The End of an Era – or a New Start? drphilos dissertation.pdf · ix Preface This is a dissertation for the degree called doctor philosophiae, Dr.philos, the old doctorate degree

Dr.philos.DissertationVegardBye,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofOslo

TheEndofanEra–oraNewStart?

EconomicReformswithPotentialforPoliticalTransformationinCuba

onRaúlCastro´sWatch(2008-2018).

ii

iii

ToCuba’syouth,

wishingthemtheopportunitytoformafuturetheycanbelievein.

iv

v

INDEX

PREFACE.....................................................................................................................................................IX1:INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................................11.1.THESETTINGOFTHESTUDY...........................................................................................................................................11.2.OUTLINEOFTHEDISSERTATION....................................................................................................................................6

CHAPTER2:RESEARCHDESIGN.........................................................................................................112.1.THEPROBLEMOFSTUDYINGPOLITICSINCUBA.....................................................................................................112.2.INTERPLAYBETWEENECONOMICANDPOLITICALVARIABLES...........................................................................142.3.RESEARCHSTRATEGY....................................................................................................................................................192.4.SOURCES............................................................................................................................................................................20

CHAPTER3:SUMMARYOFMAINREFORMSONRAÚLCASTRO´SWATCH..............................233.1.THEECONOMICSITUATIONATTHEOUTSETOFTHEREFORMERA....................................................................233.2.THEPROCESSLEADINGTOTHEREFORMAGENDA..................................................................................................263.3.THEREFORMAGENDA...................................................................................................................................................293.4.REFORMSLEADINGTOTRANSFORMATION?............................................................................................................35

CHAPTER4:THEORETICALANDCOMPARATIVE-EMPIRICALFRAMEWORKFORTHESTUDY........................................................................................................................................................374.1.INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................374.2.CATEGORISINGSOCIO-ECONOMICANDPOLITICALTRANSITIONSORTRANSFORMATIONS..........................384.3.THEORETICALAPPROACHESFORECONOMICVS.POLITICALTRANSFORMATIONS.........................................414.4.LIBERALTRANSITIONTHEORIES.................................................................................................................................444.4.1Thedeathofthedemocratictransitionparadigm?...........................................................................444.4.2.LinzandStepan´sFiveArenasofDemocracy.......................................................................................484.4.3.LinzandStepan´sapproachestothestudyofpost-totalitarianism..........................................504.4.4.Fukuyama´s”waytoDenmark”..................................................................................................................514.4.5.Thepoliticaleconomyofdemocratictransitions...............................................................................544.4.6.Przeworskiand‘theliberalisationfromdictatorship’.....................................................................55

4.5.THECASEFOR‘TRANSFORMATIVEDEMOCRATICPOLITICS’–ORSCANDINAVIAN-STYLESOCIALDEMOCRACY..............................................................................................................................................................................574.6.ALTERNATIVES:‘DELIBERATIVE’OR‘CONSENSUS’DEMOCRACY........................................................................634.7.THEISSUEOF‘EARLYWINNERS’AND‘EARLYLOSERS’..........................................................................................644.8.TRANSITIONFROMCOMMUNISM................................................................................................................................664.8.1.KornaiandThePoliticalEconomyofCommunism...........................................................................664.8.2.AHistorian´sperspectiveonthefalloftheUSSR................................................................................684.8.3.Post-Communistelitere-circulation.........................................................................................................69

4.9.THEPATTERNOFTRANSFORMATIONTOAUTHORITARIANMARKETECONOMIES.........................................714.9.1.Theconceptof‘neo-patrimonialism’–anditsapplicationtoLatinAmerica.........................714.9.2.Transformationtooligarchicneo-patrimonialism:thecaseofAngola...................................754.9.3.Transformationtooligarchicneo-patrimonialism:RussiaandthearrivaloftheOligarchs............................................................................................................................................................................774.9.4.ThecaseofChinaasareferencepoint....................................................................................................794.9.5.ThecaseofVietnamasareferencepoint...............................................................................................88

4.10.RESILIENTPOST-COMMUNISMANDPRAGMATICACCEPTANCE........................................................................964.11.WHATMAKESSTATESFAILALTOGETHER?...........................................................................................................984.12.THEEXTERNALENVIRONMENTANDTHEEMERGENCEOFA‘SECONDWORLDBLOC’..............................1004.13.EXITVS.VOICE?.........................................................................................................................................................1034.14.SOMEPECULIARCUBANASPECTSTOBEARINMIND........................................................................................1054.14.1.Remembering‘Cubanexceptionalism’...............................................................................................1054.14.2.Cuba´s‘democraticbirthdefect’...........................................................................................................107

4.15.THEORETICALCONSIDERATIONSABOUTPOST-CASTROLEGITIMACY.........................................................1104.16.HOWANDWHEREDOESTHETHEORETICAL-EMPIRICALLITERATUREFITINTOOUR“ROADMAP”?...113

vi

4.17.THEOVERARCHINGISSUESOFTHESTUDY.........................................................................................................117CHAPTER5:TRANSFORMATIVECHALLENGES,HYPOTHESESANDINDICATORS...............1225.1.THEMEETINGOFTHEPRACTICALREFORMAGENDAANDTHETRANSITIONLITERATURE.......................1225.2.THETHREEPOSSIBLEOUTCOMESOFTHESTUDY................................................................................................1235.3.THENINECHALLENGESWITHHYPOTHESESANDINDICATORS........................................................................1255.4SOMEDILEMMASWHENENTERINGTHECRITICALJUNCTURE(2018-2021):............................................140

CHAPTER6:THEEVOLVINGECONOMICARENA..........................................................................142CHALLENGE1:.......................................................................................................................................................................142SIGNIFICANTRETREATOFTHESTATEINTHEAGRICULTURALSECTOR,I.A.ASAMEASURETOMEETTHEMASSIVENEEDFORINCREASEDFOODPRODUCTION...................................................................................................142CHALLENGE2:.......................................................................................................................................................................162LOOSENINGOFSTATECONTROLANDDOMINANCEOFTHEECONOMY–GROWTHOFNON-STATEECONOMY–AIMINGATSUSTAINEDECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTGENERATION...................................................162CHALLENGE3:.......................................................................................................................................................................210MASSIVENEEDFORPRODUCTIVEINVESTMENTSTOSPURECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTCREATION...................................................................................................................................................................................................210

CHAPTER7:POLITICALIMPLICATIONSOFSOCIO-ECONOMICCHANGES.............................235CHALLENGE4:POLITICALIMPLICATIONSOFSOCIO-ECONOMICCHANGES...........................................................235

CHAPTER8:THEEVOLVINGINTERNATIONALARENA–FITTINGINTOANEWCONTEXT...................................................................................................................................................................267CHALLENGE5:ACHANGINGINTERNATIONALCONTEXT:HOWTOINFLUENCETHEUSTOABANDONTHEEMBARGO/BLOCKADE;AND/ORCOMPENSATETHEEMBARGOBYHELPOFOTHERINTERNATIONALALLIANCES..............................................................................................................................................................................267

CHAPTER9:THEEVOLVINGPOLITICALARENA..........................................................................298CHALLENGE6:EMERGENCEOFAMOREPLURALISTCIVIL,ACADEMICANDMEDIASOCIETY...........................298CHALLENGE7:DIFFERENTIATIONOFSTATEVS.PARTYFUNCTIONS;DIVISIONOFSTATEPOWERS(LEGISLATIVEVS.EXECUTIVE)?........................................................................................................................................326CHALLENGE8:MOVESTOWARDSALESSAUTHORITARIANANDMOREPLURALISTPOLITICALSYSTEM.......354CHALLENGE9:GENERATIONALRENEWALWITHNEWSOURCEOFLEGITIMACY.................................................384

CHAPTER10:STATUSOFTRANSFORMATIONS...........................................................................419CHAPTER11:SOMEPRINCIPALDILEMMASDURINGTHECRITICALJUNCTURE(2018-2021)........................................................................................................................................................46111.1WHATISACRITICALJUNCTURE?...........................................................................................................................46111.2SOMEPARADIGMATICCHOICESAHEAD................................................................................................................46511.3:THESUPPOSEDINCOHERENCEOFPARTIALREFORM.......................................................................................47311.4:POWER,HEGEMONYANDLEGITIMACYDURINGTHECRITICALJUNCTURE.................................................48211.5:EMERGENCEOFCOUNTER-HEGEMONYANDTHEOPTIONOFNEGOTIATEDSOLUTIONS.........................486

CHAPTER12:ASSESSMENTOFSCENARIOS...................................................................................49212.1.ALTERNATIVEECONOMICSCENARIOS.................................................................................................................49312.1.1Ritter’sscenarios...........................................................................................................................................49312.1.2.Feinberg’sthreescenarios.......................................................................................................................49512.1.3.Monreal’sscenarios.....................................................................................................................................496

12.2.ALTERNATIVEPOLITICALSCENARIOS..................................................................................................................49812.2.1.SaxonbergonTransitionsfromCommunism.................................................................................49812.2.2.Transformationtoliberaldemocracy................................................................................................49912.2.3.AMexican“PRI-like”scenario?..............................................................................................................499

12.3.SCENARIOSFORANAUTHORITARIANMARKETECONOMY..............................................................................50012.3.0.Overviewandcommondenominators...............................................................................................500Scenario1.1:Transformationstowardsasocialistneo-patrimonial(orauthoritarianmarketeconomic)state?..........................................................................................................................................................507

vii

Scenario1.2:Transformationstowardsanoligarchicneo-patrimonialstate................................509Scenario2:TransformationstowardsaTransnationalneo-authoritarianstate........................510

12.4.ASCENARIOFORTRANSFORMATIVEDEMOCRATICPOLICIES........................................................................512Scenario3:Transformativedemocraticpolicies:towardsamixedeconomywithmoreparticipatorypolity....................................................................................................................................................512

12.5THEREJECTIONOFSYSTEMATICMARKETREFORMANDTHEDANGEROFCOLLAPSE–SOMEFINALCONSIDERATIONS..................................................................................................................................................................520

CHAPTER13:CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................................................527APPENDIX1:...........................................................................................................................................541LISTOFCHALLENGES...........................................................................................................................................................541

APPENDIX2:...........................................................................................................................................547NOTEONSOURCES...............................................................................................................................................................547

APPENDIX3:...........................................................................................................................................559BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................................................................................559

APPENDIX4:...........................................................................................................................................582LISTOFACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................................................582

TABLESANDFIGURESFIGURE2.1:POLITICS–ECONOMICSCORRELATIONMATRIX:TRANSFORMATIONOPTIONSFORTHERAÚL

CASTROERAREFORMSFIGURE1.....................................................................................................................................16FIGURE6.1:COMPOSITIONOFCUBANECONOMICSECTORS(STATEANDNON-STATE)FIGURE2.........................171FIGURE6.2:GAESASUBSIDIARYALMACENESUNIVERSALESFIGURE3.....................................................................172FIGURE6.3:GAESASUBSIDIARYGAVIOTACORPORATIONFIGURE4.........................................................................173FIGURE10.1:POLITICS-ECONOMICSCORRELATIONROADMAP:2018OUTCOMEOFTHERAÚLCASTRO

REFORMEFFORTSFIGURE5............................................................................................................................................460FIGURE12.1:THEMONREALSCENARIOSFIGURE6..........................................................................................................496FIGURE12.2:SCENARIO1:STATUSQUOTOWARDSNEO-PATRIMONIALISMFIGURE6..........................................508FIGURE12.3:SCENARIO3:PARTICIPATORYDEMOCRACYWITHSOCIO-ECONOMICANDWELFARESTATE

REHABILITATIONFIGURE9..............................................................................................................................................519TABLE6.1:FORMSOFLANDTENUREINCUBATABLE1..................................................................................................148TABLE6.2:DEVELOPMENTINNUMBEROFREGISTEREDSELF-EMPLOYEDTABLE2.................................................180TABLE6.3:DEVELOPMENTINPERCENTAGEOFNON-STATEEMPLOYMENTTABLE3..............................................186TABLE6.4:THECUBANPRIVATESECTOR,2015TABLE4..............................................................................................187TABLE6.5:ESTIMATEDCOMPOSITIONOFSTATEANDNON-STATESECTORSINTHECUBANECONOMYTABLE5

..............................................................................................................................................................................................193TABLE6.6:ESTIMATEDINVOICINGINDIFFERENTPRIVATESECTORS,2016TABLE6............................................194TABLE6.7:EVOLUTIONOFVARIOUSFORMSOFCOOPERATIVES,2011-2016TABLE7.........................................202TABLE6.8:SELECTEDMACROECONOMICINDICATORS,CUBA(2008-2018)TABLE8...........................................232TABLE9.1:MEMBERSHIPINTHECUBANCOMMUNISTPARTYTABLE9......................................................................332TABLE9.2:PERCENTAGEOFCOLOUREDANDWOMENINLEADINGCUBANBODIES,2016TABLE10.................334TABLE9.3:REPRESENTATIONOFWOMENINCUBANPARLIAMENTABLE11............................................................335TABLE9.4:OVERLAPBETWEENSTATECOUNCILANDPARTYLEADERSHIPTABLE12.............................................337TABLE9.5:"THETWELVEAPOSTLES"OFCUBA(UNTIL2018)TABLE13..................................................................340TABLE9.6:MILITARYPRESENCEINTOPPARTYANDSTATEBODIESTABLE14.........................................................345TABLE9.7:COMPOSITIONOFPCCCENTRALCOMMITTEE2016-2021TABLE15.................................................387

viii

TABLE12.1:SCENARIO1.1:"SOCIALIST"NEO-PATRIMONIALISM(ORAUTHORITARIANMARKETECONOMY)TABLE16........................................................................................................................................................523

TABLE12.2:SCENARIO1.2:"OLIGARCHIC"NEO-PATRIMONIALISMTABLE18........................................................524TABLE12.3:SCENARIO2:TRANSITIONALNEO-AUTHORITARIANISMTABLETABLE19........................................525TABLE12.4:SCENARIO3:MIXEDECONOMYWITHPARTICIPATORYDEMOCRACYTABLE20...............................526

ix

Preface

Thisisadissertationforthedegreecalleddoctorphilosophiae,Dr.philos,theold

doctoratedegreeatNorwegianuniversities.SincetheintroductionofthePh.D.system,it

isnotverycommontosubmitDr.philos.dissertations.Accordingtotheregulationsof

theUniversityofOslo,aDr.philos.dissertationshallbe“anindependentscientificwork,

fulfillinginternationalstandardsregardingethicalcriteria,academiclevel,methodand

documentation.Itshallcontributetothedevelopmentofnewacademicknowledgeand

stayonanacademiclevelqualifyingforpublicationaspartofthescientificliterature

withinitsdiscipline”(translatedfromNorwegian).

ToworkwithaDr.philos.degreeisnormallyaverylonelyprocess.TheUniversityoffers

noacademicoreconomicsupport.Youhavenoformalaccesstosupervision.Itisoften

saidthatyouareexpectedworkinsplendidisolationandcomedownfromyour

mountainresortwithabunchofpaperstobehandedintothescientificcommitteewith

themessage:“takeitorleaveit”.

Inreality,Ihavebeenfortunatetohaveseveralacademiccolleaguesandfriendswho

havesupportedmethroughoutthisprocess.ProfessorsOlleTörnquistandBernt

Hagtvet,bothofthePoliticalScienceDepartmentattheUniversityofOslo,haveoffered

goodandimportantguidanceandfeedback.ThesameisthecaseforProfessorTorbjørn

L.KnutsenatNTNUUniversity(Trondheim),andforProfessorAxelBorchgrevinkat

OsloMetUniversity.Withouttheiracademicadvice,Iwouldnothavedaredtopresent

thisdissertation.AssociateProfessorKarinDokkenatthePoliticalScienceDepartment

hasofferedallherexperiencewiththepresentationofdoctoratethesestoguideme

throughthefinallapofthework.

Iclaimtohaveaquiteuniquepointofdeparturetomakethisstudy.Ihavebeenlivingin

andvisitingCubaregularlysincethelate1970s,startingwithatwo-yearperiodas

JuniorProfessionalOfficerwiththeUNDPinCuba.Iliterallywentrightfrommydefence

ofthe“hovedoppgave”inPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofOsloinJune1977,tothis

excitingjobinHavana.IhavemeanwhilebeenfollowingCubaneconomicandpolitical

developmentsquiteregularly.Since2010,intherun-uptothe6thCommunistParty

x

CongresswhenRaúlCastro´sreformagendawasapproved,Ihavebeencoordinatingan

academiccollaborationprojectwithseveralCubaninstitutions,firstonbehalfofthe

NorwegianInstituteforInternationalAffairs(NUPI),lateronbehalfoftheCentrefor

DevelopmentandtheEnvironment(SUM)attheUniversityofOslo.Theprojecthasbeen

financedbytheNorwegianMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheEmbassyinHavana.

ThroughseveralannualvisitstoCuba,Ihavealsobeencollectingdataforthestudy.

TherearesomanypersonsIneedtothankfortheirsupport.Manyofthem–butnotall

–arementionedinAppendix2(Sources).MostofallIwanttothankthegenerousand

hospitableCubanpeopleandallmyCubanfriendsandcolleagues.Iwanttothankthose

attheHavanaEmbassyandtheMFAwhohaveshowninterestinmywork,and

colleaguesatNUPIandSUM.IthankmysonsSilvioandDavid,andmypartnerVigdis,

whohavesupportedmeandputupwithmeintheprivatesphere.Mycolleaguesat

Scanteamhavealsoshowngreatpatience.MonicaFørdeSalater,StephanieDischand

mysonDavidByeObandohavehelpedmewiththemanuscript.

Attheendoftheday,everythingwritteninthisdissertationisofcoursemyown

responsibility.Ilookforwardtoallconstructivefeedbackandcomments.

Oslo,18May2018

VegardBye

QuotationsmarkedwithS/E,aretranslatedfromSpanishtoEnglishbytheauthorofthe

dissertation.

1

1: Introduction

1.1. The setting of the study

On19April2018,RaúlCastrosteppeddownasCuba’sPresidentaftertenyears—two

periods—inthisposition,thusformerlyfinalizing59yearsofCastroruleinCuba.The

generalviewofmostobservershasbeenthatRaúlCastrocarriedoutmorefundamental

reformsinCubaaftertakingoverfrombigbrotherFidel,thananythingthathadever

occurredbeforesincetheRevolutiondefineditsMarxist-Leninistcharacterintheearly

1960s.Thequestioniswhatthesereformsconsistedofintermsofeconomicandpolitical

change,andinwhichdirectiontheyhavesetCubainthefinalphaseofitsCastroera.

CubahassinceJanuary1959beenauniquecountry,intheAmericasandglobally.With

itsiconicRevolution,mastermindedandledforalmostfiftyyearsbyoneofthemost

charismaticpoliticalleadersofthetwentiethcentury,FidelCastroRuz,accompanied

untilhisdeathbycomrade-in-armsErnesto“Che”Guevara.Thissmallislandnationof

around11millioninhabitantshasbeenthecentreofattentionforstudentsofsocialism

andcommunism;anti-imperialismandnationalliberation;US-Sovietcoldwar

geostrategicrivalryandthedangerofnuclearwar;humanrightsdiscussionsof

economic,socialandculturalrightsversuscivil-politicalrights;leftistversusrightist

recipesfordevelopmentstrategies.Cubasimplyhaditall.

SocompletelywasthiscountryanditsRevolutionassociatedwithitstoweringleader,

thatnobodycouldimagineitwouldsurvivewithoutFidelatthehelm.Then,onthe31st

July2006,theCubanstatetelevisionannouncedthatFidel(then80)wastoundergo

intestinalsurgery,forcinghimonapreliminarybasistoleaveallcommandingpositions

intheCommunistParty,theArmedForcesandtheGovernmenttohisbrotherand

second-in-command,RaúlCastroRuz(then75).Newsdesksallovertheworldstartedto

speculate:wasthisfinallytheendbothofElComandanteandhisrevolution,bothhaving

beenwrittenoffsomanytimes?WasitatallconceivablethatCuba,onitskneesafterthe

2

collapseofitsSovietbenefactor,wouldsurvivewithoutFidel?Wehadbeenreminded

abouthisomnipotencefiveyearsearlier,whenFidelhadfaintedonthepodium,and

insistedthathebekeptawakeduringthesurgeryhehadtoundergototreatsomequite

seriouskneeinjuries,soastomakesurehecouldkeepcontrolonthesame24/7basis

hewasusedto.Afterwardshecrackedajoke:“Isimplypretendedtodie,inorderto

observehowmyownfuneralwouldlooklike”.

Then,inaletterdated18February2008,FidelCastroannouncedthathewouldnot

acceptthepositionsofPresidentoftheCouncilofStateandCommanderinChiefatthe

upcomingNationalAssemblymeeting.Hestatedthathishealthwasaprimaryreason

forhisdecision,remarkingthat:"Itwouldbetraymyconsciencetotakeupa

responsibilitythatrequiresmobilityandtotaldevotion,thatIamnotinaphysical

conditiontooffer".1OnFebruary24,2008,theNationalAssemblyofPeople'sPower

unanimouslyvotedRaúlaspresident.Describinghisbrotheras"notsubstitutable",Raúl

proposedthatFidelcontinuetobeconsultedonmattersofgreatimportance,amotion

unanimouslyapprovedbythe597NationalAssemblymembers.

Inreality,afterthatJulyeveningin2006,RaúlhasbeenCuba´sundisputedleader,

althoughhewasonlyformalisedasPresidentbytheNationalAssemblyin2008,andas

FirstSecretaryoftheCubanCommunistPartyatthePartyCongressin2011.Thefirst

andprovisionaltransferofpowertookplaceinatypicallyinformalfidelistamanner:

rightbeforehewashospitalisedwithunknownoutcome,heleftahandwrittenmessage

wherehe“provisionally”delegatedallhisfunctionsasheadofstate,ofthearmedforces

andoftheCommunistPartytohisformallydesignateddeputy,RaúlCastro.Neitherthe

NationalAssemblynorthePolitburoofthePartymet.Yet,thiswasinaccordancewith

Article94oftheCubanConstitution,stipulatingthetransferofresponsibilitiestothe

deputyinthecasethatthePresidentoftheCouncilofStateisabsentordies.

WhenRaúltookover,manyanalystssawthisasanexampleofadynasticsuccession

withinthefamily,comparingittoNorthKorea(theKimfamily),Nicaragua(Somoza),

Haiti(Duvalier).ThiswasvehementlydeniedbytheCubanleadership,claimingthat

Raúlhadbeenappointedtothedeputypositionexclusivelybasedonthemeritshe 1"FidelCastroannouncesretirement".BBCNews.February19,2008.RetrievedFebruary19,2008.(S/E)

3

earnedduringtheguerrillastruggleandinhisfunctionswithintheparty,stateand

militaryestablishmentaftertherevolution.InFidel´saddresstotheNationalAssembly

inDecember2007,hestatedasiftorespondtoanyaccusationsaboutafamily

succession:“IntheProclamationIsignedon31July2006,noneofyoueversawanyact

ofnepotism”.

ItwasgenerallyexpectedthatRaúl,havinglivedinhisbigbrother´sshadowduringtheir

entirelife,wouldsimplycarryonFidel´smodeofrule.Itdidnottakelong,however,

beforeheprovedmostforecasterswrong.TherewereearlysignsthatRaúlwouldset

thecountryonadifferenttrack.Thefirstsignalcameinhisspeechonthedayofthe

revolution(26July)in2007,whenherecognisedserioussocio-economicproblemsand

promised“structuralandconceptualreforms”.Hewarned,however,that“everything

cannotberesolvedimmediately[andthat]youshouldnotexpectspectacular

solutions”.2Inabadlyhiddencriticismofhisbrother´sexaggeratedlustforcontrolof

everyaspectoftheCubancitizens´life,heremovedanumberofwhathecalled

“unnecessaryrestrictions”:allowingaccessforhiscountrymentotouristhotels,

internet,DVDplayers,significantlyallowingordinaryCubanstoestablishcellphone

accounts,andtorentcars(forthosewithaccesstohardcurrency).

OnlyfourdaysafterRaúlformallytookoverasCuba´sPresident,on28February2008,

ForeignMinisterFelipePerezRoquewenttotheUNHeadquartersinNewYorktosign

thetwobasichumanrightstreatiesthat,togetherwiththeUniversalDeclarationof

HumanRights,conformtheInternationalBillofHumanRights:TheInternational

CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheInternationalCovenanton

Economic,SocialandCulturalRights(ICESC).Acoupleofmonthsearlier,Pérezhad

announcedthatCubawouldratifythesetwocovenantsbyMarch2008.3Untilnow,

ratificationhasnevertakenplace,norhasanysuchintentionmeanwhilebeen

expressed.

InMarch2009,Raúlmadeasuddendecisiontofiresomeofthecountry´smost

prominentyoungleaders,those“youngTalibans”whohadbeenhandpickedbyFidelto 2Granma27July2007.3Signatureofahumanrightstreatydoesnotconstitutionallyconvertittonationallaw,onlyratificationbythecountry´slegislativebodymakesitpartofthelawoftheland.

