticularmatterwilldependonthe circumstances.To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of

the presence of the screening, itmay be appropriate for the firm to undertakesuchprocedures as awrittenundertakingby the screened lawyer to avoid anycommunicationwithotherfirmpersonnelandanycontactwithanyfirmfilesorother information, including information in electronic form, relating to thematter,writtennoticeandinstructionstoallotherfirmpersonnelforbiddinganycommunicationwiththescreenedlawyerrelatingtothematter,denialofaccessbythescreenedlawyertofirmfilesorotherinformation,includinginformationinelectronicform,relatingtothematter,andperiodicremindersofthescreentothescreenedlawyerandallotherfirmpersonnel.

[10]Inordertobeeffective,screeningmeasuresmustbeimplementedassoonas practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know thatthereisaneedforscreening.

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Crossreferences.—As to theStatementofPrinciplesofLawyerConduct,seeSupremeCourtRule71(b)(ii).

NOTESTODECISIONS

Knowingly.

Lawyer engaged in knowing misconduct, for which suspension was theappropriatediscipline,by:(1)assistingasuspendedlawyerintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenthelawyerengagedthesuspendedlawyertoworkoncaseswithout determining the applicable restrictions; (2) failing to supervise thesuspendedlawyeradequately;and(3)givingthesuspendedlawyerapercentageof a contingency fee that included work performed both before and after thesuspension.InreMartin,105A.3d967(Del.2014).

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/105%20A.3d%20967


Rule1.1.Competence.

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competentrepresentationrequiresthelegalknowledge,skill,thoroughnessandpreparationreasonablynecessaryfortherepresentation.

COMMENT

[1]Legalknowledgeandskill.—Indeterminingwhethera lawyeremploystherequisiteknowledgeandskillinaparticularmatter,relevantfactorsincludetherelativecomplexityandspecializednatureofthematter,thelawyer’sgeneralexperience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, thepreparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it isfeasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer ofestablishedcompetenceinthefieldinquestion.Inmanyinstances,therequiredproficiencyisthatofageneralpractitioner.Expertiseinaparticularfieldoflawmayberequiredinsomecircumstances.

[2]Alawyerneednotnecessarilyhavespecialtrainingorpriorexperiencetohandle legal problemsof a typewithwhich the lawyer is unfamiliar.Anewlyadmitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience.Someimportantlegalskills,suchastheanalysisofprecedent,theevaluationofevidenceandlegaldrafting,arerequiredinalllegalproblems.Perhapsthemostfundamental legal skill consists of determiningwhat kind of legal problems asituation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particularspecialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in awhollynovel field throughnecessary study.Competent representationcanalsobeprovidedthroughtheassociationofalawyerofestablishedcompetenceinthefieldinquestion.

[3] In an emergency a lawyermay give advice or assistance in amatter inwhichthelawyerdoesnothavetheskillordinarilyrequiredwherereferraltoorconsultationorassociationwithanotherlawyerwouldbeimpractical.Eveninanemergency,however,assistanceshouldbelimitedtothatreasonablynecessaryinthe circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions canjeopardizetheclient’sinterest.

[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level ofcompetencecanbeachievedbyreasonablepreparation.Thisappliesaswelltoa

lawyerwhoisappointedascounselforanunrepresentedperson.SeealsoRule6.2.

[5] Thoroughness and preparation. — Competent handling of a particularmatterincludesinquiryintoandanalysisofthefactualandlegalelementsoftheproblem,anduseofmethodsandproceduresmeetingthestandardsofcompetentpractitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention andpreparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation andcomplextransactionsordinarilyrequiremoreextensivetreatmentthanmattersoflessercomplexityandconsequence.Anagreementbetween the lawyerand theclientregardingthescopeoftherepresentationmaylimitthemattersforwhichthelawyerisresponsible.SeeRule1.2(c).

[6]Retainingorcontractingwithotherlawyers.—Beforealawyerretainsorcontractswithotherlawyersoutsidethelawyer’sownfirmtoprovideorassistinthe provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtaininformed consent from the client and must reasonably believe that the otherlawyers’serviceswillcontribute to thecompetentandethical representationoftheclient.SeealsoRules1.2(allocationofauthority),1.4(communicationwithclient), 1.5(e) (fee sharing), 1.6 (confidentiality), and 5.5(a) (unauthorizedpractice of law). The reasonableness of the decision to retain or contractwithotherlawyersoutsidethelawyer’sownfirmwilldependuponthecircumstances,including theeducation, experienceand reputationof thenonfirm lawyers; thenatureoftheservicesassignedtothenonfirmlawyers;andthelegalprotections,professional conduct rules, and ethical environments of the jurisdictions inwhich the services will be performed, particularly relating to confidentialinformation.

[7]Whenlawyersfrommorethanonelawfirmareprovidinglegalservicestotheclientonaparticularmatter,thelawyersordinarilyshouldconsultwitheachother and theclient about the scopeof their respective representationsand theallocationofresponsibilityamongthem.SeeRule1.2.Whenmakingallocationsofresponsibilityinamatterpendingbeforeatribunal,lawyersandpartiesmayhave additional obligations that are amatter of lawbeyond the scopeof theseRules.

[8]Maintaining competence. — To maintain the requisite knowledge andskill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,including thebenefits and risksassociatedwith relevant technology, engage incontinuingstudyandeducationandcomplywithallcontinuinglegaleducationrequirementstowhichthelawyerissubject.

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.

—Conflictsofinterest.

—Effectiverepresentation.

Professionalconduct.

—Candortowardthetribunal.

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Clientrelations.


Attorneyfailedtoprovidecompetentrepresentationwheretheattorneyfailedto check files to determine if a conflict of interest existed as a result of theattorney’srepresentationoftheclient’sex-spouseagainsttheclientinaformerproceedinginvolvingthesameissues.InreMekler,689A.2d1171(Del.1996).

Attorneywassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawfor3months,followedbya1-yearperiodofprobation,forviolatingLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.1,1.4(b),1.7,and1.16(a)(InterpretativeGuidelineRe:Residentialrealestatetransactions);theattorney failed toobtain the clients’ consent to a conflict of interest that arosewhen the attorney represented both the borrower and the lender in a loantransaction,andfailedtoinformtheclientsoftheir3-dayrighttorescind.In reKatz,981A.2d1133(Del.2009).

WhereanattorneycommittedviolationsofLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.1,1.4(b),and1.16during thecourseof10closings foraprivatemoney lender,apublicreprimandwasdeemedtheappropriatesanction;theattorneyhadethicaldutiesto disclose to the borrowers a conflict of interest and the fact that the loandocumentswereinadequate,eventhoughtheattorneydidnotrepresentthem,astheyhadnoattorneys.InreGoldstein,990A.2d404(Del.2010).





Failuretopromptlycomplywithcourtrules,evenafternotificationfromthecourt,isaviolationofthisRule.InreTos,576A.2d607(Del.1990).

Failuretofileanopeningbriefonbehalfofaclient,resultinginthedismissaloftheclient’sappeal,wasaviolationofthisrule.InreSullivan,727A.2d832(Del.1999).

Attorneyviolated this ruleby failing toprovidecompetent representation toclientwhere attorney had the requisite legal knowledge and skills but did notexercise the thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to properlyrepresentclientinbankruptcyaction.InreBenge,754A.2d871(Del.2000).

Lawyerwhoviolatednumerousprofessionaldutiesinrealestatepractice,andcausedover$500,000 indamages to clients,wasdisbarred. In reSpiller, 788A.2d114(Del.2001).

FindingthatattorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.1waswarrantedwherethe attorney failed to probate the estate in a timelymanner. In reWilson,900A.2d102(Del.2006).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 by: (1) failing to conduct anadequateinvestigation;and(2)failingtoprepareandfileamotionforreductionofsentenceuponwhichaSuperiorCourtmighthavereliedtoreducetheclient’ssentence.InrePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).

Attorneywhosemultiple federal actions for assorted clientswere dismisseddue to failure to respond to dismissal or summary judgmentmotions violatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.1,1.3,1.4,1.5,and8.4,warrantinga2-yearsuspensionfrom the practice of law, with conditions where: (1) the attorney had anunblemished record; (2) the attorney had undergone 2 eye surgeries; (3) theattorneyhadsufferedthelossofahalf-sibling;but(4)theconductwasdeemed“knowing” and evidenced engagement in a pattern of misconduct. In reFeuerhake,998A.2d850(Del.2010).

Whereanattorneyengagedinlatenessorfailuretoappearatscheduledcourtappearances, tardy requests for postponements, failure to comply with court-imposeddeadlines,“sloppyworkandcompletedisregardtotheCourt’srulesandprocedure” andwasted judicial resources in 3DelawareCourts, in addition toviolating the duty of candor to the Supreme Court of Delaware, the attorneyviolatedLawProf.ConductR.1.1,1.3,3.3,3.4and8.4.Inre:Poliquin,49A.3d1115(Del.2012).









AttorneydidnotviolateLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1byfailingtotaketimetoexplainvariousformsofjointownershipavailableandtheirlegalimplicationsorbyfailingtoattendasettlement.InreSisk,54A.3d257(Del.2012).

LawyerviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1becausethelawyerdidnotfileacomplaintorsecureatollingagreementtopreservethestatuteoflimitations.InreWilks,99A.3d228(Del.2014).



Attorney’smisrepresentationtoaFamilyCourtthataclientwasnotinarrearswithregardtoalimonyandhadpaidthedebtinfullwasdeterminedtohavebeenanactofdishonesty,fraud,deceit,ormisrepresentationinviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.4(c)and (d),a failure toprovidecompetent representation to theclient,inviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,andafailuretoexplainamatterto the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informeddecisions, in violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.4(b); themisrepresentationwasfoundtohavebeenknowinglymade,buttherecommendedsuspensionof2yearswasreducedto6months,becausemitigatingcircumstanceswerefoundinthe nature of the attorney providing the Family Court with correspondence,which would have permitted the Family Court and the adverse party anopportunitytoverifythedebt.InreChasanov,869A.2d327(Del.2005).

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

Because an attorney neglected client’s matters, failed to promptly disburseclient funds, and failed to cooperatewith disciplinary authorities, the attorneyviolated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), (4), 1.15(d), and 8.1(b);accordingly,theattorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandplacedonprobationfor18monthswiththeimpositionofcertainconditions.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDel.,999A.2d853(Del.2010).

Attorneywas publicly reprimanded and placed on conditional probation forviolatingLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.3,1.4(a)(3),(4),1.15(b),and8.1(b)wherethe attorney: (1) failed to timely distribute settlement funds; (2) failed tocommunicatewithapersonal injuryclient;and(3)failedtokeeptheOfficeofDisciplinary Counsel informed of changes. In re Siegel, 47 A.3d 523 (Del.2012).

—Suspension.






Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules ofProfessionalConductandwhoviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.2(a),1.4(a),1.15(a),8.1,8.1(b),8.4(c),and8.4(d),andLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c),wassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawinDelawarefor3yearsaftertheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility found that theattorney’sproblemsappeared tobegettingworseand included: co-mingling client trust funds; inadequate bookkeeping andsafeguarding of client funds; inadequate maintenance of books and records;knowingly making false statements of material fact to the ODC; falserepresentations in Certificates of Compliance for 3 years; and failure to filecorporatetaxreturnsfor3years.InreBecker,947A.2d1120(Del.2008).

Suspension for 6 months and 1 day was warranted where an attorney: (1)violatedLawProf.ConductR.1.1,1.3,3.3,3.4and8.4; (2)hadarecordof2priorprivateadmonitions;(3)engagedinapatternofmisconductconsistingofmultiple offenses; (4) suffered from personal or emotional problems; (5)cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in connection with thehearing; (6) was generally of good character, as evidenced by willingness torepresent those who might not otherwise have had representation; and (7)exhibitedremorse.Inre:Poliquin,49A.3d1115(Del.2012).

Attorney who committed numerous ethical violations, including neglectingmultiple client matters, making misrepresentations to the court and failing toproperly safeguard clients’ funds, was suspended for 18 months, based on adetermination that the mitigating factors significantly outweighed theaggravatingfactors.InreCarucci,132A.3d1161(Del.2016).





Rule1.2.Scopeofrepresentation.

(a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’sdecisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required byRule1.4,shallconsultwiththeclientastothemeansbywhichtheyaretobepursued.Alawyermaytakesuchactiononbehalfoftheclientasisimpliedlyauthorizedto carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisionwhether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by theclient’sdecision, after consultationwith the lawyer, as to aplea tobeentered,whethertowaivejurytrialandwhethertheclientwilltestify.

(b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation byappointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political,economic,socialormoralviewsoractivities.

(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation isreasonableunderthecircumstancesandtheclientgivesinformedconsent.

(d)Alawyershallnotcounselaclienttoengage,orassistaclient,inconductthat the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyermaydiscuss thelegal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client andmaycounselor assist a client tomakeagood faitheffort todetermine thevalidity,scope,meaningorapplicationofthelaw.

COMMENT

Allocationofauthoritybetweenclientandlawyer.—[1]Paragraph(a)confersupontheclienttheultimateauthoritytodeterminethepurposestobeservedbylegal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’sprofessional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such aswhethertosettleacivilmatter,mustalsobemadebytheclient.SeeRule1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer’sduty tocommunicatewith theclientabout suchdecisions.Withrespecttothemeansbywhichtheclient’sobjectivesaretobepursued,thelawyershallconsultwiththeclientasrequiredbyRule1.4(a)(2)andmaytakesuchactionasisimpliedlyauthorizedtocarryouttherepresentation.

[2]Onoccasion,however,alawyerandaclientmaydisagreeaboutthemeansto be used to accomplish the client’s objectives.Clients normally defer to thespecialknowledgeandskilloftheirlawyerwithrespecttothemeanstobeused

to accomplish their objectives, particularlywith respect to technical, legal andtacticalmatters.Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding suchquestionsastheexpensetobeincurredandconcernforthirdpersonswhomightbeadverselyaffected.Becauseofthevariednatureofthemattersaboutwhichalawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question mayimplicatetheinterestsofatribunalorotherpersons,thisRuledoesnotprescribehow such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may beapplicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should alsoconsult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of thedisagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamentaldisagreementwiththeclient,thelawyermaywithdrawfromtherepresentation.See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement bydischargingthelawyer.SeeRule1.16(a)(3).

[3]At the outset of a representation, the clientmay authorize the lawyer totakespecificactionontheclient’sbehalfwithoutfurtherconsultation.AbsentamaterialchangeincircumstancesandsubjecttoRule1.4,alawyermayrelyonsuchanadvanceauthorization.Theclientmay,however,revokesuchauthorityatanytime.

[4]Inacaseinwhichtheclientappearstobesufferingdiminishedcapacity,thelawyer’sdutytoabidebytheclient’sdecisionsistobeguidedbyreferencetoRule1.14.

[5] Independence from client’s views or activities. — Legal representationshouldnotbedeniedtopeoplewhoareunabletoaffordlegalservices,orwhosecauseiscontroversialorthesubjectofpopulardisapproval.Bythesametoken,representing a client does not constitute approval of the client’s views oractivities.

[6]Agreements limitingscopeofrepresentation.—Thescopeofservices tobeprovidedbyalawyermaybelimitedbyagreementwiththeclientorbythetermsunderwhichthelawyer’sservicesaremadeavailabletotheclient.Whenalawyerhasbeenretainedbyaninsurertorepresentaninsured,forexample,therepresentationmay be limited tomatters related to the insurance coverage. Alimited representation may be appropriate because the client has limitedobjectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon whichrepresentationisundertakenmayexcludespecificmeansthatmightotherwisebeusedtoaccomplishtheclient’sobjectives.Suchlimitationsmayexcludeactionsthat the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant orimprudent.

[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude tolimit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under thecircumstances.If,forexample,aclient’sobjectiveislimitedtosecuringgeneralinformation about the law the client needs in order to handle a common andtypicallyuncomplicatedlegalproblem,thelawyerandclientmayagreethatthelawyer’s services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such alimitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was notsufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although anagreementforalimitedrepresentationdoesnotexemptalawyerfromthedutytoprovide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be consideredwhen determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparationreasonablynecessaryfortherepresentation.SeeRule1.1.

[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer’s representation of a client mustaccordwith theRules of ProfessionalConduct and other law. See, e.g.,Rules1.1,1.8and5.6.

[9] Criminal, fraudulent and prohibited transactions. — Paragraph (d)prohibitsalawyerfromknowinglycounselingorassistingaclienttocommitacrime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer fromgiving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely toresult from a client’s conduct.Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in acourseofactionthatiscriminalorfraudulentofitselfmakealawyerapartytothecourseofaction.Thereisacriticaldistinctionbetweenpresentingananalysisoflegalaspectsofquestionableconductandrecommendingthemeansbywhichacrimeorfraudmightbecommittedwithimpunity.

[10]Whentheclient’scourseofactionhasalreadybegunandiscontinuing,thelawyer’sresponsibilityisespeciallydelicate.Thelawyerisrequiredtoavoidassisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that thelawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might beconcealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that thelawyeroriginallysupposedwaslegallyproperbutthendiscoversiscriminalorfraudulent.Thelawyermust,therefore,withdrawfromtherepresentationoftheclientinthematter.SeeRule1.16(a).Insomecases,withdrawalalonemightbeinsufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact ofwithdrawalandtodisaffirmanyopinion,document,affirmationorthelike.SeeRule4.1.

[11]Where theclient isa fiduciary, the lawyermaybechargedwithspecialobligationsindealingswithabeneficiary.

[12]Paragraph(d)applieswhetherornotthedefraudedpartyisapartytothetransaction.Hence, a lawyermust not participate in a transaction to effectuatecriminalorfraudulentavoidanceoftaxliability.Paragraph(d)doesnotprecludeundertakingacriminaldefenseincidenttoageneralretainerforlegalservicestoalawfulenterprise.Thelastclauseofparagraph(d)recognizesthatdeterminingthevalidityor interpretationof a statuteor regulationmay require a courseofactioninvolvingdisobedienceofthestatuteorregulationoroftheinterpretationplaceduponitbygovernmentalauthorities.

[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a clientexpectsassistancenotpermittedby theRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaworifthelawyerintendstoactcontrarytotheclient’sinstructions,thelawyermust consultwith the client regarding the limitationson the lawyer’s conduct.SeeRule1.4(a)(5).

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.


—Perjury.

—Scope.

——Authority.

——Objectivesofrepresentation.

Employmentcontracts.

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Clientrelations.


Evidenceheldsufficienttoestablishaviolationofsubsection(d)ofthisRulewhere attorney prepared and filed certain deeds on behalf of a client in

derogationof a final judgment concerning that client. In reShearin, 721A.2d157(Del.1998),cert.denied,526U.S.1122,119S.Ct.1776,143L.Ed.2d805(1999).

Attorney’sfailuretofileanunderinsuredmotoristclaimonbehalfoftheclientwasinviolationofthisrule.InreBecker,788A.2d527(Del.2001).

Defendant’smotionforpostconvictionreliefpursuant toSuper.Ct.Crim.R.61 was denied where defendant: (1) failed to show that trial counsel wasineffectiveforfailingtorequestanaccomplicelevelofliabilityjuryinstructionpursuant to 11 Del. C. § 274; (2) failed to rebut the presumption that notrequesting an accomplice level of liability instruction was reasonable,professionaltrialconduct;(3)failedtoadduceareasonableprobabilitythat,butfor the lackof jury instruction, the trial resultswouldhavebeendifferent;and(4)personally rejectedapleaoffering the same lesser includedoffenses that alevelofliabilityinstructionwouldhaveprovided.Statev.Dickinson,2012Del.Super.LEXIS380(Del.Super.Ct.Aug.17,2012).

Delay of 18 days in extending a settlement offer did not satisfy Law. Prof.ConductR.1.2.InreSisk,54A.3d257(Del.2012).

—Perjury.

Defense counsel’s refusal to cooperatewith defendant’s planned perjury (aswasrequiredbyLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.2)didnotdeprivedefendantofrighttocounselor theright totestifytruthfullyanddidnotgiverisetoadisqualifyingconflictofinterest.Rileyv.State,867A.2d902(Del.2004).

—Scope.

——Authority.

In a matter before the Industrial Accident Board, attorney’s agreeing toemployer’s petition to terminate total disability benefits without his client’sconsentviolatedsubsection(a).InreMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Defendant’s counsel had no authority to agree to giving of jury charge, indefendant’s absence, where there was no showing that defendant expresslywaivedhisrighttobepresent;defendant’srighttobepresentwaspersonalandcouldnotbewaivedbycounsel.Bradshawv.State,806A.2d131(Del.2002).

Nothing in the constitution prevented defendant from choosing to have hisfatetriedbeforeajudgewithoutajuryeventhough,indecidingwhatwasbestforhimself,defendantfollowedtheguidanceofhisownwisdomandrejectedthe


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adviceofhis attorney;professional rule requireddefendant’s attorney to abidebyhisclient’sdecisiontowaivetrialbyjury.Davisv.State,809A.2d565(Del.2002).

Attorney violatedLaw.R. Prof.Conduct 1.2(a) by failing to consultwith adivorce client about the contents of a petitioner’s answer to respondent’scounterclaim,signing theclient’snameon thedocument,andfiling itwith theFamily Court without the client’s approval. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122(Del.2007).

——Objectivesofrepresentation.

Adefendant’swishtoforegofurtherappealsandacceptthedeathpenalty,likeotherdecisions relating to theobjectivesof litigation, is essentially that of theclient,whosedecisiontheattorneymustrespect.RedDogv.State,625A.2d245(Del.1993).

Counselrepresentingashareholderclassinaderivativesuitwasnotsubjecttobeingdisqualifiedforadvocatingtheadoptionofasettlementproposaltowhichsomemembersoftheclassobjected,andtherewasnoviolationofDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct 1.2(a). In reM&FWorldwideCorp. S’holdersLitig., 799A.2d1164(Del.Ch.2002).

Employmentcontracts.

Dischargeoflegalcounselandvicepresidentwhowasemployedasalicensedprofessionalandwhoclaimedthattheactionforwhichshewasdischargedwasrequiredbyheremploymentcontract,butprohibitedbyherobligationundertheDelaware Rules of Professional Conduct, stated a claim for breach of at-willemployment contract. Shearin v. E.F.HuttonGroup, Inc., 652A.2d 578 (Del.Ch.1994).

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

Where attorney violated Rule 1.2(a), Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4(a) and (b), Rule1.15(a)and(d),Rule1.16(b)and(d),andRule3.4(c),attorneyagreedtopayallthe costs of the disciplinary proceedings, the costs of the investigatory auditsperformedby theLawyers’Fund forClientProtection, the restitutionnoted inthe parties stipulation, and consented to the imposition of a public reprimandwithapublicfour-yearprobationwithconditions.InreSolomon,745A.2d874(Del.1999).







—Suspension.

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules ofProfessionalConductandwhoviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.2(a),1.4(a),1.15(a),8.1,8.1(b),8.4(c),and8.4(d),andLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c),wassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawinDelawarefor3yearsaftertheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility found that theattorney’sproblemsappeared tobegettingworseand included: co-mingling client trust funds; inadequate bookkeeping andsafeguarding of client funds; inadequate maintenance of books and records;knowingly making false statements of material fact to the ODC; falserepresentations in Certificates of Compliance for 3 years; and failure to filecorporatetaxreturnsfor3years.InreBecker,947A.2d1120(Del.2008).



Rule1.3.Diligence.

Alawyershallactwithreasonablediligenceandpromptnessinrepresentingaclient.

COMMENT

[1]Alawyershouldpursueamatteronbehalfofaclientdespiteopposition,obstructionor personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and takewhatever lawfuland ethicalmeasures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.Alawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of theclientandwithzealinadvocacyupontheclient’sbehalf.Alawyerisnotbound,however, to press for every advantage thatmight be realized for a client. Forexample, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion indeterminingthemeansbywhichamattershouldbepursued.SeeRule1.2.Thelawyer’s duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use ofoffensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legalprocesswithcourtesyandrespect.

[2]Alawyer’sworkloadmustbecontrolledsothateachmattercanbehandledcompetently.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented thanprocrastination. A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by thepassage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, aswhen alawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client’s legal position may bedestroyed. Even when the client’s interests are not affected in substance,however,unreasonabledelaycancauseaclientneedlessanxietyandundermineconfidence in the lawyer’s trustworthiness. A lawyer’s duty to act withreasonablepromptness,however,doesnotprecludethelawyerfromagreeingtoa reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer’sclient.

[4]Unless the relationship is terminated as provided inRule 1.16, a lawyershould carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If alawyer’semploymentislimitedtoaspecificmatter, therelationshipterminateswhen the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over asubstantialperiodinavarietyofmatters,theclientsometimesmayassumethatthelawyerwillcontinuetoserveonacontinuingbasisunlessthelawyergives

notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship stillexistsshouldbeclarifiedbythelawyer,preferablyinwriting,sothattheclientwillnotmistakenlysupposethelawyerislookingaftertheclient’saffairswhenthelawyerhasceasedtodoso.Forexample,ifalawyerhashandledajudicialoradministrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and thelawyerandtheclienthavenotagreedthatthelawyerwillhandlethematteronappeal, the lawyermust consultwith the client about the possibility of appealbefore relinquishing responsibility for thematter. SeeRule 1.4(a)(2).Whetherthe lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on thescopeof the representation the lawyerhas agreed toprovide to the client.SeeRule1.2.

[5]To prevent neglect of clientmatters in the event of a sole practitioner’sdeathordisability,thedutyofdiligencemayrequirethateachsolepractitionerprepare a plan, in conformity with applicable rules, that designates anothercompetentlawyertoreviewclientfiles,notifyeachclientofthelawyer’sdeathor disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protectiveaction.Cf.Rule 28 of theAmericanBar associationModelRules forLawyerDisciplinary Enforcement (providing for court appointment of a lawyer toinventoryfilesandtakeotherprotectiveactioninabsenceofaplanprovidingforanother lawyer to protect the interests of the clients of a deceased or disabledlawyer).

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.

—Diligence.

Sanctions.

—Disbarment.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Clientrelations.

—Diligence.

Failure to promptly comply with requests of the Court, such as to prepaycosts,isaviolationofthisRule.InreTos,576A.2d607(Del.1990).

Failureeithertofileseveralduescollectioncases,orkeepclientinformedofhisprogress in relation to thesecases,violated thisRuleandProf.Cond.Rule1.4(a).InreMcCann,669A.2d49(Del.1995).

Failuretofileanopeningbriefonbehalfofaclient,resultinginthedismissaloftheclient’sappeal,wasaviolationofthisrule.InreSullivan,727A.2d832(Del.1999).

Attorneyviolatedthisrulebyfailingtorespondpromptlytoclient’srequestsforinformationandbyfailingtopromptlyandproperlydeterminethestatusofclient’s bankruptcypetition so that the clientwas subjected to sanctions. In reBenge,754A.2d871(Del.2000).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.3 by: (1) failing to conduct anadequateinvestigation;and(2)failingtoprepareandfileamotionforreductionofsentenceuponwhichaSuperiorCourtmighthavereliedtoreducetheclient’ssentence.InrePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).



Attorney failed to act with reasonable diligence in violation of Law. Prof.ConductR.1.3,wheretheattorneyadmittedconductingarealestatesettlementwhileundertheinfluenceofalcohol.InreDavis,43A.3d856(Del.2012).

Whereanattorneyengagedinlatenessorfailuretoappearatscheduledcourtappearances, tardy requests for postponements, failure to comply with court-









imposeddeadlines,“sloppyworkandcompletedisregardtotheCourt’srulesandprocedure” andwasted judicial resources in 3DelawareCourts, in addition toviolating the duty of candor to the Supreme Court of Delaware, the attorneyviolatedLawProf.ConductR.1.1,1.3,3.3,3.4and8.4.Inre:Poliquin,49A.3d1115(Del.2012).

AttorneydidnotviolateLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.3,withrespecttothedelayinrecordingadeed,wheretheattorneywasfacedwiththechoiceofpreparingthedeedincompliancewithcondominiumcouncil requirementsornotsettlingon the purchase at all; the attorney acted in what was thought to be the bestinterestsoftheclient.InreSisk,54A.3d257(Del.2012).

Lawyer violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.3 because the lawyer did notdiligently pursue a client’s claims or timely file a complaint. In reWilks, 99A.3d228(Del.2014).

Sanctions.

—Disbarment.

Lawyerwhoviolatednumerousprofessionaldutiesinrealestatepractice,andcaused over $500,000 in damages to clients,was disbarred. In re Spiller, 788A.2d114(Del.2001).

—Reprimand.


When an attorney handling 2 estates failed to actwith reasonable diligenceand promptness in probating the estates, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof.Conduct1.3;attorneywaspubliclyreprimanded,preventedfromrepresentingapersonalrepresentativeorservingas1,andrequiredtocooperateandpaycosts.InreWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

Attorneywas publicly reprimanded and placed on conditional probation forviolatingLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.3,1.4(a)(3),(4),1.15(b),and8.1(b)wherethe attorney: (1) failed to timely distribute settlement funds; (2) failed tocommunicatewithapersonal injuryclient;and(3)failedtokeeptheOfficeof







Disciplinary Counsel informed of changes. In re Siegel, 47 A.3d 523 (Del.2012).

—Suspension.







Rule1.4.Communication.

(a)Alawyershall:

(1)promptlyinformtheclientofanydecisionorcircumstancewithrespecttowhich the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required bytheseRules;

(2) reasonablyconsultwith theclient about themeansbywhich theclient’sobjectivesaretobeaccomplished;

(3)keeptheclientreasonablyinformedaboutthestatusofthematter;

(4)promptlycomplywithreasonablerequestsforinformation;and

(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’sconductwhenthelawyerknowsthattheclientexpectsassistancenotpermittedbytheRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary topermittheclienttomakeinformeddecisionsregardingtherepresentation.

COMMENT

[1]Reasonablecommunicationbetweenthelawyerandtheclientisnecessaryfortheclienteffectivelytoparticipateintherepresentation.

[2]Communicating with client. — If these Rules require that a particulardecisionabouttherepresentationbemadebytheclient,paragraph(a)(1)requiresthat the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client’s consent prior totakingactionunlesspriordiscussionswiththeclienthaveresolvedwhatactionthe clientwants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyerwho receives fromopposingcounselanofferofsettlementinacivilcontroversyoraprofferedpleabargaininacriminalcasemustpromptlyinformtheclientofitssubstanceunlessthe client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable orunacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. SeeRule1.2(a).

[3]Paragraph(a)(2)requiresthelawyertoreasonablyconsultwiththeclientabout the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. In somesituations—dependingonboththeimportanceoftheactionunderconsiderationand the feasibility of consulting with the client—this duty will require

consultationpriortotakingaction.Inothercircumstances,suchasduringatrialwhenan immediatedecisionmustbemade, the exigencyof the situationmayrequire the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyermust nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer hastaken on the client’s behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that thelawyerkeeptheclientreasonablyinformedaboutthestatusofthematter,suchassignificant developments affecting the timing or the substance of therepresentation.

[4] A lawyer’s regular communication with clients will minimize theoccasions on which a client will need to request information concerning therepresentation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information,however,paragraph(a)(4)requirespromptcompliancewith therequest,or ifaprompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or amember of the lawyer’sstaff,acknowledgereceiptoftherequestandadvisetheclientwhenaresponsemaybeexpected.A lawyer shouldpromptly respond tooracknowledgeclientcommunications.

[5]Explainingmatters.— The client should have sufficient information toparticipate intelligently indecisions concerning the objectives of therepresentationandthemeansbywhichtheyaretobepursued,totheextenttheclientiswillingandabletodoso.Adequacyofcommunicationdependsinpartonthekindofadviceorassistancethatisinvolved.Forexample,whenthereistime toexplainaproposalmade inanegotiation, the lawyer should reviewallimportant provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. Inlitigationalawyershouldexplainthegeneralstrategyandprospectsofsuccessand ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result insignificant expense or to injure or coerce others.On the other hand, a lawyerordinarilywillnotbeexpectedtodescribetrialornegotiationstrategyindetail.The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable clientexpectations for informationconsistentwith theduty to act in theclient’sbestinterests, and the client’s overall requirements as to the character ofrepresentation.Incertaincircumstances,suchaswhenalawyerasksaclienttoconsenttoarepresentationaffectedbyaconflictofinterest,theclientmustgiveinformedconsent,asdefinedinRule1.0(e).

[6]Ordinarily, the information tobeprovided is thatappropriate foraclientwho is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing theclientaccording to this standardmaybe impracticable, forexample,where theclient is a childor suffers fromdiminishedcapacity.SeeRule1.14.When the

client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate toinform every one of itsmembers about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyershouldaddresscommunications to theappropriateofficialsof theorganization.SeeRule1.13.Wheremanyroutinemattersareinvolved,asystemoflimitedoroccasionalreportingmaybearrangedwiththeclient.

[7]Withholding information. — In some circumstances, a lawyer may bejustifiedindelayingtransmissionofinformationwhentheclientwouldbelikelyto react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer mightwithhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatristindicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withholdinformationtoservethelawyer’sowninterestorconvenienceortheinterestsorconvenienceof anotherperson.Rulesor court ordersgoverning litigationmayprovidethatinformationsuppliedtoalawyermaynotbedisclosedtotheclient.Rule3.4(c)directscompliancewithsuchrulesororders.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.

—Communication.

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Clientrelations.

—Communication.

Lawyer’sdutytocommunicateundersubsection(b)runsonlytoaclientandpresupposes,forthedutytoarise,theexistenceofalawyer-clientrelationship.InreBerl,540A.2d410(Del.1988);InreBerl,560A.2d1009(Del.1989).

Subsection (b) violation could not be sustainedwithoutmore particularizedfindingsbytheBoardonProfessionalResponsibilityestablishingthatattorney,ataparticulartime,cameunderalawyer-clientrelationshipfromwhichadutyarosetoinformplaintiffoftheapplicationandrelevanceof18Del.C.§6865,notwithstanding plaintiff’s relationshipwith his attorney of record. In re Berl,





540A.2d410(Del.1988);InreBerl,560A.2d1009(Del.1989).

Failureeithertofileseveralduescollectioncases,orkeepclientinformedofhis progress in relation to these cases, violated Prof. Cond. Rule 1.3 andsubsection(a)ofthisRule.InreMcCann,669A.2d49(Del.1995).

Attorney’s failing to consult with client prior to agreeing to dismiss adiscriminationcomplaintviolatedsubsection (b). In reMaguire, 725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Attorney’sfailuretokeepaclientinformedaboutthestatusofhercaseandtoexplain certain matters violated this rule. In re Sullivan, 727 A.2d 832 (Del.1999).


Attorney’sfailureoveraperiodofsixyearstocommunicatewithclient,andfailure to notify the client of the dismissal of the no-fault lawsuit were inviolationsubsection(a)ofthisrule.InreBecker,788A.2d527(Del.2001).


Attorney’s acceptance of a retainer of $250 froma client through a prepaidlegalplan,whilenevercontacting theclientandrefusing torefundtheretaineruntil after the first disciplinary hearing, was held to have violated Law. Prof.ConductR.1.3,withregardtoactingwithreasonablediligenceandpromptness,








Law.Prof.ConductR.1.4(a) and (b),with regard to failing tokeep the clientreasonably informed to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client tomake informed decisions, and, Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.15(b) and (d), withregard tofailing tosafeguard theclient’sfundsanddeliver themuponrequest;theprepaidlegalfirmhadrefusedtorefundtheretainerand,infact,showednorecord of the amount, which had been paid directly to the attorney. In reChasanov,869A.2d327(Del.2005).

AttorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.4(a)by:(1)failingtoconsultwitha divorce about the contents of the petitioner’s answer to the respondent’scounterclaim;(2)failingtorespondtotheclient’sattemptstoinquireastostatusof a FamilyCourt case over a period of 2weeks; and (3) failing promptly toinformtheclientthatafinaldivorcedecreeandotherordershadbeenenteredbytheFamilyCourt.InrePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).

Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief was denied because defendantdidnotexplainhowcounsel’sattempttoreducedefendant’sconfusionovertheterm “evidentiary hearing” was objectively unreasonable or prejudicial to thecase; where the attorney attempted to clarify that what defendant called an“evidentiaryhearing”was,infact,referredtoasamotiontosuppress,thefailureof the attorney’s attempt to clear up defendant’s understanding of motions tosuppresswasnotevidencethatcounsel’sactionswereobjectivelyunreasonable.Statev.Addison,2007Del.Super.LEXIS441(Del.Super.Ct.June15,2007).


Counselforadisabledpersonwaspresumedtohavehadlawfulauthority tosettleapersonalinjuryaction,where(1)thedisabledperson’sguardian,didnotsuccessfullyrebutthatpresumptionbyclaimingtheguardianeitheragreedtothesettlement under duress or failed to agree to it at all; (2) counsel’s notes andletters supported the finding of a settlement agreement; (3) counsel properlyinformed theguardianabout theagreementpursuant toobligationsunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.4(a)(1);and(4)thefactthattheagreementwasoraldidnotrenderitunenforceableunderthestatuteoffrauds,6Del.C.§2714(a).Williamsv.ChancellorCareCtr.,2009Del.Super.LEXIS166(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.22,







2009).



AttorneydidnotviolateLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.4(a)(4)forfailingtoexplainto a client the various forms of joint ownership available and their legalimplications;theattorneywasnotretainedtodoanymorethantakethemattertoclosing, which required compliance with condominium council titlingrequirements.InreSisk,54A.3d257(Del.2012).

LawyerviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.4(a)(3)and(4)byfailingtoprovideinformation, including negotiations status and a client’s file, despite client’smultiplerequests.InreWilks,99A.3d228(Del.2014).

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

Fortheviolationofbothsubdivision(b)of thisRuleandRule1.5(e)(1), theappropriatesanctiontobe imposedisapublicreprimand.InreBerl,560A.2d1009(Del.1989).


Attorneywas publicly reprimanded and placed on conditional probation for







violatingLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.3,1.4(a)(3),(4),1.15(b),and8.1(b)wherethe attorney: (1) failed to timely distribute settlement funds; (2) failed tocommunicatewithapersonal injuryclient;and(3)failedtokeeptheOfficeofDisciplinary Counsel informed of changes. In re Siegel, 47 A.3d 523 (Del.2012).

—Suspension.

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules ofProfessionalConductandwhoviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.2(a),1.4(a),1.15(a),8.1,8.1(b),8.4(c),and8.4(d),andLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c),wassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawinDelawarefor3yearsaftertheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility found that theattorney’sproblemsappeared tobegettingworseand included: co-mingling client trust funds; inadequate bookkeeping andsafeguarding of client funds; inadequate maintenance of books and records;knowingly making false statements of material fact to the ODC; falserepresentations in certificates of compliance for 3 years; and failure to filecorporatetaxreturnsfor3years.InreBecker,947A.2d1120(Del.2008).




Rule1.5.Fees.

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect anunreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to beconsideredindeterminingthereasonablenessofafeeincludethefollowing:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questionsinvolved,andtheskillrequisitetoperformthelegalserviceproperly;

(2)thelikelihood,ifapparenttotheclient,thattheacceptanceoftheparticularemploymentwillprecludeotheremploymentbythelawyer;

(3)thefeecustomarilychargedinthelocalityforsimilarlegalservices;

(4)theamountinvolvedandtheresultsobtained;

(5)thetimelimitationsimposedbytheclientorbythecircumstances;

(6)thenatureandlengthoftheprofessionalrelationshipwiththeclient;

(7)theexperience,reputation,andabilityofthelawyerorlawyersperformingtheservices;and

(8)whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent.

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee andexpensesforwhichtheclientwillberesponsibleshallbecommunicatedtotheclient, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time aftercommencingtherepresentation,exceptwhenthelawyerwillchargearegularlyrepresentedclientonthesamebasisorrate.Anychangesinthebasisorrateofthefeeorexpensesshallalsobecommunicatedtotheclient.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which theserviceisrendered,exceptinamatterinwhichacontingentfeeisprohibitedbyparagraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writingsigned by the client and shall state the method by which the fee is to bedetermined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to thelawyerintheeventofsettlement,trialorappeal;litigationandotherexpensestobededucted from the recovery;andwhether suchexpensesare tobedeductedbefore or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearlynotify theclientofanyexpenses forwhich theclientwillbe liablewhetherornottheclientistheprevailingparty.Uponconclusionofacontingentfeematter,

thelawyershallprovidetheclientwithawrittenstatementstatingtheoutcomeofthematterand,ifthereisarecovery,showingtheremittancetotheclientandthemethodofitsdetermination.

(d)Alawyershallnotenterintoanarrangementfor,charge,orcollect:

(1)anyfeeinadomesticrelationsmatter,thepaymentoramountofwhichiscontingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony orsupport,orpropertysettlementinlieuthereof;or

(2)acontingentfeeforrepresentingadefendantinacriminalcase.

(e)Adivisionof feebetween lawyerswhoarenot in thesamefirmmaybemadeonlyif:

(1)theclientisadvisedinwritingofanddoesnotobjecttotheparticipationofallthelawyersinvolved;and

(2)thetotalfeeisreasonable.

(f)Alawyermayrequiretheclienttopaysomeorallofthefeeinadvanceofthelawyerundertakingtherepresentation,providedthat:

(1)Thelawyershallprovidetheclientwithawrittenstatementthatthefeeisrefundableifitisnotearned,

(2)Thewritten statement shall state thebasisunderwhich the fees shall beconsideredtohavebeenearned,whetherinwholeorinpart,and

(3) All unearned fees shall be retained in the lawyer’s trust account, withstatement of the fees earned provided to the client at the time such funds arewithdrawnfromthetrustaccount.

COMMENT

[1] Reasonableness of fee and expenses. — Paragraph (a) requires thatlawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factorsspecifiedin(1)through(8)arenotexclusive.Norwilleachfactorberelevantineachinstance.Paragraph(a)alsorequiresthatexpensesforwhichtheclientwillbechargedmustbereasonable.Alawyermayseekreimbursementforthecostofservicesperformedin-house,suchascopying,orforotherexpensesincurredin-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount towhichtheclienthasagreedinadvanceorbycharginganamountthatreasonablyreflectsthecostincurredbythelawyer.

[2]Basisorrateoffee.—Whenthelawyerhasregularlyrepresentedaclient,theyordinarilywillhaveevolvedanunderstandingconcerningthebasisorrateof the fee and the expenses forwhich the clientwill be responsible. In a newclient-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expensesmustbepromptlyestablished.Generally,itisdesirabletofurnishtheclientwithat least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer’s customary feearrangementsthatstatesthegeneralnatureofthelegalservicestobeprovided,the basis, rate or total amount of the fee andwhether and to what extent theclientwillberesponsibleforanycosts,expensesordisbursementsinthecourseof the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of theengagementreducesthepossibilityofmisunderstanding.

[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonablenessstandard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particularcontingent fee is reasonable,orwhether it is reasonable tochargeany formofcontingent fee, a lawyermust consider the factors that are relevant under thecircumstances.Applicablelawmayimposelimitationsoncontingentfees,suchasaceilingonthepercentageallowable,ormayrequirealawyertoofferclientsanalternativebasisforthefee.Applicablelawalsomayapplytosituationsotherthan a contingent fee, for example, government regulations regarding fees incertaintaxmatters.

[4]Termsofpayment.—Alawyermayrequireadvancepaymentofafee,butisobligedtoreturnanyunearnedportion.SeeRule1.16(d).Alawyermayacceptpropertyinpaymentforservices,suchasanownershipinterestinanenterprise,providingthisdoesnotinvolveacquisitionofaproprietaryinterestinthecauseofactionorsubjectmatterof the litigationcontrary toRule1.8(i).However,afeepaidinpropertyinsteadofmoneymaybesubjecttotherequirementsofRule1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a businesstransactionwiththeclient.

[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyerimproperlytocurtailservicesfortheclientorperformtheminawaycontrarytotheclient’s interest.For example, a lawyer shouldnot enter intoanagreementwhereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it isforeseeable thatmore extensive services probablywill be required, unless thesituationisadequatelyexplainedtotheclient.Otherwise,theclientmighthaveto bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction.However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client’sabilitytopay.Alawyershouldnotexploitafeearrangementbasedprimarilyon

hourlychargesbyusingwastefulprocedures.

[6] Prohibited contingent fees. — Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer fromcharging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment iscontingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony orsupportorpropertysettlementtobeobtained.Thisprovisiondoesnotprecludeacontract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with therecovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or otherfinancial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policyconcerns.

[7]Divisionoffee.—Adivisionoffeeisasinglebillingtoaclientcoveringthefeeoftwoormorelawyerswhoarenotinthesamefirm.Adivisionoffeefacilitatesassociationofmorethanonelawyerinamatterinwhichneitheralonecouldservetheclientaswell,andmostoftenisusedwhenthefeeiscontingentandthedivisionisbetweenareferringlawyerandatrialspecialist.Paragraph(e)permitsthelawyerstodivideafeewithoutregardtowhetherthedivisionisinproportiontotheserviceseachlawyerrendersorwhethereachlawyerassumesresponsibilityfortherepresentationasawhole,solongastheclientisadvisedinwritinganddoesnotobject,and the total fee is reasonable. Itdoesnot requiredisclosuretotheclientofthesharethateachlawyeristoreceive.Contingentfeeagreementsmustbeinawritingsignedbytheclientandmustotherwisecomplywithparagraph(c)ofthisRule.Alawyershouldonlyreferamattertoalawyerwhom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle thematter.SeeRule1.1.

[8]Paragraph(e)doesnotprohibitorregulatedivisionoffeestobereceivedin the future forworkdonewhen lawyerswerepreviouslyassociated ina lawfirm.

[9]Advancefees.—Alawyermayrequirethataclientpayafeeinadvanceof completing the work for the representation. All fees paid in advance arerefundableuntil earned.Until such timeas that fee isearned, that feemustbeheld in the attorney’s trust account. An attorney who accepts an advance feemustprovidetheclientwithawrittenstatementthatthefeeisrefundableifnotearnedandhowthefeewillbeconsideredearned.Whenthefee isearnedandthemoney is withdrawn from the attorney’s trust account, the client must benotifiedandastatementprovided.

[10] Some smaller fees—such as those less than $2500.00—may beconsidered earned in whole upon some identified event, such as upon

commencement of the attorney’s work on that matter or the attorney’sappearance on the record. However, a fee considered to be “earned uponcommencementof the attorney’sworkon thematter” isnot the sameas a fee“earneduponreceipt.”Theformerrequiresthattheattorneyactuallybeginworkwhereas the latter isdependentonlyuponpaymentby theclient. Inacriminaldefensematter,forexample,asmallerfee—suchasafeeunder$2500.00—maybeconsideredearneduponentryoftheattorney’sappearanceontherecordoratthe initial consultation atwhich substantive, confidential informationhas beencommunicatedwhichwouldprecludetheattorneyfromrepresentationofanotherpotentialclient (e.g.aco-defendant).Nevertheless,all feesmustbe reasonablesuchthatevenasmallerfeemightberefundable,inwholeorinpart,ifitisnotreasonableunderthecircumstances.

[11]Asageneral rule, larger advance fees—suchas thoseover$2500.00—willnotbe consideredearneduponone specific event.Therefore, the attorneymust identify themanner inwhichthefeewillbeconsideredearnedandmaketheappropriatedisclosures to theclientat theoutsetof therepresentation.Thewrittenstatementmustincludeareasonablemethodofdeterminingfeesearnedatagiven time in the representation.Onemethodmightbecalculationof feesbased upon an agreed upon hourly rate. If an hourly rate is not utilized, theattorneyisrequiredtoidentifycertaineventswhichwilltriggerearnedfees.Forexample,inacriminaldefensematter,anattorneymightidentifyeventssuchasentryofappearance,arraignment,certainmotions,casereview,and trialas theeventswhichmighttriggercertainspecifiedearnedfeesanddeductionofthosefeesfromtheattorneytrustaccount.Likewise,inadomesticmatter,anattorneymight identifysucheventsasentryofappearance,draftingpetition,attendanceat mediation conference, commissioner’s hearing, pre-trial conference, andjudge’s hearing as triggering events for purposes of earning fees. It might bereasonableforanattorneytoprovidethatacertainpercentageofthisfeewillbeconsideredearnedonamonthlybasis,foranyworkperformedinthatmonth,oruponthecompletionofanidentifiedportionofthework.Nevertheless,allfeesmustbereasonablesuchthatevenafeeconsideredearnedinfullperthewrittenstatementprovidedtotheclientmightberefundable,inwholeorinpart,ifitisnotreasonableunderthecircumstances.

[12] In contrast to the general rule, a larger advance feemay, under certaincircumstances, be earned upon one specific event. For example, this fee or alargeportionthereofcouldbecomeearneduponanattorney’sinitialconsultationwith a client in a bankruptcy matter at which substantive, confidentialinformation has been communicated which would preclude the attorney from

representation of another potential client (e.g. the client’s creditors). In thiscontext, the attorneymust provide a clear written statement that the fee, or aportion thereof, is earned at timeof consultation as compensation for this lostopportunity.Likewise, a criminaldefenseattorneymightoutline in thewrittenagreementthattheentirefeebecomesearneduponconclusionofthematter—inthecaseofnegotiationandacceptanceofapleaagreementpriortotrial.Bothofthese examples are tempered, however, by the reasonableness requirement setforthabove.

[13]Itisnotacceptableforanattorneytoholdearnedfeesintheattorneytrustaccount.SeeRule1.15(a).Thisiscommingling.Oncefeesareearned,thosefeesmustbewithdrawnfromtheattorneytrustaccount.Typically,itisacceptabletodraw down earned fees from an attorney trust account on amonthly or someother reasonable periodic basis. Similarly, monthly/periodic statements areconsideredanacceptablemethodofnotifyingone’sclientsthatearnedfeeshavebeen withdrawn from a trust account. For those attorneys earning fees on apercentage basis, wherein the fee would be considered earned upon thecompletionofanidentifiedportionofthework,astatementtothateffectuponcompletionofthatworkwouldsatisfythisrequirement.

[14]Disputesoverfees.—Ifaprocedurehasbeenestablishedforresolutionoffeedisputes,suchasanarbitrationormediationprocedureestablishedbythebar,thelawyermustcomplywiththeprocedurewhenitismandatory,and,evenwhenitisvoluntary,thelawyershouldconscientiouslyconsidersubmittingtoit.Lawmayprescribeaprocedurefordeterminingalawyer’sfee,forexample,inrepresentationofanexecutororadministrator, aclassorapersonentitled toareasonablefeeaspartofthemeasureofdamages.Thelawyerentitledtosuchafee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee shouldcomplywiththeprescribedprocedure.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Arbitration.

—Fees.

Attorneys’fees.

—AllocationinFamilyCourt.

—Contingencyfees.

—Feeagreements.

—Feesplitting.

—Prevailingparty.

—Reasonableness.

—Retainer.

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Arbitration.

—Fees.

Arbitrator’s award of fees to law firm that represented the clients in anunderlying complex and physically dangerous lawsuit was not manifestlyviolativeofthetermsofthearbitrationagreementorDelawarelaw;althoughthecourt did not review the individual factual findings, it did find substantialevidence supporting the approach taken by the arbitrator in reviewing thereasonablenessofvariousgroupsofchargesaccordingtorulesofDelawarecaselawandethical rules.BlankRome,L.L.P.v.Vendel,2003Del.Ch.LEXIS84(Del.Ch.Aug.5,2003).

Attorneys’fees.

—AllocationinFamilyCourt.

Husband’smotionforcounselfeesunder13Del.C.§1515andFam.Ct.Civ.R.11wasgrantedinpartinawife’saction,seekingspecificperformanceunderthe parties’ separation agreement, because the wife had changed her positionwith respect to selectionofanappraiser;while the feeswere reasonableunderFam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a), since it was unclearwhethercounselmadeareaonableinquiry,sanctionswerenotimposeddirectlyagainstcounsel.C.L.G.v.J.F.W.,2002Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS111(Del.Fam.Ct.June3,2002).

Basedonconsiderationof13Del.C.§1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLawProf.ConductR.1.5(a),itwasnotdeemedappropriatetoawardcounselfeesto

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/2003%20Del.%20Ch.%20LEXIS%2084


http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/2002%20Del.%20Fam.%20Ct.%20LEXIS%20111


eitherpartyinpost-divorceancillaryproceedings;whilethecourtmustprovidereasonsforanyawardoffees,itneednotjustifyadenialofcounselfees.N.M.B.v.C.R.B.,2002Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS155(Del.Fam.Ct.June26,2002).

Based on the financial circumstances, each party was to pay their ownattorney’sfees.R.A.C.v.V.M.E.,2002Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS153(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.7,2002).

Motherwasawardedcounselfeesunder13Del.C.§1515wherethepartiessubstantially agreed on visitation,making a court appearance unnecessary hadthe father informed the mother that he did not intend to pursue primaryresidential custody; although the mother’s counsel fees of $1,462 werereasonableunderFam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5(a),giventheparties’finances,itwasimpropertoorderthefathertopaythemother’sfeesin full.E.K. v.C.K., 2002Del. Fam.Ct. LEXIS 163 (Del. Fam.Ct.Dec. 16,2002).

Because both parties were difficult and contributed to unnecessary andexcessive litigation, eachpartywas tobear his or her ownattorney’s fees andcostspursuant to13Del.C.§1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88, andDel.Law.Prof.ConductR.1.5.T.M.v.M.M.,2002Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS250 (Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.12,2002);D.L.M.v.A.L.M.,2005Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS35(Del.Fam.Ct.June6,2005).

Trialcourtevaluatedrelevantevidenceand13Del.C.§1515Del.Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88,andDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5toconcludethateachpartywastopaytheirownattorneys’fees.R.D.L.v.C.M.U.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS56(Del.Fam.Ct.Apr.30,2003);S.W.v.S.W.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS62(Del.Fam.Ct.June24,2003);J.P.v.S.P.,2004Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS189(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.8,2004);J.H.v.L.H.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS267(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.13,2006);D.E.v.S.M.E.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS38(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.29,2007).

Trialcourtenteredorders,under13Del.C.§1513,awarding65percentofmaritalassetsand35percentofliabilitiestothewife,under13Del.C.§1512,andaftermakingallowanceforhermother’slivingwithher,awardingthewife$241monthlyalimonyfor8.5years,50percentoftheir17-yearmarriage;under13Del.C.§1515,Del.Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88,andDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5,thecourtawardednoattorneys’fees.J.S.v.K.S.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS54(Del.Fam.Ct.May12,2003);K.D.R.v.C.P.R.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS58(Del.Fam.Ct.May12,2003).



















The purpose of 13 Del. C. § 1515 is to equalize the parties’ positions byproviding a financially disadvantaged party with the financial means toprosecute or defend a divorce action; the court must provide reasons for anyawardoffees,andisalsoguidedbyDel.Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88andDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5.S.S.v.C.S.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS213(Del.Fam.Ct.Aug.22,2003);M.B.v.P.B.,2005Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS63(Del.Fam.Ct.Apr.21,2005);D.B.v.N.D.B.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS218(Del.Fam.Ct.Jan.31,2006);N.P.v.S.B.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS194(Del.Fam.Ct.Oct.24,2007).

Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 requires the Family Court of Delaware, indetermining the reasonableness of litigation costs incurred by the parties, toconsider: (1) the time and expense expended; (2) an itemization of servicesrendered;(3)relevanthourlyrates;(4)anitemizationofdisbursementsclaimed;(5) any sums received or that will be received with respect to legal servicesand/or disbursements; and (6) any information that will enable the court toproperlyweightherelevantfactorssetforthinthisrule.L.E.B.v.J.J.B.,2004Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS17(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.25,2004).

Familycourtawardedamotherattorneyfeesandcostsbecause,inlightofthefactorsenumeratedin13Del.C.§731andLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,thefeessheincurredwerereasonable,withtheexceptionofchargingthefatherwiththetravel timeof themother’scounsel toand from thecourthouse; the fatherwasresponsiblefortheremainderofthemother’sfees,notwithstandingthedisparityin the parties’ incomes, because it was his refusal to exercise the visitationawardedhimandtocomplywithhisresponsibilitiesasthejointcustodianoftheparties’sonsthatcausedthemothertoincurthefeesthatshedid.M.D.H.v.G.S.H.,2004Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS62(Del.Fam.Ct.June29,2004);M.B.M.v.C.M., 2006Del. Fam.Ct. LEXIS 10 (Del. Fam.Ct. Jan. 27, 2006); S.F.C. v.D.F.C.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS164(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.27,2007);M.B.v.E.B.,28A.3d495(Del.Fam.Ct.2011).

Under the 13Del. C. § 1515 factors (especially the financial conditions ofboth parties), Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 and Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5, it wasappropriate for the husband and the wife to be responsible for their ownattorneys’ fees and costs; thiswas despite the fact that the husband refused toconsider anoffer to settle alimonyuntil the daybefore the trial, leading to aneventual award of alimony at trial. K.A.D. v. F.W.D., 2005Del. Fam.Ct.LEXIS28(Del.Fam.Ct.May24,2005);A.C.M.-W.v.S.W.,2009Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS58(Del.Fam.Ct.Feb.2,2009);InreC.M.,2011Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS
















54(Del.Fam.Ct.Aug.22,2011).

Wife’s recalcitrant behavior regarding a sale of the marital home wasexcessively litigious behavior that increased litigation costs and warranted anattorney’s fee award to husband; in finding that the requested fees werereasonable, the court considered the factors listed under Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88,which incorporated consideration of any factors that would be relevant underLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(a) todeterminewhetheranattorneymet theethicalduty to charge reasonable fees.D.L.D. v.N.M.D., 2005Del. Fam.Ct. LEXIS143(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.7,2005);D.E.v.S.M.E.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS211(Del.Fam.Ct.Dec.19,2003).

Taking intoaccountFam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5, thecourt denied mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs in a custodymodificationactionunder13Del.C. § 731; themother did not prevail in herrequestsforsolelegalcustodyofherminordaughter,forpermissiontorelocatewiththechildtoUtahoraneighboringstate,orforrestrictionsonthelocationofthe father’s visits with the child, and she and the child’s father were incomparable financialpositions.K.J.G.v. J.M.,2005Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS164(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.1,2005).

FamilyCourtdeclinedtoawardattorneys’feestoeitherawifeorhusbandinan ancillary order following the dissolution of their 35-year marriage; bothpartiesworked and had sufficient income or assets to pay their own legal feeobligations.S.C.v.D.C.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS232(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.20,2006).

Parties’requestsforattorneys’feesweredeniedasan interimagreementdidnotprohibitahusbandfrommakingaclaimagainsttheincreasedequityinthewife’s home, even though the trial court ruled that the parties could keep theappreciation in their respective properties, and neither party took an overlylitigiousposition.K.C.S.v.S.H.S.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS160(Del.Fam.Ct.Sept.7,2006).

Asawifeinadivorceproceedingwasextremelylitigious,tookunreasonablepositionsandincurredasignificantamountofattorneys’feesasaresult,andwasrelentless with numerous filings that proved baseless and bordered onharassment, thewife’s request under 13Del.C. § 1515 for attorneys’ fees, aswellasbasedonconsiderationsofFam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLawR.Prof.Conductwas 1.5, was not deemed meritorious. C.G.B. v. P.C.B., 2006 Del. Fam. Ct.LEXIS255(Del.Fam.Ct.Dec.4,2006).









Becausethewifereceivedasubstantialportionofthemaritalestate,thewifewasrequiredtopayherownattorneys’feespursuantto13Del.C.§1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5.S.C.B.v.L.A.S.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS138(Del.Fam.Ct.June7,2007).

Becauseawifewas to receivea largeportionof themaritalestate, itwouldnot have been appropriate to award attorneys’ fees, under 13 Del. C. § 1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88,andLawR.Prof.Conduct1.5.E.F.F.v.A.J.O.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS165(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.15,2007);C.F.M.v.S.R.M.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS250(Del.Fam.Ct.Oct.31,2007);E.F.F.v.A.J.C.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS17(Del.Fam.Ct.Jan.29,2008).

Becauseahusband’srequestforacontinuanceresultednotfromanintentionalattempttocausedelaybutrathertheunforeseenunavailabilityofwitnessesandthe husband’s position regarding the wife’s alleged cohabitation was notfrivolous, it would be inequitable to order attorneys’ fees merely because thewifeprevailed.M.D.v.C.D.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS11(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.15,2007).

Pursuantto13Del.C.§1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88,andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5, a wife was entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees from thehusbandintheparties’divorceaction,asthewifedidnothavesufficientincomeorabilitytopayherownfees.W.J.F.v.K.F.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS88(Del.Fam.Ct.Jan.15,2008).

Aspartiesinadivorceproceedingwerenotoverlylitigiousanddidnottakeunreasonablepositions,neitherpartywasentitledtoanawardofattorneys’feesfromtheotherpursuantto13Del.C.§1515;thecourtconsideredthefinancialcircumstancesofthepartiesindenyingthefeeawards,aswellasFam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5.K.T.v.Y.T.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS39(Del.Fam.Ct.Feb.8,2008).

Sinceboththehusbandandwifehadsomeincomeeventhoughtheywereindirefinancialstraits,thetrialcourtdecidednottoawardattorneys’feesandcoststoeitherpartyfollowingtheendoftheir16-yearmarriage;pursuantto13Del.C. § 1515, and considering reasonable fee award factors set forth in Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5,thetrialcourtdirectedeachpartytopayhisorherownfeesandcosts,asthehusbandhadlimitedincomebecausethehusband was disabled and only receiving weekly workers’ compensationpayments,whilethewifealthoughworkinghadbeenbearingthebruntofpayingthe bills and rearing the parties’ 2 children even before the husband left the













maritalresidence.K.F.v.L.F.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS10(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.10,2008).

Upon evaluation by a court of each party’s assets, debts, and financialcircumstances in their divorce and ancillary relief proceeding, each partywasresponsible for their own attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 88 andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5.N.P.v. J.L.P., 2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS20 (Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.11,2008).

Husbandwasnotentitled tocounselfeesunder13Del.C.§1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88orLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5,giventhedeminimissizeofthemaritalestate ($645 equity in a car), the 25-year length of the marriage and thesubstantialdifferenceinincomeandearningcapacityoftheparties;thehusbandtook unreasonable positions, leading to excessive litigation. N.J.H. v. J.H.H.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS128(Del.Fam.Ct.Nov.26,2008).

Wifewasnotawardedattorneyfeesandcostsunder13Del.C.§1515,Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88,andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5,eventhoughthewifewasdisabledandthehusbandwasingoodhealth,asthepartieshadbeenessentiallyplacedinequalfinancialpositionsthroughthepaymentofalimonyandthedispositionofthemarital home.A.S. v. R.S., 2010Del. Fam.Ct. LEXIS 39 (Del. Fam.Ct.May12,2010).

Basedonthecounselfeesincurredbythehusbandinsuccessfullydefendingthewife’s appeal on the issueof thevalidityof theparties’ divorce, anduponconsiderationofFam.Ct.Civ.R.88andLawProf.ConductR.1.5,therewasnobasistosupportanawardoffees.M.R.v.B.R.,2012Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS51(Del.Fam.Ct.May23,2012).

Althoughadecisiononattorney’sfeeswasdeferred,thecourtwasinclinedtorequire that each party be responsible for payment of their respective counselfees and costs because, although thewifewas the economicallyweaker party,shewasreceiving60%of themaritalestateand50%of tax-deferredassets, inadditiontoalimonyandchildsupport.E.K.v.M.K.,2013Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS55(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.28,2013).

Wife was awarded attorneys’ fees in a divorce action based upon thehusband’sunreasonableconductofdissipation,butnotbaseduponhereconomicstate(duetothesubstantialawardofmaritalpropertyandalimonytoher).InreJ-M-R,2013Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS50(Del.Fam.Ct.July29,2013).

Award of attorneys’ fees in the wife’s favor was appropriate because theFamily Court on several occasions acknowledged the husband’s delay in










litigation and the wife’s need to continually resort to motions to compeldiscovery for litigation. Weiner v. Weiner, — A.3d —, 2015 Del. Fam. Ct.LEXIS34(Del.Fam.Ct.July13,2015).

—Contingencyfees.

Attorney’s failing to put a contingency fee arrangement in writing violatedsubsection(c).InreMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Attorneywasentitledtoquantummeruitfeesuptoa1/3contingencyfeefromformer clients because: (1) the attorneywas not fired for cause; (2) the issueswere not complex; (3) the clients pressed the attorney to settle quickly; (4)nothingshowedtheattorneywasprecludedfromotheremployment;(5)thefeewascontingentandbasedon1/3oftherecovery;and(6)theclients’subsequentattorneycouldpaythefeebasedonacharginglienonrecoveredfees.Murreyv.Shank,2011Del.Super.LEXIS431(Del.Super.Ct.Aug.30,2011).

—Feeagreements.

Attorneywassuspendedfor3months,followedby18monthsofconditionalprobation, for having violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.7(a), 1.15(a),1.16(d)by:(1)havingaconflictofinterestwith2clients;(2)havingapersonalinterestinaloantransaction;(3)failingtosafeguardclientfunds;and(4)failingtoprovideanewclientwithafeeagreement.InreO’Brien,26A.3d203(Del.2011).

The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Board on ProfessionalResponsibility’s findings and recommendation for discipline, publiclyreprimandingandplacingtheattorneyona2-yearperiodofprobationwiththeimposition of specific conditions, because the attorney failed to provide theclientwithafeeagreementand/orstatementofearnedfeeswithdrawnfromthetrustaccount,toidentifyandsafeguardclientfund,tomaintainfinancialbooksand records or to supervise nonlawyer assistants; the attorney had engaged inconductinvolvingmisrepresentation,prejudicialtotheadministrationofjustice.InreMalik,167A.3d1189(Del.2017).

—Feesplitting.

Finding of attorney’s violation of subdivision (e)(1) was supported bysubstantialevidence.InreBerl,540A.2d410(Del.1988);InreBerl,560A.2d1009(Del.1989).

Feedivisionagreementbetweenalawfirmanditsformerassociatewasvalidandenforceableanddidnotviolatethedisciplinaryrules;itisnotcommonfora







lawfirmandadepartingattorneytodividethefeesresultingfromcontingentfeecaseswhichtheattorneyhasbeenhandlingandwillcontinuetohandleafterheleaves.Tomar,Seliger,Simonoff,Adourian&O’Brienv.Snyder,601A.2d1056(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

A Delaware lawyer may not assert non-compliance with Rule 1.5(e) as adefensetoanoralagreementwithanout-of-statelawyerwhoisnotchargedwithcompliance with that rule or a similar rule of another jurisdiction. Potter v.Peirce,688A.2d894(Del.1997).

Attorney’sfailingtoobtainawrittenagreementwiththeclientregardingjointrepresentationwithanotherlawyerandhisattemptingtodivideaprospectivefeeviolatedsubsection(e).InreMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Assuming that there was a contract by which a law firm engaged arepresentative plaintiff to perform legal work in class action litigation, anypurportedcontractwouldhavebeenvoidandunenforceableasitwasunethicalandinviolationoftheprinciplesgoverningrepresentativeactionsinDelaware;inparticular,theagreementwouldhaveviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(e)astherepresentativeplaintiffdidnotadvisetheclass,eitherinwritingororally,oftheallegedfee-sharingagreement.FuquaIndus.S’holderLitig.v.Abrams(InreFuquaIndus.),2006Del.Ch.LEXIS167(Del.Ch.Sept.7,2006).

