THE DICTATORSHIP SHOWS ITS CARDS:IMAGES AND MEMORIES OF THE 1964-1985 PERIOD1

Carlos FicoUniversidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro2

The Good Old Days?

Controversies have been an important part of academic and political

commemorations of the fortieth anniversary of the 1964 coup d'etat. The debates have

questioned the fragile commitment to democracy among various actors of the coup,

including the left. President João Goulart's purported inclinations towards extralegal

measures that might have allowed him to remain in power independent of the National

Congress has been scrutinized. If there is little doubt to the first issue, the second lacks

strong empirical evidence.3 Beyond these delicate questions, an even older polemic

resurfaced: why everyday people [pessoas comuns] in Brazil believe "things were better"

during the dictatorship. This favorable impression of the past, which circulates among

diverse sectors of society, is undoubtedly related to the difficulties of resolving basic

problems of the country under a democracy. The impression is also a function of the image

1 This paper draws upon research, much of it previously published, conducted by me andmembers of the Grupo de Estudos sobre a Ditadura Militar da UFRJ. The analyticalquestion of how images of the military period influenced everyday people is beingpresented for this first time. English translation, completed by Daryle Williams and BarbaraWeinstein, reviewed by author.2 The author thanks the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico(CNPq) and the Fundação Carlos Chagas de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio deJaneiro (FAPERJ) for research support.3 See Jorge Ferreira, Daniel Aarão Reis, Marcelo Ridenti and Caio Navarro de Toledo,Anais do Seminário 40 Anos do Golpe de 1964. (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras, 2004).

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of military rules that people took from the dictatorship itself. As it is well-known, the

attempt to enunciate a supposed "truth" about the past is not merely the exclusive

prerogative of History, as memory is a field of disputes that encompasses many social

agents. In this case, military officials, various factions of the lefts [as esquerdas], and other

actors involved in the historical process are in play. Disputes over the past bring to light

sometimes quite distinct conjunctures of symbolism, impressions, memories,

representations, etc. Naturally, many of these conjunctures are mutually incompatible. This

paper intends to discuss the various images attached to the military dictatorship. Its intent it

to help better understand the affirmation that the military period was somehow better than

the present.

Historians were not the first to write a narrative of the military dictatorship. The

diverse genre of memoirs [memorialística] provided some of the first detailed descriptions

of the 1964 coup and the ensuring dictatorial regime. The press was quite important here,

occasionally publishing revealing facts, especially in the context of protest campaigns.

Examples include the work of Carlos Heitor Cony, Marcio Moreira Alves, and Edmundo

Muniz.4 Cony, the ideologically-independent author of O ato e o fato [The Act and the

Fact], voiced his criticism within the same time frame as the coup itself. When Marcio

Moreira Alves took to the press to protest abuses committed at the outset of the regime, the

government of General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco ordered an investigation into

accusations of torture. Castelo Branco's Chief of Military Staff [Chefe da Casa Militar], the

future president Ernesto Geisel, carried out the charge; the investigation did not result in

4 Cony, Carlos Heitor. O ato e o fato: crônicas políticas. (Rio de Janeiro: CivilizaçãoBrasileira, 1964); Alves, Marcio Moreira. Torturas e torturados. (Rio de Janeiro: [s.n.],1964); Moniz, Edmundo. O golpe de abril. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1965).

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any punishment. Carlos Castello Branco is another important figure in the press. His clever

prose provided readers with a kind of information that certainly would have faced

censorship had he spelled out the details in black and white. With the passage of time,

Castello Branco was able to win a kind of "journalist immunity," largely due to his

restrained objectivity even at moments of criticism.5

The first substantive factual revelations about the regime did not come to light until

the so-called distensão politica, General Ernesto Geisel's policy of decompression. The

distensão permitted the discussion of certain aspects of the regime deemed to be

"historical." Some of the most important revelation to come to light were made statements

made by civilian collaborations of the Castelo Branco administration. Castelo Branco's

Chief of Staff, Luís Vianna Filho, published a memoir in 1975, and Daniel Kreiger, leader

of the government party [ARENA] in the Senate, published his account the following year.6

Although the narratives were marked by officialisms and predictable partisan slants, the

memoirs provided, at the least, insights from the men who had a close relationship to the

events described.

The "official memory" would be gradually enriched by other publications. The

works of Viana Filho and Kreiger, offering favorable readings of the Castelo Branco

regime, were acceptable within the context of the Geisel regime, which was understood to

be moderate and castelista (a well-accepted, if imprudent, classification). When Generals

5 Castello Branco's “Coluna do Castello” appeared in the Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro)between 1962 and 1993. See also: Castello Branco, Carlos. Os militares no poder: CasteloBranco. 3. ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1977); Os militares no poder: o ato 5. (Riode Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1978); Os militares no poder: o baile das solteironas. (Rio deJaneiro: Nova Fronteira, 1979).6 Viana Filho, Luís. O governo Castelo Branco. (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1975);Krieger, Daniel. Desde as Missões... saudades, lutas, esperanças. (Rio de Janeiro: J.Olympio, 1976).

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Jayme Portella de Mello and Hugo Abreu published their memoirs in 1979, attentions

turned to the existence of dissident factions within the military. The so-called "military

unity" was called into question.7 Portella de Mello—who the castelistas treated as one of

the "intolerant advisors"—was Chief of the Military Staff under the Costa e Silva

presidency and the succeeding Military Junta.8 In this capacity, Portella de Mello occupied

the post of Secretary-General of the National Security Council, an administrative organ that

he strengthened via the implantation of the political police. Written in an uncompromising

style, Portella de Melo's A revolução e o governo Costa e Silva is 1000+page diary that

supports Costa e Silva, the leader of the so-called hardliners.

Hugo Abreu was originally Geisel's Chief of Military Staff, but left the government

after disagreeing with General João Figueiredo's nomination for the presidency. His

memoir included various accusations against the Geisel government and the president

himself. For this, Abreu was detained for twenty days. Abreu left prison stating that he

would write another book with even more accusations, but the second would only be

published posthumously, as he would assuredly be dead within a few months. After the end

of the dictatorship, other high-ranking military published their own accounts, some of

7 Mello, Jayme Portella. A revolução e o governo Costa e Silva. (Rio de Janeiro: Guavira,1979); Abreu, Hugo. O outro lado do poder. (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1979).8 Testimony given by General Gustavo Moraes Rego Reis, published in: Os anos dechumbo: a memória militar sobre a repressão. Orgs. D'Araujo, Maria Celina, Gláucio AryDillon Soares, and Celso Castro. (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994), 151.

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which defended9 the supposed positive sides of the regime and the necessities of

repression.10

Former left-wing militants of the "armed struggle" began to publish their version of

events in the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, within the context of the

abertura. Best represented were works by people who had participated in various "urban

guerilla movements." Books by Fernando Gabeira and Alfredo Sikiris were publishing

successes, and served as a catalyst for far-reaching debates among those who opted to "take

up arms" against the dictatorship. Such debates often concerned the charge that the radical

option had been "romantic" or "naïve."11 At the same time that the radical left resurrected,

somewhat carelessly, a touch of the countercultural climate of the 1960s, anguishing

narratives about torture gradually surfaced. These texts emphasized the cruel character of

the hardest phases of the regime12—a topic that would come to be fully chronicled by

Brasil: Nunca Mais [Brazil: Never Again], a human rights project that managed to collect

documentation related to more than 700 cases of torture involving political prisoners.13

Daniel Aarão Reis has been the most perceptive in observing that those leftists who

took the path of armed struggle tend to operate within the context of struggles over the

9 Camargo, José Maria de Toledo. A espada virgem: os passos de um soldado. (São Paulo:Ícone, 1995) and Passarinho, Jarbas. Um híbrido fértil. (Rio de Janeiro: Expressão eCultura, 1996).10 Ustra, Carlos Alberto Brilhante. Rompendo o silêncio: OBAN, DOI/CODI. 29 set. 70 - 23jan. 74. (Brasília: Editerra, 1987).11 GABEIRA, Fernando. O que é isso, companheiro. (Rio de Janeiro: Codecri, 1979).SIRKIS, Alfredo. Os carbonários. Memórias da guerrilha perdida. (São Paulo: Global,1980).12 See: Freitas, Alípio de. Resistir é preciso: memória do tempo da morte civil do Brasil.(Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1981); Tavares, Flávio. Memórias do esquecimento. (São Paulo:Globo, 1999). Coelho, Marco Antônio Tavares. Herança de um sonho: as memórias de umcomunista. (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2000).13 Brasil Nunca Mais. (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985).