4

takeoveraftertherevolutionarygenerationwouldstepdown.TheseincludedVice

PresidentandexpectedpresidentialcandidateCarlosLage,foreignministerFelipePérez

Roqueandotheryoungleaderswhohadsurroundedthenowretiredcommander-in-

chiefalongwithanothertenministerswerealldismissedinamajorcabinetsweep,in

whichRaúlfilledmostministerialpositionswithhismilitaryconfidents.By2012,Raúl

hadsubstitutedatotalof32ministers,whichmeansthatthecountry´sentireexecutive

leadershipunderneaththeoverarchingCommunistPartyleadershiphadbeenchanged

fromFideltoRaúl.Themilitarizationoftheministryoffices,however,turnedouttobea

preliminarysolution:by2016,onlytwolineministriesinadditiontoDefenceandthe

Interiorwereheadedbymilitaryofficers.

RaúlsoonrecognisedtheseriousnessofCuba´seconomicsituation.In2010,inaspeech

toaconferenceoftheTradeUnionConfederation(CTC)hewarnedofthedangerthat

therevolutioncouldendupindeepcrisisiftheworkersdidnotassumetheir

responsibilityforthenecessaryeconomicreforms.InhisspeechtotheNational

AssemblyinDecember2010,hewentontostate:“Eitherwerectify,orthetimeisupfor

continuingtobalanceontheborderoftheabyss;wesinkandwewillsinktheeffortsof

entiregenerations”.4

Themainpointofdeparturehasbeenthegovernment´s(andtheparty´s)ownreform

agenda,assetoutintheGuidelines,“Lineamientos”,approvedbythe6thCommunist

PartyCongressinApril2011,forthenecessary“updating”(“actualización”)ofthe

socialistsocio-economicmodel(expliciteconomicreformsandimplicitpolitical

adaptations).Aseconddecisivedecision-makingmomentwasassumedtobethe7th

PartyCongressin2016.

This,ofcourse,setthestageforthegeneraleconomicreformprogramme—althoughthe

term“reform”wasnotused—launchedbythe6thPartyCongress.Althoughpolitical

reformswereruledout,essentialstructuralchangeshavetakenplacesthatalsoimply

deeptransformationsofCuba´spolity.AspointedoutbythemostprestigiousCuban-

Americaneconomist,CarmeloMesa-Lago,thetransformationstakingplaceduringthe

firsttenyearsofRaúlCastro´sgovernment(countingfromhisrealbutstillinformal 4ElPaís,19.12.10.

5

takeoverin2006)weredeeperandmorecomprehensivethananyotherchangeduring

thepreviousclosetofiftyyearsoftheCubanrevolution(MesaLago2013).Thisgoesfor

thepoliticalaswellastheeconomicarena,inacountryinwhichsocialismgotmore

doctrinarianthananywhereelse(withthepossibleexceptionforNorthKorea)whenit

comestoabolitionoftheprivatesector(ref.the1968ofensivarevolucionara,seeSzulc

1986).

UntilNovember2016,Fidelwasstillaround,probablywagingconsiderableinfluence

behindthescenes,buthedidsowithoutstoppingRaúlfromsettingCubaonavery

differentcoursecomparedtohisownwhilststillkeepingsocialismorMarxism-

Leninismastheofficialideology.Then,only14monthsbeforeRaúlwasscheduledto

leavethePresidency,thehistoriccommander-in-chiefpassedaway,staginganational

mourningprocessandmyth-buildingcelebrationofhisachievementsinnationalmedia

andpublicplacesthatseemedtohavenoend.

Andherewecometotheissuesweintendtostudyandhopefullyunderstandmore

aboutinthisresearchprojectabouttheCubanreformprocessduringRaúlCastro´s

periodofgovernment(countedbyhisformalPresidentialperiodfromFebruary20085-

April2018):6

GivenRaúl´sfocusoneconomicmeasures,hisintentionofkeepingthepoliticalstructure

inplace,butatthesametimeobservingthesignificantpoliticalimplicationsofthe

transformationstakingplace,thekeyquestionofthisstudyisthereforethefollowing:

WhereisCubagoing?Morespecifically,isawideningofeconomicpluralismtakingplacein

suchawaythatitmayleadtoincreasingpoliticalpluralismandde-concentrationof

power?Or,alternatively,willchangesinthepoliticalandpowerstructureaccelerateor

slowdowneconomicreforms?

5Someelementsevenfromhisinformalexecutionofpresidentialauthoritystartingin2016willalsobeincluded.6Electionsofthefirstpost-CastroPresident,whichinCubaistheresponsibilityofthenewlyelectedNationalAssembly,werescheduledforFebruary2018.ReferringtotheimpactontheelectoralprocesscreatedbythedevastatinghurricaneIrma(September2017),presidentialelectionswerepostponedtoApril2018.

6

InChapter2,wewilldrawuparesearchdesignthatmayallowustodiscussthis

questionassystematicallyaspossible.Wetrytorepresentthesepossiblecorrelations

betweeneconomicandpoliticalchangethroughasimple2x2matrix(Figure2.1).

Furthermore(inChapter4)wewillelaboratethekeyquestionthroughninechallenges

andtheirrespectivehypothesesaboutpossibletransformationsoftheCubansociety,to

bestudiedthroughatotalof56indicators.

1.2. Outline of the dissertation

AfterthisintroductionandthepresentationoftheresearchdesigninChapter2,the

dissertationisstructuredasfollows:

Chapter3providesasummaryofthemainreformsonRaúlCastro´swatch,with

emphasisonthestrategydocumentspresentedtothe6thPartyCongressin2011and7th

PartyCongressin2016,respectively.Wewilldistinguishbetweeneconomicand

politicalreforms—althoughtheconcept“reform”isnotpartoftheofficialvocabulary

(theyspeakaboutactualización—updatingofthesocio-economicmodel).Wewillalso

distinguishbetweenformallyintroducedreformsandchangesthatsimplyoccuraspart

of“realityontheground”,forinstancetechnologicalcircumstancesunderminingthe

informationmonopoly.

Chapter4givesthetheoretical-empiricalframeworkofthestudy.Wedepartfromthe

bedrockoftransitionliteraturethatemergedattheheightofwhatHuntington(1991)

termed“TheThirdWaveofDemocracy”,endingupwiththe“democraticfatigue”,post-

liberalismandpopulismdominatingthepoliticalregimedebate25yearslater.Wewill

discusstherelationship—includingcausaldirection—betweeneconomicandpolitical

transformations;wewillbringinthediscussionabout“earlywinnersandlosers”in

transformationprocesses.Wethengoontodiscusssomealternativestoliberal

democraticmodels:“transformativedemocraticpolitics”withparticularreferenceto

Scandinavianexperiences,andneo-patrimonialismorauthoritarianmarketeconomies

invariousfashions(oligarchicvs.socialist;RussianandAngolanvs.Chineseand

Vietnameseexperiences).Specialstudiesofpost-Communisttransformation(Kornai

7

1992;Brown2009;Saxonberg2013)areofcourserelevant.Wealsogothroughsome

peculiaraspectsofrelevanceforthecaseofCubaandtrytodigintotheissueof

legitimacychallengesforpost-CastroCuba.TowardstheendofChapter4,weshallsee

howthedifferenttheoreticalandempirical-comparativeapproachesfitintothe

‘roadmap’wehaveestablishedinordertoanalysethecorrelationbetweenpoliticaland

economicchange:thematrixinfigure2.1.

Basedonthiswewill,inChapter5,formulatethetransformativechallenges,hypotheses

andindicators.Thiswillbefollowedbythethreemainempiricaldiscussionsofthe

dissertation,abouttheeconomicandpolitical,aswellastheinternationalarenas.

InChapter6,wewilldiscussthechangingCubaneconomicarenaduringthereform

processunderstudy,basedonthevariouschallengespresentedinchapter5.Wewill

startwiththeagriculturalpoliciesandtheevolvingagriculturalsector,acrucialarenaof

changeinsuchprocesses.Thenwewillgothroughthereorganisationofthestate

economywithparticularemphasisonthecrucialroleofmilitary-managed

corporations—thedominantandmostdynamicpartofCuba´seconomy.Thenewspace

forsmallentrepreneursismostlyrepresentedintheformofself-employedworkers,in

somecasesdevelopingintomicroandsmallenterprisesinspiteofstrongofficial

scepticismagainsttheconstitutionofaproperprivatesectorintheeconomy.The

quantitativegrowthofnon-stateemployment,andtherelationshipbetweenstateand

non-stateemployment,needstobeclarified.Thegrowingweightofthenon-statesector

willbediscussed.AnotherhotissueinCubaistheevolvingroleofcooperatives—

agriculturalaswellasnon-agricultural.Thenewroleofforeigninvestmentwillbe

discussed,alongwithotherinvestmentsources(notleastfamilyremittances)thatmay

spurthenecessaryeconomicgrowthandemploymentgeneration.TheimpactofnewUS

relationsforthespaceofthenon-statesector—duringtheObamaandtheTrump

administration,respectively,isalsodiscussed.

Chapter7providesananalysisofhowtheeconomicchangesmayimpactonpolitical

changesbydiscussingtherelationshipbetweenwinnersandlosersoftheeconomic

reforms,theincreasingsocialdifferentiation,thepotentialpowerpositionoftheprivate

8

sector,theinternaldebateaboutcapitalaccumulationandtheissueofallowingmore

independentinterestorganisationtoemerge.

Chapter8turnsourattentiontothechanginginternationalarena.Thehistoric

rapprochementwiththeUSwillbediscussedatsomelength,bothintermsofnewand

lostopportunities.WewillalsodiscussandhowtheObamawarmingofrelationsto

CubahadaparadoxicalimpactleadingtoabattlefortheCubanheartsandmindsabout

whatCommunistPartyintransigents(hardliners)sawassomekindof“Obamaneo-

imperialism”,turningonthebrakesinthereformprocess.Then,thenewerawiththe

Trumpadministrationfromearly2017,itsreturntohead-onconfrontationwithCuba

andtheimpactofthisontheCubanreformprocesswillalsobediscussed.Cuba’s

positionintheregionalLatinAmericanpicturewillbeassessed,withrelationsto

Venezuelaasaspecialissue.NewrelationstotheEUwereconfirmedthroughanew

collaborationagreementrightbeforethechangeofUSadministrationin2017,while

relationstotherestoftheworld(particularlyRussiaandChina)mayalsoplayarolefor

Cuba´stransformation.

Chapter9assessesthechangingpoliticalarena.Thebasicquestioniswhetherwecan

seeanymovefromanauthoritariantoamorepluralisticpoliticalstructure.Wewillthen

moveontoadiscussionontheroleofcivilsociety,intellectuals,mediaandothernon-

stateactors.Whateverthecriteria,thereisnodoubtthatCubaisexperiencingan

increasingpluralismincivilsociety,whichiscloselylinkedtotheexpansionofthenon-

stateeconomy.Adiscussionofwhoaretheagentsofchangeamongcivilsocietyleaders,

academics,intellectuals,artists,churchmembers,andabovealltheindependent

peasantryandtheemergingurbanmiddleclasses,isimportantalthoughperhaps

somewhatspeculative.Bloggersandindependentjournalistsaretwoothergroupsof

potentialchangeactors.OneofthebigquestionsinCubaiswhetherthesepotential

changeagentsintheendwillchoosevoiceorexit:openlyworkingforchangeorrather

withdrawingfromtheformalpoliticalandeconomicarenasorliterallyleavingthe

country.

Inchapter9,wewillalsoanalysethepowerstructureinthecountry.Isthereany

emergingdistinctionofrolesbetweenpartyandstateandbetweentheexecutiveand

9

thelegislativebranchesofgovernment?Therespectiverolesofthemilitaryandthe

bureaucracyareaspectsofthis.Anotherchallengeiswhetherthecountryismoving

towardsalessauthoritarianandmorepluralisticpoliticalsystem,lookingi.a.atthe

politicalcultureintheCommunistPartyandparty-dominatedmassorganisations,and

mostnotablythe2017/18-electionprocessthatwillculminatewiththe(indirect)

electionofthefirstPost-CastroPresident.Thisisalsowherewewillanalysethestatus

ofthevariousrule-of-lawelementsintheCubansociety.

Furthermore,wewilltrytoidentifythepossiblenewgenerationofleadersafter2018

and2021,andtheirexpectedideologicalandpoliticalorientation.Adecisivequestion

hereiswhetherthepost-Castrogenerationofleaderswillhaveanynewsourceof

legitimacywhentheytakeoverthegovernmentresponsibility,e.g.intheformof

“pragmaticacceptance”.

Chapter10goessystematicallythroughthestatusoftransformationsduringtheten

yearsoftheRaúlera,bytestingtheninehypothesesbymeansofthe56indicators.

Chapter11containsadiscussionofsomedilemmasCubaisexpectedtobeconfronted

withduringwhatwehavecalledthecriticaljunctureinthepost-totalitarianpolitical

transformationprocess:thealmosttotalgenerationalchangeofleadersthatwilloccur

betweentheelectionsofnewStatebodies(includingLegislatureandPresident)in2018

andthefullandunavoidableoverhauloftheCommunistPartyPolitburoatitsnext

Congress,scheduledfor2021.Whichparadigmaticchoiceswillthenewgenerationof

leadersbemakingduringthiscriticaljuncture?IsCubasufferingfromanon-curable

democraticbirthdefect,orfromtheincoherenceofpartialandabortedreform?Thiswill

defineCuba´sfurthertransformationpattern,alsowhetherthereisspaceforsome

variantofwhatwewillcall“transformativedemocraticpolitics”inCuba.Newconflicts

ofinterestwillundoubtedlyemergeandbeplayedout.Theentirequestionofpower,

hegemonyandlegitimacywiththepossibleemergenceofcounter-hegemonyandthe

needfornegotiatedsolutionswillbediscussed.Adecisivequestiontoaddressherewill

be:istransformationofpowerrelations—thelooseningupofpowermonopolyandthe

introductionofmorepluralisticpoliticalparticipation—anoptioninCuba?

10

Chapter12isanattempttogazeintothecrystalballanddiscussthreescenariosfor

post-CastroCuba,tostartmaterializingduringthe2018-2021criticaljuncture.

Chapter13drawsthegeneralconclusionsofthestudy.

11

Chapter 2: Research design

TheobjectofthisstudyisthereformsproposedandimplementedinCubaduringthe

tenyearsofRaúlCastro’spresidency(2008-2018).Theyhavefocusedoneconomic

measures;Raúlseemstohavebeenquiteintentonkeepingthepoliticalstructurein

place.Yet,manyofthereformshavehadapoliticalcharacter,oratleasttherehavebeen

obviouspoliticalimplicationsoftheeconomicreforms.Whatwewanttostudyhereis

therelationshipbetweenchangesintheeconomicandpoliticalarenas.However,any

examinationofCuba’spoliticaleconomyishamperedbycertainchallenges.Oneofthem

concernsthelackofinformation;inCubathereisadearthofprimaryindependent

sourcesaboutthesereforms.AnotherchallengeconcernsthenatureoftheCuban

discussionaboutpoliticalandeconomicissues;thereisnonativePolitical-Science

traditionthatcanprovidethisstudywithanalyticaltermsandusefultheories.

2.1. The problem of studying politics in Cuba

ThisstudyisanattempttomakeuseofauniqueopportunitytofollowtheCuban

economicandpoliticaltransformationscloselyoveraperiodofseveralyears,collect

empiricaldataandinterpretthechangesfromasocialscienceperspective.Theauthor

hasbeenlivinginandvisitingCubaregularlysincethelate1970s,startingwithatwo-

yearperiodasaJuniorProfessionalwiththeUNDPinHavana.Since2010,intherun-up

tothe6thCommunistPartyCongresswhenRaúlCastro´sreformagendawasapproved,

theauthorhasbeencoordinatinganacademiccollaborationprojectwithseveralCuban

institutions,firstonbehalfoftheNorwegianInstituteforInternationalAffairs(NUPI),

lateronbehalfoftheCentreforDevelopmentandtheEnvironment(SUM)atthe

UniversityofOslo.

Whilecoordinatingthisproject,therehasbeendatacollectedassystematicallyas

possiblebeencollectingdataforthisStudy,andatthesametimedevelopinga

12

theoreticalframeworkfortheunderstandingofthetransformations.Fromtheoutset,

theoriesofdemocratictransition(neoliberalvs.socialdemocratic)havebeenheldup

againstanumberofothertheoriesfordeepsocialtransformationsinotherdirections,

generallytreatedhereundertheconceptneo-patrimonial.Thesehavealsobeenspelled

outinanumberofchallenges,hypotheses,indicatorsandscenarios.

However,studyingtheCubanpoliticalsystemrepresentssomequitepeculiar

challenges.

ArmandoChaguaceda,anexiledCubansocialscientistwrote,recallingwhathisM.A.

thesisadvisoroncetoldhimaboutthestudyoftheCubanpowerelite:“Powerdoesnot

liketobestudied”.Hegoesontosay:“theabsenceofsubstantialstudiesandthelackof

publicaccesstosuchkeyissuesasthemakeupofCuba’spoliticaleliteanditsreal

circulationanddecision-makingmechanismsmaintainalmostallproductioninthefield

atasuperficiallevel”(Chaguaceda2014).

ThepeculiaritiesforstudyingpoliticalpowerinCuba,giventhelackofanativeresearch

traditionwithrelevanttheories,evidentlyrepresentaseriousmethodanddesign

problemforthepresentstudy.

TheCanadianpoliticalscientistandCubawatcherYvonGreniercallsit“aclearcaseof

whatHegelcalledthe‘cunningofhistory’”,that“thetriumphoftheCubanrevolutionled

totheendoftheacademicdisciplinethatcriticallyexaminestheuseofpowerinsociety:

politicalscience”.WithreferencetooneofthefewCubanscholarswhoactually

considershimselfapoliticalscientist,theex-topdiplomatCarlosAlzugaray,recallsthe

foundationofanEscueladeCienciasPolíticaswithintheFacultaddeHumanidadesdela

UniversidaddelaHabana,aroundthetimeoftheUniversityreformof1961.The

directorswereDrs.RaúlRoaGarcía(History)andPelegrínTorrasdelaLuz(Law),

respectivelyForeignMinisterandVice-ForeignMinister.Itisnotclearhowdistinctthis

EscuelawasfromtheDiplomaticServiceAcademy(EscueladeServicioExterior),

foundedin1960bythesameRoaGarcía.Hethengoesontocomment:

13

“IftheEscuelacontinuedtoexistduringthe1960s,asAlzugaraysuggests,itdidnotleavea

trailofacademicinitiativestoshowforit.As“politics”becameequivalent,bothintheoryand

inpractice,with“revolution”,“socialism”and“Marxism-Leninism”,theschoolandthe

disciplinequicklydisappeared,tobereplacedbytheteachingofMarxism-Leninismasan

officialideologyandasamandatoryparadigminuniversities,schoolsandinthemedia.

AccordingtoonesourcetheEscuelawasoneofthemostdogmaticunitswithinthe

universityduringthe1960s,followingthemotd’ordre“LaUniversidadesparalos

revolucionarios”(Grenier2016:159).

AfellowCanadianCubawatcher,economistArchRitter,highlightssomeofthe

implicationsofthissituation:

“OneconsequenceoftheabsenceofthedisciplineofPoliticalScienceinCubaisthatwehave

onlyavagueideaofhowCuba’sgovernmentactuallyfunctions.WhowithinthePolitbureau

andCentralCommitteeofthepartyactuallymakesdecisions?Towhatextentandhowdo

pressuresfromthemassorganizationsactuallyaffectdecision-making,oristheflowof

influencealwaysfromtoptobottomratherthanthereverse?Whatroledothelarge

conglomerateenterprisesthatstraddletheinternationalizeddollareconomyandthepeso

economyplayintheprocessofpolicy-formulation?IstheNationalAssemblysimplyan

emptyshellthatunanimouslypassesprodigiousamountsoflegislationinexceedinglyshort

periodsoftime—asappearstobethecase?Oneisleftwithafeelingthattherealpolitical

systemisoneofblackboxeswithinblackboxeslinkedinvariouswaysbyinvisiblewiresand

tubes”(Ritter2013).

AlthoughGrenierseemstotakeaquitedogmaticanti-Marxistviewoftheroleofsocial

sciences,heisrightwhenpointingoutthat:

“[T]hereisactuallyverylittlespaceforpoliticaldiscussions,debates,andanalysisofthe

politicalprocess,andremarkablyfewreliablesourcesofinformationanddataon“whogets

what,whenandhow”,tousepoliticalscientistRobertDahls’definitionofpolitics[…and]

usinganalyticaltoolstofindouthowpowerisusedinCuba,forwhatpurpose(i.e.whatare

thepoliticaloutcomes)andbywhom”(Grenierop.cit:160).7

7Infact,thedefinitionGrenierreferstohereisthetitleofHaroldLasswell’sclassicaltextbookonpolitics(Lasswell1972,originallypublishedin1936).

14

AlzugarayinaninterviewwithCubaPosiblecallsfortheestablishmentofapolitical

sciencecareeratCubanuniversities,asonequalitativesteptowardsamoreopenCuban

society(Alzugaray2016).

ThepoorpoliticalsciencetraditioninCubameansthatwehavetogotothe

internationalPolitical-Economyliteraturefortermsandtheories.

2.2. Interplay between economic and political variables

Whatwewanttostudyhereistherelationshipbetweenchangesintheeconomicand

politicalarenas:whethereconomicpluralismmayleadtoincreasingpoliticalpluralism,

orwhetheralooseningofpowerconcentrationcouldleadtomoreeconomicpluralism.As

weshallsee,theremaybetheoreticalandempiricalsupportforbothcausal

correlations.

Inordertoorganisethisdiscussion,wetakeasapointofdeparturethedistinctionmade

byAcemogluandRobinson(A&R)(2012:73-87)betweeninclusiveandextractive

economicandpoliticalinstitutions.Theydefineinclusiveeconomicinstitutionsas

follows:

“[…]thosethatallowandencourageparticipationbythegreatmassofpeopleineconomic

activitiesthatmakebestuseoftheirtalentsandskillsandthatenableindividualstomake

thechoicestheywish.Tobeinclusive,economicinstitutionsmustsecureprivateproperty,

anunbiasedsystemoflaw,andaprovisionofpublicservicesthatprovidesalevelplaying

fieldinwhichpeoplecanexchangeandcontract;italsomustpermittheentryofnew

businessesandallowpeopletochoosetheircareers.”

Politicalinstitutionsareinclusive,theysay,iftheyare“sufficientlycentralizedand

pluralistic[…].Wheneitheroftheseconditionsfails,wewillrefertotheinstitutionsas

extractivepoliticalinstitutions.”

“Pluralistic”isunderstoodas“politicalinstitutionsthatdistributepowerbroadlyin

societyandsubjectittoconstraints”.A&R(:81)alsoarguethat:

15

“(T)hereisastrongsynergybetweeneconomicandpoliticalinstitutions.Extractivepolitical

institutionsconcentratepowerinthehandsofanarrowpoliticaleliteandplacefew

constraintsoftheexerciseofthispower.Economicinstitutionsarethenoftenstructuredby

thiselitetoextractresourcesfromtherestofsociety.Extractiveeconomicinstitutionsthus

naturallyaccompanyextractivepoliticalinstitutions.Inclusivepoliticalinstitutions,vesting

powerbroadly,wouldtendtouprooteconomicinstitutionsthatexpropriatetheresourcesof

themany,erectentrybarriers,andsuppressthefunctioningofmarketssothatonlyafew

benefit.”

ThesedefinitionsdonotreallysuittheCubancase.Theycannotbeappliedinadirect

waytothepoliticaleconomyofCuba(ref.whatwesayabout‘Cubanexceptionalism’in

Chapter4).A&Rusestheterm“economicexploitation”ofthepopulationatlargebythe

elite–andtheyusetheslave-basedsugareconomyincolonialBarbadosasanexample

ofanextractiveeconomy.Theycouldjustaswellhaveusedthesimilarpatternin

colonialorneo-colonialCuba.OneofthemaingoalsoftheCubanRevolutionwasexactly

toundotheremainingpatternsofthisstructure,somethingthatwasachievedbetter

herethaninmostsocietieswithasimilarhistory.

Regardingtheirdefinitionofpoliticalinclusiveness,thereismuchmoretoitthanhaving

sufficientcentralisation(theprobleminCubaisratherthecontrary:fartoomuch

centralisation)andpluralism(needstobebetterspelledoutandwillbesoe.g.in

Chapter4.5).

ItfollowsfromwhatissaidabovethatwecannotuseA&R’sconceptualframeworkina

literalsense.Therearealsovastproblemsbyusingthepresent-dayUSasaprototypeof

inclusiveeconomicandpoliticalinstitutions,asdonebytheseauthors.Wemay,

howeverstillusetheirgeneralexampletoourbenefit.Wecandrawadistinction

betweentheeconomicandpoliticalinstitutions.Wewillalsoredefinetheirconcepts

slightly;replacethetermextractivewithexclusiveandthusdistinguishbetween

inclusiveversusexclusiveinstitutions,definedverysimilarlyasAcemogluandRobinson,

butwithoutincludingtheinternaleconomicexploitationcriterion.