—Prevailingparty.

Pursuant to Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a)(4), an award for fees, costs, andexpenses incurred in the Chancery Court was not warranted to an investmentcompany, because it was not the prevailing party there; rather, the company’sclaimsinthatCourtweredismissed.ShoreInvs.,Inc.v.Bhole,Inc.,2012Del.Super.LEXIS621(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.9,2012).

—Reasonableness.

Although the fees incurredby amother in an expedited custodyproceedingwerereasonableinlightofthefactorsenumeratedinLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,pursuant to 13Del. C. § 731, the fatherwas not responsible for fees that themotherwouldhave incurred regardlessofhisobstreperousconduct.M.D.H. v.G.S.H.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS6(Del.Fam.Ct.Feb.28,2003).

Court granted the father’s motion for attorney fees because the motherviolatedthecourt’sordergrantingthefatherjointlegalcustodyofandvisitationwith the parties’ children in several respects; in setting the fees, the courtconsideredthefactorsenumeratedinDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5.D.M.E.v.









M.B.S.E.,2003Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS119(Del.Fam.Ct.Sept.11,2003).

Although the insuredwasentitled toanattorneyfeeawardas theprevailingpartyagainsttheinsurer,itsfeerequestwasexcessiveandhadtobereducedtoareasonableamount.NassauGallery,Inc.v.NationwideMut.FireIns.Co.,2003Del.Super.LEXIS401(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.18,2003).

Exercisingitsbroad13Del.C.§731discretionandconsideringDel.Fam.Ct.Civ.R.88,Del.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5, and related factors todetermineareasonablefee, thecourtallowedthemother’s$412andfather’s$275attorneyfee requests and ordered the father to pay $100 of themother’s fee; the courtspecifically mentioned it took into account the father’s intransigent positionviolating Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 16(b) policy that contemplated the parties’participation inmediation tomediate to settle unresolved issues, the positionstaken by the parties, the discrepancy in counsel’s experience, and the parties’incomes.N.J.G.v.J.J.G.,2004Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS18(Del.Fam.Ct.Mar.2,2004);LDMv.RL, 2006Del. Fam.Ct.LEXIS131 (Del. Fam.Ct. June 1,2006);D.G.C.v.R.C.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS260(Del.Fam.Ct.Aug.30,2006);R.U. v.R.L.U., 2008Del. Fam.Ct. LEXIS 26 (Del. Fam.Ct. Jan. 22,2008).

After plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action against defendants for theinterpretationofapartnershipagreement,defendantswereentitledtoreasonableattorney fees for answering the complaint and responding to the motion todismiss; however, the court declined to award fees for the preparation ofdefendants’ counterclaims since these were voluntary in nature and were notnecessarilyincurredindefenseoftheaction.RichmontCapitalPtnrs.I,L.P.v.J.R.Invs.Corp.,2004Del.Ch.LEXIS73(Del.Ch.May20,2004).

Taking intoaccount theLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5(a) factors, the trial courtapproved the reasonableness of the attorney fees the Special MasterrecommendedintheSpecialMaster’sFinalReport,asthecoproateofficerwasduetheadvancementoffunds(asprovidedforinthecorporation’sbylaws)inaninvestigationforpossibleaccountingirregularities;however, the trialcourthadto modify the corporate officer’s pre-judgment interest request because thecorporateofficerwasonlyentitledtointerestfromthetimetheofficerproducedspecific advancement expenses to the corporation. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc.,2005Del.Ch.LEXIS41(Del.Ch.Mar.29,2005).

DelawareIndustrialAccidentBoard,inawardingminimalattorney’sfeetotheemployee’scounselunder19Del.C.§2320,abuseditsdiscretioninfailingto










demonstrate that ithadconsidered the requisiteCox factors,basedonLaw.R.Prof. Conduct 1.5(a), in making its award; the Board merely stated that itawardedaminimalfeeduetotheemployee’scounsel’sfailuretocooperatewiththe employer’s counsel by refusing to send photographs of the employee’sdisfigurement. Green v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 321(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.8,2005).

Wife’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in the parties’ post-divorce proceedings was granted based upon consideration of the relevantfactorsunderFam.Ct.Civ.R.88,aswellasthereasonablenessofthefeeunderLaw.R. Prof. Conduct 1.5; the awardwaswithin the family court’s authorityunder 13Del. C. § 1515, and included consideration of the former husband’sfinancial situation, his retention of a new attorney for a longer time than thewife, theextensivenessoftheparties’ litigation,andthenecessityofthewife’sretentionofcounseltoobtainafinalresolutionofpendingmatters.L.F.v.L.M.H.,2005Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS73(Del.Fam.Ct.June3,2005).

Because a mortgage agreement established a ceiling of 5 percent of thejudgment amountwhich ultimatelywould be entered after trial and the lendercould not recover attorneys’ fees outside of the foreclosure, the requestedattorneys’ fees were unreasonable. Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v. Waples, 2006Del.Super.LEXIS274(Del.Super.Ct.July3,2006).

When the court had held that a workers’ compensation claimant was anemployee and not an independent contractor, the claimant’s attorney wasawarded a fee of $29,053.19, representing $300 multiplied by 96 hours pluscostsof$253.19,asthetimeexpendedandthehourlyratewerereasonablegiventhe nature of the case, counsel’s experience, and community custom, and theemployers had not supplied any evidence of their claimed inability to pay thefee; a 1/3 multiplier, however, was not justified, because if the issue wascomplex at all, it was factually, not legally, complex. Falconi v. Coombs &Coombs,Inc.,2006Del.Super.LEXIS471(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.21,2006).

The employee was entitled to attorney’s fees under 19 Del. C. § 2350(f)where: (1) the employee’s total disability case presented relatively difficultquestions on appeal; (2) the attorney’s hourly rate was reasonable; (3) theattorneywassuccessfulonappeal;(4)pursuanttoLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,theemployerwasabletopay;and(5)theIndustrialAccidentBoard’sawardwastheonlysourceofattorneys’fees.Smithv.Del.StateHous.Auth.,2006Del.Super.LEXIS624(Del.Super.Ct.Feb.14,2006).








Whenanemployerwaspartiallysuccessfulinasuitagainstanemployeeforthe employee’s violation of a noncompetition agreement, an award to theemployerofattorneys’feesexceedingtheamountofdamagesawardedwasnotexcessive under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 because the employee wasresponsiblefordelaysresultinginincreasedfees,as:(1)theemployee’smotionfor a continuance required counsel to prepare for trial twice; and (2) theemployeecouldhaveminimizedlitigationcostsbutinsteaddrewoutthecasebyrequiringtheemployertoproveeverykeyissueoffact.EDIXMediaGroupv.Mahani,2007Del.Ch.LEXIS17(Del.Ch.Jan.25,2007),aff’d,935A.2d242(Del. 2007);Mahani v. EDIXMedia Group, Inc., 935 A.2d 242 (Del. 2007);WeichertCo.v.Young,2008Del.Ch.LEXIS51(Del.Ch.May1,2008).

AttorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(a)bycharginga feeof$1,500for the minimal legal services performed in connection with a motion forreductionofsentence.InrePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).

Attorneys’ total fees of $144,866.70were reasonable as the case required atenacious and highly-skilled lawyer with extensive understanding ofemploymentlawand,asasolopractitioner,theattorney’sabilitytotakeonothercaseswasseverely limitedby theobligations in thecase; theamount involvedandtheamountrecoveredbytheclient,$252,416onwrongfulterminationandbad faith claims, were both substantial. Bunting v. Citizens Fin. Group, 2007Del.Super.LEXIS205(Del.Super.Ct.June29,2007).

Theattorneys’requestforthemaximumfeeallowedbylawwasunsupportedbecause: (1) motion practice was a normal part of litigation; (2) movantattorneysofferednoreasonwhytheirmotionsweresocomplexastojustifyanattorneys’feeawardof33%;and(3)thefactthatthecountyvigorouslyopposedthemotionwas irrelevant.Korn v.NewCastleCounty, 2007Del.Ch.LEXIS139(Del.Ch.Oct.3,2007).

Although an attorney fee award in a workers’ compensation case could bebased on nonmonetary benefits, the Industrial Accident Board had nothingbeforeitotherthantheemployee’smonetaryawardfromwhichtocalculatetheattorneyfeeaward;however,applyingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5,regardingreasonableattorneyfees,andtheGeneralMotorsCorporationv.Cox,304A.2d55, 57 (Del. 1973) factors that included the amount involved and the resultsobtained,thereexistednobasisforoverturningtheBoard’sattorneyfeeaward.Pughv.Wal-MartStores,Inc.,945A.2d588(Del.2008).

Reimbursement of defense fees and costs pursuant to an indemnification










provisioninastockpurchaseagreementofamanufacturingentitybytheformermanufacturer was warranted where the fees were reasonable based onconsiderationof thereasonablenessfactorsunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(a)(1)and(4);suchfeesincludedworkdonepriortothetimewhentheunderlyingenvironmental litigation was commenced, as there were subpoenas andinformation requests that served as the basis for the lawsuit against the newmanufacturing entity and others. Rexnord Indus., LLC v. RHI Holdings, Inc.,2009Del.Super.LEXIS47(Del.Super.Ct.Feb.13,2009).

Attorneyfeesandexpertwitness fees incurredby formerexecutives in theiractionagainstacorporation,seekingpaymentofcertainoptionsthat theywereallegedly promised, were ordered to be paid by the corporation where theexecutiveswereawardedjudgmentaftertrialandthesumssoughtwere,forthemost part, reasonable, not duplicative, and not excessive under Law. R. Prof.Conduct1.5(a); theexecutiveswerealsoentitled to fees for theprosecutionoftheir action seeking payment of fees. Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 2009 Del. Ch.LEXIS34(Del.Ch.Feb.25,2009).

Treatment center that failed to comply with subpoenas duces tecum forsubstance and alcohol abuse records of an indigent parent involved in a childdependency case, and which was ultimately found in contempt for itsmisconduct,wasorderedtopaytheparent’sattorneythatattorney’sreasonableattorneys’feesunderFam.Ct.Civ.R.88;suchattorneys’fees,basedonwhattheattorneywouldhaveearnediftheattorneywasworkingforaprivateclient,werereasonableinthecircumstancespursuanttoLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5.A.B.v.Thresholds,Inc.,982A.2d295(Del.Fam.Ct.2009).

Plaintiffs’ request for $83,980 in attorneys’ feeswas reduced by 30 percentwhere: (1) the disputed fees pertained directly to plaintiffs’ efforts to gainpossessionofandabilitytoinspectadefendant’scomputerwhichthatdefendanthadalreadymodified, losingordisposingof, theharddrive;(2) the timespentby themost junior and senior attorneyswas disallowed; (3) itwas reasonableunder Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) to allow a weighted average rate ofapproximately $340 per hour for the other 2 attorneys who spent almost 240hoursontheclaimedwork,giventheirlevelofexperience;and(4)muchoftherequested relief was denied; and (5) the award was directed to the prejudicecausedby the spoliation.BeardResearch, Inc v.Kates, 2009Del.Ch.LEXIS170(Del.Ch.Oct.1,2009).

Condominiumcodeanddeclarationauthorizedattorneys’feestoaprevailingparty, such that a condominium council that was awarded partial summary





judgment in its debt action against condominium owners was awarded itsreasonable fees; the feeswere reasonable underLaw.R.Prof.Conduct 1.5(a),based on the amount charged, the hours worked, the owners’ willingness topursue litigation, and their ability topay.Dixon v.Council of theCliffHouseCondo.,2009Del.C.P.LEXIS71(Del.Dec.8,2009).

Althoughthefirstparty’sattorneys’feeswerereasonableunderthefactorssetforth in Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(a), the first party’s expenses related tophotocopying,transcripts,travel,andcomputerresearchwerenottobeincludedbecause: (1) the terms“costs”and“expenses”haddifferentmeanings; and (2)the parties’ asset purchase agreement only provided for payment of costs,pursuant toCh.Ct.R.54.IvizeofMilwaukeev.CompexLitig.Support,2009Del.Ch.LEXIS251(Del.Ch.June24,2009).

Attorneys’feesbasedonLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(a)werereducedpartiallywhere the amount of time spent by partners in 1 law firm was deemed anartificialinflationofacompany’srequestedfees;thecompanywasawardedfeesbasedonanothercompany’sbreachofanoncompetitionprovisionintheparties’asset purchase agreement.Concord Steel, Inc. v.Wilmington Steel ProcessingCo.,2010Del.Ch.LEXIS18(Del.Ch.Feb.5,2010).

Because the plaintiffs’ feeswere reasonable as to the amount involved, andbecause the time expended was justifiable based on the amount of moneyinvolved,thenumberofthedefendants,andthevigorwithwhichthearbitrationwascontested,theplaintiffswereentitledtotheirattorneys’feesandcostsunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct 1.5(a).GlobalLinkLogistics, Inc. v.OlympusGrowthFundIII,L.P.,2010Del.Ch.LEXIS30(Del.Ch.Feb.24,2010).

With the exception of certain expenses that fell outside the fee award, acorporation’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable as to the number of attorneysinvolved and the related dollar amounts; therefore, pursuant to Law. R. Prof.Conduct 1.5(a) and Ch. Ct. R. 88, a shareholder was obligated to pay thecorporation’s expenses incurred by the shareholder’s contempt. Aveta Inc. v.Bengoa,2010Del.Ch.LEXIS175(Del.Ch.Aug.13,2010).

Formerofficerofacorporationreasonablyrequested$292,019.91forfeesandexpenses incurred in connection with the officer’s defense of claims assertedagainsttheofficerbythecorporation’sparentinanunderlyingaction;therecordin theunderlyingaction strongly suggested that theparent adopteda litigationstrategy designed to overwhelm the officer by forcing the officer to incursignificantexpensesdefendingawide-ranging,unfocusedaction.Danenbergv.

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/2009%20Del.%20C.P.%20LEXIS%2071






Fitracks,Inc.,58A.3d991(Del.Ch.2012).

Attorneys’feesandcostsof$3,267,355requestedwerereasonableandwereawarded to a fund under a contractual fee-shifting provision because: (1) theattorneys’ fee component was calculated using the rates the fund’s counselcustomarilychargedthefund,whichweretheirstandardhourlyratesdiscountedby 10%; (2) the lawyers who staffed the matter were able and experiencedpractitionersandchargedwhatwerereadilyrecognizableasreasonableratesforcomplexcommercial litigation;(3) that theopponents’attorneyschargedlowerratesdidnotrenderthefund’scounsel’sratesunreasonableinlightofthefund’scounsel’sprominence,thequalificationsofitspractitionersandthelegalmarketin which the firm provided services; and (4) that the opponents’ attorneysincurredfewerhoursworkingonthecasedidnotundercutthereasonablenessofthe fund’s request. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion BreckenridgeManagingMember,LLC,50A.3d434(Del.Ch.2012).

Trialcourtproperlyawardedaminoritystockholder’sattorneyafeeof$304million(15%ofa$2.031billionjudgment)inaderivativesuitsinceLawProf.ConductR.1.5(c)contemplatedfees thatwerebasedonapercentage; the trialcourt properly made a reasonableness determination based on the SugarlandIndus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980) factors. Ams. Mining Corp. v.Theriault,51A.3d1213(Del.2012).

Theextraordinarybenefitthatwasachievedbyplaintiffminorityshareholderinaderivativesuitmeritedaverysubstantialawardof$304millioninattorneys’feeswhere: (1)plaintiff’sattorneyspursued thecaseonacontingentfeebasis,invested a significant number of hours, incurred more than $1 million inexpenses, attorneys reviewed approximately 282,046 pages in documentproductionand traveledoutside theUnitedStates to takemultipledepositions;(2) plaintiffs indisputably prosecuted the action through trial and secured animmenseeconomicbenefit;(3)plaintiffhadtodealwithverycomplexfinancialandvaluationissues,whilebeingupagainstmajorleague,first-ratelegaltalent;(4) with prejudgment interest, the benefit achieved through the litigationamountedtomorethan$2billion;and(5)postjudgmentinterestaccruedatmorethan $212,000 per day. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del.2012).

Award of $304 million in attorneys’ fees in a derivative suit was properlybased upon the total damage award,which included prejudgment interest; theCourtofChancery’sdecisiontoincludeprejudgmentinterestinitsdeterminationof the benefit achieved was not arbitrary or capricious, but rather was the





productofalogicalanddeductivereasoningprocesswhichtookintoaccounttheslow pace of litigation and any part plaintiffsmight have played in that pace.Ams.MiningCorp.v.Theriault,51A.3d1213(Del.2012).

Award of $304million in attorneys’ fees in a derivative suit, based upon acalculation of 15% of a $2.031 billion judgment, was proper due to thecomplexityof thecaseandvaluablebenefitsconferred; the fact thatplaintiff’scounselspent8,597hoursonthiscase,meaningthattheawardwouldrepresentaper hourpaymentof approximately$35,000 anhour,was irrelevant becausethe benefit achieved by the litigation was the common yardstick by which aplaintiff’scounselshouldbecompensatedinasuccessfulderivativeaction.Ams.MiningCorp.v.Theriault,51A.3d1213(Del.2012).

Wife’s request for attorneys’ feeswasgrantedonly inpartbecausemanyoftheentriesbyherattorneydidnotrelatetothehusband’sdissipationofmaritalassets, which was the basis of the award; the amount awarded was deemedreasonable.J-M-R-v.K-J.R-,2013Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS48(Del.Fam.Ct.Sept.23,2013).

In awarding fees and costs under the bad faith exception to the AmericanRule,anindicationthattheamountofthefeerequestwasreasonablewasthatatthe time the fees and expenses were incurred, plaintiffs had no guarantee ofobtaining a fee-shifting award; further, the court determined that mostprelitigation expenses were reasonable, considering that plaintiffs actedreasonablybyseekingtoresolvethematterbeforefilingsuitStaffieriv.Black,2013Del.Ch.LEXIS322(Del.Ch.Aug.8,2013).

While theattorney feeawardwasgreater than theamount recovered for thebreach of contract, the award was supported because: (1) the guarantormademany claimswhichwere costly to defend against; (2) the lender hired a legalteamandexpertadvisorsnecessaryto tacklethenumerous,difficult issues;(3)thefeeschargeswerereasonableandlessthanthoseexpendedbytheguarantor;and(4)theprofessionalschosenwerewell-qualified.EdgewaterGrowthCapitalPartnersL.P.v.H.I.G.Capital,Inc.,2013Del.Ch.LEXIS104(Del.Ch.Apr.18,2013).

PursuanttoLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,anawardforfees,costsandexpensesincurred in a breach of lease claimwas reasonable and appropriate where aninvestmentcompanyprevailedonthatclaim;thecourtallocatedthepercentagetobeawardedforeachitem,becauseotherclaimshadalsobeenpursued.ShoreInvs., Inc.v.Bhole, Inc.,2012Del.Super.LEXIS621(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.9,







2012).

Defendant’s attorneys’ fees of $287,339 were reasonable because: (1) thelitigation lasted over 3 years; (2) plaintiff repeatedly engaged in bad faithlitigationtactic;(3)defensecounsel’shourlyrateswereconsistentwiththeratesgenerally charged in Delaware; and (4) the number of hours devoted to thelitigation was not excessive, redundant, duplicative or otherwise unnecessary.PreferredInvs.,Inc.v.T&HBailBonds,—A.3d—,2014Del.Ch.LEXIS43(Del.Ch.Mar.25,2014).

Shifting attorneys’ fees under the bad faith exception to theAmericanRuleand awarding reasonable fees to an estate for defending against a challenger’sexceptions to the final accountingwas appropriate because: (1) the challengerlacked standing to prosecute exceptions; (2) the litigation was vexatious andfrivolous;and(3) theattorney’sfeesrequestedwerereasonableandinvolvedamodesthourlyrateof$225forover20hoursinpreparingfortheexceptions.InreEstateofBranson,—A.3d—,2014Del.Ch.LEXIS57(Del.Ch.Apr.22,2014).

In this contract action, defendant was entitled to an award of $700,000 forattorneys’ fees, costs and expenses because defendant predominated in thelitigationregardingthebreachofcontractissuea;thetimeandlaborrequiredinthissuitweresignificantbecausetheownershipandcontrolofdefendantwasatstake.AFHHolding&Advisory,LLCv.EmmausLifeScis.,Inc.,—A.3d—,2014Del.Super.LEXIS228(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.16,2014).

Althoughplaintiffrequested$374,128inattorneys’feesandcostsformisuseof computer system information, the awardwas reduced to $200,000because:(1)theamountsoughtwasunreasonableanddisproportionatetothe$87,016.25awardedtoplaintiffasnominalandunjustenrichmentdamages;and(2)notallof the time and labor expendedby plaintiff’s counsel on the computermisuseclaimwasnecessary.WaymanFireProt.,Inc.v.PremiumFire&Sec.,LLC,—A.3d—,2014Del.Ch.LEXIS108(Del.Ch.June27,2014).

Plaintiffwasentitledtoanawardofreasonableattorneys’feesof$33,440fordefendant’s refusal to complywith a discovery request because: (1) plaintiff’stime entries sufficiently advised the court as to the task being completed; (2)plaintiff’sexplanationsastothenatureofanydisputedworkwerecredible;(3)defendantwas not paying for purely clerical tasks; and (4) defendantwas notpaying for redundant/unnecessary tasks or excessive time. Mine SafetyAppliancesCo.v.AIUIns.Co.,—A.3d—,2014Del.Super.LEXIS475(Del.

Super.Ct.Sept.19,2014).

While the amount of time law firms devoted to the representation of thetrustees of a trust was reasonable, given that the beneficiaries vigorouslycontested numerous aspects of the action, and the amounts charged by thetrustees’attorneysgenerallywerereasonable,thecourtcappedthereimbursablebillingratesforonelawfirmwhenthecourtdeterminedthatthemaximumrateforreasonableattorneys’feeswaslowerthanthatfirmcharged.InreHawkMt.Trust,—A.3d—,2015Del.Ch.LEXIS236(Del.Ch.Sept.8,2015).

Upon granting a mortgagee’s foreclosure and breach of contract claimspursuant to a judgment on the pleadings, the court determined the reasonableamountofattorneys’feestoaward,baseduponconsiderationoftheprofessionalconductfactors,includingthebillingstatementsthatdetailedthehoursworked,thenatureoftherepresentationandtheamountofthejudgment.CRELKEnters.v.MerisProps.,—A.3d—,2016Del.Super.LEXIS180(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.21,2016).

Nursinghome’sattorneywasentitledtoanawardoffeesandcostspursuanttotheadmissionagreementbecause: (1) theattorneypracticed lawformore than40years, includingtherepresentationofnursinghomesforabout20years;(2)theattorney’sdiscountedhourlyrateof$270wasbelowthosefeescustomarilycharged by attorneyswith similar experience; and (3) the attorney obtained afavorableresultforthehome.810SouthBroomSt.Operations,LLCv.Daniel,—A.3d—,2016Del.Super.LEXIS332(Del.Super.Ct.July15,2016).

Trialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninawardingattorneys’feesandcostsintheamountof$10,296 toanursinghomebecause: (1) therewasacontractualbasis for shifting attorneys’ fees; (2) the parties engaged in an unsuccessfulmediation;(3)thenursinghomewasrequiredtoengageinmotionpractice;and(4) therewas a 1-day trial.Miller v.Onix Silverside, LLC,—A.3d—, 2016Del.Super.LEXIS434(Del.Super.Ct.Aug.26,2016).

Although a commercial landlord sought $42,412 in attorneys’ fees, thelandlordwas awarded $20,132 in fees because 32.5 hours billed for post-trialmemorandawasunreasonable;thelandlordwasnotpermittedtobillforanothertrial thathadtobeheldatalaterdatewhen2ofthelandlord’switnesseswereunavailablefortheoriginaltrial.J.M.L.Inc.v.ShoppesofMountPleasant,LLC,—A.3d—,2016Del.Super.LEXIS519(Del.Super.Ct.Oct.14,2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees to amaintenance company in its action against a property owner, arising from the

propertyowner’sallegedfailuretopayannualassessment;theamountawardedwas reasonable. Saunders-Gomez v.RutledgeMaint.Corp.,—A.3d—, 2017Del.Super.LEXIS164(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.3,2017).

Defendant’smotionforattorneys’feeswasgranted,inpart,because:(1)tasksperformedbydefendant’sattorneysweremadenecessarybycounselhavinghadno part in negotiating the asset purchasing agreement; and (2) defendant’sattorneys were required to research and understand a complex corporatetransactionwithlittletonopriorfamiliaritywithwhatoccurred.TheBoeingCo.v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., — A.3d —, 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 630 (Del.Super.Ct.Dec.5,2017).

Whenapartnershipofficialsoughtadvancementoffeesandcosts,wherethepartnershipobjectedthattheofficial’scounsel’sfeesexceededrateschargedbyother law firms, the official was not entitled to summary judgment; adiscrepancy between rates the official’s counsel charged and rates other firmschargedraiseda factquestionon thereasonablenessof thefirm’s fees.Weilv.VereitOperatingP’ship,L.P.,—A.3d—, 2018Del.Ch.LEXIS48 (Del.Ch.Feb.13,2018).

In light of the absence of any novel or complex issues on appeal from adecisionoftheDelawareIndustrialAccidentBoard,arequestforattorneys’feeswasexcessive (failing to justifya contingencymultiplier).McCabev.BaysideRoofing,Inc.,—A.3d—,2018Del.Super.LEXIS76(Del.Super.Ct.Feb.13,2018).

Plaintiff’scounsel’sfeesof$41,110werereasonable,eventhoughplaintiff’scounsel spent 11 more hours working on the case than defendant’s counsel,because: (1) plaintiff’s counsel had to review and respond to defendant’saffirmativedefenses;(2)plaintiffshowedthattheservicesitsattorneysrenderedwerethoughtprudentandappropriateatthetime,inthegoodfaithprofessionaljudgment of counsel; and (3) plaintiff’s counsel successfully secured a$1,000,000award and charged less than5%of that sum todo so.Bellmoffv.IntegraServs.Techs.,—A.3d—,2018Del.Super.LEXIS273(Del.Super.Ct.June22,2018).

—Retainer.

Attorney’s acceptance of a $1,000.00 retainer, without providing the clientwithawrittenexplanationoffees,wasinviolationofsubsection(f)ofthisrule.InreBecker,788A.2d527(Del.2001).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(f) by: (1) failing to provide a


clientwithawrittenstatementthata$1,500advancefeewasrefundable(ifnotearned)andstatingthebasisunderwhichthefeeswouldbeconsideredtohavebeenearned,whetherinwholeorinpart;and(2)byfailingtodeposit,accountfor and retain the $1,500 in a client trust account as fees were earned. In rePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).

Attorney did not violate Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5 where a retainer wasdeposited originally into a trust account and not into an operating account;becausenofeeswereclaimedtohavebeenearnedat the timetheretainerwasdeposited,awrittenstatementofthefeesearnedwasnotrequired.InreSisk,54A.3d257(Del.2012).

Attorney violated various disciplinary rules because the results of an auditshowed the attorney’s failure to adequately maintain books and records, tosafeguard client funds or to indicate in the retainer that unearned fees wererefundable.InreAMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDelaware:FredBar,99A.3d639(Del.2013).

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

FortheviolationofbothRule1.4(b)andsubdivision(e)(1)of thisRule, theappropriatesanctiontobe imposedisapublicreprimand.InreBerl,560A.2d1009(Del.1989).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),8.4(c)and(d)byfailingtoproperlymaintainlawfirm’sbooksandrecordsfor3consecutiveyears,filinginaccuratecertificatesofcompliancefor3consecutiveyears,andfailingtogiveflatfeeclientspropernoticethatthefeewasrefundableif not earned, a public reprimand with a 2-year period of probation wasappropriate; this was true, even considering the mitigating factors, given alawyer’s obligation to maintain orderly books and records. In re Castro, 160A.3d1134(Del.2017).

—Suspension.

Wherealawyerengagedinapatternofknowingmisconductoveraperiodofseveralyearsbycomminglingclientfunds,failingtomaintainthelawyer’slawpractice accounts, failing to pay taxes, falsely representing on certificates ofcompliancethatthelawyercompliedwiththerecord-keepingrequirementsandpaid taxes, the lawyerviolatedDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(f),1.15(a), (b),(d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer was suspended for 3 years. In re







Garrett,835A.2d514(Del.2003).


Therewassubstantialevidencetosupportthefactualfindingsandconclusionsof law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding an attorney’sviolationsofLawProf.ConductR.1.5(f),1.15(a)and(b),and8.4(c),basedonthe attorney’s misappropriation of clients’ fees on various occasions, and theattorney’sfailuretoincludethetypicalrefundprovisionregardingunearnedfeesintheretaineragreementsforotherclients;a1-yearsuspensionwaswarranted.InreVanderslice,55A.3d322(Del.2012).






Rule1.6.Confidentialityofinformation.

(a)A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of aclient unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedlyauthorizedinordertocarryouttherepresentation,orthedisclosureispermittedbyparagraph(b).

(b)Alawyermayrevealinformationrelatingtotherepresentationofaclienttotheextentthelawyerreasonablybelievesnecessary:

(1)topreventreasonablycertaindeathorsubstantialbodilyharm;

(2)topreventtheclientfromcommittingacrimeorfraudthat isreasonablycertain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property ofanotherandinfurtheranceofwhichtheclienthasusedorisusingthelawyer’sservices;

(3)toprevent,mitigate,orrectifysubstantialinjurytothefinancialinterestsorpropertyofanother that is reasonablycertain to resultorhas resultedfromtheclient’s commissionof a crimeor fraud in furtherance ofwhich the client hasusedthelawyer’sservices;

(4)tosecurelegaladviceaboutthelawyer’scompliancewiththeseRules;

(5) to establish a claimor defenseonbehalf of the lawyer in a controversybetweenthelawyerandtheclient,toestablishadefensetoacriminalchargeorcivil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client wasinvolved,ortorespondtoallegationsinanyproceedingconcerningthelawyer’srepresentationoftheclient;or

(6)tocomplywithotherlaworacourtorder;or

(7)todetectandresolveconflictsofinterestarisingfromthelawyer’schangeofemploymentorfromchangesinthecompositionorownershipofafirm,butonly if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-clientprivilegeorotherwiseprejudicetheclient.

(c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent orunauthorizeddisclosureof,orunauthorizedaccessto,informationrelatingtotherepresentationofaclient.(Amended,effectiveMar.1,2013.)

COMMENT

[1]ThisRulegovernsthedisclosurebyalawyerofinformationrelatingtotherepresentation of a client during the lawyer’s representation of the client. SeeRule 1.18 for the lawyer’s duties with respect to information provided to thelawyerbyaprospectiveclient,Rule1.9(c)(2)forthelawyer’sdutynottorevealinformation relating to the lawyer’sprior representationofa formerclient andRules1.8(b)and1.9(c)(1)forthelawyer’sdutieswithrespecttotheuseofsuchinformationtothedisadvantageofclientsandformerclients.

[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in theabsenceoftheclient’sinformedconsent,thelawyermustnotrevealinformationrelating to the representation. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informedconsent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyerrelationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and tocommunicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing orlegallydamagingsubjectmatter.Thelawyerneedsthisinformationtorepresentthe client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain fromwrongfulconduct.Almostwithoutexception,clientscometolawyersinordertodetermine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations,deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know thatalmostallclientsfollowtheadvicegiven,andthelawisupheld.

[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by relatedbodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, thework product doctrine and therule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-clientprivilegeandworkproductdoctrineapply in judicial andotherproceedings inwhich a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produceevidenceconcerningaclient.Theruleofclient-lawyerconfidentialityappliesinsituations other than thosewhere evidence is sought from the lawyer throughcompulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only tomatters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all informationrelating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyermay not disclosesuch informationexceptasauthorizedor requiredby theRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.SeealsoScope.

[4]Paragraph(a)prohibitsalawyerfromrevealinginformationrelatingtotherepresentationofaclient.Thisprohibitionalsoappliestodisclosuresbyalawyerthatdonotinthemselvesrevealprotectedinformationbutcouldreasonablyleadto the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer’s use of ahypotheticaltodiscussissuesrelatingtotherepresentationispermissiblesolongasthereisnoreasonablelikelihoodthatthelistenerwillbeabletoascertainthe

identityoftheclientorthesituationinvolved.

[5]Authorizeddisclosure.—Excepttotheextentthattheclient’sinstructionsorspecialcircumstanceslimitthatauthority,alawyerisimpliedlyauthorizedtomake disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out therepresentation. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedlyauthorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make adisclosurethatfacilitatesasatisfactoryconclusiontoamatter.Lawyersinafirmmay, in the course of the firm’s practice, disclose to each other informationrelating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particularinformationbeconfinedtospecifiedlawyers.

[6]Disclosureadversetoclient.—Althoughthepublicinterestisusuallybestserved by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality ofinformationrelatingtotherepresentationoftheirclients,theconfidentialityruleissubjecttolimitedexceptions.Paragraph(b)(1)recognizestheoverridingvalueof life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary toprevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm isreasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is apresentandsubstantialthreatthatapersonwillsuffersuchharmatalaterdateifthelawyerfails totakeactionnecessarytoeliminatethethreat.Thus,a lawyerwhoknows that a client has accidentally discharged toxicwaste into a town’swatersupplymayreveal this informationto theauthorities if there isapresentand substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer’s disclosure is necessary toeliminatethethreatorreducethenumberofvictims.

[7]Paragraph (b)(2) is a limitedexception to the ruleof confidentiality thatpermits the lawyer to reveal information to the extent necessary to enableaffectedpersonsorappropriateauthoritiestopreventtheclientfromcommittingacrimeorafraud,asdefinedinRule1.0(d),thatisreasonablycertaintoresultin substantial injury to the financial or property interests of another and infurtheranceofwhichtheclienthasusedorisusingthelawyer’sservices.Suchaserious abuse of the client-lawyer relationship by the client forfeits theprotection of this Rule. The client can, of course, prevent such disclosure byrefraining from the wrongful conduct. Although paragraph (b)(2) does notrequirethelawyertorevealtheclient’smisconduct,thelawyermaynotcounselor assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. SeeRule1.2(d).SeealsoRule1.16withrespecttothelawyer’sobligationorrighttowithdrawfromtherepresentationoftheclientinsuchcircumstances.Wherethe

client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplatedconduct will actually be carried out by the organization.Where necessary toguideconductinconnectionwiththisRule,thelawyermaymakeinquirywithintheorganizationasindicatedinRule1.13(b).

[8]Paragraph(b)(3)addressesthesituationinwhichthelawyerdoesnotlearnoftheclient’scrimeorfrauduntilafterithasbeenconsummated.Althoughtheclientno longerhas theoptionofpreventingdisclosureby refraining from thewrongful conduct, there will be situations in which the loss suffered by theaffectedpersoncanbeprevented, rectifiedormitigated. In suchsituations, thelawyer may disclose information relating to the representation to the extentnecessarytoenabletheaffectedpersonstopreventormitigatereasonablycertainlosses or to attempt to recoup their losses. Disclosure is not permitted underparagraph(b)(3)whenapersonwhohascommittedacrimeorfraudthereafteremploys a lawyer for representation concerning that offense if that lawyer’sservices were not used in the initial crime or fraud; disclosure would bepermitted,however,ifthelawyer’sservicesareusedtocommitafurthercrimeor fraud, such as the crime of obstructing justice.While applicable law mayprovide that a completed act is regarded for some purposes as a continuingoffense,ifcommissionoftheinitialacthasalreadyoccurredwithouttheuseofthelawyer’sservices,thelawyerdoesnothavediscretionunderthisparagraphtouseordisclosetheclient’sinformation.

[9] A lawyer’s confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer fromsecuringconfidential legal adviceabout the lawyer’spersonal responsibility tocomply with these Rules. Inmost situations, disclosing information to securesuch advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out therepresentation.Evenwhenthedisclosureisnotimpliedlyauthorized,paragraph(b)(2) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer’scompliancewiththeRulesofProfessionalConduct.

[10] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of thelawyer in a client’s conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involvingrepresentation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyerreasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true withrespect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client.Suchachargecanariseinacivil,criminal,disciplinaryorotherproceedingandcanbebasedonawrongallegedlycommittedbythelawyeragainsttheclientoron awrong allegedby a thirdperson, for example, a person claiming to havebeendefraudedby the lawyer and client acting together.The lawyer’s right to

respondariseswhenanassertionofsuchcomplicityhasbeenmade.Paragraph(b)(5)doesnot require the lawyer toawait thecommencementofanactionorproceedingthatchargessuchcomplicity,sothatthedefensemaybeestablishedbyrespondingdirectlytoathirdpartywhohasmadesuchanassertion.Therighttodefendalsoapplies,ofcourse,whereaproceedinghasbeencommenced.

[11]A lawyerentitled toa fee ispermittedbyparagraph(b)(5) toprove theservicesrenderedinanactiontocollectit.Thisaspectoftheruleexpressestheprinciplethatthebeneficiaryofafiduciaryrelationshipmaynotexploitittothedetrimentofthefiduciary.

[12]Otherlawmayrequirethatalawyerdiscloseinformationaboutaclient.WhethersuchalawsupersedesRule1.6isaquestionoflawbeyondthescopeofthese rules. When disclosure of information relating to the representationappearstoberequiredbyotherlaw,thelawyermustdiscussthematterwiththeclient to theextent requiredbyRule1.4. If,however, theother lawsupersedesthisRuleand requiresdisclosure,paragraph (b)(6)permits the lawyer tomakesuch disclosures as are necessary to complywith the law. See, e.g., 29 DEL.CODEANN.§9007A(c)(whichprovidesthatanattorneyactingasguardianadlitem for a child in child welfare proceedings shall have the “duty ofconfidentiality to the child unless the disclosure is necessary to protect thechild’sbestinterests”).

[13]Paragraph(b)(6)alsopermitscompliancewithacourtorderrequiringalawyertodiscloseinformationrelatingtoaclient’srepresentation.Ifalawyeriscalledasawitnesstogivetestimonyconcerningaclientorisotherwiseorderedtorevealinformationrelatingtotheclient’srepresentation,however,thelawyermust,absentinformedconsentoftheclienttodootherwise,assertonbehalfoftheclientallnonfrivolousclaimsthattheinformationsoughtisprotectedagainstdisclosurebytheattorney-clientprivilegeorotherapplicablelaw.Intheeventofanadverseruling,thelawyermustconsultwiththeclientaboutthepossibilityofappeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however,paragraph(b)(6)permitsthelawyertocomplywiththecourt’sorder.

[14]Paragraph(b)(7) recognizes that lawyers indifferent firmsmayneed todisclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts ofinterest,suchaswhenalawyerisconsideringanassociationwithanotherfirm,two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering thepurchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment [7]. Under thesecircumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limitedinformation, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/29%20DEL.%20CODE%20ANN.%209007A

relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include nomore than the identityof thepersons and entities involved in amatter, a briefsummary of the general issues involved, and information about whether thematter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should bedisclosedonlytotheextentreasonablynecessarytodetectandresolveconflictsof interest that might arise from the possible new relationship.Moreover, thedisclosureofanyinformationisprohibitedifitwouldcompromisetheattorney-clientprivilegeorotherwiseprejudice theclient (e.g., the fact that acorporateclient is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publiclyannounced;thatapersonhasconsultedalawyeraboutthepossibilityofdivorcebeforetheperson’sintentionsareknowntotheperson’sspouse;orthatapersonhasconsultedalawyeraboutacriminalinvestigationthathasnotledtoapubliccharge).Underthosecircumstances,paragraph(a)prohibitsdisclosureunlesstheclientorformerclientgivesinformedconsent.Alawyer’sfiduciarydutytothelawyer’sfirmmayalsogovernalawyer’sconductwhenexploringanassociationwithanotherfirmandisbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.

[15]Anyinformationdisclosedpursuant toparagraph(b)(7)maybeusedorfurtherdisclosedonly to theextentnecessary todetectandresolveconflictsofinterest. Paragraph (b)(7) does not restrict the use of information acquired bymeansindependentofanydisclosurepursuanttoparagraph(b)(7).Paragraph(b)(7)alsodoesnotaffectthedisclosureofinformationwithinalawfirmwhenthedisclosureisotherwiseauthorized,seeComment[5],suchaswhenalawyerinafirm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect andresolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking anewrepresentation.

[16]Paragraph(b)permitsdisclosureonlytotheextentthelawyerreasonablybelievesthedisclosureisnecessarytoaccomplishoneofthepurposesspecified.Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to takesuitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosureadverse to theclient’s interestshouldbenogreater than the lawyer reasonablybelievesnecessarytoaccomplishthepurpose.Ifthedisclosurewillbemadeinconnection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in amanner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other personshavinganeedtoknowitandappropriateprotectiveordersorotherarrangementsshouldbesoughtbythelawyertothefullestextentpracticable.

[17]Paragraph(b)permitsbutdoesnotrequirethedisclosureofinformationrelating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified in

paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). In exercising thediscretion conferredby thisRule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer’srelationshipwith theclientandwith thosewhomightbe injuredby theclient,thelawyer’sowninvolvementinthetransactionandfactorsthatmayextenuatethe conduct in question. A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted byparagraph(b)doesnotviolate thisRule.Disclosuremayberequired,however,byotherRules.SomeRulesrequiredisclosureonlyifsuchdisclosurewouldbepermittedbyparagraph(b).SeeRules1.2(d),4.1(b),8.1and8.3.Rule3.3,ontheotherhand,requiresdisclosureinsomecircumstancesregardlessofwhethersuchdisclosureispermittedbythisRule.SeeRule3.3(c).

[18]Actingcompetentlytopreserveconfidentiality.—Paragraph(c)requiresa lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating to therepresentationofaclientagainstunauthorizedaccessbythirdpartiesandagainstinadvertentorunauthorizeddisclosureby the lawyerorotherpersonswhoareparticipatingintherepresentationoftheclientorwhoaresubjecttothelawyer’ssupervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. The unauthorized access to, or theinadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to therepresentationofaclientdoesnotconstituteaviolationofparagraph(c) if thelawyerhasmadereasonableeffortstopreventtheaccessordisclosure.Factorstobeconsideredindeterminingthereasonablenessofthelawyer’seffortsinclude,but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood ofdisclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employingadditional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and theextenttowhichthesafeguardsadverselyaffectthelawyer’sabilitytorepresentclients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessivelydifficult touse).Aclientmayrequire the lawyer to implementspecialsecuritymeasures not required by this Rule or it may give informed consent to forgosecurity measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule. Whether alawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’sinformationinordertocomplywithotherlaw,suchasstateandfederallawsthatgoverndataprivacyorthatimposenotificationrequirementsuponthelossof,orunauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of theseRules.Foralawyer’sdutieswhensharinginformationwithnonlawyersoutsidethelawyer’sownfirm,seeRule5.3,Comments[3]-[4].

[19]Whentransmittingacommunicationthatincludesinformationrelatingtothe representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions toprevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security

measures if themethod of communication affords a reasonable expectation ofprivacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions.Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’sexpectationofconfidentiality include thesensitivityof the informationand theextent towhich theprivacyof the communication is protectedby laworby aconfidentialityagreement.AclientmayrequirethelawyertoimplementspecialsecuritymeasuresnotrequiredbythisRuleormaygiveinformedconsenttotheuse of ameans of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by thisRule.Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order tocomplywithotherlaw,suchasstateandfederallawsthatgoverndataprivacy,isbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.

[20]Formerclient.—Thedutyofconfidentialitycontinuesafter theclient-lawyerrelationshiphasterminated.SeeRule1.9(c)(2).SeeRule1.9(c)(1)fortheprohibition against using such information to the disadvantage of the formerclient.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Confidentiality.

Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s clientchargedwithmurderandrelatedoffenses,aftertheattorneyretrieveditfromthecodefendant’s file, violated the codefendant’s attorney-client privilege; thedisclosureconstitutedaviolationoftheprofessionalconductrulesrelatingtotheconfidentiality of information and conduct that was prejudicial to theadministrationofjustice.InreLyle,74A.3d654(Del.2013).

Although theplaintiff’scounsel shouldnothavegiven theplaintiffa juror’sphone number after trial, sanctions were not imposed on counsel because noconvincing evidence showed that counsel suggested that plaintiff contact thejuror; plaintiff was not sanctioned because no authority barred plaintiff fromcontacting the juror. Baird v. Owczarek, 2013 Del. Super. LEXIS 377 (Del.Super.Ct.Aug.29,2013).

Therewasnobonafideconditionforthecourt’srecusallimitedtotheissueofcounsel’s withdrawal, because counsel could strictly limit disclosures to thecourt to preserve the client’s confidentiality pursuant to counsel’s professionalconduct obligations. State v. Pardo,—A.3d—, 2015Del. Super.LEXIS 548



(Del.Super.Ct.Oct.27,2015).

Conflictsofinterest.

Because the defendant did not object to a law firm’s representation of theplaintiff during the negotiations of amerger agreement, and failed to point toinformation or confidences obtained by the firm in its prior work for thedefendantthatwouldhaveamaterialinfluenceontheproceedings,therewasnobasistodisqualifythefirm.Rohm&HaasCo.v.DowChem.Co.,2009Del.Ch.LEXIS249(Del.Ch.Feb.12,2009).



Rule1.7.Conflictofinterest:Currentclients.

(a)Exceptasprovidedinparagraph(b),alawyershallnotrepresentaclientifthe representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrentconflictofinterestexistsif:

(1)therepresentationofoneclientwillbedirectlyadversetoanotherclient;or

(2)thereisasignificantriskthattherepresentationofoneormoreclientswillbemateriallylimitedbythelawyer’sresponsibilitiestoanotherclient,aformerclientorathirdpersonorbyapersonalinterestofthelawyer.

(b)Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest underparagraph(a),alawyermayrepresentaclientif:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to providecompetentanddiligentrepresentationtoeachaffectedclient;

(2)therepresentationisnotprohibitedbylaw;

(3)therepresentationdoesnot involvetheassertionofaclaimbyoneclientagainst anotherclient representedby the lawyer in the same litigationorotherproceedingbeforeatribunal;and

(4)eachaffectedclientgivesinformedconsent,confirmedinwriting.

COMMENT

[1]General Principles.— Loyalty and independent judgment are essentialelementsinthelawyer’srelationshiptoaclient.Concurrentconflictsofinterestcanarisefromthelawyer’sresponsibilitiestoanotherclient,aformerclientorathird person or from the lawyer’s own interests. For specific Rules regardingcertainconcurrentconflictsofinterest,seeRule1.8.Forformerclientconflictsof interest, seeRule1.9.Forconflictsof interest involvingprospectiveclients,seeRule1.18.Fordefinitionsof“informedconsent”and“confirmedinwriting,”seeRule1.0(e)and(b).

[2]Resolutionof a conflict of interest problemunder thisRule requires thelawyerto:1)clearlyidentifytheclientorclients;2)determinewhetheraconflictof interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertakendespitetheexistenceofaconflict, i.e.,whethertheconflict isconsentable;and

4) if so, consultwith the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain theirinformedconsent,confirmedinwriting.Theclientsaffectedunderparagraph(a)includebothof theclients referred to inparagraph (a)(1) and theoneormoreclientswhoserepresentationmightbemateriallylimitedunderparagraph(a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, inwhichevent the representationmustbedeclined,unless the lawyerobtains theinformed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). Todeterminewhetheraconflictofinterestexists,alawyershouldadoptreasonableprocedures,appropriateforthesizeandtypeoffirmandpractice,todetermineinbothlitigationandnon-litigationmattersthepersonsandissuesinvolved.Seealso Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute suchprocedureswill not excuse a lawyer’s violation of this Rule.As towhether aclient-lawyerrelationshipexistsor,havingoncebeenestablished,iscontinuing,seeCommenttoRule1.3andScope.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyerordinarilymustwithdrawfromtherepresentation,unlessthelawyerhasobtainedthe informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). SeeRule 1.16.Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer maycontinuetorepresentanyoftheclientsisdeterminedbothbythelawyer’sabilitytocomplywithdutiesowed to the formerclientandby the lawyer’sability torepresentadequatelytheremainingclientorclients,giventhelawyer’sdutiestotheformerclient.SeeRule1.9.Seealsocomments[5]and[29].

[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and otherorganizationalaffiliationsor theadditionorrealignmentofparties inlitigation,mightcreateconflictsinthemidstofarepresentation,aswhenacompanysuedbythelawyeronbehalfofoneclientisboughtbyanotherclientrepresentedbythe lawyer inanunrelatedmatter.Dependingon thecircumstances, the lawyermay have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order toavoid the conflict. The lawyermust seek court approvalwhere necessary andtake steps to minimize harm to the clients. See rule 1.16. The lawyer mustcontinue toprotect theconfidencesof theclient fromwhoserepresentation thelawyerhaswithdrawn.SeeRule1.9(c).

[6]Identifyingconflictsof interest:Directlyadverse.—Loyalty toacurrentclientprohibitsundertakingrepresentationdirectlyadversetothatclientwithoutthatclient’sinformedconsent.Thus,absentconsent,alawyermaynotactasanadvocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some othermatter,evenwhenthemattersarewhollyunrelated.Theclientas towhomthe

representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resultingdamagetotheclient-lawyerrelationshipislikelytoimpairthelawyer’sabilitytorepresent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf theadverse representation is undertaken reasonablymay fear that the lawyerwillpursuethatclient’scaselesseffectivelyoutofdeferencetotheotherclient,i.e.,that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer’s interest inretainingthecurrentclient.Similarly,adirectlyadverseconflictmayarisewhena lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in alawsuitinvolvinganotherclient,aswhenthetestimonywillbedamagingtotheclient who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneousrepresentation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are onlyeconomicallyadverse,suchasrepresentationofcompetingeconomicenterprisesin unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest andthusmaynotrequireconsentoftherespectiveclients.

[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. Forexample,ifalawyerisaskedtorepresentthesellerofabusinessinnegotiationswith a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but inanother, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representationwithouttheinformedconsentofeachclient.

[8]IdentifyingConflictsofInterest:MaterialLimitation.—Evenwherethereisnodirectadverseness,aconflictofinterestexistsifthereisasignificantriskthatalawyer’sabilitytoconsider,recommendorcarryoutanappropriatecourseofactionfortheclientwillbemateriallylimitedasaresultofthelawyer’sotherresponsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent severalindividuals seeking to forma jointventure is likely tobematerially limited inthe lawyer’s ability to recommendor advocate all possible positions that eachmighttakebecauseofthelawyer’sdutyofloyaltytotheothers.Theconflictineffectforeclosesalternativesthatwouldotherwisebeavailabletotheclient.Themere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure andconsent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interestswill eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with thelawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives orforeclosecoursesof action that reasonably shouldbepursuedonbehalfof theclient.

[9]Lawyer’sResponsibilitiestoFormerClientsandOtherThirdPersons.—Inadditiontoconflictswithothercurrentclients,alawyer’sdutiesofloyaltyandindependence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients

under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer’s responsibilities to other persons, such asfiduciary duties arising from a lawyer’s service as a trustee, executor orcorporatedirector.

[10]PersonalInterestConflicts.—Thelawyer’sowninterestsshouldnotbepermittedtohaveanadverseeffectonrepresentationofaclient.Forexample,iftheprobityofalawyer’sownconductinatransactionisinseriousquestion,itmaybedifficultor impossible for the lawyer togivea clientdetachedadvice.Similarly,whenalawyerhasdiscussionsconcerningpossibleemploymentwithanopponentofthelawyer’sclient,orwithalawfirmrepresentingtheopponent,such discussions could materially limit the lawyer’s representation of theclient.In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affectrepresentation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which thelawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rulespertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including businesstransactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10(personal interest conflicts underRule1.7ordinarilyarenotimputedtootherlawyersinalawfirm).

[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or insubstantiallyrelatedmattersarecloselyrelatedbybloodormarriage,theremaybeasignificantriskthatclientconfidenceswillberevealedandthatthelawyer’sfamilyrelationshipwillinterferewithbothloyaltyandindependentprofessionaljudgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence andimplicationsoftherelationshipbetweenthelawyersbeforethelawyeragreestoundertake the representation.Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., asparent,child,siblingorspouse,ordinarilymaynotrepresentaclientinamatterwhere that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client givesinformedconsent.Thedisqualificationarisingfromaclosefamilyrelationshipispersonal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom thelawyersareassociated.SeeRule1.10.

[12]Alawyerisprohibitedfromengaginginsexualrelationshipswithaclientunless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyerrelationship.SeeRule1.8(j).

[13] Interest ofPersonPaying foraLawyer’sService.—A lawyermaybepaid from a source other than the client, including a coclient, if the client isinformedofthatfactandconsentsandthearrangementdoesnotcompromisethelawyer’sdutyofloyaltyorindependentjudgmenttotheclient.SeeRule1.8(f).If acceptanceof thepayment fromanyother sourcepresents a significant riskthat the lawyer’s representation of the clientwill bematerially limited by the

lawyer’sown interest inaccommodating thepersonpaying the lawyer’s feeorbythelawyer’sresponsibilitiestoapayerwhoisalsoaco-client,thenthelawyermust comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting therepresentation,includingdeterminingwhethertheconflictisconsentableand,ifso, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of therepresentation.

[14] Prohibited Representations. — Ordinarily, clients may consent torepresentationnotwithstandingaconflict.However,asindicatedinparagraph(b)some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannotproperly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of theclient’s consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, thequestionofconsentabilitymustberesolvedastoeachclient.

[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether theinterestsoftheclientswillbeadequatelyprotectediftheclientsarepermittedtogivetheirinformedconsenttorepresentationburdenedbyaconflictofinterest.Thus,underparagraph(b)(1),representationisprohibitedifinthecircumstancesthe lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyerwill be able to providecompetentanddiligentrepresentation.SeeRule1.1(competence)andRule1.3(diligence).

[16]Paragraph(b)(2)describesconflictsthatarenonconsentablebecausetherepresentation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some statessubstantivelawprovidesthatthesamelawyermaynotrepresentmorethanonedefendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and underfederalcriminalstatutescertainrepresentationsbyaformergovernmentlawyerare prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition,decisionallawinsomestateslimitstheabilityofagovernmentalclient,suchasamunicipality,toconsenttoaconflictofinterest.

[17]Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that arenonconsentablebecauseoftheinstitutionalinterestinvigorousdevelopmentofeachclient’spositionwhentheclientsarealigneddirectlyagainsteachotherinthesamelitigationorotherproceedingbefore a tribunal.Whether clients are aligneddirectly against eachotherwithinthemeaningof thisparagraphrequiresexaminationof thecontextoftheproceeding.Althoughthisparagraphdoesnotprecludealawyer’smultiplerepresentation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not aproceeding before a “tribunal” under rule 1.0(m)), such representationmaybeprecludedbyparagraph(b)(1).

[18]InformedConsent.—Informedconsentrequiresthateachaffectedclientbe aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonablyforeseeablewaysthattheconflictcouldhaveadverseeffectsontheinterestsofthat client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information requireddependsonthenatureoftheconflictandthenatureoftherisksinvolved.Whenrepresentation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, theinformation must include the implications of the common representation,including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-clientprivilege and the advantages and risks involved. SeeComments [30] and [31](effectofcommonrepresentationonconfidentiality).

[19]Undersomecircumstancesitmaybeimpossible tomakethedisclosurenecessarytoobtainconsent.Forexample,whenthelawyerrepresentsdifferentclients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to thedisclosurenecessarytopermittheotherclienttomakeaninformeddecision,thelawyercannotproperlyaskthelattertoconsent.Insomecasesthealternativetocommon representation can be that each party may have to obtain separaterepresentation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs,alongwiththebenefitsofsecuringseparaterepresentation,arefactorsthatmaybe considered by the affected client in determining whether commonrepresentationisintheclient’sinterests.

[20]ConsentConfirmed inWriting.—Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer toobtain the informedconsentof theclient,confirmedinwriting.Suchawritingmay consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyerpromptlyrecordsandtransmitstotheclientfollowinganoralconsent.SeeRule1.0(b).SeealsoRule1.0(n)(writingincludeselectronictransmission).Ifitisnotfeasible to obtain or transmit thewriting at the time the client gives informedconsent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable timethereafter.SeeRule1.0(b).Therequirementofawritingdoesnotsupplant theneedinmostcasesforthelawyertotalkwiththeclient,toexplaintherisksandadvantages,ifany,ofrepresentationburdenedwithaconflictofinterest,aswellas reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonableopportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions andconcerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients theseriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoiddisputesorambiguitiesthatmightlateroccurintheabsenceofawriting.

[21]RevokingConsent.—Aclientwhohasgivenconsent toaconflictmayrevoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer’s

representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client’s ownrepresentation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clientsdependsonthecircumstances, includingthenatureof theconflict,whether theclient revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, thereasonableexpectationsoftheotherclientandwhethermaterialdetrimenttotheotherclientsorthelawyerwouldresult.

[22]ConsenttoFutureConflict.—Whetheralawyermayproperlyrequestaclient towaive conflicts thatmight arise in the future is subject to the test ofparagraph(b).Theeffectivenessofsuchwaiversisgenerallydeterminedbytheextent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that thewaiverentails.Themorecomprehensive theexplanationof the typesof futurerepresentations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeableadverseconsequencesofthoserepresentations,thegreaterthelikelihoodthattheclientwillhavetherequisiteunderstanding.Thus,iftheclientagreestoconsenttoaparticulartypeofconflictwithwhichtheclientisalreadyfamiliar,thentheconsent ordinarilywill be effectivewith regard to that type of conflict. If theconsent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will beineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will haveunderstood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is anexperienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informedregarding the risk that a conflictmay arise, such consent ismore likely to beeffective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by othercounselingivingconsentandtheconsentislimitedtofutureconflictsunrelatedto the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot beeffective if the circumstances thatmaterialize in the future are such aswouldmaketheconflictnonconsentableunderparagraph(b).

[23]Conflicts in Litigation.— Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation ofopposingpartiesinthesamelitigation,regardlessoftheclients’consent.Ontheother hand, simultaneous representation of partieswhose interests in litigationmayconflict,suchascoplaintiffsorcodefendants,isgovernedbyparagraph(a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties’testimony,incompatibilityinpositionsinrelationtoanopposingpartyorthefactthat there are substantiallydifferentpossibilitiesof settlementof the claimsorliabilitiesinquestion.Suchconflictscanariseincriminalcasesaswellascivil.The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in acriminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to representmore than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation ofpersonshavingsimilarinterestsincivillitigationisproperiftherequirementsof

paragraph(b)aremet.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in differenttribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact thatadvocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedentadverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelatedmatterdoesnotcreateaconflictofinterest.Aconflictofinterestexists,however,if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s action on behalf of one clientwillmaterially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in representing another client in adifferent case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create aprecedent likely to seriouslyweaken the position taken on behalf of the otherclient.Factorsrelevantindeterminingwhethertheclientsneedtobeadvisedoftheriskinclude:wherethecasesarepending,whethertheissueissubstantiveorprocedural,thetemporalrelationshipbetweenthematters,thesignificanceoftheissue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and theclients’reasonableexpectationsinretainingthelawyer.Ifthereissignificantriskofmaterial limitation, thenabsent informedconsentof theaffectedclients, thelawyer must refuse one of there presentations or withdraw from one or bothmatters.

[25]When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs ordefendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class areordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applyingparagraph(a)(1)ofthisrule.Thus,thelawyerdoesnottypicallyneedtogettheconsent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in anunrelatedmatter.Similarly,alawyerseekingtorepresentanopponentinaclassactiondoesnot typicallyneed theconsentofanunnamedmemberof theclasswhomthelawyerrepresentsinanunrelatedmatter.

[26]NonlitigationConflicts.—Conflictsof interestunderparagraphs (a)(1)and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directlyadverseconflictsintransactionalmatters,seeComment[7].Relevantfactorsindeterminingwhetherthereissignificantpotentialformateriallimitationincludethedurationand intimacyof the lawyer’srelationshipwith theclientorclientsinvolved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood thatdisagreementswillariseandthelikelyprejudicetotheclientfromtheconflict.Thequestionisoftenoneofproximityanddegree.SeeComment[8].

[27]For example, conflict questionsmayarise in estateplanning and estateadministration.Alawyermaybecalledupontopreparewillsforseveralfamilymembers,suchashusbandandwife,and,dependinguponthecircumstances,a

conflict of interestmay be present. In estate administration the identity of theclientmaybeunclearunderthelawofaparticularjurisdiction.Underoneview,the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust,includingitsbeneficiaries.Inordertocomplywithconflictofinterestrules,thelawyershouldmakeclearthelawyer’srelationshiptothepartiesinvolved.

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. Forexample, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whoseinterests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but commonrepresentation ispermissiblewhere theclients aregenerallyaligned in interesteven though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyermayseektoestablishoradjustarelationshipbetweenclientsonanamicableandmutuallyadvantageousbasis; forexample, inhelping toorganizeabusiness inwhich two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financialreorganizationofanenterpriseinwhichtwoormoreclientshaveaninterestorarrangingapropertydistributioninsettlementofanestate.Thelawyerseekstoresolvepotentiallyadverseinterestsbydevelopingtheparties’mutualinterests.Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with thepossibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Giventheseandotherrelevantfactors,theclientsmaypreferthatthelawyeractforallofthem.

[29] Special Considerations in Common Representation. — In consideringwhether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should bemindful that if thecommonrepresentationfailsbecausethepotentiallyadverseinterestscannotbereconciled, theresultcanbeadditionalcost,embarrassmentand recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw fromrepresenting all of the clients if the common representation fails. In somesituations, the risk of failure is so great thatmultiple representation is plainlyimpossible.Forexample,a lawyercannotundertakecommonrepresentationofclientswherecontentious litigationornegotiationsbetweenthemare imminentor contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartialbetween commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients isimproperwhenitisunlikelythatimpartialitycanbemaintained.Generally,iftherelationshipbetweenthepartieshasalreadyassumedantagonism,thepossibilitythattheclients’interestscanbeadequatelyservedbycommonrepresentationisnot very good.Other relevant factors arewhether the lawyer subsequentlywillrepresentbothpartiesonacontinuingbasisandwhether the situation involvescreatingorterminatingarelationshipbetweentheparties.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness ofcommon representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and theattorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, theprevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilegedoesnotattach.Hence,itmustbeassumedthatiflitigationeventuatesbetweenthe clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and theclientsshouldbesoadvised.

[31]Astothedutyofconfidentiality,continuedcommonrepresentationwillalmostcertainlybeinadequateifoneclientasksthelawyernottodisclosetotheother client information relevant to the common representation. This is sobecause the lawyerhasanequaldutyof loyalty toeachclient,andeachclienthastherighttobeinformedofanythingbearingontherepresentationthatmightaffect thatclient’s interestsandtheright toexpect that thelawyerwillusethatinformation to that client’s benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at theoutsetofthecommonrepresentationandaspartoftheprocessofobtainingeachclient’sinformedconsent,adviseeachclientthatinformationwillbesharedandthat the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some mattermaterial to the representation should be kept from the other. In limitedcircumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with therepresentationwhentheclientshaveagreed,afterbeingproperlyinformed,thatthe lawyerwillkeepcertain informationconfidential.Forexample, the lawyermay reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client’s trade secrets toanotherclientwillnotadverselyaffect representation involvinga jointventurebetween the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with theinformedconsentofbothclients.

[32]When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, thelawyer should make clear that the lawyer’s role is not that of partisanshipnormally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may berequiredtoassumegreaterresponsibilityfordecisionsthanwheneachclientisseparatelyrepresented.Anylimitationsonthescopeoftherepresentationmadenecessaryasaresultofthecommonrepresentationshouldbefullyexplainedtotheclientsattheoutsetoftherepresentation.SeeRule1.2(c).

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the commonrepresentation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and theprotectionofRule1.9concerning theobligations toaformerclient.TheclientalsohastherighttodischargethelawyerasstatedinRule1.16.

[34]Organizational Clients. — A lawyer who represents a corporation or

other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarilyrepresent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent orsubsidiary.SeeRule1.13(a).Thus,thelawyerforanorganizationisnotbarredfrom accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter,unless thecircumstancesaresuch that theaffiliateshouldalsobeconsideredaclient of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and theorganizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to theclient’saffiliates,orthelawyer’sobligationstoeithertheorganizationalclientorthe new client are likely to limitmaterially the lawyer’s representation of theotherclient.

[35]Alawyerforacorporationorotherorganizationwhoisalsoamemberofits board of directors should determinewhether the responsibilities of the tworolesmay conflict. The lawyermay be called on to advise the corporation inmattersinvolvingactionsofthedirectors.Considerationshouldbegiventothefrequencywith which such situationsmay arise, the potential intensity of theconflict,theeffectofthelawyer’sresignationfromtheboardandthepossibilityof the corporation’s obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in suchsituations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise thelawyer’sindependenceofprofessionaljudgment,thelawyershouldnotserveasadirector or should cease to act as the corporation’s lawyerwhen conflicts ofinterestarise.Thelawyershouldadvisetheothermembersoftheboardthatinsome circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer ispresentinthecapacityofdirectormightnotbeprotectedbytheattorney-clientprivilegeand thatconflictof interestconsiderationsmight require the lawyer’srecusalasadirectorormightrequirethelawyerandthelawyer’sfirmtodeclinerepresentationofthecorporationinamatter.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Civilliability.

Clientrelations.

—Classactions.


—Disqualification.

—Jointrepresentation.

Enforcement.

Sanctions.

—Determiningfactors.

Civilliability.

Client’sclaimthatalawyerandlawfirmactedincontraventionoftheclient’sbest interestbymaintaining representation (notwithstandinganallegedconflictof interest)was not actionable because the client’s “conflict of interest” claimwaspredicatedonthisrule;aviolationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductdidnotprovidethebasisforcivilliability,howevertheviolationcouldbeutilizedasevidenceintheclient’snegligenceclaim.Dickersonv.Murray,—A.3d—,2015Del.Super.LEXIS49(Del.Super.Ct.Feb.3,2015).

Clientrelations.

—Classactions.

Counselrepresentingashareholderclassinaderivativesuitwasnotsubjecttobeingdisqualifiedforadvocatingtheadoptionofasettlementproposaltowhichsomemembers of the class objected. In re M&FWorldwide Corp. S’holdersLitig.,799A.2d1164(Del.Ch.2002).

Assuming that there was a contract by which a law firm engaged arepresentative plaintiff to perform legal work in class action litigation, anypurportedcontractwouldhavebeenvoidandunenforceableasitwasunethicalandinviolationoftheprinciplesgoverningrepresentativeactionsinDelaware;inparticular,theagreementwouldhaveviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.7(a)astherewas an inherent conflict of interest in the representative plaintiff servingboth as the class representative and as an attorney for the class. Fuqua Indus.S’holderLitig.v.Abrams(InreFuquaIndus.),2006Del.Ch.LEXIS167(Del.Ch.Sept.7,2006).