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establishment of the "truth." These struggles involve a confrontation within certain

"emblematic truths;" that is, for some ex-militants, the guerrillas were irresponsible, insane,

naïve youngsters—heroic and full of illusions—who would fall prey to the powers of the

military regime. For others, the armed struggle comprised a "resistance" for those who had

no other alternatives for resisting the regime. Neither the naïve nor the members of the

"democratic resistance" won privileged places in the literature and filmmaking of the era.14

For Reis Filho, who defends an understanding that the communist organizations were a

"counter-elite, alternative, who launched an assult on political power,"15 the struggle to fix a

memory occasioned a "displacement of sense" [deslocamento de sentido], especially during

the Campaign for Amnesty [1978-79], that

…presented the factions of the revolutionary left as members of thedemocratic resistance, a type of armed wing of this resistance. Theoffensive, revolutionary posture that had originally shaped such factions waserased. Equally erased was the fact that these factions often expressed greatdisdain for democracy, especially in their written texts.16

The passage of time has enriched the production of memoirs about the dictatorship,

as politicians, artists, journalists, and other actors have come to make their statements.17

Curiously, this literature is simultaneously a first-hand account of the dictatorship as well

as an object of historical interest: the literature describes the regime, while also becoming

14 See criticism of the Bruno Barreto feature-length film O que é isso, companheiro? [FourDays in September] in Reis Filho, Daniel Aarão, et. al. Versões e ficções: o seqüestro dahistória. (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 1997).15 Reis Filho, Daniel Aarão. "Um passado imprevisível: a construção da memória daesquerda nos anos 60," in Reis Filho, Daniel Aarão et. al, . Versões e ficções. 40.16 Reis Filho, Daniel Aarão. Ditadura militar, esquerdas e sociedade. (Rio de Janeiro: JorgeZahar, 2000), 70.17 See, among others: Francis, Paulo. Trinta anos esta noite: 1964, o que vi e vivi. (SãoPaulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994); Mota, Nelson. Noites tropicais: solos, improvisos ememórias musicais, (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2000); and, Corrêa, Villas-Bôas. Conversacom a memória. (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2002).

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an object of inquiry for the struggle of a "correct version." What we have here is an

opportunity for intertextual analysis of these fragments that appear to form a single text, or

at the least, a debate animated by replies and replications [um debate animado por

“réplicas” e “tréplicas"].

The written memory, nevertheless, has a limited impact on the lives of common

people. We must recall that we are dealing with an undereducated [iletrado] society that is

often alienated from intellectual debates. The affirmations made by some people about "the

good life" during the dictatorship is not an inference that draws from academic or political

debates. Rather it springs from a chaotic composition of images.18 Memories of the so-

called "economic miracle" are much more important to these people than the anguished

testimonies of torture victims. Denunciations against the arbitrary and inflexible nature of

the military officers have little weight when compared to the hazed memories of an era of

"order." The apparent disorder associated with the slow routine of democratic

parliamentary debates is compared against the military, a firm-handed entity that proved its

meddle by closing the Congress when circumstances made it "necessary." If the so-called

"opinion makers" continue to treat the dictatorship as a time of arbitrary rule, torture, and

repression of dissent, many common people maintain memories more closely associated

with strength, order, discipline, and patriotism. Jarbas Passarinho, a colonel who served

three mandates as minister, once argued that the military had lost was the "battle of

18 When I refer to "impressions," I am thinking of the various authors who have consideredthemes of "representations," "the imaginary," "mentalities," etc. Space does not permit meto address the fragility or suitability of such terms. However, suffice to say that I wouldargue that ideology and symbols interpenetrate one another. This paper represents part ofmy ongoing attention to mixing traditional political history with approaches that areconventionally seen as part of historical anthropology.

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communication;" that is, the image of military action that prevailed was negative.19

Passarinho's views best apply to academic and political circles. They ring less true when

one considers that the most common impression of the military was that the regime had, at

the least, certain positive aspects. 20

If, for everyday people, recollections of the past have more weight than the

academic or intellectual interpretations, it is incumbent that we distinguish with more

clarity the various cleavages and antagonisms that existed within the military ranks. Our

task is to dispel an oversimplified understanding of the military as a homogenous and

cohesive entity. Important differences existed among the military officers that held various

position of power during the dictatorship— differences that cannot be solely understood in

the conventional dichotomy of hardliners [os duros] against moderates [os moderados].

This is an important issue, as some analysts would have think solely in terms of the

metaphor of the "dungeons of the dictatorship." That is, the conjunction of internal

surveillance, political police, censorship, political propaganda, and summary justice for

individuals suspected of corruption —practices that I will later call the "basic pillars of

repression" [pilares básicos da repressão]— all functioned on the same plane, in the same

manner. This is not so. It is only through a careful understanding of the differences existent

within the aforementioned practices that we can ascertain the fact that the military officers

assumed diverse stances relative to an authoritarian project of transforming Brazil into a

major power. Only if we can understand the diverse strategies in which these figures

classified some actions as "legal" and others as "revolutionary" will we be able to

19 In 2003, Passarinho was quoted to say "we won the armed fight against the communistsbut we lost the battle of communication."20 See, for example, Carvalho, Mario Cesar. "Aquele era um país que ia “pra frente”. Folhade S. Paulo, 27 March 1994. Caderno Especial 30 Anos Depois. p. 12.

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understand the dynamic that led to the elision of certain images and the superimposition of

others. The military brass and the practices of repression were heterogeneous, disqualifying

the uniform idea of the "dungeons." Nevertheless, these diverse group drew upon an a

powerful amalgam of ideas, an imagined "authoritarian utopia,"21 capable of envisioning

Brazil's transformation into a world power. The precondition for this transformation was

the elimination of certain "impediments" [óbices].

The manner in which various military figures expressed their belief in this utopian

imaginary might be broken down into two types: the first might be called the "sanitizing"

[saneador] manner and the second the "pedagogical" [pedagógico] manner. That is, for the

more radical military officers, what was necessary was the literal elimination of obstacles

like communism, subversion, "politicians' demagogueries," etc. For the second,

"pedagogical" group, the problem was the Brazilians were "unprepared" to become

members of a world power. Ignorant of the vote, they fell under the sway of politicians'

speech-making. They did not have a knowledge of the national reality, and they lacked the

most basic notions of hygiene and urban life. Because of these defects, it was necessary to

educate the people. For the first group, the sanitizers, the solution was a broad "clean-up

operation," capable of capturing, exiling, or even killing the enemies of this "authoritarian

utopia." For the second group, suffice for the military to articulate a project that might

suppress the "gestational deficiencies" [defiências de formação] of the society. The society

would be protected from "exotic ideologues" and other forces of spiritual corruption.

21 The phrase "authoritarian utopia" [utopia autoritária] first appeared in Visões do golpe: amemória militar sobre 1964. Orgs. Maria Celina D’Araujo, Celso Castro e Gláucio AryDillon Soares. (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994), 9.

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The "sanitizing" strain of the "authoritarian utopia" was preconditioned on acts of

repression, which explains the recourse to practices deemed "revolutionary" — actions that

had to be exceptional in nature (e.g. detention with arrest warrants, violent interrogation

methods, torture, and even "enemy" killings). These acts were hidden from society; their

very existence was negated. The "pedagogic" strain, on the other hand, was proudly

embraced by the dictatorship: through it, Brazilians learned of car travel and cleanliness.

Adherents to this strain worked hard so that Brazilians did not suffer "attacks upon morality

and good manners" [atentados à moral e aos bons costumes]. This strain was "legalized" —

never "revolutionary" — and openly recognized by the regime.

To better explain these classifications and to reveal certain facets of the dictatorship,

I will briefly address the differences between (a) domestic surveillance and the political

police; (b) political and moral censorship; and, (c) political propaganda and the summary

judgment of individuals faced with charges of corruption.

Domestic Surveillance and the Political Police

"I have created a monster!" So said Golbery do Couto e Silva, about the National

Information Service [Serviço Nacional de Informacões, or SNI] The SNI was created on 13

June 1964 through a congressional bill that passed the normal legislative process.22

Golbery, a colonel who played an active role in the conspiracy, was serve as its first chief.