16

Onthebasisofthiswemayestablisha2x2matrixasapointofdepartureforour

analysis.Thismatrixwillallowustoaskmorepointedquestionsandtoanalysethe

directionandcorrelationofchangesthatmaybetakingplaceinCuba:

Figure2.1:

Politics–EconomicsCorrelationMatrix:

TransformationoptionsfortheRaúlCastroerareforms

Figure 1

ContemporaryCubamaybedescribedbythetermsthatcharacterisecellcinthematrix:

apoliticaleconomymarkedbyinstitutionsthatarepoliticallyandeconomically

exclusive.

WhenweaskthequestionwhereCubaisgoing,itfollowsthatourconcernisthe

movementsbetweenthesecells,andthedrivingforcesandinter-relationsbehindthose

b

Political Institutions

a

c d

Inclusive

Inclusive

Exclusive

Exclusive

Economic Institutions

State Failure

17

movements.Thismatrixshouldnotbeunderstoodasastaticdescriptionofinstitutions,

butadynamicmodelwherewearelookingforpossibleroutes:aroadmap.

ThematrixindicatesthatCubamaygoinseveralpossibledirections.

1. Economicsonly:Onecourseisfromcellctocellb—whatmemaycalleconomics

firstroutefromthepresentsituation,inwhichboththepoliticalandeconomic

institutionsinCubaareexclusive,toasituationinwhichtheeconomyis

reformedtowardsmoreinclusiveinstitutions,whereasthepoliticalinstitutions

remainexclusive.ItisamoveexemplifiedbyChinaandVietnam.Thisisalikely

direction,becausethisisthecourseannouncedbyRaúl.ForCubatomove

towardseconomicinclusiveness,manyreformsarerelevant:

• Allowingandencouragingparticipationbythegreatmassofpeoplein

economicactivitiesthatmakebestuseoftheirtalentsandskillsandthat

enableindividualstomakethechoicestheywish.

• Securingprivateproperty.

• Anunbiasedsystemoflaw.

• Aprovisionofpublicservicesthatprovidesalevelplayingfieldinwhich

peoplecanexchangeandcontract.

• Permittingtheentryofnewbusinessesandallowpeopletochoosetheir

careers.

Someofthesecriteria,liketheprovisionofpublicservices,havebeentaken

relativelygoodcareofintheCubansystem.Butthereareothers,notincludedin

thislist,whichwewillcomebacktointhedissertation.

2. Economicsleadingtopoliticsroute:AsecondpossiblescenarioisthatRaúlgets

hiseconomicreforms,butthatincreasinginclusivityintheeconomicrealmhave

implicationsforthepoliticalinstitutionsofthecountryandthatthey,too,are

pulledinaninclusivedirection.Inthatcase,Cuba’sfutureisindicatedbyamove

fromcellc,viabtocella—fromthepresentCubansituationtoasituationin

18

whichtheeconomicinstitutionsofthecountryarerenderedmoreinclusivewith

implicationsforinclusivityinthepoliticalinstitutionsaswell.

3. Athirdpossibilityispoliticsonly—atransitionfromthepresentCubansituation

ofcellctoanewpoliticalsituationindicatedbycelld.Thismeansthatpolitical

institutionsarerenderedmoreinclusive,whereastheeconomicinstitutions

continuetobeexclusive.Thisroutemeanspoliticalreforms,whichusherin

freedomoforganisationontheisland,and,perhaps,theevolutionofamulti-

partysystemwithfreeelections.Thesearereformsthat,weassume,Raúland

mostothermembersofthepartyleadershipwanttoavoid.It’sanunlikely

scenario,because(asweknowfromGorbachev’sSovietUnion),itishardto

introducepoliticalinclusivitywithouteconomicreformsfollowingsuit.Thus,a

thirdpossibilitymayeasilypavethewayforafourthpossiblecourse:

4. Thefourthcourseisamovefromcellctocelldandthenonwardstocella,what

wemaycallpoliticsfirstorpoliticsleadingtoeconomicsroute.

5. Ifpoliticalandeconomicreformishardtodisassociate,wearelookingatafifth

possiblecoursetowardsanewCubanfuture:amovethatmakesboththe

politicalandtheeconomicinstitutionsinCubamoreinclusivetogether,whatwe

maycallthefasttrack.Thiscanbedescribedasamovefromcellcdirectlytocell

a.ThisisaprobablywhattheUSgovernmentandtheconservativeCubanlobby

inMiamiwouldliketosee,possiblyalsomanyforeignliberalobserverslikeA&R,

whobelievethatthesurestwaytowardsamodernpoliticaleconomyinvolvesa

simultaneousmovetowardsliberal-democraticmulti-partypoliticsandafree-

marketeconomy.

6. Finally,thereisalsoasixthpossiblecourse.ThisisthecoursethatRaúlCastro

wantstoavoidmostofall.Itisthepossibilitythathewarnedaboutasalikely

outcomeifhisreformprogrammewerenottobeimplemented.Thus,wecannot

excludethepossibilityofstatefailureorcollapse—likehemainsponsorformany

years,theUSSR,didin1990.ThisoutcomecanbeillustratedbyaCubanmove

19

fromcellcandoutofthematrixaltogether.Itisapossibilitytowhichwehave

devotedaproperdiscussioninChapter4.

Thesepotentialroutes,aswellasthefourcells,areofcoursenomorethanideal-typical

cases.Asweshallsee,themostprobablerouteswillrepresentacombinationofthese

cases,forinstanceroutes2and4.

2.3. Research strategy

InChapter4,atheoreticalandcomparative-empiricalframeworkforthestudyofthe

Cubantransformationprocessispresented,permittingustoextractaseriesof

conceptualtoolstobeappliedinthediscussionoftheresearchquestions.Thiswillbe

thebasisforthetwo-tierresearchstrategyweproposeasresponsetothemethodand

designproblemsignalledinChapter1:usingthisverysimple2x2roadmapmatrixasan

organisingtoolforthetheoreticalandempiricaldiscussionoftransformationoptions

availableforCuba,togetherwiththeformulationofninetransformativechallenges

(Chapter5)withtheirrespectivehypothesesandindicators.Withtheseinstrumentsin

mind,wewilltrytocarryoutanempiricalstudyoftheevolvingeconomic,international

andpoliticalarenas(Chapters6-10)duringthetenyearsperiod.

Thesechallengesarepartlybasedonofficiallyrecognisedchallengesasformulatedin

policydocumentsandofficialstatements,mostlyregardingeconomicandsocio-

economicissues,plusofcoursewhatfollowsfromtheUSembargo/blockade.These

officiallyrecognisedchallengesareaccompaniedbyotherandmorenormative

challengesderivedfromthetheoreticalliteratureandempiricalexperiencesregarding

post-totalitariantransitionandtransformationtowardslessauthoritarianpolitical

systems.Itisthereforeemphasisedthatchallengesbasedonthesocio-economicreform

agendaandtheUSembargo(Challenges1-3plus5)areingeneralexplicitlyrecognised

bytheGovernment,whilethechallengesregardingpoliticaltransformation(Challenges

4plus6-9)aremorenormativelyformulatedbytheauthor,basedontheoreticaland

comparativeliterature.

20

Foreachoftheninechallenges,weshallinChapter5(ref.alsoAppendix1)formulatea

nullhypothesis(representingstatusquoornosignificanttransformationexpected

duringtheRaúlCastroera)andanalternativehypothesis(significantchangewith

potentiallytransformativeimpact).Wehavetriedtomakethesehypothesestestable

andrefutablebymeansofdiscussingaseriesofindicatorsforeachchallenge(56in

total).Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthisisafullyqualitative,non-quantitativehypothesis

testing.

TheoutcomeofthehypothesistestingissummarisedinChapter10.

2.4. Sources

Dataforeachindicatorofthisstudyhavebeencollectedfirst-handinCubathrough

regularvisits(normally2-4peryearduringthe2011-2017period),andincollaboration

withCubansocialscientists(economistsattheCentrodeEstudiosdelaEconomía

Cubana(CEEC)andUniversidaddeLaHabana,anthropologistsattheDepartamentode

Etnología,InstitutodeAntropología)—aswellasalargenumberofothersocialscientists

andacademics.

Duringalltheyearstheauthorhasbeenworkingonthisproject(since2011),therehas

beenclosecollaborationwithaspecialteamofintellectuals,inwhatmanyconsidertobe

themostwellinformednon-statethinktankinCuba.ItstartedasEspacioLaical,

originatingintheCatholicChurch.Chaguacedaintheabove-citedreferencesaysthatthe

EspacioLaicaljournalis“theclosestthingtoaCubanpoliticalsciencesjournal”.In2013,

duetoaninternalconflictwiththeCatholichierarchy,thetwoeditorsanddrivingforces

ofEspacioLaicalleftthisprojectandfoundedanotherthink-tank(orastheythemselves

callit:“alaboratoryofideas”),withahigh-qualityInternetjournal,CubaPosible

(www.cubaposible.com).TheprojectIhavecoordinatedfirstforNUPI(Norwegian

InstituteforInternationalAffairs),laterforSUM,UniversityofOslo,(untilApril2017)

hasplayedacrucialroleinthisentireprocess.CubaPosiblehashadfundingfromthe

NorwegianEmbassyinHavanaandisbringingtogetherprominentCubanactors

21

throughwhomvaluableinformationandinterpretationofdevelopmentchallengesand

trendsinCubahasbeenobtained.

Furthermore,therehasbeencontinuouscontactwithavarietyofcivilsocietyactorsand

independentjournalistsandbloggers,aswellasdiplomatsresidinginCuba.Ihave

drawnonawidenetworkofCubaninformantsthatIhaveknownfordecades,andthese

havebeenconsultedrepeatedlybutnormallyofftherecord.Someofthem,butfarfrom

all,arelistedinAppendix2.Onnumeroustravelsaroundthecountry,Ihaveusedthe

opportunitytotalktopeoplefromallwalksoflife,normallywithoutdoingformal

interviews.Theinformalityofthedatacollectionhasbeentheresultofrestrictions

representedbytheCubanpoliticalreality,andofcoursealsoofconcernfortheworking

andlivingconditionsofCubancolleaguesandinformants.

ParticipationinacademicconferencesinCubaandelsewherehasprovideddataand

updatedinformationandhelpeddevelopnetworks.Ihaveparticipatedandmade

presentationsonrepeatedoccasionsattheMiamiconferenceorganisedannuallyby

ASCE,AssociationfortheStudyoftheCubanEconomy,providingmewithanother

importantacademicnetwork.Ihavealsoparticipatedatnumerousannualconferences

ofLASA(theLatinAmericanStudiesAssociation),whichalwayshasalargenumberof

specialCubanfora.

Secondarydatahavebeencollectedthroughsystematicscreeningofrelevantnews

services(oftentobefoundonASCENews:www.ascecuba.org),reports,aswellas

academicliterature.InteractionwithanetworkofCubascholarsinotherpartsofthe

worldhasbeenpursued.

TheSUMprojecthasalsomadeitpossibletoorganisevisitsbyCubanscholarstoOslo.

OfparticularimportancewasanacademicseminarorganisedinJune2015,givingthe

authortheopportunityto‘comparenotes’withandgetfeedbackfromaselectgroupof

CubanandEuropeanacademics.Thisseminarresultedinthepublicationofaspecial

CubaissueinThirdWorldQuarterly(Vol.37,No.9,2016),co-editedbytheauthor.

22

ThemainsourceofstatisticsinCubaistheofficialBureauofStatistics(OficinaNacional

deEstadísticaeInformación,ONEI–www.one.cu).Unfortunately,statisticsinCubaare

oftenpublishedwithseriousdelays.Also,statisticsareoftenpublishedwithout

revealingpoliticallysensitivedetails.Thesituationinthisregardgotworse,ratherthan

better,duringtheperiodbeingstudiedhere.Theabstractfor2016,publishedonlinein

JuneandJuly2017byONE,omittedachapterthatusuallyprovidesspecificsongross

domesticproduct,exportsandmoneysupplyaswellasdataondebt.Thosedetailshave

normallybeenprovidedafewmonthslater,butin2017theyfailedtomaterialise.“This

detailedbreakdownofkeyeconomicactivityinitsannualstatisticalabstractwasleftout

forthefirsttimethiscentury,”accordingtoCuba’sveteranforeigncorrespondent.8

“Thedeficiencyintermsofsocialstatisticsisevengreater,especiallyineducation,healthand

socialspending(Mesa-Lago,2012andEspina,2010).Forexample,intheannualsocial

reportofECLAC(2010)Cubadoesnotappearinthesectionsonpoverty,Gini,income,

economicallyactivepopulationbyeconomicactivityandoccupationbysector,norinthe

chapteronsocialprotection(ECLAC,2011).Therearenostatisticsoncoverage/accessof

socialservicesexceptineducation.Openunemploymentwasunderestimatedbythehuge

surplusofpublicsectorlabour,whichbegantobecutbackin2010.Thereisnoinformation

onthefamilybasket(canastabásica),purchasingpower,salarybygenderandschool

dropout;Therearefewfiguresonincomeinthestateandnon-statesectors,andtheofficial

estimateofthehousingdeficitisdebatable”(quotedfromAcosta2018,footnote2).

Throughoutthedissertation,Ihavethereforeoftenmadeuseofstatisticselaboratedby

Cubanresearchers,basedonofficialstatisticsfromONEI,oftenalsobasedonthe

economicactivityindexpublishedbytheEconomicTrendReport(seeAppendix2).In

somecases,statisticalinformatione.g.oneconomicissuesmayappeartobepartly

contradictory,incompleteandspeculative.Thisisofcourseaweaknessinascientific

work,butithasbeenimportanttoincludesuchmaterialinordertodiscussmanyofthe

crucialissuesofthisdissertationthatofficialstatisticsdon´trevealinCuba.

Appendix2containsalistofCubanandnon-Cubaninformants,aswellaswritten

sources(mostlyaccessedelectronically),thatconformthebulkofinformationsources

forthisstudy,inadditiontotheBibliography(Appendix3).

8MarcFrank:”Cubaneconomyevermoreopaqueasdataomittedfrom2016accounts”.ReutersHavana15.01.18.

23

Chapter 3: Summary of main reforms on Raúl Castro´s watch

3.1. The economic situation at the outset of the reform era

WiththedissolutionoftheSovietUnionandthesocialisteconomicsystem(COMECON)

towhichCubahadbelongedsincetheearly1960s,Cubawasthrownintoaneconomic

crisisthatthreatenedtheCubanRevolution’ssurvival.From1989to1993,theGDPfell

byanincredible35%.Althoughtherewasapartialrecoverytowardsthesecondpartof

the1990s—theofficialfigureforgrowthfrom1993to2000wassetat21%—the

“SpecialPeriod”ofthe1990srepresentaterriblememoryformostCubans.Thestate

budgetdeficitin1993was33.5%ofGDP,reducedto2.4%in2000(figuresquotedby

PerezVillanueva2010:18).ThenewspecialrelationshipofferedbyVenezuelafromthe

turnofthecenturygaveCubaacertainrelief,resultinginapartialrecoveryofits

economicgrowth(increasingfrom2%in2000toaround12%in2005and2006,then

fallingagaintounder2%in2009—figuresprovidedbyONEI,variousyears).However,

itiscrucialtorememberthatthisrelativerecoverymustbeseenagainstthebackdropof

theterriblecrisiscausedbythelossofprivilegedrelationswiththeUSSR.

From1989,Cubawentthroughatremendousprocessofproductionstagnation;in

realityafar-reachingde-industrialisationtookplaceduetotechnologicalobsolescence,

almosttotallackofcapitalresources,andachronicshortageofrawmaterialsandfuel.

Industry´sshareofGDPfellfrom28%in1989to16%in2010(Mesa-Lago2013:106).

24

Thefollowingfiguresshowstheproductionlevelin2011aspercentageofwhatitwasin

1989:

• Industrialproduction: 45.1%

• Sugarindustry: 16.4%

• Foodproduction: 67.7%

• Textile: 6.8%

• Leather/leathergoods: 17.1%

• Rubber/plasticproducts: 19.6%

Source:DeMiranda,2014:44-45,basedonONEIstatistics.

Thede-capitalisationoftheeconomyinthe1990swasimpressiveandhadfarfrombeen

compensatedattheoutsetoftheRaúlreformera.Accordingtocalculationsmadebythe

CubanColombia-basedeconomistPavelVidal,comparingCubatotenotherLatin

Americancountriesofcomparablesize,9Cubafellfromapositionasthesecondrichest

amongthesenations(onlyafterUruguay)in1970,tosixthplacein2011.10

Thepurchasingpowerofanaverageincomefelldramatically,toaboutonefourthofits

rathersober1989level(seedetailsunderIndicator4.1).Cuban´sstatesalariescouldin

nowaymeetpeople’sbasicneeds.Asecondaryconsequenceofthiswasthatthe

effectivedomesticdemandwasinsufficienttostimulateproduction,whilethequalityof

Cubanproductspresentednocompetitivenessintheinternationalmarkets.Remittances

9Theso-calledAL-10:Bolivia,CostaRica,DominicanRepublic,Ecuador,Guatemala,Honduras,Jamaica,Panama,Paraguay,Uruguay.10PavelVidal:“Lareformaquedaráincompletasinonosdespegamosdelmodelodeeconomíacentralmenteplanificada”,CubaPosible(NewYorkSeminar),20.09.17.

25

fromfamiliesabroadwerenegativelyaffectedbytheinternationalfinancialcrisisfrom

2008,makingthesituationevenworseforthosewhohadbenefitedfromthis.

CubahadatthistimepracticallynoothersourcesofinvestmentthanthoseoftheCuban

state,itselfinaprecariousfiscalcrisis(fiscaldeficitin2008was6.9%ofGDP),witha

verylimitedaccesstoforeigndirectinvestment(FDI).Thelatteratthismomentwere

estimatedtostandatalevelof15-20%ofwhatcouldbeexpectedforaneconomyof

Cuba´ssize(seeFeinberg2012,furtherdiscussedinchapter6underIndicator3.1).

Privatedomesticcapitalaccumulationwasnotpermitted,andthatissuespurreda

constantdebateinthefollowingyears(seeIndicator4.5).Asaconsequenceofallthis,

capitalformationfellfrom25.6%ofGDPin1989to7%in2010,toonethirdofthe

regionalaverageinthatyearandfarbelowwhatwouldbenecessaryforresumed

economicgrowthandrehabilitation(MesaLago2013:105).

Historically,Cuba’spatternofinternationaltradewascharacterisedbyitsroleas

exporterofrawmaterials(withsugarasthepredominantproduct)andimporterof

industrialgoods.Thischangeddramaticallywiththeclose-toeliminationofthesugar

industry,resultinginachronictradedeficit,whichwaspartlycompensatedbythesurge

inservices(medicalservicesplustourism).

“Cuba’shighdependenceonimportsoffoodstuff[85%ofdomesticconsumptionin2012

accordingtoMesa-Lago2013:107;figureaddedhere],machineryandfuel,andthelackofa

significantexportableoffergenerategreatexternalvulnerabilityanddeficientinternational

insertion”(DeMiranda2014:50).

Foreigndebtincreasedrapidlyasaconsequenceofthispattern,althoughfiguresare

consideredverysensitiveandthereforekeptsecret(wewilllatercomebacktohowthis

debtwasre-negotiated,inChapter4,underIndicator3.1).Thedebtsituation,anda

tendencytopostponedebtservicepaymentsandprofitrepatriationforforeign

companies,createdadistrustinthecountry´sliquidityandtrustworthinessasa

businesspartner,furtheraggravatedbythefactthatCubastayedoutsideofall

multilateralandevenregionalcreditorganisations.

26

Therewasagreement,sharedbyRaúlhimself,thatthesituationwassoseriousthatthe

verysurvivaloftheRevolutionwasatstake,ref.hisstatement(December2010)about

balancingontheborderoftheabyss.Thisrecognitionwaswhatprovokedthereform

measuresthatRaúlCastroinitiated,formalisednotleastthroughtheLineamientosdela

PolíticaEconómicaySocial,hereafterreferredtoasTheGuidelines,approvedbythe6th

PartyCongressin2011.11

3.2. The process leading to the reform agenda

Inreality,Raúlwasfirmlyinchargeofallpartyandstateaffairsfromtheverymoment

ofhis“temporary”take-overinmid-2006,althoughhehasletitbeknownthathe

continuedconsultingwithhisbigbrotherashehimselfhadproposed.Itwaslong

believedthatsuchconsultationbecamelessandlessfrequent,andlessandlessdecisive.

ThewayeventsunfoldedduringFidel´slastyearinlife(2016),however,mayleadtoa

contraryconclusiononthispoint.

ThefirstvitalsignalthatRaúlwouldsetthecountryonadifferenttrackcameinhis

speechonthedayoftherevolution(26July)in2007,whenherecognisedserioussocio-

economicproblemsandpromised“structuralandconceptualreforms”,butwarnedthat

“everythingcannotberesolvedimmediately[andthat]youshouldnotexpect

spectacularsolutions”.12

Raúlquiterapidlymadeaseriesofchangesintheleadershipthatannouncedhis

decisiontoworkwithanewteamofleaders.In2008hereplacedsevenministers,he

sackedtheso-called“Talibans”—youngsupposedlyhard-lineleadershandpickedby

Fidelandpromotedoutsideofinstitutionalcareerprocedures.In2009herestructured

onethirdofhisCabinet(ConsejodeMinistros)andsubstituted12highpublicofficers.

Amongthelatterweretwoofthecommonlyassumedcandidatestotakeoverafterthe

Castros,FirstVicePresident(and“economicczar”)CarlosLageandForeignMinister

FelipePerezRoque.Both,alongwithsomeofthe“Talibans”,wereaccusedbyFidelwho

11http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/PCC/6congreso/Resolución-Sobre-los-Lineamientos-de-la-Pol%C3%ADtica-Económica-y-Social-del-Partido-y-la-Revolución.pdf12Granma27July2007.

27

inthefirstplacehadpromotedthemthat“thehoneyofpower[…]hadawakened

ambitionsleadingthemtoplayanimproperrole”(i.e.forcareerism).13Inhindsight,itis

particularlyinterestingtonotethecharacterofthecriticismatthetimeraisedagainst

thetwomostprominentleadersofeconomicaffairs,MrLageandpreviouslydeposed

MinisteroftheEconomyJoséLuísRodríguez.Inaninternalconfidentialnotedistributed

amongpartymembersinordertoexplainwhyseniorleadershadbeensacked,itwas

claimedthatLageandRodríguezhadbeen“seducedbythefailedchangesinthe

disappearedsocialistcamp”,withspecialreferencetoaRodríguezreformproposalfrom

the1990sthatwouldpermitsmallprivateenterprise,aproposalallegedlystoppedby

Raúlbeforehe(Rodríguez)wasabletolaunchit.Bothofficials,theinternalnotewenton

tosay,“dustedoffplans”basedon“economicfreedom”andthe“privateenterprise”in

orderto“savesocialism”,which,however,isonly“savedwithrigor,morecontrol,more

revolutionaryvigilanceandmorediscipline”.Theyalsotriedto“letthepeasantssell

theirproductsatwhateverprice”,andtheywerestoppedfrom“handingoverthe

countrytocapitalism”.14

Whatisinterestingabouttheseaccusations,costingthejobsofthecountry´stwomost

prominenteconomicleaders,isthatmanyofthe‘crimes’theywereaccusedofin2009

areverysimilartothereformsbeingproposedandpartlyimplementedinCubaafew

yearslaterduringRaúl´spresidency,implementedbythepersonsubstitutingMr

RodriguezasMinisteroftheEconomy,CoronelMarinoMurillo,ex-MinisterofInternal

Trade.Ontheotherhand,thephilosophyexpressedintheargumentsagainstthemseem

toalargeextenttohavere-emergedinwhatweshallcallthecounter-reformof2016,

whenMrMurillowas“relievedofhisresponsibilities”asMinisteroftheEconomy.The

ideologicalpenduluminCubakeepsswinging.

By2012,Raúlhadsubstitutedatotalof32ministers,whichmeansthatthecountry´s

entireexecutiveleadershiphadbeenchangedfromFideltoRaúl.

Inthelead-uptothe6thPartyCongressin2011,therewasanactivedebateaboutCuba´s

futureeconomicpolicies.ThediscussionfocusedtoalargepartonwhetherornotCuba

13Granma,5March2009.14ThisinternalPCCnote,withquotes,isreferredtoinMesa-Lago(2013:222-223).

28

couldandshouldfollowtheexamplesofChinaandVietnam.Fidelhadrepeatedlystated

thatCubalackstheconditionstofollowChina,referringtotheenormousterritoryand

economicpower,distancefromtheUSandlargeforeigninvestments,includingfromthe

USRaúlontheotherside,hadexpressedduringavisittoChinain2005(beforehetook

overfromFidel),that“allwhatyouhavedoneherereallybringshope[…]somepeople

inCubaareveryconcernedaboutChina´sevolution,howeverIamcontentandcalm

[aboutwhatIhaveseen]”.15Sevenyearslater,MarinoMurillo,thenalsoHeadofthe

Commissionfortheimplementationoftheeconomicguidelines,madethefollowing

observationaboutthestudyoftheexperiencesfromChina,VietnamandRussia:“[We

tryto]understandmethodologicallywhattheyhavedone”but“thatdoesnotmeanthat

wearegoingtocopyautomaticallywhattheothersdid”.Andheadded:“Wearenot

carryingoutpoliticalreforms”.16

AnextensiveacademicdebatetookplaceinCubaafter2006,whenRaúlCastromadehis

firstannouncementsaboutnecessaryreforms.Thepersonexpectedtobehissuccessor

atthatpoint,FirstVicePresidentCarlosLage,wasveryclearabouttheneedforthis

debate:“Weneedtohaveatruedialoguebetweensocialscientistsandthedecision

makers”.17Anumberofeconomists,butalsoothersocialscientists,lawyers,

philosophersetc.,werepartofthisexchange.Ingeneral,theirargumentswentinfavour

ofdeepermarketreforms,someofwhichcanbefoundamongthereformmeasures.