Appellant class representative’s alleged contract to share fees with classcounselwasunenforceableunderEmeraldPartnersv.Berlin,564A.2d670(Del.Ch. 1989), because appellant succeeded appellant’s wife as the representativeplaintiffintheclassactionsuitanddidnotobtainconsentofallclassmembersto waive the conflict of interest under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7. Abrams v.Sachnoff&Weaver,Ltd.,922A.2d414(Del.2007).






Duty involved in this rule is one of loyalty to client. Nemours Found. v.Gilbane,Aetna,Fed.Ins.Co.,632F.Supp.418(D.Del.1986).

This rule applies to both simultaneous representation of two clients, orsuccessive representation, where the attorney-client relationship has beenformally terminated.NemoursFound. v.Gilbane,Aetna, Fed. Ins.Co., 632F.Supp.418(D.Del.1986).

The threshold question in determining the applicability of subsection (a) iswhether an attorney-client relationship existed. Kabi Pharmacia AB v. AlconSurgical,Inc.,803F.Supp.957(D.Del.1992).

InamatterbeforetheIndustrialAccidentBoard,attorneyviolatedsubsection(b)byrepresentingaclientinaparticularmotionwhentheclient’spositiononthematterwas directly adverse to the attorney’s interests. In reMaguire, 725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Positionalconflictofinterestrequiredgrantingofdefenseattorney’smotiontowithdraw, and appointment of new appellate counsel, where the attorney’srepresentationofanotherclientfacingthedeathpenaltyrequiredthatattorneytotake a contrary position before the Supreme Court of Delaware. Williams v.State,805A.2d880(Del.2002).

Defensecounsel’snomination,bythemurdervictim’saunt,forthepositionofa familycourtcommissionerduring theguiltphaseofdefendant’s trialdidnotviolatedefendant’srighttoeffectiveassistanceofcounselfreefromconflictsofinterest or divided loyalties, as the trial court properly determined that theattorney did not have a conflict of interest, under the former version ofsubsection(b)ofthisrule.Swanv.State,820A.2d342(Del.2003),cert.denied,540U.S.896,124S.Ct.252,157L.Ed.2d174(2003).

Plaintiffs,twodirectorsofafamilycorporationandthecorporation,failedtoprove third director’s use of long-time corporation and family attorneys todefendagainstthatdirector’sremovalbyshareholdersinadeclaratoryjudgmentaction threatened to undermine fairness and integrity of proceeding or violateDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.7,1.9,1.13(e),and1.16(b)(1).Unanuev.Unanue,2004Del.Ch.LEXIS37(Del.Ch.Mar.25,2004).

Inmate’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, as: (1) the inmateofferednoevidence thatcounselhadaconflictof interestunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct 1.7(a)(2); (2) there was no evidence of counsel’s innappropriate

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familiaritywith thevictims; (3) the inmate’spleacolloquy stated that thepleawas entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; (4) there was nosignificant risk that counsel’s relationshipwith the victimsmaterially affectedcounsel’srepresentationoftheinmate;and(5)theinmatewasnotprejudicedbyreceiving theminimummandatorysentence.Statev.Mobley,2007Del.Super.LEXIS326(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.2,2007).

TherewasnoevidencethatanattorneybreachedthedutyunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.7-1.9toaninsolvententitybyobtaininganyconfidentialinformationduringtheattorney’srepresentationoftheentitythatwouldhavebeenrelevanttotheaudiobusinessofaformerdirectorandofficeroftheinsolvententity;theattorneywasthusfreetoactinanindividualcapacityastheattorneysawfitwithrespecttotheformerdirector’sofferofapartnershipintheaudiobusiness.Gen.VideoCorp.v.Kertesz,2008Del.Ch.LEXIS181(Del.Ch.Dec.17,2008).

Because the defendant did not object to a law firm’s representation of theplaintiff during the negotiations of amerger agreement, and failed to point toinformation or confidences obtained by the firm in its prior work for thedefendantthatwouldhaveamaterialinfluenceontheproceedings,therewasnobasistodisqualifythefirm.Rohm&HaasCo.v.DowChem.Co.,2009Del.Ch.LEXIS249(Del.Ch.Feb.12,2009).

Denialofaninmate’spostconvictionreliefmotionwasproperastherewasnoperseethicalbar,andnoactualconflictunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.7(a)(2),todefensecounselrepresentinganinmatewherethatcounselwasmarriedtotheinmate’sformerattorneyinanunrelatedmatter.Runyonv.State,968A.2d492(Del.2009).


Attorneywassuspendedfor3months,followedby18monthsofconditionalprobation, for having violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.7(a), 1.15(a),1.16(d)by:(1)havingaconflictofinterestwith2clients;(2)havingapersonalinterestinaloantransaction;(3)failingtosafeguardclientfunds;and(4)failingtoprovideanewclientwithafeeagreement.InreO’Brien,26A.3d203(Del.







2011).

AlthoughanattorneywhorepresentedtheStatewasmarriedtothehomicideunit chief at the public defender’s office, there was no concurrent conflict ofinterest because: (1) the unit chief was not personally involved; and (2) thefamilialrelationshipwasnotimputedtoothermembersofthepublicdefender’soffice.Statev.Swanson,—A.3d—,2015Del.Super.LEXIS508(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.29,2015).

Therewas no basis to disqualify a former paramour’s attorney in a supportaction, because although the attorney was employed in a law firm alsoemployinganattorneycurrentlydatingtheformerparamour:(1)therewasnoasignificant risk of material limitation to the representation; (2) there was noconflict of interest; and (3) the attorney’s testimony about attorneys’ feeswaswithinanexceptionundertheprofessionalconductrules.Barkv.May,—A.3d—,2015Del.Super.LEXIS530(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.28,2015).


In determiningwhether to disqualify an attorney under this Rule, the courtshouldbalancethepurposestobeservedbytheRuleagainstsuchcountervailinginterests as a litigant’s right to retain counsel of his choice. In re ML-LeeAcquisitionFundII,848F.Supp.527(D.Del.1994).

In a custody modification proceeding between parents of a minor child, afather’s request to disqualify the mother’s counsel due to counsel’s priorrepresentation of the father’s mother was denied, as there was no conflict ofinterest under Law.R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a) and LawR. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a)where counsel had previously represented the father’s mother in estate anddivorcematters, the representation for themost part had occurred prior to thechild’sbirth,counselhadnotmetthefatherduringrepresentationofthemother,andabalancingofthecompetinginterestswasinfavorofthemother’sretentionofhercounsel rather than thepossibleminimalprejudice that the fathermightsuffer;thefatherfailedtoshowthathewouldsufferprejudiceasaresultofthecontinued representation, and accordingly, he did not meet his burden ofshowingtheneedfordisqualificationbyclearandconvincingevidence.G.M.v.E.T.W.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS153(Del.Fam.Ct.July19,2006).

Astherewasnootherclient,currentorformer,tocauseaconflictofinterest,thewife’sattorneywasnotprecludedfromrepresentingthewife,whenanothermemberoftheattorney’sfirmtookthestandasawitnessforthewifeduringthehearing.L.L.L.v.W.B.L.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS196(Del.Fam.Ct.Jan.17,




2007).

Lenderwasnotentitledtodisqualifytheborrower’scounselduetofailuretoshow by clear and convincing evidence the existence of any prejudice in thefairness of the proceedings or that an alleged conflict existed; an allegedcorporate takeoverof theborrower throughtheexerciseof the lender’sallegedrights under the pledge agreement did not form a proper basis for counsel’sdisqualification.TriumphMortg.Corp.v.GlasgowCitgo,Inc.,—A.3d—,2018Del.Super.LEXIS178(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.19,2018).

—Jointrepresentation.

Where defendants are family members who may have varying levels ofculpabilityinallegedconspiracy,thelikelihoodthataconflictwilleventuateandthat it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professionaljudgment in considering alternatives or will foreclose courses of action thatreasonablyshouldbepursuedonbehalfofeachclientistoogreattopermitjointrepresentation.UnitedStatesv.Cooper,672F.Supp.155(D.Del.1987).

Enforcement.

Anonclientlitiganthasstandingtoenforceparagraph(a)whenheorshecandemonstratethattheopposingcounsel’sconflictsomehowprejudicedhisorherrights. The nonclient litigant does not have standing to merely enforce atechnicalviolationoftheRules.InreInfotechnology,Inc.,582A.2d215(Del.1990).

In enforcing paragraph (a), the burden of proof must be on the nonclientlitiganttoprovebyclearandconvincingevidencetheexistenceofaconflictandtodemonstratehowtheconflictwillprejudicethefairnessoftheproceedings.InreInfotechnology,Inc.,582A.2d215(Del.1990).

District courts are authorized to supervise the conduct of attorneys whopractice before them. This power includes the authority to disqualify thosewhoseconductbreachesthenormsasestablishedbythebar.KabiPharmaciaABv.AlconSurgical,Inc.,803F.Supp.957(D.Del.1992).

Sanctions.

—Determiningfactors.

Themaintenanceoftheintegrityofthelegalprofessionanditshighstandingin the community are important factors to be considered in determining theappropriatesanctionforacodeviolation.Themaintenanceofpublicconfidence





in the propriety of the conduct of those associated with the administration ofjusticeissoimportantaconsiderationthatacourtmaydisqualifyanattorneyforfailing to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Kabi Pharmacia AB v.AlconSurgical,Inc.,803F.Supp.957(D.Del.1992).



Rule1.8.Conflictofinterest:Currentclients:Specificrules.

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client orknowinglyacquireanownership,possessory,securityorotherpecuniaryinterestadversetoaclientunless:

(1)thetransactionandtermsonwhichthelawyeracquirestheinterestarefairandreasonabletotheclientandarefullydisclosedandtransmittedinwritingtotheclientinamannerthatcanbereasonablyunderstoodbytheclient;

(2)theclientisadvisedinwritingofthedesirabilityofseekingandisgivenareasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on thetransaction;and

(3)theclientgivesinformedconsent,inawritingsignedbytheclient,totheessential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction,includingwhetherthelawyerisrepresentingtheclientinthetransaction.

(b)Alawyershallnotuseinformationrelatingtorepresentationofaclienttothedisadvantageoftheclientunlesstheclientgivesinformedconsent,exceptaspermittedorrequiredbytheseRules.

(c)A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including atestamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving thelawyerorapersonrelatedtothelawyeranysubstantialgiftunlessthelawyerorotherrecipientofthegiftisrelatedtotheclient.Forpurposesofthisparagraph,relatedpersons includeaspouse,child,grandchild,parent,grandparentorotherrelative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close,familialrelationship.

(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall notmakeornegotiateanagreementgiving the lawyer literaryormedia rights toaportrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to therepresentation.

(e)A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connectionwithpendingorcontemplatedlitigation,exceptthat:

(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigations, therepaymentofwhichmaybecontingentontheoutcomeofthematter;and

(2)alawyerrepresentinganindigentclientmaypaycourtcostsandexpenses

oflitigationonbehalfoftheclient.

(f)Alawyershallnotacceptcompensationforrepresentingaclientfromoneotherthantheclientunless:

(1)theclientgivesinformedconsent;

(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professionaljudgmentorwiththeclient-lawyerrelationship;and

(3)informationrelatingtorepresentationofaclientisprotectedasrequiredbyRule1.6.

(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate inmaking an aggregate settlement of the claimsof or against the clients, or in acriminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas,unlesseachclientgivesinformedconsent,inawritingsignedbytheclient.Thelawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims orpleasinvolvedandoftheparticipationofeachpersoninthesettlement.

(h)Alawyershallnot:

(1)makeanagreementprospectivelylimitingthelawyer’sliabilitytoaclientfor malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making theagreement;or

(2) settle a claimor potential claim for such liabilitywith an unrepresentedclientorformerclientunlessthatpersonisadvisedinwritingofthedesirabilityof seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice ofindependentlegalcounselinconnectiontherewith.

(i)A lawyershallnotacquireaproprietary interest in thecauseofactionorsubjectmatteroflitigationthelawyerisconductingforaclient,exceptthatthelawyermay:

(1) acquire a lien authorizedby law to secure the lawyer’s feeor expenses;and

(2)contractwithaclientforareasonablecontingentfeeinacivilcase.

(j)Alawyershallnothavesexualrelationswithaclientunlessaconsensualsexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationshipcommenced.

(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoingparagraphs (a) through (i) thatapplies toanyoneof themshall apply toallof

them.

COMMENT

[1]Businesstransactionsbetweenclientandlawyer.—Alawyer’slegalskilland training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence betweenlawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyerparticipates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, forexample,aloanorsalestransactionoralawyerinvestmentonbehalfofaclient.Therequirementsofparagraph(a)mustbemetevenwhenthetransactionisnotclosely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyerdrafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelatedexpenses and offers tomake a loan to the client. TheRule applies to lawyersengaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, forexample, thesaleoftitleinsuranceorinvestmentservicestoexistingclientsofthe lawyer’s legalpractice.SeeRule5.7. It alsoapplies to lawyerspurchasingproperty from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary feearrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5,althoughitsrequirementsmustbemetwhenthelawyeracceptsaninterestintheclient’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of afee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactionsbetween the lawyer and the client for products or services that the clientgenerallymarketstoothers,forexample,bankingorbrokerageservices,medicalservices, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities’services. Insuch transactions, the lawyerhasnoadvantage indealingwith theclient,andtherestrictionsinparagraph(a)areunnecessaryandimpracticable.

[2]Paragraph(a)(1)requiresthatthetransactionitselfbefairtotheclientandthat its essential terms be communicated to the client, inwriting, in amannerthatcanbereasonablyunderstood.Paragraph(a)(2)requiresthattheclientalsobeadvised, inwriting,of thedesirabilityof seeking theadviceof independentlegalcounsel.Italsorequiresthattheclientbegivenareasonableopportunitytoobtainsuchadvice.Paragraph(a)(3)requiresthatthelawyerobtaintheclient’sinformedconsent,inawritingsignedbytheclient,bothtotheessentialtermsofthe transaction and to the lawyer’s role. When necessary, the lawyer shoulddiscuss both thematerial risks of the proposed transaction, including any riskpresentedbythelawyer’sinvolvement,andtheexistenceofreasonablyavailablealternativesandshouldexplainwhy theadviceof independent legalcounsel isdesirable.SeeRule1.0(e)(definitionofinformedconsent).

[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer torepresent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer’s financialinterestotherwiseposesasignificantriskthatthelawyer’srepresentationoftheclient will be materially limited by the lawyer’s financial interest in thetransaction. Here the lawyer’s role requires that the lawyer must comply, notonlywith the requirementsofparagraph (a),but alsowith the requirementsofRule1.7.UnderthatRule,thelawyermustdisclosetherisksassociatedwiththelawyer’sdualroleasbothlegaladviserandparticipantinthetransaction,suchasthe risk that the lawyerwill structure the transaction or give legal advice in awaythatfavorsthelawyer’sinterestsattheexpenseoftheclient.Moreover,thelawyermust obtain the client’s informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer’sinterestmay be such that Rule 1.7will preclude the lawyer from seeking theclient’sconsenttothetransaction.

[4]Iftheclientisindependentlyrepresentedinthetransaction,paragraph(a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for fulldisclosureissatisfiedeitherbyawrittendisclosurebythelawyerinvolvedinthetransactionorby theclient’s independent counsel.The fact that theclientwasindependentlyrepresented in the transactionisrelevant indeterminingwhethertheagreementwas fair and reasonable to theclient asparagraph (a)(1) furtherrequires.

[5] Use of Information Related to Representation. — Use of informationrelating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates thelawyer’sdutyof loyalty.Paragraph (b) applieswhen the information isused tobenefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or businessassociateof the lawyer.Forexample, ifa lawyer learns thataclient intends topurchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use thatinformation topurchaseoneof theparcels incompetitionwith theclientor torecommendthatanotherclientmakesuchapurchase.TheRuledoesnotprohibituses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns agovernmentagency’sinterpretationoftradelegislationduringtherepresentationof one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients.Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless theclient gives informed consent, except as permitted or requiredby theseRules.SeeRules1.2(d),1.6,1.9(c),3.3,4.1(b),8.1and8.3.

[6]Gifts to Lawyers. — A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if thetransactionmeetsgeneralstandardsoffairness.Forexample,asimplegiftsuchas apresent given at a holidayor as a tokenof appreciation is permitted. If a

clientoffers the lawyeramoresubstantialgift,paragraph(c)doesnotprohibitthelawyerfromacceptingit,althoughsuchagiftmaybevoidablebytheclientunderthedoctrineofundueinfluence,whichtreatsclientgiftsaspresumptivelyfraudulent.Inanyevent,duetoconcernsaboutoverreachingandimpositiononclients,alawyermaynotsuggestthatasubstantialgiftbemadetothelawyerorfor the lawyer’sbenefit, exceptwhere the lawyer is related to theclient as setforthinparagraph(c).

[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrumentsuch as awill or conveyance, the client should have the detached advice thatanotherlawyercanprovide.ThesoleexceptiontothisRuleiswheretheclientisarelativeofthedonee.

[8]ThisRuledoesnotprohibitalawyerfromseekingtohavethelawyerorapartnerorassociateofthelawyernamedasexecutoroftheclient’sestateortoanotherpotentiallylucrativefiduciaryposition.Nevertheless,suchappointmentswillbesubjecttothegeneralconflictofinterestprovisioninRule1.7whenthereisasignificant risk that the lawyer’s interest inobtaining theappointmentwillmateriallylimitthelawyer’sindependentprofessionaljudgmentinadvisingtheclientconcerning thechoiceofanexecutororother fiduciary. Inobtaining theclient’s informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the clientconcerning the nature and extent of the lawyer’s financial interest in theappointment,aswellastheavailabilityofalternativecandidatesfortheposition.

[9]LiteraryRight.—An agreement bywhich a lawyer acquires literary ormedia rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflictbetween the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer.Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from thepublication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does notprohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literarypropertyfromagreeingthatthelawyer’sfeeshallconsistofashareinownershipintheproperty,ifthearrangementconformstoRule1.5andparagraphs(a)and(i).

[10] Financial Assistance. — Lawyers may not subsidize law suits oradministrativeproceedingsbroughtonbehalfoftheirclients,includingmakingorguaranteeingloanstotheirclientsforlivingexpenses,becausetodosowouldencourage clients to pursue law suits thatmight not otherwise be brought andbecausesuchassistancegiveslawyerstoogreatafinancialstakeinthelitigation.These dangers donotwarrant a prohibitionon a lawyer lending a client courtcostsandlitigationexpenses,includingtheexpensesofmedicalexaminationand

the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances arevirtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to thecourts.Similarly,anexceptionallowinglawyersrepresentingindigentclientstopaycourtcostsandlitigationexpensesregardlessofwhetherthesefundswillberepaidiswarranted.

[11]PersonPayingforaLawyer’sServices.—Lawyersarefrequentlyaskedto represent a client under circumstances in which a third person willcompensatethelawyer,inwholeorinpart.Thethirdpersonmightbearelativeor friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client(suchasacorporationsuedalongwithoneormoreofitsemployees).Becausethird-partypayers frequentlyhave interests thatdiffer from thoseof theclient,includinginterestsinminimizingtheamountspentontherepresentationandinlearning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited fromacceptingor continuing such representationsunless the lawyerdetermines thatthere will be no interference with the lawyer’s independent professionaljudgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c)(prohibiting interference with a lawyer’s professional judgment by one whorecommends,employsorpaysthelawyertorenderlegalservicesforanother).

[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client’sinformedconsentregardingthefactofthepaymentandtheidentityofthethird-partypayer.If,however,thefeearrangementcreatesaconflictofinterestforthelawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule. 1.7. The lawyer must alsoconformtotherequirementsofRule1.6concerningconfidentiality.UnderRule1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer’srepresentation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s owninterest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer’s responsibilities to the third-partypayer(forexample,whenthethird-partypayerisaco-client).UnderRule1.7(b), the lawyermayacceptorcontinue therepresentationwith the informedconsentofeachaffectedclient,unlesstheconflictisnonconsentableunderthatparagraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed inwriting.

[13]AggregateSettlements.—Differences inwillingness tomakeoracceptanofferofsettlementareamongtherisksofcommonrepresentationofmultipleclientsbyasinglelawyer.UnderRule1.7,thisisoneoftherisksthatshouldbediscussed before undertaking there presentation, as part of the process ofobtaining the clients’ informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects eachclient’srighttohavethefinalsayindecidingwhethertoacceptorrejectanoffer

ofsettlementandindecidingwhethertoenteraguiltyornolocontenderepleaina criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both theseRulesandprovidesthat,beforeanysettlementofferorpleabargainismadeoraccepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of themabout all thematerial termsof the settlement, includingwhat the other clientswill receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule1.0(e)(definitionofinformedconsent).Lawyersrepresentingaclassofplaintiffsordefendants,orthoseproceedingderivatively,maynothaveafullclient-lawyerrelationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers mustcomplywithapplicablerulesregulatingnotificationofclassmembersandotherprocedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entireclass.

[14] Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims. — Agreementsprospectively limitinga lawyer’s liability formalpractice areprohibitedunlesstheclientisindependentlyrepresentedinmakingtheagreementbecausetheyarelikely to undermine competent and diligent representation.Also,many clientsare unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before adisputehasarisen,particularlyiftheyarethenrepresentedbythelawyerseekingthe agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer fromenteringintoanagreementwiththeclient toarbitrate legalmalpracticeclaims,providedsuchagreementsareenforceableandtheclientisfullyinformedofthescopeandeffectof theagreement.Nordoes thisparagraph limit theabilityoflawyers topractice in theformofa limited liabilityentity,wherepermittedbylaw,providedthateachlawyerremainspersonallyliabletotheclientforhisorher own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law,such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequateliability insurance.Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordancewithRule1.2 that defines the scopeof the representation, althoughadefinitionof scopethatmakestheobligationsofrepresentationillusorywillamounttoanattempttolimitliability.

[15]Agreementssettlingaclaimorapotentialclaimformalpracticearenotprohibitedby thisRule.Nevertheless, inviewof thedanger thata lawyerwilltake unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyermustfirstadvisesuchapersoninwritingoftheappropriatenessofindependentrepresentationinconnectionwithsuchasettlement.Inaddition,thelawyermustgive the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consultindependentcounsel.

[16]AcquiringProprietary Interest inLitigation.—Paragraph (i) states thetraditionalgeneralrulethatlawyersareprohibitedfromacquiringaproprietaryinterestinlitigation.Likeparagraph(e),thegeneralrulehasitsbasisincommonlawchampertyandmaintenanceandisdesignedtoavoidgivingthelawyertoogreataninterestintherepresentation.Inaddition,whenthelawyeracquiresanownership interest in thesubjectof the representation, itwillbemoredifficultforaclienttodischargethelawyeriftheclientsodesires.TheRuleissubjecttospecific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in theseRules.The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth inparagraph(e).Inaddition,paragraph(i)setsforthexceptionsforliensauthorizedby law to secure the lawyer’s feesor expenses and contracts for reasonablecontingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens areauthorizedbylaw.Thesemayincludeliensgrantedbystatute,liensoriginatingincommon lawand liensacquiredbycontractwith theclient.Whena lawyeracquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recoveredthroughthelawyer’seffortsinthelitigation,suchanacquisitionisabusinessorfinancial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements ofparagraph(a).ContractsforcontingentfeesincivilcasesaregovernedbyRule1.5.

[17]Client-LawyerSexualRelationships.—Therelationshipbetweenlawyerandclientisafiduciaryoneinwhichthelawyeroccupiesthehighestpositionoftrustandconfidence.The relationship isalmostalwaysunequal; thus,asexualrelationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of thelawyer’sfiduciaryrole,inviolationofthelawyer’sbasicethicalobligationnottouse the trust of the client to the client’s disadvantage. In addition, such arelationshippresentsasignificantdangerthat,becauseofthelawyer’semotionalinvolvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client withoutimpairmentof the exerciseof independentprofessional judgment.Moreover, ablurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make itdifficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by theattorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected byprivilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyerrelationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests andbecausetheclient’sownemotionalinvolvementrendersitunlikelythattheclientcould give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer fromhaving sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship isconsensualandregardlessoftheabsenceofprejudicetotheclient.

[18] Sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not

prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship andclientdependencyarediminishedwhen the sexual relationshipexistedprior tothe commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, beforeproceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer shouldconsiderwhether the lawyer’s ability to represent the clientwill bemateriallylimitedbytherelationship.SeeRule1.7(a)(2).

[19]Whentheclientisanorganization,paragraph(j)ofthisRuleprohibitsalawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) fromhaving a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization whosupervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning theorganization’slegalmatters.

[20] Imputation of Prohibitions. — Under paragraph (k), a prohibition onconductbyanindividuallawyerinparagraphs(a)through(i)alsoappliestoalllawyersassociatedinafirmwiththepersonallyprohibitedlawyer.Forexample,one lawyer ina firmmaynotenter intoabusiness transactionwithaclientofanothermemberof the firmwithoutcomplyingwithparagraph (a),even if thefirst lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. Theprohibitionsetforthinparagraph(j)ispersonalandisnotappliedtoassociatedlawyers.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.

—Businesstransactions.

—Confidentiality.

—Gifts.

—Sexualrelations.

Clientrelations.

—Businesstransactions.

Although any business transaction between an attorney and client ispresumptivelyinvalidunlessthereisclearandconvincingevidenceshowingfulland complete disclosure of all facts known to the attorney and absolute

independenceofactiononthepartoftheclient,thecourtdeclinedtoinvalidatethetransactionwhichwouldprecludetheplaintifffromrecoveringfeedmoneys.Burgerv.LevelEndDairyInvestors,125Bankr.894(Bankr.D.Del.1991).

—Confidentiality.


—Gifts.

AttorneyviolatedthisRulewhen,uponlearningofclient’sintenttoleavehimtenpercentofherestate,hedidnotadvisehertoobtainindependentcounseltohandlethismatter.InreMcCann,669A.2d49(Del.1995).

—Sexualrelations.

Three-year suspension, along with other conditions, was the appropriatesanction for an attorneywhoadmittedhavinghad a sexual relationshipwith aclient (who claimed to have felt pressured into it) that had not pre-existedrepresentationoftheclient,andwheretheattorneywasalsoshownbyclearandconvincingevidencetohaveengagedinconductwithclientsandemployeesofthefirmthatamountedtotheDelawaremisdemeanorsofsexualharassmentandoffensivetouching.InreTenenbaum,880A.2d1025(Del.2005).

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/125%20Bankr.%20894





Rule1.9.Dutiestoformerclients.

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall notthereafterrepresentanotherpersoninthesameorasubstantiallyrelatedmatterin which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of theformer client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed inwriting.

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or asubstantiallyrelatedmatterinwhichafirmwithwhichthelawyerformerlywasassociatedhadpreviouslyrepresentedaclient:

(1)whoseinterestsaremateriallyadversetothatperson;and

(2)aboutwhomthe lawyerhadacquired informationprotectedbyRules1.6and1.9(c)thatismaterialtothematter;

unlesstheformerclientgivesinformedconsent,confirmedinwriting.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whosepresent or former firm has formerly represented a client in amatter shall notthereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of theformer client except as theseRuleswould permit or requirewith respect to aclient,orwhentheinformationhasbecomegenerallyknown;or

(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Ruleswouldpermitorrequirewithrespecttoaclient.

COMMENT

[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certaincontinuingdutieswithrespecttoconfidentialityandconflictsofinterestandthusmaynotrepresentanotherclientexceptinconformitywiththisRule.UnderthisRule, for example, a lawyer couldnot properly seek to rescindonbehalf of anewclientacontractdraftedonbehalfoftheformerclient.Soalsoalawyerwhohasprosecutedanaccusedpersoncouldnotproperlyrepresenttheaccusedinasubsequentcivilactionagainstthegovernmentconcerningthesametransaction.Nor could a lawyerwhohas representedmultiple clients in amatter representoneoftheclientsagainsttheothersinthesameorasubstantiallyrelatedmatter

afteradisputearoseamongtheclientsinthatmatter,unlessallaffectedclientsgive informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former governmentlawyersmustcomplywiththisRuletotheextentrequiredbyRule1.11.

[2]Thescopeofa“matter”forpurposesofthisRuledependsonthefactsofaparticularsituationortransaction.Thelawyer’sinvolvementinamattercanalsobeaquestionofdegree.Whenalawyerhasbeendirectlyinvolvedinaspecifictransaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverseinterests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyerwhorecurrentlyhandleda typeofproblemforaformerclient isnotprecludedfromlaterrepresentinganotherclientinafactuallydistinctproblemofthattypeeven though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to theprior client. Similar considerations can apply to there assignment of militarylawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same militaryjurisdictions.Theunderlyingquestioniswhetherthelawyerwassoinvolvedinthe matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as achangingofsidesinthematterinquestion.

[3]Mattersare“substantiallyrelated”forpurposesofthisRuleiftheyinvolvethe same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial riskthat confidential factual information aswould normally have been obtained inthe prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in thesubsequentmatter.Forexample,alawyerwhohasrepresentedabusinesspersonand learned extensive private financial information about that personmay notthenrepresentthatperson’sspouseinseekingadivorce.Similarly,alawyerwhohaspreviouslyrepresentedaclientinsecuringenvironmentalpermitstobuildashopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking tooppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations;however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantialrelationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center inresistingevictionfornonpaymentofrent.Informationthathasbeendisclosedtothepublicortootherpartiesadversetotheformerclientordinarilywillnotbedisqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have beenrenderedobsoletebythepassageoftime,acircumstancethatmayberelevantindeterminingwhethertworepresentationsaresubstantiallyrelated.Inthecaseofanorganizationalclient,generalknowledgeoftheclient’spoliciesandpracticesordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand,knowledgeofspecificfactsgainedinapriorrepresentationthatarerelevanttothematter inquestionordinarilywill preclude sucha representation.A formerclientisnotrequiredtorevealtheconfidentialinformationlearnedbythelawyer

in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidentialinformationtouseinthesubsequentmatter.Aconclusionabout thepossessionof such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyerprovided the former client and information thatwould in ordinary practice belearnedbyalawyerprovidingsuchservices.

[4]LawyersMovingBetweenFirms.—When lawyershavebeenassociatedwithin a firmbut then end their association, the question ofwhether a lawyershould undertake representation is more complicated. There are severalcompetingconsiderations.First,theclientpreviouslyrepresentedbytheformerfirmmustbereasonablyassuredthattheprincipleofloyaltytotheclientisnotcompromised.Second,theruleshouldnotbesobroadlycastastoprecludeotherpersons fromhaving reasonablechoiceof legalcounsel.Third, the ruleshouldnotunreasonablyhamperlawyersfromformingnewassociationsandtakingonnewclientsafterhavingleftapreviousassociation.Inthisconnection,itshouldberecognized that todaymany lawyerspractice in firms, thatmany lawyers tosome degree limit their practice to one field or another, and thatmanymovefromoneassociationtoanotherseveraltimesintheircareers.Iftheconceptofimputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radicalcurtailmentof theopportunityof lawyers tomovefromonepracticesetting toanotherandoftheopportunityofclientstochangecounsel.

[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyerinvolvedhasactualknowledgeofinformationprotectedbyRules1.6and1.9(c).Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or informationrelating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined anotherfirm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified fromrepresenting another client in the same or a related matter even though theinterests of the two clients conflict. SeeRule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on afirmoncealawyerhasterminatedassociationwiththefirm.

[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation’s particular facts,aidedbyinferences,deductionsorworkingpresumptionsthatreasonablymaybemadeaboutthewayinwhichlawyersworktogether.Alawyermayhavegeneralaccess to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate indiscussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact isprivy toall informationaboutall the firm’sclients. Incontrast,another lawyermayhaveaccesstothefilesofonlyalimitednumberofclientsandparticipateindiscussionsoftheaffairsofnootherclients;intheabsenceofinformationtothecontrary,itshouldbeinferredthatsuchalawyerinfactisprivytoinformation

abouttheclientsactuallyservedbutnotthoseofotherclients.Insuchaninquiry,theburdenofproofshouldrestuponthefirmwhosedisqualificationissought.

[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyerchanging professional association has a continuing duty to preserveconfidentialityofinformationaboutaclientformerlyrepresented.SeeRules1.6and1.9(c).

[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in thecourseofrepresentingaclientmaynotsubsequentlybeusedorrevealedbythelawyertothedisadvantageoftheclient.However,thefactthatalawyerhasonceserved a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally knowninformationaboutthatclientwhenlaterrepresentinganotherclient.

[9]TheprovisionsofthisRulearefortheprotectionofformerclientsandcanbewaivediftheclientgivesinformedconsent,whichconsentmustbeconfirmedin writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(e). With regard to theeffectivenessofanadvancewaiver,seeComment[22]toRule1.7.Withregardtodisqualificationofafirmwithwhichalawyerisorwasformerlyassociated,seeRule1.10.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.



—“Formerclientstatus”.

—Shareholders’derivativesuits.


—Candortothetribunal.

Clientrelations.


Because the defendant did not object to a law firm’s representation of the

plaintiff during the negotiations of amerger agreement, and failed to point toinformation or confidences obtained by the firm in its prior work for thedefendantthatwouldhaveamaterialinfluenceontheproceedings,therewasnobasistodisqualifythefirm.Rohm&HaasCo.v.DowChem.Co.,2009Del.Ch.LEXIS249(Del.Ch.Feb.12,2009).

Publicdefender’sofficefailedtoproveanactualconflictofinterestexistedintheoffice’spriorrepresentationofaState’switnessanddefendant,andwasnotentitled to withdraw as counsel for defendant, because: (1) the office’srepresentationof thewitnessanddefendantwerenot substantially related; and(2) the witness was represented by a different public defender than thoserepresentingdefendant.Statev.Kent,—A.3d—,2014Del.Super.LEXIS558(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.3,2014).

Law firmwho had helped a corporate debtor sell a portfolio of leases, andwho was later hired by real estate professionals, was not disqualified fromrepresenting the professionals in an adversary proceeding filed by Californialimited liability companies (LLCs) alleging that the professionals committedfraud to obtain a higher price for the portfolio merely because the firm hadrepresented theLLCs inothercases; theLLCs failed toshow that therewasasubstantial relationshipbetweencaseswhere the lawfirmservedas theLLCs’counsel and the adversary proceeding the LLCs filed against the debtors’professionals, or that the law firmobtained information about theLLCswhilerepresenting them in other cases that it could not use without violating Law.Prof.ConductR.1.9.AlamoGroup,LLCv.A&GRealtyPartners,LLC(InreOSH1LiquidatingCorp.),—Bankr.—, 2015Bankr. LEXIS 467 (Bankr.D.Del.Feb.2,2015).

Trust beneficiaries’ defense of counsel’s conflict of interest was waivedbecause the beneficiaries failed to raise this issue as a defense to the trustees’applicationforattorneys’feesinatimelymanner,despitemultipleopportunitiestodoso.InreHawkMt.Trust,—A.3d—,2015Del.Ch.LEXIS236(Del.Ch.Sept.8,2015).


Anattorney’s representationof a clientwhowas suing a former client on amattersubstantiallyrelatedtooneonwhichtheattorneypreviouslyworkedwasanethicalviolationresultingintheattorney’sdisqualification.Webbv.E.I.DuPontDeNemours&Co.,811F.Supp.158(D.Del.1992).

Defendant’smotiontodisqualifyplaintiff’scounselundertheformerversion



ofthisrulewasdenied,asdefendanthadnoreasonablebasistoconcludethatanattorney-client relationship had been established with plaintiff’s counsel at anearlier meeting, and defendant failed to show prejudice from disclosure ofinformationexchangedatthemeetingbecausedefendantlaterdisclosedmuchofthis information in a proxy statement and in discussions with plaintiff.BenchmarkCapitalPtnrs.IV,L.P.v.Vague,2002Del.Ch.LEXIS108(Del.Ch.Sept.3,2002).

Trial court denied a motion to disqualify plaintiff’s counsel, as priorrepresentationofadefendantbythesamelawfirminvolvedacasethatwasnotat all substantially related; anyalleged releaseof confidential informationwasdeemedminimalbythetrialcourt.Sanchez-Cazav.EstateofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

Violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.9 does not require automaticdisqualification; a court reviewing the motion must weigh the effect of anyalleged conflict upon the fairness and integrity of the proceedings beforedisqualifying the challenged counsel. Sanchez-Caza v. Estate of Whetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

Party seeking to disqualify opposing council based on council’s priorrepresentationof it isnot required topoint to specificconfidential informationthatitbelievesthecouncilpossesses.Aciernov.Hayward,2004Del.Ch.LEXIS138(Del.Ch.July1,2004).

StateDepartment ofTransportation (DOT)presented evidence that arguablysupporteddisqualificationofplaintiff’slawyerbasedonaconflictofinterest(inthat the attoney inevitably would be placed in a position where confidentialinformation obtained from prior representation of DOT would be used to itsdisadvantageinthelitigation)underLawProf.ConductR.1.9.;thethreattothefair and efficient administration of justicewas sufficiently palpable to supportthecourt’sexerciseofjurisdictionoverDOT’smotiontodisqualify.Aciernov.Hayward,2004Del.Ch.LEXIS138(Del.Ch.July1,2004).

Inasuitforadeclaratoryjudgmentastoalessee’sobligationsunderalease,counsel for the lessor was not subject to disqualification under Model RulesProf’lConductR. 1.9 because: (1) counsel’s prior representationof the lesseewaslimitedtoregulatoryfindingsandterminatedupontheclosingofatransferofstock;(2)thenatureofthecurrentlitigationwasalandlord-tenantdisputethatwas unrelated to the prior representation; and (3) the information provided tocounsel in the prior representationwas not likely to be relevant to the current






litigation. IntegratedHealth Servs. v. THCI, Co. LLC, 327B.R. 200 (D.Del.2005).

In a real estate dispute, the mere fact that counsel for one party had onceadvised a long-deadpartner of an opposingparty in entirely unrelatedmatterswasnotgrounds fordisqualificationof counsel; therewas simplynobasis forsupposing any impropriety or unfairness. Hendry v. Hendry, 2005 Del. Ch.LEXIS187(Del.Ch.Dec.1,2005).

Where attorney disqualification was sought under Model Rules of Prof’lConduct R. 1.9, which Delaware had adopted, plaintiff’s argument that noconflictarosefromtherepresentationofdefendantbyplaintiff’sformerattorney,untiltheearliercaseinvolvingplaintiffwasbroughtupinadeposition,failed,asRule1.9coveredmorethanthedisclosureofconfidentialinformation.Conleyv.Chaffinch,431F.Supp.2d494(D.Del.2006).

In a custody modification proceeding between parents of a minor child, afather’s request to disqualify the mother’s counsel due to counsel’s priorrepresentation of the father’s mother was denied, as there was no conflict ofinterest under Law.R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a) and LawR. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a)where counsel had previously represented the father’s mother in estate anddivorcematters, the representation for themost part had occurred prior to thechild’sbirth,counselhadnotmetthefatherduringrepresentationofthemother,andabalancingofthecompetinginterestswasinfavorofthemother’sretentionofhercounsel rather than thepossibleminimalprejudice that the fathermightsuffer;thefatherfailedtoshowthathewouldsufferprejudiceasaresultofthecontinued representation, and accordingly, he did not meet his burden ofshowingtheneedfordisqualificationbyclearandconvincingevidence.G.M.v.E.T.W.,2006Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS153(Del.Fam.Ct.July19,2006).

During challenge to merger process, defendant merger parties moved todisqualify the law firm retained to advise plaintiffmerger challengers becausethe law firm had access to confidential information regarding 1 of themergerparties from a prior merger case; the court declined to determine whether aconflictofinterestexisted,butdeniedthemotiontodisqualifyduetothedelayin raising the issue, plus the harm thatwould result to 1merger challenger ifforced to change law firms. Express Scripts, Inc. v. Crawford, 2007Del. Ch.LEXIS18(Del.Ch.Jan.25,2007).

Counsel representing the wife in a divorce proceeding did not have to bedisqualified from that representation where a paralegal in the husband’s firm

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/327%20B.R.%20200


http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/431%20F.%20Supp.%202d%20494



stoppedworkingforthatfirmandwenttoworkforthelawfirmrepresentingthewifeas:(1)theparalegalhadperformedaminimalamountofworkonthecase;(2) theparalegalandwife’scounselhadmaintaineda“coneofsilence”on thematter by not speaking about it, minimizing the possibility that confidentialinformationcouldbepassedalong;and(3)noshowinghadbeenmaderegardingabreachofclientconfidentialityinviolationofLawR.Prof.Conduct1.9(b)or1.10(c).InreMarriageofC.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS124(Del.Fam.Ct.Oct.6,2008).

Attorneywhopreviouslyrepresentedadoctor inamedicalnegligenceclaimagainstthedoctorwasdisqualifiedfromrepresentingapatientandthatpatient’sspouse in their medical negligence claim against the doctor, as there was anirreconcilable conflict of interest under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a); the 2actionsweresubstantiallyrelatedandthegravamenoftheclaimswerethesame.Fernandez v. St. FrancisHosp., 2009Del. Super. LEXIS 287 (Del. Super.Ct.Aug.3,2009).

Inapatentinfringementsuitagainstanelectronicscompany,anattorneyandthe attorney’s firm were disqualified under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9 fromrepresentingplaintiffwhere:(1)theattorneyhadrepresentedthecompanyinanearliersuit,whileworkingatasecondfirm;(2)thesubjectmatteroftheearliersuitconcernedthesamememorychiptechnologyatissueininstantsuit;(3)theappearance of impropriety was reflected in the fact that the attorney’srepresentationofthecompanywasnotthoroughlyvettedatthetimetheattorneybeganworking at the firm; (4) the firm’s conflict reviewwas limited towhatamounted to a word search; and (5) the company was not alerted to theattorney’s representation of plaintiff in the case at bar. Apeldyn Corp. v.SamsungElecs.Co..,—F.Supp.2d—,2009U.S.Dist.LEXIS93396(D.Del.Sept.30,2009).

Even if there was a conflict between counsel’s present and former clients’interests pursuant toLaw. Prof.ConductR. 1.9(a),where defendants failed toshow a violation so extreme that it called into question the fairness or theefficiency of the proceeding involving the validity of a corporate loan,disqualificationofcounselunderCh.Ct.R.170wasnotwarranted.Manningv.Vellardita,2012Del.Ch.LEXIS59(Del.Ch.Mar.28,2012).

Nonparties were not entitled to disqualify an attorney or a law firm fromrepresentingaseizedinsurerbasedontheattorney’sformerrepresentationof1ofthenonparties,alimitedliabilitycompany(LLC)thatpurportedlyowned99%of the insurer, because: (1) the firm would have acquired knowledge of who




controlled the LLC through representation of the insurer; and (2) vague andunsupportedallegationsofwhattheattorney“knew”wereinsufficienttojustifydisqualification. In reRehab.of Indem. Ins.Corp.,—A.3d—,2014Del.Ch.LEXIS23(Del.Ch.Feb.19,2014).

No conflict of interest existed in a slip and fall case because counsel’sprevious representation of the property owner in an unrelated case was notshown to create a substantial risk of disclosure of material confidentialinformation; indirect advantage from knowing the owner’s settlementphilosophy,andalikelihoodtheownerhadmentionedtheslipandfallincident,wouldbemitigatedbyaninsurer’sassumingthedefense.Harperv.BeaconAir,Inc.,—A.3d—,2017Del.Super.LEXIS99(Del.Super.Ct.Mar.2,2017).

Lenderwasnotentitledtodisqualifytheborrower’scounselduetofailuretoshow by clear and convincing evidence the existence of any prejudice in thefairness of the proceedings or that an alleged conflict existed; an allegedcorporate takeoverof theborrower throughtheexerciseof the lender’sallegedrights under the pledge agreement did not form a proper basis for counsel’sdisqualification.TriumphMortg.Corp.v.GlasgowCitgo,Inc.,—A.3d—,2018Del.Super.LEXIS178(Del.Super.Ct.Apr.19,2018).

—“Formerclientstatus”.

Inordertodisqualifyanattorneymorefactsofarelationshipareneededthana simple statement of priorwork done in a superficially similar area. SatelliteFin.PlanningCorp.v.FirstNat’lBank,652F.Supp.1281(D.Del.1987).

Attorney who represented a parent in a custody hearing violated this Rulewheretheattorneyhadpreviouslyrepresentedtheopposingparentinacustodymatterinvolvingthesamechildandnoconsentwasobtainedfromtheopposingparent.InreMekler,689A.2d1171(Del.1996).

General information regarding a corporate client’s business practices is notenoughtodenyrepresentationbyapresentparty’schosencounsel;knowledgeofspecificfactsgainedinapriorrepresentation,relevanttothematterinquestion,ordinarily will preclude representation. Sanchez-Caza v. Estate ofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

Anappropriate test fordeterminingwhethermattersaresubstantially relatedfor conflict purposes involves a court considering the nature and scope of thepriorrepresentation,thenatureandscopeofthepresentlawsuit,andwhethertheclientmayhaverevealedrelevantconfidentialinformationtoitscounselduringthepriorrepresentation,andifso,whethertheconfidentialinformationcouldbe




used against the former client in the current lawsuit; twomattersmay also besubstantially related if there is a substantial risk that confidential factualinformation aswould normally have been obtained in the prior representationwould materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.Sanchez-Cazav.EstateofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

—Shareholders’derivativesuits.

Counselrepresentingashareholderclassinaderivativesuitwasnotsubjecttobeingdisqualifiedforadvocatingtheadoptionofasettlementproposaltowhichsomemembers of the class objected. In re M&FWorldwide Corp. S’holdersLitig.,799A.2d1164(Del.Ch.2002).


In a derivative action, defendants’ assertions failed to demonstrate thatrepresentation by the former chief legal counsel of a parent company wassubstantially related to the instant lawsuit involving a sale of the parent’s andnon-whollyownedsubsidiary’sassets,becausethecounselwasnotchallenginga seriesof transactions inwhichcounselwasakeyparticipant,but ratherwaschallenging the allocation in a single transaction from whose negotiationscounselwasactivelyexcluded;additionally,counselhadaroleasamemberofthesubsidiaryinapprovingthetransactions,distinctfromtheroleascounseloftheparent.Bakermanv.SidneyFrankImportingCo.,2006Del.Ch.LEXIS180(Del.Ch.Oct.10,2006).


—Candortothetribunal.

Even though there was no cause to disqualify counsel or revoke counsel’sadmissionprohacvicestatus,wherecounselfailedtodiscloseacolorableclaimofconflictbetweenformerandpresentclientspursuanttoLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.9(a),suchevidencedalackofcandortothecourtandwarrantedreferraltothedisciplinary authorities.Manning v.Vellardita, 2012Del. Ch. LEXIS 59 (Del.Ch.Mar.28,2012).







Rule1.10.Imputationofconflictsofinterest:Generalrule.

(a)Exceptasotherwiseprovidedinthisrule,whilelawyersareassociatedinafirm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of thempracticingalonewouldbeprohibitedfromdoingsobyRules1.7or1.9,unlesstheprohibitionisbasedonapersonalinterestoftheprohibitedlawyeranddoesnot present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of theclientbytheremaininglawyersinthefirm.

(b)Whenalawyerhasterminatedanassociationwithafirm,thefirmisnotprohibitedfromthereafterrepresentingapersonwithinterestsmateriallyadverseto those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and notcurrentlyrepresentedbythefirm,unless:

(1)thematteristhesameorsubstantiallyrelatedtothatinwhichtheformerlyassociatedlawyerrepresentedtheclient;and

(2)anylawyerremainingin thefirmhasinformationprotectedbyRules1.6and1.9(c)thatismaterialtothematter.

(c)Whena lawyerbecomesassociatedwitha firm,no lawyer associated inthe firmshall knowingly represent a client in amatter inwhich that lawyer isdisqualifiedunderRule1.9unless:

(1) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from anyparticipationinthematterandisapportionednopartofthefeetherefrom;and

(2)writtennoticeispromptlygiventotheaffectedformerclient.

(d)Adisqualificationprescribedby this rulemaybewaivedby theaffectedclientundertheconditionsstatedinRule1.7.

(e)ThedisqualificationoflawyersassociatedinafirmwithformerorcurrentgovernmentlawyersisgovernedbyRule1.11.

COMMENT

[1] Definition of “firm”. — For purposes of the Rules of ProfessionalConduct, the term “firm” denotes lawyers in a law partnership, professionalcorporation,soleproprietorshiporotherassociationauthorized topractice law;orlawyersemployedinalegalservicesorganizationorthelegaldepartmentofacorporationorotherorganization.SeeRule1.0(c).Whethertwoormorelawyers

constituteafirmwithinthisdefinitioncandependonthespecificfacts.SeeRule1.0,Comments[2]-[4].

[2] Principles of imputed disqualification. — The rule of imputeddisqualificationstatedinparagraph(a)giveseffecttotheprincipleofloyaltytotheclientasitappliestolawyerswhopracticeinalawfirm.Suchsituationscanbeconsideredfromthepremisethatafirmoflawyersisessentiallyonelawyerforpurposesoftherulesgoverningloyaltytotheclient,orfromthepremisethateach lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by eachlawyerwithwhomthelawyerisassociated.Paragraph(a)operatesonlyamongthelawyerscurrentlyassociatedinafirm.Whenalawyermovesfromonefirmtoanother,thesituationisgovernedbyRules1.9(b)and1.10(b).

[3]The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representationwhere neitherquestions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information arepresented.Where one lawyer in a firm could not effectively represent a givenclientbecauseofstrongpoliticalbeliefs,forexample,butthatlawyerwilldonoworkonthecaseandthepersonalbeliefsofthelawyerwillnotmateriallylimittherepresentationbyothersinthefirm,thefirmshouldnotbedisqualified.Ontheotherhand,ifanopposingpartyinacasewereownedbyalawyerinthelawfirm,andothers in thefirmwouldbematerially limited inpursuing thematterbecause of loyalty to that lawyer, the personal disqualification of the lawyerwouldbeimputedtoallothersinthefirm.

[4]Theruleinparagraph(a)alsodoesnotprohibitrepresentationbyothersinthe law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is anonlawyer,suchasaparalegalorlegalsecretary.Nordoesparagraph(a)prohibitrepresentation if the lawyer isprohibited fromactingbecauseofeventsbeforethepersonbecamealawyer,forexample,workthatthepersondidwhilealawstudent.Suchpersons,however,ordinarilymustbescreenedfromanypersonalparticipation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm ofconfidentialinformationthatboththenonlawyersandthefirmhavealegaldutytoprotect.SeeRules1.0(k)and5.3.

[5]Rule1.10(b)operatestopermitalawfirm,undercertaincircumstances,torepresentapersonwithinterestsdirectlyadversetothoseofaclientrepresentedby a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule appliesregardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client.However,thelawfirmmaynotrepresentapersonwithinterestsadversetothoseofapresentclientofthefirm,whichwouldviolateRule1.7.Moreover,thefirmmay not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially

relatedtothatinwhichtheformerlyassociatedlawyerrepresentedtheclientandany other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected byRules1.6and1.9(c).

[6]Wheretheconditionsofparagraph(c)aremet,imputationisremoved,andconsent to the new representation is not required. Lawyers should be aware,however, that courts may impose more stringent obligations in ruling uponmotionstodisqualifyalawyerfrompendinglitigation.

[7] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k).Paragraph(c)(2)doesnotprohibitthescreenedlawyerfromreceivingasalaryorpartnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyermaynotreceivecompensationdirectlyrelatedtothematterinwhichthelawyerisdisqualified.

[8] Notice, including a description of the screened lawyer’s priorrepresentation and of the screening procedures employed, generally should begivenassoonaspracticableaftertheneedforscreeningbecomesapparent.

[9]Rule1.10(c)removesimputationwiththeinformedconsentoftheaffectedclient or former client under the conditions stated inRule 1.7.The conditionsstatedinRule1.7requirethelawyertodeterminethattherepresentationisnotprohibitedbyRule1.7(b)andthateachaffectedclientorformerclienthasgiveninformedconsenttotherepresentation,confirmedinwriting.Insomecases,theriskmaybesoseverethattheconflictmaynotbecuredbyclientconsent.Foradiscussionof theeffectivenessofclientwaiversofconflicts thatmightarise inthefuture,seeRule1.7,Comment[22].Foradefinitionofinformedconsent,seeRule1.0(e).

[10]Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented thegovernment, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11 (b) and (c), not this Rule.Under Rule 1.11(d), where a lawyer represents the government after havingserved clients in private practice, nongovernmental employment or in anothergovernment agency, former-client conflicts are not imputed to governmentlawyersassociatedwiththeindividuallydisqualifiedlawyer.

[11]WherealawyerisprohibitedfromengagingincertaintransactionsunderRule1.8,paragraph(k)ofthatRule,andnotthisRule,determineswhetherthatprohibitionalsoappliestootherlawyersassociatedinafirmwiththepersonallyprohibitedlawyer.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis


Imputedconflicts.

Screening.


Whereadriver’sparenthadbeenpreviouslyrepresentedbyamemberoftheinjured parties’ law firm, but the driverwas not previously represented by theinjured parties’ attorney or the attorney’s law firm, the driver did not show asufficient basis to disqualify the attorney or the firm based on a conflict ofinterest.Deptula&Swontekv.Steiner,2003Del.Super.LEXIS412(Del.Super.Ct.Dec.15,2003).

Anappropriate test fordeterminingwhethermattersaresubstantially relatedfor conflict purposes involves a court considering the nature and scope of thepriorrepresentation,thenatureandscopeofthepresentlawsuit,andwhethertheclientmayhaverevealedrelevantconfidentialinformationtoitscounselduringthepriorrepresentation,andifso,whethertheconfidentialinformationcouldbeused against the former client in the current lawsuit; 2 matters may also besubstantially related if there is a substantial risk that confidential factualinformation aswould normally have been obtained in the prior representationwould materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.Sanchez-Cazav.EstateofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

General information regarding a corporate client’s business practices is notenoughtodenyrepresentationbyapresentparty’schosencounsel;knowledgeofspecificfactsgainedinapriorrepresentation,relevanttothematterinquestion,ordinarily will preclude representation. Sanchez-Caza v. Estate ofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

Trial court denied a motion to disqualify plaintiff’s counsel, as priorrepresentationofadefendantbythesamelawfirminvolvedacasethatwasnotat all substantially related; anyalleged releaseof confidential informationwasdeemedminimalbythetrialcourt.Sanchez-Cazav.EstateofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

Counsel representing the wife in a divorce proceeding did not have to be





disqualified from that representation where a paralegal in the husband’s firmstoppedworkingforthatfirmandwenttoworkforthelawfirmrepresentingthewifeas:(1)theparalegalhadperformedaminimalamountofworkonthecase;(2) theparalegalandwife’scounselhadmaintaineda“coneofsilence”on thematter by not speaking about it, minimizing the possibility that confidentialinformationcouldbepassedalong;and(3)noshowinghadbeenmaderegardingabreachofclientconfidentialityinviolationofLawR.Prof.Conduct1.9(b)or1.10(c).InreMarriageofC.,2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS124(Del.Fam.Ct.Oct.6,2008).

Publicdefender’sofficefailedtoproveanactualconflictofinterestexistedintheoffice’spriorrepresentationofaState’switnessanddefendant,andwasnotentitled to withdraw as counsel for defendant, because: (1) the office’srepresentationof thewitnessanddefendantwerenot substantially related; and(2) the witness was represented by a different public defender than thoserepresentingdefendant.Statev.Kent,—A.3d—,2014Del.Super.LEXIS558(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.3,2014).

Imputedconflicts.

Whereplaintiffhadanattorney-clientrelationshipforalmosttwoyearsbeforeentering into a service agreement for dairy farm with another attorney in thesame firm, the original attorney-client relationship must be imputed to thesecond contracting attorney. Burger v. Level End Dairy Investors, 125 Bankr.894(Bankr.D.Del.1991).

Dutyofloyaltytoaformerclientnotonlyappliestotheindividualattorney,butisimputedtothelawfirm,asafirmoflawyersisessentiallyconsideredonelawyerforpurposesoftherulesgoverningloyaltytotheclient;asmembersofthesamelawfirm,attorneysareexpectedtoavoidconflictsofintereststhatarisenot only with their own former clients, but all former clients of the firm.Sanchez-Cazav.EstateofWhetstone,2004Del.Super.LEXIS300(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.16,2004).

Therewas no basis to disqualify a former paramour’s attorney in a supportaction, because although the attorney was employed in a law firm alsoemployinganattorneycurrentlydatingtheformerparamour:(1)therewasnoasignificant risk of material limitation to the representation; (2) there was noconflict of interest; and (3) the attorney’s testimony about attorneys’ feeswaswithinanexceptionundertheprofessionalconductrules.Barkv.May,—A.3d—,2015Del.Super.LEXIS530(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.28,2015).




Disqualificationofapatient’schosenlawfirmwaswarrantedbecause:(1)thepatient’s attorney and another attorney were partners during previousrepresentation of the doctor at issue in a separate matter; (2) the attorneyscontinuedtobepartnersintheinstantmatter;and(3)theremedyof“screeningoff”didnotapplyincasesofalong-standingpartnership.Bleacherv.Bose,—A.3d—,2017Del.Super.LEXIS223(Del.Super.Ct.May3,2017).

Screening.

Anappropriatescreeningmechanism,inthepropercircumstances,mayrebutthepresumptionofsharedconfidencesthatarisesunderthisruleincaseswherethe disqualified attorney’s conflict of interest originated in private practice.Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del.1986).

Thescreeningprocedurerelatingtolawyersinconflictofinterestareasshouldbe referred to figurativelyasa“coneof silence” rather thana“Chinesewall”;the conical image more appropriately describes the responsibility of theindividualattorneytoguardthesecretsofhisformerclient.Heiscommandedbytheethical rules toseal,orencase, theseparticularconfidenceswithinhisownconscience.Thelattertermissuggestiveofattemptsinthecontextofalargelawfirm to physically cordon off attorneys possessing information from the othermembers of the firm who represent clients whose interests are adverse tointerestsof theseattorneys’ formerclients.NemoursFound.v.Gilbane,Aetna,Fed.Ins.Co.,632F.Supp.418(D.Del.1986).

Although an attorney who previously represented a doctor in a medicalnegligenceclaimagainstthedoctorwasdisqualifiedfromrepresentingapatientandthatpatient’shusbandintheirmedicalnegligenceclaimagainst thedoctor,there was no conflict that prevented the attorney’s firm from continuing torepresent the patient and the patient’s husband provided that the appropriatestepsweretakento“walloff”theattorneyfromfurtherrepresentationpursuantto Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(c). Fernandez v. St. Francis Hosp., 2009 Del.Super.LEXIS287(Del.Super.Ct.Aug.3,2009).





Rule1.11.Special conflicts of interest for formerand currentgovernmentofficersandemployees.

(a)Exceptaslawmayotherwiseexpresslypermit,alawyerwhohasformerlyservedasapublicofficeroremployeeofthegovernment:

(1)issubjecttoRule1.9(c);and

(2)shallnototherwiserepresentaclientinconnectionwithamatterinwhichthe lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer oremployee,unlesstheappropriategovernmentagencygivesitsinformedconsent,confirmedinwriting,totherepresentation.

(b)Whenalawyerisdisqualifiedfromrepresentationunderparagraph(a),nolawyerinafirmwithwhichthatlawyerisassociatedmayknowinglyundertakeorcontinuerepresentationinsuchamatterunless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in thematterandisapportionednopartofthefeetherefrom;and

(2)writtennoticeispromptlygiventotheappropriategovernmentagencytoenableittoascertaincompliancewiththeprovisionsofthisrule.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer havinginformationthatthelawyerknowsisconfidentialgovernmentinformationaboutapersonacquiredwhen the lawyerwasapublicofficeroremployee,maynotrepresentaprivateclientwhoseinterestsareadversetothatpersoninamatterinwhichtheinformationcouldbeusedtothematerialdisadvantageofthatperson.As used in this Rule, the term “confidential government information” meansinformationthathasbeenobtainedundergovernmentalauthorityandwhich,atthe time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law fromdisclosingtothepublicorhasalegalprivilegenottodiscloseandwhichisnototherwise available to the public.A firmwithwhich that lawyer is associatedmayundertakeor continue representation in thematteronly if thedisqualifiedlawyeristimelyscreenedfromanyparticipationinthematterandisapportionednopartofthefeetherefrom.

(d)Exceptaslawmayotherwiseexpresslypermit,alawyercurrentlyservingasapublicofficeroremployee:

(1)issubjecttoRules1.7and1.9;and

(2)shallnot:

(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally andsubstantiallywhile inprivatepracticeornongovernmental employment,unlessthe appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed inwriting;or

(ii) negotiate for private employmentwith any personwho is involved as aparty or as lawyer for a party in amatter inwhich the lawyer is participatingpersonally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to ajudge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for privateemploymentaspermittedbyRule1.12(b)andsubjecttotheconditionsstatedinRule1.12(b).

(e)AsusedinthisRule,theterm“matter”includes:

(1)anyjudicialorotherproceeding,application,requestforarulingorotherdetermination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation,arrestorotherparticularmatterinvolvingaspecificpartyorparties,and

(2)anyothermattercoveredbytheconflictofinterestrulesoftheappropriategovernmentagency.

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer oremployee ispersonallysubject to theRulesofProfessionalConduct, includingthe prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. Inaddition, sucha lawyermaybe subject to statutesandgovernment regulationsregardingconflictofinterest.Suchstatutesandregulationsmaycircumscribetheextent towhich thegovernmentagencymaygiveconsentunder thisRule.SeeRule1.0(e)forthedefinitionofinformedconsent.

[2]Paragraphs(a)(1),(a)(2)and(d)(1)restatetheobligationsofanindividuallawyerwhohasservedor iscurrentlyservingasanofficeroremployeeof thegovernment toward a former government or private client. Rule 1.10 is notapplicableto theconflictsof interestaddressedbythisRule.Rather,paragraph(b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former government lawyers thatprovides for screening and notice. Because of the special problems raised byimputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not impute theconflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of thegovernment to other associated government officers or employees, although

ordinarilyitwillbeprudenttoscreensuchlawyers.

[3] Paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) apply regardless of whether a lawyer isadverse toaformerclientandare thusdesignednotonly toprotect theformerclient, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for theadvantageofanotherclient.Forexample,alawyerwhohaspursuedaclaimonbehalf of the governmentmay not pursue the same claim on behalf of a laterprivate client after the lawyer has left government service, except whenauthorizedtodosobythegovernmentagencyunderparagraph(a).Similarly,alawyerwhohaspursuedaclaimonbehalfofaprivateclientmaynotpursuetheclaim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so byparagraph(d).Aswithparagraphs(a)(1)and(d)(1),Rule1.10isnotapplicabletotheconflictsofinterestaddressedbytheseparagraphs.

[4]ThisRulerepresentsabalancingofinterests.Ontheonehand,wherethesuccessiveclientsareagovernmentagencyandanotherclient,publicorprivate,theriskexists thatpowerordiscretionvestedinthatagencymightbeusedforthespecialbenefitoftheotherclient.Alawyershouldnotbeinapositionwherebenefittotheotherclientmightaffectperformanceofthelawyer’sprofessionalfunctionsonbehalfof thegovernment.Also,unfair advantagecouldaccrue tothe other client by reason of access to confidential government informationabout the client’s adversary obtainable only through the lawyer’s governmentservice.On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerlyemployed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibittransfer of employment to and from the government. The government has alegitimate need to attract qualified lawyers aswell as tomaintain high ethicalstandards.Thusaformergovernmentlawyerisdisqualifiedonlyfromparticularmatters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. Theprovisionsforscreeningandwaiverinparagraph(b)arenecessarytopreventthedisqualificationrulefromimposingtoosevereadeterrentagainstenteringpublicservice. The limitation of disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d)(2) tomatters involving a specific party or parties, rather than extendingdisqualification toall substantive issuesonwhich the lawyerworked, servesasimilarfunction.

[5]Whena lawyerhasbeenemployedbyonegovernment agencyand thenmovestoasecondgovernmentagency,itmaybeappropriatetotreatthatsecondagencyasanotherclientforpurposesofthisRule,aswhenalawyerisemployedbyacityandsubsequentlyisemployedbyafederalagency.However,becausethe conflict of interest is governed by paragraph (d), the latter agency is not

required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b) requires a law firm to do. Thequestionofwhethertwogovernmentagenciesshouldberegardedasthesameordifferent clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of theseRules.SeeRule1.13Comment[6].

[6] Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate a screening arrangement. See Rule1.0(k)(requirementsforscreeningprocedures).Theseparagraphsdonotprohibita lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by priorindependentagreement,but that lawyermaynot receivecompensationdirectlyrelatingthelawyer’scompensationtothefeeinthematterinwhichthelawyerisdisqualified.


[8]Paragraph(c)operatesonlywhenthelawyerinquestionhasknowledgeoftheinformation,whichmeansactualknowledge;itdoesnotoperatewithrespecttoinformationthatmerelycouldbeimputedtothelawyer.

[9]Paragraphs(a)and(d)donotprohibitalawyerfromjointlyrepresentingaprivatepartyandagovernmentagencywhendoingso ispermittedbyRule1.7andisnototherwiseprohibitedbylaw.

[10]Forpurposesofparagraph (e)of thisRule, a“matter”maycontinue inanother form. In determiningwhether twoparticularmatters are the same, thelawyer shouldconsider theextent towhich thematters involve the samebasicfacts,thesameorrelatedparties,andthetimeelapsed.

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Although sentencing counsel had personally prosecuted defendant indefendant’soriginalcriminalcase,counselwasnot involvedasaprosecutor inthe violation of probation (VOP) case in which defendant was found to haveviolateddefendant’sprobation,andtheVOPcasewasnotthesame“matter”astheoriginalcriminalcaseforpurposesofLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.11(e),astheVOP case involved defendant’s subsequent conduct; even assuming that theVOP proceeding involved the same matter, defendant failed to show actual

prejudiceasdefendantadmitted thatcounselvigorously representeddefendant.Hitchensv.State,931A.2d437(Del.2007).

Screening.

Anappropriatescreeningmechanism,inthepropercircumstances,mayrebutthepresumptionofsharedconfidencesthatarisesunderRule1.10incaseswherethe disqualified attorney’s conflict of interest originated in private practice.Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del.1986).

Thescreeningprocedurerelatingtolawyersinconflictofinterestareasshouldbe referred to figurativelyasa“coneof silence” rather thana“Chinesewall”;the conical image more appropriately describes the responsibility of theindividualattorneytoguardthesecretsofhisformerclient.Heiscommandedbytheethical rules toseal,orencase, theseparticularconfidenceswithinhisownconscience.Thelattertermissuggestiveofattemptsinthecontextofalargelawfirm to physically cordon off attorneys possessing information from the othermembers of the firm who represent clients whose interests are adverse tointerestsof theseattorneys’ formerclients.NemoursFound.v.Gilbane,Aetna,Fed.Ins.Co.,632F.Supp.418(D.Del.1986).