Most often seen as a deft articulator of the regime's policies, in reality, Golbery suffered

some rather serious disappointments. For instance, Golbery was unable to impeded the

ascent of Costa e Silva to the presidency, even through Golbery counted upon the support

22 Brasil. Congresso Nacional. Lei no 4.341, de 13 jun. 1964.

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of Ernesto Geisel, then Head of the Military Staff. Golbery was subsequently able to

coordinate the winning candidacy of João Figueiredo, Geisel's successor in 1979, but he

had to swallow the fantastical official explanation of the "Riocentro episode," a clandestine

bombing planned by the hardliners in 1981 that was officially whitewashed under the

allegation that the bombers were themselves victims of the attack. The SNI's transformation

is notable, gradually morphing from Golbery's idea a government agency capable of

supplying the President with intelligence vital to decision-making into an agency deeply

committed to hardliners objectives.

The chronology of events is illuminating: the SNI was created in 1964, by Lei N.

4.341. Therefore, the agency predated by several years the security and intelligence

networks associated with the repression. The SNI predated 1968, when the regime

unexpectedly confronted developments that would come to be called "armed struggle" and

"urban or rural guerrilla warfare" (leftist struggles that antedated 1968). Golbery, as it is

well known, was not a part of the hardliners; he was known for his intellectual airs, a

somewhat typical profile for figures identified with the Superior War College. Golbery was

not one of those radical officers [exaltados] who maintained close ties to troops or preferred

to make decisions through force. In envisioning an efficient vision for an efficient

information, Golbery drew upon past experiences, some dating back to the 1950s. 23

Inspiration and assistance came from the Federal Service for Intelligence and Counter-

Intelligence [Serviço Federal de Informações e Contra-Informações, SFICI], the United

23 Fico, Carlos. Como eles agiam. Os subterrâneos da Ditadura Militar: espionagem epolícia política. (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001), 40.

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States government,24 and the Social Studies and Research Institute [Instituto de Pesquisas e

Estudos Sociais, IPÊS].25

The SNI was created in plain view. The bill sent to Congress faced opposition from

a diverse set of legislators who saw in the proposed agency unwanted parallels with the

Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP), created by Getúlio Vargas in 1939. President

Castelo Branco found himself forced to negotiate with his congressional critics, who were

told of the President's well-intended desire to might stay on top of important information,

rather than learning of key data after the fact, as had happened in the past.26 On this topic,

Castelo Branco worked doubly hard at his own myth-making, assuring his interlocutors that

he was horrified by the DIP.27 Indeed, the evidence is compelling that Castelo Branco

prevented the SNI from becoming as "double hand," simultaneously collecting information

as well as producing political propaganda, as the DIP had done. According to General

Octávio Costa, advisors to Golbery proposed that the SNI have such functions, but Castelo

Branco intervened, 28striking down any project of this sort. The president, it is reported, had

24 Huggins, Martha K. Polícia e política: relações Estados Undidos/América Latina. (SãoPaulo: Cortez, 1998), 147.25 Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. Estado e oposição no Brasil (1964-1984). (Petrópolis:Vozes, 1984), 25. See also: Dreifuss, René Armand. 1964: A conquista do Estado: açãopolítica, poder e golpe de classe. (Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 1981), 281 e segs.25 Castello Branco, Carlos. Os militares no poder: Castelo Branco. 3. ed. (Rio de Janeiro:Nova Fronteira, 1977), 41.26 Castello Branco, Carlos. Os militares no poder: Castelo Branco. 3. ed. (Rio de Janeiro:Nova Fronteira, 1977), 41.27 According to José Maria de Toledo Camargo, Chief of the AERP under Geisel, Gen.Castelo Branco exhibited certain tendencies that recalled the defunct center-right UniãoDemocrática Nacional. When the udenistas discussed political propaganda, the dread forGetúlio's DIP was unmistakable. See [interview] between Toledo Camargo and GilneiRampazzo, cited in Fico, Carlos. Reinventando o otimismo: ditadura, propaganda eimaginário social no Brasil. (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1997), 89.28 Statement given by Octávio Pereira da Costa, published in Os anos de chumbo: amemória militar sobre a repressão. Orgs. Maria Celina D'Araujo, Gláucio Ary Dillon

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a "visceral aversion" to propaganda.29 It may be worth noting that most powerful nations,

including those with democratic governments, relied upon information agencies of the kind

contemplated for Brazil in 1964. The SNI would not be an anomaly.

By underscoring the legal origins of the SNI and its dating relative to Institutional

Act Nº 5 (AI-5), I do not intend to suggest that the agency was born out of democratic

origins or intent. It is quite clear that the SNI was created in the context of the "blushing

dictatorship," [ditadura envergonhada] to use the expressive phrase coined by Elio Gaspari

to describe aspects of the early phase of the military regime. What is necessary is that we

dispel certain misunderstandings about the SNI. That is, the SNI was an information

agency, distinctive from other entities that directly engaged in torture and political

assassination. Moreover, it is important to underscore that the SNI changes over time: the

early phase, under the command of Golbery, and the later stages, in which the SNI was

under the command or influence of the hardliners, were distinct.

With Costa e Silva's victory (or perhaps we should say, with the defeat of Castelo

Branco, Geisel, and Golbery), the SNI came to be directed by Emílio Garrastazu Médici,

then a division general and close friend to Costa e Silva who would later become president.

Médici and Costa e Silva drew close at the end of the 1950s, when Médici, then a colonel,

was Chief of Staff for Costa e Silva, commander of the Third Military Region (Porto

Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul). When Costa e Silva won the position of Castelo Branco's

Minister of War, Médici was named military attaché to the Brazilian Embassy in

Washington. When his friend subsequently assumed the presidency, Costa e Silva made it a

Soares, and Celso Castro. (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994), 259; See also Falcão,Armando. Tudo a declarar. (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1989), 302-305.29 Author's interview with Otávio Costa, cited in Fico, Carlos. Reinventando o otimismo, 89.

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point to have Médici near, first offering his former aide the post of president of Petrobrás,

which Médici declined for lack of preparation, before settling on the position of chief of the

SNI, which Médici accepted. Médici was undoubtedly quite different from his predecessor,

Golbery. The SNI would undoubtedly change under Médici's command, transforming itself

from a agency whose primary goal was supplying information into a decision-making body,

with powers to veto candidates considered for government posts.30 In July 1968, in the

context of the famous "March of One Hundred Thousand" and Costa e Silva's rising

concerns about public order, Médici came to suggest measures similar to those included in

AI-5. The recommendation would be momentarily tabled by the president. By year's end,

when Costa e Silva returned to his friend's earlier suggestions, the SNI had been

"hardened."

By October 1969, a little more than two years after assuming his post at the SNI,

Médici became President of the Republic. He arrival at the presidential palace followed a

period in which president Costa e Silva's progressive illnesses led a Military Junta to

assume temporary controls.31 The vacancy the SNI was filled by General Carlos Alberto

Fontoura, another native of Rio Grande do Sul and member of Costa e Silva's entourage.

(Between 1965 and 1966, Fontoura served as deputy chief of the staff to the then-Minister

of War.) Fontoura's tenure would last until 1974, a period coinciding with the creation of

political police service and the legal implantation of "security and information sections"

within civilian ministries.32 Originating in 1946 these offices became part of a broad

30 Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro pós-1930. Ed. rev. e atual. Orgs. Abreu, AlziraAlves et. al. (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2001), 3679.31 See: Chagas, Carlos. 113 dias de angústia: impedimento e morte de um presidente. (PortoAlegre: L&PM, 1979).32 Brasil. Congresso Nacional. Decreto no 60.940, de 4 jul. 1967.

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network of internal surveillance and spying—a network which Golbery would come to call

a "monster," though he was not precisely its creator.

The SNI testified the implantation of a political police, especially the CODI-DOI

[Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna-Destacamento de Operações de Informações =

Internal Defense Operations Center-Detachment for Intelligence Operations]. Created in the

late 1960s, the CODI-DOI was formally last until the Figueiredo presidency, which the

system was disbanded. The SNI, on the other hand, would survive into the so-called New

Republic, which began with the restitution of civilian rule in 1985. In fact, the SNI ("the

information community") fared much better than the political police (the "security

community") under Figueiredo. The political police entered into decline as soon as Geisel

announced the "political decompression" [distensão política], but the SNI endured, even

after the presidential transition. It might be said that the agency reached its peak under

Figueiredo, receiving its largest budgetary and personnel allotments and winning approval

to proceed with the development of projects requiring advanced technologies.

