The Democracy of Risk

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Organization & Environment

DOI: 10.1177/108602669200600401 1992; 6; 259 Organization Environment

Richard P. Hiskes The democracy of risk

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259

The democracy of risk

Richard P. HiskesUniversity of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

Correspondence to: R.P. Hiskes, University of Connecticut, Department of Political Science, U-24 Room 137, 341 Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT 06269-1024, USA.

Abstract .

Hiskes, R.P., 1992. The democracy of risk. Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 6: 259-278.

As liberal democracies are forced to make ever more political decisions con-cerning the distribution of technological risk, the theory of democracy itself isevolving away from traditional liberal definitions of authority, equity, and self-interest. This essay argues that the environment of risk in which liberal demo-cracies find themselves is one of great import for the definition of democracy.Risk and democracy share certain conceptual similarities as well as similar def-initional difficulties. Therefore, successful policies for determining the accept-ability and fair distribution of risk in society will necessitate a reconceptuali-zation of democracy and its constituent ideas along more communitarian andparticipatory lines.

Introduction

Democracy has always been something of a risky business. With its insistenceon individual choice and autonomy, democratic society both relies on and mustendure constant redefinition by its citizens. Debate over the meaning of de-mocracy is itself part of the democratic process, as the newly created democra-cies of Eastern Europe are discovering. At the same time, these debates them-selves present risks always beneficial to the democratic spirit. Because the term&dquo;democracy&dquo; has come in the past 50 years to be associated with ideas of good



260

or beneficial politics, contests over the &dquo;true&dquo; meaning of democracy involvethe competition of different visions of what society should be like.The definition of acceptable risk has always been something of a democratic

business. This in spite of the fact that modem technological democracies havebecome populated with elite experts known as risk analysts and arcane meas-ures known as risk/benefit calculi. Experts and their programs like these hauntdemocratic governments today, yet often what risk is and how much of it isacceptable in life remain issues defined by citizens who must live with risk’sconsequences.

Citizens claim authority to determine the acceptability of risks in a varietyof issues ranging from national defense to siting disputes, the latter evidencedin controversies surrounding everything from radioactive waste treatment fa-cilities to shopping malls. This claim is the product of incentives ranging fromnarrow self-interest to uninformed fear of future risks and damage, and it per-vades American politics at all levels. Like that of democracy, the definition ofacceptable risk is currently an integral part of democratic politics. In fact, thispaper will argue that disputes about the acceptance of risk on the part of indi-viduals and communities constitute what Hanson calls an &dquo;essential contest&dquo;of democracy, requiring an effort &dquo;by those communities to resolve somethingthat is problematic, but which must be settled, at least provisionally, in orderfor politics to proceed&dquo; (Hanson, 1985, p. 26).

If, as Hanson argues, democracy is constantly in a state of definition - andsurely the recent growth in the number of books in democratic theory bear thisout on one level - then it is not surprising that issues concerning risk engagecitizens and communities in discussions of what type of democratic societythey want. For as Douglas and Wildavsky ( 1982 ) state, &dquo; [ W ] e choose the risksin the same package as we choose our social institutions.&dquo; Societies that choosedemocratic institutions have already accepted some risk, but as technology in-troduces new risks into social life, issues arising from that technology focusboth on new risks and institutions needed to cope with them. Thus, risk anddemocracy have always been in close affinity, and this is particularly true insuch liberal democracies as the United States, where capitalism places positivevalue both on the acceptance of risk and on the personal freedom that demo-cratic institutions embody.

In this paper I want to explore the uneasy relationship between attitudes to-ward risk and beliefs about the nature of democracy. This relationship is oftenfilled with paradox and seeming contradiction for citizens of liberal democra-cies. Faced with new risks arising from technological advance, citizens com-monly look to political institutions to protect them through regulation, licen-sing, or other forms of control. Yet at the same time risk situations like sitingdisputes also exhibit large scale distrust of institutions, and a subsequent de-



261

mand in the name of democracy for more citizen participation in the decisionmaking process. But if decisions were made solely on the basis of expressedcitizen preferences, almost certainly other concerns both of those citizens andof the nation as a whole might be ignored. This is particularly evident in issuesinvolving national defense, energy policy, and waste disposal policy.

In what follows I will argue that the environment of risk in which liberaldemocracies find themselves is one of great import for the definition of democ-racy. Furthermore, I hope to show that the political challenge that technologi-cal risk poses is an opportunity for redefining liberal democracy in a way thatstresses the need for a more participatory and communitarian style of politics.Such redefinition could not come at a more efficacious time for liberalism orfor democracy. As new democratic systems are created and experimented within countries without liberal pasts, the historic connection between liberal ideasand democracy can be explored anew. Furthermore, liberal democracies maydiscover that though well established, they need to continue their own educa-tion process about the demands of democratic life and decision making. Thenew, non-liberal laboratories of democracy in Eastern Europe can provide thateducation as they struggle to cope with the nuances of both democracy andtechnological development.