Rule1.12.Formerjudge,arbitrator,mediatororotherthird-partyneutral.

(a)Exceptasstated inparagraph(d),a lawyershallnot representanyone inconnection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally andsubstantiallyasajudgeorotheradjudicativeofficerorlawclerktosuchapersonorasanarbitrator,mediatororotherthird-partyneutral,unlessallpartiestotheproceedinggiveinformedconsent,confirmedinwriting.

(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who isinvolvedasapartyoras lawyer foraparty inamatter inwhich the lawyer isparticipatingpersonallyandsubstantiallyasajudgeorotheradjudicativeofficerorasanarbitrator,mediatororother third-partyneutral.A lawyerservingasalawclerktoajudgeorotheradjudicativeofficermaynegotiateforemploymentwith apartyor lawyer involved in amatter inwhich the clerk is participatingpersonallyandsubstantially,butonlyafter thelawyerhasnotifiedthejudgeorotheradjudicativeofficer.

(c)Ifalawyerisdisqualifiedbyparagraph(a),nolawyerinafirmwithwhichthatlawyerisassociatedmayknowinglyundertakeorcontinuerepresentationinthematterunless:

(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in thematterandisapportionednopartofthefeetherefrom;and

(2)writtennoticeispromptlygiventothepartiesandanyappropriatetribunaltoenablethemtoascertaincompliancewiththeprovisionsofthisrule.

(d)Anarbitratorselectedasapartisanofapartyinamultimemberarbitrationpanelisnotprohibitedfromsubsequentlyrepresentingthatparty.

COMMENT

[1] This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term “personally andsubstantially”signifiesthatajudgewhowasamemberofamulti-membercourt,and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited fromrepresentinga client in amatterpending in the court, but inwhich the formerjudge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercisedadministrativeresponsibility inacourtdoesnotprevent theformer judgefromactingasalawyerinamatterwherethejudgehadpreviouslyexercisedremoteorincidentaladministrativeresponsibilitythatdidnotaffectthemerits.Compare

the Comment to Rule 1.11. The term “adjudicative officer” includes suchofficials as judges pro tempore, referees, specialmasters, hearing officers andother parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges.ComplianceCanonsA(2),B(2) andCof theModelCodeof JudicialConductprovide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled toactiveservice,maynot“actasalawyerinanyproceedinginwhichheservedasajudgeorinanyotherproceedingrelatedthereto.”AlthoughphraseddifferentlyfromthisRule,thoseRulescorrespondinmeaning.

[2]Likeformerjudges,lawyerswhohaveservedasarbitrators,mediatorsorotherthird-partyneutralsmaybeaskedtorepresentaclientinamatterinwhichthe lawyer participated personally and substantially. This Rule forbids suchrepresentation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informedconsent, confirmed inwriting. SeeRule 1.0(e) and (b).Other lawor codes ofethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards ofpersonalorimputeddisqualification.SeeRule2.4.

[3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not haveinformation concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, theytypicallyowethepartiesanobligationofconfidentialityunder laworcodesofethicsgoverningthird-partyneutrals.Thus,paragraph(c)providesthatconflictsof thepersonallydisqualifiedlawyerwillbe imputedtoother lawyers ina lawfirmunlesstheconditionsofthisparagrapharemet.

[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in Rule 1.0(k).Paragraph(c)(1)doesnotprohibitthescreenedlawyerfromreceivingasalaryorpartnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyermaynotreceivecompensationdirectlyrelatedtothematterinwhichthelawyerisdisqualified.



Rule1.13.Organizationasclient.

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents theorganizationactingthroughitsdulyauthorizedconstituents.

(b) If a lawyer foranorganizationknows thatanofficer, employeeorotherperson associatedwith the organization is engaged in action, intends to act orrefusestoactinamatterrelatedtotherepresentationthatisaviolationofalegalobligationtotheorganization,oraviolationoflawwhichreasonablymightbeimputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to theorganization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the bestinterestoftheorganization.Indetermininghowtoproceed,thelawyershallgivedue consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, thescope and nature of the lawyer’s representation, the responsibility in theorganizationandtheapparentmotivationofthepersoninvolved,thepoliciesoftheorganizationconcerningsuchmattersandanyotherrelevantconsiderations.Anymeasurestakenshallbedesignedtominimizedisruptionoftheorganizationand the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to personsoutsidetheorganization.Suchmeasuresmayincludeamongothers:

(1)askingforreconsiderationofthematter;

(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought forpresentationtoappropriateauthorityintheorganization;and

(3) referring thematter to higher authority in the organization, including, ifwarrantedbytheseriousnessofthematter,referraltothehighestauthoritythatcanactonbehalfoftheorganizationasdeterminedbyapplicablelaw.

(c) If, despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), thehighestauthoritythatcanactonbehalfoftheorganizationinsistsuponaction,ora refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result insubstantialinjurytotheorganization,thelawyermayresigninaccordancewithRule1.16.

(d)Indealingwithanorganization’sdirectors,officers,employees,members,shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of theclientwhenthelawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowthattheorganization’sinterests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer isdealing.

(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of itsdirectors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents,subject to the provisions ofRule 1.7. If the organization’s consent to the dualrepresentation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by anappropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to berepresented,orbytheshareholders.

COMMENT

[1]TheEntityastheClient.—Anorganizationalclientisalegalentity,butitcannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders andother constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are theconstituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in thisCommentapplyequallytounincorporatedassociations.“Otherconstituents”asused in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors,employeesandshareholdersheldbypersonsactingfororganizationalclientsthatarenotcorporations.

[2]When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicateswith the organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational capacity, thecommunication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if anorganizationalclientrequestsitslawyertoinvestigateallegationsofwrongdoing,interviewsmadein thecourseof that investigationbetweenthelawyerandtheclient’semployeesorotherconstituentsarecoveredbyRule1.6.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatconstituentsofanorganizationalclientaretheclientsofthelawyer.Thelawyermaynotdisclosetosuchconstituentsinformationrelatingtotherepresentationexceptfordisclosuresexplicitlyorimpliedlyauthorizedbytheorganizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwisepermittedbyRule1.6.

[3]Whenconstituentsoftheorganizationmakedecisionsforit,thedecisionsordinarilymust be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence isdoubtful.Decisions concerningpolicy andoperations, includingones entailingserious risk, are not as such in the lawyer’s province. However, differentconsiderations arise when the lawyer knows that the organization may besubstantiallyinjuredbyactionofconstituentthatisinviolationoflaw.Insuchacircumstance, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to ask theconstituenttoreconsiderthematter.Ifthatfails,orifthematterisofsufficientseriousnessandimportancetotheorganization,itmaybereasonablynecessaryforthelawyertotakestepstohavethematterreviewedbyahigherauthorityin

the organization. Clear justification should exist for seeking review over thehead of the constituent normally responsible for it. The stated policy of theorganizationmaydefinecircumstancesandprescribechannelsforsuchreview,and a lawyer should encourage the formulation of such a policy. Even in theabsenceoforganizationpolicy,however, the lawyermayhaveanobligation toreferamattertohigherauthority,dependingontheseriousnessofthematterandwhethertheconstituentinquestionhasapparentmotivestoactatvariancewiththeorganization’sinterest.Reviewbythechiefexecutiveofficerorbytheboardof directorsmay be requiredwhen thematter is of importance commensuratewith their authority. At some point it may be useful or essential to obtain anindependentlegalopinion.

[4] The organization’s highest authority to whom amattermay be referredordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However,applicablelawmayprescribethatundercertainconditionsthehighestauthorityreposeselsewhere,forexample,intheindependentdirectorsofacorporation.

[5]Relation toOtherRules.—Theauthorityand responsibilityprovided inthisRuleareconcurrentwiththeauthorityandresponsibilityprovidedinotherRules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer’sresponsibilityunderRule1.6,1.8,1.16,3.3or4.1. If the lawyer’sservicesarebeingusedby anorganization to further a crimeor fraudby the organization,Rule1.2(d)canbeapplicable.

[6] Government Agency. — The duty defined in this Rule applies togovernmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client andprescribingtheresultingobligationsofsuchlawyersmaybemoredifficultinthegovernmentcontextandisamatterbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.SeeScope[18].Althoughinsomecircumstancestheclientmaybeaspecificagency,itmayalsobeabranchofgovernment,suchastheexecutivebranch,orthegovernmentas awhole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the headof abureau,eitherthedepartmentofwhichthebureauisapartortherelevantbranchofgovernmentmaybetheclientforpurposesofthisRule.Moreover,inamatterinvolving theconductofgovernmentofficials, agovernment lawyermayhaveauthorityunderapplicable law toquestionsuchconductmoreextensively thanthatofalawyerforaprivateorganizationinsimilarcircumstances.Thus,whentheclientisagovernmentalorganization,adifferentbalancemaybeappropriatebetween maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act isprevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties oflawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be

definedby statutesand regulation.ThisRuledoesnot limit that authority.SeeScope.

[7]ClarifyingtheLawyer’sRole.—Therearetimeswhentheorganization’sinterestmaybeorbecomeadversetothoseofoneormoreofitsconstituents.Insuchcircumstancesthelawyershouldadviseanyconstituent,whoseinterestthelawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potentialconflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and thatsuchpersonmaywishtoobtainindependentrepresentation.Caremustbetakento assure that the individual understands that,when there is such adversity ofinterest, the lawyer for theorganizationcannotprovide legal representationforthat constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for theorganizationandtheindividualmaynotbeprivileged.

[8] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for theorganizationtoanyconstituentindividualmayturnonthefactsofeachcase.

[9]Dual Representation. — Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for anorganizationmayalsorepresentaprincipalofficerormajorshareholder.

[10]DerivativeActions.—Undergenerallyprevailing law, theshareholdersormembersofacorporationmaybringsuit tocompelthedirectorstoperformtheir legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members ofunincorporatedassociationshaveessentiallythesameright.Suchanactionmaybe brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legalcontroversyovermanagementoftheorganization.

[11]Thequestioncanarisewhethercounselfortheorganizationmaydefendsuchanaction.Thepropositionthattheorganizationisthelawyer’sclientdoesnotaloneresolvetheissue.Mostderivativeactionsareanormalincidentofanorganization’saffairs,tobedefendedbytheorganization’slawyerlikeanyothersuit.However, if theclaiminvolvesseriouschargesofwrongdoingbythoseincontroloftheorganization,aconflictmayarisebetweenthelawyer’sdutytotheorganization and the lawyer’s relationship with the board. In thosecircumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and theorganization.

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Shareholders’derivativesuits.




Rule1.14.Clientwithdiminishedcapacity.

(a) When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions inconnection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority,mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far asreasonablypossible,maintainanormalclient-lawyerrelationshipwiththeclient.

(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminishedcapacity,isatriskofsubstantialphysical,financialorotherharmunlessactionistakenandcannotadequatelyactintheclient’sowninterest,thelawyermaytakereasonablynecessaryprotectiveaction,includingconsultingwithindividualsorentitiesthathavetheabilitytotakeactiontoprotecttheclientand,inappropriatecases,seekingtheappointmentofaguardianadlitem,conservatororguardian.

(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminishedcapacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant toparagraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to revealinformation about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary toprotecttheclient’sinterests.

COMMENT

[1]Thenormalclient-lawyerrelationshipisbasedontheassumptionthattheclient,whenproperlyadvisedandassisted,iscapableofmakingdecisionsaboutimportant matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminishedmental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationshipmaynotbepossibleinallrespects.Inparticular,aseverelyincapacitatedpersonmay have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a clientwith diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon,and reach conclusions aboutmatters affecting the client’sownwell-being.Forexample,childrenasyoungasfiveorsixyearsofage,andcertainlythoseoftenor twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled toweight in legalproceedingsconcerningtheircustody.Soalso,itisrecognizedthatsomepersonsofadvancedagecanbequitecapableofhandlingroutinefinancialmatterswhileneedingspeciallegalprotectionconcerningmajortransactions.

[2]The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer’sobligationtotreattheclientwithattentionandrespect.Evenifthepersonhasalegalrepresentative,thelawyershouldasfaraspossibleaccordtherepresented

personthestatusofclient,particularlyinmaintainingcommunication.

[3]Theclientmaywishtohavefamilymembersorotherpersonsparticipateindiscussionswith the lawyer.Whennecessary to assist in the representation,the presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of theattorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep theclient’s interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized underparagraph (b), must to look to the client, and not family members, to makedecisionsontheclient’sbehalf.

[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, thelawyershouldordinarilylooktotherepresentativefordecisionsonbehalfoftheclient. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to theparentsasnaturalguardiansmaydependonthetypeofproceedingormatterinwhichthelawyerisrepresentingtheminor.Ifthelawyerrepresentstheguardianasdistinct fromtheward,and isaware that theguardian isactingadversely totheward’sinterest, thelawyermayhaveanobligationtopreventorrectifytheguardian’smisconduct.SeeRule1.2(d).

[5]TakingProtectiveAction.—Ifalawyerreasonablybelievesthataclientisatriskofsubstantialphysical,financialorotherharmunlessactionistaken,andthat a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided inparagraph(a)because theclient lackssufficientcapacity tocommunicateor tomake adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation,then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemednecessary.Suchmeasurescouldinclude:consultingwithfamilymembers,usinga reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement ofcircumstances,usingvoluntarysurrogatedecisionmakingtoolssuchasdurablepowers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services,adult-protectiveagenciesorotherindividualsorentitiesthathavetheabilitytoprotecttheclient.Intakinganyprotectiveaction,thelawyershouldbeguidedbysuch factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, theclient’sbestinterestsandthegoalsofintrudingintotheclient’sdecisionmakingautonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities andrespectingtheclient’sfamilyandsocialconnections.

[6] In determining the extent of the client’s diminished capacity, the lawyershould consider and balance such factors as: the client’s ability to articulatereasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability toappreciateconsequencesofadecision;thesubstantivefairnessofadecision;andtheconsistencyofadecisionwiththeknownlong-termcommitmentsandvalues

oftheclient.Inappropriatecircumstances,thelawyermayseekguidancefromanappropriatediagnostician.

[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer shouldconsiderwhetherappointmentofaguardianadlitem,conservatororguardianisnecessary to protect the client’s interests. Thus, if a client with diminishedcapacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client’s benefit,effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legalrepresentative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes providethat minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by aguardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In manycircumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be moreexpensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require.Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professionaljudgmentofthelawyer.Inconsideringalternatives,however,thelawyershouldbe aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictiveactiononbehalfoftheclient.

[8] Disclosure of the Client’s Condition. — Disclosure of the client’sdiminished capacity could adversely affect the client’s interests. For example,raisingthequestionofdiminishedcapacitycould,insomecircumstances,leadtoproceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to therepresentationisprotectedbyRule1.6.Therefore,unlessauthorizedtodoso,thelawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective actionpursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make thenecessary disclosures, evenwhen the client directs the lawyer to the contrary.Nevertheless,giventherisksofdisclosure,paragraph(c)limitswhatthelawyermay disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking theappointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer shoulddeterminewhether it is likely that the person or entity consultedwithwill actadverselytotheclient’sinterestsbeforediscussingmattersrelatedtotheclient.Thelawyer’spositioninsuchcasesisanunavoidablydifficultone.

[9]EmergencyLegalAssistance.—Inanemergencywherethehealth,safetyor a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity isthreatenedwithimminentandirreparableharm,alawyermaytakelegalactiononbehalfofsuchapersoneventhoughthepersonisunabletoestablishaclient-lawyerrelationshiportomakeorexpressconsideredjudgmentsaboutthematter,when the person or another acting in good faith on that person’s behalf hasconsulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer

shouldnotactunlessthelawyerreasonablybelievesthatthepersonhasnootherlawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legalaction on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary tomaintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm.AlawyerwhoundertakestorepresentapersoninsuchanexigentsituationhasthesamedutiesundertheseRulesasthelawyerwouldwithrespecttoaclient.

[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminishedcapacityinanemergencyshouldkeeptheconfidencesofthepersonasifdealingwith a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish theintendedprotectiveaction.Thelawyershoulddisclosetoanytribunalinvolvedandtoanyothercounselinvolvedthenatureofhisorherrelationshipwiththeperson.Thelawyershouldtakestepstoregularizetherelationshiporimplementotherprotectivesolutionsassoonaspossible.Normally,alawyerwouldnotseekcompensationforsuchemergencyactionstaken.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Basisforinquiry.

Where a lawyer’s actions appear contrary to the client’s stateddecision, thelawyerwhomovesforadeterminationofhisclient’scompetency,presumablyingoodfaith,must,ataminimum,demonstrateanobjectiveandreasonablebasisforbelievingthattheclientcannotactinhisowninterest.RedDogv.State,625A.2d245(Del.1993).

Protectiveaction.

Althoughmembers of defendant’s defense teamdidnot act in bad faith norweremotivatedbyotherthanthebestinterestsoftheirclient,thedifferencesofopinion among the members led to inconsistent positions and a changingstrategy,anddidnotmeet therequirementsofreasonablenessundersubsection(b)ofthisRule.RedDogv.State,625A.2d245(Del.1993).




Rule1.15.Safekeepingproperty.

(a)Alawyershallholdpropertyofclientsorthirdpersonsthatisinalawyer’spossession inconnectionwitha representationseparate from the lawyer’sownproperty.Fundsshallbekept inaseparateaccountdesignatedsolely for fundsheld in connection with the practice of law in this jurisdiction. Except asprovided in (g) with respect to IOLTA-eligible funds, such funds shall bemaintainedinthestateinwhichthelawyer’sofficeissituatedorelsewherewiththeconsentoftheclientorthirdperson.Fundsofthelawyerthatarereasonablysufficient to pay financial institution chargesmaybe deposited in the separateaccount;however,suchamountmaynotexceed$2,000andmustbeseparatelystatedandaccountedforinthesamemannerasclients’fundsdepositedtherein.Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.Completerecordsofsuchaccountfundsandotherpropertyshallbekeptbythelawyerandshallbepreservedforaperiodoffiveyearsafterthecompletionoftheeventsthattheyrecord.

(b)Uponreceiving fundsorotherproperty inwhichaclientor thirdpersonhasaninterest,alawyershallpromptlynotifytheclientorthirdperson.Exceptas stated in thisRuleorotherwisepermittedby laworby agreementwith theclient,alawyershallpromptlydelivertotheclientorthirdpersonanyfundsorother property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, uponrequest by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accountingregardingsuchproperty.

(c)Wheninthecourseofrepresentationalawyerisinpossessionofpropertyinwhichboth the lawyerandanotherpersonclaiminterests, thepropertyshallbekeptseparatebythelawyeruntilthereisanaccountingandseveranceoftheirinterests. Ifadisputearisesconcerning their respective interests, theportion indisputeshallbekeptseparatebythelawyeruntilthedisputeisresolved.

(d) A lawyer engaged in the private practice of law in this jurisdiction,whetherinanofficesituatedinthisjurisdictionorotherwise,mustmaintainonacurrent basis financial books and records relating to such practice, and shallpreservethebooksandrecordsforatleastfiveyearsfollowingthecompletionoftheyear towhich they relate, or, as to fiduciarybooksand records, fiveyearsfollowingthecompletionofthatfiduciaryobligation.Themaintenanceofbooksandrecordsmustconformwiththefollowingprovisions:

(1)Allbankstatements,cancelledchecks(orimagesand/orcopiesthereofasprovidedbythebank),recordsofelectronictransfers,andduplicatedepositslipsrelating to fiduciaryandnon-fiduciaryaccountsmustbepreserved.Recordsofall electronic transfers from fiduciary accounts shall include the name of theperson authorizing transfer, the date of transfer, the name of recipient andconfirmationfromthebankinginstitutionconfirmingthenumberofthefiduciaryaccountfromwhichthefundsarewithdrawnandthedateandtimetherequestfortransferwascompleted.

(2) Bank accounts maintained for fiduciary funds must be specificallydesignatedas“Rule1.15AAttorneyTrustAccount”or“1.15ATrustAccount”or“Rule1.15AAttorneyEscrowAccount”or“1.15AEscrowAccount,”andmustbeusedonlyforfundsheldinafiduciarycapacity.Adesignationoftheaccountasa“Rule1.15AAttorneyTrustAccount”or“1.15ATrustAccount”or“Rule1.15AAttorneyEscrowAccount”or“1.15AEscrowAccount,”mustappear intheaccounttitleonthebankstatement.Otherrelatedstatements,checks,depositslips, and other documents maintained for fiduciary funds, must contain, at aminimum, a designation of the account as “Attorney Trust Account” or“AttorneyEscrowAccount.”

(3) Bank accounts and related statements, checks, deposit slips, and otherdocumentsmaintainedfornon-fiduciaryfundsmustbespecificallydesignatedas“Attorney Business Account” or “Attorney Operating Account,” and must beused only for funds held in a non-fiduciary capacity. A lawyer in the privatepractice of law shall maintain a non-fiduciary account for general operatingpurposes,andtheaccountshallbeseparatefromanyofthelawyer’spersonalorotheraccounts.

(4)Allrecordsrelatingtopropertyotherthancashreceivedbyalawyerinafiduciarycapacityshallbemaintainedandpreserved.Therecordsmustdescribewithspecificitytheidentityandlocationofsuchproperty.

(5)Allbillingrecordsreflectingfeeschargedandotherbillings toclientsorotherpartiesmustbemaintainedandpreserved.

(6) Cash receipts and cash disbursement journals must be maintained andpreservedforeachbankaccountforthepurposeofrecordingfiduciaryandnon-fiduciarytransactions.Alawyerusingamanualsystemforsuchpurposesmusttotalandbalancethetransactioncolumnsonamonthlybasis.

(7)Amonthlyreconciliationforeachbankaccount,matchingtotalsfromthecash receipts and cash disbursement journals with the ending check register

balance,must beperformed.The reconciliationprocedures, however, shall notberequiredforlawyersusingacomputeraccountingsystemorageneralledger.

(8) The check register balance for each bank account must be reconciledmonthlytothebankstatementbalance.

(9) Copies of retainer and compensation agreements with clients shall bemaintainedandpreservedasrequiredbyRule1.5.

(10) Copies of accountings to clients or third persons showing thedisbursement of funds to them or on their behalf shall be maintained andpreserved.

(11) Copies of records showing disbursements on behalf clients shall bemaintainedandpreserved.

(12)Withrespecttoallfiduciaryaccounts:

(A) A subsidiary ledger must be maintained and preserved with a separateaccount for each client or third party in which cash receipts and cashdisbursementtransactionsandmonthlybalancesarerecorded.

(B) Monthly listings of client or third party balances must be preparedshowingthenameandbalanceofeachclientor thirdparty,andthetotalofallbalances.

(C)Nofundsdisbursedforaclientorthirdpartymustbeinexcessoffundsreceived from that client or third party. If, however, through error fundsdisbursed for a client or third party exceed funds received from that client orthirdparty, the lawyer shall transfer funds from thenon-fiduciaryaccount inatimelymannertocovertheexcessdisbursement.

(D)Thereconciledtotalcashbalancemustagreewiththetotaloftheclientorthird party balance listing. There shall be no unidentified client or third partyfunds. The bank reconciliation for a fiduciary account is not complete unlessthereisagreementwiththetotalofclientorthirdpartyaccounts.

(E) If a checkhas been issued in an attempt to disburse funds, but remainsoutstanding(thatis,thecheckhasnotclearedthetrustorescrowbankaccount)sixmonths ormore from the date itwas issued, a lawyer shall promptly takesteps tocontact thepayeetodeterminethereasonthecheckwasnotdepositedbythepayee,andshallissueareplacementcheck,asnecessaryandappropriate.Withregardtoabandonedorunclaimedtrustfunds,alawyershallcomplywithrequirementsofSupremeCourtRule73.

(F)NofundsofthelawyershallbeplacedinorleftintheaccountexceptasprovidedinRule1.15(a).

(G)Nofundswhichshouldhavebeendisbursedshallremainintheaccount,including,butnotlimitedto,earnedlegalfees,whichmustbetransferredtothelawyer’snon-fiduciaryaccountonapromptandtimelybasiswhenearned.

(H)When a separate real estate bank account is maintained for settlementtransactions, and when client or third party funds are received but not yetdisbursed,a listingmustbepreparedonamonthlybasis showing thenameoftheclientorthirdparty,thebalanceduetoeachclientorthirdparty,andthetotalofallsuchbalances.Thetotalmustagreewiththereconciledcashbalance.

(I) Only a lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction or a personunder the direct supervision of the lawyer shall be an authorized signatory orauthorizetransfersfromaclienttrustaccount.

(J) Withdrawals from a client trust account shall be made only by checkpayabletoanamedpayeeandnottocash,orbyauthorizedelectronictransfer.

(13) If a lawyer maintains financial books and records using a computersystem, the lawyer must cause to be printed each month a hard copy of allmonthlyjournals,ledgers,reports,andreconciliations,and/orcausetobecreatedeach month an electronic backup of these documents to be stored in such amannerastomakethemaccessibleforreviewbythelawyerand/ortheauditorfortheLawyers’FundforClientProtection.

(e)Alawyer’sfinancialbooksandrecordsmustbesubjecttoexaminationbythe auditor for the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection, for the purpose ofverifying the accuracy of a certificate of compliance filed each year by thelawyerpursuanttoSupremeCourtRule69.Theexaminationmustbeconductedso as to preserve, insofar as is consistent with these Rules, the confidentialnatureofthelawyer’sbooksandrecords.Ifthelawyer’sbooksandrecordsarenot located inDelaware, the lawyermayhave theoptioneither toproduce thebooksandrecordsatthelawyer’sofficeinDelawareortoproducethebooksandrecordsatthelocationoutsideofDelawarewheretheyareordinarilylocated.IftheproductionoccursoutsideofDelaware, the lawyershallpayanyadditionalexpensesincurredbytheauditorforthepurposesofanexamination.

(f)Alawyerholdingclientorthird-personfundsmustinitiallyandreasonablydeterminewhether the funds should or should not be placed in an interest ordividend-bearingaccountforthebenefitoftheclientorthirdperson.Inmakingsuch a determination, the lawyer must consider the financial interests of the

clientorthirdperson,thecostsofestablishingandmaintainingtheaccount,anytaxreportingproceduresorrequirements,thenatureofthetransactioninvolved,thelikelihoodofdelayintherelevantproceedings,andwhetherthefundsareofanominalamountorareexpectedtobeheldbythelawyerforashortperiodoftimesuchthatthecostsincurredtosecureincomefortheclientorthirdpersonwould exceed such income. A lawyer must at reasonable intervals considerwhetherchangedcircumstanceswouldwarrantanewdeterminationwithrespecttothedepositofclientorthird-personfunds.ExceptasprovidedintheseRules,interest or dividends earned on client or third-person funds placed into aninterestordividend-bearingaccountforthebenefitoftheclientorthirdperson(less any deductions for service charges or other fees of the depositoryinstitution)shallbelongtotheclientorthirdpersonwhosefundsaredeposited,and the lawyer shall have no right or claim to such interest or dividends, andmaynototherwisereceiveanyfinancialbenefitorothereconomicconcessionsrelating to a banking relationship with the institution where any account ismaintainedpursuanttothisRule.

(g) A lawyer holding client or third person funds who has reasonablydetermined,pursuanttosubsection(f)ofthisRule,thatsuchfundsneednotbedepositedintoaninterestordividend-bearingaccountforthebenefitoftheclientor third-person must establish and maintain one or more pooled trust/escrowaccountsinafinancialinstitutioninDelawareforthedepositofallclientorthirdpersonfundsheldinconnectionwiththepracticeoflawinthisjurisdictionthatarenominalinamountortobeheldbythelawyerforashortperiodsuchthatthecostsincurredtosecureincomefortheclientorthirdpersonwouldexceedsuchincome (IOLTA-eligible funds). This requirement shall not apply to a lawyerwhoeitherhasobtainedinactivestatuspursuanttoSupremeCourtRule69(d)orhasobtainedaCertificateofRetirementpursuanttoSupremeCourtRule69(f).Each pooled trust/escrow account must be established as a pooled interest ordividend-bearingaccount(IOLTAAccount)incompliancewiththeprovisionsofthis Rule, except those accounts exempted under section (h)(7) below. Thelawyer shallhaveno rightor claim to such interestordividends, andmaynototherwisereceiveanyfinancialbenefitorothereconomicconcessionsrelatingtoa banking relationship with the institution where any account is maintainedpursuanttothisRule.

(h)LawyersmaymaintainIOLTAAccountsonlyinfinancialinstitutionsthatareapprovedbytheLawyersFundForClientProtectionpursuanttoRule1.15Aof these Rules, and are determined by the Delaware Bar Foundation (theFoundation)tobe“eligibleinstitutions”.Eligibleinstitutionsaredefinedasthose

institutionsthatvoluntarilyofferacomparableinterestrateonIOLTAAccountsand meet the other requirements of this Rule. A comparable interest rate onIOLTAAccountsmeansaratethatisnolessthanthehighestrateofinterestordividends generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customerswhen IOLTA Accounts meet or exceed the same minimum balance or otheraccounteligibilityqualifications, ifany.Indeterminingthecomparableinterestrateordividend,aneligible institutionmayconsider factors, inaddition to theIOLTAAccountbalance,customarilyconsideredbytheinstitutionwhensettingratesofinterestordividendsforitscustomers,providedthatsuchfactorsdonotdiscriminateagainstIOLTAAccounts.

(1)Aneligibleinstitutionmaysatisfythecomparableinterestraterequirementbyelectingoneofthefollowingthreeoptions:

(A)establishtheIOLTAAccountasthecomparableinterestrateproduct;

(B)paythecomparableinterestrateontheIOLTAAccountinlieuofactuallyestablishingtheIOLTAAccountasthecomparableinterestrateproduct;or

(C) pay the “Safe Harbor Rate” on the IOLTA Account (as posted on theFoundation’swebsite).Until redetermined by theFoundation, theSafeHarborRateisthehigherof0.65%perannumor65%oftheFederalFundsTargetRateas of the first day of the IOLTA Account earnings period, net of AllowableReasonableServiceChargesandFees(asdefinedinsection(h)(5)below).TheSafeHarborRateshallbereevaluatedperiodically,butnomorefrequentlythanevery sixmonths, by the Foundation to reflect an overall comparable interestrate offered by financial institutions inDelaware andmay be redetermined bytheFoundationfollowingsuchreevaluation.Uponanysuchredetermination,theFoundation shall give at least 90 days advancewritten notice of the effectivedateofsuch redetermination toalleligible institutionsmaintainingany IOLTAAccounts and by posting on its website. Election of the Safe Harbor Rate isoptionalandeligibleinstitutionsmayinsteadchoosetosatisfycompliancewiththisRulebyelectinginsteadeitheroption(A)or(B)above.

(2)IOLTAAccountsmaybeestablishedas:

(A) a business checking account with an automated investment feature inovernight daily financial institution repurchase agreements or money marketfunds. A daily financial institution repurchase agreement shall be fullycollateralized by U. S. Government Securities (meaning U.S. Treasuryobligationsandobligations issuedorguaranteedas toprincipaland interestbythe United States government), and may be established only with an eligible

institution that is “well-capitalized” or “adequately capitalized” as those termsare defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations. A “money marketfund”isaninvestmentcompanyregisteredundertheInvestmentCompanyActof1940,asamended,thatisqualifiedtoholditselfouttoinvestorsasamoneymarket fund under Rules and Regulations adopted by the Securities andExchange Commission pursuant to said Act. A money market fund shall beinvested solely inU.S.GovernmentSecurities, or repurchase agreements fullycollateralizedbyU.S.GovernmentSecurities,and,atthetimeoftheinvestment,shall have total assets of at least two hundred fifty million dollars($250,000,000).

(B)acheckingaccountpayingpreferred interest rates,suchasmarketbasedorindexedrates;

(C)apublicfundsinterest-bearingcheckingaccountsuchasanaccountusedforgovernmentalagenciesandothernon-profitorganizations;

(D) an interest-bearing checking account such as a negotiable order ofwithdrawal(NOW)account;orbusinesscheckingwithinterest;or

(E) any other interest or dividend-bearing account offered by the eligibleinstitutiontoitsnon-IOLTAcustomers,whichiscommerciallyreasonabletouseforapooledaccountofshorttermornominalamountfunds.

(3)Nothing in this rule shall preclude an eligible institution from paying ahigherrateofinterestordividendsonIOLTAAccountsthandescribedaboveorelectingtowaiveservicechargesorfeesonIOLTAAccounts.

(4) Interest and dividends on IOLTA Accounts shall be calculated inaccordance with the eligible institution’s standard practice for non-IOLTAcustomers.

(5)“AllowableReasonableServiceChargesorFees”forIOLTAAccountsaredefinedaspercheckcharges,perdepositcharges,anaccountmaintenancefee,automated transfer (“sweep”) fees, FDIC insurance fees, and a reasonableIOLTA administrative fee for the direct costs of complyingwith the reportingandpayment requirementsof this rule.AllowableReasonableServiceChargesorFeesmayonlybedeductedfrominterestordividendsonanIOLTAaccountatthe rates and in accordance with the customary practices of the eligibleinstitution for non-IOLTA customers. No service charges or fees other thanAllowable Reasonable Service Charges and Fees may be assessed against ordeducted from the interest or dividends on an IOLTAAccount.NoAllowableReasonable Service Charges or Fees on an IOLTAAccount for any reporting

period shall be taken from interest or dividends earned on other IOLTAAccounts,or from theprincipalbalanceof any IOLTAAccount.Any fees andservices charges (other than Allowable Reasonable Service Charges and FeesdeductedfrominterestonanIOLTAAccount),includingbutnotlimitedtobankoverdraft fees, wire transfer fees, remote deposit fees and fees for checksreturned for insufficient funds, shall be the sole responsibility of, andmay bechargedto,thelawyerorlawfirmmaintainingtheIOLTAAccount.NothinginthisRuleshallprohibitalawyerorlawfirmmaintaininganIOLTAaccountfromrecouping fees charged to their IOLTA account from the appropriate client onwhosebehalfthefeewasincurredandasotherwiseprovidedforintheRulesofProfessionalConduct.

(6)Lawyersor lawfirmsdepositingclientor thirdparty funds inanIOLTAAccountunderthisparagraph(h)shalldirecttheeligibleinstitution:

(A)toremitinterestmonthly,or,withtheconsentoftheFoundation,quarterly(net of anyAllowableReasonableServiceCharges or Fees), computed on theaveragemonthly balance in the account or otherwise computed in accordancewiththeinstitution’sstandardpractices,providedthattheeligibleinstitutionmayelecttowaiveanyorallsuchchargesandfees;

(B)totransmitwitheachremittancetotheFoundationareportinaformandthrough any reasonable manner of transmission approved by the Foundationshowing the name of the lawyer or law firm on each IOLTAAccount whoseremittanceissent,theIOLTAAccountnumberforeachaccount,theamountofinterest attributable to each IOLTA Account, the time period covered by thereport,therateofinterestordividendapplied,theamountandtypeofAllowableReasonable Service Charges or Fees deducted, if any, the average accountbalancefortheperiodforwhichthereportwasmade,thenetamountofinterestremittedfortheperiodandsuchotherinformationasmaybereasonablyrequiredbytheFoundation;and

(C)totransmittothedepositinglawyerorlawfirmastatementinaccordancewithnormalproceduresforreportingtodepositorsoftheeligibleinstitution.

(7)Any IOLTAaccountwhich has not or cannot reasonably be expected togenerate interest or dividends in excess of Allowable Reasonable ServiceChargesorFees,may,undercriteriaestablishedbytheFoundation,beexemptedbytheFoundationfromrequiredparticipationintheIOLTAprogram.ExemptionofanIOLTAaccountfromtheIOLTAprogramrevokesthepermissiontousetheFoundation’staxidentificationnumberforthataccount.Thelawyerorlawfirm

whoseaccounthasbeenexemptedwillannuallycertifytotheSupremeCourt,aspartofitsAnnualCertificateofCompliance,thatthelawyerorlawfirmexpectsnomaterial increaseinactivityinitsexemptedtrust/escrowaccountduringthe12monthsfollowingthedateofthefilingoftheCertificate.TheFoundationwillreviewexemptedaccountsandmay revoke theexemption if itdetermines thatthe account can generate interest or dividends in excess of AllowableReasonableServiceChargesandFees.

(8) In order for the Foundation to be able to determine that all pooledtrust/escrow accounts are properly identified by the eligible institutions, eachlawyer or law firm thatmaintains a pooled trust/escrow account is deemed tohave authorized the Foundation to have access to the pooled trust/escrowaccount-related information contained within its Annual Certificate ofCompliance,filedannuallywiththeSupremeCourt.Inaddition,whenalawyerorlawfirmrequestsaneligibleinstitutiontoopenanIOLTAaccount,thelawyeror law firm will submit the request in writing to the institution, using thedesignatedformletterlocatedontheFoundation’swebsite,withacopyofsaidlettertobesenttotheFoundationbythelawyerorlawfirm.

(9) Should the Foundation determine that an IOLTAAccount of a financialinstitutionhasfailedtocomplywiththeprovisionsofthisRule,theFoundationshallnotifytheaffectedlawyerorlawfirmandthefinancialinstitutionofsuchfailuretocomply,specifyingthecorrectiveactionneeded,withareasonabletimespecified by the Foundation for the compliance to be achieved, but no longerthan90days.Shouldcompliancenotbeachievedwithinthetimespecified,theFoundationshallnotifytheaffectedlawyerorlawfirm,thefinancialinstitutionandtheOfficeofDisciplinaryCounsel.

(i)ThefundstransmittedtotheFoundationshallbeavailablefordistributionforthefollowingpurposes:

(1)Toimprovetheadministrationofjustice;

(2)Toprovideandtoenhancethedeliveryoflegalservicestothepoor;

(3)Tosupportlawrelatededucation;

(4)Forsuchotherpurposesthatservethepublicinterest.

TheDelawareBarFoundationshallrecommendfortheapprovaloftheSupremeCourtof theStateofDelaware, suchdistributionsas itmaydeemappropriate.DistributionsshallbemadeonlyupontheCourt’sapproval.

(j) Lawyers or law firms, depositing client or third party funds in a pooled

trust/escrow account under this paragraph shall not be required to advise theclient or third party of such deposit or of the purposes to which the interestaccumulatedbyreasonofsuchdepositsistobedirected.

(k)Alawyershallnotdisbursefiduciaryfundsfromabankaccountunlessthefundsdeposited in the lawyer’s fiduciaryaccount tobedisbursed,or thefundswhichareinthelawyer’sunrestrictedpossessionandcontrolandareorwillbetimely deposited, are good funds as hereinafter defined. “Good funds” shallmean:

(1)cash;

(2)electronicfund(“wire”)transfer;

(3)certifiedcheck;

(4)bankcashier’scheckortreasurer’scheck;

(5)U.S.TreasuryorStateofDelawareTreasurycheck;

(6)Checkdrawnonaseparatetrustorescrowaccountofanattorneyengagedin the private practice of law in the State of Delaware held in a fiduciarycapacity,includinghisorherclient’sfunds;

(7) Check of an insurance company that is authorized by the InsuranceCommissionerofDelawaretotransactinsurancebusinessinDelaware;

(8)Checkinanamountnogreaterthan$10,000.00;

(9) Check greater than $10,000.00, which has been actually and finallycollectedandmaybedrawnagainstunder federalor statebanking regulationsthenineffect;

(10)CheckdrawnonanescrowaccountofarealestatebrokerlicensedbythestateofDelawareuptothelimitofguaranteeprovidedpertransactionbystatute.(Amended,effectiveJan.1,2004;Oct.20,2008,effectiveJan.1,2009;Dec.12,2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009; Feb. 16, 2010, effectiveMay 1, 2010; June 10,2010,effectiveNov.1,2010;effectiveApr.25,2012;effectiveJan.21,2015.)

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of aprofessional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, exceptwhensomeotherformofsafekeepingiswarrantedbyspecialcircumstances.Allpropertywhichisthepropertyofclientsorthirdpersonsshouldbekeptseparate

fromthelawyer’sbusinessandpersonalpropertyand,ifmonies,inoneormoretrust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administeringestatemoniesoractinginsimilarfiduciarycapacities.

[2]Lawyers often receive funds from third parties fromwhich the lawyer’sfee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds withoutpayingthefee,thelawyerisnotrequiredtoremittheportionfromwhichthefeeis to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client intoaccepting the lawyer’scontention.Thedisputedportionof thefundsshouldbekept in trustand the lawyershouldsuggestmeansforpromptresolutionof thedispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall bepromptlydistributed.

[3] Third parties, such as a client’s creditors, may have just claims againstfundsorotherpropertyinalawyer’scustody.Alawyermayhaveadutyunderapplicable law to protect such third-party claims againstwrongful interferencebytheclient,andaccordinglymayrefusetosurrenderthepropertytotheclient.However,alawyershouldnotunilaterallyassumetoarbitrateadisputebetweentheclientandthethirdparty.

[4] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of thosearisingfromactivityotherthanrenderinglegalservices.Forexample,alawyerwho serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating tofiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in thetransaction.

[5]TheextensiveprovisionscontainedinRule1.15(d)representthefinancialrecordkeeping requirements that lawyers must follow when engaged in theprivatepracticeoflawinthisjurisdiction.Theseprovisionsarealsoreflectedina certificate of compliance that is included in each lawyer’s registrationstatement,filedannuallypursuanttoDelawareSupremeCourtRule69.

[6]Compliancewiththeseprovisionsprovidesthenecessarylevelofcontroltosafeguardclientandthirdpartyfunds,aswellasthelawyer’soperatingfunds.Whentheserecordkeepingproceduresarenotperformedonapromptandtimelybasis, there will be a loss of control by the lawyer, resulting in insufficientsafeguardsoverclientandotherproperty.

[7] Rule 1.15(d)(12)(I) and (J) enumerate minimal accounting controls forclient trust accounts. They also enunciate the requirement that only a lawyeradmittedtothepracticeoflawinDelawareorapersonwhoisunderthedirectsupervision of the lawyer shall be the authorized signatory or authorize

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/DEL.%20SUP.%20CT.%20R.%2069

electronic transfers fromaclient trustaccount.While it ispermissible tograntlimitednonlawyeraccesstoaclienttrustaccount,suchaccessshouldbelimitedand closelymonitored by the lawyer. The lawyer has a non-delegable duty toprotectandpreservethefundsinaclienttrustaccountandcanbedisciplinedforfailuretosupervisesubordinateswhomisappropriateclientfunds.See,Rules5.1and5.3oftheDelawareLawyersRulesofProfessionalConduct.

[8]Authorizedelectronictransfersshallbelimitedto

(1) money required for payment to a client or third person on behalf of aclient;

(2) expenses properly incurred on behalf of a client, such as filing fees orpayment to third persons for services rendered in connection with therepresentation;

(3)moneytransferredtothelawyerforfeesthatareearnedinconnectionwiththerepresentationandarenotindispute;or

(4) money transferred from one client trust account to another client trustaccount.

[9]SomeoftheessentialfinancialrecordkeepingissuesforlawyersunderthisRuleincludethefollowing:

(a) Segregation of funds. Improper commingling occurs when the lawyer’sfunds are deposited in an account intended for the holding of client and thirdparty funds, orwhenclient funds aredeposited in an account intended for theholding of the lawyer’s funds. The only exception is found in Rule 1.15(a),whichallowsa lawyer tomaintain$500of the lawyer’s funds in the fiduciaryaccount in order to cover possible bank service charges. Keeping an accurateaccountofeachclient’sfundsismoredifficultifclientfundsarecombinedwiththe lawyer’sownfunds.Therequirementofseparatebankaccountsfor lawyerfundsandnon-lawyerfunds,withseparatebookkeepingproceduresforeach,isintendedtoavoidcommingling.

(b)Depositsof legal fees.Unearned legal feesare thepropertyof theclientuntilearned,andthereforemustbedepositedintothelawyer’sfiduciaryaccount.Legalfeesmustbewithdrawnfromthefiduciaryaccountandtransferredtotheoperating or business account promptly upon being earned, to avoid impropercommingling.Themonthlylistingofclientandthirdpartyfundsinthefiduciaryaccount should therefore be carefully reviewed in order to determinewhetheranyearnedlegalfeesremainintheaccount.

(c) Identity of property. The identity and location of client funds and otherpropertymust bemaintained at all times.Accordingly, every cash receipt anddisbursementtransactioninthefiduciaryaccountmustbespecificallyidentifiedby the name of the client or third party. If financial books and records aremaintained in themanner, the resultant control shouldensure that therearenounidentifiedfundsinthelawyer’spossession.

(d) Disbursement of funds. Funds due to clients or third parties must bedisbursedwithoutunnecessarydelay.Themonthlylistingofclientfundsinthefiduciaryaccount should thereforebe reviewedcarefully inorder todeterminewhetheranybalancesduetoclientsorthirdpartiesremainintheaccount.

(e)Negativebalances.Thedisbursementof clientor thirdparty funds in anamountgreaterthantheamountbeingheldforsuchclientorthirdpartyresultsinanegativebalanceinthefiduciaryaccount.Thisshouldneveroccurwhenthepropercontrolsareinplace.However,ifanegativebalanceoccursbymistakeoroversight, the lawyermustmakea timely transferof funds from theoperatingaccount to thefiduciaryaccount inorder tocover theexcessdisbursementandcurethenegativebalance.Suchmistakescanbeavoidedbymakingcertainthatthe client balance sufficiently covers a potential disbursement prior tomakingtheactualdisbursement.

(f)Reconciliations.Reconciledcashbalances in the fiduciaryaccountsmustagreewiththetotalsofclientbalancesheld.Onlybyperformingareconciliationprocedure will the lawyer be assured that the cash balance in the fiduciaryaccountexactlycoversthebalanceofclientandthirdpartyfundsthatthelawyerisholding.

(g) Real estate accounts. Bank accounts used exclusively for real estatesettlement transactions are fiduciary accounts, and are therefore subject to thesame recordkeeping requirements as other such accounts, except that cashreceiptsandcashdisbursementsjournalsarenotrequired.

[10] Illustrations of some of the accounting terms that lawyers need to beawareof,asusedinthisRule,includethefollowing:

(a)Financialbooksandrecordsincludeallpaperdocumentsorcomputerfilesin which fiduciary and non-fiduciary transactions are individually recorded,balanced, reconciled,and totalled.Such records includecash receiptsandcashdisbursements journals, general and subsidiary journals, periodic reports,monthlyreconciliations,listings,andsoon.

(b)Thecashreceiptsjournalisamonthlylistingofalldepositsmadeduring

themonthandidentifiedbydate,sourcename,andamount,andindistributioncolumns, the nature of the funds received, such as “fee income” or “advancefromclient,”andsoon.Suchajournalismaintainedforeachbankaccount.

(c) The cash disbursements journal is a listing of all check paymentsmadeduring the month and identified by date, payee name, check number, andamount, and in distribution columns, the nature of funds disbursed, such as“rent” or “payroll,”and so on. Such a journal is maintained for each bankaccount.Cashreceiptsandcashdisbursementrecordsmaybemaintainedinoneconsolidatedjournal.

(d) Totals and balances refer to the procedures that the lawyer needs toperformwhenusingamanualsystemforaccountingpurposes,inordertoensurethat the totals in themonthlycash receipts andcashdisbursements journal arecorrect.The cash and distribution columnsmust be added up for eachmonth,thenthetotalcashreceivedordisbursedmustbecomparedwiththetotalofallofthedistributioncolumns.

(e)Theendingcheckregisterbalanceistheaccumulatednetcashbalanceofall deposits, check payments, and adjustments for each bank account. Thisbalancewillnotnormallyagreewiththebankbalanceappearingontheend-of-monthbankstatementbecausedepositsandchecksmaynotclearwiththebankuntilthenextstatementperiod.Thisiswhyareconciliationisnecessary.

(f)Thereconciledmonthlycashbalanceisthebankbalanceconformedtothecheck register balance by taking into account the items recorded in the checkregisterwhichhavenotclearedthebank.Forexample:

(g) The general ledger is a yearly record in which all of a lawyer’stransactions are recorded and grouped by type, such as cash received, cashdisbursed,feeincome,fundsduetoclients,andsoon.Eachtypeoftransactionrecordedinthegeneral ledgerisalsosummarizedasanaggregatebalance.Forexample,theledgershowscashbalancesforeachbankaccountwhichrepresenttheaccumulationofthebeginningbalance,allofthedepositsintheperiod,and

allofthechecksissuedintheperiod.

(h)Thesubsidiaryledgeristhelistoftransactionsshownbyeachindividualclient or thirdparty,with the individual balancesof each (as contrasted to thegeneral ledger, which lists the total balances in an aggregate amount “due toclients”).Thetotalofalloftheindividualclientandthirdpartybalancesinthesubsidiary ledger should agree with the total account balance in the generalledger.

(i)A variance occurs in a reconciliation procedurewhen two figureswhichshould agree do not in fact agree. For example, a variance occurs when thereconciledcashbalance ina fiduciaryaccountdoesnotagreewith the totalofclientandthirdpartyfundsthatthelawyerisactuallyholding.

[11]Accruedinterestonclientandotherfundsinalawyer’spossessionisnotthepropertyofthelawyer,butisgenerallyconsideredtobethepropertyoftheowner of the principal.An exception to this legal principle relates to nominalamounts of interest on principal. A lawyer must reasonably determine if thetransactional or other costs of tracking and transferring such interest to theowners of the principal are greater than the amount of the interest itself. Thelawyer’s proper determination along these lines will result in the lawyer’sdepositingoffiduciaryfundsintoaninterest-bearingaccountfor thebenefitoftheownersof theprincipal, or into apooled interest-bearing account. If fundsaredepositedintoapooledaccount,theinterestistobetransferred(withsomeexception) to theDelawareBarFoundationpursuant to theDelawareSupremeCourt’sInterestOnLawyerTrustAccountsProgram(“IOLTA”).

[12] Implicit in the principles underlyingRule 1.15 is the strict prohibitionagainst themisappropriationofclientor thirdparty funds.Misappropriationoffiduciary funds is clearly a violation of the lawyer’s obligation to safeguardclientandotherfunds.Moreover,intentionalorknowingmisappropriationmayalsobeaviolationRule8.4(b)(criminalconductintheformoftheft)andRule8.4(c) (general dishonest or deceptive conduct). Intentional or knowingmisappropriationisconsideredtobeoneofthemostseriousactsofprofessionalmisconduct in which a lawyer can engage, and typically results in severedisciplinarysanctions.

[13]Misappropriationincludesanyunauthorizedtakingbyalawyerofclientorotherproperty,evenforbenignreasonsorwherethereisanintenttoreplenishsuch funds. Althoughmisappropriation bymistake, neglect, or recklessness isnot as serious as intentional or knowingmisappropriation, it can nevertheless

result in severe disciplinary sanctions. See, e.g.Matter of Figliola,Del. Supr.,652A.2d1071,1076-78(1995).

__________

Revisor’snote.—TheReportoncompliancewithRule1.15oftheDelawareRulesofProfessionalConductandtheapplicableguidelinesandauditprogramappearasRuleVIIoftheRegulationsoftheTrusteesoftheLawyer’sFundforClientProtection.

Thebracketedparagraphdesignation“(g)”inparagraph(h)andthebracketedletter“s”at theendof theword“accounts” insubdivision(l)were insertedbythepublisher.

Effect of amendments.— The 2015 amendment, effective Jan. 21, 2015,substituted“$2,000”for“$1000”inthefourthsentenceof(a).

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.

—Clientfunds.

——Delivery.

——Safeguarding.

Lawfirms.

—Bookkeeping.

—Reprimand.

—Taxes.

Sanctions.

—Disbarment.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Clientrelations.

—Clientfunds.


http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/DEL.%20RULES%20OF%20PROFL%20CONDUCT%201.15

——Delivery.

Respondent violated subsection (b) of this Rule by negligently failing toaccount foranddeliver todaughter,uponhermajority, thenetproceedsof thewrongfuldeathsettlementarising fromhermother’s fatalautomobileaccident.InreBarrett,630A.2d652(Del.1993).

Whenanattorneyfailed todistributeestate fundsfromtheestateaccount tobeneficiaries and other third persons for almost 3 years after the deceased’sdeath, the attorney violated Law.R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(b). In reWilson, 886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

——Safeguarding.

The Client’s Security Trust Fund’s (CSTF) efforts to assist lawyers do notabsolve lawyers of the duty to read and follow Interpretive Guideline No. 2,whichprovidesforthepreservationoffundsandpropertyofclients;compliancechecksperformedunderCSTF’sdirectionarenotauditsandarenotintendedtoverify the correctness of entries in an attorney’s books and records. In reFigliola,652A.2d1071(Del.1995).

Attorney’sfailingtopreservecompleterecordsofaccountfunds,hisfailingtosafeguard a client’s funds, and his loss of a file violated subsection (a). In reMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Attorney’sfailingtocomplywithrequirementsforkeepingbooksandrecordsas set forth in Interpretive Guideline No. 2 violated subsection (d). In reMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Lawyerwasdisbarredforthemisappropriationofclientfundsforthelawyer’spersonaluse,andthefailuretoestablishaseparateaccountfortheproceedsofthe sale of a client’s house, despite evidence of the lawyer’s personal andemotionalproblems.InreCarey,809A.2d563(Del.2002).

When an attorney admitted that he had failed to keep his property separatefrom that of his clients, as there were negative balances in 41 client escrowaccounts and significant unidentified client funds, andhe failed topaypayrolltaxes for his employees for five years, totaling approximately $64,000, withestimatedpenalties,hewassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawfor3years,withthe right to seek reinstatement in 6months. In re Landis, 850A.2d 291 (Del.2004).

Attorney’s acceptance of a retainer of $250 froma client through a prepaidlegalplan,whilenevercontacting theclientandrefusing torefundtheretainer








until after the first disciplinary hearing, was held to have violated Law. Prof.ConductR.1.3,withregardtoactingwithreasonablediligenceandpromptness,Law.Prof.ConductR.1.4(a) and (b),with regard to failing tokeep the clientreasonably informed to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client tomake informed decisions, and, Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.15(b) and (d), withregard tofailing tosafeguard theclient’sfundsanddeliver themuponrequest;theprepaidlegalfirmhadrefusedtorefundtheretainerand,infact,showednorecord of the amount, which had been paid directly to the attorney. In reChasanov,869A.2d327(Del.2005).

Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(a),1.15(d),1.15A,1.16(d),3.4(c),8.1(b),8.4(d)were violatedwhen for several years the attorneymishandled and improperlyaccountedfortheattorney’sclient’sfundsandtheattorney’sescrowaccountandinaccurately completed certificates of compliance; the attorneywas suspendedfor3years, couldapply for reinstatementafter2years if theattorney fulfilledconditions,andcouldnotreturntosolopractice.InreFountain,878A.2d1167(Del.2005).

AttorneywasdisbarredafterhavingbeenfoundtohaveviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4bymisappropriatingclientsfundsandfailing to identifyabankaccountasa lawpracticeaccount; theattorney’sconduct was found to have been intentional and no mitigating factors werepresentwhereitwasshownthattheattorneytookalongtimetoprovideaclientwithrefinancingproceedsand,whentheattorneydid,thecheckwasreturnedforinsufficientfunds,andtheattorneyusedasepticsystemescrowdeposittocoveranother check that the attorneyhadwritten. In reGarrett, 909A.2d 103 (Del.2006).

Attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(a) by failing to deposit andsafeguardanadvancefeeof$1,500 inaclient trustaccountuntilearned. In rePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).

Attorney whose child stole funds from the attorney’s escrow account waspubliclyreprimandedforviolating,interalia,Law.Prof.ConductR.1.15(a),(b),and(d),byfailingtosafeguardclientfunds,failingtopromptlydeliverfundstoclientsandfailingtomaintaintheattorney’sbooksandrecords.InreOtlowski,976A.2d172(Del.2009).

Attorneywassuspendedfor1year,withthesuspensiontorunretroactivelytothe date the attorneywas transferred to disability inactive status, for violatingLaw. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 by: (1) permitting checks to be issued to the






attorney’soperatingaccount fromclientescrowaccounts thatwerenotearned;(2) transferring unearned funds to the attorney’s own self from client escrowaccounts;and(3)failingtoproperlymaintainbooksandrecords.InreNowak,5A.3d631(Del.2010).


AttorneydidnotviolateLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.15,where theattorneynotonlyrefundedtoaclienttheentireretainerof$1,500,butused$750inpersonalfunds to reimburse the client so that the client would not have to await theoutcome of a receivership; the attorney undertook the burden of awaiting theoutcomeofthereceivershipfromtheclient.InreSisk,54A.3d257(Del.2012).

Attorney who was involved in various real estate closings committedviolationsof theprofessionalconduct rulesbyusingotherclients’ funds in thefirm’s trust account to fund all or part of the buyer’s contribution in certainsettlements.InreSanclemente,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

Attorney violated theRules of Professional Conduct in handling real estateclosingsbyusingotherclients’fundsinthefirm’strustaccounttofundpart(orall) of the buyer’s contribution in certain settlements. In re Sullivan, 86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

BasedonareportbytheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility,therewasclearandconvincingevidencethatanattorneyengagedincriminalconductworthyofsuspensionby: (1)misappropriatingfundsfromtheattorney’semployerovera5-year period; (2) engaging in dishonest conduct by lying to the attorney’smortgage company; and (3) forging the employer’s signature. In reLankenau,138A.3d1151(Del.2016).

The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the Board on ProfessionalResponsibility’s findings and recommendation for discipline, publiclyreprimandingandplacingtheattorneyona2-yearperiodofprobationwiththeimposition of specific conditions, because the attorney failed to provide theclientwithafeeagreementand/orstatementofearnedfeeswithdrawnfromthetrustaccount,toidentifyandsafeguardclientfund,tomaintainfinancialbooksand records or to supervise nonlawyer assistants; the attorney had engaged in







conductinvolvingmisrepresentation,prejudicialtotheadministrationofjustice.InreMalik,167A.3d1189(Del.2017).

Former client failed to sufficiently plead a counterclaim claim formisappropriation of client funds against the attorney because: (1) the instantactionsoughtdeclaratoryreliefregardingthedistributionofcertainfundsbeinglawfully held in the attorney’s IOLTA trust account according to the retaineragreement; and (2)while the attorney attempted to distribute the funds in theaccount, the client contested the attorney’s accounting. Pazuniak Law OfficeLLCv.Pi-NetInt’l,Inc.,—A.3d—,2017Del.Super.LEXIS419(Del.Super.Ct.Aug.25,2017).

BoardonProfessionalResponsibilitycorrectlyassigneda6-monthsuspensionwithconditionsforviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.15,5.3and8.4because:(1)theBoardconsideredtheattorney’sstateofmindandconcludedtheattorney,as managing partner, was at least negligent in overseeing 2 non-attorneys toensurethebooksandrecordsweremaintainedincompliancewiththerules;(2)theattorneyknewofruleviolationsduetothenegativebalancesintheaccount;(3) the attorney filed an inaccurate 2015 Certificate of Compliance with theDelawareSupremeCourtthatmisrepresentedthelawfirm’scompliancewiththeruleonsafekeepingproperty;(4) thecoveringfundsreliedonbytheBoardonProfessional Responsibility should not have been considered a substitute fornegativebalancesintheclientsubsidiaryledger;(5)thelawfirmhadadutytosafeguardtheclients’propertybutfailedtodoso;and(6)asamanagingpartnerwhofailedtosupervisenon-attorneyemployees,theattorneywasresponsibleforthose deficiencies. In reBeauregard,—A.3d—, 2018Del.LEXIS 258 (Del.June5,2018).

Lawfirms.

—Bookkeeping.

Attorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandsubjecttoapublictwo-yearperiodofprobation for her violations of subsections (b) and (d) of this Rule, formerInterpretiveGuidelineNo.2,andRule8.4(d),forfailingtopayvariousfederalandstateemployeeandemployerpayrolltaxesinatimelymanner,forfailingtomaintainherlawpracticebooksandrecords,byfailingtofileher1998and1999federal unemployment tax returns until October 2000, and by makingconsistently delinquent filings and payment in connection with other lawpractice payroll tax obligations, and for certifying to the court that her lawpractice books and records were in compliance with the requirements of this


Rule and that her taxobligationswerepaid in a timelymanner. In reBenson,774A.2d258(Del.2001).

Whereanattorney,themanagingpartnerofafirm,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 and multiple other provisions of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, and where a witness testified unequivocally that theattorney instructed thewitness to transfer escrow funds to the firm’soperatingaccount, and client trust funds had to be, and were, invaded, the Office ofDisciplinary Counsel’s recommended public reprimand was rejected, and theattorneywassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawforsixmonthsandoneday;amanagingpartnerofalawfirmhadenhanceddutiestoensurethatthelawfirmcompliedwith its recordkeepingand taxobligations,and themanagingpartnerhad todischarge thoseresponsibilities faithfullyandwith theutmostdiligence.InreBailey,821A.2d851(Del.2003).

Attorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandwasorderedtoserveapublic2-yearprobation period for violating Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15(d) by failing toproperlymaintaintheattorney’slawpracticebooks,recordsandbankaccounts;the attorney’s substantial experience,multiple offenses and attitude toward theoffenses offset the attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, extensiveremedialefforts,fullcooperationandlackofinjurytoaclient.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourt,985A.2d391(Del.2009).

Followingaself-reportedembezzlementbyamemberoftheattorney’sstaff,theattorneyfailedtoobtaincourt-orderedprecertificationbyalicensedcertifiedpublicaccountantfor2yearsofcertificatesofcompliance, reporting thestatusofrecordkeepingwithregardtorequirementsofLawProf.ConductR.1.15andLawProf.ConductR.1.15A;becausetheabsenceofanyinjurytoclientsdidnotexcusethemisconduct,theattorney’srepeatedviolationsofLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c)andLawProf.ConductR.8.4(d)supportedanimpositionofapublicreprimandwithconditions.InreHolfeld,74A.3d605(Del.2013).

Attorney violated various disciplinary rules because the results of an auditshowed the attorney’s failure to adequately maintain books and records, tosafeguard client funds or to indicate in the retainer that unearned fees wererefundable.InreAMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDelaware:FredBar,99A.3d639(Del.2013).

Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney violatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,5.3,8.4(c)and(d),resultingin2years’probation,by:(1)misrepresenting to thecourt theattorney’smaintenanceof records; and (2)






failing to properly maintain them, to safeguard client funds, to provide forreasonable safeguards to assure accurate accounting, to supervise nonlawyerstaff,andtotimelyfileandpaytaxes.InreGray,152A.3d581(Del.2016).

—Reprimand.


Attorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandwasorderedtoserveapublic2-yearprobationperiodforviolatingLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c)byfilingcertificatesof compliance containing inaccurate representations as to compliance with R.Prof.Conduct1.15withreferencetotheattorney’slawpracticebankaccounts;the attorney’s substantial experience,multiple offenses and attitude toward theoffenses offset the attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, extensiveremedialefforts,fullcooperationandlackofinjurytoaclient.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourt,985A.2d391(Del.2009).

Attorney was publicly reprimanded and ordered to serve a public 2-yearprobationperiodforviolatingLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(a)byfailingtotimelytransfer earned attorneys’ fees from the attorney’s escrow account to theattorney’s operating account, and by failing to ensure that negative clientbalances in the escrow account were corrected monthly; the attorney’ssubstantialexperience,multipleoffensesandattitudetowardtheoffensesoffsettheattorney’slackofapriordisciplinaryrecord,extensiveremedialefforts,fullcooperation and lack of injury to a client. In re Member of the Bar of theSupremeCourt,985A.2d391(Del.2009).

Attorney’sfailuretomaintainlawofficebooksandrecords,filingcertificatesofcompliancewithannualregistrationstatementsthatindicatedmaintenanceofsuch documentation, and failure to file and pay taxes violated Law. R. Prof.Conduct1.15(d)andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c),(d);apublicreprimandwasimposed.InreWitherell,998A.2d852(Del.2010).

Because an attorney neglected client’s matters, failed to promptly disburseclient funds, and failed to cooperatewith disciplinary authorities, the attorneyviolated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), (4), 1.15(d), and 8.1(b);






accordingly,theattorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandplacedonprobationfor18monthswiththeimpositionofcertainconditions.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDel.,999A.2d853(Del.2010).

Theappropriatesanctionwasapublicreprimandand1yearprobationperiodwhere: (1) an attorneyviolated the conditionsof a previously imposedprivateadmonition by failing to provide a required precertification and not promptlypayingvariouspayrolltaxes;(2)theattorneyadmittedtoviolatingLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c)andLawProf.ConductR.1.15(b),1.15(d),5.3,8.4(c),and8.4(d);(3)theattorney’sviolationswerenot isolated incidentsbutwere repeatviolations; (4)the attorney failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant to assure anaccurate accounting of the firm’s books and records; and (5) the attorneydisregardedtheconditionsimposedontheprivateadmonition.InreMartin,35A.3d419(Del.2011).


—Taxes.

Attorneywhowasdelinquentinthepaymentoftheattorney’slawpractice’sfederal, state, and localpayroll taxobligationsviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(b),5.3,8.4(c)and(d);duetotheattorney’spriordisciplinaryhistorywithdelinquenttaxes,apublicreprimand,18-monthprobationandimplementationofinternalaccountingcontrolswerewarranted.InreFinestrauss,32A.3d978(Del.2011).

Chargethatanattorney’sfailuretopaytaxesviolatedtheprofessionalconductruleregardingthehandlingofthird-partyfundswasproperlywithdrawn;itdidnotapplytoanattorney’sfailuretopayapersonalobligation.InreBria,86A.3d1118(Del.2014).

Sanctions.

—Disbarment.

Disbarmentisapossiblesanctionforknowingorrecklessmisappropriationoffirmorclientfunds.InreFigliola,652A.2d1071(Del.1995).

Lawyerwhoviolatednumerousprofessionaldutiesinrealestatepractice,and







caused over $500,000 in damages to clients,was disbarred. In re Spiller, 788A.2d114(Del.2001).

Court accepted the findings by a panel of the Board on ProfessionalResponsibility that an attorney committed multiple ethical violations bymisappropriating fees received for legal services to clients while the attorneywasengagedintheprivatepracticeoflawandfailingtodisclosethefeesduringpriordisciplinaryproceedings;disbarmentwaswarranted.InreVanderslice,116A.3d1244(Del.2015).

—Reprimand.

Attorney committed professional misconduct by failing to comply with theconditions of private probation, by failing to maintain the firm’s books andrecords properly, and by filing false certifications with respect to compliancewiththatobligation;publicreprimandandprobationfor3yearswithconditionswereimposedupontheattorney’simmediatereinstatementtothepracticeoflaw.InreWoods,143A.3d1223(Del.2016).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),8.4(c)and(d)byfailingtoproperlymaintainlawfirm’sbooksandrecordsfor3consecutiveyears,filinginaccuratecertificatesofcompliancefor3consecutiveyears,andfailingtogiveflatfeeclientspropernoticethatthefeewasrefundableif not earned, a public reprimand with a 2-year period of probation wasappropriate; this was true, even considering the mitigating factors, given alawyer’s obligation to maintain orderly books and records. In re Castro, 160A.3d1134(Del.2017).