The SNI's longevity may explain the persistent notion that the agency was the "security

organ par excellence"33 that prospered above "all the other repressive organs."34 A close

examination of the fact presents a more contradictory story. That is, the SNI was constantly

at odds with other security agencies, such as the Army Information Center [Centro de

Informações do Exército, CIE], an intelligence-gathering agency that all took on

"operations" (to use the language of the day) including arrests and interrogations (and,

33 Oliveira, Eliézer Rizzo. As Forças Armadas: política e ideologia no Brasil (1964-1969).Petrópolis: Vozes, 1976. p. 100.34 Magalhães, Marionilde Dias Brephol de, "A lógica da suspeição: sobre os aparelhosrepressivos à época da ditadura militar no Brasil," Revista Brasileira de História, 17: 34(1997): 205.

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needless to say, torture and murder). Undoubtedly what helps explain the longevity of the

SNI is its legalist orientation, a quality that conferred a certain acceptability, especially in

comparison to analogous agencies in other countries.

The "information community," as I have written elsewhere, 35 did not make arrests

or engage in torture acts. The "information and security divisions" were different from

other state agencies in counting upon the active presence of military officials, an internal

ethos rooted in anticommunism, and the rules of secrecy. These divisions employed

functionaries who collected and analyzed information, which was then distributed to both

the information and security communities. This created problems at higher levels,

especially at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, the information community did not

conduct "operations"; that was a task left to the political police and the CODI-DOI system.

I do not make the distinction simply to exonerate the information community. To

the contrary, the information community must be held responsible for the very legitimation

of a discourse favorable to the radicalization of repression. Often ridiculed as "arapongas"

[a tropical songbird], in truth, the members of the information community played the

central role of spreading among the government ideas that could be used justify the action

of the political police. The community's "information" and analyses circulated among

ministers, governors, and high-ranking military officials. So, then, the issue is not one of

making excuses. Rather, it is understanding the distinctive outlines of the military

dictatorship: the variety of military groups (who were not merely split between hardliners

and moderates) and the particular relationships between these groups.

35 Fico, Como eles agiam.

17

The classic division between hardliners and moderates does not capture the

diversity of splits among various factions of the military. Some members of the military

truly believed in an "authoritarian utopia" to the point where it became necessary for Brazil

to be rid of "subversive" elements. Such advocates supported "clean-up" operations.'

However, not every hardliner engaged in, or approved of, acts of torture or political

assassination. The converse is also true: certain moderates, including castelista Ernesto

Geisel, could accept torture.36

It was precisely the "information community" that exercised the role of go-between

among divergent factions. Data analysis coming from this community was read by

everyone. Some took such analysis as a confirmation of preexisting convictions or fears,

using such information to justify the existence of political police. Others were truly alarmed

by the information, thus finding themselves accepting of the political police. It is for this

reason that I consider the "information community" to be a kind of "specialized

spokesperson."37 With the rise of the "security community" they became a kind of

authorized voice of the "Revolution."

It is in this vein that I speak of a repressive, centralized, and coherent project of

repression. From the late 1960s forward, an extremist hardliner interpretation of the

"authoritarian utopia" animating different factions within the military came to penetrate

various levels the government, winning acceptance through agreement or intimidation.

However, it would be misguided to interpret the repressive state apparatus, exemplified by

36 The former president stated "in certain instances, torture became necessary in order toobtain information… I do not defend torture, but I recognize that there are circumstances inwhich an individual has no choice but to resort to torture, for the purposes of obtaininginformation that would help avoid an even greater evil." See: Maria Celina D'Araujo andCastro Celso. Ernesto Geisel. (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1997), 225.37 Fico, Como eles agiam, 218.

18

AI-5 and CODI-DOI, as a mere reaction the so-called "armed struggle." Just as AI-2 was

not merely a knee-jerk reaction to the electoral results of October 1965, AI-5 cannot be

explained solely as a response to the outbreak of left-wing armed violence. There existed,

since the beginning of the dictatorship, a desire on the part of aforementioned hardliners to

assume a global approach to social control — a approach that envisioned internal spying

and a political police, as well as censorship, propaganda, and summary judgments.

Conversely, some sectors of the left had come to support armed struggle well before the

1964 coup.38 A more textured analysis of the conjunction of actors helps illuminate the

complexities of the story, making it much less possible to simply explain everything away

under the homogenizing rubric of the "dungeons of the dictatorship."

The "information community" was created within a legalist framework; the political

police, on the other hand, came out of a "revolutionary" framework. That is, they originated

from secret directives from the National Security Council and authorities acting with

special presidential approval.39 This dichotomy legal versus revolutionary (which echoes

the coupled idea of the "State of Law" vs. "regime of exception") is an essential key to

understanding this period. If the legalist tendency helps explain the high number of laws

and decrees passed during the military regime (not discounting Brazil's long tradition of

bacheralismo), the claims to "revolutionary powers" (which were often secret, but

sometimes shamefully admitted) that explains attempts to "institutionalize the regime." The

38 Fico, Como eles agiam, 59-64.39 Sistema de Segurança Interna. SISSEGIN. Record classified as "secret". [1974?]. Chapter2, page. 6. See also various classified correspondence found in series “Diversos/Avulsos”, ,“Divisão de Segurança e Informações”. Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro [hereafter AN-RJ], Caixa 43-4118; Also of interest: the classified "Ofício do secretário-geral do Conselhode Segurança Nacional aos governadores estaduais," 10 November 1970. The author thanksElio Gaspari.

19

proposal to draft a new constitution, originally proposed by Costa e Silva, typified various

moves to "institutionalize" exceptional powers prescribed in additional acts through their

incorporation into the constitution. This goal would be achieved under Geisel, when the AI-

5 was replaced with laws authorizing the declaration of "emergency measures" or a "state

of emergency."

The revolutionary foundations of the regime did not create torture acts; torture had

long been a part of Brazilian society. What these foundations achieved, nonetheless, was

the regularization of torture, which came to be a standard part of interrogations of detained

"subversives." The "officialization" of acts of torture (some observers would prefer to call

this the "institutionalization" of torture) discredits explanations that torture was a byproduct

of unregulated actors (autonomia) or excesses (excessos). It is patently impossible that the

systematic practice of torture could have taken place within military units without the

knowledge of commanders. Torture required fixed installations and specialized equipment.

The construction of interrogation cells with climate controls (capable of subjecting

detainees to temperature extremes) and audio technology (capable of broadcasting loud

noises and screams), would have been impossible with the knowledge of overseeing

officers. Military courts were well aware of torture.40

Torturers were not acting in defiance of the superiors. Contrary to certain

interpretations, the security community did not experience a process of disaggregation into

autonomous units.41 The so-called independence with which the security community

40 Archdiocese of São Paulo. Brasil: nunca mais. 4. ed. (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985), 203.41 The thesis of an atomized security apparatus is found in Klein, Lucia and, Marcus F.Figueiredo, Legitimidade e coação no Brasil pós-64. (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1978), 46-47; Eliézer Rizzo Oliveira, As Forças Armadas, 105; Alfred. C

20

operated—allowing the individual units to investigate, detain and torture suspected

individuals—was predicated upon a standardized sequence of investigation, imprisonment,

and torture. We must not confuse the operational autonomy under which the political police

functioned with a lack of oversight from commanders. Skeptics might still was to see the

corroborating documents — a dispatch from a high-ranking general authorizing the torture

of a named detainee. Such dispatches would have been rare, but we do have statements that

leave no doubt that commanders were aware of torture acts. Take for instance the statement

from Geisel, who called torture a "necessity," or the shocking admission from General

Adyr Fiúza de Castro who believed that, "at a minimum, a certain dose of psychological

torture —putting a snake in the detainee's cell, or housing the detainee in a place where

screams might be heard—was necessary."42

For the political police, torture was an everyday practice;43 for a high commander in

charge of repression (like Fiúza de Castro), it was a known practice to be kept apprised of,

if at a distance. Curiously, for both the "ideological" hardliners (officials radically opposed

to subversion, but who took not direct part in the repression) as well as the "pragmatists"

(like Geisel), torture had the same meaning: the lesser of evils. Again, we must underscore

the fragility of distinctions drawn between moderates, a term often assigned to Geisel, and

hardliners. Finally, we might consider military officers who were aware of the torture but

feared getting involved. General Octávio Castro, for example, made the resolution to retire

Stepan. Os militares: da Abertura à Nova República. (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1986),21.42 Statement by Adyr Fiúza de Castro appearing in Os anos de chumbo: a memória militarsobre a repressão. Orgs. D'Araujo, Maria Celina, Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, and CelsoCastro. (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994), 68-69.43 On the topic of torture as an everyday routine, see: Lobo, Amilcar. A hora do lobo, ahora do carneiro. (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1989), 71.