Risk and liberal democracies

Neither risk nor liberal democracy are easy to characterize. Each concept con-sists of a pair of different ideas wedded to each other at least conventionally,but in recent years the pairing has become somewhat suspect. Some risk ana-lysts speak of the two sides of risk as &dquo;objective&dquo; and &dquo;subjective&dquo;; the firstrefers to the actual amount of risk present in any situation, the second to theattitudes about that risk held by those persons confronting it ( Fischhoff et al.,1981; Goodin, 1982; Rescher, 1983; Shrader-Frechette, 1985; Douglas, 1986).Together these two dimensions of risk constitute &dquo;a compound measure of theperceived probability and magnitude of adverse effect&dquo; (Shrader-Frechette,1985, p. 18). Liberal democracy of course contains two distinct ideas in itsname, and though the two seem congenial enough, some democratic theoristsquestion the alleged inseparability of liberalism and democracy (Macpherson,1965, 1973, 1977; Barber, 1984). And, of course, the movement toward de-mocracy in previously communist countries grants non-liberal ideas of democ-racy their own currency.

Liberalism undervalues the true nature of democracy, claims Barber, be-cause it can only embrace an impoverished or &dquo;thin&dquo; democratic reality, &dquo;onewhose democratic values are prudential and thus provisional, optional, and



262

conditional - means to exclusively individualistic and private ends&dquo; (Barber,1984, p. 4). Barber and others argue that under liberalism’s influence, democ-racy has come to focus exclusively on individual existence and rights, and toignore the social - even communal - side of political life. This is a seriouscritique, and one put forward by thinkers from all points on the ideologicalspectrum (Bloom, 1987). It is also pertinent in any discussion of risk, for as itpresents itself in its new form of technological threats, risk is and must be per-ceived as an essentially social and political concept. Like democracy however,risk in liberal societies has not been treated sufficiently as a social form, but aspart of the confrontation between nature and individual man.

In liberal societies such as the USA, the concepts of democracy and risk sharea common component. Both are imbued with a thoroughly individualistic biasthat turns the definition of each toward certain privately felt beliefs and moti-vations of individuals. For democracy this means that:

It is nothing but a logical requirement for the governance of inherently self-interested conflict-ing individuals who are assumed to be infinite desirers of their own private benefits. Its ad-vocacy is based on the assumption that man is an infinite consumer, that his overriding mo-tivation is to maximize the flow of satisfactions, ur utilities, to himself from society, and thata national society is simply a collection of such individuals. [Macpherson, 1979, p. 43 ]

Through its alliance with capitalism, liberalism construes risk in a similarlyindividualistic way, as something to be accepted or rejected by an individualon the basis of a cost/benefit equation meant to maximize &dquo;the flow of satis-

factions,&dquo; or at least to minimize anything that will harm the flow.Many democratic theorists have argued that this definition of democracy is

wholly unsuitable in that it demeans democracy, politics, and our view of hu-man beings (Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970; Margolis, 1979; Bachrach, 1980;Mansbridge, 1980). More importantly for our purposes here, because liberalunderstandings of risk treat it also in such privatistic terms, making policy forit when needed on a national scale will likely be impossible. The difficulty formaking risk policy is abundantly clear in several areas, most recently in wastedisposal policy and in siting decisions for weapons systems such as the MX mis-sile. In these cases the individualistic refrain &dquo;not in my backyard&dquo; (or NIMBY)has been particularly effective in blocking national decisions.So democracy and risk are thrown together in a new way: traditional individ-

ualistic definitions of both are now in question, and if we arrive at a betterdefinition of risk, it is likely to effect a new definition of democracy. Further-more, if we reconceptualize risk into a more social and participatory context,we will also render our notions of democratic practice and policy making morecommunal in nature as well.



263

Whether or not one agrees that risk has both an objective and subjectivecomponent, the subjective perception of risk by any individual must be seen asthe product of that person’s social life and the social influences on belief, atti-tude, and expectations of social institutions.

In risk perception, humans act less as individuals and more as social beings who have inter-nalized social pressures and delegated their decision-making processes to institutions. Theymanage as well as they do, without knowing the risks they face, by following social rules onwhat to ignore: institutions are their problem-simplifying devices. [Douglas and Wildavsky,1982, p. 80 ]

If the institutions to which individuals in risk situations defer are those of lib-eral democracy and capitalism, however, individuals are likely to continue toperceive risk solutions only in regard to their own private self-interest. Thusfor risks confronting the nation as a whole but requiring local solutions (e.g.siting decisions), the effect of liberal institutions is to make the solution appearas a private threat to those who must live next door to its concrete manifesta-tion. Then the liberal rallying cries of individual rights and equity make deci-sion difficult. In such instances political inertia leads to a decision of &dquo;no de-cision,&dquo; or at least of no change. Though continuing the status quo is, of course,a legitimate policy choice, it is often unsuited to a changing environment, whichis what the growth of technology uniquely portends.There is no way out of this policy stalemate until we revise both our defini-

tions of democracy and risk. This effort will require both theoretical and prac-tical changes in the functioning of democratic politics and in the assessment ofrisk. All of these changes need to be seen as the direct result of the nature ofrisk in modern technological societies, and of the type of challenges it presentsto democratic procedures. For the most part what is needed is a reconceptual-ization of democracy and risk as aspects of collective life rather than as cate-gories of individual experience.