—Suspension.

A six month and one day suspension from the practice of law was properpunishmentforunlawfuldisbursementsfromtrustaccounts. In reFigliola,652A.2d1071(Del.1995).

Wherealawyerengagedinapatternofknowingmisconductoveraperiodofseveralyearsbycomminglingclientfunds,failingtomaintainthelawyer’slawpractice accounts, failing to pay taxes, falsely representing on certificates ofcompliancethatthelawyercompliedwiththerecord-keepingrequirementsandpaid taxes, the lawyerviolatedDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(f),1.15(a), (b),(d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer was suspended for 3 years. In reGarrett,835A.2d514(Del.2003).

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules of







ProfessionalConductandwhoviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.2(a),1.4(a),1.15(a),8.1,8.1(b),8.4(c),and8.4(d),andLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c),wassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawinDelawarefor3yearsaftertheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility found that theattorney’sproblemsappeared tobegettingworseand included: co-mingling client trust funds; inadequate bookkeeping andsafeguarding of client funds; inadequate maintenance of books and records;knowingly making false statements of material fact to the ODC; falserepresentations in Certificates of Compliance for 3 years; and failure to filecorporatetaxreturnsfor3years.InreBecker,947A.2d1120(Del.2008).

Attorneywhosemisconductinvolvedfalsenotarizations,failuretosafeguardfiduciary funds, failure to pay taxes on real estate transactions, and othermisrepresentationscommittedviolationsLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(a),(b),and8.4(a), (c), and (d); based on knowing, rather than negligent, conduct incommittingtheviolations,a1-yearsuspensionaswellasapublicreprimandandpermanentpracticerestrictionsweredeemedappropriatesanctionstoimpose.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourt,974A.2d170(Del.2009).







« Rule1.15A. »Del.RulesofProf'lConduct1.15A

Rule1.15A.Trustaccountoverdraftnotification.

(a)Everyattorneypracticingoradmitted topractice in this jurisdictionshalldesignateeveryaccountintowhichattorneytrustorescrowfundsaredepositedeither as “Rule 1.15A Attorney Trust Account” or “1.15A Trust Account” or“Rule1.15AAttorneyEscrowAccount”or“1.15AEscrowAccount,”pursuanttoRule1.15(d)(2).

(b) Bank accounts designated as “Rule 1.15A Attorney Trust Account” or“1.15ATrustAccount” or “Rule 1.15AAttorney EscrowAccount” or “1.15AEscrow Account,” pursuant to Rule 1.15(d)(2) shall be maintained only infinancial institutionsapprovedby theLawyers’FundforClientProtection (the“Fund”).AfinancialinstitutionmaynotbeapprovedasadepositoryforattorneytrustandescrowaccountsunlessitshallhavefiledwiththeFundanagreement,inaformprovidedbytheFund,toreporttotheOfficeofDisciplinaryCounsel(“ODC”) in the event any instrument in properly payable form is presentedagainst an attorney trust or escrow account containing insufficient funds,irrespectiveofwhetherornottheinstrumentishonored.

(c) The Supreme Court may establish rules governing approval andtermination of approved status for financial institutions and the Fund shallannually publish a list of approved financial institutions. No trust or escrowaccount shall bemaintained in any financial institution that does not agree tomake such reports. Any such agreement shall apply to all branches of thefinancialinstitutionandshallnotbecanceledexceptuponthirty(30)daysnoticeinwritingtotheFund.

(d)Theoverdraftnotificationagreementshallprovidethatallreportsmadebythefinancialinstitutionshallbeinthefollowingformat:

(1)Inthecaseofadishonoredinstrument,thereportshallbeidenticaltotheoverdraftnoticecustomarilyforwardedtothedepositor,andshallincludeacopyof thedishonoredinstrument to theODCnolater thanseven(7)calendardaysfollowingarequestforthecopybytheODC.

(2)Inthecaseofinstrumentsthatarepresentedagainstinsufficientfunds,butwhichinstrumentsarehonored,thereportshallidentifythefinancialinstitution,the attorney or law firm, the account number, the date of presentation forpayment, and the date paid, as well as the amount of the overdraft createdthereby.

(e)Reportsshallbemadesimultaneouslywith,andwithinthetimeprovidedby law for, notice of dishonor. If an instrument presented against insufficientfundsishonored,thenthereportshallbemadewithinseven(7)calendardaysofthedateofpresentationforpaymentagainstinsufficientfunds.

(f)Everyattorneypracticingoradmittedtopracticeinthisjurisdictionshall,as a condition thereof, be conclusively deemed to have consented to thereportingandproductionrequirementsmandatedbythisrule.

(g) Nothing herein shall preclude a financial institution from charging aparticularattorneyorlawfirmforthereasonablecostsofproducingthereportsandrecordsrequiredbythisrule.

(h)Thetermsusedinthissectionaredefinedasfollows:

(1) “Financial institution” includes banks, savings and loan associations,creditunions,savingsbanksandanyotherbusinessorpersonswhichacceptfordepositfundsheldintrustbyattorneys.

(2) “Properly payable” refers to an instrument which, if presented in thenormal course of business, is in a form requiring payment under the laws ofDelaware.

(3) “Notice of dishonor” refers to the noticewhich a financial institution isrequiredtogive,underthelawsofDelaware,uponpresentationofaninstrumentwhichtheinstitutiondishonors.(Amended,effectiveJan.1,2009.)

Revisor’s note. — As adopted July 17, 2002, this rule was to becomeeffectiveOctober1,2002.ByorderoftheSupremeCourtdatedOctober1,2002,theeffectivedateofthisrulewasextendedtoJanuary1,2003,“inordertoallowsufficienttimeforthepreparationofthenecessaryformsandforthenotificationofallDelawarelawyersandfinancialinstitutions.”

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Bookkeeping.

Failuretodesignateaccount.

Fraud.

Bookkeeping.

Followingaself-reportedembezzlementbyamemberoftheattorney’sstaff,

theattorneyfailedtoobtaincourt-orderedprecertificationbyalicensedcertifiedpublicaccountantfor2yearsofcertificatesofcompliance, reporting thestatusofrecordkeepingwithregardtorequirementsofLawProf.ConductR.1.15andLawProf.ConductR.1.15A;becausetheabsenceofanyinjurytoclientsdidnotexcusethemisconduct,theattorney’srepeatedviolationsofLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c)andLawProf.ConductR.8.4(d)supportedanimpositionofapublicreprimandwithconditions.InreHolfeld,74A.3d605(Del.2013).

Failuretodesignateaccount.

By failing to designate an estate account as aLawR. Prof.Conduct 1.15Aaccountwiththeattorney’sfinancialinstitution,therebyreducingthelikelihoodthat theOffice ofDisciplinaryCounselwould receive notice of any overdraftbalancesinthisaccount,theattorneyviolatedLawR.Prof.Conduct1.15A.InreWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

Fraud.






Rule1.16.Decliningorterminatingrepresentation.

(a)Exceptasstatedinparagraph(c),alawyershallnotrepresentaclientor,whererepresentationhascommenced,shallwithdrawfromtherepresentationofaclientif:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professionalconductorotherlaw;

(2)thelawyer’sphysicalormentalconditionmateriallyimpairsthelawyer’sabilitytorepresenttheclient;or

(3)thelawyerisdischarged.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw fromrepresentingaclientif:

(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on theinterestsoftheclient;

(2)theclientpersistsinacourseofactioninvolvingthelawyer’sservicesthatthelawyerreasonablybelievesiscriminalorfraudulent;

(3)theclienthasusedthelawyer’sservicetoperpetrateacrimeorfraud;

(4)aclient insistsupontakingaction that the lawyerconsidersrepugnantorwithwhichthelawyerhasafundamentaldisagreement;

(5)theclientfailssubstantiallytofulfillanobligationtothelawyerregardingthelawyer’sservicesandhasbeengivenreasonablewarningthatthelawyerwillwithdrawunlesstheobligationisfulfilled;

(6) the representationwill result in an unreasonable financial burdenon thelawyerorhasbeenrenderedunreasonablydifficultbytheclient;or

(7)othergoodcauseforwithdrawalexists.

(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to orpermissionofatribunalwhenterminatingarepresentation.Whenorderedtodoso by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding goodcauseforterminatingtherepresentation.

(d)Uponterminationofrepresentation,alawyershalltakestepstotheextentreasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable

noticetotheclient,allowingtimeforemploymentofothercounsel,surrenderingpapers and property towhich the client is entitled and refunding any advancepaymentoffeeorexpensethathasnotbeenearnedorincurred.Thelawyermayretainpapersrelatingtotheclienttotheextentpermittedbyotherlaw.

COMMENT

[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can beperformed competently, promptly,without improper conflict of interest and tocompletion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when theagreed-uponassistancehasbeenconcluded.SeeRules1.2(c)and6.5.SeealsoRule1.3,Comment[4].

[2]MandatoryWithdrawal.—AlawyerordinarilymustdeclineorwithdrawfromrepresentationiftheclientdemandsthatthelawyerengageinconductthatisillegalorviolatestheRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.Thelawyerisnotobligedtodeclineorwithdrawsimplybecausetheclientsuggestssuchacourseofconduct;aclientmaymakesuchasuggestioninthehopethatalawyerwillnotbeconstrainedbyaprofessionalobligation.

[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawalordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2.Similarly, court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicablelaw before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may beencounteredifwithdrawalisbasedontheclient’sdemandthatthelawyerengagein unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for thewithdrawal,while the lawyermaybebound tokeepconfidential the facts thatwouldconstitutesuchanexplanation.The lawyer’sstatement thatprofessionalconsiderations require termination of the representation ordinarily should beaccepted as sufficient. Lawyers should bemindful of their obligations to bothclientsandthecourtunderRules1.6and3.3.

[4]Discharge.—Aclienthasarighttodischargealawyeratanytime,withor without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may beadvisabletoprepareawrittenstatementrecitingthecircumstances.

[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend onapplicablelaw.Aclientseekingtodososhouldbegivenafullexplanationoftheconsequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointingauthority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring

self-representationbytheclient.

[6]Iftheclienthasseverelydiminishedcapacity,theclientmaylackthelegalcapacitytodischargethelawyer,andinanyeventthedischargemaybeseriouslyadverse to the client’s interests.The lawyer shouldmake special effort tohelpthe client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessaryprotectiveactionasprovidedinRule1.14.

[7]OptionalWithdrawal.—A lawyermaywithdraw fromrepresentation insome circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can beaccomplished without material adverse effect on the client’s interests.Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that thelawyerreasonablybelievesiscriminalorfraudulent,foralawyerisnotrequiredto be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it.Withdrawal is alsopermitted if the lawyer’s servicesweremisused in thepastevenifthatwouldmateriallyprejudicetheclient.Thelawyermayalsowithdrawwheretheclient insistsontakingactionthat the lawyerconsidersrepugnantorwithwhichthelawyerhasafundamentaldisagreement.

[8]A lawyermaywithdraw if theclient refuses toabideby the termsofanagreement relating to the representation, suchasanagreementconcerning feesorcourtcostsoranagreementlimitingtheobjectivesoftherepresentation.

[9]Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal. — Even if the lawyer has beenunfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps tomitigatetheconsequencestotheclient.Thelawyermayretainpapersassecurityforafeeonlytotheextentpermittedbylaw.SeeRule1.15.

INTERPRETIVEGUIDELINE.Re:Residentialrealestatetransactions.

The following statements of principles are promulgated as interpretiveguidelines in the application to residential real estate transactions in TheDelawareLawyers’RulesofProfessionalConduct:

(a) Before accepting representation of a buyer or mortgagor of residentialproperty (includingcondominiumsunder theUnitPropertyActof theStateofDelaware),uponreferralbytheseller, lender,realestateagent,orotherpersonhavinganinterestinthetransaction,itistheethicaldutyofalawyertoinformthebuyerormortgagorinwritingattheearliestpracticabletime:

(1) That the buyer or mortgagor has the absolute right (regardless of any

preferencethattheseller,realestateagent,lender,orotherpersonmayhaveandregardlessofwhoistopayattorney’sfees)toretainalawyerofhisownchoiceto represent him throughout the transaction, including the examination andcertificationoftitle,thepreparationofdocuments,andtheholdingofsettlement;and

(2)Astotheidentityofanyotherpartyhavinganinterest inthetransactionwhom the lawyer may represent, including a statement that such otherrepresentationmaybepossiblyconflictingandmayadverselyaffecttheexerciseof the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the buyer ormortgagor incaseofadisputebetweentheparties.ForthepurposeofthisGuideline,alawyershallbedeemedtohavea“possiblyconflicting”representationifherepresentsthesellerorhasrepresentedtheselleronacontinuingbasisinthepast;orifherepresents the real estate agent or has represented the real estate agent on acontinuingbasisinthepast;orifherepresentsthelenderorhasrepresentedthelenderonacontinuingbasisinthepast.

(b)Unlessa lawyerhasbeenfreelyandvoluntarilyselectedby thebuyerormortgagor after he has made to the buyer or mortgagor the statements anddisclosureshereinaboverequired,thelawyermaynotethically:

(1)Certify,report,orrepresentforanypurposethatthebuyerormortgagorishisclient,orthatthebuyerormortgagorisorwasobligatedforanylegalservicerenderedbyhiminthetransaction;or

(2)Participateincausingthebuyerormortgagor,directlyorindirectly,tobearanychargeforhislegalservice;exceptthatthelawyerforalendermayreceivefrom the buyer or mortgagor, directly or indirectly, payment of the lender’sreasonable and necessary legal expenses for preparation of documents at therequestof thebuyer’sormortgagor’s lawyer, forattendanceat settlement,andfor title insuranceproperlyspecifiedbythelender(withintheprovisionsof18Del. C. § 2305(a)(1)) but unobtainable by the buyer’s ormortgagor’s lawyer,provided that the buyer’s or mortgagor’s obligation to pay each such legalexpenseisparticularizedasatermandconditionoftheloan;or

(3) Participate as the buyer’s or mortgagor’s lawyer in any transaction inwhich his representation of the buyer or mortgagor has beenmade a term orconditionofthetransaction,directlyorindirectly.

(c) The information supplied to the buyer or mortgagor in writing shallcontainadescriptionoftheattorney’sinterestorinterestssufficienttoenablethebuyerormortgagortodeterminewhetherheshouldobtainadifferentattorney.


__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Attorneys’fees.

—Retaininglien.

Clientrelations.


—Shareholders’derivativesuit.

—Withdrawal.

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Attorneys’fees.

—Retaininglien.

Basedonmultiplefactors,includingthefinancialsituationsoftheparties,theclient’s sophistication in dealing with lawyers, and the reasonableness ofcounsel’s disputed fee, a former law client’s subpoena and motion to compelproduction of documents obtained by former counsel through discovery in anunderlyingmatterhadmerit,despitecounsel’sassertionofaretaininglienduetoa fee dispute pursuant to Law Prof. Conduct R. 1.16(d). Judy v. PreferredCommun.Sys.,29A.3d248(Del.Ch.2011).

In determining the scope of a retaining lien due to a fee dispute between aformerclientandcounselpursuanttoLawProf.ConductR.1.16(d)withrespecttotheclient’smotiontocompelcounsel’sproductionofdocumentssecuredinanunderlying action through discovery, the ethics standard (“fraud and or grossimposition by the client”) did not govern the legal question of whether theretaining lien could bemaintained. Judy v. PreferredCommun. Sys., 29A.3d248(Del.Ch.2011).

Clientrelations.




Itwasplainerrorforthescrivenerofacontestedwilltotestifyattrialandalsoparticipateintheproceedingsasanattorneyforoneoftheparties.InreEstateofWaters,647A.2d1091(Del.1994).



—Shareholders’derivativesuit.

Plaintiffs,twodirectorsofafamilycorporationandthecorporation,failedtoprove third director’s use of long-time corporation and family attorneys todefendagainstthatdirector’sremovalbyshareholdersinadeclaratoryjudgmentaction threatened to undermine fairness and integrity of proceedingor violateDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.7,1.9,1.13(e),and1.16(b)(1).Unanuev.Unanue,2004Del.Ch.LEXIS37(Del.Ch.Mar.25,2004).

—Withdrawal.

Lawyer dismissed by client violated this Rule by failing to: (1) Promptlymove to withdraw or execute a stipulation for substitution; (2) promptlysurrender the client’s file; (3) provide an accounting of the client’s funds, orrefundtheunearnedportionoftheadvancefeepaidbytheclient.InreTos,576A.2d607(Del.1990).

Appointedattorney’smotionforleavetowithdrawfromrepresentingafatherin a dependency proceedingwas denied, despite the attorney’s claims that thefather harassed, annoyed, cursed, and threatened the attorney and his staff,refused to heed legal recommendations, and verbally fired the attorney onseveraloccasions;thoughthefather’sbehaviorcouldbeconsideredrepugnantorunreasonablydifficultenoughtoallowpermissivewithdrawalunderLaw.Prof.Conduct R. 1.16(b)(4) and (6), the concern that withdrawal could materially






adversely affect the father’s interests, and the child advocate’s suggestion thatallowing the attorney to withdraw could have an adverse impact on the bestinterestsofthechild,ledtodenialofthemotion.InreDiv.ofFamilyServs.v.M.P.,2005Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS111(Del.Fam.Ct.May25,2005).

Court adoptedSpecialMaster’s report that recommended that themotionofplaintiffs’ counsel to withdraw from representation be granted, as there wasabundant evidence to support the finding that adequate grounds existed forwithdrawal of counsel under Law. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4), (6), and (7),based on plaintiffs’ own communications with counsel. Parfi Holding AB v.MirrorImageInternet,Inc.,2006Del.Ch.LEXIS69(Del.Ch.Apr.3,2006).

Where,afterappellants’counselwithdrew,thetrialcourtdismissedtheircasewith prejudice on grounds that their new counsel would not enter anunconditional appearance that could not be withdrawn, the nonwithdrawableappearance order was an abuse of discretion because Law. R. Prof. Conduct1.16(a)(1) requires attorneys to withdraw under specified circumstances. ParfiHoldingABv.MirrorImageInternet,Inc.,926A.2d1071(Del.2007).

Chancery Court permitted a law firm to withdraw as counsel for a clientbecause the tenorof anopposition to thewithdrawalwhich the client filed, inwhichtheclientexcoriatedlawyersfromfirm,especiallywhencoupledwiththehistory of frustration between the law firm and the client and an apparentdisagreement over how to move forward with the client’s actions, amplydemonstrated that the attorney-client relationship between the parties could nolongerfunctioninanypracticalfashion;althoughtheclientsuggestedthattherewereother lawyersat thefirmwithwhomtheclientmightnothadaproblem,thenotion thata lawfirmcouldnotwithdrawbecausenotevery lawyer in thefirm had had problems with the client could not be the standard. Binks v.Megapath,Inc.,2008Del.Ch.LEXIS83(Del.Ch.July2,2008).

Therewasnobonafideconditionforthecourt’srecusallimitedtotheissueofcounsel’s withdrawal, because counsel could strictly limit disclosures to thecourt to preserve the client’s confidentiality pursuant to counsel’s professionalconduct obligations. State v. Pardo,—A.3d—, 2015Del. Super.LEXIS 548(Del.Super.Ct.Oct.27,2015).

Trial court granted the motion to withdraw as counsel filed by plaintiff’sattorney because: (1) an allegation of a material breakdown in the attorney’srelationship with plaintiff and lead counsel, and their unjustifiable refusal tocommunicatewiththeattorney,establishedgoodcauseforwithdrawal;and(2)





defendantdidnotopposethemotion.Griffithv.Wawa,Inc.,—A.3d—,2017Del.Super.LEXIS344(Del.Super.Ct.July14,2017).

Sanctions.

—Reprimand.

Where attorney violated Rule 1.2(a), Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4(a) and (b), Rule1.15(a),(d),andInterpretiveGuidelineNo.2.,Rule1.16(b)and(d),andRule3.4(c),attorneyagreedtopayallthecostsofthedisciplinaryproceedings,thecostsof the investigatory audits performed by the Lawyers’ Fund for ClientProtection, the restitutionnoted in theparties stipulation, andconsented to theimposition of a public reprimand with a public four-year probation withconditions.InreSolomon,745A.2d874(Del.1999).

—Suspension.


Asaresultofalawyer’srepeatedunethicalconductandadmittedviolationofLaw.R. Prof.Conduct 1.16(d) in representation of a clientwhile the attorneywasonprobation,thelawyer’sfailuretotakethenecessaryandreasonablestepsto protect that client’s interest inwithdrawing from representation, and due tolawyer’spastdisciplinaryrecord,a3-yearsuspensionwasordered;further,saidsanction protected the public by ensuring that prior to any reinstatement, thelawyerwasrequiredtoestablishrehabilitationbeforereturningtoactivestatus.InreSolomon,886A.2d1266(Del.2005).







Rule1.17.Saleoflawpractice.

Alawyeroralawfirmmaysellorpurchasealawpractice,oranareaoflawpractice,includinggoodwill,ifthefollowingconditionsaresatisfied:

(a)Thesellerceasestoengageintheprivatepracticeoflaw,orintheareaofpractice that has been sold in the jurisdiction in which the practice has beenconducted;

(b)Theentirepractice,or theentireareaofpractice, is sold tooneormorelawyersorlawfirms;

(c)Thesellergiveswrittennoticetoeachoftheseller’sclientsregarding:

(1)theproposedsale;

(2) theclient’s right to retainothercounselor to takepossessionof the file;and

(3)theclient’sconsenttothetransferoftheclient’sfileswillbepresumedifthe client does not take any action or does not otherwise objectwithin ninety(90)daysofreceiptofthenotice.

In a matter of pending litigation, if a client cannot be given notice, therepresentationofthatclientmaybetransferredtothepurchaseronlyuponentryofanordersoauthorizingbyacourthavingjurisdiction.Thesellermaydiscloseto the court in camera information relating to the representation only to theextentnecessarytoobtainanorderauthorizingthetransferofafile.Ifapprovalofthesubstitutionofthepurchasinglawyerforthesellinglawyerisrequiredbythe rules of any tribunal inwhich amatter is pending, such approvalmust beobtainedbeforethemattercanbeincludedinthesale.

(d)Thefeeschargedclientsshallnotbeincreasedbyreasonofthesale.

(e) The seller shall make appropriate arrangements for the maintenance ofrecords specified in Rule 1.15(d). (Amended, July 1, 2003; effectiveApr. 25,2012.)

COMMENT

[1]Thepracticeoflawisaprofession,notmerelyabusiness.Clientsarenotcommoditiesthatcanbepurchasedandsoldatwill.PursuanttothisRule,when

alawyeroranentirefirmceasestopractice,orceasestopracticeinanareaoflaw,andotherlawyersorfirmstakeovertherepresentation,thesellinglawyerorfirmmayobtaincompensation for the reasonablevalueof thepractice asmaywithdrawingpartnersoflawfirms.SeeRules5.4and5.6.

[2]TerminationofPracticeby theSeller.—The requirement that all of theprivatepractice,orallofanareaofpractice,besoldissatisfiedif theseller ingoodfaithmakestheentirepractice,ortheareaofpractice,availableforsaletothe purchasers. The fact that a number of the seller’s clients decide not to berepresentedby thepurchasersbut take theirmatters elsewhere, therefore, doesnotresultinaviolation.Returntoprivatepracticeasaresultofanunanticipatedchangeincircumstancesdoesnotnecessarilyresultinaviolation.Forexample,a lawyerwhohas sold thepractice to accept an appointment to judicial officedoesnotviolatetherequirementthatthesalebeattendanttocessationofpracticeif the lawyer later resumes private practice upon failing to be reappointed orresignsfromajudiciaryposition.

[3]Therequirement that thesellercease toengage in theprivatepracticeoflawdoesnotprohibitemploymentasalawyeronthestaffofapublicagencyora legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-housecounseltoabusiness.

[4] The Rule permits a sale of an entire practice attendant upon retirementfromtheprivatepracticeoflawwithinthejurisdiction.Itsprovisions,therefore,accommodatethelawyerwhosellsthepracticeupontheoccasionofmovingtoanotherstate.

[5]ThisRulealsopermitsalawyerorlawfirmtosellanareaofpractice.Ifanareaofpracticeissoldandthelawyerremainsintheactivepracticeoflaw,thelawyermust cease accepting anymatters in the area of practice that has beensold,eitherascounselorco-counselorinconnectionwiththedivisionofafeewith another lawyer as would otherwise be permitted by Rule 1.5(e). Forexample, a lawyerwith a substantial number of estate planningmatters and asubstantialnumberofprobateadministrationcasesmaysell theestateplanningportion of the practice but remain in the practice of law by concentrating onprobateadministration;however,thatpractitionermaynotthereafteracceptanyestateplanningmatters.Althoughalawyerwholeavesthejurisdictiontypicallywouldselltheentirepractice,thisrulepermitsthelawyertolimitthesaletooneormoreareasof thepractice, therebypreservingthelawyer’sright tocontinuepracticeintheareasofthepracticethatwerenotsold.

[6]SaleofEntirePracticeorEntireAreaofPractice.—TheRule requiresthat the seller’s entire practice, or an entire area of practice, be sold. Theprohibitionagainstsaleoflessthananentirepracticeareaprotectsthoseclientswhosemattersare less lucrativeandwhomightfind itdifficult tosecureothercounsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. Thepurchasersarerequiredtoundertakeallclientmattersinthepracticeorpracticearea,subjecttoclientconsent.Thisrequirementissatisfied,however,evenifapurchaserisunabletoundertakeaparticularclientmatterbecauseofaconflictofinterest.

[7]ClientConfidences,Consent andNotice.—Negotiations between sellerandprospectivepurchaserpriortodisclosureofinformationrelatingtoaspecificrepresentation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentialityprovisionsofRule1.6 thandopreliminarydiscussionsconcerningthepossibleassociationofanother lawyerormergersbetween firms,with respect towhichclientconsentisnotrequired.SeeRule1.6(b)(7).Providingthepurchaseraccessto detailed information relating to the representation, such as the client’s file,however,requiresclientconsent.TheRuleprovidesthatbeforesuchinformationcanbedisclosedby the seller to thepurchaser the clientmust begiven actualwrittennoticeof thecontemplatedsale, includingtheidentityof thepurchaser,andmustbetoldthatthedecisiontoconsentormakeotherarrangementsmustbemadewithin 90 days. If nothing is heard from the clientwithin that time,consenttothesaleispresumed.

[8]Alawyerorlawfirmceasingtopracticecannotberequiredtoremaininpractice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposedpurchase.Sincetheseclientscannotthemselvesconsenttothepurchaseordirectanyotherdispositionofthfiles,theRulerequiresanorderfromacourthavingjurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The Court can beexpectedtodeterminewhetherreasonableeffortstolocatetheclienthavebeenexhausted,andwhethertheabsentclient’slegitimateinterestswillbeservedbyauthorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue therepresentation.Preservationofclientconfidencesrequiresthatthepetitionforacourtorderbeconsideredincamera.

[9]Alltheelementsofclientautonomy,includingtheclient’sabsoluterighttodischargealawyerandtransfertherepresentationtoanother,survivethesaleofthepracticeorareaofpractice.

[10]FeeArrangementsBetweenClientandPurchaser.—Thesalemaynotbefinanced by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing

agreementsbetweenthesellerandtheclientastofeesandthescopeoftheworkmustbehonoredbythepurchaser.

[11] Rule 1.17(a)(5) provides for the preservation of a lawyer’s client trustaccount records in the event of sale of a law practice. Regardless of thearrangements the partners or shareholders make among themselves formaintenanceoftheclienttrustrecords,eachpartnermaybeheldresponsibleforensuring the availabilityof these records.For thepurposesof theseRules, theterms “law firm,” “partner,” and “reasonable” are defined in accordance withRules 1.0(c), (g) and (h) of the Delaware Lawyers Rules of ProfessionalConduct.

[12]OtherApplicableEthicalStandards.—Lawyersparticipatinginthesaleofalawpracticeorapracticeareaaresubjecttotheethicalstandardsapplicabletoinvolvinganotherlawyerintherepresentationofaclient.Theseinclude,forexample, the seller’s obligation to exercise competence in identifying apurchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser’s obligation toundertaketherepresentationcompetently(seeRule1.1);theobligationtoavoiddisqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client’s informed consent for thoseconflictsthatcanbeagreedto(seeRule1.7regardingconflictsandRule1.0(e)forthedefinitionofinformedconsent);andtheobligationtoprotectinformationrelatingtotherepresentation(seeRules1.6and1.9).

[13] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the sellinglawyerisrequiredbytherulesofanytribunalinwhichamatterispending,suchapprovalmustbeobtainedbeforethemattercanbeincludedinthesale(seeRule1.16).

[14] Applicability of the Rule. — This Rule applies to the sale of a lawpracticebyrepresentativesofadeceased,disabledordisappearedlawyer.Thus,thesellermayberepresentedbyanonlawyerrepresentativenotsubjecttotheseRules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practicewhichdoesnotconformtotherequirementsofthisRule,therepresentativesoftheselleraswellasthepurchasinglawyercanbeexpectedtoseetoitthattheyaremet.

[15] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professionalassociation, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangibleassets of a lawpractice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governedby thisRule.

[16]ThisRuledoesnotapplytothetransfersoflegalrepresentationbetween

lawyerswhensuchtransfersareunrelatedtothesaleofapracticeoranareaofpractice.

« Rule1.17A. »Del.RulesofProf'lConduct1.17A

Rule1.17A.Dissolutionoflawfirm.

Upondissolutionof a law firmorof any legalprofessional corporation, thepartners shallmake reasonable arrangements for themaintenance of the clienttrustaccountrecordsspecifiedinRule1.15(d).(Added,effectiveApr.25,2012.)

COMMENT

[1]Rule1.17Aprovidesforthepreservationofalawyer’sclienttrustaccountrecords in the event of dissolution of a law practice. Regardless of thearrangements the partners or shareholders make among themselves formaintenanceoftheclienttrustrecords,eachpartnermaybeheldresponsibleforensuring the availabilityof these records.For thepurposesof theseRules, theterms “law firm,” “partner,” and “reasonable” are defined in accordance withRules 1.0(c), (g) and (h) of the Delaware Lawyers Rules of ProfessionalConduct.


Rule1.18.Dutiestoprospectiveclient.

(a)A personwho consultswith a lawyer about the possibility of forming aclient-lawyerrelationshipwithrespecttoamatterisaprospectiveclient.

(b)Evenwhennoclient-lawyerrelationshipensues,alawyerwhohaslearnedinformation from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information,exceptasRule1.9wouldpermitwithrespecttoinformationofaformerclient.

(c)Alawyersubjecttoparagraph(b)shallnotrepresentaclientwithinterestsmateriallyadversetothoseofaprospectiveclientinthesameorasubstantiallyrelatedmatterifthelawyerreceivedinformationfromtheprospectiveclientthatcouldbesignificantlyharmfultothatpersoninthematter,exceptasprovidedinparagraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under thisparagraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated mayknowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except asprovidedinparagraph(d).

(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined inparagraph(c),representationispermissibleif:

(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informedconsent,confirmedinwriting,or:

(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures toavoidexposuretomoredisqualifyinginformationthanwasreasonablynecessarytodeterminewhethertorepresenttheprospectiveclient;and

(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in thematterandisapportionednopartofthefeetherefrom;and

(ii) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. (Amended,effectiveMar.1,2013.)

COMMENT

[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer,place documents or other property in the lawyer’s custody, or rely on thelawyer’s advice.A lawyer’s consultationswithaprospectiveclientusuallyarelimited in timeanddepthand leaveboth theprospectiveclientand the lawyerfree(andsometimesrequired)toproceednofurther.Hence,prospectiveclients

shouldreceivesomebutnotalloftheprotectionaffordedclients.

[2]Apersonbecomesaprospectiveclientbyconsultingwithalawyeraboutthepossibilityof forminga client-lawyer relationshipwith respect to amatter.Whethercommunications,includingwritten,oral,orelectroniccommunications,constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, aconsultationislikelytohaveoccurredifalawyer,eitherinpersonorthroughthelawyer’s advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites thesubmission of information about a potential representation without clear andreasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit thelawyer’s obligations, and a person provides information in response. See alsoComment [4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person providesinformation to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes thelawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, orprovides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicatesinformationunilaterallytoalawyer,withoutanyreasonableexpectationthatthelawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyerrelationship, and is thus not a “prospective client.” Moreover, a person whocommunicateswithalawyerforthepurposeofdisqualifyingthelawyerisnota“prospectiveclient.”

[3] It isoftennecessary foraprospectiveclient to reveal information to thelawyerduringan initialconsultationprior to thedecisionabout formationofaclient-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information todetermine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client andwhetherthematterisonethatthelawyeriswillingtoundertake.Paragraph(b)prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except aspermittedbyRule1.9,evenif theclientor lawyerdecidesnot toproceedwiththerepresentation.Thedutyexistsregardlessofhowbrieftheinitialconferencemaybe.

[4] Inorder toavoidacquiringdisqualifying information fromaprospectiveclient, a lawyer consideringwhether or not to undertake a newmatter shouldlimit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appearsnecessary for that purpose.Where the information indicates that a conflict ofinterest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should soinform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospectiveclientwishestoretainthelawyer,andifconsentispossibleunderRule1.7,thenconsent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained beforeacceptingtherepresentation.

[5]A lawyermay condition a consultationwith a prospective client on theperson’sinformedconsentthatnoinformationdisclosedduringtheconsultationwill prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in thematter. SeeRule1.0(e)forthedefinitionofinformedconsent.Iftheagreementexpresslysoprovides,theprospectiveclientmayalsoconsenttothelawyer’ssubsequentuseofinformationreceivedfromtheprospectiveclient.

[6]Even in theabsenceofanagreement,underparagraph (c), the lawyer isnotprohibited from representing a clientwith interests adverse to thoseof theprospectiveclientinthesameorasubstantiallyrelatedmatterunlessthelawyerhasreceivedfromtheprospectiveclient informationthatcouldbesignificantlyharmfulifusedinthematter.

[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to otherlawyersasprovided inRule1.10,but,underparagraph (d)(1), imputationmaybeavoidedifthelawyerobtainstheinformedconsent,confirmedinwriting,ofboth theprospectiveandaffectedclients. In thealternative, imputationmaybeavoidediftheconditionsofparagraph(d)(2)aremetandalldisqualifiedlawyersare timely screened and written notice is promptly given to the prospectiveclient.SeeRule1.0(k)(requirementsforscreeningprocedures).Paragraph(d)(2)(i)doesnotprohibitthescreenedlawyerfromreceivingasalaryorpartnershipshare established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may notreceive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer isdisqualified.

[8]Notice, includingageneraldescriptionofthesubjectmatteraboutwhichthelawyerwasconsulted,andofthescreeningproceduresemployed,generallyshould be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomesapparent.

[9]Forthedutyofcompetenceofalawyerwhogivesassistanceonthemeritsofamatter toaprospectiveclient, seeRule1.1.Fora lawyer’sdutieswhenaprospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer’s care, see Rule1.15.


Rule2.1.Advisor.

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professionaljudgmentandrendercandidadvice.Inrenderingadvice,alawyermayrefernotonly to law but to other considerations, such as moral, economic, social andpoliticalfactors,thatmayberelevanttotheclient’ssituation.

COMMENT

[1] Scope of Advice. — A client is entitled to straightforward adviceexpressing the lawyer’s honest assessment. Legal advice often involvesunpleasantfactsandalternativesthataclientmaybedisinclinedtoconfront.Inpresentingadvice,alawyerendeavorstosustaintheclient’smoraleandmayputadviceinasacceptableaformashonestypermits.However,alawyershouldnotbe deterred fromgiving candid advice by the prospect that the advicewill beunpalatabletotheclient.

[2]Advicecouchedinnarrowlylegaltermsmaybeoflittlevaluetoaclient,especiallywherepracticalconsiderations,suchascostoreffectsonotherpeople,are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes beinadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethicalconsiderations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor assuch,moral and ethical considerations impinge uponmost legal questions andmaydecisivelyinfluencehowthelawwillbeapplied.

[3]A clientmay expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technicaladvice.Whensucharequestismadebyaclientexperiencedinlegalmatters,thelawyermay accept it at face value.When such a request ismade by a clientinexperienced in legalmatters, however, the lawyer’s responsibility as advisormay include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legalconsiderations.

[4]Mattersthatgobeyondstrictlylegalquestionsmayalsobeinthedomainof another profession. Family matters can involve problems within theprofessional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work;businessmatterscaninvolveproblemswithinthecompetenceoftheaccountingprofessionoroffinancialspecialists.Whereconsultationwithaprofessionalinanother field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, thelawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer’s

adviceatitsbestoftenconsistsofrecommendingacourseofactioninthefaceofconflictingrecommendationsofexperts.

[5]Offering Advice.— In general, a lawyer is not expected to give adviceuntilaskedbytheclient.However,whenalawyerknowsthataclientproposesacourseofactionthatislikelytoresultinsubstantialadverselegalconsequencestotheclient,thelawyer’sdutytotheclientunderRule1.4mayrequirethatthelawyerofferadviceiftheclient’scourseofactionisrelatedtotherepresentation.Similarly,whenamatterislikelytoinvolvelitigation,itmaybenecessaryunderRule1.4toinformtheclientofformsofdisputeresolutionthatmightconstitutereasonablealternatives to litigation.A lawyerordinarilyhasnoduty to initiateinvestigationofaclient’saffairsortogiveadvicethattheclienthasindicatedisunwanted,butalawyermayinitiateadvicetoaclientwhendoingsoappearstobeintheclient’sinterest.


Rule2.2.Intermediary(Deleted).

Revisor’snote.—FormerRule2.2,whichpertainedtoanintermediary,wasdeletedeffectiveJuly1,2003.


Rule2.3.Evaluationforusebythirdpersons.

(a)Alawyermayprovideanevaluationofamatteraffectingaclientfortheuse of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes thatmaking the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’srelationshipwiththeclient.

(b)Whenthelawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowthattheevaluationislikelytoaffecttheclient’sinterestsmateriallyandadversely,thelawyershallnotprovidetheevaluationunlesstheclientgivesinformedconsent.

(c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of anevaluation,informationrelatingtotheevaluationisotherwiseprotectedbyRule1.6.

COMMENT

[1]Definition.—Anevaluationmaybeperformedattheclient’sdirectionorwhenimpliedlyauthorizedinordertocarryouttherepresentation.SeeRule1.2.Suchanevaluationmaybefortheprimarypurposeofestablishinginformationfor thebenefit of thirdparties; for example, anopinionconcerning the titleofpropertyrenderedatthebehestofavendorfortheinformationofaprospectivepurchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospectivelender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a governmentagency; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securitiesregistered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluationmayberequiredbyathirdperson,suchasapurchaserofabusiness.

[2] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of apersonwith whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. Forexample,alawyerretainedbyapurchasertoanalyzeavendor’stitletopropertydoes not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, aninvestigation into a person’s affairs by a government lawyer, or by specialcounsel by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by thegovernment,isnotanevaluationasthattermisusedinthisrule.Thequestioniswhetherthelawyerisretainedbythepersonwhoseaffairsarebeingexamined.Whenthelawyerisretainedbythatperson,thegeneralrulesconcerningloyaltyto client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if thelawyerisretainedbysomeoneelse.Forthisreason,itisessentialtoidentifythe

personbywhomthe lawyer is retained.Thisshouldbemadeclearnotonly tothepersonunderexamination,butalso toothers towhomthe resultsare tobemadeavailable.

[3]Duties Owed to Third Person and Client. — When the evaluation isintendedfortheinformationoruseofathirdperson,alegaldutytothatpersonmay or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule.However,sincesuchanevaluationinvolvesadeparturefromthenormalclient-lawyerrelationship,carefulanalysisofthesituationisrequired.Thelawyermustbe satisfiedasamatterofprofessional judgment thatmaking theevaluation iscompatiblewithotherfunctionsundertakeninbehalfoftheclient.Forexample,if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges offraud,itwouldnormallybeincompatiblewiththatresponsibilityforthelawyertoperformanevaluationforothersconcerningthesameorarelatedtransaction.Assumingno such impediment is apparent,however, the lawyer shouldadvisethe client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer’sresponsibilitiestothirdpersonsandthedutytodisseminatethefindings.

[4]AccesstoandDisclosureofInformation.—Thequalityofanevaluationdependsonthefreedomandextentoftheinvestigationuponwhichit isbased.Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seemsnecessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances,however,thetermsoftheevaluationmaybelimited.Forexample,certainissuesorsourcesmaybecategoricallyexcluded,orthescopeofsearchmaybelimitedby time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevantinformation.Anysuch limitations thatarematerial to theevaluationshouldbedescribedinthereport.Ifafteralawyerhascommencedanevaluation,theclientrefuses tocomplywith the termsuponwhich itwasunderstood theevaluationwastohavebeenmade,thelawyer’sobligationsaredeterminedbylaw,havingreference to the terms of the client’s agreement and the surroundingcircumstances.InnocircumstancesisthelawyerpermittedtoknowinglymakeafalsestatementofmaterialfactorlawinprovidinganevaluationunderthisRule.SeeRule4.1.

[5] Obtaining Client’s Informed Consent. — Information relating to anevaluationisprotectedbyRule1.6.Inmanysituations,providinganevaluationtoa thirdpartyposesnosignificant risk to theclient; thus, the lawyermaybeimpliedlyauthorizedtodiscloseinformationtocarryouttherepresentation.SeeRule1.6(a).Where,however,itisreasonablylikelythatprovidingtheevaluationwill affect the client’s interestsmaterially and adversely, the lawyermust first

obtain the client’s consent after the client has been adequately informedconcerning the important possible effects on the client’s interests. See Rules1.6(a)and1.0(e).

[6] Financial Auditors’ Request for Information. — When a questionconcerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client’sfinancialauditorandthequestionisreferredtothelawyer,thelawyer’sresponsemaybemadeinaccordancewithproceduresrecognizedinthelegalprofession.Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement ofpolicy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information,adoptedin1975.


Rule2.4.Lawyerservingasthird-partyneutral.

(a)A lawyer serves as a third-party neutralwhen the lawyer assists two ormorepersonswhoarenotclientsofthelawyertoreacharesolutionofadisputeor othermatter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutralmayincludeserviceasanarbitrator,amediatororinsuchothercapacityaswillenablethelawyertoassistthepartiestoresolvethematter.

(b)Alawyerservingasathird-partyneutralshallinformunrepresentedpartiesthatthelawyerisnotrepresentingthem.Whenthelawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowthatapartydoesnotunderstandthelawyer’sroleinthematter,thelawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer’s role as a third-partyneutralandalawyer’sroleasonewhorepresentsaclient.

COMMENT

[1]Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civiljustice system.Aside from representingclients indispute-resolutionprocesses,lawyersoftenserveasthird-partyneutrals.Athird-partyneutralisaperson,suchas a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties,representedorunrepresented,intheresolutionofadisputeorinthearrangementof a transaction.Whether a third-partyneutral servesprimarily as a facilitator,evaluator or decisionmaker depends on the particular process that is eitherselectedbythepartiesormandatedbyacourt.

[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, insomecourt-connectedcontexts,onlylawyersareallowedtoserveinthisroleorto handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may besubject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutralsgenerallyortolawyersservingasthirdpartyneutrals.Lawyer-neutralsmayalsobesubjecttovariouscodesofethics,suchasthecodeofEthicsforArbitrationinCommercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American BarAssociationandtheAmericanArbitrationAssociationortheModelstandardsofConduct forMediators jointly prepared by theAmericanBarAssociation, theAmericanArbitrationAssociation and the Society of Professionals inDisputeresolution.

[3]Unlike nonlawyerswho serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving inthisrolemayexperienceuniqueproblemsasaresultofdifferencesbetweenthe

roleofathird-partyneutralandalawyer’sserviceasaclientrepresentative.Thepotential for confusion is significantwhen theparties areunrepresented in theprocess.Thus,paragraph (b) requiresa lawyer-neutral to informunrepresentedparties that the lawyer is not representing them.For someparties, particularlypartieswhofrequentlyusedisputeresolutionprocesses,thisinformationwillbesufficient.Forothers,particularly thosewhoareusing theprocess for the firsttime,more informationwillbe required.Whereappropriate, the lawyershouldinformunrepresentedpartiesof the importantdifferencesbetween the lawyer’sroleasthird-partyneutralandalawyer’sroleasaclientrepresentative,includingthe inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent ofdisclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular partiesinvolved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particularfeaturesofthedispute-resolutionprocessselected.

[4]Alawyerwhoservesasathird-partyneutralsubsequentlymaybeaskedtoserve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts ofinterest that arise forboth the individual lawyerand the lawyer’s law firmareaddressedinRule1.12.

[5]Lawyerswhorepresentclients inalternativedispute-resolutionprocessesaregovernedbytheRulesofProfessionalConduct.Whenthedispute-resolutionprocesstakesplacebeforeatribunal,asinbindingarbitration(seeRule1.0(m)),the lawyer’s duty of candor is governed byRule 3.3.Otherwise, the lawyer’sdutyofcandortowardboththethird-partyneutralandotherpartiesisgovernedbyRule4.1.


Rule3.1.Meritoriousclaimsandcontentions.

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert anissue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is notfrivolous,which includesagoodfaithargument foranextension,modificationorreversalofexistinglaw.Alawyerforthedefendantinacriminalproceeding,or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, maynevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of thecasebeestablished.

COMMENT

[1]Theadvocatehasadutytouselegalprocedureforthefullestbenefitoftheclient’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, bothproceduralandsubstantive,establishesthelimitswithinwhichanadvocatemayproceed.However,thelawisnotalwaysclearandneverisstatic.Accordingly,indeterminingtheproperscopeofadvocacy,accountmustbetakenofthelaw’sambiguitiesandpotentialforchange.

[2]Thefilingofanactionordefenseorsimilaractiontakenforaclientisnotfrivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated orbecausethelawyerexpectstodevelopvitalevidenceonlybydiscovery.Whatisrequiredof lawyers,however, is that theyinformthemselvesabout thefactsoftheirclients’casesandtheapplicablelawanddeterminethattheycanmakegoodfaithargumentsinsupportoftheirclients’positions.Suchactionisnotfrivolouseven though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will notprevail.Theactionisfrivolous,however,ifthelawyerisunableeithertomakeagood faith argument on themerits of the action takenor to support the actiontaken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal ofexistinglaw.

[3]Thelawyer’sobligationsunderthisRulearesubordinatetofederalorstateconstitutionallawthatentitlesadefendantinacriminalmattertotheassistanceofcounselinpresentingaclaimorcontentionthatotherwisewouldbeprohibitedbythisrule.

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Frivolousclaims.

Evidenceheld sufficient to establish a violationof thisRulewhere attorneyandherclientsdemonstratedahistoryofbringingclaimsinonecourtintendedtointerferewithanothercourt’sjurisdictionandorders.InreShearin,721A.2d157(Del.1998),cert.denied,526U.S.1122,119S.Ct.1776,143L.Ed.2d805(1999).




Rule3.2.Expeditinglitigation.

A lawyer shallmake reasonableefforts toexpedite litigationconsistentwiththeinterestsoftheclient.

COMMENT

[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek apostponementforpersonalreasons,itisnotproperforalawyertoroutinelyfailto expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will afailure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating anopposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not ajustification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. Thequestion iswhether a competent lawyer acting in good faithwould regard thecourseofactionashavingsomesubstantialpurposeotherthandelay.Realizingfinancial orother benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not alegitimateinterestoftheclient.

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Frivolousclaims.

Evidenceheld sufficient to establish a violationof thisRulewhere attorneydemonstratedahistoryofbringingfrivolouscollateralclaims.InreShearin,721A.2d157(Del.1998),cert.denied,526U.S.1122,119S.Ct.1776,143L.Ed.2d805(1999).

Attorney’s failure to respond to the Com. P. Ct. Civ. R. 41(e) notice ofdismissal of the no-fault case, resulting in dismissal of the case forwhich therelevantlimitationsperiodhadpassed,wasinviolationofthisrule.InreBecker,788A.2d527(Del.2001).





Rule3.3.Candortowardthetribunal.

(a)Alawyershallnotknowingly:

(1)makeafalsestatementoffactorlawtoatribunalorfailtocorrectafalsestatementofmaterialfactorlawpreviouslymadetothetribunalbythelawyer;

(2)failtodisclosetothetribunallegalauthorityinthecontrollingjurisdictionknowntothelawyertobedirectlyadversetothepositionoftheclientandnotdisclosedbyopposingcounsel;or

(3)offerevidencethatthelawyerknowstobefalse.Ifalawyer,thelawyer’sclient,orawitnesscalledby the lawyer,hasofferedmaterialevidenceand thelawyer comes to knowof its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedialmeasures,including,ifnecessary,disclosuretothetribunal.Alawyermayrefusetoofferevidence,other than the testimonyofadefendant inacriminalmatter,thatthelawyerreasonablybelievesisfalse.

(b)A lawyerwhorepresentsaclient inanadjudicativeproceedingandwhoknowsthatapersonintendstoengage,isengagingorhasengagedincriminalorfraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedialmeasures,including,ifnecessary,disclosuretothetribunal.

(c)Thedutiesstatedinparagraph(a)and(b)continuetotheconclusionoftheproceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of informationotherwiseprotectedbyRule1.6.

(d)Inanexparteproceeding,alawyershallinformthetribunalofallmaterialfactsknown to the lawyerwhichwillenable the tribunal tomakean informeddecision,whetherornotthefactsareadverse.

COMMENT

[1]ThisRulegovernstheconductofalawyerwhoisrepresentingaclientintheproceedingsofatribunal.SeeRule1.0(m)forthedefinitionof“tribunal.”Italsoapplieswhenthelawyerisrepresentingaclientinanancillaryproceedingconductedpursuanttothetribunal’sadjudicativeauthority,suchasadeposition.Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonableremedialmeasuresifthelawyercomestoknowthataclientwhoistestifyinginadepositionhasofferedevidencethatisfalse.

[2]ThisRulesetsforththespecialdutiesoflawyersasofficersofthecourttoavoidconductthatunderminestheintegrityoftheadjudicativeprocess.Alawyeractingasanadvocateinanadjudicativeproceedinghasanobligationtopresentthe client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty whilemaintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’sdutyofcandortothetribunal.Consequently,althoughalawyerinanadversaryproceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or tovouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow thetribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that thelawyerknowstobefalse.

[3]RepresentationsbyaLawyer.—Anadvocateisresponsibleforpleadingsandotherdocumentspreparedforlitigation,butisusuallynotrequiredtohavepersonal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documentsordinarilypresentassertionsbytheclient,orbysomeoneontheclient’sbehalf,and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertionpurportingtobeonthelawyer’sownknowledge,asinanaffidavitbythelawyeror in a statement in open court,may properly bemade onlywhen the lawyerknowstheassertionistrueorbelievesittobetrueonthebasisofareasonablydiligent inquiry.Therearecircumstanceswhere failure tomakeadisclosure istheequivalentofanaffirmativemisrepresentation.TheobligationprescribedinRule1.2(d)nottocounselaclienttocommitorassisttheclientincommittingafraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see theCommenttothatRule.SeealsothecommenttoRule8.4(b).

[4] Legal Argument. — Legal argument based on a knowingly falserepresentationoflawconstitutesdishonestytowardthetribunal.Alawyerisnotrequired tomake a disinterested exposition of the law, butmust recognize theexistenceofpertinent legal authorities.Furthermore, as stated inparagraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in thecontrolling jurisdiction that has not beendisclosedby the opposingparty.Theunderlyingconcept is that legal argument is adiscussion seeking todeterminethelegalpremisesproperlyapplicabletothecase.

[5]OfferingEvidence.—Paragraph(a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse tooffer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client’swishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of thecourttopreventthetrieroffactfrombeingmisledbyfalseevidence.Alawyerdoes not violate thisRule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose ofestablishingitsfalsity.

[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants thelawyertointroducefalseevidence,thelawyershouldseektopersuadetheclientthat theevidenceshouldnotbeoffered.If thepersuasionis ineffectiveandthelawyercontinuestorepresenttheclient,thelawyermustrefusetoofferthefalseevidence.Ifonlyaportionofawitness’stestimonywillbefalse,thelawyermaycall thewitness to testifybutmaynotelicitorotherwisepermit thewitness topresentthetestimonythatthelawyerknowsisfalse.

[7]Thedutiesstatedinparagraphs(a)and(b)applytoalllawyers,includingdefense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts haverequired counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrativestatementiftheaccusedsodesires,evenifcounselknowsthatthetestimonyorstatement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules ofProfessional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment[9].

[8]Theprohibitionagainstofferingfalseevidenceonlyappliesif thelawyerknows that the evidence is false.A lawyer’s reasonablebelief that evidence isfalsedoesnotprecludeitspresentationtothetrieroffact.Alawyer’sknowledgethatevidenceisfalse,however,canbeinferredfromthecircumstances.SeeRule1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity oftestimonyorotherevidence in favorof theclient, the lawyercannot ignoreanobviousfalsehood.

[9]Althoughparagraph(a)(3)onlyprohibitsalawyerfromofferingevidencethelawyerknowstobefalse,itpermitsthelawyertorefusetooffertestimonyorotherproofthatthelawyerreasonablybelievesisfalse.Offeringsuchproofmayreflectadverselyonthelawyer’sabilitytodiscriminateinthequalityofevidenceandthusimpairthelawyer’seffectivenessasanadvocate.Becauseofthespecialprotections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule doesnotpermita lawyer to refuse tooffer the testimonyof suchaclientwhere thelawyer reasonablybelievesbutdoesnotknowthat the testimonywillbe false.Unlessthelawyerknowsthetestimonywillbefalse,thelawyermusthonortheclient’sdecisiontotestify.SeealsoComment[7].

[10]RemedialMeasures.—Having offeredmaterial evidence in the beliefthat itwas true,a lawyermaysubsequentlycometoknowthat theevidence isfalse.Or,alawyermaybesurprisedwhenthelawyer’sclient,oranotherwitnesscalledbythelawyer,offerstestimonythelawyerknowstobefalse,eitherduringthe lawyer’s direct examination or in response to cross-examination by theopposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of

testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must takereasonableremedialmeasures.Insuchsituations,theadvocate’spropercourseisto remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer’sdutyofcandor to the tribunalandseek theclient’scooperationwith respect tothewithdrawalorcorrectionofthefalsestatementsorevidence.Ifthatfails,theadvocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from therepresentationisnotpermittedorwillnotundotheeffectofthefalseevidence,the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonablynecessarytoremedythesituation,evenifdoingsorequiresthelawyertorevealinformationthatotherwisewouldbeprotectedbyRule1.6.Itisforthetribunalthentodeterminewhatshouldbedone—makingastatementaboutthemattertothetrieroffact,orderingamistrialorperhapsnothing.

[11] The disclosure of a client’s false testimony can result in graveconsequencestotheclient,includingnotonlyasenseofbetrayalbutalsolossofthe case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that thelawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-findingprocesswhichtheadversarysystemisdesignedtoimplement.SeeRule1.2(d).Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon thedutytodisclosetheexistenceoffalseevidence,theclientcansimplyrejectthelawyer’sadvicetorevealthefalseevidenceandinsistthatthelawyerkeepsilent.Thustheclientcouldineffectcoercethelawyerintobeingapartytofraudonthecourt.

[12]Preserving Integrity of Adjunctive Process.— Lawyers have a specialobligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct thatundermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing,intimidatingorotherwiseunlawfullycommunicatingwithawitness,juror,courtofficial or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying orconcealingdocumentsorotherevidenceorfailingtodiscloseinformationtothetribunalwhenrequiredbylawtodoso.Thus,paragraph(b)requiresalawyertotakereasonableremedialmeasures,includingdisclosureifnecessary,wheneverthelawyerknowsthataperson,includingthelawyer’sclient,intendstoengage,is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to theproceeding.

[13]Duration ofObligation.—A practical time limit on the obligation torectify falseevidenceor falsestatementsof lawandfacthas tobeestablished.The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for theterminationoftheobligation.Aproceedinghasconcludedwithinthemeaningof

thisRulewhenafinaljudgmentintheproceedinghasbeenaffirmedonappealorthetimeforreviewhaspassed.

[14] Ex parte Proceedings. — Ordinarily, an advocate has the limitedresponsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal shouldconsider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to bepresentedbytheopposingparty.However, inanyexparteproceeding,suchasan application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance ofpresentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding isnevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmativeresponsibility toaccord theabsentparty just consideration.The lawyer for therepresentedpartyhas thecorrelativeduty tomakedisclosuresofmaterial factsknowntothelawyerandthatthelawyerreasonablybelievesarenecessarytoaninformeddecision.

[15]Withdrawal.—Normally,alawyer’scompliancewiththedutyofcandorimposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from therepresentationofaclientwhoseinterestswillbeorhavebeenadverselyaffectedby the lawyer’s disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule1.16(a)toseekpermissionofthetribunaltowithdrawifthelawyer’scompliancewith thisRule’s dutyof candor results in such an extremedeteriorationof theclient-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently representtheclient.AlsoseeRule1.16(b)forthecircumstancesinwhichalawyerwillbepermitted to seek a tribunal’s permission to withdraw. In connection with arequestforpermissiontowithdrawthatispremisedonaclient’smisconduct,alawyermay reveal information relating to the representationonly to theextentreasonablynecessarytocomplywiththisRuleorasotherwisepermittedbyRule1.6.

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Attorneys’fees.

—Retainers.

Clientrelations.


—Perjury.



—Frivolousclaims.

—Illegalconduct.

—Opposingcounsel.

Attorneys’fees.

—Retainers.

Attorney’s acceptance of a retainer of $250 froma client through a prepaidlegalplan,whilenevercontacting theclientandrefusing torefundtheretaineruntil after the first disciplinary hearing, was held to have violated Law. Prof.ConductR.1.3,withregardtoactingwithreasonablediligenceandpromptness,Law.Prof.ConductR.1.4(a) and (b),with regard to failing tokeep the clientreasonably informed to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client tomake informed decisions, and, Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.15(b) and (d), withregard tofailing tosafeguard theclient’sfundsanddeliver themuponrequest;theprepaidlegalfirmhadrefusedtorefundtheretainerand,infact,showednorecord of the amount, which had been paid directly to the attorney. In reChasanov,869A.2d327(Del.2005).

Clientrelations.





—Perjury.

An attorney should have knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt beforedeterminingunderthisRulethathisclienthascommittedorisgoingtocommitperjury.Shockleyv.State,565A.2d1373(Del.1989).

Counseladequatelyperformedhisdutyasofficerofcourtbydisclosingtothecourtwhat he believed beyond a reasonable doubt to be his client’s proposedperjury;counsel’sresorttonarrativetestimonywhenclientinsistedontestifyingwas reasonable under the circumstances and did not prejudice client’s case.Shockleyv.State,565A.2d1373(Del.1989).

Disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s intentionalmisconduct in a medical negligence case, which included failing to disclosealteredmedicalrecords,failingtosupplementdiscoveryresponsesandfailingtocorrect a client’s false testimony (despitemultiple opportunities for correctiveaction); although the attorney had no prior disciplinary record and presentedevidence of good character and reputation, dishonesty and other aggravatingfactorsoutweighed themitigating factors. In reMcCarthy,173A.3d536 (Del.2017).



An attorney, acting as an officer of the court, has a duty to respond withcomplete candor to court inquiries; counselmay not, knowingly or otherwise,engage in conductwhichmay reasonablybeperceived asmisleading either tothecourtortoopposingcounsel.Statev.Guthman,619A.2d1175(Del.1993).

Attorneyviolatedsubsection(a)(1)ofthisRuleandProf.Cond.Rules3.4(b)and 8.4(c) when he identified himself as client’s “nephew” and submittedfalsifiedevidencetothetribunalintheformofapetitionwhichidentifiedhimassuch.InreMcCann,669A.2d49(Del.1995).

Defense counsel has a responsibilitynot only to thedefendant-client, but tothetrialcourt,aswell.Statev.Grossberg,705A.2d608(Del.Super.Ct.1997).

An attorney’s duty to respondwith complete candor to the court includes aresponsibility to promptly inform the court and opposing counsel of anydevelopmentthatrendersamaterialrepresentationtothecourtinaccurate.Statev.Grossberg,705A.2d608(Del.Super.Ct.1997).

The SixthAmendment right to counsel was never intended to override the








http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/U.S.%20CONST.%20AMEND.%206

court’s broader responsibility for keeping the administration of justice and thestandards of professional conduct unsullied. State v.Grossberg, 705A.2d 608(Del.Super.Ct.1997).

Evidenceheldsufficienttoestablishaviolationofsubsections(a)(1)and(4)ofthisRulewhereattorneyinconsistentlyinformedthetrialcourtthatshedidastowhethershedidordidnotrepresentaclient.InreShearin,721A.2d157(Del.1998),cert.denied,526U.S.1122,119S.Ct.1776,143L.Ed.2d805(1999).

Although a trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’smotiontowithdrawdefendant’sguiltyplea,defendant,defensecounsel,andtheprosecutor improperly failed todisclose anoral side agreement as requiredbySuper. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(2), as the failure to disclose the side agreementviolated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3) in the face of defendant’smisrepresentation,underoath,about thepleaagreement’sactual terms inopencourt; if defendant proved that the terms of the oral side agreement werefulfilled, then the State could be barred from requesting that defendant bedeclaredahabitualoffender.Scarboroughv.State,938A.2d644(Del.2007).

Basedonanattorney’sfalsestatementstoaVirginiacourtregardingdeliveryoflegaldocumentstoaparty-opponent,andmisleadingstatementsinaVirginiadisciplinaryproceedingconstitutingviolationsofLaw.Prof.ConductR.3.3(a)(1),4.1,and8.4(c),a30-daysuspensionwasimposed;ratherthanimposingan“admonishment with terms,” as Virginia did, a “substantially differentdiscipline”waswarrantedpursuanttoBd.Prof.Resp.18(4).InreAmberly,996A.2d793(Del.2010).

Claim by automobile purchasers that a dealership and a financing companycommitteda“frauduponthecourt”inviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.3.3(a)(2)lackedmerit;thepurchasersactuallyallegedthatlawyersforthedealershipand financing company failed to inform the court of a third-party beneficiarytheory for recovery prior to dismissing a party for lack of standing, but thedealershipandfinancingcompanydidnotmisinformthecourtregardingthelaw.Gibsonv.CarZone,2011Del.Super.LEXIS627(Del.Super.Ct.May3,2011).

Whereanattorneyengagedinlatenessorfailuretoappearatscheduledcourtappearances, tardy requests for postponements, failure to comply with court-imposeddeadlines,“sloppyworkandcompletedisregardtotheCourt’srulesandprocedure” andwasted judicial resources in 3DelawareCourts, in addition toviolating the duty of candor to the Supreme Court of Delaware, the attorneyviolatedLawProf.ConductR.1.1,1.3,3.3,3.4and8.4.Inre:Poliquin,49A.3d








1115(Del.2012).


Deputyattorneygeneralwassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawfor6monthsand 1 day for 7 ethical violations because the attorney initially falsely deniedmaking statements (corroboratedby a prothonotory also present) threatening acriminal defendant by implying that the State would brand that defendant aninformant;theattorneyadmittedonlypartofthesubstance,falselyaccusingthedefendantofeavesdropping,althoughlateradmitting that theattorneyintendedfor the defendant to hear the intimidating statements about possible prisonreprisals.InreFavata,119A.3d1283(Del.2015).

Therewasnobonafideconditionforthecourt’srecusallimitedtotheissueofcounsel’s withdrawal, because counsel could strictly limit disclosures to thecourt to preserve the client’s confidentiality pursuant to counsel’s professionalconduct obligations. State v. Pardo,—A.3d—, 2015Del. Super.LEXIS 548(Del.Super.Ct.Oct.27,2015).

Attorneywas suspended for an additional 6monthswhere: (1) the attorneyfiled 2 complaints in Superior Court without maintaining a Delaware office,conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; (2) the attorney created afalseimpressionbytestifyinginapriordisciplinarymatterthattheattorneydidnot currently have any suits pending in Delaware; (3) the violations wereknowingandcausedpotentialharmtothelegalsystem;(4)suspensionwasthepresumptive sanction; and (5) the aggravating factors did not sufficientlyoutweighthemitigatingfactorstowarrantdisbarment.InreLankenau,158A.3d451(Del.2017).

—Frivolousclaims.

Where thebulkof the claims and legal contentions assertedby the attorneyhad no foundation in existing law, norwere they supported by a nonfrivolousargument for reversal ormodification of existing law, the attorney proceedingprosefailedtoactappropriatelyasanofficeroftheSuperiorCourtofDelaware




byviolatingSuper.Ct.Civ.R.11andLaw.Prof.ConductR.3.3(a)(1);asneitherthecountynorcountyofficialswhichtheattorneysuedrequestedsanctionsorafee-shifting award in the case, the trial court did not impose any. Abbott v.Gordon,2008Del.Super.LEXIS103(Del.Super.Ct.Mar.27,2008),aff’d,957A.2d1(Del.2008).

—Illegalconduct.

AttorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct3.3(a)(1)by filingwith theFamilyCourt a petitioner’s answer to a respondent’s counterclaim, on which theattorneyhadsignedtheclient’snameandhadfalselynotarizedthesignature.InrePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).


—Opposingcounsel.

BecauseLaw.R.Prof.Conduct 3.3(a)(2) didnot requiredefense counsel todevelopandadvancepotentiallegalclaimsfortheplaintiff,therewasnosupportfora findingof fraudorothermisconductbyopposingcounsel.Gibsonv.CarZone,31A.3d76(Del.2011).







Rule3.4.Fairnesstoopposingpartyandcounsel.

Alawyershallnot:

(a)unlawfullyobstructanotherparty’saccesstoevidenceorunlawfullyalter,destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiaryvalue.Alawyershallnotcounselorassistanotherpersontodoanysuchact;

(b) falsifyevidence,counselorassistawitness to testify falsely,orofferaninducementtoawitnessthatisprohibitedbylaw.

(c)knowinglydisobeyanobligationunder therulesofa tribunal,exceptforanopenrefusalbasedonanassertionthatnovalidobligationexists;

(d) inpretrialprocedure,makea frivolousdiscovery requestor fail tomakereasonablydiligenteffortstocomplywithalegallyproperdiscoveryrequestbyanopposingparty;

(e)intrial,alludetoanymatterthatthelawyerdoesnotreasonablybelieveisrelevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personalknowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state apersonalopinion as to the justnessof a cause, the credibilityof awitness, theculpabilityofacivillitigantortheguiltorinnocenceofanaccused;or

(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily givingrelevantinformationtoanotherpartyunless:

(1)thepersonisarelativeoranemployeeorotheragentofaclient;and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not beadverselyaffectedbyrefrainingfromgivingsuchinformation.

COMMENT

[1]Theprocedureoftheadversarysystemcontemplatesthattheevidenceinacase is to be marshalled competitively by the contending parties. Faircompetition in the adversary system is secured by the prohibitions againstdestruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses,obstructivetacticsindiscoveryprocedure,andthelike.