21

from the Army should he be forced to agree to the installation of a center of suspect

purposes in the Forte Duque de Caxias, where he commanded the Centro de Estudos de

Pessoal do Exército.44 Sadly, very few officers came to denounce torture, despite that fact

that torture is considered to be one of the worst crimes against the humanity. The case of

Captain Sérgio Miranda de Carvalho, who denounced Brigadier João Paulo Brunier, is an

exception.45

Quite different from the other "basic pillars" of the repression, such as spying and

moral censorship, torture was embarrassing. It compromised the honor of the military,

particularly because this was the first time that the armed forced had taken a direct and

systematic role in police violence. It was, therefore, necessary to deny the existence of

torture, even as it was impossible to actually bring it to a stop, or to openly denounce the

practice. The "information community" had as one of its main tasks providing cover to the

"security community," crafting a rhetoric of deniability that would be widely absorbed by

the military and civilian authorities associated with the regime. The efficiency with the

information community fulfilled this mission can be easy seen in the enduring uniformity

of the language of denial: torture did not exist, only "excesses" on the part of a few

overzealous low-ranking soldiers who, acting independently, were outside the oversight of

their commanding officers. This kind of rhetoric came to be a precondition for Geisel to

take the progressive position of ending torture. The secret irony was that Geisel had

acquiesced to the practice of torture up until his inauguration.

In 1998, while conducting research in the archives of the defunct Security and

Information Division of the Ministry of Justice [Divisão de Segurança e Informações do

44 Author's interview with Octávio Pereira da Costa, granted 18 July 1994.45 Elio Gaspari, A ditadura envergonhada. (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), 291.

22

Ministério da Justiça], I came across a "white book" ["livro branco" or "livro da verdade"]

prepared for Alfredo Buzaid, Médici's minister of justice. Prepared in 1970, the paper was

intended to be released in response to accusations, originated in the international

community, of torture.46 The regime's most acute problem was a request made by Gabino

Fraga, president of the Organization of American States' International Commission for

Human Rights, to send a team of investigators to Brazil to look into accusations of torture.

Minister Alfredo Buzaid's rapid response to the news [of the OAS request]preempted any reaction from the Foreign Ministry…The Braziliangovernment considered as a threat to its sovereignty any attempt atinterference in the country's internal affairs. This attitude, then, brought thematter to the attention of national authorities…The Ministry of Justicecommissioned a piece that could respond to the accusations, not wanting tocall the work a "white book," but instead a "book of truth" or somethingsimilar. In the preface, the minister himself, Prof. Alfredo Buzaid, listed theaccusations, providing background information and providingdocumentation that refuted the individual charges….The justice ministry iscertain that it can provide convincing responses, with strong supportingevidence, to the persistent charges circulating in the internationalcommunity.47

The existence of international critics would come to be a recurrent concern after

1970, from Médici to Geisel. The latter found Amnesty International to the an "combative

entity infiltrated by the left."48 Between June 1982 and July 1973, under Médici, the SNI

received nearly 2,800 letters from Amnesty written by European citizens expressing

46 Informações do governo brasileiro para esclarecer supostas violações de direitoshumanos relatadas em comunicações transmitidas pela “Comissão Interamericana deDireitos Humanos”, da Organização dos Estados Americanos. Documento “confidencial”da série “Movimentos Contestatórios à Ordem Política e Social”, subsérie “Avulsos” dofundo “Divisão de Segurança e Informações.” AN-RJ Cx. 3582. [1970].47 Jornal do Brasil, 31 October and 14 November 1970, reprinted in Castello Branco,Carlos. Os militares no poder: o baile das solteironas. (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira,1979), 703 and 717.48 D'Araujo, et. al Ernesto Geisel, 232.

23

concern about the denunciations.49 Thanks to the research of James N. Green, we can now

see how torture came cast a cloud over Brazil's image in the United States, where

manifestations against violations of human rights had an impact on the foreign policy of

president Jimmy Carter.50 In July 1974, General Confúcio Danton de Paula Avelino, a

member of the Centro de Informational do Exército, coordinated a campaign of

conterinformation. Certain European representatives of Amnesty International received

personal correspondence offering clarifications about various cases of Brazilian terrorists.51

The denunciations, nonetheless, continued.

Although the "white book" that Buzaid prepared in 1970 would not be published,

the original manuscript was preserved. The originals include a 145-page typed preface with

a brief analytical introduction and 11 volumes of documents refuting the accusation that

torture was sanctioned in Brazil. The volumes had the following titles: 1. Terroristas,

pseudos presos políticos; [Terrorists, pseudo political prisoners] 2. As prisões dos

terroristas; [Detention Centers for Terrorists] 3. A campanha de difamações contra o Brasil;

[The Campaigns to Defame Brazil] 4. O alimento da campanha de difamações contra o

Brasil - “Dossier das Torturas” [The Source of the Campaign to Defame Brazil—"The

Torture Dossier"]; 5. Cinco exemplos de difamações; [Five Cases of Defamations] 6. As

difamações de Ângelo Pezzuti e presos da penitenciária de Linhares; [The Cases of Angelo

49 Informação no 30/73/P, de 19 de julho de 1973. Classified document from Série“Movimentos Contestatórios à Ordem Política e Social”, subsérie “Avulsos” do fundo“Divisão de Segurança e Informações AN-RJ. Caixa 4109, unidade documental 130.50 James N. Green, "Clerics, Exiles, and Academics: Opposition to the Brazilian MilitaryDictatorship in the United States, 1969-1974," Latin American Politics and Society 45:1(Spring 2003): 87-117.51 Relatório Especial de Informações, no 06/74, 25 July 1974, authored by Confúcio Dantonde Paula Avelino. Documento “confidencial” da série “Movimentos Contestatórios àOrdem Política e Social”, subsérie “Avulsos” do fundo “Divisão de Segurança eInformações AN-RJ. Caixa 4109-34, unidade documental 130. fls. 2, 11 e 12.

24

Pezzuti and the Detainees at Linhares] 7. Calúnias sórdidas: as alienadas e paralíticas;

[Sordid Charges: the Insane and Paralyzed] 8. Difamações de torturas - moças de Belo

Horizonte; [The Charges of Torture: Girls from Belo Horizonte] 9. Difamações de torturas -

Ilha das Flores; [Charges of Torture: The Ilha das Flores] 10. A Operação Bandeirante -

vítimas do terrorismo, Olavo Hansen e os demais “torturados”; [Operation Bandeirantes:

Victims of Terrorism: Olavo Hansen and Others "Torture Victims"] 11. Alguns exemplos

da legislação brasileira. [Some Examples of Brazilian Legislation.]

These titles indicate why the document would never published: they call attention to

some of the most scandalous episodes of torture under the regime. The factitious reasoning

developed in the document, whose direct authorship cannot be determined, still managed to

become commonplace within the regime's attempts to deny the existence of torture.

"Political prisoners," for example, became common criminals, "everyday delinquents who

rob banks, kidnap diplomats, and practice acts of murder under the pretence of political

aims."52 Although the government would not disavow the possibility of "excesses,"53 these

people were not subjected to torture. The theme of an international "combative defamatory

campaigns" bent upon damaging the image of the Brazilian government and people became

a leitmotif for the regime.54 The response was logical, as the military state were seriously

concerned with the possibility that denunciations from the international community,

especially foreign governments who maintained close diplomatic relations with Brazil,

might be damaging.

52 Informação no 30/73/P, 19 July 1973. Documento classificado como “secreto” da série“Movimentos Contestatórios à Ordem Política e Social”, subsérie “Avulsos” do fundo“Divisão de Segurança e Informações.” AN-RJ. Caixa 4109. fl. 253 Ibid. fl. 3454. Ibid. fl. 1

25

The argument developed in the white book was not especially well-made. The

report listed various hot-spots of torture in Brazil. The first editor made the mistake of

mentioning of "political prisoners" (a term likely crossed out by Buzaid),55 raising the

hypothesis that torture marks would have to be hidden on detainees related in exchange for

kidnapped diplomats.56 The report would never be released, in large part because it called

attention to themes that regime preferred to keep quiet. The basic justifications contained in

the report, nonetheless, were there.57

Confronted with the discomforting petitions submitted by the OAS, the regime

would adopt the most dubious form of denial: silence. Following internal studies conducted

by the National Security Council. The SNI, and Special Office for Public Relations, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff, a Government Politic of Overseas

Social Communication were developed. Silence was the general strategy proscribed.