It is not difficult to see how the vocabulary of liberal democracy has becomeincreasingly individualistic, even egoistic, in Western, capitalistic nations. It isvirtually axiomatic among democratic theorists that, beginning with Hobbesand Locke and running through Bentham, the Mills and the Federalist authors,there has been a sustained emphasis on the autonomy and dignity of the indi-vidual as the prerequisite of democracy. Pennock has summarized this:

the twin democratic ideals of liberty and equality are both derived from the notions of humandignity and autonomy (which, in turn, they imply); and democracy is, in this sense at least,a profoundly individualistic doctrine. [Pennock, 1979, p. 4 ]

Whether this emphasis on autonomy manifests itself in the language of individ-ual rights as in Hobbes and Locke, in that of individual self-interest as in utili-



264

tarian thought, or in both as the pages of The Federalist Papers, the resultingconceptualizations of democracy are in one very important sense identical. De-mocracy posits individuals as political adversaries, each carrying his or her ownarsenal of rights, interests, or claims that must be respected in order to protecthis or her dignity and sense of self-worth. And though theoretically it may bepossible, as Rousseau teaches, to get &dquo;beyond adversary democracy&dquo; and ar-rive at true community, Rousseau’s own skepticism on this score seems only toentrench the isolated individual more firmly as the model of democratic citi-zenship (see also Mansbridge, 1980).

Since the 1950s, political scientists and philosophers have commented onthe inevitable political consequences of this view of democracy. Chiefly theconsequences are two: the drop in political participation among large groupsof citizens and the emergence of policy-making elites to fill the political void.Democratic theorists disagree vigorously on whether these developments arebeneficial or even truly &dquo;democratic&dquo; in some sense, but few dispute that theyhave actually occurred. Many books and articles have appeared that encouragethe renewal of political participation on the part of all citizens, along with theacceptance of whatever structural changes necessary to effect the resuscitationof the active democratic citizen. The reason why it is necessary to re-enlivendemocratic participation is often a matter of some disagreement, but eventu-ally boils down to the same thing: to enhance the dignity of the individualthrough what J.S. Mill saw as the opportunities for growth afforded each citi-zen through active partnership in the common life of politics.The problem with such appeals for participation is, of course, that if one

begins with a definition of democracy that centers on self-interest or the pro-tection of individual rights, it is difficult to see what the common life would beother than a common free-for-all. Shouting to make one’s claims heard is in asense participation, but it does not elicit visions of mutually respectful citizenssharing a common goal or objective that can only be gained collectively throughcooperation. In short, criticisms of liberal individualism for its tendencies to-ward political elitism - or even authoritarianism in the eyes of Tocqueville -do not supply the basis for a truly common life. And without reasons differentand better than the need to protect one’s interest and rights or to grow person-ally, the gulf between citizens and elites can never be bridged. Corcoran statesthe matter succinctly:

The brute fact remains that democratic politics (albeit not alone) cannot prevent the creationof remote, stable and entrenched centres of power which tend to promote general apathy,cynicism and ignorance about politics among the masses of people. About forty years ago, anumber of intellectuals thought television would change all of that, but we can readily seewhat has become of this hope. Over a century ago, John Stuart Mill though public educationwould do it. Two centuries ago, Thomas Jefferson though a free press would do it. But nothing



265

has altered the chasm between oligarchs and public, and now mass communications and sci-entific technology, especially as they relate to our physical and material security, have actuallycaused the chasm to deepen and widen. It remains the challenge of democratic theory to pro-vide a bridge. [Corcoran, 1983, p. 19 ]

Today, coping with the risks of our technological age can provide such a bridge.If this is true it may seem more a matter of deterministic coercion than an actof will by a free people. But this is too visceral a response inculcated by liber-alism’s lack of a sense of its own history. It is liberalism’s historical embrace ofscience more than the inexorable march of nature that has landed us in ourpresent state alone with the risks of technology. If coping with those risks canbring democratic citizens together in the common life of politics, it may be thatwe will finally realize what Rousseau meant - we will force ourselves to befree.

Risk and liberal adversaries

The risks posed by 20th-century science and technological advance are one ofthe fruits of liberal democracy. As a political theory, liberalism has its roots inthe scientific revolution and the rationalist philosophy of the 16th and 17thcenturies. Enlightenment figures Locke and Montesquieu made no secret oftheir admiration of Newton and Descartes, who in turn became icons of liberaldemocratic thought. Science and rationalism brought a dual justification forliberal democracy - a political theory that would wed empirically discoveredknowledge of the universe with knowledge of self gained through introspection.Liberal society would be a model of Newton’s harmonious universe governedby natural laws, and populated by rational individuals whose sure self-knowl-edge of their own interests could be a sufficient basis for collective politicaldecision.As science was glorified by liberal thought, it was easy for liberal societies to

merge it with politics and a fundamental belief in the right of private propertyemphasized by Locke. Thus, capitalism and science became central to the ideaof liberal democracy (Price, 1985). This convergence, however, brought someunexpected consequences. As science became more arcane and capable of as-tonishing successes, it became its own community populated by experts speak-ing a language unknowable to scientific laypersons. It offered a brand of truthdeserving of respect partly because of the modesty of its own admitted uncer-tainty. This uncertain truth challenged other systems of knowledge such as re-ligion that had previously bound people together through an assurance of cer-tainty not necessarily the product of proof. The exchange of modernity wasmade: science for religion, uncertain truth for certain untruth -’and the risks



266

of uncertainty could only be resolved through deference to the scientific elite,who by the 1960s had become knowledge brokers to the elites of politics.