[2]Documentsandother itemsofevidenceareoftenessential toestablishaclaim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing

party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery orsubpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can befrustratedifrelevantmaterialisaltered,concealedordestroyed.Applicablelawin many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose ofimpairingitsavailabilityinapendingproceedingoronewhosecommencementcan be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense.Paragraph(a)applies toevidentiarymaterialgenerally, includingcomputerizedinformation.Applicablelawmaypermitalawyertotaketemporarypossessionof physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limitedexaminationthatwillnotalterordestroymaterialcharacteristicsoftheevidence.Insuchacase,applicablelawmayrequirethelawyertoturntheevidenceovertothepoliceorotherprosecutingauthority,dependingonthecircumstances.

[3]Withregardtoparagraph(b),itisnotimpropertopayawitness’sexpensesortocompensateanexpertwitnessontermspermittedbylaw.Thecommonlawruleinmostjurisdictionsisthatitisimpropertopayanoccurrencewitnessanyfee for testifyingand that it is improper topayanexpertwitness a contingentfee.

[4]Paragraph(f)permitsa lawyer toadviseemployeesofaclient to refrainfromgiving information toanotherparty, for theemployeesmay identify theirinterestswiththoseoftheclient.SeealsoRule4.2.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Clientrelations.


Enforcement.



—Illegalconduct.

—Obligationstotribunal.

—Opposingcounsel.

—Witnesses.

Clientrelations.



Enforcement.

When a plaintiff, acting pro se, alleged that plaintiff’s former spouse’sattorneyhadviolated theLawyers’RulesofProfessionalConduct, theplaintiffdid not have standing to recover damages, even if there had been ethicalviolations; there was no basis for enforcement of a lawyer’s ethical dutiesoutsidetheframeworkofdisciplinaryproceedings.Buchananv.Gay,2006Del.Super.LEXIS382(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.20,2006).

Attorney who had knowingly violated a protective order was properlysanctioned to public reprimand because the misconduct was serious, causedpotentialinjurytothevulnerableteenagevictimandcausedactualinjurytothelegalsystem.InreKoyste,111A.3d581(Del.2015).

Becausetheintegrityoftheproceedingsandthecourt’struth-findingfunctioninvolvingcompanymanagementdisputesbetweenthepartieswasthreatenedbyplaintiffs’actions,basedontheirpaymentstowitnessesinexchangeforcertaintestimony, threats against witnesses and threats of civil litigation on baselessclaims, their conspiracy claims were dismissed against all defendants; certainadverseinferenceswerealsodrawnastootherclaims.OptimisCorpv.Waite,—A.3d—,2015Del.Ch.LEXIS222(Del.Ch.Aug.26,2015).



Attorneyviolatedsubsection(b)ofthisRuleandProf.Cond.Rules3.3(a)(1)and 8.4(c) when he identified himself as client’s “nephew” and submittedfalsifiedevidencetothetribunalintheformofapetitionthatidentifiedhimassuch.InreMcCann,669A.2d49(Del.1995).

Deputyattorneygeneralwassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawfor6monthsand 1 day for 7 ethical violations because the attorney initially falsely deniedmaking statements (corroboratedby a prothonotory also present) threatening acriminal defendant by implying that the State would brand that defendant an





informant;theattorneyadmittedonlypartofthesubstance,falselyaccusingthedefendantofeavesdropping,althoughlateradmitting that theattorneyintendedfor the defendant to hear the intimidating statements about possible prisonreprisals.InreFavata,119A.3d1283(Del.2015).



—Illegalconduct.

Court imposed an 18-month suspension from the practice of law upon alawyerwho,interalia,hadconcealedordestroyedpotentialevidencerelevanttocriminalchargesagainstlawyer.InreMelvin,807A.2d550(Del.2002).

In an attorney disciplinary matter, an attorney was disbarred as a result ofcommitting various felonies (violently physically attacking that attorney’sspouseinfrontoftheirchildren,destructionofevidenceandcontinualviolationofaprotectiveorder)intheStateofMainewhichviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct3.4(a)and(c)and8.4(b),(c),and(d);theSupremeCourtofDelawarerejectedtheattorney’sdefensethattheconductwastheresultof2braininjuries,asthemedicalevidencedidnotaddressmentalstateatthetimeofthecrimesandtherewasnothingintherecordtosuggestthattheattorneyraisedanydefensetothosecrimesbasedontheclaimedinfirmity.InreEnna,971A.2d110(Del.2009).

Becausetherewasevidencetosupport thefindingthatasuspendedattorneyknowingly practiced law multiple times over more than 1 year during a






disciplinary suspension, the lawyer violated multiple disciplinary rules; theappropriatesanctioninthecircumstanceswasdisbarment.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDel.Feuerhake,89A.3d1058(Del.2014).

—Obligationstotribunal.

Failure to comply with directions of Court in relation to pleadings is aviolationofthisRule.InreTos,576A.2d607(Del.1990).

Attorneyviolatedsubsection(c)when,inconnectionwiththereceivershipofhislawpractice,hefailedtocooperatewiththereceiver’seffortstogaincontrolover thebooksand recordsof thepractice. In reMaguire,725A.2d417 (Del.1999).


Whereattorneyfailed to timelyfile theaffidavit requiredbyRule4(a)(1)ofthe Delaware Rules for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, he violatedsubsection (c) of this section; thus, a public reprimand was the appropriatesanction, as the attorney had received a prior private admonition for similarmisconductinthepast.InreMcDonald,755A.2d389(Del.2000).

Whereattorneywhohadpracticed forover20years andwas found tobeagood lawyer committed professional misconduct by failing to appear at ascheduled family court hearing and by failing to reschedule two otherteleconferences in family court, which constituted violations of Del. Law. R.Prof.Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), the public probation period that attorneywasalreadyservingforpriormisconductwasextendedforanadditionalyear.In reSolomon,847A.2d1122(Del.2004).









Whenanattorneyhandling2estates,interalia,failedtoprobatetheestatesina timely manner, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c). In reWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005);InreWilson,900A.2d102(Del.2006).

Attorney,whowasnotauthorizedtopracticelawinDelaware,wasdisbarredfor violating Law. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c) as, even if the attorney contactedPennsylvania authorities to determine whether the attorney’s conduct violatedDelawarelaw,theattorneywastoldtocontactDelawareauthorities,anddidnotdoso; theattorneyknowinglyviolatedaceaseanddesistorder thatprohibitedtheconduct.InreTonwe,929A.2d774(Del.2007).

Whileanattorney’sviolationofaceaseanddesistorderwouldhavesupporteda finding of contempt under Bd. Unauthorized Prac. L. R. 19, the DelawareOfficeofDisciplinaryCounseldidnotabuseitsdiscretioninproceedingunderthe attorney disciplinary rules as the same conduct also constituted knowingdisobedienceofacourtorderinviolationofLaw.R.Prof.Conduct3.4(c).InreTonwe,929A.2d774(Del.2007).

Attorney’s conduct inmeetingwith a former client to provide legal advice,discussinglegalservicesandfeeswithapotentialclientwhichledtheclienttobelieve that the attorney’s residential services company could provide legalservices and using the attorney’s former law firm email address incommunications with the public at least 6 weeks after a suspension orderviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.3.4(c).InreDavis,43A.3d856(Del.2012).

TheBoardonProfessionalResponsibilitydidnotfindbyclearandconvincingevidence a violation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 3.4(c) where: (1) the attorneyconstructivelyrefusedcourt-orderedappointmentsbypresenting thatattorney’sownabilities insuchapoor light toclientsas toencouragethemtoseekotherrepresentation;but(2)theattorneyrequesteddocumentationandcontinuancesinbothcases,anominalsignofawillingnesstoproceedasattorneyofrecord.InreMurray,47A.3d972(Del.2012).


Suspension for 6 months and 1 day was warranted where an attorney: (1)








violatedLawProf.ConductR.1.1,1.3,3.3,3.4and8.4; (2)hadarecordof2priorprivateadmonitions;(3)engagedinapatternofmisconductconsistingofmultiple offenses; (4) suffered from personal or emotional problems; (5)cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in connection with thehearing; (6) was generally of good character, as evidenced by willingness torepresent those who might not otherwise have had representation; and (7)exhibitedremorse.Inre:Poliquin,49A.3d1115(Del.2012).

Attorney admittedly committed disciplinary violations by failing to complywithcontinuinglegaleducation(CLE)requirements,andbyfailingtorespondtocommunications with the CLE Commission about that deficiency. In rePoverman,80A.3d960(Del.2013).

Attorneywho committed various disciplinary violations with respect to thefailure to complete continuing legal education requirements and reportingobligationsrelatingtheretowaspubliclyreprimandedwithconditions,because:(1) the attorney actedknowingly andhadno remorse; (2) the attorneydidnotcause injury to a client; and (3) the aggravating factors outweighed themitigatingones.InrePoverman,80A.3d960(Del.2013).

Where an attorney, in order to benefit a client, knowingly violated theChanceryCourt’sseizureorderenjoiningpersonsfrombringingclaimsrelatingtoaninsurerexceptinthatCourt, therebycausinginjurytotheinsurerandtheInsuranceCommissioner andprejudice to the judicial system, the presumptivesanctionofsuspensionwasneverthelessreducedtopublicreprimand;mitigatingfactorsoutweighed the aggravating factors in the case. In reBrown,103A.3d515(Del.2014).


Itwasprosecutorialmisconducttovouchfor1oftheState’s2keywitnesses,a friendof thevictim,bystating inanobjectionduringcross-examination thatthewitnesshadnotspokentodefendantsince thepoint in timedefendantshotthevictim.McCoyv.State,112A.3d239(Del.2015).

OfficeofDisciplinaryCounselprovedbyclearandconvincingevidencethat







an attorney committed professional conduct violations by knowingly causingimagesfromasexualabusevictim’scellphonetobeshowntoboththevictim’sparentanddefendant inviolationofaprotectiveorder. In reKoyste,111A.3d581(Del.2015).

—Opposingcounsel.

While an attorney has duties of fairness to an opposing party andmay notengage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit ormisrepresentation, anattorneyneednotaffirmativelyrevealtheweaknessofhiscasetohisopponent.InreEnstarCorp.,593A.2d543(Del.Ch.1991),rev’donothergrounds,604A.2d404(Del.1992).

Newtrialwasgrantedwheredefensecounsel’scommentstojuryincludedanunjustified attack on the integrity of opposing counsel. Putney v. Rosin, 791A.2d902(Del.Super.Ct.2001).

—Witnesses.

All Delaware lawyers are bound by the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules ofProfessionalConducttorefrainattrialfromexpressingapersonalopiniononthecredibilityofawitness.Trumpv.State,753A.2d963(Del.2000).

Defense counsel did not violate subsection (e) of this rule when, duringclosingargument,counselmadecommentswhichcomparedawitness’testimonyon the stand to information provided duringmeetings conducted prior to trial.Russov.MedlabClinicalTesting,Inc.,2001Del.Super.LEXIS464(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.14,2001).

First corporation’s motion to approve its designation of a consultant wasgranted because, although the consultant was also to be a fact witness, thecompensation the first corporationproposed topay to theconsultant related tothatconsultant’sworkassuch,andnottoanywillingnesstotestifyastothefactsunderlyingtheclaims;therewasnoProf.ConductR.3.4(b)violation.BAESys.Info.&Elec.Sys.Integrationv.LockheedMartinCorp.,2011Del.Ch.LEXIS117(Del.Ch.Aug.10,2011).









Rule3.5.Impartialityanddecorumofthetribunal.

Alawyershallnot:

(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official bymeansprohibitedbylaw;

(b)communicateorcauseanothertocommunicateexpartewithsuchapersonormembersofsuchperson’sfamilyduringtheproceedingunlessauthorizedtodosobylaworcourtorder;or

(c)communicatewitha jurororprospective jurorafterdischargeof the juryunlessthecommunicationispermittedbycourtrule;

(d)engageinconductintendedtodisruptatribunalorengageinundignifiedordiscourteousconductthatisdegradingtoatribunal.

COMMENT

[1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed bycriminallaw.OthersarespecifiedintheABAModelCodeofJudicialConduct,with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to voidcontributingtoaviolationofsuchprovisions.

[2]Duringaproceedinga lawyermaynotcommunicateorcauseanother tocommunicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in theproceeding,suchasjudges,mastersorjurors,orwithmembersofsuchperson’sfamily,unlessauthorizedtodosobylaworcourtorder.Furthermore,alawyershall not conduct or cause another to conduct a vexatious or harassinginvestigationofsuchpersonsortheirfamilymembers.

[3]Alawyermaynotcommunicatewithajurororprospectivejurorafterthejury has been discharged unless permitted by court rule. The lawyermay notengageinimproperconductduringthecommunication.

[4]The advocate’s function is to present evidence and argument so that thecausemaybedecidedaccordingtolaw.Refrainingfromabusiveorobstreperousconduct isacorollaryof theadvocate’sright tospeakonbehalfof litigants.Alawyermaystandfirmagainstabusebyajudgebutshouldavoidreciprocation;thejudge’sdefaultisnojustificationforsimilarderelictionbyanadvocate.Anadvocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and

preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than bybelligerenceortheatrics.

[5]Theduty to refrain fromdisruptive, undignifiedordiscourteous conductappliestoanyproceedingofatribunal,includingadeposition.SeeRule1.0(m).

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Decorumtowardtribunal.

Expartecommunications.

Opposingcounsel.

Witnesses.

Decorumtowardtribunal.

Revocation of an attorney’s admission pro hac vice was authorized for hisfailuretocontrolhisclient’sbehaviorduringadeposition.Statev.Mumford,731A.2d831(Del.Super.Ct.1999).

Evidenceheldsufficienttoestablishaviolationofsubsection(c)ofthisRulewhereattorneyfiledareplybriefcastigatingthetrialjudgeinpersonalterms.InreShearin,721A.2d157 (Del.1998), cert. denied,526U.S. 1122, 119S.Ct.1776,143L.Ed.2d805(1999).

Inanappealtakentothetrialcourtfromalicensingboard,attorney’swrittenarguments suggesting that the trial court would not rule on the merits, anunfoundedaccusation,violatedLawR.Prof.Conduct3.5(d),conductdegradingto a tribunal, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to theadministrationof justice; the trialcourthad towaste judicial resourcesstrikingthe offending arguments sua sponte and writing an opinion explaining itsactions,andwarrantedapublicreprimandoftheattorney.InreAbbott,925A.2d482 (Del. 2007), cert. denied,—U.S.—, 128 S.Ct. 381, 169L. Ed. 2d 263(2007).

Attorney engaged in undignified and discourteous conduct, in violation ofLaw Prof. Conduct R. 3.5(d), through: (1) the language and tenor of theattorney’scommunicationswiththecourtandwithclients;(2)persistenteffortstobeexcusedfromappointments;(3)failuretoobtainsubstitutecounsel;and(4)





actionswhichweredisruptive to the tribunal. In reMurray,47A.3d972 (Del.2012).

While it was true that an attorney’s language did not amount to theinflammatorylanguageofothercaseswherepublicreprimandwasordered,theattorney did send discourteous letters to the court in 3 different cases andviolatedLawProf.ConductR.3.5and6.2 ineachof thosecases;because theLawProf.ConductR. 8.4(d) violation for thewasting of judicial resources inattempting to avoid court appointmentwas not deminimus, public reprimandwasappropriate.InreMurray,47A.3d972(Del.2012).

Prosecutor’s conduct did not comport with fundamental professionalrequirementsbecause,ratherthanensurethatjusticebedone,theprosecutor:(1)appearedtopreventaself-representingdefendant’sproperdefense;(2)mockeddefendant during cross-examination; (3) attempted to prevent defendant fromusing standby counsel for legal research and logistical assistance; and (4)activelygeneratedalevelofcynicismthatpermeatedthetrial.McCoyv.State,112A.3d239(Del.2015).


Thirty-day suspensionof adeputy attorneygeneralwas appropriatebecausethe attorney’s conduct, cajoling a bailiff to enter a room in a courthousebrandishing a firearm as an ill-conceived prank, involved breaches of dutiesowedtothelegalsystemandtothelegalprofession.InreGelof,142A.3d506(Del.2016).


AttorneyforafamilydidnothavetobedisqualifiedpursuanttoLawR.Prof.Conduct3.5forsendingexpartecommunicationstothepriortrialcourt,astheprior trial court recused itself based on such communications and no suchcommunications were made to the current trial court in a case involving thefamily’sclaimthatan insurerbreachedthe impliedcovenantofgoodfaithandfairdealing.Dunlapv.StateFarmFire&Cas.Co.,955A.2d132(Del.Super.







Ct.2007),rev’dandremandedonothergrounds,950A.2d658(Del.2008).

Opposingcounsel.

An attorneywho referred to opposing counsel in a crude, but graphic, analtermwhile in anofficeconferencewitha judgeviolated subsection (c)of thisRuleand11Del.C.§1271(1).InreRamunno,625A.2d248(Del.1993).

Replybrieffilledwithabusivereferencestotheopposingpartyanditscounselwassounprofessionalanddegradingtothecourtthatitstruckmuchofthebrief,suasponte,anddirected theparty todraftandsubmitanewone.395Assocs.,LLCv.NewCastleCounty,2005Del.Super.LEXIS386(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.28,2005).

Witnesses.

AlthoughtheState’squestioningofthewitnesseswasimpropertotheextentthat thewitnesses indicated that defendantwasonprobation, as the trial courthadspecificallyinstructedtheStatenottorevealthatfact,theerrorwasharmlessunder an analysis pursuant to Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139 (Del. 2006), asdefendant’s substantial rightswere not affected anddoubtwas not cast on theintegrityofthejudicialprocess.Buntingv.State,907A.2d145(Del.2006).








Rule3.6.Trialpublicity.

(a)A lawyerwho is participating or has participated in the investigation orlitigationof amatter shall notmake an extrajudicial statement that the lawyerknows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of publiccommunicationandwillhaveasubstantial likelihoodofmateriallyprejudicinganadjudicativeproceedinginthematter.

(b)Notwithstandingparagraph(a),alawyermaystate:

(1)theclaim,offenseordefenseinvolvedand,exceptwhenprohibitedbylaw,theidentityofthepersonsinvolved;

(2)informationcontainedinapublicrecord;

(3)thataninvestigationofamatterisinprogress;

(4)theschedulingorresultofanystepinlitigation;

(5) a request for assistance inobtainingevidenceand informationnecessarythereto;

(6)awarningofdangerconcerningthebehaviorofapersoninvolved,whenthereisreasontobelievethatthereexiststhelikelihoodofsubstantialharmtoanindividualortothepublicinterest;and

(7)inacriminalcase,inadditiontosubparagraphs(1)through(6):

(i)theidentity,residence,occupationandfamilystatusoftheaccused;

(ii)if theaccusedhasnotbeenapprehended,informationnecessarytoaidinapprehensionofthatperson;

(iii)thefact,timeandplaceofarrest;and

(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and thelengthoftheinvestigation.

(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that areasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from thesubstantialundueprejudicialeffectofrecentpublicitynotinitiatedbythelawyeror the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall belimited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adversepublicity.

(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyersubjecttoparagraph(a)shallmakeastatementprohibitedbyparagraph(a).

COMMENT

[1]Itisdifficulttostrikeabalancebetweenprotectingtherighttoafairtrialandsafeguardingtherightoffreeexpression.Preservingtherighttoafairtrialnecessarilyentailssomecurtailmentoftheinformationthatmaybedisseminatedaboutapartyprior to trial,particularlywhere trialby jury is involved. If therewere no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of theprotectiveeffectof therulesofforensicdecorumandtheexclusionaryrulesofevidence.On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the freedisseminationofinformationabouteventshavinglegalconsequencesandaboutlegalproceedingsthemselves.Thepublichasarighttoknowaboutthreatstoitssafety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimateinterestintheconductofjudicialproceedings,particularlyinmattersofgeneralpublicconcern.Furthermore,thesubjectmatteroflegalproceedingsisoftenofdirectsignificanceindebateanddeliberationoverquestionsofpublicpolicy.

[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings injuvenile,domesticrelationsandmentaldisabilityproceedings,andperhapsothertypesoflitigation.Rule3.4(c)requirescompliancewithsuchRules.

[3]TheRulesetsforthabasicgeneralprohibitionagainstalawyer’smakingstatements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantiallikelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizingthat the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood ofprejudicetoaproceedingbythecommentaryofalawyerwhoisnotinvolvedintheproceeding issmall, theruleappliesonly to lawyerswhoare,orwhohavebeeninvolvedintheinvestigationorlitigationofacase,andtheirassociates.

[4]Paragraph(b)identifiesspecificmattersaboutwhichalawyer’sstatementswouldnotordinarilybeconsideredtopresentasubstantiallikelihoodofmaterialprejudice,andshouldnot inanyeventbeconsideredprohibitedby thegeneralprohibitionofparagraph (a).Paragraph (b) isnot intended tobeanexhaustivelisting of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, butstatementsonothermattersmaybesubjecttoparagraph(a).

[5]Thereare,ontheotherhand,certainsubjectswhicharemorelikelythannottohaveamaterialprejudicialeffectonaproceeding,particularlywhentheyrefertoacivilmattertriabletoajury,acriminalmatter,oranyotherproceeding

thatcouldresultinincarceration.Thesesubjectsrelateto:

(1)thecharacter,credibility,reputationorcriminalrecordofaparty,suspectin a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or theexpectedtestimonyofapartyofwitness;

(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, thepossibilityofapleaofguiltytotheoffenseortheexistenceorcontentsofanyconfession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or thatperson’srefusalorfailuretomakeastatement;

(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal orfailureofapersontosubmittoanexaminationortest,ortheidentityornatureofphysicalevidenceexpectedtobepresented;

(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in acriminalcaseorproceedingthatcouldresultinincarceration;

(5)informationthatthelawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowislikelytobe inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create asubstantialriskofprejudicinganimpartialtrial;or

(6) the fact that a defendant has been chargedwith a crime, unless there isincludedthereinastatementexplaining that thecharge ismerelyanaccusationandthatthedefendantispresumedinnocentuntilandunlessprovenguilty.

[6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of theproceedinginvolved.Criminal jurytrialswillbemostsensitivetoextrajudicialspeech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitrationproceedingsmaybeeven lessaffected.TheRulewill stillplace limitationsonprejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may bedifferentdependingonthetypeofproceeding.

[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a questionunder this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response tostatements made publicly by another party, another party’s lawyer, or thirdpersons,whereareasonablelawyerwouldbelieveapublicresponseisrequiredinorder to avoidprejudice to the lawyer’s client.Whenprejudicial statementshavebeenpubliclymadebyothers,responsivestatementsmayhavethesalutaryeffectoflesseninganyresultingadverseimpactontheadjudicativeproceeding.Suchresponsivestatementsshouldbe limited tocontainonlysuch informationas isnecessary tomitigateundueprejudicecreatedby the statementsmadebyothers.

[8] See Rule 3.8(f) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection withextrajudicialstatementsaboutcriminalproceedings.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Gagorders.

Courtdeniedmotionforagagorderwherethedisputedstatementsweremadeto protect the plaintiff from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recentpublicity initiatedwhenanemail containingaconfidential InternalAffairs filewas released to a Delaware newspaper, in violation of the confidentialityprovisionsof11Del.C.§9200(c)(12);assuch,plaintiff’sattorney’sstatementsfell under the “safe haven” of the Law. Prof. Conduct R. 3.6. Conley v.Chaffinch,— F. Supp. 2d—, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3279 (D. Del.Mar. 2,2005).

While keeping a court record sealed was not warranted, an order limitingpublicity was entered; given the subject matter of the case, child sex abuse,mediacoveragewascertainlypossible.Sokolovev.Marenberg,2013Del.Super.LEXIS598(Del.Super.Ct.Dec.20,2013).

Publicfacts.

There was no showing, and no factual assertion to support, that theprosecutionkneworreasonablyshouldhaveknownthatthestatements,referringtodefendantasa“cold-bloodedkiller,”wouldhavea substantial likelihoodofmateriallyprejudicingtheproceedingsnorthattheproceedingswerelikelytobeprejudiced,andthestatementsmirroredlanguageusedbytheprosecutioninitsclosingargumentanddidnotappearinthenewspaperuntilafterdefendantwasfoundguiltyoffirst-degreemurder;therefore,thestatementthatwaspublishedin the newspaper described information that the prosecution had put into thepublic record of the trial. State v. Ploof, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 285 (Del.Super.Ct.Aug.20,2003).





Rule3.7.Lawyeraswitness.

(a)Alawyershallnotactasadvocateatatrialinwhichthelawyerislikelytobeanecessarywitnessunless:

(1)thetestimonyrelatestoanuncontestedissue;

(2)thetestimonyrelatestothenatureandvalueoflegalservicesrenderedinthecase;or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on theclient.

(b)A lawyermay act as advocate in a trial inwhich another lawyer in thelawyer’sfirmislikelytobecalledasawitnessunlessprecludedfromdoingsobyRule1.7orRule1.9.

COMMENT

[1] Combining the roles of advocate andwitness can prejudice the tribunaland theopposingparty and can also involve a conflict of interest between thelawyerandclient.

[2]Advocate-WitnessRule.—Thetribunalhasproperobjectionwhenthetrierof factmay be confused ormisled by a lawyer serving as both advocate andwitness.Theopposingpartyhasproperobjectionwherethecombinationofrolesmayprejudicethatparty’srightsinthelitigation.Awitnessisrequiredtotestifyonthebasisofpersonalknowledge,whileanadvocateisexpectedtoexplainandcommentonevidencegivenbyothers.Itmaynotbeclearwhetherastatementbyanadvocate-witnessshouldbetakenasprooforasananalysisoftheproof.

[3] To protect the tribunal, paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer fromsimultaneously serving as advocate and necessary witness except in thosecircumstances specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). Paragraph (a)(1)recognizesthatifthetestimonywillbeuncontested,theambiguitiesinthedualrolearepurelytheoretical.Paragraph(a)(2)recognizesthatwherethetestimonyconcerns theextentandvalueof legalservicesrendered in theaction inwhichthetestimonyisoffered,permittingthelawyers to testifyavoids theneedforasecondtrialwithnewcounseltoresolvethatissue.Moreover,insuchasituationthe judge has firsthand knowledge of thematter in issue; hence, there is less

dependenceontheadversaryprocesstotestthecredibilityofthetestimony.

[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that abalancingisrequiredbetweentheinterestsoftheclientandthoseofthetribunaland the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or theopposingpartyislikelytosufferprejudicedependsonthenatureofthecase,theimportanceandprobabletenorofthelawyer’stestimony,andtheprobabilitythatthelawyer’stestimonywillconflictwiththatofotherwitnesses.Evenifthereisriskofsuchprejudice,indeterminingwhetherthelawyershouldbedisqualified,dueregardmustbegiventotheeffectofdisqualificationonthelawyer’sclient.It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyerwouldprobablybeawitness.Theconflictof interestprinciplesstatedinRules1.7,1.9and1.10havenoapplicationtothisaspectoftheproblem.

[5] Because the tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts asadvocateinatrialinwhichanotherlawyerinthelawyer’sfirmwilltestifyasanecessarywitness,paragraph(b)permitsthelawyertodosoexceptinsituationsinvolvingaconflictofinterest.

[6]ConflictofInterest.—Indeterminingifitispermissibletoactasadvocateinatrialinwhichthelawyerwillbeanecessarywitness,thelawyermustalsoconsiderthatthedualrolemaygiverisetoaconflictofinterestthatwillrequirecompliancewithRules1.7or1.9.Forexample,ifthereislikelytobesubstantialconflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer, therepresentationinvolvesaconflictofinterestthatrequirescompliancewithRule1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited byparagraph(a)fromsimultaneouslyservingasadvocateandwitnessbecausethelawyer’s disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client.Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to simultaneously serve as anadvocateandawitnessbyparagraph(a)(3)mightbeprecludedfromdoingsobyRule 1.9. The problem can arisewhether the lawyer is called as awitness onbehalfof theclientor iscalledby theopposingparty.Determiningwhetherornotsuchaconflictexistsisprimarilytheresponsibilityofthelawyerinvolved.Ifthere is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client’s informedconsent,confirmedinwriting.Insomecases,thelawyerwillbeprecludedfromseekingtheclient’sconsent.SeeRule1.7.SeeRule1.0(b)forthedefinitionof“confirmedinwriting”andRule1.0(e)forthedefinitionof“informedconsent.”

[7]Paragraph(b)providesthatalawyerisnotdisqualifiedfromservingasanadvocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm isprecluded from doing so by paragraph (a). If, however, the testifying lawyer

wouldalsobedisqualifiedbyRule1.7orRule1.9fromrepresentingtheclientinthe matter, other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing theclientbyRule1.10unlesstheclientgivesinformedconsentundertheconditionsstatedinRule1.7.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Employerandemployeerelations.

Enforcement.


Familylaw.

Personalinjuries.

Standardofreview.

Stockderivativesuits.

Trustsandestates.


In an unemployment benefits matter the employer’s attorney was notdisqualified under a former version of this rule from serving as counsel eventhough the attorney was a part-time employee of the employer because theattorney did not serve in any managerial capacity and could not providetestimonyregardinganyofthecontestedissuesinthecase,therefore,wasnotanecessary witness in the case. Brighton Hotels v. Gennett, 2002 Del. Super.LEXIS372(Del.Super.Ct.Oct.23,2002).

Enforcement.

A non-client litigant does have standing to enforce the Delaware Rules ofProfessionalConductinatrialcourtwhenheorshecandemonstratetothetrialjudgethattheopposingcounsel’sconflictsomehowprejudicedhisorherrightsandcallsintoquestionthefairorefficientadministrationofjustice.InreEstateofWaters,647A.2d1091(Del.1994).

Therewasnobasistograntaprotectiveorderprecludingthetestimonyofan



attorneyasarebuttalwitnessbecause:(1)theattorneywastimelyidentifiedonthe trialwitness listbasedonareservationofright; (2) therewasnoprejudiceshownwithrespecttoasequestrationorder;and(3)theattorney’stestimonyasafactwitnessdidnotviolatethewitness-as-advocaterulewheretheattorneydidnotserveasanadvocateattrial.InreOxbowCarbonLLCUnitholderLitig.,—A.3d—,2017Del.Ch.LEXIS135(Del.Ch.July28,2017).


AttorneyforafamilydidnothavetobedisqualifiedpursuanttoLawR.Prof.Conduct3.5forsendingexpartecommunicationstothepriortrialcourt,astheprior trial court recused itself based on such communications and no suchcommunications were made to the current trial court in a case involving thefamily’sclaimthatan insurerbreachedthe impliedcovenantofgoodfaithandfairdealing;however,thatattorneydidhavetobedisqualifiedpursuanttoLawR. Prof. Conduct 3.7 because the attorney could be called to testify aboutnegotiations that occurred related to the family’s claim.Dunlap v. State FarmFire&Cas.Co.,955A.2d132(Del.Super.Ct.2007), rev’dandremandedonothergrounds,950A.2d658(Del.2008).

Familylaw.

Chancery Court denied a former husband’smotion to disqualify his formerwife’sattorney,onthegroundthattheattorneymayhavebeenrequiredtotestifyin the husband’s action to rescind transfers of property between the formerhusbandandhisformerwife;Law.Prof.ConductR.3.7(a)wasnotsorigidastorequire the counsel’s immediate withdrawal or to deny her the opportunity topresent a motion on behalf of the former wife to dismiss for lack of subjectmatterjurisdiction.Bengev.OakGroveMotorCourt,Inc.,2006Del.Ch.LEXIS5(Del.Ch.Jan.13,2006).

Astherewasnootherclient,currentorformer,tocauseaconflictofinterest,thewife’sattorneywasnotprecludedfromrepresentingthewife,whenanothermemberoftheattorney’sfirmtookthestandasawitnessforthewifeduringthehearing.L.L.L.v.W.B.L.,2007Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS196(Del.Fam.Ct.Jan.17,2007).

Therewas no basis to disqualify a former paramour’s attorney in a supportaction, because although the attorney was employed in a law firm alsoemployinganattorneycurrentlydatingtheformerparamour:(1)therewasnoasignificant risk of material limitation to the representation; (2) there was noconflict of interest; and (3) the attorney’s testimony about attorneys’ feeswas





withinanexceptionundertheprofessionalconductrules.Barkv.May,—A.3d—,2015Del.Super.LEXIS530(Del.Super.Ct.Sept.28,2015).

Personalinjuries.

In a personal injury actionwherein an adult child alleged childhood sexualabusebyaparent, thechildwasnotentitled todisqualify theparent’sattorneyunder this rule because: (1) the child did not present clear and convincingevidencethattheattorneyhadinformationregardingallegedabuseofthechild’ssibling;(2)therewasnoevidencetheattorneybecamefriendswiththesibling;and (3) the child failed to demonstrate the attorney’s testimony would benecessary to the resolutionof the suit.McLeodv.McLeod,—A.3d—,2014Del.Super.LEXIS662(Del.Super.Ct.Dec.20,2014).

Standardofreview.

In determiningwhether to disqualify an attorney under this Rule, the courtshouldbalancethepurposestobeservedbytheRuleagainstsuchcountervailinginterests as a litigant’s right to retain counsel of his choice. In re ML-LeeAcquisitionFundII,848F.Supp.527(D.Del.1994).

Stockderivativesuits.

When, in a derivative action, plaintiffs’ counselwasdisqualifiedbecauseofthe possibility that he could be a witness in the action, and plaintiffs did notsubsequentlyretainsubstitutecounselorappearatthetrialcourt’scalendarcall,resultinginthedismissaloftheiraction,thetrialcourt’spriordisqualificationofcounselwasnotevidenceofplaintiffs’badfaithjustifyinganawardtodefendantofattorney’sfeesorcosts.Mainierov.Tanter,2003Del.Ch.LEXIS43(Del.Ch.Apr.25,2003).

When, in a derivative action, plaintiffs’ counselwasdisqualifiedbecauseofthepossibilitythathecouldbeawitnessintheaction,thefailureofplaintiffstoappear,throughcounsel,morethanfourmonthslater,atthetrialcourt’scalendarcall,asrequiredbyDel.Ch.Ct.R.40(c), justifieddismissalofplaintiffs’case,underDel.Ch.Ct.R. 41(b), due to their failure to complywith theDelawareChanceryCourtRules.Mainierov.Tanter,2003Del.Ch.LEXIS43 (Del.Ch.Apr.25,2003).

Trustsandestates.







Rule3.8.Specialresponsibilitiesofaprosecutor.

Theprosecutorinacriminalcaseshall:

(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is notsupportedbyprobablecause;

(b)makereasonableeffortstoassurethattheaccusedhasbeenadvisedoftherightto,andtheprocedureforobtaining,counselandhasbeengivenreasonableopportunitytoobtaincounsel;

(c) not seek to obtain fromanunrepresented accused awaiver of importantpretrialrights,suchastherighttoapreliminaryhearing;

(d)(1)make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or informationknowntotheprosecutorthattendstonegatetheguiltoftheaccusedormitigatestheoffense, and, in connectionwith sentencing,disclose to thedefense and tothe tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,exceptwhentheprosecutorisrelievedofthisresponsibilitybyaprotectiveorderofthetribunal;

(2)whentheprosecutorcomestoknowofnew,credibleandmaterialevidenceestablishingthataconvicteddefendantdidnotcommittheoffenseforwhichthedefendantwas convicted, the prosecutor shall, unless a court authorizes delay,make timely disclosure of that evidence to the convicted defendant and anyappropriatecourt,or,wheretheconvictionwasobtainedoutsidetheprosecutor’sjurisdiction, to the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the convictionoccurred;

(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding topresentevidenceaboutapastorpresentclientunlesstheprosecutorreasonablybelieves:

(1)theinformationsoughtisnotprotectedfromdisclosurebyanyapplicableprivilege;

(2)theevidencesoughtisessentialtothesuccessfulcompletionofanongoinginvestigationorprosecution;and

(3)thereisnootherfeasiblealternativetoobtaintheinformation;

(f)exceptforstatementsthatarenecessarytoinformthepublicofthenature

andextentoftheprosecutor’sactionandthatservealegitimatelawenforcementpurpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantiallikelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercisereasonablecaretopreventinvestigators,lawenforcementpersonnel,employeesor other persons assisting or associatedwith the prosecutor in a criminal casefrommakinganextrajudicialstatementthattheprosecutorwouldbeprohibitedfrommakingunderRule3.6orthisRule.(Amended,effectiveSept.21,2009.)

COMMENT

[1]Aprosecutorhastheresponsibilityofaministerofjusticeandnotsimplythatofanadvocate.Thisresponsibilitycarrieswithitspecificobligationstoseethat thedefendant isaccordedprocedural justiceandthatguilt isdecideduponthebasisofsufficientevidence.Preciselyhowfar theprosecutor is required togo in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions.Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal JusticeRelatingtotheProsecutionFunction,whichinturnaretheproductofprolongedandcarefuldeliberationbylawyersexperiencedinbothcriminalprosecutionanddefense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor andknowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorialdiscretioncouldconstituteaviolationofRule8.4.

[2] In some jurisdictions, a defendantmaywaive a preliminary hearing andthereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause.Accordingly,prosecutors shouldnot seek toobtainwaiversofpreliminaryhearingsorotherimportantpretrialrightsfromunrepresentedaccusedpersons.Paragraph(c)doesnot apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of thetribunal.Nordoesitforbidthelawfulquestioningofanunchargedsuspectwhohasknowinglywaivedtherightstocounselandsilence.

[3]Thedutyofdisclosuredescribed inparagraph (d)doesnot endwith theconvictionof the criminal defendant.Theprosecutor also is bound to discloseafter-acquiredevidencethatcastsdoubtuponthecorrectnessof theconviction.If a prosecutor becomes aware of new, material and credible evidence whichleadshimorhertoreasonablybelieveadefendantmaybeinnocentofacrimeforwhichthedefendanthasbeenconvicted,theprosecutorshoulddisclosesuchevidencetotheappropriatecourtand,unlessthecourtauthorizesadelay,tothedefense attorney, or, if the defendant is not represented by counsel, to thedefendant. If the convictionwasobtainedoutside theprosecutor’s jurisdiction,disclosureshouldbemadeto thechiefprosecutorof the jurisdictionwhere the

convictionoccurred.Aprosecutor’sindependentjudgment,madeingoodfaith,that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligation ofparagraph(d),evenifsubsequentlydeterminedtohavebeenerroneous,doesnotconstituteaviolationofthisRule.Theexceptioninparagraph(d)recognizesthata prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal ifdisclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to anindividualortothepublicinterest.

[4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas ingrandjuryandothercriminalproceedingstothosesituationsinwhichthereisagenuineneedtointrudeintotheclient-lawyerrelationship.

[5] Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extra judicialstatements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatoryproceeding.Inthecontextofacriminalprosecution,aprosecutor’sextrajudicialstatementcancreate theadditionalproblemof increasingpubliccondemnationoftheaccused.Althoughtheannouncementofanindictment,forexample,willnecessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, andshould, avoid comments that have no legitimate law enforcement purpose andhave a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused.Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which aprosecutormaymakewhichcomplywithRule3.6(b)or3.6(c).

[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject toRules 5.1 and 5.3,whichrelatetoresponsibilitiesregardinglawyersandnonlawyerswhoworkfororareassociatedwiththelawyer’soffice.Paragraph(f)remindstheprosecutoroftheimportance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers ofimproper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f)requiresaprosecutortoexercisereasonablecaretopreventpersonsassistingorassociatedwith the prosecutor frommaking improper extrajudicial statements,evenwhensuchpersonsarenotunder thedirectsupervisionof theprosecutor.Ordinarily,thereasonablecarestandardwillbesatisfiediftheprosecutorissuesthe appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevantindividuals.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Hinderingdefense.

Prosecutor’s conduct did not comport with fundamental professionalrequirementsbecause,ratherthanensurethatjusticebedone,theprosecutor:(1)appearedtopreventaself-representingdefendant’sproperdefense;(2)mockeddefendant during cross-examination; (3) attempted to prevent defendant fromusing standby counsel for legal research and logistical assistance; and (4)activelygeneratedalevelofcynicismthatpermeatedthetrial.McCoyv.State,112A.3d239(Del.2015).

Lend-A-ProsecutorProgram.

Under29Del.C.§2505,theAttorneyGeneralisauthorizedtoappointapart-timeprosecutoremployedandcompensatedbyaprivate lawfirm toprosecutecriminalcasesforthestate.ThereisnobartothisLend-A-ProsecutorProgramon ethical grounds where no actual conflict between the public and privateinterestispresented.Sethv.State,592A.2d436(Del.1991).





Rule3.9.Advocateinnonadjudicativeproceedings.

A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or administrativeagencyinanonadjudicativeproceedingshalldisclosethattheappearanceisinarepresentative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a)through(c),3.4(a)through(c)and3.5(a)and(c).

COMMENT

[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures,municipal councils,and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-makingcapacity, lawyerspresentfacts, formulate issuesandadvanceargumentin the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a court,shouldbeable torelyon the integrityof thesubmissionsmade to it.Alawyerappearingbeforesuchabodymustdealwithithonestlyandinconformitywithapplicable rules of procedure. SeeRules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a) through (c)and3.5.

[2]Lawyershavenoexclusiverighttoappearbeforenonadjudicativebodies,as theydobeforeacourt.Therequirementsof thisRule thereforemaysubjectlawyerstoregulationsinapplicabletoadvocateswhoarenotlawyers.However,legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to dealwiththemastheydealwithcourts.

[3] This Rule only applieswhen a lawyer represents a client in connectionwith an official hearing ormeeting of a governmental agency or a legislativebody to which the lawyer or the lawyer’s client is presenting evidence orargument.Itdoesnotapplytorepresentationofaclientinanegotiationorotherbilateral transaction with a governmental agency or in connection with anapplication for a license or other privilege or the client’s compliance withgenerally applicable reporting requirements, such as the filing of income-taxreturns.Nordoesitapplytotherepresentationofaclientinconnectionwithaninvestigation or examination of the client’s affairs conducted by governmentinvestigatorsorexaminers.RepresentationinsuchmattersisgovernedbyRules4.1through4.4.


Rule3.10.Communicationwithorinvestigationofjurors(Deleted).

Revisor’snote.—FormerRule3.10,whichconcernedcommunicationwithorinvestigationofjurors,wasdeletedeffectiveJuly1,2003.

Cross references. — As to current provisions concerning communicationwith(orinvestigationof)jurors,seeRule3.5.


Rule4.1.Truthfulnessinstatementstoothers.

Inthecourseofrepresentingaclientalawyershallnotknowingly:

(a)makeafalsestatementofmaterialfactorlawtoathirdperson;or

(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoidassistingacriminalorfraudulentactbyaclient,unlessdisclosureisprohibitedbyRule1.6.

COMMENT

[1]Misrepresentation.—A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealingwithothersonaclient’sbehalf,butgenerallyhasnoaffirmativedutytoinformanopposingpartyofrelevantfacts.Amisrepresentationcanoccurifthelawyerincorporatesoraffirmsa statementofanotherperson that the lawyerknows isfalse. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleadingstatementsoromissions that are the equivalentof affirmative false statements.For dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or formisrepresentationsbyalawyerotherthaninthecourseofrepresentingaclient,seeRule8.4.

[2]Statement ofFact.—This Rule refers to statements of fact.Whether aparticular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on thecircumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certaintypes of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.Estimatesofpriceorvalueplacedon thesubjectofa transactionandaparty’sintentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in thiscategory, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except wherenondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should bemindfuloftheirobligationsunderapplicablelawtoavoidcriminalandtortiousmisrepresentation.

[3]CrimeorFraudbyClient.—UnderRule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibitedfromcounselingorassistingaclientinconductthatthelawyerknowsiscriminalorfraudulent.Paragraph(b)statesaspecificapplicationoftheprinciplesetforthinRule1.2(d)andaddressesthesituationwhereaclient’scrimeorfraudtakestheformofalieormisrepresentation.Ordinarily,alawyercanavoidassistingaclient’s crime or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. Sometimes it

maybenecessaryforthelawyertogivenoticeofthefactofwithdrawalandtodisaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme cases,substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to therepresentationtoavoidbeingdeemedtohaveassistedtheclient’scrimeorfraud.Ifthelawyercanavoidassistingaclient’scrimeorfraudonlybydisclosingthisinformation,thenunderparagraph(b)thelawyerisrequiredtodoso,unlessthedisclosureisprohibitedbyRule1.6.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Candortowardthetribunal.



Truthfulness.

Attorney committed violations of the professional conduct rules bymakingfalsestatementsofmaterialfacttolendersonDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentsettlementstatements(“HUD-1statements”)filedonbehalfoftheattorneyandtheattorney’sclientsasborrowersinresidentialrealestatematters;theattorney’scertificationoftheHUD-1statementswasnotatrueandaccurateaccountofthetransactions.InreSanclemente,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

AttorneywhoviolatedtheDelawareRulesofProfessionalConduct,aswellas18U.S.C.§1010,bymakingfalsecertificationsinDepartmentofHousingand




http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/18%20U.S.C.%201010

UrbanDevelopment settlement statements (HUD-1 statements) was disbarred;the attorney acted with the intent of facilitating 22 real estate closings thatdefrauded those who relied on the accuracy of the HUD-1 statements. In reSullivan,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

Inmate did not show ineffective assistance of counsel; the inmate did notallege a specific instance inwhich counsel violated this rule or prove that theguiltypleaatissuewasunknowinglyorinvoluntarilyentered.Statev.Pickle,—A.3d—,2017Del.Super.LEXIS634(Del.Super.Ct.Dec.4,2017).



Rule4.2.Communicationwithpersonrepresentedbycounsel.

Inrepresentingaclient,alawyershallnotcommunicateaboutthesubjectoftherepresentationwithapersonthelawyerknowstoberepresentedbyanotherlawyerinthematter,unlessthelawyerhastheconsentoftheotherlawyerorisauthorizedtodosobylaworacourtorder.

COMMENT

[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system byprotecting apersonwhohas chosen tobe representedby a lawyer in amatteragainst possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in thematter,interferencebythoselawyerswiththeclient-lawyerrelationshipandtheuncounseleddisclosureofinformationrelatingtotherepresentation.

[2]ThisRuleappliestocommunicationswithanypersonwhoisrepresentedbycounselconcerningthemattertowhichthecommunicationrelates.

[3]TheRuleapplieseventhoughtherepresentedpersoninitiatesorconsentsto the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communicationwith a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that thepersonisonewithwhomcommunicationisnotpermittedbythisRule.

[4]ThisRuledoesnotprohibitcommunicationwitharepresentedperson,oran employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside therepresentation. For example, the existence of a controversy between agovernmentagencyandaprivateparty,orbetweentwoorganizations,doesnotprohibitalawyerforeitherfromcommunicatingwithnonlawyerrepresentativesof the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule precludecommunicationwitharepresentedpersonwhoisseekingadvicefromalawyerwhoisnototherwiserepresentingaclientinthematter.Alawyermaynotmakeacommunicationprohibitedby thisRule throughtheactsofanother.SeeRule8.4(a). Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other, and alawyerisnotprohibitedfromadvisingaclientconcerningacommunicationthattheclient is legallyentitled tomake.Also,a lawyerhaving legalauthorizationforcommunicatingwitharepresentedpersonispermittedtodoso.

[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications by alawyeronbehalfofaclientwhoisexercisingaconstitutionalorotherlegalright

tocommunicatewith thegovernment.Communicationsauthorizedbylawmayalso include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmentalentities,directlyorthroughinvestigativeagents,priortothecommencementofcriminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with theaccusedinacriminalmatter,agovernmentlawyermustcomplywiththisRuleinaddition to honoring the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that acommunication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right isinsufficienttoestablishthatthecommunicationispermissibleunderthisRule.

[6]A lawyerwho is uncertainwhether a communicationwith a representedperson is permissiblemay seek a court order.A lawyermay also seek a courtorder in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that wouldotherwisebeprohibitedbythisRule,forexample,wherecommunicationwithapersonrepresentedbycounselisnecessarytoavoidreasonablycertaininjury.

[7] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibitscommunicationswithaconstituentoftheorganizationwhosupervises,directsorregularly consultswith the organization’s lawyer concerning thematter or hasauthoritytoobligatetheorganizationwithrespecttothematterorwhoseactoromissioninconnectionwiththemattermaybeimputedtotheorganizationforpurposesofcivilorcriminalliability.Consentoftheorganization’slawyerisnotrequired for communication with a former constituent. If a constituent of theorganizationisrepresentedinthematterbyhisorherowncounsel,theconsentbythatcounseltoacommunicationwillbesufficientforpurposesofthisRule.CompareRule3.4(f).Incommunicatingwithacurrentorformerconstituentofan organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence thatviolatethelegalrightsoftheorganization.SeeRule4.4.

[8]Theprohibitiononcommunicationswitharepresentedpersononlyappliesincircumstanceswherethelawyerknowsthatthepersonisinfactrepresentedinthemattertobediscussed.Thismeansthatthelawyerhasactualknowledgeofthefactof therepresentation;butsuchactualknowledgemaybeinferredfromthe circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade therequirementofobtainingtheconsentofcounselbyclosingeyestotheobvious.

[9]Intheeventthepersonwithwhomthelawyercommunicatesisnotknownto be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer’s communications aresubjecttoRule4.3.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Applicability.

Intentofrule.

Representedparties.

Applicability.

ThisRulerelatesonlytopresentprincipals,officers,employees,agents,etc.,of a represented entity and does not prohibit ex parte communications withformeremployeesofarepresentedentity.DiOssiv.Edison,583A.2d1343(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

A relevant inquiry iswhether an individual is represented since thisRule isonly applicable if the lawyer “knows” that the individual is “represented byanotherlawyer.”MonsantoCo.v.AetnaCas.&Sur.Co.,593A.2d1013(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

Intentofrule.

The clear purpose of this Rule is to foster and protect the attorney-clientrelationship,andnottoprovideprotectiontoapartyincivillitigationnorplacealimitondiscoverablematerial.DiOssiv.Edison,583A.2d1343(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

ThisRule is intended to preclude ex parte communicationswith thosewhocould currently bind or admit liability for the represented entity. DiOssi v.Edison,583A.2d1343(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

Representedparties.

When investigatorsdidnotdetermine if formeremployeeswere representedby counsel, did not clearly identify themselves as working for attorneys whowererepresentingaclientwhichwasinvolvedinlitigationagainsttheirformeremployer, did not clearly state the purpose of the interview, and whereaffirmativemisrepresentationsregardingthesemattersweremade,thisRuleandRule4.3wereviolated.MonsantoCo.v.AetnaCas.&Sur.Co.,593A.2d1013(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

Rule 4.3, read in conjunction with this Rule, requires more than a simpledisclosure by an investigator of his identity qua investigator.MonsantoCo. v.AetnaCas.&Sur.Co.,593A.2d1013(Del.Super.Ct.1990).







Requiringthatcounselrepresentingacreditorinabankruptcyproceedingbeservedwithnoticeofadebtor’sobjections to thecreditor’sclaim isconsistentwiththisrule.InreLomasFin.Corp.,212Bankr.46(Bankr.D.Del.1997).

Addressesandphonenumbersofacorporation’semployeeeyewitnessestoanexplosionwereproperlydiscoverableandmotiontocompelwasgrantedwheretheemployeeswerenotdeemedtoberepresentedbycorporatecounsel,astherewasno assertion that the employees at issue served in any typeofmanagerialcapacity and there were no allegations that any of these employees werenegligent or that their acts or omissions contributed to the explosion; theclaimant’s need to uncover the truth and prepare for trial outweighed thecorporation’s interest in withholding the information. Showell v. MountaireFarms,Inc.,2002Del.Super.LEXIS492(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.18,2002).

Because a codefendant was represented by counsel, the public defender’sofficewasnotpermitted to interview the codefendant.Statev.Coleman,2003Del.Super.LEXIS492(Del.Super.Ct.Feb.19,2003).

Defendant’s motion to suppress statements and derivative evidence wasdenied where, inter alia, the prosecutor disclosed that there was a potentialconflict of interest betweendefendant and defendant’s counsel, and the recorddidnotreflectthatthegovernment’sknowledgeofcounsel’spossiblebreachofhisethicaldutiestainteddefendant’sinterviews.UnitedStatesv.Kossak,275F.Supp.2d525(D.Del.2003).

Purchasing corporation’s (PC) motion for a protective order to precludeformer shareholders of a sold corporation (SC) from conducting ex parteinterviewswith thePC’s formermanagement employees,whopreviously heldshares in the SC and who were privy to privileged information regarding amerger agreement and a lawsuit by the shareholders thereunder, was deniedwhere only key non-privileged information was sought from the formeremployees,theywerekeywitnesses,andtherewasnoviolationofLaw.R.Prof.Conduct 4.2.LaPoint v.AmerisourcebergenCorp., 2006Del. Ch. LEXIS 134(Del.Ch.July18,2006).

Attorneys for the buyers were guilty of litigation misconduct by failing toprovidethenecessarycautionaryinstructionstoformeremployeesofthesellers,whom the attorneys contacted, so that their actions at least created theappearance of violating the Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, andunderminedtheintegrityoftheproceedings.Althoughthecourtdidnotconcludethattheattorneys,infact,violatedtheapplicableDelawareRulesofProfessional






Conduct, the court found that the actions of the attorneys created a sufficientthreat to the integrity of the proceedings that some form of sanction waswarranted; accordingly, the court disqualified the attorneys, but not theattorneys’ law firm, from representing the buyers and awarded the sellers aportionofthesellers’attorneys’feesandcostsinbringingthesellers’motionforsanctions.Postorivov.AGPaintballHoldings, Inc.,2008Del.Ch.LEXIS120(Del.Ch.Aug.20,2008).



Rule4.3.Dealingwithunrepresentedperson.

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented bycounsel,alawyershallnotstateorimplythatthelawyerisdisinterested.Whenthe lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented personmisunderstandsthelawyer’sroleinthematter,thelawyershallmakereasonableeffortstocorrectthemisunderstanding.Thelawyershallnotgivelegaladvicetoanunrepresentedperson,other than theadvice tosecurecounsel, if the lawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowthattheinterestsofsuchapersonareorhaveareasonablepossibilityofbeinginconflictwiththeinterestsoftheclient.

COMMENT

[1]Anunrepresentedperson,particularlyonenotexperiencedindealingwithlegal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is adisinterestedauthorityon the lawevenwhen the lawyer representsaclient. Inorder toavoidamisunderstanding, a lawyerwill typicallyneed to identify thelawyer’sclientand,wherenecessary,explainthattheclienthasinterestsopposedto those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimesarisewhenalawyerforanorganizationdealswithanunrepresentedconstituent,seeRule1.13(d).

[2]TheRuledistinguishesbetweensituationsinvolvingunrepresentedpersonswhoseinterestsmaybeadversetothoseofthelawyer’sclientandthoseinwhichtheperson’sinterestsarenotinconflictwiththeclient’s.Intheformersituation,the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person’sinterestsissogreatthattheRuleprohibitsthegivingofanyadvice,apartfromtheadvice toobtaincounsel.Whethera lawyer isgiving impermissibleadvicemaydependontheexperienceandsophisticationoftheunrepresentedperson,aswellas thesetting inwhich thebehaviorandcommentsoccur.ThisRuledoesnot prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling adisputewithanunrepresentedperson.Solongasthelawyerhasexplainedthatthe lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, thelawyermay inform the person of the terms onwhich the lawyer’s client willenter into an agreement or settle amatter, prepare documents that require theperson’s signature and explain the lawyer’s own view of the meaning of thedocumentorthelawyer’sviewoftheunderlyinglegalobligations.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis


Familylaw.

Insurance.


Addressesandphonenumbersofacorporation’semployeeeyewitnessestoanexplosionwereproperlydiscoverableandmotiontocompelwasgrantedwhereemployees were considered to be unrepresented by counsel; however, anyinterviewsofsuchemployeeswouldhavetobeconductedinaccordancewithaformerversionofthisrule.Showellv.MountaireFarms,Inc.,2002Del.Super.LEXIS492(Del.Super.Ct.Nov.18,2002).

Familylaw.

GiventheinequitythatwouldresultifpetitionerwereforcedtocomplywithaCommissioner’s order to pay respondent’s attorney’s fees, as the respondentreasonably believed that an attorney from the Division of Child SupportEnforcementwasproviding representation (even though the signedapplicationfor containedboilerplate language to the contrary), theorderwas rejected; theDivisionwas relieved from theCommissioner’s order despite its possible badfaith.DCSE v.W.C., 2007Del. Fam.Ct. LEXIS 62 (Del. Fam.Ct. Sept. 21,2007).

Wife’sinterpretationofaletterbythehusband’sattorney—thattheattorneyhadacceptedtheroleofsecuringthewife’sinterestinthehusband’spension—wasreasonable;however,theattorneymadenoeffortstocorrectthisforeseeablemisunderstanding when the qualified domestic relations order was notcompleted. Greater vigilance was necessary with regard to communicationsbetweenattorneys and thoseunrepresentedby counsel. J.T.E. v.D.K., 2008Del.Fam.Ct.LEXIS106(Del.Fam.Ct.June13,2008).

Insurance.

When investigatorsdidnotdetermine if formeremployeeswere representedby counsel, did not clearly identify themselves as working for attorneys who




wererepresentingaclientwhichwasinvolvedinlitigationagainsttheirformeremployer, did not clearly state the purpose of the interview, and whereaffirmativemisrepresentationsregardingthesemattersweremade,thisRuleandRule4.2wereviolated.MonsantoCo.v.AetnaCas.&Sur.Co.,593A.2d1013(Del.Super.Ct.1990).

This Rule, read in conjunction with Rule 4.2, requires more than a simpledisclosure by an investigator of his identity qua investigator.MonsantoCo. v.AetnaCas.&Sur.Co.,593A.2d1013(Del.Super.Ct.1990).




Rule4.4.Respectforrightsofthirdpersons.

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have nosubstantialpurposeother than toembarrass,delayorburdena thirdperson,orusemethodsofobtainingevidencethatviolatethelegalrightsofsuchaperson.

(b) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored informationrelating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonablyshould know that the document or electronically stored information wasinadvertentlysentshallpromptlynotifythesender.(Amended,effectiveMar.1,2013.)

COMMENT

[1]Responsibilitytoaclientrequiresalawyertosubordinatetheinterestsofotherstothoseoftheclient,butthatresponsibilitydoesnotimplythatalawyermaydisregardtherightsofthirdpersons.Itisimpracticaltocatalogueallsuchrights,buttheyincludelegalrestrictionsonmethodsofobtainingevidencefromthird persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such astheclient-lawyerrelationship.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document orelectronically stored information that was mistakenly sent or produced byopposing parties or their lawyers. A document or electronically storedinformation is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such aswhenanemailor letter ismisaddressedoradocumentorelectronically storedinformation is accidentally included with information that was intentionallytransmitted.Ifalawyerknowsorreasonablyshouldknowthatsuchadocumentor electronically stored information was sent inadvertently, then this Rulerequiresthelawyertopromptlynotifythesenderinordertopermitthatpersonto take protectivemeasures.Whether the lawyer is required to take additionalsteps, suchas returning thedocumentorelectronically stored information, isamatteroflawbeyondthescopeoftheseRules,asisthequestionofwhethertheprivileged status of a document or electronically stored information has beenwaived.Similarly, thisRuledoesnot address the legaldutiesof a lawyerwhoreceivesadocumentorelectronicallystoredinformationthatthelawyerknowsor reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by thesending person. For purposes of this Rule, “document or electronically stored

information”includes,inadditiontopaperdocuments,e-mailandotherformsofelectronicallystoredinformation,includingembeddeddata(commonlyreferredto as “metadata”), that is subject to being read or put into readable form.Metadata inelectronicdocumentscreatesanobligationunder thisRuleonly ifthe receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that themetadatawasinadvertentlysenttothereceivinglawyer.

[3] Some lawyersmay choose to return a document or delete electronicallystoredinformationunread,forexample,whenthelawyerlearnsbeforereceivingitthatitwasinadvertentlysent.Wherealawyerisnotrequiredbyapplicablelawto do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document or deleteelectronicallystoredinformationisamatterofprofessionaljudgmentordinarilyreservedtothelawyer.SeeRules1.2and1.4.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Attorney-clientprivilege.

Attorneysforthebuyerswereguiltyoflitigationmisconductinfailingtoactsoonertoprovideappropriatenoticetothesellersandtotakereasonablestepsinthemeantimetoavoidunwarrantedintrusionsuponthesellers’colorableclaimsof privilege. Although the court did not conclude that either attorney, in fact,violatedtheapplicableDelawareRulesofProfessionalConduct,thecourtfoundthattheactionsoftheattorneyscreatedasufficientthreattotheintegrityoftheproceedings that some form of sanctionwaswarranted; accordingly, the courtdisqualifiedtheattorneys,butnottheattorneys’lawfirm,fromrepresentingthebuyersandawardedthesellersaportionofthesellers’attorneys’feesandcostsinbringingthesellers’motionforsanctions.Postorivov.AGPaintballHoldings,Inc.,2008Del.Ch.LEXIS120(Del.Ch.Aug.20,2008).


Disrespectfulcommunications.

Attorney was publicly reprimanded with conditions because the offensive



portionsofemailssentbytheattorneyto4differentDeputyAttorneysGenerals(DAGs) had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burdenopposing counsel; the comments included, calling a male DAG “a certifiedasshole,” calling a female DAG “another beautiful, but arrogant female” andreferringtoanotherfemaleDAGas“Kurvacious”and“Kooky.”In reMemebroftheBaroftheSupremeCourt:Hurley,183A.3d703(Del.2018).



Rule5.1.Responsibilitiesofpartners,managers,andsupervisorylawyers.

(a)Apartner in a law firm, and a lawyerwho individuallyor togetherwithother lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shallmake reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures givingreasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules ofProfessionalConduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shallmakereasonableeffortstoensurethattheotherlawyerconformstotheRulesofProfessionalConduct.

(c)Alawyershallberesponsibleforanotherlawyer’sviolationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductif:

(1) thelawyerordersor,withknowledgeof thespecificconduct,ratifies theconductinvolved;or

(2)thelawyerisapartnerorhascomparablemanagerialauthorityinthelawfirminwhichtheotherlawyerpractices,orhasdirectsupervisoryauthorityovertheotherlawyer,andknowsoftheconductatatimewhenitsconsequencescanbeavoidedormitigatedbutfailstotakereasonableremedialaction.

COMMENT

[1]Paragraph(a)applies to lawyerswhohavemanagerialauthorityover theprofessional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(c). This includes members of apartnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professionalcorporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law;lawyershavingcomparablemanagerialauthorityinalegalservicesorganizationor a lawdepartment of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyerswhohaveintermediatemanagerialresponsibilitiesinafirm.Paragraph(b)appliestolawyerswhohavesupervisoryauthorityovertheworkofotherlawyersinafirm.

[2]Paragraph(a)requireslawyerswithmanagerialauthoritywithinafirmtomakereasonableeffortstoestablishinternalpoliciesandproceduresdesignedtoprovide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firmwill conform to theRules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include thosedesigned to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by whichactionsmustbetakeninpendingmatters,accountforclientfundsandproperty

andensurethatinexperiencedlawyersareproperlysupervised.

[3]Othermeasuresthatmayberequiredtofulfilltheresponsibilityprescribedinparagraph(a)candependonthefirm’sstructureandthenatureofitspractice.Inasmallfirmofexperiencedlawyers,informalsupervisionandperiodicreviewofcompliancewiththerequiredsystemsordinarilywillsuffice.Inalargefirm,orinpracticesituationsinwhichdifficultethicalproblemsfrequentlyarise,moreelaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have aprocedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethicalproblemsdirectlytoadesignatedseniorpartnerorspecialcommittee.SeeRule5.2.Firms,whetherlargeorsmall,mayalsorelyoncontinuinglegaleducationin professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm caninfluencetheconductofallitsmembersandthepartnersmaynotassumethatalllawyersassociatedwiththefirmwillinevitablyconformtotheRules.

[4]Paragraph(c)expressesageneralprincipleofpersonal responsibility foractsofanother.SeealsoRule8.4(a).

[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer havingcomparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who hasdirectsupervisoryauthorityoverperformanceofspecificlegalworkbyanotherlawyer.Whethera lawyerhassupervisoryauthority inparticularcircumstancesis a question off act. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have atleastindirectresponsibilityforallworkbeingdonebythefirm,whileapartneror manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisoryresponsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter.Appropriateremedialactionbyapartnerormanaginglawyerwoulddependonthe immediacy of that lawyer’s involvement and the seriousness of themisconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidableconsequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconductoccurred.Thus,ifasupervisinglawyerknowsthatasubordinatemisrepresenteda matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as thesubordinatehasadutytocorrecttheresultingmisapprehension.

[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal aviolationofparagraph(b)on thepartof thesupervisory lawyereven thoughitdoes not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction,ratificationorknowledgeoftheviolation.

[7]ApartfromthisRuleandRule8.4(a),alawyerdoesnothavedisciplinaryliabilityfortheconductofapartner,associateorsubordinate.Whetheralawyer

maybeliablecivillyorcriminallyforanotherlawyer’sconductisaquestionoflawbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.

[8]ThedutiesimposedbythisRuleonmanagingandsupervisinglawyersdonot alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules ofProfessionalconduct.SeeRule5.2(a).

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Lawfirms.

—Managingpartners.

EffectiveonJuly1,2003,lawyerswithmanagerialauthoritywithinafirmarerequiredtomakereasonableeffortstoestablishinternalpoliciesandproceduresdesigned to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm willconformtotheDelawareLawyers’RulesofProfessionalConduct;suchpoliciesandproceduresincludethosedesignedtodetectandresolveconflictsofinterest,identify dates bywhich actionsmust be taken in pendingmatters, account forclient funds and property, and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properlysupervised.InreBailey,821A.2d851(Del.2003).

An attorney committed professional conduct violations with respect toengaginginvariousrealestateclosingsbecausethatattorneywasthesoleownerand managing partner of the firm and had supervisory authority over thequestionable conduct of a second attorney (as well as over nonlawyeremployees).InreSanclemente,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).




Rule5.2.Responsibilitiesofasubordinatelawyer.

(a)AlawyerisboundbytheRulesofProfessionalConductnotwithstandingthatthelawyeractedatthedirectionofanotherperson.

(b)AsubordinatelawyerdoesnotviolatetheRulesofProfessionalConductifthatlawyeractsinaccordancewithasupervisorylawyer’sreasonableresolutionofanarguablequestionofprofessionalduty.

COMMENT

[1]Althougha lawyer isnot relievedof responsibility foraviolationby thefact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may berelevantindeterminingwhetheralawyerhadtheknowledgerequiredtorenderconductaviolationoftheRules.Forexample,ifasubordinatefiledafrivolouspleadingatthedirectionofasupervisor,thesubordinatewouldnotbeguiltyofaprofessionalviolationunless thesubordinateknewof thedocument’s frivolouscharacter.