Petitions and accusations made by international organs were not go unanswered. João

Figueiredo, secretary-general of the National Security Council, formally presented the plan

to Minister Buzaid in 1972. President Médici later gave his approval.58 Figueiredo, like

Geisel, was quite well-informed of torture acts.

The existence of press censorship was also hidden by the policy of silence. The

legal/revolutionary dichotomy previous discussed explains the existence of two forms of

censorship: a legal and lasting censorship—the one the had controlled public entertainment

55 Ibid.56 Ibid. fl. 2657 See: Côrtes, Giovana Xavier da Conceição. Argumento insustentável: as justificativas dacomunidade de informações para a tortura durante a ditadura militar. Monografia deBacharelado apresentada ao Departamento de História da UFRJ. Rio de Janeiro, 2003.58 Processo no 61397, 31 October 1972. “Confidencial” document from Série“Movimentos Contestatórios à Ordem Política e Social”, subsérie “Processos” do fundo“Divisão de Segurança e Informações.” AN-RJ. Caixa 592/05132.

26

for decades—and a secretive "revolutionary" censorship — an explicitly political form of

press censorship that was treated as "a recourse for repression" by the regime.59

Moral and Political Censorship

There were not one, but two kinds of censorship under the dictatorship. Officially-

sanctioned censorship of public entertainment has been in place since 1946.60 A long-

established part of the professional theater prior to the coup, the post-1964 arrival of

censors at rehearsals, and the attendant frictions, were not novel. In time, censorship was

directed at radio, cinema, television and even circuses and live music performances at

restaurants. There Division of Censorship for Public Entertainment has its own particular

ethos that originated well before 1964. The Division proudly took on its role in Brazilian

society, believing itself to represent the desires of the majority of the populace in warding

off "attacks on morality and good manners." This was an official activity, regulated by

legislative codes, run by career civil servants, and sustained by broad-based support across

a society who found the advent of contraceptives pills and countercultural practices to be

shocking. Expressive portions of society denounced the proliferation of foul language,

sexual situations in film, seminude women on television programs, and song lyrics with

double-meanings. The DCDP, fulfilling its protective mission, fought such offensives.

Perhaps the most important contributing factors to the ethic and moral debates that took

place in the 1960s and 70s was the telenovela. TV Globo was especially important here,

producing daring novelas, broadcast in color, that turned on urban situations and new

59 Aquino, Maria Aparecida de. Censura, imprensa, estado autoritário (1968-1978).(Bauru: Edusc, 1999), 207.60 Decreto n. 20.493 de 24 January1946.

27

modes of behavior. The telenovela phenomenon is especially important for researchers,

who are reminded that the period between 1964 and 1985 cannot be told merely through a

traditional political narratives of the military dictatorship. The impact of TV Globo novelas

on the practice of censorship was large, forming an integral part of a transformation of

manners experienced during the period.61

Even if it would be a historiographic mistake to see moral censorship as originating

within the military regime, it would be equally misguided to ignore the peculiarities of

moral censorship practiced during the regime. The most obvious examples has already

been mentioned: when the hardliners assumed power with the passage of AI-5, moral

censorship of public entertainment became a much more important political concern. After

December 1968, it was not only foul language and nudity that fell under the scrutiny of the

DCDP; film and theater productions with political content, as well as protest music were

closely monitored. The problems for the censors accustomed to moral censorship was how

to work under the rules of political censorship. The DCDP director made a specific point of

informing his superior, the Minister of Justice, of the difficulties confronted by his

employees in enforcing political censorship. He advocated that the duties of these

functionaries should remain more closely focused on moral censorship.62

The question of censorship can be quantified, with the highest rates of censorship

falling outside of the height of repression (that is, the period of the Military Junta and

Médici). Of the plays submitted to the DCDP for review, the highest rate of censorship

(nearly 3%) was registered in 1978. The largest number of film censored (1.5% of films

61 Master's dissertation research underway by Douglas Attila Marcelino, Programa de Pós-graduação em História Social da UFRJ.62 Fico, Carlos. "'Prezada Censura': cartas ao regime military," Topoi - Revista de História,5 (September 2002): 259.

28

reviewed) was in 1980, well into the process of "political opening" that started with Ernesto

Geisel.63

If the politicization of censorship in public entertainment appeared to unify the two

stands of censorship, in fact, moral censorship and political censorship operated on very

distinct logics. Beyond the question of moral versus political content, we must recognize

the importance of the legal versus revolutionary underpinnings of the two kinds of

censorship. The close attention paid to the articulation of laws, norms, and regulations

throughout the dictatorship was not merely an expression of the intent to put forth the

image of legality (for internal and especially external consumption). It was also a symptom

of the distinction made by the regime between activities of repression and social control

that could be placed within the context of the constitutional norms of democratic regimes

and those exceptional activities classified as "revolutionary." Within this distinction, moral

censorship was legal, while press censorship was revolutionary.

Until 1973, the regime denied the very existence of political censorship, even as the

practice was fully developed. Censorship took place outside of any legal or regulatory

framework. Pressrooms would receive telephone calls or missives [bilhetinhos] that

indicated prohibitions on the publication of determined topics. Immediately after the

passage of AI-5, the practice of political censorship was somewhat haphazard: both

commanders of military units as well as agents of the federal police could determine

prohibitions. Later, censorship activities were centralized in the Ministry of Justice, which

received requests and recommendations from various agencies, then to be passed on to

63 Fundo “Divisão de Censura de Diversões Públicas”, Arquivo Nacional, CoordenaçãoRegional do Arquivo Nacional no Distrito Federal, série “Relatórios de Atividades”. 1969-1985.

29

press editors. In 1973, the daily Opinião successfully argued to the nation's highest court

that the government had to admit "political censorship as a "revolutionary" practice— that

is, predicated upon AI-5 (the actual instrumentalization of the Act was exempt from legal

challenge).64 It is not surprising that that height of political censorship was registered during

the height of the political repression (1968-1974). As we have previously seen, the timing

is different from moral censorship.

Political Propaganda and Corruption

My previous research has analyzed the scope of repression relative to two lesser-

known aspects of the military regime: the General Investigations Commission [Comissão

Geral de Investigações (CGI)]65 and political propaganda.66 Without going into too much

detail, I offer my readers a summary overview of these two features of the military

dictatorship. My principal intention is to draw attention to two themes requiring further

historiographic clarification, namely the importance of the ethical-moral discourse among

the military ranks, particularly relative to the legitimation of the regime, and the variety of

political-ideological profiles that one find among various factions of the military. The latter

issues points, once again, to the deficiencies in the classic typology of moderates versus

hardliners.

64 Smith, Anne-Marie. Um acordo forçado: o consentimento da imprensa à censura noBrasil. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2000), 130-132.65 Fico, Como eles agiam, 149-160; Adriano de Macedo Garcia, BA student at theUniversidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, is working on the same theme.66 Fico, Reinventando o otimismo.

30

The Comissão Geral de Investigações (CGI) was created four days after the

promulgation of AI-5.67 Its purpose was to regulate the confiscation of goods belonging to

public servants found to be guilty of illicit gains [enriquecimento ilícito].68 The punishment

of corrupt functionaries was proscribed in the eighth article of AI-5. Officially, the CGI

was subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. In practice, the vice-president was the

commission's head. Functional between 1968 and 1978, the commission was headed by

Gens. Oscar Luiz da Silva, Obino Lacerda Álvares, and Luiz Serff Sellmann. Based in Rio

de Janeiro, the commission was part of a national network, known as the "CGI System" that

included subcommissions functioning at the state level. The personnel working within the

system was detailed from the civil service.