Thisdebatefocusedonissuessuchasprivateproperty,agriculture,thedoublemonetary

system,socialwelfare,andcitizenparticipation.18

The6thPartyCongress,whichfinallytookplaceinApril2011afterseveral

postponements,19passedtheso-calledLineamientosdelapolíticaeconómicaysocial

(Guidelinesfortheeconomicandsocialpolicy)20forwhatwastermed“laactualización

delmodeloeconómico”,updatingoftheeconomicmodel.Thiswassupposedtobethe 15Granma,21.04.2005.16Granma,29.03.2012.17Quotedfrom”SobrelatransiciónsocialistaenCuba:Unsimposio”(2007):Temas:51-52.18ThedebateiswellsummarisedinMesa-Lago2008:45-74andinMesa-Lago2013:224-236.WecomebacktotheroleofintellectualsandacademicsinChapter6,Indicator6.2.19ThePCCCongress,whichaccordingtoitsstatutesshouldnormallytakeplaceeveryfiveyears,hadnotbeenconvenedsince1997(14yearsearlier).The7thCongresswouldthen–accordingtostatutes–takeplacein2016.20http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2011/05/09/descargue-en-cubadebate-los-lineamientos-de-la-politica-economica-y-social-pdf/#.WgxP17bBKuU

29

majorblueprintfornecessaryeconomicreforms(althoughthiswordwasneverused)in

thecomingyearsinCuba.Draftguidelineswerepublishedfivemonthsearlier

(November2010),andsubmittedtodiscussionsatpublicmeetingsalloverthecountry.

Peoplewerealsoencouragedtohandinproposalsforchangetotheguidelines,andthe

Partyclaimedthatseveralmillionsuchproposalsweresubmitted.Therewasalsoa

heateddebateinsomeofthegovernment-controlledwebsites(likecudadebate.cu)and

theofficialmedia.Raúlhadinadvanceencouragedpeopletotakeanactivepartinthe

debate,andadvisedleadersto“listenandcreateaproperenvironmentsothatothers

mayexpressthemselveswithabsolutefreedom”(butalwayswithinthelawand

socialism).“Criticism”hesaid,“whenadequatelyexpressed,isessentialinorderto

advance”.21Thisdebateandtheproposalssubmitteddidleadtosomechangesinthe

GuidelinesthatwereultimatelyapprovedbytheCongress,butnoneofthemwerereally

substantial(perhapswiththeexceptionofaproposaltodiscontinuetheuseofthe

rationingcard,aproposalthatwasonlypartlyapproved).

3.3. The Reform agenda

AccordingtoMesa-Lago(2013:273),thereformsapprovedbythe6thPartyCongress

werethemostcomprehensiveandthedeepestreformsinitiatedandcarriedoutduring

theentirerevolution.

Alreadybeforethe2011PartyCongress,somereformshadbeenapprovedunderRaúl´s

leadership,amongthemadministrativemeasuresandmoreorlessstructuralreforms.22

Amongthenon-structuralreformsfeaturedthepermissionforCubanstovisithotelsand

restaurantspreviouslyreservedforforeigners,theacquisitionofelectro-domestic

goods,andadditionallytheauthorisationofprivatetransport(taxisaswellasother

privatetransportofpersonsandgoods).Thefirststructuralreformintroducedin2008

wasthedecisiontoleaseoutCuba´slargeextensionsofidleland,throughso-called

usufructo.Itwasalsointhisperiodthatacomprehensivecampaignagainstcorruption

wasinitiated.AccordingtoRaúl,“thecorruptionistodayoneoftheprincipalenemiesof

21QuotedbyMesaLago2013:242.22Inthefollowing,weuseMesa-Lago(2013)’sdistinctionbetweenadministrativeandfunctionalreforms.

30

therevolution,muchmoreharmfulthanthesubversiveandinterferenceactivityofthe

USgovernment[…]Thecorruptionistodayequivalenttocounter-revolution”.23Raúl

alsointroducedaseriesofmeasurestoreducesocialbenefits;tomakethemmore

focalizedtowardsthosewhoreallyneededthem(e.g.the35%ofthepopulation

assumednottoreceivefamilyremittancesfromabroad).

TheGuidelinesstateveryclearlythatcentralplanningandnotthemarketforceswillbe

keptastheoverridingeconomicinstrumentinCuba.Stateenterpriseswillcontinueto

dominate,butcompaniesrunningatalosswillbeclosedortransferredtonon-state

management.

“Theobjective”,saidRaúlinhisopeningreporttothe2011Congress(Castro2011)“isto

guaranteethecontinuationandirreversibilityofsocialism,aswellastheeconomic

developmentofthecountryandtheelevationoflivingstandards,combinedwiththe

necessaryformationofethicalandpoliticalvaluesamongourcitizens”.

Thesearethemostimportantreformmeasurestobediscussedinthisdissertation:24

Significantstateretreatinagriculture:Achieveasufficientagriculturalproductionin

ordertoendthedependenceonfoodinputsandthusalsoimprovethecountry´sbalance

ofpayments.Thiswillbeachievedthroughincreasedpresenceofnon-stateproduction

formsandbypromotingmajorautonomyfortheproducers(Guidelines177-178).

1. Leasing(usufructo)ofidlestate-ownedagriculturalland(Guideline189):This

practicestartedin2008with56,000“usufructuarios”occupying560,000

hectaresofland,graduallyincreasingto250,000beneficiariesoccupying1.8mill

hectaresatthemostin2014-2015beforethefiguresstartedfallingagain.Inthe

beginning,thisreformlackedanumberofaspectsthatmadeitrelatively

ineffective:acontractlimitoftenyears(laterraisedto20whileboththepeasant

organizationANAPandindependenteconomistssaidcontractsshouldbe

permanentandsubjecttoinheritance—whichnowinprincipleispossible);the

maximumextensionofeachparcelwasfirstsetatonly13hectaresandlater

23Granma,23.12.2011.24TheselectionofthemostimportantreformissuesismostlybasedonMesa-Lago2013.

31

raisedto67;therewasnopermissiontobuildadwellingattheleasedland—this

wasalsolaterpermitted.

2. Gradualintroductionofnon-statewholesalemarkets,substitutingthestate-

controlledacopios:

“Transformtheacopioandmarketingsystemforagriculturalproducts,bymeansof

moreefficientmanagementmechanismsthatcontributetoreducethelosses,and

simplifythelinksbetweenprimaryproductionandthefinalconsumer,includingthe

possibilitythattheproducercanbringtheproductstothemarketwithhisown

means”(Guideline183)(S/E).

3. Expansionofprivateworkandlayoffsfromthestatesector:TheGuidelinesmadeit

clearthattheStatehadnocapacitytokeepthepresentworkforce,andthat

considerablelayoffswouldbenecessary,fromstatecompaniesnotconsideredto

beofstrategicimportance.TheCubancategoryofself-employedworkers,

“cuentapropistas”,hadexistedsincethe1990s,vacillatingaround3%ofthe

workforceinthefirstdecadeofthenewcentury.Totalnon-stateemployment

reached20%oftotalworkforcein2004,fallingto15.7%in2010.25TheParty

Congressapproved178activitiesforself-employment(laterexpandedto201),

someofthemprofessionsofacertainimportance,butmostofthemunqualified

work.Professionalswithhighereducationwereexcluded,eveniftheywerelaid

off,leavingthemwiththeonlyoptiontotakeonno-qualifiedwork.Theself-

employedwereinitiallyonlypermittedtoemployfiveotherworkers.Private

restaurants(so-called“paladares”)wereallowedtoexpandtheircapacityfrom

12to20chairs(laterexpandedto50).ThePartyCongressprincipleofavoiding

theconcentrationofwealthwasvisibleinallthesemeasures,inmanycases

simplyformalisinginformalwork.Initsinitialformcuentapropismowasbymany

seenasawayofstimulatingentrepreneurshipthatcouldcreatesignificantnew

employmentopportunitiesforthoselaidofffromthestate.

4. Leasingoutofsmall-scalebusinesses:Anotheraspectofclosureofstate-owned

companieswastooffersmallbusinesseslikebarbershopstotheworkerswith 25Mesa-Lago2013:260,Table30.

32

ten-yearleasingcontracts,onceagainwiththisveryspecialwayoflimitingthe

businesstonumberofchairs(inthiscasethree).Thelistofpermittedbusinesses

thatcouldbeleasedoutwasgraduallyincreased.

5. Expansionofthecooperativesector:“Firstdegreecooperativeswillbecreatedas

aformofsocialistcollectivepropertyinvarioussectors”(Guideline25).The

intentionwastotakethecooperativesbeyondagriculture,andcreatenon-

agricultural(orurban)cooperatives.ButtheGuidelinesalsodeclaredthe

intentionofcreatingsecond-degreecooperatives,withtheprospectivethatcould

openforasignificantstrengtheningofthecooperativesectorintheeconomy:

“Second-degreecooperativeswillbecreated,withfirst-degreecooperativesas

members[…]formedwiththeobjectiveoforganisingcomplementaryactivities

oraddvaluetotheproductsandservicesofitsmembers”(Guideline29).Alaw

waspassedinearly2013fortheintroductionofnon-agriculturalcooperatives.

6. Microcreditsandprivatebankaccounts:Until2011,onlystatecompaniesand

cooperativeshadaccesstostatecredits.Asof2012,smallcreditscouldbeoffered

toprivatepeasants,usufructuariosandcuentapropistas.Theamountsnormally

available,however,wereverylimited,andtheadministrativeprocessesquite

complicated,sothatinpracticeveryfewsmallbusinessescouldmakeuseofthe

creditopportunities(ref.Feinberg2013,seealsoVidal2012).TheEU,Spain,

BrazilandagroupofdiasporaCubanbusinesspeopleinFlorida(CubanStudy

Group)haveallofferedcreditfundsforsmallbusinessesthroughCubanbanks,

butthegovernmentneveracceptedsuchproposals.In2011,thesamegroups

wereforthefirsttimegivenaccesstoopenbankaccounts.

7. Socialwelfare:Oneofthemostdebatedissuesatthe6thPartyCongresswasthe

eliminationoftherationcards,whichhadbeenproposedasawayofreducing

thesocialexpenditurethat,accordingtoRaúl,thecountrycouldnolonger

sustain.Ratherthaneliminatingthesystemaltogether,itwasapprovedto

introduceanewsystemofmorefocalisedsubsidiesonlycoveringonethirdofthe

month.TheCongressalsoapprovedareductioninsocialservices:whilethey

previouslyhadrepresented53%ofthestatebudget,thissharewouldnowbe

reducedto34%.

33

8. PermissiontoownmobilephoneswasonlyallowedinCubain2008:Combined

withaslowbutincreasingopeningofinternetaccess,andaccesstosmart

phones,thishasbeenthebasisforoneofthemostimportantpoliticalchanges

duringthereformperiod,inrealityresultingintheendoftheinformation

monopoly.

9. Realestatemarket:ThePartyCongressauthorisedthebuyingandsellingofreal

estate.Untilthatpointintime,theonlylegalwaytobuyorselldwellingswas

throughaverybureaucraticandeasilycorruptiblesystemfortheexchange

(permuta)ofonedwellingwithanother.TheCongressnowauthorisedthat

Cubancitizensandforeignerswithpermanentresidenceinthecountry—butnot

otherforeigners—couldacquireonedwellingplusanadditionalholidayhouse.

Inheritancerightswerealsoguaranteed,andthepropertyregistry,heavilyout-

dated,wasre-established.

10. Buyingandsellingofcars:Inthesameway,Cubancitizensandpermanentforeign

residents(withaccesstoconvertiblecurrency)wereauthorisedtobuyandsell

privatecars.

11. Migrationpolicy:Oneofthemostsignificantmeasures,onlycautiouslytouched

bythePartyCongressbutintroducedandimplementedacoupleofyearslater

(from1January2013)—apparentlyafterintensediscussions—wasthe

eliminationofthegeneralemigrationcontrolthroughtheso-calledTarjeta

Blanca.ThiswasasystemthatinrealityhadgiventheGovernmentfulland

discretionarycontrolofalltravelstoforeigncountries,atprohibitivelyhigh

pricesforordinaryCubans(USD150forthetarjeta,USD200forthoseforeigners

issuinganinvitationletter,plusamonthlytaxofUSD150).Suddenly,inprinciple

allCubancitizens,includingoppositionpersonsand“enemiesoftherevolution”,

hadfreeaccesstotravelaslongastheycouldgetthepassportandavisato

anothercountry.26

26Thegovernmentreservedsomerestrictionstotherighttotravelabroad:thosewhoaresubjecttopenalprocessorhaveapendingpenalsanction,thosewhohaveadutytomilitaryservice,or–moreconfusedly

34

12. NewregimeforDirectForeignInvestment(notmentionedinGuidelines,but

approvedin2014;ref.Indicator3.1).

13. Eliminationofthedualmonetarysystem(convertibleandnon-convertible

currencies):Point55oftheGuidelinesreadsasfollows:

“Wewilladvancetowardsthemonetaryunification,bearinginmindwork

productivityandtheeffectivenessofdistributionandredistributionmechanisms.

Duetoitscomplexity,thisprocessdemandsarigorouspreparationandexecution”.

Thisisoneofthereformmeasuresthatapparentlyhaveturnedouttobemost

difficulttoimplement.

14. RestrictionsontimeofserviceintopPartyandStateleadershippositions(max.two

periodsortenyears):LatertobecomplementedwithagerestrictionsforParty

positions(max.60yearswhenenteringCentralCommitteeandgeneral

retirementat70).Thisisinfactaseriouspoliticalreformproposal.Ifthisrule

hadbeenappliedatthe7thPartyCongressin2016(asRaúlpredicteditwouldat

the6thCongress),twothirdsofthePolitburowouldhavebeenretired.By2018,

RaúlCastrowillhavefinishedtwoperiodsasHeadofStateandGovernment,and

hewouldlogicallyresignalongwithmostofhisgenerationalcomrades.

Ithasbeenclaimed27thatRaúlinrealityhadfourmajorpointsonhispoliticalagenda

whenhetookofficein2008,inadditiontotheeconomicreforms:normalisationof

relationswiththeCatholicChurch,normalisationwiththeUS,re-negotiationofthe

country´sforeigndebt,andfinallyratificationofinternationalhumanrightstreaties.

NormalisationwiththeChurchcamefirst,whenhein2010negotiatedwithCardinal

Ortegathereleaseof75politicalprisoners(thevictimsoftheso-called‘BlackSpring’,

–wheretheremaybe”reasonsofdefenceandnationalsecurity”.TheGovernmentcouldalsorefuseexitpermissiontopeoplewhopossessnecessaryqualificationsfor”thecountry´seconomic,socialandscientifictechnicaldevelopment,andforthesecurityandprotectionofofficialinformation”(Articles23and25ofthenewMigrationLaw).27ThisistheappreciationofthetwodirectorsofCubaPosible,previouslyEspacioLaical,RobertoVeigaandLeonelGonzales(interviewedrepeatedlyinHavana).

35

imprisonedin2003),thuspreparingthegroundforthevisitofPopeFranciswhoinhis

turnhelpedpreparethegroundforthenormalisationprocesswiththeUS.Thelatter

wasofficiallylaunchedon17December2014.ThedebtagreementwiththeParisClub

wasreachedinDecember2015.28Whatremainedunmetamongthesepointswasthe

ratificationofhumanrightstreaties,inspiteoftheprocessheinitiatedin2008(ref.

Chapter1).

HowshouldoneinterpretRaúl’sreforms—isheaconservativeorareformist?Klepak

(2012)suggeststhefollowingobservation,whichsoundsreasonable;heisneithera

conservativenorareformer:

“IfRaúlfeelsthatreformisnecessaryfortheefficiencyandprogressoftheRevolution,and

forthefurtheranceofprotectionofitsmaingoals,hewillbeinterestedinreform.Ifhefeels

thatreformisdangerousforthesurvivalorwell-beingofthosegoals,heisinterestedin

conservatism”(Klepak2012:99).

Thesegoals,Klepakadds,arebasicallythesocialgainsoftherevolution(health,

education,socialsecurityetc.).

Klepaksaysnothingaboutthemaintenanceofpowerasagoalinandofitself.Itis,

however,difficulttoavoidthesuspicionthatthisgoalliesbehindofeverythingthathas

happenedasthesereformmeasureshavebeentestedinpractice.

UnderIndicator9.3,wearguethatthesereformmeasuresweremetbyavirtualcounter

reform,particularlyfrom2016.

3.4. Reforms leading to transformation?

Fromtheverybeginning,therewasconsiderableresistanceagainstthereformagenda.

RaúlCastrorepeatedlycriticisedthebureaucracyforsabotagingthereforms—almost

28CubaandtheParisClubofcreditorsagreedinDecember2015onapardonof11.1billionUSDofthecountry´s13.7billionUSDdebt,withCubacommittingtocleartheremaining2.6billionUSDofdebtinarrearsoveran18-yearperiod.http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/communications/press-release/agreement-on-the-debt-between-cuba-and-the-group-of-creditors-of-cuba

36

amountingtosomekindofcivildisobedience.Partsoftheofficialpress,perhapsmost

consistentlyJuventudRebelde,werepushinginthereformdirection,callingfora

deepeningofthereformsagainstthebrakesappliedbythebureaucracy.29

ThereformsannouncedandinitiallyimplementedbyRaúlCastrofrom2008wereby

mostobserversseenasthebeginningofasignificanteconomictransformationofthe

Cubansociety.Theyformalogicalbasisforthechallengeswithhypothesesthatweshall

presentinChapter5anddiscussinthisdissertation,togetherwiththetheoreticaland

empirical-comparativediscussioninChapter4.Whenformulatingthehypothesesfor

eachofthe9challengesweintendtodiscuss,wewilltrytointegratedirectmeasuresof

thereformagendaandthetransformativeimplicationsthesemaybesupposedtohave

whenbuildingonthetheoreticalliterature.

29Seee.g.JuventudRebelde,11.09.11.

37

Chapter 4: Theoretical and comparative-empirical framework for

the study

4.1. Introduction

Thepurposeofthischapteristodrawupatheoreticalandconceptualframeworkfor

theempiricaldiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenon-goingeconomicandpolitical

transformationsinCuba.Thetheoreticalframeworkwillhelpformulatethehypotheses

innextchapter.

Wewillfirstdiscusstraditionaltheoriesoftransition,theoriesthatassumeatransition

towardsamoreorlessliberaldemocracy.Thistransitionparadigmwillbequestionedin

thelightoftheincreasingrecognitionofthedemocraticfatigueandthecrisisofliberal

democracyintheworld.Couldthisleadthewaytosomeformofrenewalofdemocratic

practices,whatsomehavecalledtransformativedemocraticpolitics?Thepolitical

scienceliteraturewillbecomplementedbyeconomistsandhistoriansofferingmore

structuralistapproaches,forauthoritarianwithdrawalingeneralandmorespecifically

fortransformationsofsocialistsystems.Itshouldbeemphasizedthatallthesetheories

dealwithrelationsbetweeneconomic(statevs.market)andpolitical(authoritarianvs.

liberalpolities)transformationsinonewayortheother.

Furtheron,therewillbeadiscussionofwhetherthetransformationmaygoinaquite

differentdirection,asexemplifiedbycountrieslikeChinaandVietnam.Inorderto

understandtheimplicationsofsuchtransformations,wewillintroducetheconceptof

socialistneo-patrimonialregimes,alternativelyauthoritarianmarketeconomy.Wewill

alsodiscusswhethertheresilienceofChineseandVietnameseregimes,basedonwhat

wecallpragmaticacceptance,isatallaviableoptionforCuba,giventhedeephistorical

andculturaldifferencescomparedtotheseAsiansocietiesandthepeculiaraspectsof

theCubansociety.ThisistoalargedegreerelatedtotheissueoflegitimacyasCubais

38

arrivingatitscriticaljunctureofthepost-Castroepoch.Thisallhappensinaveryspecial

internationalcontextforCuba:thehistoricalenemyimageofUSimperialismwasinfull

disruptionunderex-PresidentObama,beforePresidentTrumpofferedgreatsupportto

itsresurrectionbyreturningtoconfrontationpolicies.

4.2. Categorising socio-economic and political transitions or transformations

Weprefertousetheterm‘transformation’ratherthan‘transition’inthisdissertation.

Thereasonissimple:asweshallsee,‘transition’isinterpretedbytheCuban

governmentasaUSefforttoimposeregimechange,thusblockingmeaningfuldialogue.

Butthereisalsoanincreasingacademicrejectionoftheconceptof‘transition’

altogether,specificallyinthecaseofCubaanditsreformprocessunderRaúlCastro.A

formercountryeconomistwiththeInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IADB),Emily

Morris(2015:8),observedthat“muchofthediscussionoftheimpactofnormalization

onCubanpolicyhascenteredonthequestionofwhetheritwillprecipitate‘transition’”,

goingontoargue:

“ButthediverseexperiencesofEasternEuropeanandAsianeconomies,aswellasthehuge

differencesbetween‘capitalist’economiesintermsofeconomicsystemsandperformance,

castdoubtonthemeaningofthetermof‘transition’,anditsapplicationtothecaseofCubais

arguablyuninformative.Theideaofa‘market’economyanda‘state’onewasalwaysa

caricatureusedtodistinguishtheeconomicsystemsofthe‘capitalist’countriesfromthe

‘communist’ones.Infact,thestateobviouslyplaysacrucialroleinallcapitalisteconomies

(unlessfailedstatesareincludedinthedefinition),andmarketshavealwaysexistedwithin

communisteconomies,includingCuba”.

Inthetheoreticalandempiricaldiscussionsabouttransitionsortransformationsfrom

totalitarianorauthoritarianregimesoverthelast40years,wemaybroadlyspeaking

distinguishbetweenthreedifferenttransformativepatterns:

Thefirstpatternisinternaldemocraticreform,suchasthosethattookplaceinSouthern

Europe,SouthAmericaandinex-USSRandformersocialistcountriesinEasternEurope.

ThisisthepatternofdemocratisationstudiedinstandardreferenceslikeLinz&Stepan

(1994),normallydescribedas‘democratictransition’or‘transitiontodemocracy’.

39

Whitehead(2009)referstoSpainasthe‘modeltransition’ofthispattern:the

replacement“withapparentease”oftheFrancodictatorship“byalegitimateand

consensualdemocraticregime,withinafewyearsofthedeathoftheolddictator”

(Whitehead2009:218).TheSpanishtransitionwasobviouslyveryrelevantforlater

transitionsfromdictatorshipinSouthAmerica.WhiteheadgoesontorefertoPoland

andHungaryastwoother‘pivotalcases’ofregimetransitionunderthispattern,under

theterm‘tripletransition’:

“They(PolandandHungary)bothgenerated‘reformcommunist’eliteswhoinitiated

liberalizationanddemocratizationthroughpeaceful‘round-table’negotiations.Theyboth

transitedfromcommunistruletomulti-partydemocracy;fromstate-runtomarket-led

economies;andfrommilitaryalliancewiththeEasttomilitaryalliancewiththeWest.These

remarkablycomprehensive‘tripletransitions’tookplacebyconsent”(ibid:219).

Finally,Whiteheadalsoreferstoathirdbrandof‘pivotalcase’oftransitionthatfallsinto

thisbroadercategory:whathecallsthe‘miracletransition’inSouthAfrica:“The

peacefuldismantlingoftheapartheidregime;thenegotiatedinstallationofabroad-

basedsubstitute,onecapableofdrawingalineunderanuglypoliticalpastandof

promotingco-existencebetweenapparentlyirreconcilableenemies”(ibid:217).30

WhiteheadclaimsthattheSouthAfricantransitionmayhaveprovenwrongthebelief

thatdemocracywouldbeunviableindeeplydividedsocieties.Laterworrisome

developmentsinSouthAfricadonotseemtothreatenthedemocraticbasisofthis

transition.

Thesecondpatterniswhatwemaytermeconomictransformationwithoutchangeof

politicalregime,withChinaandVietnamasthemostprominentcases.Cubamaysofar

besaidtohavefollowedthispattern,althoughmuchmoremoderatelywhenitcomesto

theintroductionofmarketreforms.Thebigquestioniswhetherafurtherdeepeningof

theeconomictransformations,toalevelcomparabletothoseinthetwoAsiancountries,

wouldbecompatiblewiththemaintenanceofthesamepoliticalregimeinCuba.

30TheproblemwiththisnotionofanegotiatedoutcomeinCubaisthatitishardtoseehowanyseriousnegotiationcounterpartwouldappearinthenearfutureinCuba–seethoughafurtherdiscussionofthisinChapter11.5.