[2]Whenlawyersinasupervisor-subordinaterelationshipencounteramatterinvolvingprofessional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisormayassumeresponsibilityformakingthejudgment.Otherwiseaconsistentcourseofactionorpositioncouldnotbetaken.Ifthequestioncanreasonablybeansweredonlyoneway, thedutyofboth lawyers isclearandtheyareequallyresponsibleforfulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has todecide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in thesupervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if aquestionariseswhether the interestsof twoclientsconflictunderRule1.7, thesupervisor’sreasonableresolutionofthequestionshouldprotectthesubordinateprofessionallyiftheresolutionissubsequentlychallenged.


Rule5.3.Responsibilitiesregardingnon-lawyerassistance.

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with alawyer:

(a) a partner in a law firm, and a lawyerwho individually or togetherwithother lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shallmake reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures givingreasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with theprofessionalobligationsofthelawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shallmake reasonableefforts toensure that theperson’sconduct iscompatiblewiththeprofessionalobligationsofthelawyer;and

(c)alawyershallberesponsibleforconductofsuchapersonthatwouldbeaviolationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductifengagedinbyalawyerif:

(1) thelawyerordersor,withtheknowledgeof thespecificconduct, ratifiestheconductinvolved;or

(2)thelawyerisapartnerorhascomparablemanagerialauthorityinthelawfirm inwhich theperson isemployed,orhasdirect supervisoryauthorityovertheperson, andknowsof the conduct at a timewhen its consequences canbeavoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action. (Amended,effectiveMar.1,2013.)

COMMENT

[1]Paragraph(a)requireslawyerswithmanagerialauthoritywithinalawfirmtomakereasonableeffortstoensurethatthefirmhasineffectmeasuresgivingreasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm and nonlawyers outside thefirmwhowork on firmmatters act in away compatiblewith the professionalobligations of the lawyer. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.1 (retaining lawyersoutsidethefirm)andComment[1] toRule5.1(responsibilitieswithrespect tolawyerswithina firm).Paragraph(b)applies to lawyerswhohavesupervisoryauthority over such nonlawyers within or outside the firm. Paragraph (c)specifies thecircumstances inwhicha lawyer isresponsiblefor theconductofsuchnonlawyerswithinoroutsidethefirmthatwouldbeaviolationoftheRulesofProfessionalConductifengagedinbyalawyer.

[2] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, includingsecretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Suchassistants,whetheremployeesor independentcontractors,act for the lawyer inrendition of the lawyer’s professional services. A lawyer must give suchassistantsappropriateinstructionandsupervisionconcerningtheethicalaspectsof their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to discloseinformationrelatingtorepresentationoftheclient,andshouldberesponsiblefortheirworkproduct.Themeasures employed in supervising nonlawyers shouldtakeaccountofthefactthattheydonothavelegaltrainingandarenotsubjecttoprofessionaldiscipline.

[3]Nonlawyersoutsidethefirm.—Alawyermayusenonlawyersoutsidethefirm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. Examplesinclude the retention of an investigative or paraprofessional service, hiring adocumentmanagementcompanytocreateandmaintainadatabaseforcomplexlitigation,sendingclientdocumentstoathirdpartyforprintingorscanning,andusing an Internet-based service to store client information. When using suchservicesoutside thefirm,a lawyermustmakereasonableefforts toensure thatthe services are provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’sprofessional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon thecircumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of thenonlawyer; thenatureof the services involved; the termsof any arrangementsconcerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethicalenvironments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed,particularlywithregardtoconfidentiality.SeealsoRules1.1(competence),1.2(allocationofauthority),1.4 (communicationwithclient),1.6 (confidentiality),5.4(a) (professional independence of the lawyer), and 5.5(a) (unauthorizedpractice of law).When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, alawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances togive reasonable assurance that thenonlawyer’s conduct is compatiblewith theprofessionalobligationsofthelawyer.

[4]Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer serviceprovider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the clientconcerningtheallocationofresponsibilityformonitoringasbetweentheclientand the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matterpendingbeforea tribunal, lawyers andpartiesmayhaveadditionalobligationsthatareamatteroflawbeyondthescopeoftheseRules.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Lawfirms.

—Managingco-counsel.

—Managingofemployees.


—Taxes.

Lawfirms.



—Managingofemployees.

Attorney whose child stole funds from the attorney’s escrow account waspubliclyreprimandedforviolatingLaw.Prof.ConductR.5.3byfailingtohavereasonable safeguards in place to assure accurate accounting and by failing tosupervise the attorney’s child (who was working for the attorney). In reOtlowski,976A.2d172(Del.2009).

Attorneywassuspendedfor1year,withthesuspensiontorunretroactivelytothe date the attorneywas transferred to disability inactive status, for violatingLaw.R.Prof.Conduct5.3by:(1)failingtohavereasonablesafeguardsinplacetoassureaccurateaccountingofthefinancialbooksandrecords;and(2)failingtosupervisenonlawyerassistants.InreNowak,5A.3d631(Del.2010).

Theappropriatesanctionwasapublicreprimandand1yearprobationperiodwhere: (1) an attorneyviolated the conditionsof a previously imposedprivateadmonition by failing to provide a required precertification and not promptlypayingvariouspayrolltaxes;(2)theattorneyadmittedtoviolatingLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c)andLawProf.ConductR.1.15(b),1.15(d),5.3,8.4(c),and8.4(d);(3)theattorney’sviolationswerenot isolated incidentsbutwere repeatviolations; (4)




the attorney failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant to assure anaccurate accounting of the firm’s books and records; and (5) the attorneydisregardedtheconditionsimposedontheprivateadmonition.InreMartin,35A.3d419(Del.2011).

Attorney handling real estate closings violated the Rules of ProfessionalConduct by taking took no action to prevent a paralegal from issuing checksinconsistent with the disbursement amounts listed on Department of HousingandUrbanDevelopment settlement statements,while knowing that the checksreceived from the buyers (in most instances were never cashed) and that thelenderswerenotnotifiedofanyof theseactions. In reSullivan,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney violatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,5.3,8.4(c) and (d), resulting in2year’sprobation,by: (1)misrepresenting to thecourt theattorney’smaintenanceof records;and(2) failing toproperlymaintain them, to safeguard client funds, toprovide forreasonable safeguards to assure accurate accounting, to supervise nonlawyerstaff,andtotimelyfileandpaytaxes.InreGray,152A.3d581(Del.2016).



Whereanattorney,themanagingpartnerofafirm,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(a)bykeepingmorethan$1700ofthefirm’sfundsintheclientescrowaccountforalmostayear,admitted toviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(d),byfailing,foralmostayear,tomaintainthefirm’sbooksand records in compliance with the rule’s requirements, admitted to violatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct5.3byfailingtohavereasonablesafeguardsinplaceto ensure an accurate accounting of the firm’s financial books and records incompliance with the Rules, by failing to supervise employees’ conduct inreconciling books and records and filing and paying payroll taxes, and by





knowingthatpayroll,grossreceipts,andcorporatetaxeswerenotbeingtimelyfiledandpaid,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c)byfilingaCertificate ofCompliance for the year 2000,which falsely stated that the lawpractice’sbooksandrecordsweremaintainedincompliancewithDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15andbyfalselystatingontheCertificatesofCompliancefor1998, 1999, and 2000 that the attorney was meeting tax filing and paymentobligations,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(d)byfailingtofileandpayvarioustaxesandbyfilingfalseCertificatesofCompliancefortheyears 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, and where a witness testifiedunequivocallythattheattorneyinstructedthewitnesstotransferescrowfundstothefirm’soperatingaccount,andclienttrustfundshadtobe,andwere,invaded,the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s recommended public reprimand wasrejected,andtheattorneywassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawforsixmonthsandoneday; amanagingpartnerof a law firmhad enhancedduties to ensurethat the law firmcompliedwith its recordkeepingand taxobligations, and themanagingpartnerhadtodischargethoseresponsibilitiesfaithfullyandwiththeutmostdiligence.InreBailey,821A.2d851(Del.2003).

An attorney committed professional conduct violations with respect toengaginginvariousrealestateclosingsbecausethatattorneywasthesoleownerand managing partner of the firm and had supervisory authority over thequestionable conduct of a second attorney (as well as over nonlawyeremployees).InreSanclemente,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

BoardonProfessionalResponsibilitycorrectlyassigneda6-monthsuspensionwithconditionsforviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.15,5.3and8.4because:(1)theBoardconsideredtheattorney’sstateofmindandconcludedtheattorney,as managing partner, was at least negligent in overseeing 2 non-attorneys toensurethebooksandrecordsweremaintainedincompliancewiththerules;(2)theattorneyknewofruleviolationsduetothenegativebalancesintheaccount;(3) the attorney filed an inaccurate 2015 Certificate of Compliance with theDelawareSupremeCourtthatmisrepresentedthelawfirm’scompliancewiththeruleonsafekeepingproperty;(4) thecoveringfundsreliedonbytheBoardonProfessional Responsibility should not have been considered a substitute fornegativebalancesintheclientsubsidiaryledger;(5)thelawfirmhadadutytosafeguardtheclients’propertybutfailedtodoso;and(6)asamanagingpartnerwhofailedtosupervisenon-attorneyemployees,theattorneywasresponsibleforthose deficiencies. In reBeauregard,—A.3d—, 2018Del.LEXIS 258 (Del.June5,2018).



—Taxes.




Rule5.4.Professionalindependenceofalawyer.

(a)A lawyeror lawfirmshallnotshare legal feeswithanonlawyer,exceptthat:

(1)anagreementbyalawyerwiththelawyer’sfirm,partner,orassociatemayprovide for the payment ofmoney, over a reasonable period of time after thelawyer’sdeath,tothelawyer’sestateortooneormorespecifiedpersons;

(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of adeceasedlawyermaypaytotheestateofthedeceasedlawyerthatproportionofthe total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by thedeceasedlawyer;

(3) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, ordisappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to theestateorotherrepresentativeofthatlawyertheagreed-uponpurchaseprice;

(4)alawyerorlawfirmmayincludenonlawyeremployeesinacompensationorretirementplan,eventhoughtheplanisbasedinwholeorinpartonaprofit-sharingarrangement;and

(5)alawyermaysharecourt-awardedlegalfeeswithanonprofitorganizationthat employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in thematter.

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of theactivitiesofthepartnershipconsistofthepracticeoflaw.

(c)Alawyershallnotpermitapersonwhorecommends,employs,orpaysthelawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’sprofessionaljudgmentinrenderingsuchlegalservices.

(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professionalcorporationorassociationauthorizedtopracticelawforaprofit,if:

(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciaryrepresentative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of thelawyerforareasonabletimeduringadministration;

(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies theposition of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a

corporation;or

(3)anonlawyerhastherighttodirectorcontroltheprofessionaljudgmentofalawyer.

COMMENT

[1]TheprovisionsofthisRuleexpresstraditionallimitationsonsharingfees.These limitations are to protect the lawyer’s professional independence ofjudgment.Wheresomeoneotherthantheclientpaysthelawyer’sfeeorsalary,orrecommendsemploymentofthelawyer,thatarrangementdoesnotmodifythelawyer’sobligationto theclient.Asstatedinparagraph(c),sucharrangementsshouldnotinterferewiththelawyer’sprofessionaljudgment.

[2]ThisRulealsoexpressestraditionallimitationsonpermittingathirdpartyto direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legalservicestoanother.SeealsoRule1.8(f)(lawyermayacceptcompensationfroma third party as long as there is no interferencewith the lawyer’s independentprofessionaljudgmentandtheclientgivesinformedconsent).

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Attorneys’fees.

—Feesplitting.

The fact thatat the timeof the fee splittingagreement the law firmhadnotregisteredwiththeSupremeCourtofthestateorthatitwasnotregisteredtodobusiness in the statepursuant to8Del.C. § 371doesnot change its status as“lawyer.”Tomar, Seliger, Simonoff,Adourian&O’Brien v. Snyder, 601A.2d1056(Del.Super.Ct.1990).






Rule5.5.Unauthorizedpracticeoflaw;multijurisdictionalpracticeoflaw.

(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of theregulationof the legalprofession in that jurisdiction,orassistanother indoingso.

(b)Alawyerwhoisnotadmittedtopracticeinthisjurisdictionshallnot:

(1) except as authorized by theseRules or other law, establish an office orothersystematicandcontinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionforthepracticeoflaw;or

(2)holdouttothepublicorotherwiserepresentthatthelawyerisadmittedtopracticelawinthisjurisdiction.

(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or in a foreignjurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction,mayprovidelegalservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionthat:

(1)areundertakeninassociationwithalawyerwhoisadmittedtopracticeinthisjurisdictionandwhoactivelyparticipatesinthematter;

(2)areinorreasonablyrelatedtoapendingorpotentialproceedingbeforeatribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or aperson the lawyer isassisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding orreasonablyexpectstobesoauthorized;

(3)areinorreasonablyrelatedtoapendingorpotentialarbitration,mediation,orotheralternativedisputeresolutionproceedinginthisoranotherjurisdiction,iftheservicesariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtothelawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisadmittedtopracticeandarenotservicesforwhichtheforumrequiresprohacviceadmission;or

(4)arenotwithinparagraphs(c)(2)or(c)(3)andariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtothelawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisadmittedtopractice.

(d)A lawyer admitted in anotherUnited States jurisdiction, or in a foreignjurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction,mayprovidelegalservicesinthisjurisdictionthat:

(1)areprovidedtothelawyer’semployeroritsorganizationalaffiliatesafter

compliancewithSupremeCourtRule55.1(a)(1)andarenotservicesforwhichtheforumrequiresprohacviceadmission;or

(2)areservicesthatthelawyerisauthorizedtoprovidebyfederallaworotherlaw of this jurisdiction. (Amended, effective Oct. 16, 2007; effective Jan. 7,2008.)

COMMENT

[1]A lawyermaypractice lawonly in a jurisdiction inwhich the lawyer isauthorizedtopractice.Alawyermaybeadmittedtopracticelawinajurisdictionon a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law topractice fora limitedpurposeorona restrictedbasis.Paragraph (a)applies tounauthorized practice of lawby a lawyer,whether through the lawyer’s directactionorbythelawyerassistinganotherperson.Forexample,alawyermaynotassistapersoninpracticinglawinviolationoftherulesgoverningprofessionalconductinthatperson’sjurisdiction.

[2]Thedefinitionofthepracticeoflawisestablishedbylawandvariesfromonejurisdictiontoanother.Whateverthedefinition,limitingthepracticeoflawtomembersofthebarprotects thepublicagainstrenditionoflegalservicesbyunqualifiedpersons.ThisRuledoesnot prohibit a lawyer fromemploying theservices of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as thelawyer supervises thedelegatedworkand retains responsibility for theirwork.SeeRule5.3.

[3]A lawyermayprovideprofessionaladviceand instruction tononlawyerswhose employment requires knowledge of law; for example, claims adjusters,employees of financial or commercial institutions, socialworkers, accountantsand persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assistindependent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals,who are authorized by thelaw of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, alawyermaycounselnonlawyerswhowishtoproceedprose.

[4]OtherthanasauthorizedbylaworthisRule,alawyerwhoisnotadmittedto practice generally in this jurisdiction violates paragraph (b) if the lawyerestablishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in thisjurisdictionforthepracticeoflaw.Presencemaybesystematicandcontinuouseven if the lawyer isnotphysicallypresenthere.Sucha lawyermustnotholdout to thepublicorotherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted topracticelawinthisjurisdiction.SeealsoRules7.1(a)and7.5(b).

[5] There are occasions in which a lawyer admitted to practice in anotherUnitedStates jurisdiction,andnotdisbarredorsuspendedfrompractice inanyjurisdiction,mayprovidelegalservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionunder circumstances that donot create anunreasonable risk to the interests oftheir clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four suchcircumstances.Thefactthatconductisnotsoidentifieddoesnotimplythattheconductisorisnotauthorized.Withtheexceptionofparagraphs(d)(1)and(d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or othersystematicandcontinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionwithoutbeingadmittedtopracticegenerallyhere.

[6] There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer’s services areprovided on a “temporary basis” in this jurisdiction, and may therefore bepermissibleunderparagraph(c).Servicesmaybe“temporary”eventhoughthelawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for anextendedperiodoftime,aswhenthelawyerisrepresentingaclientinasinglelengthynegotiationorlitigation.

[7]Paragraphs(c)and(d)applytolawyerswhoareadmittedtopracticelawin anyUnitedStates jurisdiction,which includes theDistrict ofColumbia andanystate,territoryorcommonwealthoftheUnitedStates.Theword“admitted”in paragraph (c) contemplates that the lawyer is authorized to practice in thejurisdiction inwhich the lawyer is admitted and excludes a lawyerwhowhiletechnically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, thelawyerisoninactivestatus.

[8]Paragraph(c)(1)recognizesthattheinterestsofclientsandthepublicareprotected if a lawyer admitted only in another jurisdiction associates with alawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For this paragraph to apply,however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must activelyparticipateinandshareresponsibilityfortherepresentationoftheclient.

[9] Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may beauthorizedby lawororderofa tribunaloranadministrativeagency toappearbeforethetribunaloragency.Thisauthoritymaybegrantedpursuanttoformalrulesgoverningadmissionprohacviceorpursuant to informalpracticeof thetribunaloragency.Underparagraph(c)(2),a lawyerdoesnotviolate thisRulewhenthelawyerappearsbeforeatribunaloragencypursuanttosuchauthority.Totheextentthatacourtruleorotherlawofthisjurisdictionrequiresalawyerwho isnotadmitted topractice in this jurisdiction toobtainadmissionprohacvice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this rule

requiresthelawyertoobtainthatauthority.

[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a lawyer rendering services in thisjurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the lawyerengagesinconductinanticipationofaproceedingorhearinginajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisauthorizedtopracticelaworinwhichthelawyerreasonablyexpectstobeadmittedprohacvice.Examplesofsuchconductincludemeetingswiththeclient,interviewsofpotentialwitnesses,andthereviewofdocuments.Similarly,alawyeradmittedonlyinanotherjurisdictionmayengageinconducttemporarily in this jurisdiction inconnectionwithpending litigation inanotherjurisdiction in which the lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized toappear,includingtakingdepositionsinthisjurisdiction.

[11]Whenalawyerhasbeenorreasonablyexpectstobeadmittedtoappearbeforeacourtoradministrativeagency,paragraph(c)(2)alsopermitsconductbylawyerswhoareassociatedwiththatlawyerinthematter,butwhodonotexpectto appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinatelawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings withwitnessesinsupportofthelawyerresponsibleforthelitigation.

[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a lawyer admitted to practice law in anotherjurisdictiontoperformservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionifthoseservices are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration,mediation, or other alternativedispute resolutionproceeding in this or anotherjurisdiction,iftheservicesariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtothelawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisadmittedtopractice.Thelawyer,however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexedarbitrationormediationorotherwiseifcourtrulesorlawsorequire.

[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction toprovidecertainlegalservicesonatemporarybasisinthisjurisdictionthatariseoutoforarereasonablyrelatedtothelawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichthe lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). Theseservices includeboth legal servicesand services thatnonlawyersmayperformbutthatareconsideredthepracticeoflawwhenperformedbylawyers.

[14]Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services ariseout of or bereasonablyrelatedtothelawyer’spracticeinajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerisadmitted.Avarietyoffactorsevidencesucharelationship.Thelawyer’sclientmayhavebeenpreviously representedby the lawyer,ormaybe resident inorhavesubstantialcontactswith the jurisdiction inwhich the lawyer isadmitted.

The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significantconnection with that jurisdiction. In other cases, significant aspects of thelawyer’sworkmightbeconductedinthatjurisdictionorasignificantaspectofthemattermay involve the lawof that jurisdiction.Thenecessary relationshipmight arise when the client’s activities or the legal issues involve multiplejurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation surveypotential business sites and seek the services of their lawyer in assessing therelative merits of each. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer’srecognizedexpertisedevelopedthroughtheregularpracticeoflawonbehalfofclients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform,foreign,orinternationallaw.Lawyersdesiringtoprovideprobonolegalservicesonatemporarybasisinajurisdictionthathasbeenaffectedbyamajordisaster,butinwhichtheyarenototherwiseauthorizedtopracticelaw,aswellaslawyersfrom the affected jurisdictionwho seek to practice law temporarily in anotherjurisdiction, but in which they are not otherwise authorized to practice law,shouldconsultSupremeCourtRule58onProvisionofLegalServicesFollowingDeterminationofMajorDisaster.

[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a lawyer who isadmittedtopracticeinanotherUnitedStatesjurisdiction,andisnotdisbarredorsuspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or othersystematicandcontinuouspresenceinthisjurisdictionforthepracticeoflawaswell as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided inparagraphs(d)(1)and(d)(2),alawyerwhoisadmittedtopracticelawinanotherjurisdiction and who establishes an office or other systematic or continuouspresence in this jurisdictionmustbecomeadmitted topractice lawgenerally inthisjurisdiction.

[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a lawyer who is employed by a client toprovidelegalservicestotheclientoritsorganizationalaffiliates,i.e.,entitiesthatcontrol,arecontrolledby,orareundercommoncontrolwiththeemployer.Thisparagraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to theemployer’sofficersoremployees.Theparagraphapplies to in-housecorporatelawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legalservicestotheemployer.Thelawyer’sabilitytorepresenttheemployeroutsidethejurisdictioninwhichthelawyerislicensedgenerallyservestheinterestsoftheemployeranddoesnotcreateanunreasonable risk to theclientandothersbecause the employer iswell situated to assess the lawyer’squalifications andthequalityofthelawyer’swork.

[17]Ifanemployedlawyerestablishesanofficeorothersystematicpresencein this jurisdiction for thepurposeof rendering legal services to theemployer,the lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, includingassessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legaleducation.

[18]Paragraph(d)(2)recognizesthatalawyermayprovidelegalservicesinajurisdiction in which the lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so byfederalorother law,which includes statute, court rule, executive regulationorjudicialprecedent.

[19]Alawyerwhopracticeslawinthisjurisdictionpursuanttoparagraphs(c)or(d)orotherwiseissubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdiction.SeeRule8.5(a).

[20] In some circumstances, a lawyerwho practices law in this jurisdictionpursuanttoparagraphs(c)or(d)mayhavetoinformtheclientthatthelawyerisnot licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may berequired when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction andrequiresknowledgeofthelawofthisjurisdiction.SeeRule1.4(b).

[21]Paragraphs(c)and(d)donotauthorizecommunicationsadvertisinglegalservices in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are admitted to practice in otherjurisdictions.Whether and how lawyers may communicate the availability oftheirservicesinthisjurisdictionisgovernedbyRules7.1to7.5.

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Crossreferences.—Astoadmissionprohacvice,seeSupremeCourtRule71.

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Advertising.

Assistingunauthorizedpractice.

Multi-jurisdictionalpractice.

Sanctions.

Advertising.

Broadcast of legal service ads which did not include or reference anunlicensed foreign attorney, or any lawyer in the firm, did not establish aviolationoftheruleprohibitingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.InreEdelstein,99A.3d227(Del.2014).

Assistingunauthorizedpractice.


Multi-jurisdictionalpractice.

No violation of subsection (a) establishedwhere attorney represented clientwhohadmovedtoFlorida.InreMcCann,669A.2d49(Del.1995).

Attorney,whowasnotauthorizedtopracticelawinDelaware,wasdisbarredforviolatingR.Prof.Conduct5.5(b)(1)as theattorneylived inDelaware,wasactive in church groups, and worked in the medical office of the attorney’shusband before and after the attorney was reinstated as an attorney inPennsylvania;manyof theattorney’sDelawareclientswere thepatientsof theattorney’s husband, or people the attorney met through church activities, andwhile the attorney might not have engaged in formal advertising to attractclients, the attorney cultivated a network of Delaware contacts whoaccomplishedthesameresult.InreTonwe,929A.2d774(Del.2007).

Attorney’s actions in continuing to prepare documents for an accountantdespitenotbeinglicensedinDelawareandtheattorney’sknowingviolationofacease and desist order violated the attorney’s ethical duties and seriouslyunderminedthelegalsystem;theattorney’sactionswereinviolationofLaw.R.Prof.Conduct5.5andwarranteddisbarment.InreKingsley,950A.2d659(Del.2008).

Whilealiberalreadingofaclient’scomplaintsignaledaviolationofLawR.Prof.Conduct5.5,suchaviolationinandofitselfprovidedinsufficientgroundsforasuitbasedonlegalmalpractice.Brooksv.Quinn&Quinn,—F.Supp.2d—,2010U.S.Dist.LEXIS14206(D.Del.Feb.19,2010).

Attorney’s conduct inmeetingwith a former client to provide legal advice,






discussinglegalservicesandfeeswithapotentialclientwhichledtheclienttobelieve that the attorney’s residential services company could provide legalservices and using the attorney’s former law firm email address incommunications with the public at least 6 weeks after a suspension orderviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.5.5(a).InreDavis,43A.3d856(Del.2012).

Indeterminingreasonablenessofanattorneys’feeaward,anattorneydidnotactunethicallyinbillinghoursassociatedwithanappealinanticipationofbeingadmittedprohacvice; further, feeschargedbyDelawarecounsel forattendingthe trialwere proper,where counsel filed themotion for the admission of theout-of-state attorney and was required to attend unless excused by the court.Staffieriv.Black,2013Del.Ch.LEXIS322(Del.Ch.Aug.8,2013).

Attorneyviolatedthisrulebyprovidinglegalservicestoatleast75Delawareresidents involved in automobile accidents, covered by Delaware insurancepolicies; although the attorney did not go to court inDelaware, the attorney’smeeting with clients in Delaware could have given the impression that theattorneywasaDelawarelawyer.InreNadel,82A.3d716(Del.2013).

Sanctions.

An attorney’s actions in engaging in the unauthorized practice of law inDelaware, which included establishing an office for the practice of law, weredeemed knowingly conducted; the attorney’s violation of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct warranted the sanction of a 1-year suspension from thepracticeoflaw.InrePelletier,84A.3d960(Del.2014).

BoardonProfessionalResponsibilityproperlyfoundthatanattorneyengagedintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawbecausebyrepresentingDelawareresidentsin over 100 matters involving Delaware motor vehicle accidents despite notbeingadmittedto theDelawareBar; theattorneywassanctionedwitha1-yearsuspension upon weighing of the mitigating and aggravating factors. In reEdelstein,99A.3d227(Del.2014).







Rule5.6.Restrictionsonrighttopractice.

Alawyershallnotparticipateinofferingormaking:

(a)apartnership, shareholders,operating,employment,orothersimilar typeofagreementthatrestrictstherightsofalawyertopracticeafterterminationoftherelationship,exceptanagreementconcerningbenefitsuponretirement;or

(b)anagreementinwhicharestrictiononthelawyer’srighttopracticeispartofthesettlementofaclientcontroversy.

COMMENT

[1]An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving afirmnotonly limits theirprofessionalautonomybutalso limits thefreedomofclients to choose a lawyer.Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except forrestrictionsincidenttoprovisionsconcerningretirementbenefitsforservicewiththefirm.

[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent otherpersonsinconnectionwithsettlingaclaimonbehalfofaclient.

[3]ThisRuledoesnotapply toprohibit restrictions thatmaybe included inthetermsofthesaleofalawpracticepursuanttoRule1.17.

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Mootnessagreement.

Even if the parties had a meeting of the minds regarding a fee award, theparties’purportedfeeagreementbasedon“mootness”ofafailedmergerattemptwasvoidandunenforceablebecausethecontractrestrictedthelawfirm’srighttopractice and, as such, violated this rule; the firm’s initiation of some sort oflitigation prevented or terminated the mootness fee arrangement. La. Mun.PoliceEmples.Ret.Sys.v.Black,—A.3d—,2016Del.Ch.LEXIS36(Del.Ch.Feb.19,2016).


Rule5.7.Responsibilitiesregardinglaw-relatedservices.

(a)AlawyershallbesubjecttotheRulesofProfessionalConductwithrespecttotheprovisionoflaw-relatedservices,asdefinedinparagraph(b),ifthelaw-relatedservicesareprovided:

(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’sprovisionoflegalservicestoclients;or

(2) inothercircumstancesbyanentitycontrolledbythelawyerindividuallyorwith others if the lawyer fails to take reasonablemeasures to assure that apersonobtaining the law-related servicesknows that the services arenot legalservicesandthattheprotectionsoftheclient-lawyerrelationshipdonotexist.

(b)Theterm“law-relatedservices”denotesservicesthatmightreasonablybeperformed in conjunctionwithand in substanceare related to theprovisionoflegalservices,andthatarenotprohibitedasunauthorizedpracticeoflawwhenprovidedbyanonlawyer.

COMMENT

[1]Whena lawyerperformslaw-relatedservicesorcontrolsanorganizationthat does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal amongthese is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services areperformed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them theprotections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. Therecipientofthelaw-relatedservicesmayexpect,forexample,thattheprotectionof client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons withconflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professionalindependenceapplyto theprovisionof law-relatedserviceswhenthatmaynotbethecase.

[2]Rule5.7appliestotheprovisionoflaw-relatedservicesbyalawyerevenwhenthelawyerdoesnotprovideanylegalservicestothepersonforwhomthelaw-related services are performed and whether the law-related services areperformed through a law firm or a separate entity. The Rule identifies thecircumstances in which all of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to theprovisionof law-relatedservices.Evenwhen thosecircumstancesdonotexist,however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related

services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct,regardlessofwhethertheconductinvolvestheprovisionoflegalservices.See,e.g.,Rule8.4.

[3]Whenlaw-relatedservicesareprovidedbyalawyerundercircumstancesthatarenotdistinctfromthelawyer’sprovisionoflegalservicestoclients,thelawyerinprovidingthelaw-relatedservicesmustadheretotherequirementsoftheRulesofProfessionalConductasprovided inparagraph(a)(1).Evenwhenthelaw-relatedandlegalservicesareprovidedincircumstancesthataredistinctfromeachother,forexamplethroughseparateentitiesordifferentsupportstaffwithin the law firm, theRulesofProfessionalConduct apply to the lawyer asprovided in paragraph (a)(2) unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures toassure that therecipientof the law-relatedservicesknows that theservicesarenotlegalservicesandthattheprotectionsoftheclient-lawyerrelationshipdonotapply.

[4]Law-relatedservicesalsomaybeprovidedthroughanentitythatisdistinctfrom that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyerindividuallyorwithothershascontrolof suchanentity’soperations, theRulerequiresthelawyertotakereasonablemeasurestoassurethateachpersonusingtheservicesoftheentityknowsthattheservicesprovidedbytheentityarenotlegalservicesandthattherulesofProfessionalConductthatrelatetotheclient-lawyerrelationshipdonotapply.Alawyer’scontrolofanentityextendstotheability to direct its operation.Whether a lawyer has such control will dependuponthecircumstancesoftheparticularcase.

[5]Whenaclient-lawyerrelationshipexistswithapersonwhoisreferredbyalawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer,individuallyorwithothers,thelawyermustcomplywithRule1.8(a).

[6]Intakingthereasonablemeasuresreferredtoinparagraph(a)(2)toassurethat a person using law-related services understands the practical effect orsignificance of the inapplicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct, thelawyershouldcommunicatetothepersonreceivingthelaw-relatedservices,inamanner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of thefact,thattherelationshipofthepersontothebusinessentitywillnotbeaclient-lawyerrelationship.Thecommunicationshouldbemadebeforeenteringintoanagreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferablyshouldbeinwriting.

[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken

reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desiredunderstanding.Forinstance,asophisticateduseroflaw-relatedservices,suchasa publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someoneunaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-relatedservices, suchasan individual seeking taxadvice froma lawyer-accountantorinvestigativeservicesinconnectionwithalawsuit.

[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-relatedservices,alawyershouldtakespecialcaretokeepseparatetheprovisionoflaw-related and legal services in order tominimize the risk that the recipientwillassume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of suchconfusionisespeciallyacutewhenthelawyerrendersbothtypesofserviceswithrespecttothesamematter.Undersomecircumstancesthelegalandlaw-relatedservicesmaybesocloselyentwinedthattheycannotbedistinguishedfromeachother,andtherequirementofdisclosureandconsultationimposedbyparagraph(a)(2)oftheRulecannotbemet.Insuchacasealawyerwillberesponsibleforassuringthatboththelawyer’sconductand,totheextentrequiredbyRule5.3,that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity that the lawyer controlscompliesinallrespectswiththeRulesofProfessionalConduct.

[9]Abroadrangeofeconomicandotherinterestsofclientsmaybeservedbylawyers’ engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-relatedservicesincludeprovidingtitleinsurance,financialplanning,accounting,trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis,socialwork, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent,medical orenvironmentalconsulting.

[10]When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services theprotectionsofthoseRulesthatapplytotheclient-lawyerrelationship,thelawyermusttakespecialcaretoheedtheproscriptionsoftheRulesaddressingconflictofinterest(Rules1.7through1.11,especiallyRules1.7(a)(2)and1.8(a),(b)and(f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6 relating todisclosureofconfidentialinformation.Thepromotionofthelaw-relatedservicesmust also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing withadvertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care toidentify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction’sdecisionallaw.

[11]WhenthefullprotectionsofalloftheRulesofProfessionalConductdonotapply to theprovisionof law-relatedservices,principlesof lawexternal totheRules, forexample, the lawofprincipalandagent,govern the legalduties

owedtothosereceivingtheservices.Thoseotherlegalprinciplesmayestablishadifferentdegreeofprotectionfortherecipientwithrespecttoconfidentialityofinformation, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships withclients.SeealsoRule8.4(Misconduct).


Rule6.1.Voluntaryprobonopublicoservice.

Alawyershouldrenderpublicinterestlegalservice.Alawyermaydischargethisresponsibilitybyprovidingprofessionalservicesatnofeeorareducedfeeto persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups ororganizations,byserviceinactivitiesforimprovingthelaw,thelegalsystemorthelegalprofession,andbyfinancialsupportfororganizationsthatprovidelegalservicestopersonsoflimitedmeans.

COMMENT

[1] The ABA House of Delegates has formally acknowledged “the basicresponsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide publicinterest legal services”without fee,orata substantially reduced fee, inoneormore of the following areas: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law,charitable organization representation and the administration of justice. ThisRule expresses that policy but is not intended to be enforced through thedisciplinaryprocess.

[2] The rights and responsibilities of individuals and organizations in theUnited states are increasingly defined in legal terms.As a consequence, legalassistanceincopingwiththewebofstatutes,rulesandregulationsisimperativeforpersonsofmodestandlimitedmeans,aswellasfortherelativelywell-to-do.

[3] The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those unable topayultimatelyrestsupontheindividuallawyer,andpersonalinvolvementintheproblemsofthedisadvantagedcanbeoneofthemostrewardingexperiencesinthe life of a lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence orprofessionalworkload,shouldfindtimetoparticipateinorotherwisesupporttheprovision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free legalservicestothoseunabletopayreasonablefeescontinuestobeanobligationofeach lawyer as well as the profession generally, but the efforts of individuallawyersareoftennotenoughtomeettheneed.Thus,ithasbeennecessaryfortheprofessionandgovernmenttoinstituteadditionalprogramstoprovidelegalservices.Accordingly,legalaidoffices,lawyerreferralservicesandotherrelatedprogramshavebeendeveloped,andotherswillbedevelopedbytheprofessionandgovernment.Everylawyershouldsupportallpropereffortstomeetthisneedforlegalservices.


Rule6.2.Acceptingappointments.

A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent apersonexceptforgoodcause,suchas:

(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules ofProfessionalConductorotherlaw;

(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financialburdenonthelawyer;or

(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely toimpair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer’s ability to represent theclient.

COMMENT

[1]A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a clientwhose character orcausethelawyerregardsasrepugnant.Thelawyer’sfreedomtoselectclientsis,however,qualified.All lawyershavea responsibility toassist inprovidingprobono publico service. See Rule 6.1. An individual lawyer fulfills thisresponsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent orunpopular clients.A lawyermay also be subject to appointment by a court toserveunpopularclientsorpersonsunabletoaffordlegalservices.

[2]AppointedCounsel.—Forgood cause a lawyermay seek todecline anappointmenttorepresentapersonwhocannotaffordtoretaincounselorwhosecauseisunpopular.Goodcauseexistsifthelawyercouldnothandlethemattercompetently,seeRule1.1,orifundertakingtherepresentationwouldresultinanimproper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is sorepugnanttothelawyerastobelikelytoimpairtheclient-lawyerrelationshiporthelawyer’sabilitytorepresenttheclient.Alawyermayalsoseektodeclineanappointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example,whenitwouldimposeafinancialsacrificesogreatastobeunjust.

[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retainedcounsel,includingtheobligationsofloyaltyandconfidentiality,andissubjecttothesamelimitationsontheclient-lawyerrelationship,suchas theobligationtorefrainfromassistingtheclientinviolationoftheRules.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Avoidingappointment.

The Board on Professional Responsibility found that the Office ofDisciplinary Counsel established by clear and convincing evidence that anattorney sought to avoid appointment by the Family Court on 3 occasions,withoutgoodcause,inviolationofLawProf.ConductR.6.2.InreMurray,47A.3d972(Del.2012).


WhileanattorneyappointedbyaFamilyCourtpossessedqualifiedimmunityunder10Del.C.§4001,becauseamalpracticeclaimwassubject todismissalbased upon that qualified immunity, the lack of professional malpracticeinsurancecoveragebytheattorneywouldnotconstitutegoodcauseunderLawProf. Conduct R. 6.2(b) to withdraw from court-appointed service. Hanson v.Morton,67A.3d437(Del.2013).

Publicservice.

The Board on Professional Responsibility found that the Office ofDisciplinary Counsel established by clear and convincing evidence that anattorney sought to avoid appointment by the Family Court on 3 occasions,withoutgoodcause,inviolationofLawProf.ConductR.6.2.InreMurray,47A.3d972(Del.2012).

While it was true that an attorney’s language did not amount to theinflammatorylanguageofothercaseswherepublicreprimandwasordered,theattorney did send discourteous letters to the Court in 3 different cases andviolatedLawProf.ConductR.3.5and6.2 ineachof thosecases;because theLawProf.ConductR. 8.4(d) violation for thewasting of judicial resources inattempting to avoid court appointmentwas not deminimus, public reprimandwasappropriateInreMurray,47A.3d972(Del.2012).








Rule6.3.Membershipinlegalservicesorganization.

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal servicesorganization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices,notwithstandingthattheorganizationservespersonshavinginterestsadversetoaclientofthelawyer.Thelawyershallnotknowinglyparticipateinadecisionoractionoftheorganization:

(a) if participating in thedecisionor actionwouldbe incompatiblewith thelawyer’sobligationstoaclientunderRule1.7;or

(b)where thedecisionoractioncouldhaveamaterial adverseeffecton therepresentation of a client of the organizationwhose interests are adverse to aclientofthelawyer.

COMMENT

[1]Lawyersshouldbeencouragedtosupportandparticipateinlegalserviceorganizations.Alawyerwhoisanofficeroramemberofsuchanorganizationdoes not thereby have a client-lawyer relationshipwith persons served by theorganization.However, there ispotential conflictbetween the interestsof suchpersonsandtheinterestsofthelawyer’sclients.Ifthepossibilityofsuchconflictdisqualifiedalawyerfromservingontheboardofalegalservicesorganization,theprofession’sinvolvementinsuchorganizationswouldbeseverelycurtailed.

[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of theorganization that therepresentationwillnotbeaffectedbyconflicting loyaltiesof a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect canenhancethecredibilityofsuchassurances.


Rule6.4.Lawreformactivitiesaffectingclientinterests.

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organizationinvolved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that thereformmayaffecttheinterestsofaclientofthelawyer.Whenthelawyerknowsthattheinterestsofaclientmaybemateriallybenefittedbyadecisioninwhichthelawyerparticipates, thelawyershalldisclosethatfactbutneednot identifytheclient.

COMMENT

[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do nothave a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it mightfollow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reformprogramthatmightindirectlyaffectaclient.SeealsoRule1.2(b).Forexample,a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualifiedfrom participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. Indetermining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyershouldbemindfulofobligationstoclientsunderotherRules,particularlyRule1.7.Alawyerisprofessionallyobligatedtoprotecttheintegrityoftheprogrambymaking an appropriate disclosurewithin the organizationwhen the lawyerknowsaprivateclientmightbemateriallybenefitted.


Rule6.5.Non-profitandcourt-annexedlimitedlegal-serviceprograms.

(a)Alawyerwho,undertheauspicesofaprogramsponsoredbyanonprofitorganization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a clientwithoutexpectationbyeitherthelawyerortheclientthatthelawyerwillprovidecontinuingrepresentationinthematter:

(1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that therepresentationoftheclientinvolvesaconflictofinterest;and

(2) is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyerassociatedwiththelawyerinalawfirmisdisqualifiedbyRule1.7or1.9(a)withrespecttothematter.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to arepresentationgovernedbythisRule.

COMMENT

[1] Legal-service organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizationshave established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limitedlegalservices—suchasadviceorthecompletionoflegalforms—thatwillassistpersons to address their legal problems without further representation by alawyer. In theseprograms,suchas legal-advicehotlines,advice-onlyclinicsorprosecounselingprograms,aclient-lawyerrelationshipisestablished,butthereis no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continuebeyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated undercircumstancesinwhichitisnotfeasibleforalawyertosystematicallyscreenforconflictsofinterestasisgenerallyrequiredbeforeundertakingarepresentation.See,e.g.,Rules1.7,1.9and1.10.

[2]A lawyerwhoprovides short-term limited legal servicespursuant to thisRule must secure the client’s informed consent to the limited scope of therepresentation.SeeRule1.2(c).Ifashort-termlimitedrepresentationwouldnotbereasonableunderthecircumstances,thelawyermayofferadvicetotheclientbut must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel.Except as provided in thisRule, theRules of ProfessionalConduct, includingRules1.6and1.9(c),areapplicabletothelimitedrepresentation.

[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances

addressedbythisRuleordinarilyisnotabletochecksystematicallyforconflictsofinterest,paragraph(a)requirescompliancewithRules1.7or1.9(a)onlyifthelawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for thelawyer,andwithRule1.10onlyifthelawyerknowsthatanotherlawyerinthelawyer’sfirmisdisqualifiedbyRules1.7or1.9(a)inthematter.

[4]Becausethelimitednatureoftheservicessignificantlyreducestheriskofconflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer’s firm,paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representationgovernedbythisRuleexceptasprovidedbyparagraph(a)(2).Paragraph(a)(2)requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyerknowsthatthelawyer’sfirmisdisqualifiedbyRules1.7or1.9(a).Byvirtueofparagraph (b), however, a lawyer’s participation in a short-term limited legalservices program will not preclude the lawyer’s firm from undertaking orcontinuingtherepresentationofaclientwithinterestsadversetoaclientbeingrepresentedundertheprogram’sauspices.Norwillthepersonaldisqualificationof a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyersparticipatingintheprogram.

[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordancewith thisRule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in thematter on anongoingbasis,Rules1.7,1.9(a)and1.10becomeapplicable.


Rule7.1.Communicationsconcerningalawyer’sservices.

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about thelawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if itcontainsamaterialmisrepresentationoffactorlaw,oromitsafactnecessarytomakethestatementconsideredasawholenotmateriallymisleading.

COMMENT

[1]ThisRulegovernsallcommunicationsaboutalawyer’sservices,includingadvertisingpermittedbyRule7.2.Whatevermeansareused tomakeknownalawyer’sservices,statementsaboutthemmustbetruthful.

[2]TruthfulstatementsthataremisleadingarealsoprohibitedbythisRule.Atruthfulstatementismisleadingifitomitsafactnecessarytomakethelawyer’scommunication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthfulstatementisalsomisleadingifthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatitwillleadareasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or thelawyer’sservicesforwhichthereisnoreasonablefactualfoundation.

[3]Anadvertisementthattruthfullyreportsalawyer’sachievementsonbehalfof clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead areasonablepersontoformanunjustifiedexpectationthatthesameresultscouldbeobtainedforotherclientsinsimilarmatterswithoutreferencetothespecificfactual and legal circumstances of each client’s case. Similarly, anunsubstantiatedcomparisonofthelawyer’sservicesorfeeswiththeservicesorfees of other lawyersmay bemisleading if presentedwith such specificity aswould lead a reasonable person to conclude that the comparison can besubstantiated.Theinclusionofanappropriatedisclaimerorqualifyinglanguagemay preclude a finding that a statement is likely to create unjustifiedexpectationsorotherwisemisleadthepublic.

[4] See also Rule 8.4(e) for the prohibition against stating or implying anability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieveresultsbymeansthatviolatetheRulesofProfessionalConductorotherlaw.


Rule7.2.Advertising.

(a)SubjecttotherequirementsofRules7.1and7.3,alawyermayadvertiseservicesthroughwritten,recordedorelectroniccommunication,includingpublicmedia.

(b)Except as permitted byRule 1.5(e), a lawyer shall not give anything ofvalue toapersonforrecommending the lawyer’sservicesexcept thata lawyermay

(1)pay the reasonablecostsofadvertisementsorcommunicationspermittedbythisRule;

(2)paytheusualchargesofalegalserviceplanoranot-for-profitorqualifiedlawyer referral service.A qualified lawyer referral service is a lawyer referralservicethathasbeenapprovedbyanappropriateregulatoryauthority;and

(3)payforalawpracticeinaccordancewithRule1.17.

(c)Anycommunicationmadepursuanttothisruleshallincludethenameandofficeaddressofatleastonelawyerorlawfirmresponsibleforitscontent.

COMMENT

[1]Toassistthepublicinlearningaboutandobtaininglegalservices,lawyersshouldbeallowedtomakeknowntheirservicesnotonlythroughreputationbutalso through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising.Advertising involvesanactivequest forclients,contrary to the tradition thatalawyershouldnotseekclientele.However,thepublic’sneedtoknowaboutlegalservices can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularlyacuteinthecaseofpersonsofmoderatemeanswhohavenotmadeextensiveuseof legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legalservices ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless,advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading oroverreaching.

[2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning alawyer’s name or firm name, address, email address, website, and telephonenumber;thekindsofservicesthelawyerwillundertake;thebasisonwhichthelawyer’sfeesaredetermined,includingpricesforspecificservicesandpayment

and credit arrangements; a lawyer’s foreign language ability; names ofreferences and,with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; andother information that might invite the attention of those seeking legalassistance.

[3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters ofspeculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensiveprohibitionsagainsttelevisionandotherformsofadvertising,againstadvertisinggoing beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against “undignified”advertising. Television, the Internet, and other forms of electroniccommunicationarenowamongthemostpowerfulmediaforgettinginformationto the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibitingtelevision, Internet, andother formsof electronic advertising, therefore,wouldimpede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of thepublic.Limitingtheinformationthatmaybeadvertisedhasasimilareffectandassumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that thepublicwouldregardasrelevant.ButseeRule7.3(a)fortheprohibitionagainstasolicitationthroughareal-timeelectronicexchangeinitiatedbythelawyer.

[4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3 prohibits communications authorized bylaw,suchasnoticetomembersofaclassinclassactionlitigation.

[5]Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer. — Except as permitted underparagraphs (b)(1)-(b)(3), lawyers are not permitted to pay others forrecommending the lawyer’s services or for channeling professional work in amannerthatviolatesRule7.3.Acommunicationcontainsarecommendationifitendorsesorvouchesforalawyer’scredentials,abilities,competence,character,orotherprofessionalqualities.Paragraph(b)(1),however,allowsalawyertopayforadvertisingandcommunicationspermittedbythisRule, includingthecostsof print directory listings, on-line directory listings, newspaper ads, televisionand radio airtime, domain-name registrations, sponsorship fees, Internet-basedadvertisements, and group advertising. A lawyer may compensate employees,agentsandvendorswhoareengagedtoprovidemarketingorclientdevelopmentservices, such as publicists, public-relations personnel, business developmentstaffandwebsitedesigners.Moreover,a lawyermaypayothers forgeneratingclient leads, such as Internet-based client leads, as long as the lead generatordoesnotrecommendthelawyer,anypaymenttotheleadgeneratorisconsistentwithRules 1.5(e) (division of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of thelawyer), and the leadgenerator’s communicationsareconsistentwithRule7.1(communications concerning a lawyer’s services).To complywithRule 7.1, a

lawyermustnotpayaleadgeneratorthatstates,implies,orcreatesareasonableimpression that it is recommending the lawyer, ismaking the referralwithoutpayment from the lawyer, or has analyzed a person’s legal problems whendeterminingwhichlawyershouldreceivethereferral.SeealsoRule5.3(dutiesoflawyersandlawfirmswithrespecttotheconductofnonlawyers);Rule8.4(a)(dutytoavoidviolatingtheRulesthroughactsofanother).

[6]A lawyermaypay theusual chargesof a legal serviceplanor anot-forprofit or qualified lawyer referral service.A legal service plan is a prepaid orgrouplegalserviceplanorasimilardeliverysystemthatassistspeoplewhoseektosecurelegalrepresentation.Alawyerreferralservice,ontheotherhand,isanyorganizationthatholdsitselfouttothepublicasalawyerreferralservice.Suchreferral services are understood by the public to be consumer-orientedorganizations that provide unbiased referrals to lawyers with appropriateexperience in the subject matter of the representation and afford other clientprotections, such as complaint procedures or malpractice insurancerequirements. Consequently, this Rule only permits a lawyer to pay the usualchargesofanot-for-profitorqualifiedlawyerreferralservice.Aqualifiedlawyerreferralserviceisonethatisapprovedbyanappropriateregulatoryauthorityasaffording adequate protections for the public. See, e.g., the American BarAssociation’sModelSupremeCourtRulesGoverningLawyerReferralServicesand Model Lawyer Referral and Information Service Quality Assurance Act(requiring that organizations that are identified as lawyer referral services (i)permittheparticipationofalllawyerswhoarelicensedandeligibletopracticeinthe jurisdiction andwhomeet reasonable objective eligibility requirements asmaybe establishedby the referral service for the protectionof the public; (ii)require each participating lawyer to carry reasonably adequate malpracticeinsurance; (iii) act reasonably to assess client satisfaction and address clientcomplaints;and (iv)donotmakereferrals to lawyerswhoown,operateorareemployedbythereferralservice.)

[7]Alawyerwhoacceptsassignmentsorreferralsfromalegalserviceplanorreferrals from a lawyer referral servicemust act reasonably to assure that theactivities of the plan or service are compatiblewith the lawyer’s professionalobligations.SeeRule5.3.Legalserviceplansandlawyerreferralservicesmaycommunicatewith the public, but such communicationmust be in conformitywiththeseRules.Thus,advertisingmustnotbefalseormisleading,aswouldbethecaseifthecommunicationsofagroupadvertisingprogramoragrouplegalservices plan would mislead the public to think that it was a lawyer referralservice sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer

allowin-person,telephonic,orreal-timecontactsthatwouldviolateRule7.3.


Rule7.3.Solicitationofclients.

(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time electroniccontact solicit professional employment when a significant motive for thelawyer’sdoingsoisthelawyer’specuniarygain,unlessthepersoncontacted:

(1)isalawyer;or

(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with thelawyer.

(b)Alawyershallnotsolicitprofessionalemploymentbywritten,recordedorelectronic communication or by in-person, telephone or real-time electroniccontactevenwhennototherwiseprohibitedbyparagraph(a),if:

(1)thetargetofthesolicitationhasmadeknowntothelawyeradesirenottobesolicitedbythelawyer;or

(2)thesolicitationinvolvescoercion,duressorharassment.

(c) Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a lawyersolicitingprofessional employment fromanyoneknown to be in needof legalservicesinaparticularmattershallincludethewords“AdvertisingMaterial”ontheoutsideenvelope,ifany,andatthebeginningandendingofanyrecordedorelectroniccommunication,unlesstherecipientofthecommunicationisapersonspecifiedinparagraphs(a)(1)or(a)(2).

(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer mayparticipatewithaprepaidorgrouplegalserviceplanoperatedbyanorganizationnotownedordirectedbythelawyerthatusesin-personortelephonecontacttosolicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are notknown to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the plan.(Amended,effectiveMar.1,2013.)

COMMENT

[1]Asolicitation isa targetedcommunication initiatedby the lawyer that isdirected to a specific person and that offers to provide, or can reasonably beunderstood as offering to provide, legal services. In contrast, a lawyer’scommunicationtypicallydoesnotconstituteasolicitationifitisdirectedtothegeneralpublic,suchasthroughabillboard,anInternetbanneradvertisement,a

website or a television commercial, or if it is in response to a request forinformationorisautomaticallygeneratedinresponsetoInternetsearches.

[2]Thereisapotentialforabusewhenasolicitationinvolvesdirectin-person,livetelephoneorreal-timeelectroniccontactbyalawyerwithsomeoneknownto need legal services. These forms of contact subject a person to the privateimportuning of the trained advocate in a direct interpersonal encounter. Theperson,whomayalreadyfeeloverwhelmedbythecircumstancesgivingrisetothe need for legal services,may find it difficult fully to evaluate all availablealternativeswith reasoned judgmentandappropriateself-interest in the faceofthe lawyer’s presence and insistence upon being retained immediately. Thesituation is fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, andover-reaching.

[3]Thispotentialforabuseinherentindirectin-person,livetelephoneorrealtime electronic solicitation justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyershavealternativemeansofconveyingnecessaryinformationtothosewhomaybein need of legal services. In particular, communications can be mailed ortransmitted by email or other electronic means that do not involve real-timecontact and do not violate other laws governing solicitations. These forms ofcommunicationsandsolicitationsmakeitpossibleforthepublictobeinformedabout the need for legal services, and about the qualifications of availablelawyers and law firms, without subjecting the public to direct in-person,telephone or real-time electronic persuasion that may overwhelm a person’sjudgment.

[4] The use of general advertising and written, recorded or electroniccommunications to transmit information from lawyer to thepublic, rather thandirect in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact, will help toassure that the information flows cleanly as well as freely. The contents ofadvertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 can bepermanently recorded so that theycannotbedisputedandmaybe sharedwithotherswhoknowthelawyer.Thispotentialforinformalreviewisitselflikelytohelp guard against statements and claims that might constitute false andmisleadingcommunications,inviolationofRule7.1.Thecontentsofdirectin-person, live telephoneor real-timeelectronic contact canbedisputedandmaynotbesubjecttothird-partyscrutiny.Consequently,theyaremuchmorelikelytoapproach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accuraterepresentationsandthosethatarefalseandmisleading.

[5]Thereisfarlesslikelihoodthatalawyerwouldengageinabusivepractices

againstaformerclient,orapersonwithwhomthelawyerhasaclosepersonalorfamily relationship, or in situations in which the lawyer is motivated byconsiderations other than the lawyer’s pecuniary gain. Nor is there a seriouspotential for abuse when the person contacted is a lawyer. Consequently, thegeneral prohibition in rule 7.3(a) and the requirements of Rule 7.3(c) are notapplicable in those situations.Also,paragraph (a) isnot intended toprohibit alawyer from participating in constitutionally protected activities of public orcharitable legalservice organizations or bona fide political, social, civic,fraternal,employeeortradeorganizationswhosepurposesincludeprovidingorrecommendinglegalservicestotheirmembersorbeneficiaries.

[6] But even permitted forms of solicitation can be abused. Thus, anysolicitationwhichcontains informationwhich is falseormisleadingwithin themeaningofRule7.1,whichinvolvescoercion,duressorharassmentwithinthemeaning of Rule 7.3(b)(2), or which involves contact with someone who hasmadeknowntothelawyeradesirenottobesolicitedbythelawyerwithinthemeaning ofRule 7.3(b)(1) is prohibited.Moreover, if after sending a letter orothercommunicationaspermittedbyRule7.2thelawyerreceivesnoresponse,anyfurtherefforttocommunicatewiththerecipientofthecommunicationmayviolatetheprovisionsofRule7.3(b).

[7] This Rule is not intended to prohibit a lawyer from contactingrepresentativesoforganizationsorgroupsthatmaybeinterestedinestablishingagrouporprepaidlegalplanfortheirmembers,insureds,beneficiariesorotherthirdpartiesforthepurposeofinformingsuchentitiesoftheavailabilityofanddetailsconcerningtheplanorarrangementwhichthelawyerorlawyer’sfirmiswillingtooffer.Thisformofcommunicationisnotdirectedtopeoplewhoareseeking legal services for themselves. Rather, it is usually addressed to anindividualactinginafiduciarycapacityseekingasupplieroflegalservicesforotherswhomay,iftheychoose,becomeprospectiveclientsofthelawyer.Underthesecircumstances,theactivitywhichthelawyerundertakesincommunicatingwith such representatives and the type of information transmitted to theindividualarefunctionallysimilartoandservethesamepurposeasadvertisingpermittedunderRule7.2.

[8] The requirement in Rule 7.3(c) that certain communications bemarked“AdvertisingMaterial” does not apply to communications sent in response torequests of potential clients or their spokespersons or sponsors. Generalannouncementsbylawyers,includingchangesinpersonnelorofficelocation,donotconstitutecommunicationssolicitingprofessionalemploymentfromaclient

knowntobeinneedoflegalserviceswithinthemeaningofthisRule.

[9] Paragraph (d) of this Rule permits a lawyer to participate with anorganization which uses personal contact to solicit members for its group orprepaid legalserviceplan,providedthat thepersonalcontact isnotundertakenbyanylawyerwhowouldbeaprovideroflegalservicesthroughtheplan.Theorganization must not be owned by or directed (whether as manager orotherwise)byanylawyerorlawfirmthatparticipatesintheplan.Forexample,paragraph (d) would not permit a lawyer to create an organization controlleddirectlyorindirectlybythelawyerandusetheorganizationforthein-personortelephonesolicitationof legalemploymentof the lawyer throughmembershipsin theplanor otherwise.The communicationpermittedby theseorganizationsalsomustnotbedirectedtoapersonknowntoneedlegalservicesinaparticularmatter, but is to be designed to inform potential plan members generally ofanothermeansof affordable legal services.Lawyerswhoparticipate in a legalservice planmust reasonably assure that the plan sponsors are in compliancewithRules7.1,7.2and7.3(b).See8.4(a).


Rule7.4.Communicationoffieldsofpracticeandspecialization.

(a) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does notpracticeinparticularfieldsoflaw.

(b)A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before theUnitedStatesPatent and Trademark Officemay use the designation “Patent Attorney” or asubstantiallysimilardesignation;

(c) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may use the designation“Admiralty,”“ProctorinAdmiralty”orasubstantiallysimilardesignation.

(d)Alawyershallnotstateorimplythatalawyeriscertifiedasaspecialistinaparticularfieldoflaw,unless:

(1) the lawyer has been certified as a specialist by an organization that hasbeenapprovedbyanappropriatestateauthorityor thathasbeenaccreditedbytheAmericanBarAssociation;and

(2) the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in thecommunication.

COMMENT

[1]Paragraph(a)ofthisRulepermitsalawyertoindicateareasofpracticeincommunicationsaboutthelawyer’sservices.Ifalawyerpracticesonlyincertainfields,orwillnotacceptmattersexceptinaspecifiedfieldorfields,thelawyeris permitted to so indicate. A lawyer is generally permitted to state that thelawyer is a “specialist,” practices a “specialty,” or “specializes in” particularfields, but such communications are subject to the “false and misleading”standardappliedinRule7.1tocommunicationsconcerningalawyer’sservices.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes the long-established policy of the Patent andtrademark Office for the designation of lawyers practicing before the Office.Paragraph (c) recognizes that designation of Admiralty practice has a longhistoricaltraditionassociatedwithmaritimecommerceandthefederalcourts.

[3] Paragraph (d) permits a lawyer to state that the lawyer is certified as aspecialist in a field of law if such certification is granted by an organizationapproved by an appropriate state authority or accredited by theAmericanBarAssociationoranotherorganization,suchasastatebarassociation,thathasbeen

approvedbythestateauthoritytoaccreditorganizationsthatcertifylawyersasspecialists. Certification signifies that an objective entity has recognized anadvanceddegreeofknowledgeandexperienceinthespecialtyareagreaterthanissuggestedbygeneral licensure topractice law.Certifyingorganizationsmaybe expected to apply standards of experience, knowledge and proficiency toinsure that a lawyer’s recognitionas a specialist ismeaningful and reliable. Inordertoinsurethatconsumerscanobtainaccesstousefulinformationaboutanorganizationgrantingcertification,thenameofthecertifyingorganizationmustbeincludedinanycommunicationregardingthecertification.


Rule7.5.Firmnamesandletterheads.

(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professionaldesignation that violates Rule 7.1.A trade namemay be used by a lawyer inprivatepractice if itdoesnot implyaconnectionwithagovernmentagencyorwith a public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise inviolationofRule7.1.

(b)A law firmwithoffices inmore thanone jurisdictionmayuse the samenameorotherprofessionaldesignationineachjurisdiction,butidentificationofthelawyersinanofficeofthefirmshallindicatethejurisdictionallimitationsonthosenotlicensedtopracticeinthejurisdictionwheretheofficeislocated.

(c)Thenameofalawyerholdingapublicofficeshallnotbeusedinthenameofalawfirm,orincommunicationsonitsbehalf,duringanysubstantialperiodinwhichthelawyerisnotactivelyandregularlypracticingwiththefirm.

(d) Lawyersmay state or imply that they practice in a partnership or otherorganizationonlywhenthatisthefact.

COMMENT

[1]Afirmmaybedesignatedbythenamesofallorsomeofitsmembers,bythenamesofdeceasedmemberswheretherehasbeenacontinuingsuccessioninthefirm’sidentityorbyatradenamesuchasthe“ABCLegalClinic.”Alawyeror law firm may also be designated by a distinctive website address orcomparableprofessionaldesignation.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthas held that legislation may prohibit the use of trade names in professionalpractice, use of such names in law practice is acceptable so long as it is notmisleading.Ifaprivatefirmusesatradenamethatincludesageographicalnamesuchas“SpringfieldLegalClinic,”anexpressdisclaimerthatitisapubliclegalaid agency may be required to avoid a misleading implication. It may beobservedthatanyfirmnameincludingthenameofadeceasedpartneris,strictlyspeaking,atradename.Theuseofsuchnamestodesignatelawfirmshasprovenausefulmeansofidentification.However,itismisleadingtousethenameofalawyernotassociatedwiththefirmorapredecessorofthefirm,orthenameofanonlawyer.

[2]Withregardtoparagraph(d),lawyerssharingofficefacilities,butwhoare

not in fact associated with each other in a law firm, may not denominatethemselvesas, forexample,“SmithandJones,”for that titlesuggests that theyarepracticinglawtogetherinafirm.


Rule7.6.Politicalcontributionstoobtaingovernmentlegalengagementsorappointmentsbyjudges.

Alawyeror lawfirmshallnotacceptagovernment legalengagementoranappointmentbyajudgeifthelawyerorlawfirmmakesapoliticalcontributionor solicits political contributions for the purpose of obtaining or beingconsideredforthattypeoflegalengagementorappointment.

COMMENT

[1] Lawyers have a right to participate fully in the political process,whichincludesmakingandsolicitingpolitical contributions tocandidates for judicialand other public office. Nevertheless, when lawyers make or solicit politicalcontributions in order to obtain an engagement for legal work awarded by agovernment agency, or to obtain appointment by a judge, the public maylegitimately question whether the lawyers engaged to perform the work areselected on the basis of competence and merit. In such a circumstance, theintegrityoftheprofessionisundermined.

[2] The term “political contribution” denotes any gift, subscription, loan,advance or deposit of anything of value made directly or indirectly to acandidate, incumbent, political party or campaign committee to influence orprovide financial support for election to or retention in judicial or othergovernmentoffice.Politicalcontributionsininitiativeandreferendumelectionsarenotincluded.Forpurposesofthisrule,theterm“politicalcontribution”doesnotincludeuncompensatedservices.

[3] Subject to the exceptions below, (i) the term “government legalengagement” denotes any engagement to provide legal services that a publicofficialhasthedirectorindirectpowertoaward;and(ii)theterm“appointmentbyajudge”denotesanappointmenttoapositionsuchasreferee,commissioner,special master, receiver, guardian or other similar position that is made by ajudge. Those terms do not, however, include (a) substantially uncompensatedservices; (b) engagements or appointments made on the basis of experience,expertise,professionalqualificationsandcostfollowingarequestforproposalorotherprocessthatisfreefrominfluencebaseduponpoliticalcontributions;and(c)engagementsorappointmentsmadeonarotationalbasisfromalistcompiledwithoutregardtopoliticalcontributions.

[4] The term “lawyer or law firm” includes a political action committee orotherentityownedorcontrolledbyalawyerorlawfirm.

[5]Politicalcontributionsareforthepurposeofobtainingorbeingconsideredfor a government legal engagement or appointment by a judge if, but for thedesiretobeconsideredforthelegalengagementorappointment, thelawyerorlawfirmwouldnothavemadeorsolicitedthecontributions.Thepurposemaybe determined by an examination of the circumstances in which thecontributionsoccur.Forexample,oneormorecontributionsthatintheaggregatearesubstantial inrelation toothercontributionsby lawyersor lawfirms,madefor thebenefit of anofficial in a position to influence awardof a governmentlegal engagement, and followed by an award of the legal engagement to thecontributingorsolicitinglawyerorthelawyer’sfirmwouldsupportaninferencethatthepurposeofthecontributionswastoobtaintheengagement,absentotherfactors that weigh against existence of the proscribed purpose. Those factorsmay include among others that the contribution or solicitation was made tofurther a political, social, or economic interest or because of an existingpersonal,family,orprofessionalrelationshipwithacandidate.

[6]Ifalawyermakesorsolicitsapoliticalcontributionundercircumstancesthatconstitutebriberyoranothercrime,Rule8.4(b)isimplicated.


Rule8.1.Baradmissionanddisciplinarymatters.

Anapplicant for admission to thebar, or a lawyer in connectionwith a baradmissionapplicationorinconnectionwithadisciplinarymatter,shallnot:

(a)knowinglymakeafalsestatementofmaterialfact;or

(b)failtodiscloseafactnecessarytocorrectamisapprehensionknownbytheperson to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawfuldemandforinformationfromanadmissionordisciplinaryauthority,exceptthatthisruledoesnotrequiredisclosureofinformationotherwiseprotectedbyRule1.6.

COMMENT

[1]ThedutyimposedbythisRuleextendstopersonsseekingadmissiontothebaraswellastolawyers.Hence,ifapersonmakesamaterialfalsestatementinconnectionwithanapplicationforadmission,itmaybethebasisforsubsequentdisciplinaryactionifthepersonisadmitted,andinanyeventmayberelevantinasubsequentadmissionapplication.ThedutyimposedbythisRuleappliestoalawyer’s own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is aseparate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make amisrepresentationoromissioninconnectionwithadisciplinaryinvestigationofthelawyer’sownconduct.Paragraph(b)ofthisRulealsorequirescorrectionofanypriormisstatementinthematterthattheapplicantorlawyermayhavemadeand affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of theadmissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomesaware.