The CGI System functioned somewhat precariously. Authorized to use legal

warrants for the seizure of property, the Commission conducted summary investigations

into fraud. However, the process was often poorly carried out. Even under the pall of AI-5,

the accused were able to file judicial challenges to seizures. What we see, in fact, was a

tribunal whose primary power was intimation. The CGI was empowered to issue

subpoenas, calling the recipient to testify, and the subpoenas were often issued with the

explicit purpose of frightening the recipient into ceasing the alleged corruption. Although

the CGI took pride in such acts, called "catalytic acts" [ações catalíticas], they were little

more than acts of political persecution and the abuse of power. With time, the members of

67 Researchers must be attentive to the fact that the regime organized two independentCGIs: the first, the Comissão Geral de Investigação, was created by the Comando Supremoda Revolução, on 27 April 1964. It was responsible for military police inquiries. Thesecond was created on 17 December 1968, after AI-5. Its function was the confiscation ofillicit gains. The Comissão Geral de Inquérito Policial-Militar, created by Decreto-lei no

459, also functioned after AI-5.68 Brasil. Congresso Nacional. Decreto-lei no 359, 17 December 1968.

31

the CGI began to investigate more unusual cases under their jurisdictions, such as numbers

running schemes [jogo do bicho]. The so-called CGI System perpetually faced difficulties

in carrying out its punitive functions. The president rarely accepted the conclusions reached

in summary investigations. Between 1968 and 1973, more than 1,000 of the 1,153

investigations of corruption were closed without action. Of the 58 cases that resulted in a

recommendation for the confiscation of property, only 41 receive presidential approval.

The CGI was also empowered to recommend the application of various provisions of AI-5,

including the suspension of political rights or the loss of public office. It might also forward

its investigative finding to the Ministry of Justice for possible criminal prosecution. Neither

of these powers were exercised with much effect.

Political propaganda was more sophisticated. Operating within the purview of the

Presidency of the Republic, the Special Office for the Public Relations (AERP) was created

by Costa e Silva in early 1968. Initially run by Col. Hernani D'Aguiar (1968-1969), the

agency had more success under the leadership of Col. Octávio Pereira da Costa (1969-

1974), a Médici appointment. D'Aguair was a devotee of hyper-patriotic [ufanista]

propaganda that invoked images of "Brazilian greatness." The problem was that the

language did catch on with the general populace. Octávio Costa reformulated the

government's propaganda activities, overseeing made-for-television films that did not

appear to be produced by the government. At the height of the dictatorship, these

"commercials" spoke of participation and love, showing idealized family relations,

interracial fraternity, and the benefits of education, hygiene, and civility. Octávio Costa was

an intellectual officer, an aficionado of Brazilian literature and historical-sociological

insights that drew from the work of Gilberto Freyre. The films produced under Costa were

32

successful: attractive images were accompanied by moving sound tracks. Narration and

voiceovers were limited to slogans like “Ninguém segura o Brasil” [Nobody is going to

hold back Brazil]; “É tempo de construir” [It is time to build]; “Ontem, hoje e sempre:

Brasil” [Yesterday, today, and always: Brazil]; “Você constrói o Brasil” [You build Brazil];

“O Brasil merece o nosso amor" [Brazil needs our love]. The AERP was partially

dismantled at the beginnig of the Geisel administration, but gained new life after official

party's poor performaces in the 1974 elections. In renewing the agency's mandate, Geisel

called upon Col. José Maria de Toledo Camargo, who was told "I want you to help me win

an election, the next election."69 Under Camargo, who served until 1978, the AERP was

renamed under the new name of the Office of Public Relations (AEP). Camargo, who had

formerly served as assistant to Octávio Costa, was not an innovator.

To regime critics, the AERP seemed to be an all-powerful agency, fully integrated

into the repressive apparatus. The AERP certainly cultivated this impression, deftly selling

the idea that the regime calmly guided a "land of the future" populated by a unique people

at the same time that the repression was at its harshest. The press, the left, and intellectuals

were convinced that the AERP was the source of the slogan "Brasil: ame-o ou deixe-o"

[Brazil: Love It or Leave It], which appeared on windshield stickers. (In fact, the phrase

was adapted from its English-language original. The OBAN (Operação Bandeirantes), a

branch of the CODI-DOI system, can be credited with introducing the phrase to Brazil.)

Octávio Costa faced sharp criticism among the intelligence community, whose members

saw his work as irrelevant, a parfumerie. Key advisors to president Médici found Costa,

who once authored a column in the Rio daily Jornal do Brasil and later served as a hapless

69 Fico, Carlos. Op. cit. p. 106.

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ghost-writer for Médici's notorious inaugural address, to be a "blockheaded poet."70 For the

hardliners, the purpose of propaganda was not to producing edifying commercials; it was,

instead, a support for "psychological war." Contrary to Octávio Costa's desires,

propaganda sometimes served this very purpose, as was the case when repentant ex-

guerillas were paraded on televisions to protest their regret for past actions.

The idea of creating a propaganda agency came up early in the regime. The SNI,

created in 1964, was originally conceived as serving a double function: the collection and

dissemination of information. Within the tradition of military history, Castelo Branco's

resistance to such a service, attributed to his believe that the truth was self-evident and did

not need to be imposed. The AERP would not be created until the administration of Costa e

Silva, and the agency would not become fully functional until Médici took office. Geisel

would try to diminish the importance of political propaganda, but electoral necessities

forced him to maintain it.

There were serious differences between the CGI and the AERP/ARP. Empowered

by provisions in the AI-5, the Commission proposed punishments based on "revolutionary"

criteria. The AERP antedated AI-5 and only punished those who found themselves forced

to watch its "filmettes" (as the AERP named its film productions). Nevertheless, in a close

analysis of these two agencies, I argue, we find a conjunction of the entirety of the "basic

pillars"71 of repression. That is, we see the political police, surveillance, press censorship,

censorship of public entertainment, the summary judgment of corrupted officials, and

70 Ibid. 10071 See: Fico, Carlos, "Espionagem, polícia política, censura e propaganda: os pilaresbásicos da repressão," in O Brasil republicano. Livro 4: O tempo da ditadura – regimemilitar e movimentos sociais em fins do século XX. Orgs. Jorge Ferreira and Lucilia deAlmeida Neves. (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2003).

34

political propaganda. These six facets of authoritarian regimes were rooted in the image of

an "authoritarian utopia" — "the idea that the military was, at that moment, superior to

civilian authorities on questions of patriotism, knowledge of Brazilian realities, and moral

rectitude." 72 To my reading, then, this utopia should not be mistaken for a systematic and

unified ideology, as other analysis is, based on the idea of a "doctrine of national security,"

have argued. 73

While the political police, internal spies, press censorship, and the CGI were deeply

imbricate within the sanitizing impulse of the "authoritarian utopia," the AERP and the

DCDP were distinguished by their "civilizing" and pedagogical missions. The first set

physically eliminated communists, subversive corrupt officials, and "exotic doctrines"; the

second set worked to "educate the Brazilian people" and defend them from attacks on

morals and good manners. It would be relatively easy to find instances in which these two

orientations could be combined in the same operation. A good example of this

complementary would by the CGI, which acted both in a "sanitation" function (hunting

down and stripping political rights from allegedly corrupt officials) as well as the educating

function, though its "catalytic actions."

Images That Linger

For everyday people, the images of the military dictatorship that linger are not the

same images that intellectuals associate with the period. For intellectuals, of which I

include myself, talk of the dictatorship brings back memories of a time of arbitrary rule, the

72 D'Araujo et. al. Visões do golpe, 973 See: Oliveira, As Forças Armadas, and Comblin, Joseph. A ideologia da segurançanacional: o poder militar na América Latina. (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978).

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suspension of the right to express one's opinion, vote, to come and go as one pleases.

Above all else, such talk recalls a time in which friends and colleagues were imprisoned,

humiliated, tortured, and in some cases, murdered. The same cannot be said for everyday

people. One might say that the notion of "everyday people" lacks conceptual rigor. The

fragility of this concept is manifest in the words of the current president [Luis Ignácio

"Lula" da Silva], who once invoked the image of better times when talking about the height

of the repression. Lula is typically treated as a member of a left-wing elite that maintains a

critical attitude towards the dictatorship. Nevertheless, Lula was favorably impressed by the

image of the Médici government as a time of full employment. "It was a time, " stated the

president, "when we changed jobs whenever we wanted to. There were companies that sent

vans to steal employees from other companies."74

Like it or not, the images of the military regime evoked by everyday people did not

include denunciations of arbitrary rule. Enjoying powers that ranged from censorship of the

press to the imprisonment of opponents, the regime's "manipulators of symbols goods" had

on their side the power of the sanitizing dimension of the authoritarian utopia. There were

equally competent "educators," drawing upon an immense reservoir of positive images

evoking that supposed singularity of the nation. Below, we trace out some of the principal

outlines of images of the dictatorship constructed by the regime itself.