40

ThethirdpatternofrelevanceforCubaiswhatwemayterm‘democracyattemptedto

beimposedfromoutside’,alsoinsomecontextscalled‘regimechange’.Themostknown

casesfromthepresentcenturyareAfghanistanandIraq,basicallydesignedbytheUS

regimeofGeorgeW.Bush,tobe‘democratised’throughmilitaryinterventionsremoving

theenemyregimesandlettingdemocracygrowasalogicalconsequence.Thiswas

obviouslynogreatsuccess.Whatisperhapslessknownisthatthesameadministration

hadaverysimilardesignforCuba(seeChapter8).PresidentObamaexplicitlyabolished

thisapproachthroughhisrapprochementwithCuba.WithPresidentTrumpnowtalking

about‘anewdeal’,itisaquestionwhetheritmaybeputonthetableagain.

Whitehead(op.cit.)hasdescribedIraqasanotherpivotalcase,whereheshowsthe

contradictionbetweenpro-democracyobjectivesandanti-democraticresults,inwhat

hecalls“thedarksideofdemocracypromotion”,oralso“coercivedemocracy

imposition”.Thefailureof‘pro-democracyinterventions’(Afghanistan,Iraq,Libya),the

wholeissueofwhatwentwronginSyriaandthemorerecentemergenceoftheIslamic

State(IS)isalsorelevant,notleastbecauseCubawasseenbytheGeorgeW.Bush

administrationasacaseofwhatwecouldcall‘softpro-democracyintervention’.

Theideologicaluseofthetransitionparadigmhadmilitaryinterventionsasitsmost

extremeform.WesawitinAfghanistan,inIraq,andbeforethatinCentralAmerica

throughtheUSsupporttothecontrasinNicaraguaandmilitarysupporttoviolentand

farlessdemocraticbutpro-USregimesinElSalvador,Guatemala,andHonduras.31

TheIraqregime-changecase—andwemayaddAfghanistaninthesamecategory—is

seenagainstthebackdropofthementionedmodeltransitionsandisthoughttohave

underminedtheinternationalsupportfortheentireUS-ledprojectofdemocracy

promotion.Itrepresentedaleapfrom‘liberalinternationalism’(typicallyrepresented

byDemocraticpresidentslikeCarterandClinton)tothe‘coercivedemocratisation’of

theneoconservativeReaganandBushJr.administrations.TheUN-adopteddogmasof

‘responsibilitytoprotect’and‘humanitarianintervention’mayalsohavesuffered

seriousblows,evenmoresoafterthedisastrousoutcomesofsimilareffortincountries 31TheUSinterventioninCentralAmericainthe1980swasthesubjectofmybook(Bye1990;Bye1991),whereitiswelldocumentedthattheeffectwasrunningclearlycountertotheofficiallydeclaredobjectiveofdemocracypromotion.

41

likeLibyaandSyria.Evennon-interventionistpro-democracyinitiativesinthenameof

theworldcommunityaresufferingtheconsequences.

OneparticularlyobjectionableaspectofdemocraticinterventionsseenfromCubais

theirdenialofnationalsovereignty,aholyconceptinCubaandtheveryideologicalbasis

oftherevolutionbeforeitwasdeclaredassocialist.ThefailureoftheIraqexperience—

asseenbymostinternationalobservers—hasbeenashotinthearmforCuba´sclaim

thatexternallyimposeddemocratisationisillegitimate.AsWhitehead(op.cit:229)sums

up:

“Whatthepivotalexperienceofcoercivedemocratizationonthisscalealreadydemonstrates,

however,isthatwhenregimechangeisnotmainlydrivenandcontrolledfromwithin(asit

wasinSpain,PolandandSouthAfrica),thetheoreticalmodelsderivedfromexisting

academicliteratureareunlikelytoprovidemuchhelpfulguidance”.

Thismayproveaverysignificantobservationaswemoveaheadtounderstandwhat

maycauseeconomicandpoliticaltransformationsinCuba—somethingthatex-

PresidentObamaseemstohavebeenthefirstUSpresidenttorealisesincetheCuban

revolution(Bye2015).HishistoricallyredefinedCubapolicymayparadoxicallyhave

amountedtobethemostseriouspoliticalchallengeeverexperiencedbythisrevolution,

untilhisnewapproachwasabortedbyPresidentTrump.

4.3. Theoretical approaches for economic vs. political transformations

Buildingonthecorrelationmatrixbetweeneconomicandpoliticaltransformationsthat

wedevelopedinChapter2(Figure2.1),wecanimaginetwooppositecausalparadigms

atplaywhenitcomestotherelationshipbetweeneconomicandpolitical

transformations.

Mostofthetraditionaltheoriesseemtobuildatleastonanimplicitassumptionsimilar

toourRoute2:economicchangesfirst,lateraffectingpolitics:thatchangesinthe

economicstructureswillleadtopoliticaltransformations,or,putbluntly,thatcapitalism

willleadtodemocracy.Lipset(1960)maybethescholarprovidingthemostclassical

42

argumentforthis.Inreality,thisisprettymuchinlinewiththeorthodoxMarxist

assumptionthatchangesintheeconomicbasewillleadtochangesinthepolitical

superstructure(Marx2004).32AnextphasewasintroducedbyHuntington(1968)and

histheoryofpoliticalorder.33HeconsidersLipset´sargumenttobeoversimplifiedand

flawed,arguingthatchangesinpoliticalsystemsandinstitutionsarerathercausedby

tensionswithinthepoliticalandsocialsystem.

LinzandStepanbringstheLipsetargumentfurther,intheirargumentsfor“thecrafting

ofdemocraticinstitutions”,inmanycasesthroughelitecompromises.TheSpanish

transitionisaclassicalreferencecaseinthiscontext.

Itmaybeclaimedthatthesetransitiontheoriesinrealitycanbeseenasproposalsfora

combinationofRoutes2and4,oreventheRoute5fasttrack,withparallelmovesand

mutualimpactbetweentheeconomicandpoliticaldimensions.

Analternativetothisparadigm(althoughneitherofthetwoareclaimedtobeabsolute)

istheoneappliedbyJánosKornai(1992),inhisstudyoftheUSSRandEastern

Europeantransformations.Contrarytotheaforementionedarguments,heclaims,the

mainlineofcausalityrunsfrompoliticstoeconomics:politicalliberalisationofpower

andideology(independentvariable)towardslastingeconomicphenomena(dependent

variables).ThisisatypicalRoute3withpossiblecontinuationalongRoute4inour

matrix:politicsfirstwithpossibleeconomicimplication.

InthisstudyofpossibleCubantransformations,sincethemainfocusisoneconomic

reforms,wewillsticktothethesisofeconomyfirst,beingontheoutlookforsignsthat

theeconomyalsomaycausepoliticalchange.Wewillhoweverdefinitelykeepanopen

mindforadiscussionofwhetherKornai´sthesismayofferanalternativeapproachto

theanalysisoftheCubanreformprocess.

32BaseandsuperstructurearetwoconceptsinKarlMarx´viewofhumansociety.Thebaseisthebasicwayasocietyorganisestheproductionofgoods.Itincludesemployer-employeeworkconditions,thetechnicaldivisionoflabor,andpropertyrelations,whichpeopleentertoproducethenecessitiesandamenitiesoflife.Thesuperstructureofasocietyincludesitsculture,institutions,politicalpowerstructures,roles,rituals,andnorms.AccordingtotheclassicalMarxistthesis,thebaseshapesanddeterminesthesuperstructure,howeverthesuperstructuredoesofteninfluence(maintainsandlegitimates)thebase.33Huntingtonwillprobablyfalloutsideoftheclassicalliberalparadigm.

43

InChinaandVietnam,thereseemstobeverylittlecausalrelationbetweentheeconomic

andpoliticalarenas.WemayherespeakaboutRoute1:theeconomicsonlyparadigm,

wheretheheavytransformationfromexclusivetoinclusiveeconomicinstitutionsis

accompaniedbystrongeffortstoholdbackaslidetowardsinclusivepolitical

institutions.Limitedsecurityforprivatepropertyandrestrictedrule-of-lawrepresent

flawsintheeconomicinclusivenessaccordingtothedefinitionwehaveusedhere.But

thathasnotstoppedtheseeconomiesfrombeingfarmoresuccessfuloverthelast

generationthanallfull-fledgedcapitalistdemocracies.

Also,inthecaseofCuba,thereformprocessis,inprinciple,limitedtotheeconomic

arena,whilepoliticalreformswereexplicitlyruledoutbythe20116thPartyCongress,

the2012PartyConference,34andagainbythe20167thPartyCongress.Itisinteresting

tonotethatintheofficiallanguage,eventhechangesineconomicpolicyarenotreforms,

onlyan‘updating’(actualización)ofthesocialisteconomicmodel.So,fromthat

perspective,onemightconcludethatCuba,likeChinaandVietnam,hasbeenattempting

aneconomicsonlytransformation.Ontheotherhand,eveneconomicreformsoriginate

inpoliticaldecisions.AswecomebacktounderIndicator8.2,theon-going

transformationshaveobviouspoliticalaspectswithoutquestioningbasicpower

relations.Wewillalsoclaimthateconomicreformsmayhavebeensloweddown

becauseofaconcernthattheymightspillovertothepoliticalarena.Itwilltherefore

makesensetoconsiderbothcausaldirectionsinthecaseofCuba.

AquestionattherootofthisstudyiswhetherthebasicMarxistassumptionofrelations

betweenbaseandsuperstructurereallywillturnouttobevalidinpracticeinsocialist

societiesundergoingacapitalistormarkettransition.Butifthathas,sofar,notoccurred

toanysignificantextentinChinaandVietnam(bothwillbefrequentreferencecasesin

thisstudy),thebigquestioniswhethertheassumptionwouldbeofmorerelevancein

thecaseofCuba,foraseriesofreasonstowhichwewillreturn.

AtleastoneMarxistclassic,AntonioGramsci,arguesverymuchalongthesamelinesas 34 The Party Conference is a new institution in Cuba, which in advance had been expected to touch upon political reform aspects not on the agenda for the Party Congress, but in reality, failed to do so. No other Party Conference has ever since been organised.

44

Kornai.Hisconcept‘historicbloc’ispresentedasacertainsocialorderproducingand

re-producingaculturalhegemonythroughinstitutions,socialrelationsandideas.

Gramsci,therefore,differentfromorthodoxMarxism,emphasisedtheimportanceofthe

politicalandideologicalsuperstructure,bothformaintainingandfracturingrelationsin

theeconomicbase.

ItisinterestingtoseehowCubansthemselvesviewthisconnection.Inararebut

apparentlyquitereliableopinionpolltakeninMarch2015,35peoplewereaskedwhat

theythoughtabouttheprospectsofthenewrelationshipwiththeUS.Whiletwothirds

(64%)thoughtthattheeconomicsystemwouldchange(orcontinuetochange),only

slightlymorethanonethird(37%)wereexpectingchangesinthepoliticalsystem.Ifthe

pollhadbeenrepeatedacoupleofyearslater,deepfrustrationabouteitherchange

scenariowouldprobablyhavebeenexpressed.

4.4. Liberal transition theories

Liberaltransitiontheoriesareprescriptionsforregimestomovetowardsthe

combinationofeconomicandpoliticalinclusiveness,invariousdegreesofpoliticsor

economicsfirst.HowrelevantaretheyforCuba?

4.4.1 The death of the democratic transition paradigm?

Intheearly1990s,afterthefalloftheUSSRandtheSovietbloc,therewasaeuphoric

andtriumphalistattitudeamongtheproponentsofliberaldemocratictransition.

Huntington(1991)launchedhisthesisof‘TheThirdWaveofDemocracy’.Fukuyama

(1989:1),evenbeforetheUSSRfellapart,usedthequitesensationalconcept‘TheEndof

History’(admittedlywithaquestionmark),withthefollowingkeyargument:

"WhatwemaybewitnessingisnotjusttheendoftheColdWar,orthepassingofaparticular

35”CubanswelcomewarmerrelationswiththeU.S.”,apollofCubanresidentsconductedbyBendixenandAmandiInternationalforUnivisionNoticiasandFusionincollaborationwithTheWashingtonPost,financedbytheNationalEndowmentforDemocracy,publishedbyWashingtonPoston08.04.15,http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/cuba-poll-2015/

45

periodofpost-warhistory,buttheendofhistoryassuch:thatis,theendpointofmankind's

ideologicalevolutionandtheuniversalizationofWesternliberaldemocracyasthefinalform

ofhumangovernment".

Meanwhile,Fukuyama(2014)hassignificantlychangedhismind,ascribingrecent

democraticsetbackstothefailureofinstitutionalisation,morespecificallytothefact

thatstatecapacityinmanynewandexistingdemocracieshasnotkeptpacewith

populardemandsfordemocraticaccountability.36InanevenlaterdiscussionofTrump´s

electoralvictory(Fukuyama2017),hegoesasfarascharacterisingtheUSasafailed

state,recognisingthathedidnotseehowdemocraciescouldgobackwardwhenhe

formulatedhisoriginalthesis.

Theworldhasevidentlyundergonedeepchangesince1991.Theacademicobservation

ofthisgotunderwayalreadyinthesecondhalfofthe1990s,withacounter-reactionto

theoverwhelmingdemocracyoptimism.ItmayhavebeenFareedZakariawhostarted

thisnewtrendbycoiningtheconcept‘illiberaldemocracy’,referringtoauthoritarian

tendenciesamongnewlyelectedleadersincountriesasdifferentasPeru,Argentina,

PhilippinesandKazakhstan(Zakaria1997).Thisreleasedadebateabouttheneedfor

‘democraticsequencing’,theclaimbeingthatdemocratisation—especiallynational

elections—incountriespoorlypreparedforitoftencanresultinbadoutcomes,even

civilorarmedconflict.Inordertopreventsuchresults,itwasargued,certain

preconditions,amongthemruleoflawandawell-functioningstate,oughttobeinplace

beforeasocietydemocratises(MansfieldandSnyder2005).Animportantpremisefor

thispositionwasthatthedemocratictransitionparadigmof‘thethirdwave’

underestimatedoroutrightignoredacountry´sunderlyingsocio-economicandpolitical

structureandhistoricallegacies;inshort,thattheylackedacontextanalysis.

Warningagainstthe‘sequencing’positionbyclaimingitwasmissingthetarget,other

democracytheoristsarguedthatwhatwasrequiredwasratherwhattheycalled

‘democraticgradualism’.Puttingoffelectionsinordertoallowin-depthnegotiations

betweencontendingpoliticalgroups,wouldallowthemto“getusedtodealingwithone

anotherpeacefullyandagreeontherulesofthegamebeforepotentiallydivisive

36WewillreturnrepeatedlytoFukuyama´sinterestingtheoreticalevolution.

46

electionsareheld”(Carothers2007:25).The‘gradualistagenda’,thoughttofitplaces

likeChinaandpartsoftheMiddleEast,37“highlightstheneedforsmallbutsignificant

stepsthatcreatespaceandmechanismsfortruepoliticalcompetitionandpointtheway

toaneventualendoftherulers’monopolyonpower”(ibid:26).Amongthemostcrucial

stepsaccordingtothisview,istheestablishmentofwhatwemaycall‘politicalcivil

society’,holdinglocalelectionswithacertaincompetition,andtoleratingamoreopen

publicspacewithindependentmedia.38

Thereisnowanevenmoreoverwhelmingacademicagreementthan25yearsago,but

aboutthecontraryconclusion:thattherelevanceandindeedtheattractionofthe

democratictransitionparadigmhasbeendrasticallyreduced.TheJournalofDemocracy,

thisbeaconofliberaldemocracythinkingandpromotion,celebratedits25yearsof

existencewithaspecialissueinJanuaryof2015.Amongthetitlesandheadlineswefind

thefollowing:“Democracyindecline?”;“Whyisdemocracyperformingsopoorly?”;

“Facinguptothedemocraticrecession”;“Democraticfatigue”.Pessimismaboutthe

prospectsofliberaldemocracyisalmostunanimous.TheDemocracyIndexproduced

annuallybyTheEconomistIntelligenceUnit(EIU)concludedinitsmostrecentreport:

”Inthe2017DemocracyIndextheaverageglobalscorefellfrom5.52in2016to5.48(ona

scaleof0to10).Some89countriesexperiencedadeclineintheirtotalscorecomparedwith

2016,morethanthreetimesasmanyasthecountriesthatrecordedanimprovement(27),

theworstperformancesince2010-11intheaftermathoftheglobaleconomicandfinancial

crisis[…]Inthe2017DemocracyIndexnotasingleregionrecordedanimprovementinits

averagescorecomparedwith2016.”

LatinAmericaremainsthemostdemocraticregioninthedevelopingworldaccordingto

thisindex,butwithsomesignificantmodificationsamongCuba’sfriendlycountries:

”Ecuadorimprovedfroma‘hybridregime’toa‘flaweddemocracy’.Venezuela,by

37ThiswaswrittenbeforeXiJinpingtookoverthetoppositioninChinaandbeforetheArabSpring.38TerryLynnKarl,ProfessorofStanfordUniversity,arguedatapanelduringtheLASAConferenceinNewYork2016(28.05.16)thatruleoflawmustbeinplacefirstifyouwantaqualitydemocracytotakehold(referringtotheproblemofimpunityforHRviolations–mentioningElSalvadorasabadmodelinthatregard).

47

contrast,movedfroma‘hybridregime’toan‘authoritarianregime’,joiningCubainthat

category.”39

Thesupportfordemocracyasthepreferredformofgovernmenthasfallensignificantly

inLatinAmericaoverthelateryears,accordingtotheprestigiouspollingof

Latinobarómetro,from61%in2010to53%in2017.TheapprovalratingsofLatin

Americangovernmentsarefallingquitedrastically,from60%in2009to36%in2017.

Only5%ofLatinAmericansnowbelievethattheyliveinafulldemocracy

(Latinobarómetro2017).

Itshouldbesaidthatwarningscamequiteearlyabouttheover-optimismofthefinal

triumphofliberaldemocracy.TheprominentBritishphilosopherJohnGraypresented

alreadyintheearly1990sathesisabout“post-totalitarianism,civilsocietyandthe

limitsofthewesternmodel”(NameofChapter14inGray1993).Hisconceptofpost-

liberalism,launchedthen,maybeamorerelevantdescriptionoftherealworldnow

morethanever.Inoneofhismostrecentessays(Gray2016),hestronglyquestionsthe

claimthatliberalvaluesareuniversal,criticisingliberalsthatthey:

“[C]annothelpbelievingthatallhumanbeingssecretlyyearntobecomeastheyimagine

themselvestobe.Butthisisfaith,notfact.Thebeliefthatliberalvaluesareuniversally

reveredisnotfoundedinempiricalobservation.Theyarefarfromsecureeveninpartsof

continentalEuropewheretheywereseenasunshakeableonlyafewyearsago.Inmuchof

theworldtheyarebarelyrecognised”.

”Infuture”,hegoesontosay,”governmentswillsucceedorfailbyhowwelltheycandeliver

prosperitywhilemanagingthesocialdisruptionthatglobalisationproduces”.

Thequestion,therefore,iswhetherthedeterministicthesesformulatedinthe1990sare

atallrelevanttoon-goingchangesinCubaandother‘emergingdemocracies’today.

Whatisobviousisthatsuchtheoriesneedtobequalified;theycannotbeappliedina

39http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWW1ZNU16STVaRGt6TnpCayIsInQiOiJYNFpEMGJ0dFp6d3U4MUpLXC9JMXhKQlZPVmdYMU5IR3Y3NUNGT1NkS0ptbE9Na3RnaUlHT21QRUtCMzQ3RW1EUWhmRE5mMnA2WWpWZjZ6TXczUmQyZjRMYnY5NjVNXC9RRFVvMW1TbXRNRFArMzFHS01ra2NSOEtYNW9WWHA1dEx5In0%3D(quotesfromp.3andp.10).

48

mechanisticmanner.Also,thereisnoone-stageorunilinearprocess.Andthirdly,one

hastotakeintoaccounttheparticularitiesandhistoricalmemoriesandcultural

traditionsofeachcountry.Bysodoing,onemaycomeupwithsomeusefuland

relativelypowerfulexplanatorycategories,withoutexpectingthattheygive‘onesizefits

all’orguaranteedanswer.

Whatwemayconcludeisthatthe‘democratictransitionparadigm’maynotfitasa

forecastingmethodinthecaseofCuba.Still,aswewillseethroughoutthisstudy,most

ofthetheoreticalconstructionspresentedbyLinzandStepanandothersarestill

relevantinordertodiscussthedirectionofasocialtransformationtakingplace.

4.4.2. Linz and Stepan´s Five Arenas of Democracy

ForthepurposeofstudyingwhetherandtowhatdegreeCubamaybeonthewayto

undergoatransformationtolessauthoritarianandmoreliberalpoliticalstructures,we

believethatLinzandStepan´s(1996op.cit.)fivearenasofaconsolidateddemocracy

(democraticpolity)offerameaningfulframeworkforthediscussionofon-going

reforms.Theroutestowardsbotheconomicandpoliticalinclusivenessoperateonall

thesearenas.Thisframeworkwillgivethefirstopportunitytodiscusstowardswhich

modelorscenariothecountryismoving.Afurtherelaborationofthisdiscussionwillbe

basedonthespecialcharacteristicsofwhattheyterm‘post-totalitarianregime’—where

present-dayCubaseemstofitverywell(ref.alsoLinz´studyoftotalitarianism:Linz

2000).

Theirfivearenasare:40

1. Aninstitutionalisedeconomicsociety:norms,institutionsandregulationsthat

mediatebetweenstateandmarket.Marketeconomyandownershipdiversity

capableofproducingtheindependenceandlivelinessofcivilsocietywillmake

crucialcontributionstoademocracy.

40Onpurpose,wehavechangedtheorderofthesefivearenascomparedtotheorderinwhichLinzandStepanpresentedthem.

49

2. Afreeandlivelycivilsociety:self-organisinggroups,movements,individuals,

relativelyautonomousfromthestate(tradeunions,entrepreneurialgroups,

journalists,lawyers).InLatinAmericaandpartlyinEasternEurope(Poland),

underpreviousmilitary-ledbureaucratic-authoritarianregimesandwhenthe

Sovietironfiststartedtodisintegrate,suchcivilsocietyshowedgreatcapacityto

mobilisetheoppositiontotheseregimes.Inothercases,popularprotestinthe

streethasbeenthebeginningoftransitions.Ontheotherhand,asinthecaseof

China(TiananmenSquare1989)andpreviouslyinHungary(1956)and

Czechoslovakia(1968),regimeshavebeenwillingtousemassiveforcetoquell

thesemovements.

3. Arelativelyautonomousandvaluedpoliticalsociety:mechanismstocontestthe

legitimaterighttoexercisecontroloverpublicpowerandthestateapparatus:

Civilsocietymaydestroyanon-democraticregime,butpoliticalsocietyis

requiredtoallowfulldemocratictransitionandparticularlyitsconsolidation;

thereisaclearcomplementaritybetweenthetwo.

4. Ruleoflawtoensurelegalguaranteesforcitizens’freedomsandindependent

associationallife:allsignificantactors,especiallythedemocraticgovernmentand

thestate,mustrespectandupholdtheruleoflaw,embodiedinaspiritof

constitutionalism(basedonstrongconsensus)—aclearhierarchyoflaws,

interpretedbyanindependentjudicialsystemandsupportedbyastronglegal

cultureincivilsociety.

5. Astatebureaucracythatis“usablebythenewdemocraticgovernment”:withan

effectivecapacitytocommand(monopolyoflegitimateuseofforce),regulate

(preparelaws)andextract(compulsorytaxation).Theissueisparticularly

sensitiveinpost-Communistcaseswherethedistinctionbetweenthepartyand

thestatehasbeenvirtuallynon-existentbeforethepartylostitspower

hegemony(throughdisintegrationorde-legitimisation).

50

4.4.3. Linz and Stepan´s approaches to the study of post-totalitarianism

Linz’andStepan’sclassicalworkalsoprovidesaprimaryreferencetothemorespecific

studyofpost-totalitarianism,bymakingadistinctionbetweentotalitarian,post-

totalitarian(whichagainmaybebrokendowntoearly,frozenandmaturepost-

totalitarianism),andauthoritarianregimes.Theyapplyasetoffourdimensionsto

determinetheregimetype:

1. Pluralism:amovefromatotalitariantoapost-totalitariansituationwould

basicallybedeterminedbytheemergenceofa‘secondeconomy’(i.e.anon-state

economy),andthetoleranceofpoliticalpluralism(firstcivilsociety,break-down

ofthemediaandinformationmonopoly,inmoreadvancedstagesofamulti-

partysystem).

2. Ideology:Inatotalitariansociety,astrongguidingideologystillexists,witha

strongcommitmenttoorfaithinutopia.Inasocietymovingtowardspost-

totalitarianism,therewillbea“growingempiricaldisjunctionbetweenofficial

ideologicalclaimsandreality”(LinzandStepan:48),wheretheregimeneedto

legitimiseitselfismoredecidedonthebasisofperformancecriteria.Inacontext

ofgrowingeconomiccrisis,regimecollapsehasoftenoccurredwhenmid-level

functionariesofthecoerciveapparatusstarthavinggrowingdoubtsabout

repressionofprotest.