[2]ThisRuleissubjecttotheprovisionsofthefifthamendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionandcorrespondingprovisionsofstateconstitutions.Apersonrelying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do soopenly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure tocomplywiththisRule.

[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, orrepresentingalawyerwhoisthesubjectofadisciplinaryinquiryorproceeding,is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship, includingRule1.6and,insomecases,Rule3.3.

http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/U.S.%20CONST.%20AMEND.%205

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NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Officeforlawpractice.

Publicservice.

—Disbarment.

Sanctions.

—Publicreprimand.

—Suspension.

Tribunals.

Officeforlawpractice.

Attorneywhofailedtomaintainabonafideofficefor thepracticeof lawinDelawareviolatedvariousdisciplinaryrulesbecausetheattorney’sassurancetodisciplinary counsel that the bona fide office requirement was satisfied wasknowingly false and dishonest; merely being reachable by phone was notsufficient.InreAMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDelaware:FredBar,99A.3d639(Del.2013).

Publicservice.

—Disbarment.


Whenanattorneyhandling2estates,interalia,failedtoprovideinformationand documents in a timely manner in response to a request by the Office ofDisciplinaryCounsel, theattorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.1(b). In reWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).




Where the attorneywas aware that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel wasinvestigatingtheattorney’sestatepractice,andwasawareofaparticularestatebecausetheattorneytransferreditsfundsbeforepreparinganinventoryofopencasesfor theOfficeofDisciplinaryCounsel, theattorneykneworshouldhaveknown that the attorney was withholding information in violation of Law. R.Prof.Conduct8.1.InreWilson,900A.2d102(Del.2006).

AttorneyviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.1(a)whentheattorneyknowinglymadeafalsestatementofmaterialfactconcerningamotorvehicleaccidentinareinstatement questionnaire;with respect to the statement, “At the time of theaccident Ididnothavemycellphonewithme,soIwalkedhome;” thepolicereport indicated that the attorney informed the investigating officer that theattorneywasdistractedby talkingon thecellphone. In reDavis,43A.3d856(Del.2012).


Sanctions.

—Publicreprimand.



—Suspension.

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules of






ProfessionalConductandwhoviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.2(a),1.4(a),1.15(a),8.1,8.1(b),8.4(c),and8.4(d),andLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c),wassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawinDelawarefor3yearsaftertheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility found that theattorney’sproblemsappeared tobegettingworseand included: co-mingling client trust funds; inadequate bookkeeping andsafeguarding of client funds; inadequate maintenance of books and records;knowingly making false statements of material fact to the ODC; falserepresentations in Certificates of Compliance for 3 years; and failure to filecorporatetaxreturnsfor3years.InreBecker,947A.2d1120(Del.2008).

Tribunals.

Attorney’sfalsestatementtotheOfficeofDisciplinaryCouncilregardinghisdistributionofsettlementfundstoaclientviolatedthisrule.InreMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Where attorney’s prior disciplinary record included public reprimands andprivate admonitions and attorneywas found tohaveviolated subsection (b) infive instances, attorney was suspended from the practice of law for sevenmonths.InreGuy,756A.2d875(Del.2000).

Attorney’s failure to timely respond to theOffice ofDisciplinaryCounsel’s(ODC) letter, or to contact the client as requested by the ODC, violatedsubsection(b)ofthisrule.InreBecker,788A.2d527(Del.2001).






Rule8.2.Judicialandlegalofficials.

(a)Alawyershallnotmakeastatementthatthelawyerknowstobefalseorwithrecklessdisregardastoits truthorfalsityconcerningthequalificationsorintegrityofajudge,adjudicatoryofficerorpubliclegalofficer,oracandidateforelectionorappointmenttojudicialorlegaloffice.

(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with theapplicableprovisionsoftheCodeofJudicialConduct.

COMMENT

[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional orpersonal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment tojudicialofficeandtopublic legaloffices,suchasattorneygeneral,prosecutingattorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on suchmatterscontributestoimprovingtheadministrationofjustice.Conversely,falsestatements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in theadministrationofjustice.

Whenalawyerseeksjudicialoffice,thelawyershouldbeboundbyapplicablelimitationsonpoliticalactivity.

[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound byapplicablelimitationsonpoliticalactivity.

[3]Tomaintainthefairandindependentadministrationofjustice,lawyersareencouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustlycriticized.


Rule8.3.Reportingprofessionalmisconduct.

(a)Alawyerwhoknowsthatanotherlawyerhascommittedaviolationoftherules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to thatlawyer’shonesty, trustworthinessor fitnessasa lawyer inother respects, shallinformtheappropriateprofessionalauthority.

(b)Alawyerwhoknowsthatajudgehascommittedaviolationofapplicablerulesofjudicialconductthatraisesasubstantialquestionastothejudge’sfitnessforofficeshallinformtheappropriateauthority.

(c)ThisRuledoesnot requiredisclosureof informationotherwiseprotectedbyrule1.6.

(d)Notwithstandinganythinginthisorotheroftherulestothecontrary,therelationshipbetweenmembersofeither(i)theLawyersAssistanceCommitteeofthe Delaware State Bar Association and counselors retained by the BarAssociation,or(ii)theProfessionalEthicsCommitteeoftheDelawareStateBarAssociation, or (iii) the Fee disputeConciliation andMediationCommittee ofthe Delaware State Bar Association, or (iv) the Professional GuidanceCommitteeoftheDelawareStateBarAssociation,andalawyerorajudgeshallbethesameasthatofattorneyandclient.

COMMENT

[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of theprofession initiate disciplinary investigationwhen they know of a violation ofthe Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation withrespect to judicialmisconduct.Anapparently isolatedviolationmay indicateapattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover.Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely todiscovertheoffense.

[2]Areportaboutmisconductisnotrequiredwhereitwouldinvolveviolationof Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent todisclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client’sinterests.

[3]IfalawyerwereobligedtoreporteveryviolationoftheRules,thefailuretoreportanyviolationwoulditselfbeaprofessionaloffense.Sucharequirement

existed inmany jurisdictionsbut proved tobeunenforceable.ThisRule limitsthereportingobligation to thoseoffenses thataself-regulatingprofessionmustvigorouslyendeavortoprevent.Ameasureofjudgmentis,therefore,requiredincomplyingwiththeprovisionsofthisRule.Theterm“substantial”referstotheseriousnessofthepossibleoffenseandnotthequantumofevidenceofwhichthelawyerisaware.Areportshouldbemadetothebardisciplinaryagencyunlesssome other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in thecircumstances. Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicialmisconduct.

[4] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyerretainedtorepresentalawyerwhoseprofessionalconductisinquestion.SuchasituationisgovernedbytheRulesapplicabletotheclient-lawyerrelationship.

[5] Information about a lawyer’s or judge’s misconduct or fitness may bereceivedbyalawyerinthecourseofthatlawyer’sparticipationinanapprovedlawyers or judges assistance program. In that circumstance, providing for anexception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of thisRuleencourages lawyers and judges to seek treatment through such a program.Conversely,withoutsuchanexception,lawyersandjudgesmayhesitatetoseekassistance from these programs, which may then result in additional harm totheirprofessionalcareersandadditionalinjurytothewelfareofclientsandthepublic.TheseRulesdonototherwiseaddresstheconfidentialityofinformationreceived by a lawyer or judge participating in an approved lawyers assistanceprogram; such an obligation, however, may be imposed by the rules of theprogramorotherlaw.

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NOTESTODECISIONS


Defendant’s motion to suppress statements and derivative evidence wasdenied where, inter alia, the prosecutor disclosed that there was a potentialconflict of interest betweendefendant and defendant’s counsel, and the recorddidnotreflectthatthegovernment’sknowledgeofcounsel’spossiblebreachofhisethicaldutiestainteddefendant’sinterviews.UnitedStatesv.Kossak,275F.Supp.2d525(D.Del.2003).



Rule8.4.Misconduct.

Itisprofessionalmisconductforalawyerto:

(a)violateorattempttoviolatetheRulesofProfessionalConduct,knowinglyassistorinduceanothertodosoordosothroughtheactsofanother;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,trustworthinessorfitnessasalawyerinotherrespects;

(c)engageinconductinvolvingdishonesty,fraud,deceitormisrepresentation;

(d)engageinconductthatisprejudicialtotheadministrationofjustice;

(e)stateorimplyanabilitytoinfluenceimproperlyagovernmentagencyorofficial or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of ProfessionalConductorotherlaw;or

(f)knowinglyassistajudgeorjudicialofficerinconductthatisaviolationofapplicablerulesofjudicialconductorotherlaw.

COMMENT

[1]Lawyersaresubject todisciplinewhen theyviolateorattempt toviolatetheRulesofProfessionalConduct,knowinglyassistorinduceanothertodosoordosothroughtheactsofanother,aswhentheyrequestorinstructanagenttodosoonthelawyer’sbehalf.Paragraph(a),however,doesnotprohibitalawyerfromadvisingaclientconcerningactiontheclientislegallyentitledtotake.

[2]Manykindsofillegalconductreflectadverselyonfitnesstopracticelaw,such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file anincometaxreturn.However,somekindsofoffensescarrynosuchimplication.Traditionally, the distinctionwas drawn in terms of offenses involving “moralturpitude.”Thatconceptcanbeconstruedto includeoffensesconcerningsomemattersofpersonalmorality, suchas adultery andcomparableoffenses,whichhavenospecificconnectiontofitnessforthepracticeoflaw.Althoughalawyeris personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should beprofessionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of thosecharacteristicsrelevanttolawpractice.Offensesinvolvingviolence,dishonesty,breachof trust,or serious interferencewith theadministrationof justiceare inthat category.A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones ofminor significance

whenconsideredseparately,canindicateindifferencetolegalobligation.

[3]Alawyerwho,inthecourseofrepresentingaclient,knowinglymanifestsbywordsorconduct,biasorprejudicebaseduponrace, sex, religion,nationalorigin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violatesparagraph(d)whensuchactionsareprejudicialtotheadministrationofjustice.Legitimateadvocacyrespectingtheforegoingfactorsdoesnotviolateparagraph(d). A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on adiscriminatorybasisdoesnotaloneestablishaviolationofthisrule.

[4]Alawyermayrefusetocomplywithanobligationimposedbylawuponagood faithbelief that novalidobligation exists.TheprovisionsofRule1.2(d)concerningagoodfaithchallengetothevalidity,scope,meaningorapplicationofthelawapplytochallengesoflegalregulationofthepracticeoflaw.

[5]Lawyersholdingpublicofficeassumelegalresponsibilitiesgoingbeyondthoseofothercitizens.Alawyer’sabuseofpublicofficecansuggestaninabilitytofulfilltheprofessionalroleoflawyers.Thesameistrueofabuseofpositionsof private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent andofficer,directorormanagerofacorporationorotherorganization.

INTERPRETIVEGUIDELINE.Lawyer’sincometaxes.

The following statements of principles are promulgated as InterpretiveGuidelines in the application of theDelaware Lawyers’ Rules of ProfessionalConduct:

Criminalacts thatreflectadverselyonalawyer’shonesty, trustworthinessorfitness as a lawyer in other respects, as construed under theseRules, shall bedeemedtoinclude,butnotlimitedto,thefollowing:

(1)Willfulfailuretomakeandfilefederal,state,orcityincometaxreturnsorestimatedincometaxreturns,ortopaysuchestimatedtaxortaxes,ortosupplyinformation in connection therewith at the time or times required by law orregulation;

(2)Willfulattemptinanymannertoevadeanyfederal,state,orcityincometax.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

Analysis

Attorneys’fees.

—Feesplitting.

Clientrelations.

—Clientfunds.

——Accounting.

——Misappropriation.

——Safeguarding.

—Diligence.

—Sexual.

Incapacityorincompetenceofattorney.

—Defensetomisconduct.

—Reinstatement.

Lawfirms.

—Bookkeeping.


—Managingpartner.

—Office.

—Taxes.



—Decorumofthetribunal.

—Illegalconduct.

—Obligationstowardthetribunal.

Sanctions.

—Disbarment.

—Disciplinaryproceedings.

—Dismissalofclaim.

—Reprimand.

—Suspension.

Attorneys’fees.

—Feesplitting.

Attorneyviolatedsubsection(a)byattemptingtodivideaprospectivefeeinviolationofProf.Cond.R.1.5(e).InreMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).

Clientrelations.

—Clientfunds.

——Accounting.


——Misappropriation.

Attorney violated subsection (c) through his misappropriation of client’sfunds,failuretopayoffajudgment,andsigningclient’snametoacheckwithoutindicatinghewassigningforher.InreMaguire,725A.2d417(Del.1999).


Therewassubstantialevidencetosupportthefactualfindingsandconclusionsof law of the Board on Professional Responsibility regarding an attorney’sviolation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), based on the attorney’s theft bymisappropriatingfirmfunds;suchconductreflectedadverselyontheattorney’shonesty, trustworthiness,or fitnessasa lawyer. In reVanderslice,55A.3d322






(Del.2012).

BasedonareportbytheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility,therewasclearandconvincingevidencethatanattorneyengagedincriminalconductworthyofsuspnsionby:(1)misappropriatingfundsfromtheattorney’semployerovera5-year period; (2) engaging in dishonest conduct by lying to the attorney’smortgage company; and (3) forging the employer’s signature. In reLankenau,138A.3d1151(Del.2016).

——Safeguarding.

WhenanattorneyfalselyrepresentedthathehaddesignatedanestateaccountasanattorneytrustorescrowaccountunderLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15A,theattorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c)and(d).InreWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

AttorneywasdisbarredafterhavingbeenfoundtohaveviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4bymisappropriatingclientsfundsandfailing to identifyabankaccountasa lawpracticeaccount; theattorney’sconduct was found to have been intentional and no mitigating factors werepresentwhereitwasshownthattheattorneytookalongtimetoprovideaclientwithrefinancingproceedsand,whentheattorneydid,thecheckwasreturnedforinsufficientfunds,andtheattorneyusedasepticsystemescrowdeposittocoveranother check that the attorneyhadwritten. In reGarrett, 909A.2d 103 (Del.2006).

Attorney whose child stole funds from the attorney’s escrow account waspubliclyreprimandedforviolatingLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.4(c)and(d)byfilinganannualregistrationstatementthatinaccuratelyreportedthattheattorneyhadaprecertificationreview.InreOtlowski,976A.2d172(Del.2009).

BoardonProfessionalResponsibilitycorrectlyassigneda6-monthsuspensionwithconditionsforviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.15,5.3and8.4because:(1)theBoardconsideredtheattorney’sstateofmindandconcludedtheattorney,as managing partner, was at least negligent in overseeing 2 non-attorneys toensurethebooksandrecordsweremaintainedincompliancewiththerules;(2)theattorneyknewofruleviolationsduetothenegativebalancesintheaccount;(3) the attorney filed an inaccurate 2015 Certificate of Compliance with theDelawareSupremeCourtthatmisrepresentedthelawfirm’scompliancewiththeruleonsafekeepingproperty;(4) thecoveringfundsreliedonbytheBoardonProfessional Responsibility should not have been considered a substitute fornegativebalancesintheclientsubsidiaryledger;(5)thelawfirmhadadutyto





safeguardtheclients’propertybutfailedtodoso;and(6)asamanagingpartnerwhofailedtosupervisenon-attorneyemployees,theattorneywasresponsibleforthose deficiencies. In reBeauregard,—A.3d—, 2018Del.LEXIS 258 (Del.June5,2018).

—Diligence.

Whenanattorneyhandling2estates,interalia,failedtoprobatetheestatesina timely manner, the attorney violated Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d). In reWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

LawyerviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.4(c)becausethelawyerfalselytolda client: (1) a complaintwas filed; (2) therewas a tolling agreement; and (3)negotiationswereongoing.InreWilks,99A.3d228(Del.2014).

—Sexual.

Three-year suspension, along with other conditions, was the appropriatesanction for an attorneywhoadmittedhavinghad a sexual relationshipwith aclient (who claimed to have felt pressured into it) that had not pre-existedrepresentationoftheclient,andwheretheattorneywasalsoshownbyclearandconvincingevidencetohaveengagedinconductwithclientsandemployeesofthefirmthatamountedtotheDelawaremisdemeanorsofsexualharassmentandoffensivetouching.InreTenenbaum,880A.2d1025(Del.2005).

Inaprofessionaldisciplinaryproceeding,anattorneywasdisbarredasaresultof engaging in a pattern of sexual misconduct with clients for more than 2decades.InreTenenbaum,918A.2d1109(Del.2007).

Incapacityorincompetenceofattorney.

—Defensetomisconduct.

A pattern of takingmortgage payoff funds is strong evidence of deliberatewrongdoingduringanextendedperiodof time,andwasgrounds for findingaviolation of this section notwithstanding the attorney’s mental illness. In reDorsey,683A.2d1046(Del.1996).

—Reinstatement.

StateSupremeCourtapprovedtheProfessionalResponsibilityBoard’sreportandrecommendedsanctionas theattorneyadmittedviolationsofLawR.Prof.Conduct8.4(b),andthe18-monthsuspensionwasproperlymaderetroactivetothe date that the State Supreme Court entered its order that the disciplinaryproceedings be held in abeyance because the attorney had been transferred to






disability inactive status and was later granted transfer to active status afterrehabilitation.InreAmalfitano,931A.2d1006(Del.2007).

Lawfirms.

—Bookkeeping.

Attorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandsubjecttoapublictwo-yearperiodofprobation for her violations of Rule 1.15(b) and (d), former InterpretiveGuideline No. 2, and subsection (d) of this Rule, for failing to pay variousfederalandstateemployeeandemployerpayroll taxes ina timelymanner, forfailingtomaintainherlawpracticebooksandrecords,byfailingtofileher1998and1999federalunemploymenttaxreturnsuntilOctober2000,andbymakingconsistently delinquent filings and payment in connection with other lawpractice payroll tax obligations, and for certifying to the court that her lawpractice books and recordswere in compliancewith the requirements ofRule1.15andthathertaxobligationswerepaidinatimelymanner.InreBenson,774A.2d258(Del.2001).

Attorneywaspubliclyreprimandedandwasorderedtoserveapublic2-yearprobationperiodforviolatingLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c)byfilingcertificatesofcompliancecontaininginaccuraterepresentationsastocompliancewithLaw.R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 with reference to the attorney’s law practice bankaccounts; the attorney’s substantial experience, multiple offenses and attitudetoward the offenses offset the attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record,extensive remedialefforts, fullcooperationand lackof injury toaclient. In reMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourt,985A.2d391(Del.2009).

Attorney’sfailuretomaintainlawofficebooksandrecords,filingcertificatesofcompliancewithannualregistrationstatementsthatindicatedmaintenanceofsuch documentation, and failure to file and pay taxes violated Law. R. Prof.Conduct1.15(d)andLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c),(d);apublicreprimandwasimposed.InreWitherell,998A.2d852(Del.2010).

Attorneywassuspendedfor1year,withthesuspensiontorunretroactivelytothe date the attorneywas transferred to disability inactive status, for violatingLaw.Prof.ConductR. 8.4(c) and (d), by filing certificates of compliance thatcontained misrepresentations relating to attorney’s maintenance of the lawpractice’sbooksandrecords.InreNowak,5A.3d631(Del.2010).

Followingaself-reportedembezzlementbyamemberoftheattorney’sstaff,theattorneyfailedtoobtaincourt-orderedprecertificationbyalicensedcertifiedpublicaccountantfor2yearsofcertificatesofcompliance, reporting thestatus






ofrecordkeepingwithregardtorequirementsofLawProf.ConductR.1.15andLawProf.ConductR.1.15A;becausetheabsenceofanyinjurytoclientsdidnotexcusethemisconduct,theattorney’srepeatedviolationsofLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c)andLawProf.ConductR.8.4(d)supportedanimpositionofapublicreprimandwithconditions.InreHolfeld,74A.3d605(Del.2013).

Attorney’s admissions and the record established that the attorney violatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.5,5.3,8.4(c)and(d),resultingin2years’probation,by:(1)misrepresenting to thecourt theattorney’smaintenanceof records; and (2)failing to properly maintain them, to safeguard client funds, to provide forreasonable safeguards to assure accurate accounting, to supervise nonlawyerstaff,andtotimelyfileandpaytaxes.InreGray,152A.3d581(Del.2016).



—Managingpartner.

Whereanattorney,themanagingpartnerofafirm,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(a)bykeepingmorethan$1700ofthefirm’sfundsintheclientescrowaccountforalmostayear,admitted toviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(d),byfailing,foralmostayear,tomaintainthefirm’sbooksand records in compliance with the rule’s requirements, admitted to violatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct5.3byfailingtohavereasonablesafeguardsinplaceto ensure an accurate accounting of the firm’s financial books and records incompliance with the Rules, by failing to supervise employees’ conduct inreconciling books and records and filing and paying payroll taxes, and byknowingthatpayroll,grossreceipts,andcorporatetaxeswerenotbeingtimelyfiledandpaid,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c)byfilingaCertificate ofCompliance for the year 2000,which falsely stated that the lawpractice’sbooksandrecordsweremaintainedincompliancewithDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.15andbyfalselystatingontheCertificatesofCompliancefor1998, 1999, and 2000 that the attorney was meeting tax filing and paymentobligations,admittedtoviolatingDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(d)byfailingto




fileandpayvarioustaxesandbyfilingfalseCertificatesofCompliancefortheyears 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, and where a witness testifiedunequivocallythattheattorneyinstructedthewitnesstotransferescrowfundstothefirm’soperatingaccount,andclienttrustfundshadtobe,andwere,invaded,the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s recommended public reprimand wasrejected,andtheattorneywassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawforsixmonthsandoneday; amanagingpartnerof a law firmhad enhancedduties to ensurethat the law firmcompliedwith its recordkeepingand taxobligations, and themanagingpartnerhadtodischargethoseresponsibilitiesfaithfullyandwiththeutmostdiligence.InreBailey,821A.2d851(Del.2003).

—Office.

Attorneywhofailedtomaintainabonafideofficefor thepracticeof lawinDelawareviolatedvariousdisciplinaryrulesbecausetheattorney’sassurancetodisciplinary counsel that the bona fide office requirement was satisfied wasknowingly false and dishonest; merely being reachable by phone was notsufficient.InreAMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDelaware:FredBar,99A.3d639(Del.2013).

—Taxes.

When an attorney failed to pay payroll taxes for five years and personalincometaxesforsixyears,theattorneywassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawfor3yearsforconductprejudicialtotheadministrationofjustice,subjecttotheright to seek reinstatement after 6 months. In re Landis, 850 A.2d 291 (Del.2004).


Evidence supported the determination of an attorney’s misconduct by theBoardonProfessionalResponsibilitybecausetheattorneyfailedtofiletaxesinatimelymannerforaperiodofyears;theattorneyalsorespondeduntruthfullythatthetaxeshadinfactbeenfiledontheannualattorneyregistrationstatement.InreBria,86A.3d1118(Del.2014).

Attorney’s failure to file taxes ina timelymanner foraperiodofyears,andthe attorney’s false response on that issue on the annual attorney registration






statement,warrantedasuspensionof6monthsand1dayinorder toavoidtheautomaticreinstatementofalessersuspensionperiod.InreBria,86A.3d1118(Del.2014).



“Negligentmisrepresentation”mayformthebasisforachargeofmisconductundertheliteral termsofLawR.Prof.Conduct8.4(c).InreWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

Attorney’smisrepresentationtoaFamilyCourtthataclientwasnotinarrearswithregardtoalimonyandhadpaidthedebtinfullwasdeterminedtohavebeenanactofdishonesty,fraud,deceit,ormisrepresentationinviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.4(c)and(d),a failure toprovidecompetent representation to theclient,inviolationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,andafailuretoexplainamatterto the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informeddecisions, in violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.4(b); themisrepresentationwasfoundtohavebeenknowinglymade,buttherecommendedsuspensionof2yearswasreducedto6months,becausemitigatingcircumstanceswerefoundinthe nature of the attorney providing the Family Court with correspondence,which would have permitted the Family Court and the adverse party anopportunitytoverifythedebt.InreChasanov,869A.2d327(Del.2005).

AttorneyviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.4(c)byfilingwithaFamilyCourtapetitioner’sanswertoarespondent’scounterclaim,onwhichtheattorneyhadsigned the client’s name and had falsely notarized the signature. In rePankowski,947A.2d1122(Del.2007).


Attorney admittedly committed disciplinary violations by failing to complywithcontinuinglegaleducation(CLE)requirements,andbyfailingtorespondtocommunications with the CLE Commission about that deficiency. In rePoverman,80A.3d960(Del.2013).







Attorneyadmittedlycommitteddisciplinaryviolationsbyfalselycertifyingintheannualregistration that therewerenodisciplinarychargespendingbecausethe attorney knew of a continuing legal education deficiency issue and theinvestigationthereof.InrePoverman,80A.3d960(Del.2013).



—Decorumofthetribunal.

Revocation of an attorney’s admission pro hac vice was authorized for hisfailuretocontrolhisclient’sbehaviorduringadeposition.Statev.Mumford,731A.2d831(Del.Super.Ct.1999).

Inanappealtakentothetrialcourtfromalicensingboard,attorney’swrittenarguments suggesting that the trial court would not rule on the merits, anunfoundedaccusation,violatedLawR.Prof.Conduct3.5(d),conductdegradingto a tribunal, and Law R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to theadministrationof justice; the trialcourthad towaste judicial resourcesstrikingthe offending arguments sua sponte and writing an opinion explaining itsactions,andwarrantedapublicreprimandoftheattorney.InreAbbott,925A.2d482 (Del. 2007), cert. denied,—U.S.—, 128 S.Ct. 381, 169L. Ed. 2d 263(2007).

Attorney’scommunicationssentto4differentDeputyAttorneysGeneralsdidnotviolatethisrulebecausetheevidencedidnotclearlyshowthattheletters,asoffensive and inappropriate as they were, had an actual impact on the






administration of justice; the emails, which included crude and sexualizedcomments,wereprivateanddidnotdirectlyburdenthetrialcourtoraffect theoutcomeofpendinglitigation.InreMemebrof theBarof theSupremeCourt:Hurley,183A.3d703(Del.2018).

—Illegalconduct.

Attorney’sconvictionforfelonypossessionofafirearmwasconclusiveofaviolationofsubsection(b).InreFunk,742A.2d851(Del.1999).

Where an attorney was convicted of possession of child pornography andunlawful dealing inmaterial depicting a child engaging in a prohibited sexualact,theseriouscrimesreflectedontheattorney’sfitnessasalawyerinviolationof Del. Law. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(b), and attorney’s misconduct warranteddisbarmentwithoutfurtherproceedings.InreFink,825A.2d238(Del.2003).

StateSupremeCourt approved the state ProfessionalResponsibilityBoard’sreport and found that the attorney’s conduct in getting togetherwith a friend,sellingpaintingstoeachother,makingclaimsagainstacorporationthatacceptedpaymentsfortransactions,andthenpursuingalegalactiontorecovernotonlyamoneybackguarantee,butalsotrebledamagesandattorneyfees,violatedLawProf. ConductR. 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), andwarranted a public reprimand(especiallyinlightoftheattorney’slackofpriordisciplineandremorse).In reGielata,933A.2d1249(Del.2007).

In an attorney disciplinary matter, an attorney was disbarred as a result ofcommitting various felonies (violently physically attacking that attorney’sspouseinfrontoftheirchildren,destructionofevidenceandcontinualviolationofaprotectiveorder)intheStateofMainewhichviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct3.4(a)and(c)and8.4(b),(c),and(d);theSupremeCourtofDelawarerejectedtheattorney’sdefensethattheconductwastheresultof2braininjuries,asthemedicalevidencedidnotaddressmentalstateatthetimeofthecrimesandtherewasnothingintherecordtosuggestthattheattorneyraisedanydefensetothosecrimesbasedontheclaimedinfirmity.InreEnna,971A.2d110(Del.2009).

Attorney’s conduct in connection with a motor vehicle accident was aviolation of Law. Prof. ConductR. 8.4,where the attorney: (1) reported falseinformation(i.e. that theattorneydidnotdrinkprior to theaccident) toa law-enforcement officer relating to an actual offense or incident in violation of 11Del C. § 1245; and (2) ingested alcohol after the incident with the intent tocircumventthepoliceinvestigation.InreDavis,43A.3d856(Del.2012).

Sanction of a public reprimand of attorney was the appropriate where the








attorney violated Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b), (c) and (d); the attorney hadmade a false report to the police in a 9-1-1 call that a hostage situation wastakingplace, inviolationof11Del.C.§1245, inorder toobtainanexpeditedpoliceresponse.InreSchaeffer,45A.3d149(Del.2012).

Attorneywassuspendedfor2yearsunderLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.4(d)wherethe attorney pled guilty to possession of controlled substances and drugparaphernalia (both misdemeanors) with no aggravating factors; there were,however, a number of mitigating factors including political involvement andsubstantialprobonowork.InreNixon,49A.3d1193(Del.2012).

DenialofapetitionfordisciplineagainstanattorneywasproperbecauseLawProf. Conduct R. 8.4(b) implicated only criminal conduct that reflectedadverselyonanattorney’sfitnesstopracticelaw;therewasnosuchcasewheretheoffensive touchingwascommittedby theattorney inanattempt topreventthat attorney’s child from running away from home. In reMichaels, 67 A.3d1023(Del.2013).

BecauseanattorneyknowinglyexecutedDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentsettlementstatementscontainingfalse informationwhichensuredloanfundingbylenders,suchconstitutedacriminalactthatreflectedadverselyontheattorney’shonesty,trustworthiness,orfitnessasalawyerinotherrespectsin violation of the rules of professional conduct. In re Sanclemente, 86 A.3d1119(Del.2014).

AttorneywhoviolatedtheDelawareRulesofProfessionalConduct,aswellas18U.S.C.§1010,bymakingfalsecertificationsinDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment settlement statements (HUD-1 statements) was disbarred;the attorney acted with the intent of facilitating 22 real estate closings thatdefrauded those who relied on the accuracy of the HUD-1 statements. In reSullivan,86A.3d1119(Del.2014).

Court accepted the findings by a panel of the Board on ProfessionalResponsibilitythatanattorney’smisappropriationoflegalfeesconstitutedtheftunder thecriminalcode,whichwasanethicalviolation.InreVanderslice,116A.3d1244(Del.2015).

—Obligationstowardthetribunal.

Whereattorneywhohadpracticed forover20years andwas found tobeagood lawyer committed professional misconduct by failing to appear at ascheduled family court hearing and by failing to reschedule two otherteleconferences in family court, which constituted violations of Del. Law. R.






http://advance.lexis.com/api/document/citation/18%20U.S.C.%201010



Prof.Conduct 3.4(c) and 8.4(d), the public probation period that attorneywasalreadyservingforpriormisconductwasextendedforanadditionalyear.In reSolomon,847A.2d1122(Del.2004).

OfficeofDisciplinaryCounselestablishedbyclearandconvincingevidencethatanattorneyengagedinconductprejudicial to theadministrationof justice,in violation of Law Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(d) where: (1) the attorney wastedjudicial resources in continuing to request to withdraw from appointments asattorney of record; (2) asked the court to put “on the record” and disclose toclientsthefactthattheattorneyshouldnotbeappointed,butthatthecourtwasmakingtheappointmentanyway;(3)causedclientstobelievethattheattorneycouldnot represent themand that theyneededother counsel; and (4) failed toobtainsubstitutecounselor toevencontact the2attorneyswhosenameswereprovided by the court for just that purpose. In reMurray, 47 A.3d 972 (Del.2012).



BasedontheSupremeCourt’sinterpretationofLaw.Prof.ConductR.8.4(d)to mean that although not all crimes are “prejudicial to the administration ofjustice,” crimes involving “violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or seriousinterference with the administration of justice” are categorically Rule 8.4(d)violations;anattorney’s theftconstitutedaviolation thereof. In reVanderslice,55A.3d322(Del.2012).

Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s clientchargedwithmurderandrelatedoffenses,aftertheattorneyretrieveditfromthe






codefendant’s file, violated the codefendant’s attorney-client privilege; thedisclosureconstitutedaviolationoftheprofessionalconductrulesrelatingtotheconfidentiality of information and conduct that was prejudicial to theadministrationofjustice.InreLyle,74A.3d654(Del.2013).

Attorney’s disclosure of a codefendant’s statement to the attorney’s clientchargedwithmurderandrelatedoffenses,aftertheattorneyretrieveditfromthecodefendant’sfile,didnotinvolvedishonesty,fraud,deceitormisrepresentation;despite the attorney’s mere “knowing” conduct, the attorney was trying tozealouslydefendtheclientandhadnointenttoengageindishonestbehavior.InreLyle,74A.3d654(Del.2013).

Where an attorney, in order to benefit a client, knowingly violated theChanceryCourt’sseizureorderenjoiningpersonsfrombringingclaimsrelatingtoaninsurerexceptinthatCourt, therebycausinginjurytotheinsurerandtheInsuranceCommissioner andprejudice to the judicial system, the presumptivesanctionofsuspensionwasneverthelessreducedtopublicreprimand;mitigatingfactorsoutweighed the aggravating factors in the case. In reBrown,103A.3d515(Del.2014).

OfficeofDisciplinaryCounselprovedbyclearandconvincingevidencethatan attorney committed professional conduct violations by knowingly causingimagesfromasexualabusevictim’scellphonetobeshowntoboththevictim’sparentanddefendant inviolationofaprotectiveorder. In reKoyste,111A.3d581(Del.2015).

Thirty-day suspensionof adeputy attorneygeneralwas appropriatebecausethe attorney’s conduct, cajoling a bailiff to enter a room in a courthousebrandishing a firearm as an ill-conceived prank, involved breaches of dutiesowedtothelegalsystemandtothelegalprofession.InreGelof,142A.3d506(Del.2016).

Board on Professional Responsibility erred in finding that the attorney’sadmitted violation of the terms of private probation did not also constitute aviolationoftheruleofprofessionalmisconductwithrespecttoobligationstothetribunal; therewas clear and convincing evidence that the attorney’s violationthereofwasprejudicial to theadministrationof justice. In reWoods,143A.3d1223(Del.2016).

Sanctions.

—Disbarment.







Lawyerwasdisbarredforthemisappropriationofclientfundsforthelawyer’spersonaluse,andthefailuretoestablishaseparateaccountfortheproceedsofthe sale of a client’s house, despite evidence of the lawyer’s personal andemotionalproblems.InreCarey,809A.2d563(Del.2002).

Attorney was disbarred for knowingly violating the terms of a priorsuspensionby failing to turn all files over to an activemember of the bar, byfailing to notify all parties of attorney’s suspension, and by paying attorney’sfeesfromestatesduringthesuspension;thatmisconductcausedpotentialinjurytotheestatebeneficiaries.InreMcCann,894A.2d1087(Del.2005).

Attorneywasdisbarredinpartbecauseoffailureto:(1)maintainproperbooksandrecordsrelatingtoclientfunds,butfalselycertifiedcompliancefor3years;(2) timely file and pay federal and state payroll taxes, but falsely certifiedcompliancefor6years;and(3)paypersonalstateandfederalincometaxes.InreMcCann,894A.2d1087(Del.2005).

Becausetherewasevidencetosupport thefindingthatasuspendedattorneyknowingly practiced law multiple times over more than 1 year during adisciplinary suspension, the lawyer violated multiple disciplinary rules; theappropriatesanctioninthecircumstanceswasdisbarment.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourtofDel.Feuerhake,89A.3d1058(Del.2014).


—Disciplinaryproceedings.

Nostatuteoflimitationappliestoaprofessionaldisciplinaryproceedingand,therefore,nobasisexistsinsuchproceedingstoasserttheaffirmativedefenseoflaches.InreTenenbaum,918A.2d1109(Del.2007).

—Dismissalofclaim.

Becausetheintegrityoftheproceedingsandthecourt’struth-findingfunctioninvolvingcompanymanagementdisputesbetweenthepartieswasthreatenedbyplaintiffs’actions,basedontheirpaymentstowitnessesinexchangeforcertaintestimony, threats against witnesses and threats of civil litigation on baselessclaims, their conspiracy claims were dismissed against all defendants; certain







adverseinferenceswerealsodrawnastootherclaims.OptimisCorpv.Waite,—A.3d—,2015Del.Ch.LEXIS222(Del.Ch.Aug.26,2015).

—Reprimand.

Whenan attorneyhandling2 estatesviolatedLaw.R.Prof.Conduct 8.4(d),because the attorney had aggravating factors of a prior private admonition,multiple counts, and substantial legal experience, and mitigating factors ofremorse and lack of dishonestmotive, the attorneywas publicly reprimanded,prevented from representing a personal representative or serving as 1, andrequiredtocooperateandpaycosts.InreWilson,886A.2d1279(Del.2005).

Theappropriatesanctionwasapublicreprimandand1yearprobationperiodwhere: (1) an attorneyviolated the conditionsof a previously imposedprivateadmonition by failing to provide a required precertification and not promptlypayingvariouspayrolltaxes;(2)theattorneyadmittedtoviolatingLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c)andLawProf.ConductR.1.15(b),1.15(d),5.3,8.4(c),and8.4(d);(3)theattorney’sviolationswerenot isolated incidentsbutwere repeatviolations; (4)the attorney failed to adequately supervise a nonlawyer assistant to assure anaccurate accounting of the firm’s books and records; and (5) the attorneydisregardedtheconditionsimposedontheprivateadmonition.InreMartin,35A.3d419(Del.2011).

Attorneywho committed various disciplinary violations with respect to thefailure to complete continuing legal education requirements and reportingobligationsrelatingtheretowaspubliclyreprimandedwithconditions,because:(1) the attorney actedknowingly andhadno remorse; (2) the attorneydidnotcause injury to a client; and (3) the aggravating factors outweighed themitigatingones.InrePoverman,80A.3d960(Del.2013).

Attorney who had knowingly violated a protective order was properlysanctioned to public reprimand because the misconduct was serious, causedpotentialinjurytothevulnerableteenagevictimandcausedactualinjurytothelegalsystem.InreKoyste,111A.3d581(Del.2015).

Attorney committed professional misconduct by failing to comply with theconditions of private probation, by failing to maintain the firm’s books andrecords properly, and by filing false certifications with respect to compliancewiththatobligation;publicreprimandandprobationfor3yearswithconditionswereimposedupontheattorney’simmediatereinstatementtothepracticeoflaw.InreWoods,143A.3d1223(Del.2016).

When respondent violated Law. Prof. Conduct R. 1.5(f), 1.15(a) and (d),






8.4(c)and(d)byfailingtoproperlymaintainlawfirm’sbooksandrecordsfor3consecutiveyears,filinginaccuratecertificatesofcompliancefor3consecutiveyears,andfailingtogiveflatfeeclientspropernoticethatthefeewasrefundableif not earned, a public reprimand with a 2-year period of probation wasappropriate; this was true, even considering the mitigating factors, given alawyer’s obligation to maintain orderly books and records. In re Castro, 160A.3d1134(Del.2017).


Attorney was publicly reprimanded with a 2-year probation, subject toconditions; the attorney acted with “wilfulness” and did not comply with 3conditions of a prior disciplinary sanction by failing to inform the firm’ssupervisingattorneyoftheconditionsoftheattorney’sreinstatement,includingtheneed for apracticemonitor. In reGrandell,—A.3d—,2018Del.LEXIS309(Del.June29,2018).

—Suspension.

Wherealawyerengagedinapatternofknowingmisconductoveraperiodofseveralyearsbycomminglingclientfunds,failingtomaintainthelawyer’slawpractice accounts, failing to pay taxes, falsely representing on certificates ofcompliancethatthelawyercompliedwiththerecord-keepingrequirementsandpaid taxes, the lawyerviolatedDel.Law.R.Prof.Conduct1.5(f),1.15(a), (b),(d), 8.4(b), (c), (d); as a result, the lawyer was suspended for 3 years. In reGarrett,835A.2d514(Del.2003).

Attorney, who was on probation for previous violations of the Rules ofProfessionalConductandwhoviolatedLaw.Prof.ConductR.1.1,1.2(a),1.4(a),1.15(a),8.1,8.1(b),8.4(c),and8.4(d),andLaw.Disc.P.R.7(c),wassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawinDelawarefor3yearsaftertheBoardonProfessionalResponsibility found that theattorney’sproblemsappeared tobegettingworseand included: co-mingling client trust funds; inadequate bookkeeping and




safeguarding of client funds; inadequate maintenance of books and records;knowingly making false statements of material fact to the ODC; falserepresentations in Certificates of Compliance for 3 years; and failure to filecorporatetaxreturnsfor3years.InreBecker,947A.2d1120(Del.2008).

Attorneywhosemisconductinvolvedfalsenotarizations,failuretosafeguardfiduciary funds, failure to pay taxes on real estate transactions, and othermisrepresentationscommittedviolationsLaw.R.Prof.Conduct1.15(a),(b),and8.4(a), (c), and (d); based on knowing, rather than negligent, conduct incommittingtheviolations,a1-yearsuspensionaswellasapublicreprimandandpermanentpracticerestrictionsweredeemedappropriatesanctionstoimpose.InreMemberoftheBaroftheSupremeCourt,974A.2d170(Del.2009).



Basedonanexperiencedattorney’smisappropriationonmultipleoccasionsofclients’ funds and the attorney’s use of a deficient retainer agreement, whichconstituted a violation of Law. Prof. Conduct R. 8.4(b) and (d) as well asviolations of other disciplinary rules, a suspension of 1 year was deemedappropriate; in the circumstances, a public reprimand was too lenient. In reVanderslice,55A.3d322(Del.2012).

Lawyerwassuspendedfor21months,retroactivetothedateoftheattorney’stransfer to disability inactive status, for violating this rule after the attorneyinjuredanotherdriverasaresultofDUI; theattorneydemonstratedaggressive






and consistent rehabilitation since the accident, implementing the appropriateandnecessarylifechangesandcounselingtomaintainsobrietyforover1year.InreCairns,132A.3d1160(Del.2016).







Rule8.5.Disciplinaryauthority;choiceoflaw.

(a)DisciplinaryAuthority.Alawyeradmittedtopracticeinthisjurisdictionissubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdiction,regardlessofwherethelawyer’sconductoccurs.Alawyernotadmittedinthisjurisdictionisalsosubjecttothedisciplinaryauthorityofthisjurisdictionifthelawyerprovidesorofferstoprovide any legal services in this jurisdiction.A lawyermaybe subject to thedisciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for thesameconduct.

(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of thisjurisdiction,therulesofprofessionalconducttobeappliedshallbeasfollows:

(1)forconductinconnectionwithamatterpendingbeforeatribunal,therulesof the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunalprovideotherwise;and

(2) foranyotherconduct, the rulesof the jurisdiction inwhich the lawyer’sconduct occurred, or, if thepredominant effect of the conduct is in a differentjurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. Alawyershallnotbesubjecttodisciplineifthelawyer’sconductconformstotherulesofajurisdictioninwhichthelawyerreasonablybelievesthepredominanteffectofthelawyer’sconductwilloccur.

COMMENT

[1]Disciplinary Authority. — It is longstanding law that the conduct of alawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinaryauthority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of thisjurisdictiontootherlawyerswhoprovideoroffertoprovidelegalservicesinthisjurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction.Reciprocalenforcement of a jurisdiction’s disciplinary findings and sanctionswill furtheradvancethepurposesof thisRule.See,Rules6and22,ABAModelRulesforLawyerDisciplinaryEnforcement.A lawyerwho is subject to thedisciplinaryauthority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to bedesignated by thisCourt to receive service of process in this jurisdiction.Thefact that the lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdictionmay be a factor in determiningwhether personal jurisdictionmay be assertedoverthelawyerforcivilmatters.

[2]ChoiceofLaw.—Alawyermaybepotentiallysubjecttomorethanoneset of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. Thelawyermaybelicensedtopracticeinmorethanonejurisdictionwithdifferingrules, ormay be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules thatdiffer from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer islicensedtopractice.Additionally, thelawyer’sconductmayinvolvesignificantcontactswithmorethanonejurisdiction.

[3]Paragraph(b)seekstoresolvesuchpotentialconflicts.Itspremiseisthatminimizingconflictsbetweenrules,aswellasuncertaintyaboutwhichrulesareapplicable,isinthebestinterestofbothclientsandtheprofession(aswellasthebodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes theapproachof(i)providingthatanyparticularconductofalawyershallbesubjecttoonlyonesetofrulesofprofessionalconduct,(ii)makingthedeterminationofwhich set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible,consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevantjurisdictions,and(iii)providingprotectionfromdisciplinefor lawyerswhoactreasonablyinthefaceofuncertainty.

[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer’s conduct relating to aproceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer shall be subject only to therulesofthejurisdictioninwhichthetribunalsitsunlesstherulesofthetribunal,including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct,including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before atribunal,paragraph(b)(2)providesthatalawyershallbesubjecttotherulesofthe jurisdiction inwhich the lawyer’sconductoccurred,or, if thepredominanteffectoftheconductisinanotherjurisdiction,therulesofthatjurisdictionshallbeappliedtotheconduct.Inthecaseofconductinanticipationofaproceedingthat is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conductcould be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in anotherjurisdiction.

[5]Whenalawyer’sconductinvolvessignificantcontactswithmorethanonejurisdiction,itmaynotbeclearwhetherthepredominanteffectofthelawyer’sconduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conductoccurred.Solongasthelawyer’sconductconformstotherulesofajurisdictioninwhich the lawyer reasonablybelieves thepredominanteffectwilloccur, thelawyershallnotbesubjecttodisciplineunderthisRule.

[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for thesameconduct,theyshould,applyingthisrule,identifythesamegoverningethics

rules.Theyshouldtakeallappropriatestepstoseethattheydoapplythesamerule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against alawyeronthebasisoftwoinconsistentrules.

[7]The choiceof lawprovision applies to lawyers engaged in transnationalpractice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements betweencompetentregulatoryauthoritiesintheaffectedjurisdictionsprovideotherwise.Withrespecttoconflictsofinterest,indeterminingalawyer’sreasonablebeliefunderparagraph(b)(2),awrittenagreementbetweenthelawyerandclient thatreasonablyspecifiesaparticularjurisdictioniswithinthescopeofthatparagraphmay be considered if the agreement was obtained with the client’s informedconsentconfirmedintheagreement.

__________

NOTESTODECISIONS

In-statepractice.

Attorney’sregularrepresentationofDelawareclientsconstitutedthepracticeoflaw“inDelaware”underLaw.R.Prof.Conduct8.5as,forseveralyears,theattorney: (1) accepted new clients who were Delaware residents, involved inDelaware car accidents, and seeking recovery under Delaware insurancepolicies;(2)dideverythingshortofappearinginDelawarecourts;(3)engagedDelaware attorneys as co-counsel only if the attorney could not resolve thematter without litigation; and (4) was physically present in Delaware,representing theattorney’sDelawareclients,on3occasions. In reTonwe,929A.2d774(Del.2007).

Safeharborprovision.

Where attorney’s regular representation of Delaware clients constituted thepractice of law “in Delaware,” the safe harbor provision of Law. R. Prof.Conduct8.5(b)wasunavailableaseveniftheattorneyharboredabeliefthattherepresentationwasinPennsylvania,theattorneyknowinglyviolatedaceaseandconsentorderprohibitingsuchconduct;theattorneywasdisbarred.InreTonwe,929A.2d774(Del.2007).



FORMS

For court forms associated with this rule set, see:http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/.

INDEXTOTHEDELAWARELAWYERS’RULESOFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT

__________

A

ACCOUNTS.Safekeepingclient’sproperty,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

ACTIONONBEHALFOFCLIENT.Impliedauthority,ProfCondRule1.2.

ADMINISTRATIVEAGENCY.Representingclientbefore,ProfCondRule3.9.

ADMISSIONTOBAR.Falsestatementsorfailuretodisclose,ProfCondRule8.1.

ADVANCEPAYMENTOFFEE,ProfCondRule1.5.

ADVERTISING,ProfCondRule7.2.False or misleading communications or misrepresentations concerningservices,ProfCondRule7.1.

Fieldsofpracticeandspecialization,ProfCondRule7.4.

ADVISOR.Actingaswhenrepresentingclient,ProfCondRule2.1.

ADVOCATEINNONADJUDICATIVEPROCEEDING,ProfCondRule3.9.

ADVOCATE-WITNESSRULE,ProfCondRule3.7.

AGGREGATEAGREEMENTS.Representingtwoormoreclient,ProfCondRule1.8.

AGREEMENT RESTRICTING RIGHT TO PRACTICE, ProfCond Rule5.6.

ALIMONY.

Contingentfeearrangements,restrictions,ProfCondRule1.5.

ALTERINGORCONCEALINGDOCUMENT,ProfCondRule3.4.

APPOINTMENT BY TRIBUNAL TO REPRESENT PERSON, ProfCondRule6.2.

ARBITRATORS.Conflicts.Formerarbitrator,ProfCondRule1.12.

Lawyerservingasthirdpartyneutral,ProfCondRule2.4.

ATTORNEYBUSINESSACCOUNT.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.Itemsspecificallydesignatedas,ProfCondRule1.15.

ATTORNEYOPERATINGACCOUNT.Itemsspecificallydesignatedas,ProfCondRule1.15.

B

BARADMISSION.Falsestatementsorfailuretodisclose,ProfCondRule8.1.

BELIEFORBELIEVES.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

BUSINESSTRANSACTIONSWITHCLIENT.Conflictofinterest,ProfCondRule1.8.

C

CAMPAIGNCONTRIBUTIONS.Obtaininggovernmentlegalengagementorappointmentbyjudge,ProfCondRule7.6.

CANDIDADVICE.Renderingwhenrepresentingclient,ProfCondRule2.1.

CANDIDATESFORELECTIVEOFFICE.Falsestatementabout,ProfCondRule8.2.

CANDORTOWARDTRIBUNAL,ProfCondRule3.3.

CHARITABLEGROUPSORORGANIZATIONS.Probonopublicservice,ProfCondRule6.1.

CHOICEOFLAW.Disciplinaryauthority,ProfCondRule8.5.

CLIENT’SDECISIONS.Lawyertoabideby,ProfCondRule1.2.

CLIENTWITHDIMINISHEDCAPACITY,ProfCondRule1.14.

CODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT.Lawyercandidateforjudicialoffice,compliancewith,ProfCondRule8.2.

COMMUNICATIONCONCERNINGSERVICES,ProfCondRule7.1.Advertising,ProfCondRule7.2.Fieldsofpracticeandspecialization,ProfCondRule7.4.Live telephone or real-time electronic contact soliciting employment,ProfCondRule7.3.

COMMUNICATIONSWITHCLIENT,ProfCondRule1.4.Feesandexpenses,ProfCondRule1.5.

COMMUNICATIONWITHJURORS,ProfCondRule3.5.

COMMUNICATIONWITHPERSONORFAMILYMEMBERS,ProfCondRule3.5.

COMMUNICATIONWITHPERSONSREPRESENTEDBYCOUNSEL,ProfCondRule4.2.

COMPETENTREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.1.

CONCURRENTCONFLICTOFINTEREST,ProfCondRule1.7.

CONFIDENTIALINFORMATION,ProfCondRule1.6.Governmentinformation.Acquiredbylawyerwhilepublicofficeroremployee,ProfCondRule1.11.

Saleofpractice,ProfCondRule1.17.

CONFIRMEDINWRITING.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

CONFLICTOFINTEREST.Concurrentconflict,ProfCondRule1.7.Dutiestoformerclients,ProfCondRule1.9.Formergovernmentofficersandemployees,ProfCondRule1.11.Former judge,arbitrator,mediatororother thirdpartyneutral,ProfCondRule1.12.

Imputation,ProfCondRule1.10.Lawyeraswitness,ProfCondRule3.7.Prospectiveclients,ProfCondRule1.18.Specificrules,ProfCondRule1.8.

CONSENT.Informedconsent.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

CONSULTATIONWITHCLIENT,ProfCondRule1.2.

CONTINGENTFEES,ProfCondRule1.5.

CONTRIBUTIONSTOCANDIDATES.Obtaininggovernmentlegalengagementorappointmentbyjudge,ProfCondRule7.6.

COURT-ANNEXEDLIMITEDLEGALSERVICEPROGRAMS,ProfCondRule6.5.

COURTAPPOINTMENTTOREPRESENTPERSON,ProfCondRule6.2.

CRIMINALCASES.Aggregateagreementastopleas.Representingtwoormoreclients,ProfCondRule1.8.

Pleatoenter.Abidingbyclient’sdecision,ProfCondRule1.2.

Prosecutors,specialresponsibilitiesof,ProfCondRule3.8.

CRIMINALCONDUCT.Clientengagingin,remedialmeasures,ProfCondRule3.3.Lawyernottocounselclientorassistclient,ProfCondRule1.2.

D

DEALINGWITHUNREPRESENTEDPERSONS,ProfCondRule4.3.

DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION, ProfCond Rule1.16.

DEFINITIONS,ProfCondRule1.0.

DELAWAREBARFOUNDATION.Availabilityoffundstransferredto,ProfCondRule1.15.

DILATORYPRACTICE.Lawyertomakereasonableeffortstoexpeditelitigation,ProfCondRule3.2.

DILIGENCEINREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.3.

DIMINISHEDCAPACITYOFCLIENT,ProfCondRule1.14.

DISCIPLINARYAUTHORITYOFTHISJURISDICTION.Choiceoflaw,ProfCondRule8.5.Lawyeradmittedtopracticesubjectto,ProfCondRule8.5.

DISCIPLINARYMATTER.Falsestatementsorfailuretodisclose,ProfCondRule8.1.

DISCLOSUREOFINFORMATION,ProfCondRule1.6.

DISCOVERY.Frivolousrequest,failuretocomply,ProfCondRule3.4.

DISQUALIFICATION.Imputationofconflict,ProfCondRule1.10.Lawyeraswitness,ProfCondRule3.7.Lawyerformerlyservingaspublicofficeroremployee,ProfCondRule1.11.Representingprospectiveclient,ProfCondRule1.18.

DISSOLUTIONOFLAWFIRM,ProfCondRule1.17A.

DIVIDEND-BEARINGACCOUNTS.Placingclient’sfundsin,ProfCondRule1.15.

DIVISIONOFFEES,ProfCondRule1.5.

Sharingfeeswithnonlawyer,ProfCondRule5.4.

DIVORCE.Contingentfeearrangements,restrictions,ProfCondRule1.5.

DOMESTICRELATIONSMATTERS.Contingentfeearrangements,restrictions,ProfCondRule1.5.

DUTIESTOFORMERCLIENTS,ProfCondRule1.9.

E

ELECTRONICSOLICITATIONSOFEMPLOYMENT,ProfCondRule7.3.

EMBARRASSINGTHIRDPERSONS.Usingmeans,ProfCondRule4.4.

EMPLOYMENTAGREEMENTRESTRICTINGRIGHTTOPRACTICE,ProfCondRule5.6.

ENDORSEMENTOFCLIENTSVIEWSORACTIVITIES.Representationdoesnotconstitute,ProfCondRule1.2.

ESCROWACCOUNT.Itemsspecificallydesignatedas,ProfCondRule1.15.

EVALUATIONOFMATTER.Usebythirdparty,ProfCondRule2.3.

EVIDENCE.Offeringfalseevidence,ProfCondRules3.3,3.4.Prosecutors.Exculpatoryevidence,responsibilitiesasto,ProfCondRule3.8.

EXAMINATION OF FINANCIAL BOOKS AND RECORDS, ProfCondRule1.15.

EXPARTEPROCEEDINGS.Dutytoinformtribunal,ProfCondRule3.3.

EXPEDITINGLITIGATION.Lawyertomakereasonableefforts,ProfCondRule3.2.

EXPLANATIONOFMATTERSTOCLIENT,ProfCondRule1.4.

EXTRAJUDICIALSTATEMENTS,ProfCondRule3.6.

F

FAIRNESSTOOPPOSINGPARTYANDCOUNSEL,ProfCondRule3.4.

FALSEEVIDENCE,OFFERING,ProfCondRules3.3,3.4.

FALSESTATEMENTS.Aboutjudicialorlegalofficials,ProfCondRule8.2.Admissiontobarordisciplinarymatter,ProfCondRule8.1.Concerningservices,ProfCondRule7.1.Tothirdparties,ProfCondRule4.1.Totribunal,ProfCondRule3.3.

FEESANDEXPENSES,ProfCondRule1.5.Acceptingcompensationfromoneotherthanclient,ProfCondRule1.8.Sharingfeeswithnonlawyer,ProfCondRule5.4.

FEESPLITTING.Divisionoffeesbetweenlawyers,ProfCondRule1.5.Sharingfeeswithnonlawyer,ProfCondRule5.4.

FIDUCIARYACCOUNTS.Lawyer’sduties,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

FIELDSOFPRACTICE.Communications,ProfCondRule7.4.

FINANCIALASSISTANCETOCLIENT.Conflictofinterest,ProfCondRule1.8.

FINANCIALBOOKSANDRECORDS.Lawyertomaintain,preservation,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

FIRMDEFINED,ProfCondRule1.0.

FIRMNAMEANDLETTERHEADS,ProfCondRule7.5.

FOREIGNLAWYERS.

Practiceinthisjurisdiction,ProfCondRule5.5.

FORMERCLIENTS.Dutiesto,ProfCondRule1.9.

FORMERGOVERNMENTOFFICERSOREMPLOYEE.Conflicts,ProfCondRule1.11.

FORMERJUDGE,ARBITRATOR,MEDIATOR.Conflicts,ProfCondRule1.12.

FRAUD.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

FRAUDULENTCONDUCT.Clientengagingin,remedialmeasures,ProfCondRule3.3.Lawyernottocounselclientorassistclient,ProfCondRule1.2.

FRIVOLOUSCLAIMSANDCONTENTIONS,ProfCondRule3.1.

FRIVOLOUSDISCOVERYREQUESTS,ProfCondRule3.4.

G

GIFTFROMCLIENT.Soliciting,conflictofinterest,ProfCondRule1.8.

GOODFUNDS,ProfCondRule1.15.

GOVERNMENTOFFICERSOREMPLOYEES.Conflicts,lawyerformerlyservingas,ProfCondRule1.11.Nameoflawyerholdingoffice.Useinnameoffirmorcommunication,ProfCondRule7.5.

I

IMPARTIALITYANDDECORUMOFTRIBUNAL,ProfCondRule3.5.

IMPLIEDAUTHORITY.Actiononbehalfofclient,ProfCondRule1.2.

IMPUTATIONOFCONFLICT,ProfCondRule1.10.

INADVERTENTLYSENTDOCUMENTS,ProfCondRule4.4.

INDEPENDENTPROFESSIONALJUDGMENT.Exercisingwhenrepresentingclient,ProfCondRule2.1.

INFLUENCINGJUDGEORJUROR,ProfCondRule3.5.

INFORMEDCONSENT.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

INTERESTADVERSETOCLIENT.Acquiring,conflictofinterest,ProfCondRule1.8.

INTEREST-BEARINGDEPOSITORYACCOUNT.Placingclient’sfundsin,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

IOLTAACCOUNTS,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

J

JUDGES.Conflicts.Formerjudges,ProfCondRule1.12.

Falsestatementabout,ProfCondRule8.2.

K

KNOWINGLY.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

KNOWLEDGEANDSKILL.Competentrepresentation,ProfCondRule1.1.

L

LAWFIRM.Actingatdirectionofanother,ProfCondRule5.2.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.Name,letterheadorotherprofessionaldesignation,ProfCondRule7.5.Nonlawyerassistants,responsibilitiesfor,ProfCondRule5.3.Otherperson’sviolation,responsibilityfor,ProfCondRule5.1.Nonlawyerassistant’sviolation,ProfCondRule5.3.

Partner,managerandsupervisorylawyer.Responsibilities,ProfCondRule5.1.Nonlawyerassistants,ProfCondRule5.3.

Professionalindependenceoflawyer,ProfCondRule5.4.Sharingfeeswithnonlawyer,ProfCondRule5.4.Subordinatelawyer,responsibilities,ProfCondRule5.2.

LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT’S INTEREST,ProfCondRule6.4.

LAWRELATEDSERVICES.Responsibilities,ProfCondRule5.7.

LEGALKNOWLEDGEANDSKILL.Competentrepresentation,ProfCondRule1.1.

LEGALSERVICESORGANIZATION.Membership,ProfCondRule6.3.

LEGISLATIVEBODY.Representingclientbefore,ProfCondRule3.9.

LETTERHEADS,ProfCondRule7.5.

LIMITINGLIABILITY.Agreement,restriction,ProfCondRule1.8.

LIMITINGSCOPEOFREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.2.

LITERARYORMEDIARIGHTS.Acquiring,conflictofinterest,ProfCondRule1.8.

M

MALPRACTICE.Agreementlimitingliability,restriction,ProfCondRule1.8.

MEDIATORS.Conflicts.Lawyerformerlyservingas,ProfCondRule1.12.

Lawyerservingasthirdpartyneutral,ProfCondRule2.4.

MENTALIMPAIRMENT.Representingclientwithdiminishedcapacity,ProfCondRule1.14.

MERITORIOUSCLAIMSANDCONTENTIONS,ProfCondRule3.1.

MINORS.Representingclientwithdiminishedcapacity,ProfCondRule1.14.

MISCONDUCT,ProfCondRule8.4.Reporting,ProfCondRule8.3.

MISREPRESENTATIONCONCERNINGSERVICES,ProfCondRule7.1.

MULTIJURISDICTIONALPRACTICE,ProfCondRule5.5.

N

NAMES.Firmnameandletterheads,ProfCondRule7.5.

NON-PROFITLEGALSERVICEPROGRAMS,ProfCondRule6.5.

NONRESIDENTLAWYERS.Practiceinthisjurisdiction,ProfCondRule5.5.

O

OBSTRUCTINGACCESSTOEVIDENCE,ProfCondRule3.4.

ORGANIZATIONASCLIENT,ProfCondRule1.13.

OVERDRAFTNOTIFICATIONAGREEMENT,ProfCondRule1.15A.

P

PARTNER.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

PARTNERSHIPWITHNONLAWYER.Forming,ProfCondRule5.4.

PERJURY.Offeringfalseevidence,ProfCondRules3.3,3.4.

PERSONSREPRESENTEDBYCOUNSEL.Communicationwith,ProfCondRule4.2.

PLEAINCRIMINALCASE.Abidingbyclient’sdecision,ProfCondRule1.2.

POLITICALCONTRIBUTIONS.Obtaininggovernmentlegalengagementorappointmentbyjudge,ProfCondRule7.6.

POOLEDTRUST/ESCROWACCOUNTS.Compliancerequirements,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

PROBONOPUBLICSERVICE,ProfCondRule6.1.

PROFESSIONALCORPORATIONSORASSOCIATION.Practicewith,ProfCondRule5.4.

PROHACVICEADMISSION.Practiceinthisjurisdiction,ProfCondRule5.5.

PROMPTNESSINREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.3.

PROPERTYOFCLIENT.Safekeeping,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

PROPERTYSETTLEMENTS.Contingentfeearrangements,restrictions,ProfCondRule1.5.

PROPRIETARYINTERESTINACTION.Acquiring,restriction,ProfCondRule1.8.

PROSECUTORS.Specialresponsibilities,ProfCondRule3.8.

PROSPECTIVECLIENTS.Directcontactwith,ProfCondRule7.3.Dutiesto,ProfCondRule1.18.

PUBLICINTERESTLEGALSERVICE,ProfCondRule6.1.

PUBLICITY,ProfCondRule3.6.

PUBLICOFFICERSOREMPLOYEES.Conflicts,lawyerformerlyservingas,ProfCondRule1.11.Nameoflawyerholdingoffice.Useinnameoffirmorcommunication,ProfCondRule7.5.

R

REASONABLE.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

REASONABLEBELIEF.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

REASONABLEFEESANDEXPENSES,ProfCondRule1.5.

REASONABLYSHOULDKNOW.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

RECOMMENDINGLAWYERSSERVICES,ProfCondRule7.2.

REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT’S INTEREST, ProfCondRule6.4.

REPORTINGPROFESSIONALMISCONDUCT,ProfCondRule8.3.

RESPECTFORRIGHTSOFTHIRDPERSONS,ProfCondRule4.4.

RESTRICTIONSONRIGHTTOPRACTICE.Enteringintoagreement,ProfCondRule5.6.

S

SAFEKEEPINGPROPERTY,ProfCondRule1.15.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.

SALEOFPRACTICE,ProfCondRule1.17.

SCOPEOFREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.2.

SCREENED.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

SETTLEMENTS.Aggregatesettlements.Representingtwoormoreclient,ProfCondRule1.8.

Client’sdecision,abidingby,ProfCondRule1.2.

SEXUALRELATIONSWITHCLIENT.Restriction,ProfCondRule1.8.

SHORT-TERMLIMITEDLEGALSERVICES,ProfCondRule6.5.

SOLICITINGPROFESSIONALEMPLOYMENT.Livetelephoneorreal-timeelectroniccontact,ProfCondRule7.3.

SPECIALIZATION.Communications,ProfCondRule7.4.

SPLITTINGFEE.Divisionoffeesbetweenlawyers,ProfCondRule1.5.Sharingfeeswithnonlawyer,ProfCondRule5.4.

SUBSTANTIAL.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

SUPPORT.Contingentfeearrangements,restrictions,ProfCondRule1.5.

T

TELEPHONESOLICITATIONSOFEMPLOYMENT,ProfCondRule7.3.

TERMINATINGREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.16.

TERMINOLOGY,ProfCondRule1.0.

TESTIMONYBYCLIENT.Abidingbyclient’sdecisiontotestify,ProfCondRule1.2.

THIRDPARTYNEUTRALS.Conflicts.Lawyerformerlyservingas,ProfCondRule1.12.

Lawyerservingas,ProfCondRule2.4.

THOROUGHNESSANDPREPARATION.Competentrepresentation,ProfCondRule1.1.

TRIALPUBLICITY,ProfCondRule3.6.

TRIBUNAL.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.

TRUSTACCOUNT.Dissolutionoflawfirm,arrangementsupon,ProfCondRule1.17A.Itemsspecificallydesignatedas,ProfCondRule1.15.

TRUSTACCOUNTOVERDRAFTNOTIFICATION,ProfCondRule1.15A.

TRUTHFULNESSINSTATEMENTSTOOTHERS,ProfCondRule4.1.

U

UNAUTHORIZEDPRACTICEOFLAW.Multijurisdictionalpractice,ProfCondRule5.5.

UNREASONABLEFEESANDEXPENSES.Prohibition,ProfCondRule1.5.

UNREPRESENTEDPERSONS.Dealingwith,ProfCondRule4.3.

V

VIOLATIONSOFRULES,ProfCondRule8.4.Reporting,ProfCondRule8.3.

VOLUNTARYPROBONOPUBLICSERVICE,ProfCondRule6.1.

W

WAIVEROFJURYTRIAL.Abidingbyclient’sdecision,ProfCondRule1.2.

WITHDRAWALFROMREPRESENTATION,ProfCondRule1.16.

WITNESSES,LAWYERAS,ProfCondRule3.7.

WRITING.Defined,ProfCondRule1.0.