This brief history of the relationship of science and liberal politics is by nowgenerally accepted as part of our liberal political past (Price, 1965; Salomon,1973; Barber, 1984; Hiskes and Hiskes, 1986). As such, it also forms a back-ground for policy controversies today that focus on the riskiness of technolog-ical developments in many areas as energy, national defense, biomedical tech-nologies, waste treatment and disposal, and communications. As products of20th-century scientific discovery, these technologies carry with them risks ofvarious types, many of which are well known to the public who sees them asthreatening. This perception of threat or risk has led to policy stalemates inmany areas of political decision, and the resulting absence of decision itselfcarries a high risk, as evidenced in the lack of policy regarding reproductivetechnologies and the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes.

Decisions concerning risk acceptability are difficult for liberal democraciesprecisely because of their liberal past. This is so because risk decisions requiresensitivity to aspects of social and political life toward which liberalism hastraditionally been notably insensitive. There are four such characteristics ofrisk decisions that need to be recognized and discussed.

( 1 ) Coping with risk requires that we contemplate the future both in termsof ourselves and those who come after us.

(2) Risks presented by modern technologies call attention to the intercon-nectedness of social life and of the individuals that live it, including per-sons not yet born.

(3) Living with risk offers a justification for authority in decision makingnot based on expertise or elected office, but on the fact of living with theconsequences.

( 4 ) Risk decisions require a different view of what it means to be self-inter-ested, and particularly a different idea of what a political interest is.

Understanding how these aspects of risk challenge liberal democracies todaywill provide some clues as to how the theory and practice of those democraciesmust be transformed to cope with our risky technological age.

Risk and the future

By definition, risk is a future-oriented concept. As a stochastic measure it refersto a future state characterized by a change for the worse as compared to thepresent or the past. Because the measure is never absolutely certain it is subjectto interpretation and dispute. Already it poses a problem for liberal democracy.In policy areas where risk is a prominent factor such as energy or pollution,



267

liberal democracies, particularly the United States, have a sorry record in plan-ning for the future. This needs little elaboration, but the point here is not thatliberal democracies have difficulties thinking about the future, but that in prin-ciple liberal democracy as a theory of politics is ill equipped to plan. The rea-sons for this are not difficult to fathom. First of all, with its emphasis on profitrather than savings, capitalism is notoriously oriented toward the short-term,as Marx insisted in Wage Labour and Capital, and most other observers admit.Second, the individualistic orientation of liberalism hesitates to consider thosewho do not yet exist, in other words, future generations. And since in our shortsightedness we do not see the risks in our future until they are upon us, we aremost willing to let the future be responsible for itself. Third, policy makers -if not philosophers - find it is easy to ignore future generations as long as theonly moral theory liberalism embraces is that of individual rights. People whodo not exist yet obviously cannot exercise rights since they cannot be treated asindividuals. Therefore our obligation to the future does not exist - or at leastdoes not provide a strong argument for present sacrifice on the grounds of therights of the future.

Risk and the common life

The problem of liberalism’s insufficient moral theory will arise again later inthe discussion of the nature of self-interest, but leads into the second aspect ofrisk that befuddles liberal democracy. A pervasive feature of many risks thatmodem technology has produced is simply that they are so &dquo;pervasive.&dquo; Theydemocratically affect all citizens regardless of wealth, class, race, etc., becausethey are present in the air, the ozone layer, the food, the food chain. They arethe product of our life together, and cannot be put away when we enter ourcherished private realms. Risks call attention to our common life, both in thesense of all individuals in the aggregate and as a social whole that also includesfuture citizens. Now this aspect is disconcerting politically for liberal democra-cies in two ways: first, it means that it is difficult to fix individual blame orresponsibility for the creation of risks; second, it is difficult politically to saddlesome individuals with the new risks of a proposed solution. The political resultis usually a decision affirming the status quo, a poor response in an environ-ment of change.These two problems inherent in the communal nature of risk are evident first

in what economists call &dquo;externalities,&dquo; and second in most siting disputes.Externalities are the social costs of individual action, costs that are frequentlyunintentional and sometimes unknown at the time the action is taken. A com-mon example is pollution, but a better one is simply risk or the fear of risk. In



268

a real sense, of course, the fact of social life presumes externalities as individ-uals interact, but one of the features of modern technological externalities isthe problem of identifying the individuals responsible for negative externali-ties. This problem highlights the &dquo;emergent&dquo; nature or aspect of modern risks.Risks seem to be the product of no one and of everyone; they are a result of ourlife as social beings who individually make private decisions that affect others;they seem simply to emerge. Thus, for example, the eastern United States suf-fers from pollution generated by coal-powered electrical plants in the midwest-ern states, but who or what is fundamentally to blame? Is it the factory ownersin the midwest trying to maximize profits by burning dirty coal; their cus-tomers ; the lifestyle the products produced make possible? These causes arenot separable; they partake of one source: our interconnected and common life.