3. Mobilization:Atypicalsituationoftotalitarianismisthatthereis“extensive

mobilisationintoavastarrayofregime-createdobligatoryorganisations”,while

movementsawayfromtotalitarianismimpliesaprogressivelossofinterest,

where“boredom,withdrawalandultimatelyprivatisationofpopulation’svalues”

isbecominganacceptedfact.

4. Leadership:Alossofcharismaticleadershipisanothertypicalcharacteristicof

reducedtotalitarianism,asisalsoasituationwherethenewrecruitmenttotop

leadershipbecomeslessdependentonacareerwithinthepartyorganisation.

‘Frozenpost-totalitarianism’mayoftenrevealgeriatrictendencies,“withlimited

51

capacitytonegotiate.Suchaleadershipstructure,ifitisnotabletorepress

opponentsinacrisis,isparticularlyvulnerabletocollapse”(ibid.p.47-48).

ThesefourdimensionswillbediscussedempiricallyunderChallenge6,emergenceofa

morepluralistsociety.

Theemergenceofpost-totalitarianism,LinzandStepanclaim,canbetheresultofthree

distinct,butofteninterconnected,processes:

1. Deliberatepoliciesoftherulers(“de-totalitarianismbychoice”);

2. Theinternal‘hollowingout’oftheregimeandinternalideologicalerosion(“de-

totalitarianismbydecay”);or

3. Creationofsocial,culturaloreconomicspacesthatresistorescapetotalitarian

control(“de-totalitarianismbysocietalconquest”).

Transitionsarefrequentlyseenasinvolvingapactbetweenregimemoderatesand

oppositionmoderates,whoareableto‘use’and‘contain’theirrespectivehardliners(a

four-playergame).Twoconditionsmustbesatisfiedforthistohappen:moderate

regimeplayersmusthavesufficientautonomy;andmoderateoppositionplayersneeda

degreeofcontinuedorganisationalpresence,powerandfollowers(ref.thenegotiation

scenariosdiscussedinChapter11).

4.4.4. Fukuyama´s ”way to Denmark”

Fukuyama(2011:431)usesthemetaphor“GettingtoDenmark”,forwhatheseesasthe

mostdevelopedstageofdemocraticdevelopment:“alaw-abiding,democratic,

prosperousandwell-governedpolitywithsomeoftheworld’slowestlevelsofpolitical

corruption”.ThemetaphormayhavebeeninfluencedbythefactthattheNordic

countriessystematicallyfindthemselvesatthetopofmanyrelevantrankingslike

UNDP´sHumanDevelopmentIndicator(HDI),thedemocracyindexesetc.Wemay

52

followFukuyamahereandconsidertheScandinaviansocietiesastheprobablybest

combinationofeconomicandpoliticalinclusiveness(boxainourmatrix).

WewillcomebacktoCuba´sperformanceonsomeoftheserankings,inorderto

determinethemostcriticalmissingelementsinits“waytowardsDenmark”.Whatwe

mayemphasiseatthispointisthatFukuyama´srecipeforhistoricdemocratic

developmentisthecombinationofstrongstateinstitutionsatcentralbutalsoatlocal

level(localself-determination)togetherwithfreeandautonomousfarmers.Itis

interestingtonotethatCubadoeshaveaverystrongstate,butlacksthetwoother

requirements:decentralisedstateauthorityandfreeandautonomousfarmersor

peasants.

Fukuyamabaseshisunderstandingoftheemergenceofdemocraticsystemsonthree

mainpillars:statebuilding,theruleoflaw(R-o-L)andaccountablegovernment.The

majorelementofR-o-L,inhisview,iseffectiveandindependentlegalinstitutions—

perhapsthemostdifficulttoconstruct:“incontemporarydevelopingcountries,oneof

thegreatestpoliticaldeficitsliesintherelativeweaknessoftheruleoflaw”(p.247).

“LatinAmericatodayisoverwhelminglydemocratic,butruleoflawisextremelyweak,

fromthebribe-takingpoliceofficertoatax-evadingjudge”(p.247).Theeconomic

componentofR-o-Lreferstomodernpropertyrights(heldbyindividuals,freetobuy

andselltheirproperty,withoutwhichlong-terminvestmentsareunlikelytotakeplace).

Butherecognisesthatthishasnotbeennecessarytoachievedouble-digiteconomic

growthinChina:disbandingcollectivefarmsandgivingpeasantsheritableusufructuary

rightstothelandwasevidently‘goodenough’.Contractenforcementisanother

dimensionofR-o-Lintheeconomy(traderequiresalegalmachinerytoenforce

contractsandtoadjudicatedisputesamongcontractingparties).

Fukuyamaseestheself-owningpeasants,withtherighttofreelyengageincommerce,as

oneofthedecisivestepsin“gettingtoDenmark”,alongwiththeProtestantReformation

anditsencouragementofpeasantliteracy(drivingsocialmobilisation,opportunityto

communicateamongthemselves,gettingorganisedaspoliticalagents—evenbeforethey

wereenfranchised).Fukuyamaspeaksabouttheparallelriseoffarmers’movements

andsocialistparties—butseemstoforgettheimportanceofworkers’unions.Generally

53

speaking,hehascapturedmanyelementsofwhatwenormallyrefertoas‘theNordic

model’,butnotnecessarilyall(seeTörnquistandHarris2016;Dølvik2015).A

complementaryexplanationof“howtogettoDenmark”or“theNordic(or

Scandinavian)model”thatgoesfurtherthantheimportanceofstate-building

institutions,isobviouslyrequired(andwecomebacktothisbelow).Literatureonthe

historicevolutionofthismodelsincethe1930smaybeinterestingforthosewhoare

consideringdevelopmentoptionsforemergingeconomies.41

Inthiscontext,itishighlyinterestingtonotethatthedrasticreductionofthesugar

economy—themainextractivesectorhistoricallyspeakinginCuba—givingwaytoan

emergingfamilyfarmeragriculturalstructure,mayhaveverysignificanteffectsfora

politicaltransition.Thisisanotherargumentforwatchingtransitionsintheagricultural

sectorveryattentively.

Fukuyamaalsoseestheemergenceofmoderncivilsocietyasdecisiveforeconomic

development:

“Themobilizationofsocialgroupsallowsweakindividualstopooltheirinterestsandenter

thepoliticalsystem;evenwhensocialgroupsdonotseekpoliticalobjectives,voluntary

associationshavespillovereffectsinfosteringtheabilityofindividualstoworkwithone

anotherinnovelsituations–whatistermedsocialcapital”(Fukuyama2011:472).

Thepoolingofinterests,particularlyofneweconomicactors,willbediscussedunder

Challenge4(politicalimplicationsofsocio-economicchanges).

“Successfulliberaldemocracyrequiresbothastatethatisstrong,unifiedandabletoenforce

lawsonitsownterritory,andasocietythatisstrongandcohesiveandabletoimpose

accountabilityonthestate.Itisthebalancebetweenastrongstateandastrongsocietythat

makesdemocracywork”(ibid:479-480).

41ThiswaswhathappenedinBrazilwhenLulaassumedpresidencyin2003,andheorderedsomeofhisclosestcollaboratorstostudyhistoricexperiencesfromScandinaviaandNorwayinparticular,i.a.byreadingthePortuguesetranslationofFurre(2006)(unpublishedversionavailableseveralyearsearlier)andcoiningoneofLula’sfavouritereferences:Omodelonorueguês.

54

4.4.5. The political economy of democratic transitions

HaggardandKaufman(1995)haveattemptedtounderstandthewidespreadmovement

fromauthoritariantodemocraticruleobservedduring‘thethirdwaveofdemocracy’in

politicaleconomyterms.Thistransitionoccurred,theyclaim,againstabackdropof

severeeconomiccrisis,raisingthequestionaswedointhisstudy:whatisthe

relationshipbetweeneconomicandpoliticalchange,ormorepreciselybetween

economiccrisisandwhattheauthorscall‘authoritarianwithdrawal’.Thethesisisthat

botheconomicconditionsandpolicy,andthenatureofpoliticalinstitutions,shapethe

prospectfordemocracy.Goingbacktoourmatrix,themessagehereispoliticsand

economicssimultaneously.

Threecrucialassumptionsaredeveloped:

1. Basedonsocio-economicstructures,itispossibletoidentifypoliticallyrelevant

groupsandtheirpolicypreferences,andthroughthatpoliticalalignmentsand

conflicts;

2. Opportunitiesforconflictingelitestomobilisesupportfortheirrespective

projectsdependonhoweconomicpoliciesaffectdifferentsocialgroups(interms

ofgrowthanddistribution);

3. Itisimportanttounderstandtheinstitutionalcontextinwhichcontending

groupsoperate,i.e.thewaypoliticsisstructuredbyrepresentativeinstitutions,

andthestateitself,inordertoderivepoliticalorpolicyoutcomesfromeconomic

cleavagesandinterests.

Thenatureofpoliticalinstitutions,itisclaimed,willdeterminethecapacityof

governmentstomanagetheeconomyeffectively,andalsowhatsocialgroupswinand

loseoneconomicreformandchange(ref.thesectionabout“earlywinners”and“early

losers”laterinthisChapter).Authoritarianregimesaremoredependentthan

democraciesontheircapacitytodelivermaterialresourcestokeysupporters(wecome

55

backtothisquestionlaterundertheconcept‘pragmaticacceptance’).Amongdifferent

kindsofauthoritarianregimes,whatiscalled‘dominantpartyregimes’(asopposedto

militarygovernments)possessgreaterpoliticalresourcesforthemanagementof

politicalconflict,andtheyarethereforemorelikelytopersistthrougheconomiccrises.

ThisiscertainlyarelevantobservationforCuba.

Haggard/Kaufman´smainemphasisisontherelationshipbetweeneconomicconditions,

theinterestsandpowerofcontendingsocialgroups,andthemediatingroleof

representativeinstitutions(i.a.politicalparties).Aswesee,thereisaninteractionof

structuralistandactor-orientedapproachesintheiranalysis.Butthefactorsbehind

regimechangestudiedheremayhavelimitedrelevancefortheCubacase:defectionof

businesselitesandelitedivisioncausedbythisofferlittleexplanatoryforce,while

balanceofpaymentcrises,mobilisationandstrikesmaybecomemorerelevantchange

factorsinCuba.

Onbalance,consideringtheCubancase,economiccrisisresultinginalossofsocial

supportisapotentialscenario.Itmightbeworthwhilestudyingwhetherthiswould

contributetodeepenpre-existingdivisionswithinrulingelites.Evenifthelackof

transparencyandaccesstoinformationaboutthecharacteristicsandwayofthinking

withintheCubannomenclaturemakesitdifficulttoobtainnecessaryinformationinthis

regard,thisframeworkwilldefinitelyhelpusintheanalysisofpower,hegemonyand

legitimacyduringthecriticaljuncture(Chapter11).

4.4.6. Przeworski and ‘the liberalisation from dictatorship’

Oneoftheclassicalcontributionstothestudyofdemocratictransitionprocesseswith

examplesfromEasternEuropeandLatinAmericaisPrzeworski(1991).Oneofhismain

thesesisabouttheroleofindependentorganisationsinsuchtransitions.Whilesuch

organisationsarenottoleratedinadictatorship,eventhegradualtolerationofthemis

nopanaceaforatransitiontodemocracy,heclaims.Wemustprobablycharacterise

PrzeworskiasanadvocateofRoute4:politicsfirst,leadingtoeconomics.

Heisparticularlyconcernedwiththebreakdownoflegitimacyoftheoldregimeandthe

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roleplayedbycivilsocietyinthissituation:

“Whatisthreateningtoauthoritarianregimesisnotthebreakdownoflegitimacybutthe

organizationofcounterhegemony:collectiveprojectsforanalternativefuture.Onlywhen

collectivealternativesareavailabledoespoliticalchoicebecomeavailabletoisolated

citizens”(p.54-55).

So,accordingtoPrzeworskiandbuildingontheGramscianconceptofhegemony,the

emergenceofcivilsocietyorganisationsinitselfonlybecomesarelevantregime

transitionforceinasituationofdeterioratinglegitimacy,ifcivilsocietyorganisations

managetoorganisea‘counter-hegemonicbloc’.

Thequestioninsuchasituationiswhatmaybringagroupinsidetheauthoritarian

powerestablishmenttotolerateanautonomousorganisationofcivilsociety,thusalso

signallingfissuresintheregimepowerblocand“theonsetofliberalisation”,asheputs

it.Theremaybetwodifferentsituationshere:decisionsfromaboveorpressurefrom

below.PrzeworskicitesHungaryandEastGermanyasexamplesofthetworespective

cases.Butthereisoftenacompetitionbetweentop-downandbottom-upexplanations

amonganalysts.InthecaseofdemocratisationinBrazilforinstance,someemphasise

thelong-standingdivisionswithinthemilitary,whereasothersbelievethatpopular

mobilisationwasdecisive.Inmostcases,itisprobablyacombinationofthetwo.

Theissueofalliancebuildingmaybequitedecisivefortheoutcome.Przeworski

schematicallydistinguishesbetweenLiberalizersandHardlinersintheregime.42

“Liberalization”,hegoesontosay:

“[I]saresultofaninteractionbetweensplitsintheauthoritarianregimeandautonomous

organizationofthecivilsociety.PopularmobilizationsignalstothepotentialLiberalizersthe

possibilityofanalliancethatcouldchangetherelationofforceswithinthepowerblocto

42ApairofconceptssometimesusedinSpanishis’Aperturistas’vs.’Immobilistas’.O´Donnell(inO´Donellet.al.1986)appliesamorenuancedconceptsystem,distinguishingbetweenfouractors:HardlinersandReformersinsidetheauthoritarianblocandModeratesandRadicalsintheopposition(ref.LinzandStepan´sconcept’four-playergame’).Hardliners,theysay,tendtobefoundintherepressiveapparatusoftheauthoritarianbloc(police,legalbureaucracy,censors,evenamongregime-loyaljournalists),whereasReformersareoftenrecruitedamongpoliticiansoftheregimeandfromsomegroupsoutsidethestateapparatus:sectorsofthebourgeoisieundercapitalismandsomeeconomicmanagersundersocialism.Inthelattercase,ithasbeenclaimed,somefactorymanagerssawthepossibilityofconvertingtheirpoliticalpowerintoeconomicpower(andprobablypersonalenrichment),andthereforesupporteddemocratisation.

57

theiradvantage;visiblesplitsinthepowerblocindicatetothecivilsocietythatpolitical

spacemayhavebeenopenedforautonomousorganization.Hence,popularmobilizationand

splitsintheregimemayfeedoneachother”(ibid.p.57).

Hedoeswarn,however,thattheprojectoftheLiberalizerswithinthepowerblocis

normallyforacontrolledopeningofthepoliticalspace,fortherelaxationofsocial

tensionandforbroadeningtheirownpositionandthegeneralsocialbaseoftheregime.

Gorbachev´sperestroikawasprobablylaunchedwiththispurposeinmind.Most

empiricalcasesshow,however,thatoncethereisathaw,oncetheauthoritarianiceberg

startsmelting,asheputsit,therewillbeanoutburstofautonomousorganisationthat

becomesunstoppable.Thisexperience,however,summarisedintheearly1990s,hasof

coursebeenstudiedverycautiouslybythoseauthoritarianregimesthatsurvived,

includingCuba.Theyalsosawhowinonecasethebeginningdemocraticmobilisation

wasbrutallyquelled:intheTiananmenmassacreinChinain1989.

Ifthegradualbreakdownofanauthoritarianregimeleadstoanegotiationprocess,the

respectiverolesoftheseactorsoneithersidewillbeveryinterestingtowatch.Allthis

willhelpusanalysethedilemmasthatmaybeexpectedforthecriticaljuncture(Chapter

11).

4.5. The case for ‘transformative democratic politics’ – or Scandinavian-style social

democracy

Upagainsttheendofthe‘thirddemocraticwave’andthetrendsthatwehavecalled

democraticfatigue,andtoacertainextentbuildingfurtherontheconceptof‘democratic

gradualism’presentedabove,someauthorshavestartedlookingforanalternativethat

couldgivedemocratictransformationanewstart.

Theunderstandingofthepoliticaleconomyofthe‘Nordicmodel’wouldbeofrelevance

foracountrylikeCuba.Averyinstructiveexplanationofthesuccessofthismodelis

presentedinBarth,MoeneandWillumsen(2014),byhighlightingtheinterconnection

betweenthreesetsofmechanisms.Thefirstrelatestocollectivewagebargaining,ina

combinationofcentrallynegotiatedtariffwagessupplementedbylocalwage

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adjustmentbargainingbasedonproductivitylevel.This,itisargued,bothcompresses

thewagedistributionandinducesefficiencyattheworkplace,thuspartlyresolvingthe

conflictbetweenpayandperformance.Thesecondmechanismisrelatedtocapital

investmentsandtheconcept(inheritedfromSchumpeter—seelaterinthischapter)of

creativedestruction,wheretheargumentgoesthat“wagecompressionfuelscapitalist

investmentsintheprocessofcreativedestruction,increasingtheaverageproductivity

andtheaveragewageforaconstantemploymentlevel”(p.3).Thesetwoindustry-level

mechanismsarecomplementedbyathirddimension,relatedtowelfarespending.The

claimhereisthattheScandinaviancradle-to-gravewelfarestateobtainshigherpolitical

supportacrossmostofthepoliticalspectrumwhenincomedifferencesintheworkforce

aresmall,andwhentheproductivityintheprivatesectorishigh.Thiswelfarestateis

notlimitedtoincomere-distribution;itisratheraproviderofpublicgoodsandservices

(socialinsurance,healthcare,education,pensions).

Thebottom-lineisasystemthatrunscountertotheconventionalwisdomamongmany

businessleaders:thatstrongunionsandprotectivesafenetserodeincentivesforhard

workandcapitalistinvestments.IntheCubancontext,suchaninfluentialeconomistas

Cuban-AmericanCarmeloMesaLagoclaimsthattheegalitarianpoliciesoftheCuban

revolutionhavehadahighcostintermsofproductivity.43Whilethisisprobablytrue,

whatMoeneetal.showisthatthisdoesnotnecessarilyhavetobethecasewithanother

labourmarketorganisation,basedontheNordictripartitemodel.

Harrissetal.(2004)observethatthestagnationofdemocracyinmanypost-transition

stateshasbeenaconsequenceofade-politicisationofpublicaffairsandflawedpopular

representation.Thisalsoleadstoadiminishingtrustinpoliticalparties,andinthe

democraticsystemitself,resultinginpopulism,clientelism,andtheemergenceofwhat

weelsewherewilldescribeasneo-patrimonialism.Arecognitionofthesechallengeshas

ledsomeofthesameauthorstoarguefortherethinkingofpopulardemocratic

representation,throughwhattheyhavecalled‘politicisingdemocracy’,or

‘transformativedemocraticpolitics’,meaning:“politicalagendas,strategiesandalliances

thatuseformalandminimalistdemocracytointroducepoliticsandpoliciesthatmay

enhancepeople´sopportunitiesforimprovingdemocracyandmakingbetteruseofit” 43AtaconferenceinNewYorkorganisedbyCubaPosibleon26.05.16.

59

(StokkeandTörnquist2013:3).

Withoutquestioningtheimportanceofinstitutionsinpromotinggoodgovernance,the

scholarsbehind‘politicisingdemocracy’claimthatproponentsofgoodinstitutionsasa

panaceafordemocracyandgoodgovernanceareoftenignoringpowerrelationsandthe

contextinwhichtheinstitutionsoperate(ref.Carothers’(2007)callforbetter

contextualunderstanding).Theargumentisforaccumulativereforms,wherebetter

institutionsmaypromoteordinarypeoples’capacitiesforpoliticalparticipation,which

inturnmayalterpredominantstructures.

A‘politiciseddemocracy’—morethananything—requirestheempowermentofcitizens

asindividualsandasanorganisedcivilsociety,withavoiceandcapacitytoreformthe

system,i.e.toorganisestruggleforchange.Andthisstruggleobviouslydependson

institutionsdesignedinsuchawaythattheyallowforparticipationandrepresentation.

Peopleneedtohaveavoiceandachannelforthisvoicetobetakenseriously,inthe

formof“thepoliticsthattheactorsdevelopinordertopromotetheirinterestsand

enhancepeople´sdemocraticcapacity,andthetransformativepotentialsinvolved”

(StokkeandTörnquist2013:10).

BasedonfifteenyearsofaverycomprehensiveresearchprojectforemostinIndonesia,

partlyinKerala(India),OlleTörnquistcallsforasecondgenerationofdemocratisation

(‘democratisation2.0’)inwhathecalls‘theGlobalSouth’:

“Thefirstphasewascharacterizedbytheengagementofpowerfulactorsinmodestreform

agendasandthebuildingofthoseprimarilyliberalinstitutionsthattheycouldaccept.The

secondphasethatweadvocatemustalsoengagethewiderconcernsandintereststhathave

beenmarginalizedbutareneededtotackletheremainingmajorproblemsoflimited

governancereformsandthepoorrepresentationoftheactorsofchange.Wesuggestthatthe

mainpriorityofdemocratization2.0shouldbethepromotionofdemocraticrepresentation

thatcomplementsliberaldemocraticelectionsandfreedoms”(TörnquistandHarris

2016:11).

Theargumentincludesfourdimensionsoftransformativepolitics:

60

1. Theformationandorganisationofdemocraticpoliticalcollectivesbasedonbroad

popularinterestsandideas,affectedbytheassociatedrightsandlinkages

betweenstateandsociety.Thedualorganisationinmovements(e.g.trade

unions)andpoliticalpartiesiscrucialhere.

2. Theestablishmentofstronganddemocraticlinkagesbetweenstateandsociety,in

contrasttoweakliberaldemocraticinstitutions,thelackofbroaderissueand

interestrepresentation,andpoorstatecapacityforimpartialpolicy

implementation.

3. Buildingalliancesaroundbroadpopularinterestsandideasthatconcernmany

peopleandconstitutethebasisforuniversalcivil-politicalaswellassocio-

economicrights.Welfarepolicies(developmentofwelfarestatestructures)area

crucialpartofthis.

4. Providingthestructuralconditionsandeffortsforthedevelopmentofcoalitions,

socialpactsandcollectivebargainingbetweensectionsofcapitalandlabour,

notablyintheexportsectorincludingagribusiness.Thestrategybehindthisis

alsotoimprovewagesandtherebyincreasingdemandinordertopromote

growth(justasHenryForddidwithhisFordworkforce,ormoregenerallythe

philosophybehindpre-Keynesianwelfarepolicy).44

Twoverydifferentcaseshavebeencitedasexamplesofsuchtransformativepolitical

experiences:theScandinaviansocialdemocracyfromthe1930sonward,andBrazil´s

constructionofanewdemocracyinthewakeofdictatorshipinthe1980sonward.The

latterwasoneoffewexceptionsfromthegeneralpicturethatsuchtransformative

politicshavebeenhardtofosterintheGlobalSouth—withfreedomsbeingthreatened

andelectionsbeingincreasinglyelitistandshallow,corruptionincreasing,andstatesin

44ThislatestdimensionmaybeofparticularrelevancetoCubawhenwethinkoftheconstructiveroleplayedbythesugarcaneunionists(ledbyCommunistPartymilitants)accompanyingtheenterprisesectorandtheCubanstateininternationalnegotiationsaboutsugarquotaandpricesduringthedemocraticphaseinCubanpoliticsinthe1940s.Itisalsorelevanttorememberthatafterthecollapseofthesugarcanesector,Cubahasnomoretheextractiveeconomythatmighthavemadeitdifficulttocreatea‘socialdemocraticpact’.

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generalfailingintheirbasictasks.45

Theseexamplesareseenincontrasttosixcommonrecipes:

• Transformationbywayofpoliticsratherthanwhatisseenastheeconomistic

formulaofMarxism.

• GradualismratherthanLenin´sthesisofcapturingstatepowerfirst.

• State-societyrelationsratherthanconsiderationsofputtingsocietyfirst,with

referencetoPutnamandhisemphasisonsocialcapital(Putnam2000).

• Continuedcentralityofthestateratherthanamorecommunitarianapproach

withauthoritarianpoliticalleadership.

• Collectiveactionratherthanliberalindividualism.

• Counter-posedtothosewhointheviewoftheauthorsoveremphasisethe

importanceofinstitutions,theyarguefortheputtingofstableinstitutionsfirst.

Thereisalsoanothersetofdemocraticcriteriathatmayhaveinspiredtheproponentsof

Democratisation2.0.BeethamandBoyle(2002)developedalistofnolessthan80such

criteriaormeanstoreachthegoalofdemocracy,particularlyfocusingonthelinkages

betweencivilsocietyandthestate.Törnquist(2013:42)hasreducedthis

comprehensivelistto13mainvariables:

1. Equalandinclusivecitizenshipandclearlydefinedpublicaffairs

2. TheRuleofLaw

3. Equaljustice

4. Humanrights(civil-politicalaswellassocio-economic)

5. Democraticrepresentationthroughpartiesandelections 45Thetragedy,ofcourse,ishowthesedemocraticgainsinBrazilatleastforthetimebeingseemtohavebeenlostpreciselyincorruptionscandalsandelitistpoliticalrevengeagainstthoseforcesthatbroughtaboutthepromising‘politiciseddemocracy’.