At the regime's outset, Catholic doctrine was quite important. The famous "Marches

for Family, with God and for Liberty" took off after President João "Jango" Goulart made

some careless remarks in his speech at the Comício da Central. In an attempt to criticize the

"Crusade of the Rosary"— a movement which originated in the United States in 1945

74 Couto, Ronaldo Costa. Memória viva do regime militar. Brasil: 1964-1985. (Rio deJaneiro: Record, 1999), 251.

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before making its way to Brazil—Jango declared that rosaries could not be raised "against

the people."75 This was more than sufficient for Ana de Lurdes — Catholic nun,

granddaughter of Rui Barbosa [a prominent statesman of the First Republic], and confidant

to the image-makers at IPÊS — to start the marches, which were initially thought to be a

movement to rectify the president's "attack" on rosary. The strategy had been underway for

some time: while Goulart spoke at the main train station, candles burned in protest in the

homes of Rio's elite neighborhoods.

Source: “Mulher se ajoelha para rezar o terço na Marcha do Recie”. Manchete, 25 April 1964. p. 36

The fervor with which Brazil would be associated with "Western and Christian

democracies" (in contrast to communist regimes) would fade with time. However, the

images of small-town parish churches, symbolizing the authentic national community,

75 Discurso de João Goulart no Comício da Central em 13 de março de 2004.

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would never wholly disappear from state-sponsored propaganda. The regime's attempt to

maintain or restore a good relationship with the Church was another indicator of the force

of Catholicism in Brazil.76 The marches, led by Catholic, middle-class women defending

the values of strong moral values, would remain the object of criticism, both in the press

and among intellectuals, who saw the movements as outdated in relation to new modes of

behavior made possible by women's liberation and counterculture. The women would not

be deterred: they simply moved on to other causes, particulate crusades against "attacks on

morality and good manners," already a major theme for censors of public entertainment.

With the passage of time, these women became sharp critics of "excesses" in film, theatre,

popular music, and especially television. They would send letters to the Division of

Censorship for Public Entertainment, a tactic that had already proved successful prior to the

coup.77 1964's female marchers [marchadeiras] come to be known, especially after 1969, as

the guardians of morality. Their letters drew upon a system of moral values deeply

ingrained in the Brazilian imaginary, itself deeply marked by many of the most

conservative aspects of Catholic doctrine. These women treated the DCDP as a [female]

companion, a trusted next-door neighbor. The letters typically began with the salutation

"Dear Censor" [Prezada Censura]

76 Serbin, Kenneth P. Diálogos na sombra. Bispos e militares, tortura e justiça social naditadura. (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001).77 The pressure politics began in 1964, with letter-writing campsigns to Congress. See:Pollanah, Stella M Senra. Livro de cabeceira da mulher. (Rio de Janeiro: CivilizaçãoBrasileira, 1967) Vol. 5, p. 161; Presot, Aline. As “Marchas da Família, com Deus pelaLiberdade." MA thesis, Programa de Pós-graduação em História Social da UFRJ. Rio deJaneiro, 2004.

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Source: Fundo “Divisão de Censura de Diversões Públicas”, Arquivo Nacional, Coordenação Regional doArquivo Nacional no Distrito Federal, Série “Correspondência Oficial”, Subsérie “Manifestações da

Sociedade Civil”, 23 September 1974, Caixa 1.

Another important set of images comes directly from the public appearances of the

military officers. The grave poses of "serious men" seemed to want to mark a supposed

superiority in relation to civilian politicians, who came off as unprepared and subject to the

temptations of corruption. The typical solemnity of military life would seem to be

frightening or overly somber for both the left and intellectuals, but we must not discount

the power of the image of formality and ceremony, so typical of the public appearances

often general-presidents. Such images could easily transmit the idea of order, respectability,

discipline, and so on.78

78 Fico, Reiventando o otimismo, 59.

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Source: Agência O Globo. Golpe de 64 - Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco,Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo e Arthur da Costa e Silva, 01 March 1964

The images produced by an exuberant language of rapid economic development

would be recycled often, by the agents of political propaganda as well as the mainstream

press. Such images helped produce a political atmosphere of high hopes for the nation, the

eternal "land of the future," about to become a world power. Such images were legion in

magazines, including Machete. During the Médici regime, the press wrote of the futurist

architecture of Brasília, the rapid development of cities such as São Paulo and Rio de

Janeiro, the peculiarities of the drought-stricken Northeast, the imponderable mysteries of

the Amazon jungle, not to mention soccer, telecommunications, and the nation's gold

reserves.79 Under Geisel, the focus shifted to the maintenance of the "new levels of

economic development" reached during the "miracle." Such reports include coverage of the

79 Melo Filho, Murilo. "O Brasil para o Presidente Médici," Manchete, 17: 916 (8November 1969): 92-105.

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production of steel, petroleum, electricity, and automobiles as well as road construction.80

General Geisel would also reprise the images of the northeastern "backlands" [sertões], the

Amazon Hylea [hiléia amazônica], and the "vastness" of the Central Plateau.81 Such images

were classic tropes of the "Brazilian greatness" [grandeza brasileira]. The invocation of

Brazil's natural splendor was a throw-back to the colonial period.82 During the dictatorship,

such images could be found in the work of Jean Manzon, the AERP, and journalist Amaral

Netto. For the readers of Manchete and O Cruzeiro, and for those who watched TV Globo's

programming, the images that lingered from that period include the construction of the

highways including the Transamazônica (the regime claimed the highway, like the Great

Wall of China, was visible from outer space) and the road linking the capital to the North,

the immense amount of water passing through the floodgates at the Itaipu hydroelectric

plant (the largest in the word), not to mention the bridge spanning between Rio de Janeiro

and Niterói (whose central span was, once again, the "largest in the world"). This was the

discourse describing the construction of the tenth largest economy of the world, eighth

among Western nations.

80 Melo Filho, Murilo. "Começa agora o Brasil de Geisel: mais rico, mais sólido, maisconfiante" Manchete, 21:1144 (23 March 1974): 66-84.81 Geisel, Ernesto. Discursos. Volume I, 1974. (Brasília: Assessoria de Imprensa e RelaçõesPúblicas da Presidência da República, 1975), 128.82 Fico, Reiventando o otimismo. passim.

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Source: Agência O Globo

What's to be made of political propaganda? Certainly the conjunction of images

deployed in commercials produced by the AERP had a great impact on the Brazilian

populace. Under Octávio Pereria de Costa (1969-1974), the AERP was capable of

articulating a long-running set of promises about a Brazil of greatness, a world leader,

blessed by Nature. A powerful country inhabited by a cordial people. A racial democracy

where the powerful were kind. The country envisioned by the AERP propaganda —

unified, speaking a single tongue — mixed together the image of natural beauty, the

ufanism of Afonso Celso and Stefan Zweig, and these thesis of benevolent slavery

developed by Gilberto Freyre. Scored to sentimental harmonies, infused with the patriotism

of scouting, the images that linger from the AERP speak of a new era, a time of

constriction, born out of the dictatorship; In this era, happy families cared for their children

and the elderly. Workers had jobs. This list goes on.

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The positive outlook of all these images, was not an invention of the military

regime. Deeply ingrained in the imaginary of Brazilian society, such images were useful

at that moment and they continue to be so today. It should not be surprising that the civilian

administrations that have followed the dictatorship have continued to invoke some of the

same images.

From 1971 forward, the military dictatorship granted itself powers that might seem

ridiculous: the regime reserved the right to legislate through "reserved decrees," acts in

which the content would remain unknown.83 This would appear to be the high point in the

regime's compulsive drive for formalism and legitimacy, when, in fact, what we had was

merely a legalist veil over blatant illegitimacy. This interpretation would not be wholly

incorrect, but we must recognize that the regime was quite successful at mobilizing a good

83 Thirteen decretos reservados were published between 1971 and 1985. Most dealt withissues related to the security and intellegice communities, as well as the problem of nationalsecurity.

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number of positive images to accompany the actions of the CGI, censors, and political

police. The fight against corruption and immorality, and the exaltation of Brazilian values,

contributed had favorably to the construction of a positive image of the period, especially

among everyday people. Hidden from sight, denied in the very moment of their

normalization, were the repressive acts of torture and press censorship. In the process, the

regime saved itself from its own negative images.