Similarly, finding solutions for negative externalities sometimes meanshardship or risk for some citizens so that all may benefit. If ever the UnitedStates finds a place to secure its radioactive waste someone will be living closeto the dump site. That fact has made it impossible thus far to select a site dueto the ire of citizens in Kansas and New Mexico (previously chosen recipientsof a dump), and their success in stopping the project. In short, modern tech-nological development presents recognized risks whose sources are undefina-ble in individualistic terms and whose solutions require local hardships thatseem inequitable. Thus because it lacks a clear enough sense of common life,liberal politics is stymied in providing solutions.

Risk and political authority

Because of externalities and perceived inequity in resolving risk disputes, lib-eral societies now face a new kind of demand from citizens for authority inmaking decisions that is not based on either expertise or elected office. Thisthird aspect of risk appears in many controversies in which so-called expertsdisagree on what risks exist in any technological project and how to cope withthem (Nelkin, 1979). When this happens issues of technological impact areoften redefined by citizens as moral issues concerning freedom, justice, or theirobligation to live with risk. For moral issues they claim the right to defer to noone for answers, for as good liberals they believe in individual moral auton-omy. Courts have often agreed with this stance, for instance in many nuclearpower siting disputes, and the resultant decisions have contributed to the slowdeath of the nuclear industry.This argument for decision-making authority is an intriguing development

in liberal societies, challenging as it does the allegedly contractual relationshipbetween citizens and their government. It also muddies the theoretical dispute



269

between natural rights and utilitarian bases of liberal political obligation, be-cause it unites the consequentialist concerns of utilitarianism with the rights-based argument for autonomy beginning with Hobbes and Locke.But most interesting here is how arguments for citizen authority in making

decisions about risk show the incapacity of present liberal democracies in un-derstanding the basic liberal attitude toward risk. Most risk analysts point outthat risk is more likely to be accepted if two criteria are fulfilled: first, thatacceptance of risk be voluntary and perceived as a conscious act of choice; sec-ond, that acceptance of risk carries with it some tangible benefit. These criteriamirror the basic liberal democratic values of autonomy and hope for improve-ment (Thompson, 1970), and are bolstered by a basic capitalist understandingof how profits are won. Why then are policies providing for risk so difficult toeffect? Because at national, state, and local levels these liberal attitudes towardrisk are ignored in government siting decisions. Most state and federal sitingdecisions (e.g., for power plants, missile installations, prisons, etc.) are stillmade with little public input and with no plan for compensation for citizensforced to live with new risk.

It is tempting to blame government for this policy failure, since risk decisionmaking appears to ignore the two basic features of risk acceptability. But theproblem may lie in the liberal citizen’s understanding of the meaning of choiceand beneficial result. Because of the emergent, collective nature of many risks,the choices and benefits that surround them must also be perceived as collec-tive. In other words, if a citizen demands the opportunity to choose what risksshe will live with, in order to achieve some benefits, she cannot expect to do soalone. Others will also make the same demands, since they too will be affected.Thus, any decision must be the result of collective choice, and any benefit ex-pected to be a shared one.

Risk and interest

As a consequence of these three aspects of risk, few citizens believe that theirself-interest is enhanced by living with some of the risks of technology or withtheir solutions. This belief is not surprising and is clearly evident in politics atall levels, but is mistaken nevertheless for its misreading of the meaning of self-interest. That this mistake is endemic to liberal democratic thought does nothelp matters, but points to how risk challenges liberal politics in a fourth andfinal way. Living with risk requires that definitions of interest and self-interestbe recast in light of the interconnectedness of modem technological life.A long history of dispute over the meanings of self-interest, common (nor.

public) interest, and interest simpliciter exists in the literature of political the-



270

ory and political science, but the real world of technological risks shows theway to a solution of these theoretical concerns. It does so through a realizationthat successfully coping with the problem of risk requires that distinctions be-tween self- and common interest and between interests as want-regarding andas right-regarding be dissolved. Rousseau of course attempted this synthesistwo centuries ago, and there is a compelling irony in the prospect that scienceand technology might accomplish what their most severe liberal critic couldnot.

The harshest lesson that technological risk imposes is that there is no escap-ing the consequences of other people’s action. Risk invades private life fromoutside, it is often unchosen and its benefits do not always calm private fears.Its sources are sometimes unidentifiable in terms of other individuals’ respon-sibility, and it cannot be avoided through purely private response. It is in ourself-interest to minimize risks, but is is not in our power to do so alone, giventhe nature of the risks we individually face. In short, modern technological riskdestroys the line between public and private life. In so doing it makes self-interest unrealizable without pursuit of the common interest in setting limitsto risk.As risk calls attention to our common life, it also forces us to recognize that

an ever larger part of our self-interest lies in what Connolly has called our &dquo;so-cial interests.&dquo; These are &dquo;interests a person has as a social being,&dquo; and &dquo;in-volve a reference to other people&dquo; (Connolly, 1974, p. 54). Social interestsmake life in society possible, for without a recognized self-interest in maintain-ing relations with other people, no individual would accept the sacrifices thatthese relations require. And social interests do indeed presume the sacrifice ofself-interests narrowly construed as want satisfaction, but are still self-inter-ested in a different sense. Connolly provides an example:

For instance, a person might decide to forgo a certain material benefit in the interests ofmaintaining a relationship of trust with another. He might simply cherish for itself the kindof life implied by sustaining such relationships more than he prizes the sacrificed materialbenefits. He is surely acting in his own interest in this case. There is sacrifice here, of course,but not in the sense that an act of altruism is the sacrifice of one’s own interest. The person is

simply sacrificing a lower-order interest for the higher-order interest he has as a social being.[Connolly, 1974, p. 65 ]

Certain risk decisions cannot be made without the acknowledgement of socialinterests. If I am chosen to live adjacent to a hazardous public works installa-tion, I must decide if my immediate self-interest in avoiding risk should giveway to my interest in helping to resolve a pressing social problem. However,social interests in this case must also include a recognition on the part of societyof my sacrifice in accepting the new risk. This means that public acknowledge-



271

ment of my good citizenship, and even perhaps some compensation, is due mein much the same way that military heroes are awarded medals or veteransreceive benefits. It is not enough simply to assume that as a good citizen I shouldaccept without demur the new situation of risk - this is both undemocratic and,as both the history of the military draft and the course of technical controver-sies has shown, will not work. It is undemocratic because it violates my mostbasic democratic rights. These are not the egoistic right to win or the anti-socialright to claim &dquo;NIMBY.&dquo; They are the social right to be heard and the right tobe respected as an individual whose interests are legitimate and cannot betrampled on lightly. The assumption that my duty as a citizen is to accept newrisk also will not work as policy because I will fight such coercion, and if con-temporary patterns hold and I am clever in publicizing my plight, I will winand the installation will have to be located elsewhere. Risk decisions cannot bemade without recognizing the rights, obligations, and even sacrifices on thepart of both society and individual citizens that social interests imply.The politics of risk management also demand that within the context of so-

cial interest, the concept of an interest itself must be changed. Political theo-rists have argued for years over the meaning of this term, and their positionshave ranged from the &dquo;want-regarding&dquo; definition of Barry to the &dquo;right-re-garding&dquo; characterization of Benn (Benn, 1960; Barry, 1965; Held, 1970 ; Ben-ditt, 1975; Oppenheim, 1975). For Barry, interests are simply wants, and apolicy is in someone’s interest if &dquo;it increases his opportunities to get what hewants&dquo; (Barry, 1965, p. 181 ) . In this formulation interest is devoid of norma-tive or ideological components, and is something entirely different from Benn’sview that an interest is &dquo;very much like the idea of a natural right (Benn, 1960,p. 135). For Americans, well-schooled in the language of rights, what they seeas in their interest is often demanded as something to which they have a right.Thus if the elimination of all unwanted risk is in their interest, they have a rightto deny any action on the part of society that will increase the amount of riskunder which they live. Similarly, interest defined as a want will have the sameeffect: we don’t want risk, so it is in our interest to fight the imposition of it.The inescapability of risk, however, indicates the inadequacy of both these

conceptions of interest. To view risk avoidance in terms of personal interestdefined either as a want or a right leads to the same result: the impossibility ofmaking policy. What we need to recognize is that once it enters politics, aninterest is neither merely a want nor fully a right, but simply a claim. As a claimit carries with it certain expectations and reasons that warrant it being pre-sented in politics with a reasonable hope of being honored. These expectationsand reasons are themselves part of the governing philosophy or ideology of asociety, and thus, for the United States and other liberal democracies, includeideas of rights, liberty, and equality. These reasons themselves are not part of



272

the definition of interest simpliciter, as Benn claims, but are the basis uponwhich claims of interest are evaluated, honored, or denied once they are pressedon the political realm.The importance of seeing interests as claims rather than as wants or rights is

evident in dealing with risk. Whereas individually we may all have an interestin eliminating certain risks, we can only achieve this through collective coop-eration that may, and probably will, impose additional risk on some membersof society. If we see our individual interests here as wants, we will not be per-suaded to accept any policy that results in what we do not want - more risk. Ifwe construe our interests as rights, we will see any violation of our interests asactual moral transgressions. Seeing our interests as claims simply allows thepolitical process to proceed - all interests must be heard and respected, butnot necessarily honored equally, because we have interests only as social beings,and the claims we make on society must be weighed against the claims of otherindividuals both individually and collectively.’This view of interests merely as claims may strike some as dangerous, since

it seems to imply that society may run roughshod over individuals and theirinterests whenever necessary. That technological risks bring us to this realiza-tion about interests does not alleviate these authoritarian fears; in fact, it oftenleads to a fear or denunciation of technology generally. But this is where de-mocracy comes in to protect individuals and their interests, and this is whyinterests must be seen as different from rights. Democracy protects the individ-ual’s rights to be heard and to be respected as the cornerstones of liberty andequality. This protection ensures that in the decision to distribute risks, all cit-izens have the right to have their interests be given a respectful hearing. Butthis is a different proposition altogether than protecting interests equally as ifthey were the same as rights.Thus as technological risk demarcates interest from right, it also emphati-

cally endorses the necessity of democracy. Without democracy there is no pro-tection for the individual chosen to suffer the dangers of proximity to riskyinstallations or of practices deemed essential to the common interest. In thissense non-democratic societies have considerably fewer problems in dealing

’The preceding argument actually follows closely that of Ronald Dworkin in Taking Rights Se-riously ( 1977 ). Dworkin argues that two senses of rights - weak and strong - must be distin-guished, and only strong rights are to be honored without reference to the claims of other citi-zens. In this sense Benn’s argument could be accepted that interests are similar to rights, but only&dquo;weak&dquo; rights. Still, I think it remains important to distinguish rights from interests, since con-fusing the two even with Dworkin’s clarification runs the risk of once again ignoring the social,strictly interpersonal character of interests. In Dworkin’s terms, strong rights may indeed by&dquo;trumps,&dquo; but interests cannot be interpreted this way if there is tu be any hope for cooperationin society.