62

6. Rights-basedparticipationinpublicgovernance

7. Institutionalizedchannelsforinterestandissuebasedrepresentation

8. Localdemocracycombinedwithrelevantinfluenceonotherlevels

9. Democraticcontrolofarmedforces,police,militiasetc.

10. Transparent,impartialandaccountablegovernance

11. Government´scapacitytotakeitsowndecisionsandimplementthem

12. Freedomofandequalaccesstopublicdiscourse,cultureandacademia,within

theframeworkofhumanrights

13. Citizens´democraticself-organising

Alistlikethismayofcoursebeappliedfortheassessmentofdemocraticqualities,or—

morerelevantinourcase—asguidelinesforthediscussionofprerequisitesforan

authoritariansocietymovinginademocraticdirection:whicharetheenablingqualities,

andwhicharethemainchallenges.

Thegeneralquestionunderlyingtheseconsiderationsisthefollowing:Canthe

democraticstagnationinpost-transitioncountriesbeturnedinto‘transformative

democraticpolitics’,throughare-thinkingofpopulardemocraticrepresentation.

ThequestionwewanttoraiseinthecaseofCubaisquitedifferent:are‘transformative

democraticpolitics’possibleinapre-transitionstate,undergoingpost-totalitarian

transformations,butwithheavyLeninist,authoritarian,centralist,verticalist,opaque

structuresremaining?

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Aswehaveseen,theproponentsofthe‘Nordicmodel’or‘transformativedemocratic

politics’combinethetworoutestoinclusiveness,wheretheeconomists(Moeneet.al.)

havetheirmainemphasisoneconomicsfirstandthepoliticalscientists(Törnquistet.al.)

onpoliticsfirst.Thesetwoapproachescomplementeachotherverynicely.Perhapseven

moreimportant:theypaintamuchmorecomprehensivepictureofwhattheymeanby

inclusiveeconomicandpoliticalinstitutions(cella).WhereAcemogluandRobinson

speakabouteconomicinstitutions“allowingparticipation”,andpoliticalinstitutionsthat

“distributepower”,theapproachhereismuchmoreproactiveandbottom-up.Itis

throughempowermentofthenon-eliteanditseffectiveandcontinuousstrugglefor

economicandpoliticalinterestrepresentationthatFukuyama’s“waytoDenmark”may

becomearealityforacountrylikeCuba.Thechallenge,ofcourse,isforanykindof

economicandpoliticalelitetoopenupforthis.Wewilldiscussthisamongthescenarios

forapost-CastroCuba(Chapter12).

4.6. Alternatives: ‘deliberative’ or ‘consensus’ democracy

SomeCubanscholars(seee.g.Alzugaray2016)havebeenarguingforalternativesto

classicalliberalor‘Westminster’democracythatmayofferamorerealistic

transformationavenueforCuba.Onesuchalternativeisdeliberativedemocracy,where

thoughtfulandauthenticdeliberation,notmereaggregationofpreferencesthatoccurin

voting,istheprimarysourceoflegitimacy.Theallegedadvantageofsuchprocedureis

tomakedecision-makersfreefromdistortionsofunequalpoliticalpowerrepresented

byeconomicwealthororganisedinterestgroups.Deliberativedemocracymaybe

compatiblewithbothrepresentativeanddirectdemocracy,whichmaymakeit

particularlyattractivetoCubawhereacombinationofthetwoarereferredtointhe

definitionofCuba’ssocialistmodelcontainedinthestrategydocumentdiscussedatthe

7thPartyCongressandfinallyapprovedin2017(ref.Indicator8.1).Thetermwas

originallycoinedbyBesette(1980),butbuildsonatraditiongoingbacktoAristotle—

typicallylimitedtoelitedeliberations—andalsodiscussedinHabermas’(1984)workon

communicativerationalityandthepublicsphere.Perhapsofmorerelevancetoday

wouldbewhatwecouldcallpopulistdeliberativedemocracy,empoweringgroupsoflay

citizens—oftenthosefeelingmostdisenfranchisedbytraditionalpolitics—tomobilisea

majorityandhavetheirwillthroughareferendum(ref.Brexit)orelections(ref.the

64

Trumpvictoryinthe2016USpresidentialelections).Itseemsdoubtfulthatthiswould

beakindofdemocracywelcomedbytheCubanregime.

Anotherrelatedalternativeistheconsensusdemocracy,withLijphart(1999)asthemain

proponent.ThisisseenindirectcontrasttotheWestminsterdemocracybyinvolvingfar

greatercompromiseandmoresignificantlyguaranteeingminorityrights.Lijphart

arguesthatconsensusdemocracyhasparticularadvantagesfordeeplydividedsocieties,

e.g.alongideologicallines,wherethereisunlikelytobemuchoverlapbetweenthe

minority'sandthemajority'sinterestsandpreferences.Thus,theminority'spermanent

exclusionmightleadtounrestorviolence.ConsensusdemocracyisLijphart's

institutionalsolutiontothisproblem,allowingdemocracytofunctionbyincorporating

minorityrightsandallowingminoritygroupstoinfluencepolicies.TheCubanpolitical

systemdoesnotrecogniseminorityrights,sincebythedefinitionoftheCuban

ConstitutionthereisonlyonePeoplewithcommoninterestsrepresentedbythe

CommunistParty.Yet,suchmechanismsmightberelevanttodiscussif,andwhen,Cuba

letsgoofitsLeninistpoliticalstructure.

Therehavebeensomequasi-academicdiscussionsinCubaabouttheconcept

‘participatorydemocracy’,butveryoftencharacterisedbywhatmostobserverswould

perceiveasafictitiousinterpretationoftheCubanpoliticalreality.Anexampleofthatis

August(2014:5),whodescribestheCubandemocracyincontrasttothenon-

participatoryUSsystem:“Cuba,bycontrast,isalaboratorywheretheprocessof

democratizationiscontinuallyinmotion,anon-goingexperimenttocreatenewways

forpeopletoparticipate”.Thisargumentappearsasratheridealistic,prettymuchoutof

touchwiththe‘reallyexisting’Cubanpolity.

4.7. The issue of ‘early winners’ and ‘early losers’

Aninterestingtheoreticalandempiricaldiscussioninthetransitionliteratureisthatof

thebehaviourof‘earlywinners’,respectively‘earlylosers’,inthereformprocess.This

discussionisprobablyofhighrelevancealsointhecaseofCuba,perhapstobeseenin

thesameperspectiveaswhatissaidabout‘deliberative’or‘consensus’democracy.

65

Theconventionalwisdomisthateconomicreforms,expectedtobenecessaryinthelong

term,oftengeneratehighshort-termcostsforsomegroups(‘earlylosers’)butalso

significantandinsomecasesspectaculargainsforothers(the‘earlywinners’).Inorder

tounderstandthedynamicsofthetransformationprocess,itisnecessarytoidentify

thesetworespectivegroupsandanalysetheirinterests,strategiesandpolitical

behaviour.

First,wehavetheproblemoftheearlylosers.Itiscommonlyclaimedthatintoday´s

EasternEuropewearewitnessingarevengeofthetransitionlosers.Theymayfirsthave

tendedtovotefortheoldCommunistparties(ortheirheirs);subsequentlythesegroups

havebeenamongthestrongestsupportersofright-wingpopulists,expressing

xenophobicviewsandanti-liberalsentiments.46Inanticipationofsuchreactions,ithas

beenaconventionalviewthatthechallengeistosustainreformsagainsttheopposition

ofshort-termlosers;“tomarginalizethelosers,ifonlytemporarily,andtoinsulatethe

statefromshort-termpoliticalpressuresuntiltheeconomicreformshavehadsufficient

timetocreateaconstituencyofwinnerscapableofsustainingthemovertime”(Hellman

1998:i).

Intheabovequotedarticle,however,Hellmangoesontoarguethatthebiggest

challengeinpost-communisttransitionsisrather‘theproblemofthewinners’:

“Thoughreformsdoentailhightransitionalcostsinshortterm,theyalsogenerate

extraordinaryshort-termgainsforparticulargroups,namelythoseinapositiontotake

advantageofarangeofmarketdistortionsassociatedwithpartialeconomicreforms.Though

thesewinnersdogainanearlystakeinthereformprocess,theyalsodevelopaninterestin

preservingtheverydistortionsoftheearlyreformsthatcanimpedetherealizationofthe

efficiencygainsofafullyfunctioningmarket.Ratherthanpursuingfurthermarketreforms,

thesewinnersmayhaveincentivestofreezetheeconomyinapartialreformequilibrium

thatgeneratesconcentratedgainstoanarrowrangeofgroups,whileimposingsubstantial

costsontherestofthepopulation”(op.cit:i).

Basedonevidencefromthepost-communisttransitions,therealpoliticalchallenge 46UweOptenhogel,BrusselsofficeofFriedrichEbertFoundation,inCubaPosibleconferenceinNYC,26.05.16.

66

thereforehastoberecast,accordingtoHellman,fromoneofmarginalisingtheshort-

termloserstoconstrainingtheshort-termwinners.Thesuccess—andHellmanhereis

concernedmorewiththesuccessofmarketreformthanwiththepoliticalreform

model—dependsonbothcreatingwinnersandconstrainingthem“bydissipatingtheir

concentratedrentsthroughincreasingcompetitionwithothergroupsorbyrestricting

theirabilitytounilaterallyvetoreformmeasures”(op.cit:ii).

Frye(2007:35)comestosimilarconclusionsbasedonlaterdata(1991-2006):“In

contrasttoexpectations,groupsgainingfromeconomicreformmayhaveincentivesto

blockratherthanadvanceeconomicliberalization”.Heismostlyconcernedwiththe

creationofstateinstitutionsthatarecapableofsustainingeconomicliberalisation(ref.

‘usablestatebureaucracies’inLinzandStepan´sterms),andtobalancetheexchange

betweenpoliticalandeconomicagentsintheprocesstowardsdemocraticandeconomic

reform.Anadditionalconcernhehasistheunderstandingofhowcommunistera

legaciesshapeinstitutionalchoicesandpolicyoutcomesinthepost-communistperiod

is.

TheissueofearlywinnersandlosersofCubanreformswillbediscussedasaspecific

indicator(4.1).

4.8. Transition from Communism

4.8.1. Kornai and The Political Economy of Communism

OfdefinitiverelevancetothestudyofCubaisJánosKornai(1992),whoinhisclassical

workonthepoliticaleconomyofCommunism(PartThree)dealswiththeissueof

“Shiftingfromtheclassicalsystem”,meaningtransformationoptionsfromtheclassical

socialistorcommunistsystemwiththeUSSRasthemainmodel.Hedistinguishes

between‘post-socialisttransition’and‘revolution’.Theformer,whichismoreorless

synonymouswithhisconceptof‘politicalreform’,isdefinedas“changesinthepower

structureandtheofficialideology[that]areappreciableandsubstantivebutdonotgo

morethanhalfwaytowardinstitutingrealpoliticaldemocracy”(p.409).‘Revolution’,on

67

theotherhand,inhisdefinitionmeansaqualitativeleapfromonefamilyofsystemsto

theother(fromcapitalismtosocialismasinRussiain1917,ortheotherwayaroundas

inEasternEuropein1989).HefitsChinaafter1978andVietnamafter1987intohis

reformcategory,eventhoughtheCommunistPartieshavemaintainedtheirmonopolyof

politicalpower.

WehavealreadypointedoutonepeculiaraspectofKornai´stheory:hisclaimthatthe

mainlineoftransformationrunsfrompowerandideologytowardlastingeconomic

phenomena.Ultimately,heclaims,thesphereofpolitics—powerandideology—isthe

decisiveone,althoughherecognisestheexistenceofimportantfeedbackmechanisms.

Soherewehaveperhapsthemostideal-typicalcaseofRoute4:politicsfirstleadingto

economictransformations.

Kornaihaselaboratedaseriesofcriteriaforpoliticalreformaswellasforeconomic

transformation,whichwefindhighlyusefulintheformulationofourtransformation

hypotheses,fortheuseinourstudyofwhathashappened‘ontheground’inCuba.We

willcomebacktoseveralofthemthere.Thebottom-lineofhisanalysisofreform

attemptsinpost-totalitarianregimesisabout‘theincoherenceofthetendenciesto

reform’:intheend,hepredicts,‘revolution’,i.e.thefullintroductionofmarketeconomy,

isunavoidable.“TheCommunistParty,amidtheprocessesofreform,wantstoretainits

monopolyofpower,butinthemeantime,itreleasespoliticalforcesthatimmediately

demandtheabandonmentofthismonopoly”(ibid:571).Inotherwords:anyreformwill

underminetheentiresystem.

ThisishowYuriF.Orlov,aSovietdissidentwhoemigratedin1986andreturnedona

visittotheUSSRrightbeforeitsdissolutionin1991,eloquentlycharacterisedthe

situation:

“Gorbachevunderstoodnothingwhenhebegan[…]Allheknewwasthatsocialismmustbe

improved.Hisideawassimple,andclosetoWesternthinking:ifyoutakesocialismandadd

democracyandfreespeech,allwillbewell.Butwhathediscoveredwasthatthesystem

designedbyLeninwassuchthatonceyoupulledoutonebrick,thewholethingfellapart.

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Nowhe´stryingtopushthebrickbackin.Thisisthefarceandthetragedy”.47

WhilethetransformationofRussianeverwentallthewaytoliberaldemocracy,rather

leadingtoanotherauthoritarianregimeliketheoneledbyPresidentPutin(seeSection

4.9.3below),someoftheotherex-Communistcountriesdidtoalargedegreefinalise

‘transition’asprescribedbythetransitiontheories.Aswehavementioned,Whitehead

(2009)evencallsPolandandHungarypivotalcasesof‘tripletransition’.Alateraspectof

this‘transition’observedin2018,however,isthatboththesecountriesseemtobe

bouncingbacktoneo-authoritarianrule,beingheavilyquestionedbyotherEUcountries

andinstitutionsfortheirthreattothebasicdemocraticvaluesoftheEU.Apartial

explanationinthecaseofPolandmaybethatliberalWestEuropeanvaluesruncounter

tostronglyentrenchedCatholictraditions,whileinthecaseofHungarytheoldconflict

betweenChristianityandIslamre-emergesintheperceptionofthepopularmajorities.

Whatthistellsusisthatvaluesimportedfromabroadmayeasilybequestionedand

bringaboutananti-liberalbacklash.

AlltheseempiricalexperiencesarevaluabletobearinmindwhenassessingtheCuban

experience.

4.8.2. A Historian´s perspective on the fall of the USSR

TheclassicalinterpretationbyBritishhistorianArchieBrown(2009,Chapter5)ofthe

collapseoftheUSSRmaybeanothersourceforanalysis.Hisargumentsseemto

combineRoutes2and4,whatwehavecalledpoliticsandeconomicssimultaneously.

BrownhimselfstatesquiteclearlythatCubaisadifferentstory—oratleastwassoat

thetimewhenhewrotethistext—whenhespeaksaboutthepeculiaritiesofChina,

VietnamandCubasurvivingthedeathofotherSoviet-styleregimes:

“[…]theCommunistPartyitselfmadeapowerfulappealtothosewhowishedtoseeChina

reassertitselfasanationafteracenturyandahalfofhumiliationatthehandsofforeigners.

InVietnamandCuba,anti-imperialistsentimentsandnationalpridewerealsoofgreat

importancebothinthefoundationoftheregimesandfortheirpersistence”(p.586).

47NewYorkTimes,February10,1994:4.

69

SeveralofBrown´slonglistofexplanatoryfactorsbehindthefallofSovietandEast

EuropeancommunismareclearlyrelevantforouranalysisoftheCubantransformation

process,andformeasurestakenbytheCubanregimetoavoidasimilarchainofevents.

Thesefactorsincludeeconomicandsocialproblems,restrictionsonpeople´sfreedoms

thatbecameincreasinglydifficulttodefend,andontheothersidehowpartialreforms

triggereddemandforadeepeningofthesamereforms(ref.Kornai).Hediscusses

differencesbetweenthelogicoftransformationsinthevariouscountries,arguingfor

instancethattheUSSRwasatypicalcaseofliberalisationfromabove,likeHungary,as

opposedtoliberalisationfrombelowashearguesthecasewasinPoland.Another

distinguishingfactorwaswhetherthechangeprocessoriginatedwithintheCommunist

parties,orratherfromoutsideforcesliketheCatholicChurchinPoland.Furthermore,

BrownemphasisestheroleofanewleaderlikeGorbachev—highlyrelevantforthe

upcominggenerationalchangeinCuba.Theinternationalcontext,withtheendofthe

ColdWarinthecaseoftheUSSRcomparedtoredefinitionofrelationsbetweenCuba

andtheUS,isofcourseanotheraspectthatisworthwhilediscussing.

Thismixtureofeconomicandpoliticalchangefactorswillbeusedintheformulationof

hypothesesandtheempiricaldiscussionoftheCubacase.

4.8.3. Post-Communist elite re-circulation

Anaspecttowatchinpost-authoritariantransformationcountriesisthepatternofwhat

isoftentermed‘eliterecirculation’.Althoughthetransitionfrom‘communism’to

‘capitalism’haddifferentcharacteristicsintheotherex-COMECONcountriesthanin

Russia,oneaspectwasthesame:thepreviousstateandpartyeliteverysoon

accommodateditselfasthenewbusinesselite.Wecanspeakabouta‘political

capitalism’wherepoliticalpowerwasconvertedintoeconomicpower.Grossomodo,

threequartersofthebusinessleadersinHungary,Poland,CzechRepublicandEast

Germanyaround2000hadabackgroundasleadersinthecommunistregimes,and

abouthalfhadbeenpartymembers.Thebasisforthisrecirculationwasthatthisgroup

hadalmostamonopolyofleadershipexperienceandofaccesstopowernetworksthat

remainedverymuchthesame(Coenen-Huther2000).

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WhattheoldUSSRandtheEastEuropeancountrieshadincommon,incontrasttoCuba

untilquiterecently,wastheexistenceofacertain‘secondeconomy’consistingofsmall

enterprises,normallyorientedtoprivateconsumptioninlocalmarkets.This‘second

economy’wascrushedbythe‘RevolutionaryOffensive’inCubain1968andwasonly

allowedtore-emergeinthe1990sandmoresystematicallyafterRaúlCastrotookover.

Butevenwhensuchasmallprivateeconomyexisted,smallentrepreneursfromthis

sectorhadpracticallynoaccesstotheleadershippositionsoftheprivatisedstate

companies.

Thisbeingsaid,itmustalsobeaddedthattheprivatisationmodelwasverydifferentin

differentcountries,leadingtodifferenteconomicmodelsinspiteofsimilarpatternsof

elitereproduction.Russiawastheonlycountrywherepreviousstateandpartycadres

werepredominantlyconvertedtoacapitalistclass,properlyspeaking,bytakingover

thepropertyoftheprivatisedcompanies(aclassicalexampleofwhatisreferredtoas

‘statecapture’).ThisalsohappenedtoamorelimitedextentinHungaryandPolandand

evenintheCzechRepublic,buthardlyatallinEastGermany.Theroleoftheprevious

socialistleaders(oftentheyoungergenerationofleaders)inthesecountrieswasoften

limitedtothatofcompanymanagers,whileforeign—oftendiaspora—investors

dominatedasowners.InEastGermany,investorswerepredominantlyWestGermans.

ThisdifferencebetweenRussiaandtheotherEastBloccountriesmayhavebeenvery

importantintermsoftheirbusinessphilosophy.Itisclaimedthatthesenewbusiness

managersweremuchmoreinclinedtomarketregulationandwelfare-statethinking

thantheunscrupulousRussianoligarchs,oftenassociatedwith‘mafiacapitalism’

(Windolf1998)or‘cronycapitalism’.

Thesenuancesshouldbeobservedif,andwhen,aserioustransitiontomarketeconomy

startsinCuba.Itmaybeofparticularimportancetowatchtheroleoftwogroupsinthis

connection:themanagersofmilitarycorporations—perhapsthemostobviousgroupof

earlywinnersinthereformprocess,and—comparedtothepatternobservedafterthe

reunificationofGermany—thereturningCubandiaspora.

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4.9. The pattern of transformation to authoritarian market economies

4.9.1. The concept of ‘neo-patrimonialism’–and its application to Latin America

Sincetheconceptof‘neo-patrimonialism’willbebroughtinwithseveraladditional

qualificationshere,weshouldstartwithadiscussionofthisconceptperse.

ThepointofdepartureisareferencetoMaxWeber´sdistinctionbetweenthree

categoriesoflegitimateauthority:legal-rationalauthority,charismaticauthorityand

traditionalauthority,thelatterdividedintofeudalismandpatrimonialism.

Patrimonialism,accordingtoWeber,isaformofpost-feudalpersonalistand

discretionarypowerexercise,wherethereishardlyanydistinctionbetweentheprivate

andthepublicsphere(Weber1968).Neo-patrimonialism,ontheotherhand,isaform

ofdominationwherelegal-rationalauthoritymaybecombinedwithpatrimonialism,

wherepatrimonialismcontinuestoexistevenwhenastatehasintroducedformallegal-

rationalprocedures:informalinstitutionsandpersonalrelationsofdominationpersist

eventhoughamodernstatewithaformallyrationalbureaucracyhasbeenestablished.

AsexpressedbyErdmann/Engel(2007:105),theseparationoftheprivateandthe

publicspheresinsuchcasesismoreorlessblurred.

Neo-patrimonialismisacommonlyusedconceptinliteratureonperipherydevelopment

issues,particularlyinpost-colonialAfrica,wherethreeinformalinstitutionsareclaimed

toco-exist.Thesethreearepresidentialism,whichissystematicclientelismand

particularisticuseofstateresources,withpersonalistpowerconcentrationand

extensiveoccurrenceofcorruption,nepotismandrent-seekingbehaviour(seee.g.

BrattonandvanderWalle1994).

InLatinAmerica,however,theconceptofneo-patrimonialismhasnotbeencommonly

used.AninterestingattempttoapplythisconcepttotheLatinAmericancontexthas

beenmadebyBechle(2010).AsBechleargues,similarinformalpowerrelationsinLatin

Americahaveratherbeenreferredtoascaudillismo(post-colonialstrongmen),

caciquismo(Andeanstates),coronelismo(regionalruralstrongmeninBrazil),and

72

populism(amoreurbanphenomenonasrepresentede.g.byVargasinBrazilorPeronin

Argentina).

Wemayspeakaboutthreemobilisationstagesduringthelatestthreequartersofa

centuryinLatinAmerica.Populismasmobilisationfromabove,militarydictatorshipas

anecessaryde-mobilisationinordertocontrolanti-capitalistpressures,andsubsequent

leftistregimesappearingduringthefirstdecadeofthe21stcenturyasmobilisation

frombelow,nurturedbythestruggleagainstdictatorshipsinthelattercoupleof

decadesofthe20thcenturyandthencomingtofruitioninthemobilisationagainst

structural-adjustmentmeasures.

Bechle(op.cit.)claimsthattheconceptofneo-patrimonialismisfullyapplicableevento

LatinAmerica,characterisedbyfourcriteria:alegal-rational(andinsomecasesa

traditional)foundationofauthority;apersonalistpowerconcentration;clientelism;and

often,widespreadcorruption.

Thethreelattercriteriaaremuchlesspresentintherelativelymodernisedstates

characterisedas‘bureaucraticauthoritarianism’(theconceptusedbyO’Donnell1973;

seealsoO’Donnell,SchmitterandWhitehead1986),so‘neo-patrimonialism’and

‘bureaucraticauthoritarianism’maybeseenalmostasLatinAmericandichotomies.

ItmaybeofparticularrelevancetoCubahowtocharacterisetheleftistCuban-friendly

regimesofthiscentury(particularlyChávezinVenezuela,MoralesinBolivia,Correain

Ecuador).Bachleisreluctanttoputthemintheneo-patrimonialcategoryandprefersto

callthemcharismatic‘neo-populists’.Therecanbelittledoubt,however,aboutthe

personalistpowerconcentrationandclientelismtheyrepresent,withsignificant

differences.Whiletheirsuccessfulascendencytopowertoalargeextentwasbasedona

battleagainstcorruption,thisproblemnonethelessgrewontheirwatch—particularlyin

Venezuela(althoughChávezpersonallydidnotnecessarilyenrichhimself).Withan

increasingsocio-economiccrisis,therefore,HugoChávez,theclosestofallCubanallies

inLatinAmerica,becametheleaderofatrulyneo-patrimonialregime,combining

presidentialism,systematicclientelismandtheparticularisticuseofstateresourcesfor

thepurposeofstayinginpower.

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InthecaseofCubasincetheRevolution,itgoeswithoutsayingthattherehavebeen

obviouspopulistelements,withFidelCastrooftencharacterisedasatypicalLatin

Americancaudillo,wherecharismaticpersonalistpowerconcentrationandeven

clientelismwerepredominantqualities.Itwouldnotbefair,however,tolabelthe

Castrosasneo-patrimonial:therewerenovisiblesignsofpersonalenrichmentthrough

captureofstateresources.