273

with risk - without the assumption of democratic rights, siting disputes aremoot, or simply never occur. But modem risks do challenge democracy’s prin-ciples, by the mere fact that equality of treatment is impossible when it comesto the siting of certain installations. Some will live closer than others to themodern icons of nuclear plants or waste treatment facilities; thus their libertieswill be constrained more than those who live a distance away. This inequity isinevitable, but democracy guarantees that equality can yet prevail, as long aswe recognize that the existence of risk demands that we view interests and rightsin a newly communal manner.What technological risk demands of liberal democracy in its characterization

of interests is no less daunting than it effects on liberal notions of the future, ofcollective life, or of legitimate authority. Risk is challenging to liberal democ-racy, and modern technological risk threatens to undermine many of the atti-tudes and concepts of liberal democracy as they are now understood. Liberaldemocracy is threatened by risk, and it can only surmount this threat if it re-defines itself - as the &dquo;democracy of risk.&dquo;

Conclusion: the democracy of risk

For 200 years, liberal democracy has acknowledged its intimate aquaintancewith risk. Indeed, its twin pillars of belief in individual autonomy and the hopefor improvement presume a willingness to take the risks of individual liberty.Yet liberal democracies are threatened by modem technological risks, and areso because these risks do not fit the liberal epistemological position that ex-plains all phenomena by reducing them to the causal efficacy of individual be-havior. Risk today has an emergent quality; in some cases it is difficult to traceits causes and it cannot be explained easily by examining the isolated behaviorof individuals. Risk emerges amid the interstices of our common life, and itmust be through our common life that liberal democracy proceeds to makepolicy decisions for risk.As it has always done, liberal democracy needs to embrace risk, but with a

difference. Rather than viewing the taking of risks as a matter of individualchoice, liberal democracies need to understand this behavior as the result of acollective and communal choice. In a sense, all this means is that society as awhole through government must generate policy for risk, rather than assumethat risk is a matter of individual self-interest. But this necessitates a majorshift in attitude. It means that the values of assuming risk - liberty and benefit- are values implicit in collective behavior, not individual action. And it meansthat liberal respect for the individual and her interests guarantees a fair hearing



274

as a matter of democratic right. But only a fair hearing, not the granting of anexpressed want or an alleged right.These are major philosophical shifts in perspective and will require tangible

changes in the way liberal democracies make decisions concerning risk. Theseparallel the four challenges risk presents to democratic societies, and togetherconstitute a different attitude or even definition of democratic practice predi-cated not on attributes of individuals, but on the existence of risk. None of theproposals that follow are necessarily novel in the actual policy changes theyrepresent. But together they both signal and require major shifts in how liberalsocieties view the process of democracy. No longer can democratic politics beunderstood as the clash of adversarial and individually pursued interests. Thosesingular - and insular - interests exist within an environment of risk that canonly be managed collectively - and publicly. If that management is to remaindemocratic, it will require new forms of or renewed emphasis upon coopera-tion, participation, and even individual sacrifice in the larger social intereststhat define politics. There is room in the liberal tradition for such non-individ-ualistic approaches to democratic practice - one must only recall Rousseau’snotion of the &dquo;General Will&dquo; - but it is a room liberal democracies vacatedsome time ago. It is the public room, the assembly, where the meetings are heldand all participate, the room of our own.

First, liberal democracies need to learn how to think about the future; inshort, they must learn to plan. They must see that present choices regardingdevelopment and use of technological products affect the future in ways thatcarry risk to later generations. Present shortcomings in liberal planning are thefocus on cost/benefit analysis that does not include non-quantifiable elements(Goodin, 1982; Shrader-Frechette, 1980), and an ethical theory that does notextend beyond the attribution of rights to individuals. Many externalities arenot quantifiable in that they refer to the quality of life as perceived by individ-uals affected by technological development. Also, since it is difficult for liberalsto attribute rights to non-living individuals, our obligations to the future musthave a different basis, one that recognizes that the basis of morality is not pres-ent individual life but social life now and in the future.

Second, because risks invoke the interconnectedness of individuals in soci-ety, decisions about risk must strive to manifest the consensual nature of de-mocracy. This means not only that participation must be increased in the mak-ing of technical decisions, but that decisions should not be made in anenvironment that portrays individual members of society - either persons or&dquo;legal individuals&dquo; like corporations - as adversaries. This environment is ofcourse the courts, where much policy concerning risk is presently being for-mulated in civil suit decisions and awards. Courts cannot make acceptable pol-icy for risk for a variety of reasons involving lack of expertise of judges, ex-



275

pense, the ad hoc nature of judicial decisions, the non-representativeness oflitigants, and others. But the primary reason is that judicial decision making incivil cases is simply too individualistic in its approach. It postulates that liti-gants are discrete individuals with separable and adversarial interests and rights.As modern risks call us away from these assumptions, the courtroom as aninstitution is an anachronism for making policy in the area of risk.

If the courts ought not to possess the authority to make policy for risk, thenwho should have it? This third change in the way liberal democracies like theUSA make risk policy must be a pervasive one. The only way to recognize theinterconnectedness of social life that risk imposes is to hear as many voices aspossible in the policy process. Not only judges, elected officials, and scientificexperts live with the consequences of risk decisions. All citizens do, and if in-dividual liberty means anything it must mean that all citizens must have a voicein dealing with risk. Referenda, town meetings, citizen boards, all have a placein risk policy, since the first lesson we must learn to cope with risk is that weare all involved. So many voices - probably at least initially in opposition -will be a cacophony of dissent, since risk decisions have raised participation inalmost every locale. But if the realization is to dawn that risk brings us all to-gether, then as many as possible must be heard. Such a hearing is necessary forsuccessful policy, but it is also a matter of right - in fact the supreme demo-cratic right to be heard.But not necessarily heeded. A hearing for one’s point of view is a right; a

victory for that point of view is only a matter of interest or claim - it is openfor discussion and evaluation. Effective policies for risk will mean that someself-interested arguments will be denied; some people will live with more riskthan others. But if self-interest is to be raised from its individualistic and want-

regarding level - as risk management demands - a fourth change in the wayliberal democracies make risk policies is needed. This is in the matter of rec-ognition and of compensation for the acceptance of risk in the name of socialinterests. Individuals and localities chosen for additional risk (for instance inenergy and waste treatment installations) must be publicly rewarded for theirsacrifice. This is the only way that liberal attitudes concerning individuals andrisk can be brought in line with the realities of collective life and emergenttechnological risk. Liberal democrats are not particularly averse to risk; in fact,they are ideologically prone to accept it, as long as they do so freely and with ahope of reward. Policies must acknowledge the justness of this attitude, bothfor ethical reasons stemming from the rightness of democracy and for the prac-tical reasons that without compensation policies will continue to fail.Some new approaches to compensation that stress both the collective and

sacrificial character of risk policy are worth mentioning in this regard. In hisexample of adjudicating a siting dispute between a community and a devel-



276

oper, Raiffa proposes what he calls &dquo;creative compensation,&dquo; which stressesboth the community-based mentality of effective risk policy, and the mutualityof interests:

I am arguing for the establishment of a new mind set-not one that pits the community againstthe developer, but a mind set where the community and the developer join in a mutual prob-lem-solving effort...It’s wrong to think of compensation as coming from the developer to thetown; compensation should be in the form of a transfer payment from the rest of the state tothis community in appreciation for solving a mutual problem. [Raiffa, 1985, p. 196 ]

Of course compensation, whether in the form of direct payments or commu-nity benefits such as better schools or programs in the arts, can be made to lookunseemly - as an attempt to buy off affected communities with appeals topersonal or collective greed. Yet is is only through the public acknowledgementof personal sacrifice that the necessary convergence of self and social interestcan ever occur. As a community, society owes a debt of gratitude to citizenswilling to live with the risk emanating from proximity to a radioactive wastesite. Society has a pressing interest in finding such sites; those who are willingto merge their self-interest with this social interest are to be honored and, ifneed be, rewarded. This is a lesson that liberal democracies find hard, but theyhave learned it before in times of war, since the self-interest in dying for one’scountry is simply not within the liberal logic of self concern. They must learnit again to face the risks of technological society or there is no sense in declar-ing, as President Carter once did, the &dquo;moral equivalence of war.&dquo;

Liberal democracies will indeed look and act differently if they adopt thenecessary political responses to the environment of technological risk. And therewill be coercion felt by individuals selected to live with new risks, coercion thatis unacceptable under present notions of interest and individual liberty. Butthese are notions as unsuited to the modern world as they are to the legacy ofliberal democracy. Modem risk does not pose the demise of either liberal de-mocracy or individual autonomy. But it does signal that democracy can nolonger afford its visceral belief in a Newtonian harmony of divergent individ-uals completely absorbed in their Cartesian journeys of self discovery. Democ-racy is now defined by the presence of risk that comes not from individualsacting in an illiberal or irrational manner but from their interaction, individ-ual growth, and the inevitable consequences of those processes. Rousseauunderstood that the convergence of science and individual freedom would leadto these consequences, and proposed the General Will to contain them whileyet preserving individual liberty through participation. Liberal societies haveindeed drifted from his communal ideal. But that ideal is being resuscitatedboth by the demands of modern risks and by a rejuvenated democratic spiritawakening in societies without liberal pasts. Policy makers in liberal democra-



277

cies may discover that the best lessons for risk decision making will be taughtby countries only now discovering the promise of democracy, not by those long-established democracies struggling to reassess their liberal heritage.

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Mansbridge, J.J., 1980. Beyond Adversary Democracy. Basic, New York.Margolis, M., 1979. Viable Democracy. St Martin’s, New York.Nelkin, D., ed., 1979. Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA.Oppenheim, F.E., 1975. Self-interest and public interest. Political Theory, 3: 259-276.Pateman, C., 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge University Press,

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The Democracy of Risk