Inthefollowingsub-chapters,wewillattempttoexposeprominentaspectsoftwo

differentvariantsofwhatweseeasneo-patrimonialisminpotentialCubanrolemodel

regimes:oligarchicneo-patrimonialisminAngolaandpost-socialistRussia,andsocialist

neo-patrimonialismorauthoritarianmarketeconomyinChinaandVietnam.Allthese

cases,itisarguedhere,exposeacombinationoftheabove-mentionedcriteriaforneo-

patrimonialism:presidentialism(orstrongexecutiveleadershipwithdifferentnames),

clientelismandparticularisticuseofstateresourceswithallknownconsequences.

Oneaspectofthisphenomenonthathasbeenemphasisedbysomeauthorsdoesnotfit

allthesecases:Fukuyama(2014:26)understandsneo-patrimonialismtocombinewhat

hecalls“theoutwardformsofmodernstates”withwhatinrealityis“ruleforprivate

gain”.Thisgoesfurtherthanthethirdcriterionabove.Angolaisinthisregardtheonlyof

thesecases(atleastuntilthe2017electionsandchangeofPresident)wherestate

captureforthebenefitofpersonalfamilyenrichmenthasbeenasalientcharacteristic.

Whenapplyingtheconcepthere,wedonotunderstanditasimplying“personal

enrichment”foranysingularrulerorfamily.

Yet,inAngolaandRussia—twoconspicuouslysimilarcases—theconcentrationof

wealthinthehandsofasmallnumberofsuper-richoligarchsisaveryprominent

characteristic—hencethenamewepropose.Theyarebothpost-socialistregimes

withoutanypretensiontocontinuesocialism.Wemaysaythattheyhavetakensome

stepsalongbothRoute1(politicsfirst)andRoute2(economicsfirst),withoutreaching

neithereconomicnorpoliticalinstitutionalinclusiveness.

InChinaandVietnam,bycontrast,socialismisstillhowtheregimescharacterise

themselves.Theseareclearlythetwobestexamplesoftransformationsalongthe

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economicsonlyroute,andassuchservingasinspirationforRaúlCastro’sreforms.China

andVietnampridethemselvesoverasuccessfulanti-povertystruggle,andthenepotism

andrent-seekingbehaviourmaynothavebeendirectlybenefittingthechiefs-of-stateor

theirfamilies.Butthelinkbetweenpoliticalandeconomicpowerelitesisnonetheless

quiteobvious.ChinanowhasmorebillionairesthantheUS,withthenumberof

membersofthisexclusiveclubgrowingbyoneeverythreeweeks.48Themoststriking

aspectofChineseenrichmentregardingourdiscussionoftheneo-patrimonial

characteristicoftheregimeisthat100membersofthePeople’sNationalCongress

belongtothisgroupofbillionaires,withacombinedwealthofnearly700billionUSD.

LeadingChinesecriticscomplain—accordingtoareportbytheShanghai-basedwealth

researchfirmHurun—thatthiswealthconcentrationamongtheCommunistParty

Nomenclatureleadstoreducedstatecompanyvitality.Withthesuper-richputtingtheir

owninterestaheadofthatofthestate,theprivatecompaniesandtheeconomyatlarge

tendtoshrink.ThisissoinspiteofPresidentXi’scrackdownoncorruptionand

decadence—whichisbythewayofteninterpretedmoreasastrategytogetridof

disloyalpoliticalcompetitorsthantouprootcorruptionperse.49Vietnamhadonlytwo

billionairesincludedintheForbes2017list.50Buttherewerereportedly(accordingto

Oxfam)210super-richcitizensin2014(estimatedtorisetomorethan400by2025),

withacombinedwealthof20billionUSD,equivalentto12%ofthecountry´sGDP.51

Attheveryleast,therefore,wemaytalkaboutregimeswithdistinctneo-patrimonial

aspects.Tobeonthesafeside,wecombinetheconceptwiththemoregeneral

authoritarianmarketeconomy.

ParticularlyinChinaandVietnam,thetwomostfrequentlyquotedrolemodelsforCuba,

webelievethatitisrelevanttogotosomedepthinthehistoricalandcontemporary

presentationofbothempiricalandmoretheoreticalaspectsofthesetwosurviving

‘socialistmarket’economies,forthepurposeofreturningtoacomparativeanalysisin

48https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-26/billionaires-fortunes-rise-to-6-trillion-with-asia-leading-way;https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/24/china-has-more-billionaires-than-us-report.html49http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-06/chinas-billionaire-members-behind-lack-of-enterprise-reforms/832787850https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/#version:static_header:position_country:Vietnam51https://vietnam.oxfam.org/sites/vietnam.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/Vietnam%20Inequality%20Report_ENG.pdf

75

theempiricaldiscussionofCuba´stransformation.Thereare,however,significant

differencesbetweencharacteristicsofCubavs.thesetwocasesoffar-reachingmarket

transformations.Indoingso,wewillexplainsomeofthebasichistoricandcultural

characteristicsofthetwoAsiansocialistsocieties,followedbythemostrelevant

elementsofpresent-daysocio-economicandpoliticalprocessesandstructuresinChina

andVietnam,asabasisfordiscussingsimilaritiesanddifferencestobeborninmindto

theextenttransformationsoftheseregimesareseenasinspirationforCuba.52

4.9.2. Transformation to oligarchic neo-patrimonialism: the case of Angola

TwobooktitlesprobablycapturestheAngolantransitionbetterthanalonganalysis:

FromAfro-StalinismtoPetro-DiamondCapitalism(Hodges2001),andMagnificentand

BeggarLand:AngolasincetheCivilWar(SoaresdeOliveira2015).53Theseworksoffera

verycriticalanalysisofhowAngola(onceanintimateallyofCubaandthereforerelevant

tobringinhere)tookthequickanddramaticsteparound1990ofabolishingformal

stateownershipandintroducing‘marketeconomy’.Theydidsobylargelypermitting

thestate,partyandmilitaryleaderstotransferstatepropertytotheirownprivate

property,allowingforahugecorruptionproblemandabolishingmostsocialandre-

distributivepolicies.Thisway,hugeoilincomeswereappropriatedbyafamilydynasty

withminimalpracticalconsiderationsforpovertyeradication.Butthistransitionto

‘marketeconomy’wasnotaccompaniedbyanyreal‘transitiontodemocracy’although

someformaldemocraticinstitutionswereputinplace.

Theintentiontobuildacommandeconomybasedonplanningafternational

independencein1975,largelyfailed.Therewascriticallackofqualifiedcadres(a

substantialproportionofthelimitednumberofAngolanswithuniversityeducationhad

beenphysicallyeliminatedaspartofapoliticalpurgein1977),andthewarhad

devastatedtheeconomy.Ahugeparalleleconomydeveloped.ThesecondMPLA

Congress(1985)acknowledgedthatthestateplanningsystemwassimplynotworking, 52Ofcourse,asuperpowerlikeChinacanneverbearealisticrolemodelforasmallstatelikeCuba.Vietnam,ontheotherhand,findsitselfinmuchofthesameasymmetricinferiorityinrelationtoitshistoricandgeographichegemonChina,asCubainrelationtotheUS.Therefore,VietnamisamuchmorerelevantrolemodelforCuba.Yet,thesuccessfultransformationtowardauthoritarianmarketeconomyinboththeseAsiancountriesisstudiedwithgreatinterestinCubaandthereforeworthdwellingwithhere.53Mostofthediscussioninthissectionisbasedonthesetwobooks,plusBirmingham2015.

76

andapprovedagraduallegalisationofmarketmechanisms.Thereformtooksometime

tomaterialise,however,startingwiththeintroductionoftheProgramadeSaneamento

EconómicoeFinanceiro(SEF)in1987,andtheestablishmentoftheGabinetedo

RedimensionamentoEmpresarial(GARE),theOfficeforEnterpriseRestructuring.The

GAREwasthemaininstrumentforlaterprivatisationmeasures.

Itwasonlyin1990-91,however,thatmorefar-reachingandrapideconomictransition

gotunderway,accompaniedbyanexplicitrejectionofMarxism-Leninism.Thistook

placewithoutanychangeofthetoppoliticalleadership,whichsimplydecidedtomake

thegreatleapfromsocialismtocapitalism.Notably,thishappenedwithoutthe

introductionofanyregulatorychecks-and-balances.Theelitefamiliesunderthe

undisputedpatronageofPresidentJoséEduardodosSantos(throughhiscontrolof

state,partyandmilitarystructures)simplystartedamassivetransferofstateproperty

tohis,andhisloyalallies’,privatebenefit.Therent-seekingenrichmentopportunitiesin

anoil-driveneconomywereenormous,andthereseemstohavebeennoethicallimitto

thecapitalistlustofthisformer“socialist”nomenclature.Accesstooil(anddiamond)

revenueswasofcoursethefirstandforemostsourceofaccumulation,arbitrarilyusinga

systemofdualexchangerates.

AsHodgespointsout:“partoftheoilrevenuehasbeenmadeavailabletothewell

connectedatanartificiallylowexchangerate,enablingtheprivilegedbeneficiariesto

makelargeprofitsthrough“round-tripping”betweenmarkets”(p.40).Addingtothis

wastheprivilegedaccesstorationedcreditsfromstatebanksatnegativerealinterest

rates(inconditionsofhighinflation).Also,statecontractswereawardedtobusinesses

ownedbythetopfamilieswithoutanycleartenderrulesandlarge‘underthetable

commissions’fromwillingforeignsuppliers,i.a.ofmilitaryequipmentwhilethecivil

warcontinuedforanothertenyearsafterthe1992elections.Diamondminingand

tradingwasanotherhugesourceofenrichmentforthesameelites,althoughguerrilla

challengerSavimbialsograbbedhisshareofdiamondrevenuestokeepthewargoing.

Themassivecapitalaccumulationonprivatehandswasalsoaccompaniedbyanalmost

completedismantlingofthesocialservicesthattoalargeextenthadbeendevelopedby

Cubanadvisorsduringthefirstfifteenyearsfollowingthe1975independence.

77

Itisratherinterestingtocomparethis‘transitiontomarketeconomy’inAngolatothe

onethattookplaceinRussia,bearinginmindPresidentdosSantosćloselinkstotheex-

USSR54andhispersonalrelationshiptoPresidentPutin.TheAngolanandtheRussian

‘transitions’tookplacealmostsimultaneously.

TheAngolantransitionmaybecomerelevantforCubainthepost-Castroperiod,

particularlytotheextentthatmilitarycorporateleaderswithexperiencefromAngola

andwithAngolanmilitaryofficersintheirnetworkoffriendscometooccupyprominent

politicalpositionsinpost-CastroCuba.Ifpersonalgainsbecomemoreimportantthan

socialbenefitsalsoinCuba,itmightbetemptingtofollowtheexampleoftheirAngolan

comrades,ofcoursewithouthavingsimilarsourcesofrent-seekingasinAngola.55

4.9.3. Transformation to oligarchic neo-patrimonialism: Russia and the arrival of the Oligarchs

InRussia,itiscommontodistinguishbetweenthreedifferentprivatisationphases

duringandafterthefalloftheUSSR(seeFreeland2000;andSchleiferandTreisman

2000).Thefirstwascalledspontaneousprivatisation(1988-1991),basedonanew

Sovietlegislationthateffectivelytransferredpartofenterprisepropertyrightsfromthe

governmenttotheemployeesandthemanagement.Inreality,themanagementand

otherinsidersfoundthewaytotakeoverthecontroloftheseenterprises.This

concentrationofcontrolcontinuedafterthefalloftheSovietUnion,whenthenew

RussiangovernmentunderPresidentYeltsinstartedasell-outofallthehugeand

inefficientstateenterprisesinheritedfromtheSovieteconomy.Thegoalwasto

54WhendosSantoswasstudyingpetroleumengineeringinAzerbaijanandmarriedhisfirstwifethere–hespeaksfluentRussian.55Thefirstpost-dosSantospresidentafter38years,JoãoLourenço,hand-pickedbydosSantosandelectedin2017,soonsurprisedbytakingsignificantstepstounravelthedosSantosdynasty:https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21731842-dos-santos-family-used-control-everything-now-they-dont-angolas-new.TheremaybeaninterestingparalleltoCubahere:LikeRaúlCastro,dosSantosleftthePresidencytohissuccessorwhilehekeptcontroloftheParty(MPLA).ThenewPresident,however,duringhisfirsthalfyearinthePresidency,sackedbothfavouritedosSantoschildrenasheadofoilcompanySonangolandthesovereignwealthfund,respectively,whilealsofiringthedosSantosprotégésinthecountry’ssecurityapparatus.ThebigquestioninAngolainearly2018ishowlongdosSantoswillsurviveasPartyboss,andhowfarLourençoisableandwillingtogoinhistransformationefforts.ThebestanalyticsourcetofollowthisevolutionisprobablyRafaelMarquez’blogwww.makaangola.org

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transformtheseenterprisestoprofit-seekingbusinessesthatcouldsurvivewithout

statesubsidies.Thenextphasewascalledvoucherprivatisation(1992-1994),whenall

Russianinhabitants,includingminors,receivedvoucherscorrespondingtoasharein

thenationalwealth.Theycouldbeexchangedforsharesinenterprisestobeprivatised.

Butmostordinarypeoplewereunwillingtoinvestandthereforequicktosellthe

vouchersforanegligibleamountofmoneytothesmartpeople:againagroupofinsider

investors.Thethirdanddecisivephaseinthisprocessstartedin1995,withtheso-called

loansforshares,wherebysomeofthelargeststateindustrialassetsinoil,gas,steel,etc.

(suchasNorilskNickel,Yukos,Lukoil)wereleasedthroughauctionsformoneylentby

commercialbanks.Thistookplace,however,withoutrealcompetition,sinceonceagain

theauctionswereeffectivelycontrolledbythesamegroupoffavouredinsiders.Very

fewoftheseloansortheleasedenterpriseswereeverreturned,soinrealitythese

enormouspropertieswereacquiredatridiculouslylowprices,givingrisetothenew

classofsuper-richRussiansnowknownastheoligarchs.

WemaytrytotakestockofhowRussia,theleadnationintheoldUSSR,hasdeveloped

intheaftermathofCommunism´sfall.Thefirstassessmentgoesbackto2007,towards

theendofPutin´sfirstpresidency,whenthereseemedtobeanincreasingperceptionin

theRussianpopulationthatauthoritarianismhadbeenontheoffensiveduringVladimir

Putin’sregime.Butmanyobserversdoubtedthesustainabilityofthisnew

authoritarianism:

“ThepoliciesofPresidentVladimirPutinhaveunderminedRussia'sfledgingdemocratic

institutionsbuthavealsofailedtogenerateanysortofcoherentauthoritarianismtotake

theirplace.Thus,fifteenyearsafterthecollapseoftheUSSR,thecountrystilllacksany

consensusaboutitsbasicprinciplesofstatelegitimacy.Toexplainthis,wemustunderstand

thewaysinwhichtheSovietUnion'sinstitutionallegacieshaveshort-circuitedallthree

historicallyeffectivetypesoflegitimaterule—traditional,rational-legal,andcharismatic—

resultinginahighlycorruptstatethatstillcannotfullycontrolitsborders,monopolizethe

legalmeansofviolence,orclearlyarticulateitsroleinthecontemporaryworld”(Hanson

2007:Abstract).

Ifwemoveaheadto2014,oneofthemorerecentanalysesofthePutinrule

(Zimmerman2016:309)concludesasfollows:

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“[…]theprospectsforfullauthoritarianismmaybebetterthanthoseforcompetitive

authoritarianism.Thereissolittlebywayofindependentinstitutions—thoroughly

independentcourts,genuinelycompetitiveparties,otherthanUnitedRussiaoritspossible

successor,independentmedia—toenvisageademocraticoutcomeofPutin´scurrentterm”.56

Inthe2015afterwordtoaneweditionofthesamebook,reflectingontheconflictwith

UkraineandtheannexationofCrimealeadingtothenewconflictwiththeWest,

Zimmerman(op.cit:325)adds:

“Thebarrierstoexpressingopposingviewshavebeenincreased.Thesedeter,butdonot

precludethearticulationofviewsthatdonotmeshwiththoseoftheKremlin,whether

throughthemainstreammedia,viatheInternet,orinthestreets.Thishasincreasedthe

propensityofarticulate,educatedurbandwellerstoseekliveselsewhere—whetherinthe

formerSovietrepublics,suchasLatviaorEstonia,inWesternEuropeorNorthAmerica”.

Aninterestingcomparativeelementwhenlookingaheadatapost-CastroCubaisthe

problemofupholdinganauthoritarianlegitimacywhenthereisnocharismaticsource

todrawon,andhowmuchlegitimacyinsuchasituationwilldependonarelative

economicsuccess.Leadershiptransitionalongwitheconomicfailureandincreasing

socio-economicinequalitiesmayprovokemorewidespreadandsustainedpublic

protest.Then,Putinapparentlyhasbeensuccessfulinrebuildingpartofhischarismatic

authorityaidedbyexternalconflictsandhisappealtonationalism.Anothercomparable

variableinthisanalysisistherelationshipbetweenexitandvoiceforthecriticsofthe

regime.

4.9.4. The case of China as a reference point

WhentryingtounderstandChinaasaninspiration,itisnecessarytogobacktothe

foundationoftheChinesestatemorethantwomillenniumsago,followingitalltheway

uptothecelebrationofthe19thNationalCongressoftheChineseCommunistPartyin

October2017.Chinawasinfactthefirstworldcivilisationtoestablishamodernstrong

stateduringtheQinDynastyasearlyasinthethirdcenturyBC,almostaccordingto

56Putin’sthirdpresidentialtermendedin2018,whenitwasrenewedforanothersix-yeartermthroughre-electioninMarch2018.

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Weberianprinciples,someeighteencenturiesbeforeanythingsimilarappearedin

Europe.ThemotivationwasthesameaslateroninEurope:prolongedandpervasive

militarycompetition,givingincentivestotaxthepopulation,tocreateadministrative

hierarchies,controlthemilitaryandtoestablishmerit-basedratherthanpatrimonial

criteriaforrecruitmentandpromotion.Chinaisoneofthekeyexamplesofthemaxim

developedbyCharlesTilly(1990):“warmadethestateandthestatemadewar”.

TheConfuciantraditionisalsoapartoftheexplanationoftheChinesesocialmodel,

withitsemphasisonmoralityratherthanformalwrittenlaws:benefitsandrightswere

seenasgiftsfromtherulersratherthancitizens’rights.Lawyerswerenotaseparate

high-statusgroup,andjudgeswerejustanothersectionofthebureaucracy.Therewas

neveranybalancebetweenrightsholdersanddutybearers,basicconceptsinmodern-

dayhumanrightsphilosophy.

UnlikethesituationinEuropewhencentralstatesstartedappearinginthemid-17th

century(theWestphalianstate),theChinesestatewasnotaccompaniedbya

transcendentalandmonotheistreligion,representingalegalhierarchyindependentof

theexecutivepoweroftheemperor.ThestateatthedisposaloftheChineserulerswas

neverchallengedbysocialactorswithahierarchyindependentfromandoftenopposed

tothestate,liketheCatholicpriests,Jewishjudges,HinduBrahminsorMuslimUlamain

otherpartsoftheworld.InEurope,thestatealsohadtocompetewithfeudalnobility,or

acommercialbourgeoisiebasedinindependentcity-states.TheChinesestatealso

inspiredotherAsiansocietiesincludingVietnam(colonisedbyChinafor1,100years)up

tomoderntimes,laidthefoundationforfarmoreabsolutistrulethantheEuropeanstate

andbyextensionthecolonialAmericas:Therewasnosocialorganisationthatcould

counterbalancestatepower.Consequently,therewasneverspaceforthetrianglepower

modelthatappearedinEuropean-basedsocieties:adivisionofpowerbetweenthe

executive,thelegislatureandthejudiciary.Whatweknowasdemocracyandruleoflaw

wasneveracharacteristicoftheChinesepowerstructure(seeFukuyama2011and

Fukuyama2014).57

57MuchofthefollowingassessmentisbasedonFukuyama´sin-depthdiscussionofthehistoricevolutionofChina(Fukuyama2014:Chapter24),towardsthepeculiarChinesepropertysystemandthe’socialistmarketeconomy’.

81

Thismillennium-longstatetraditionwasstrongenoughtosurviveChina´s‘centuryof

humiliation’,startingwiththeBritish-ledopiumwarin1839andendingwithJapanese

occupationduringthesecondworldwarandtheChineserevolutionin1949.Duringthe

Maoistrulethesovereigntyofacentralisedstatewastakentonewextremes,andthe

principleoflegalitywasall-butdismantled.ThischangedwhenDengXiaopingtookover

thecontrolofthepartyin1978,aftertheCulturalRevolution:inanattempttoavoidthe

samelevelofabsolutistpowerabuse,asetofruleswereestablishedsothattheparty

couldmonitorandhandlepopulargrievances.This,however,neveramountedtowhat

weknowastheruleoflaw,andthepartyretaineditssupremepositionover

governmentandlegislature.

Thenewsystemofformallawwasafundamentalbasisfortheintroductionofthe

‘socialistmarketeconomy’,withlanduserightsandtheopeningforforeigninvestment

includingjointventures.Regardingthelatter,contractrights,insurance,arbitrationand

similarinstitutionswerecrucial.Decisiveinthisregardmayhavebeenthe1986

adoptionoftheso-calledGeneralPrinciplesofCivilLaw(GPCL).Itrecognisedasphere

ofindependentlegalactorswhocouldacquireandalienateproperty,enterinto

contracts,anddefendtheirrightsbeforeacourtsystem.Throughthis,usufructuary

(usage)rightscouldbebought,sold,mortgagedortransferredandinpracticealso

inherited,althoughformalstateownershipwasretained.Whetherwespeakaboutan

urbandwellingoragriculturalland,naturalorlegalsubjectsownaleaseinexchangefor

aland-usefee.InkeepingwithConfucianandChinesedynastytraditions,thereisno

suchthingasanabsolutepropertyrightandprivateownership.Theselimitationsmay

obviouslyrepresentseriousproblemsforwesterninvestorsoperatinginChina,making

theprotectionofpropertyrightsmoreofapoliticalthanalegalissue,andlimitingtheir

scopeofactionvis-à-vispoliticallywell-connectedstate-ownedenterprises.Many

peasantsandhomeownersfindthemselvesinsimilarsituationsofvulnerabilitywhen

confrontedbymunicipalauthoritiesandlanddevelopers.

Anotherimportantcharacteristicofthepost-MaoChinesepoliticalsystemhasbeenthe

rulesforretirement,termlimitsandproceduresformerit-basedleadershiprecruitment

andpromotion.TheChineseconstitutionspecifiedthatseniorleaderswillserve

maximumtermsoftenyears,andthatnobodycouldbeacandidatefortheStanding

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CommitteeofthePCPPolitburopasttheageofsixty-seven.Theseprincipleshave

producedasystematicrotationofleadershippositions,contributingtostabilityand

legitimacyoftheauthoritarianruleinthecountry.Itwasthereforenotedwithgeneral

concernwhentheseconstitutionalistlimitswereabolishedinMarch2018,effectively

allowingPresidentXiJinpingtoleadChinaindefinitely.

WhereMao´srulebecameincreasinglyanarchistic,Dengintroducedaseton

institutionalrulesforthePartyandthegovernment,withoutquestioningtheformer´s

supremacyoverthelatter.Hemaintainedaduplicationofpartyandstatebureaucratic

functionsfromtoptobottom.Thepartyhierarchywasreducedbutkeptitspowerwhen

itcomestostrategicissues,overseeingtheworkofgovernmentoffices.Dengalso

restoredamerit-basedcivilservicetradition,i.a.byintroducinganexaminationsystem.

Theopeningoffourspecialeconomiczonesforforeigninvestmenthadacrucial

importancefortheeconomictake-off.Decentralisationtoprovincesandmunicipalities

isanincreasinglynoticeableaspectoftheChinesesociety,withafiscalresponsibility

systemforlocalgovernments.IthasbeenclaimedthatearlygainsoftheChinese

socialistmarketeconomyweretheproductof,notsomuchtheprivatesector,asofthe

so-calledtownshipandvillageenterprises(TVEs),turninglocalgovernmentsintoprofit-

makingbusinesses.Localgovernmentsweregiventheauthoritytoextractcertaintypes

oftaxesandwerealsopermittedtokeepsurplusrevenuesofwhich70%shouldbe

ploughedbackintonewinvestmentswhereastherestcouldbeusedatthediscretionof

theTVE.Thisbecamethesourceofwidespreadcorruptionbutitalsobecamean

incentiveforlocaleconomicgrowth.MuchofChina´sindustrialoutputintheearly

reformyearscamefromTVE-sponsoredbusinessesratherthanfromthenewprivate

sector(seeOi1999).

Whencorruptionbecametoorampant,anewtaxreformtookawaymanyoftheTVE

privileges,whichhadbeenimportantincreatinganewmiddleclass.AsFukuyama

pointsoutreferringtoZhaoandYang(2013):

“[…]theChinesegovernmentcouldshiftgearssoquicklywhenitbecameclearthatanearlier

initiativewasproducingunanticipatedconsequences,andcouldsuccessfullyimplementthe

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newcourseinthefaceoflargevestedinterests.DengandtheCommunistPartyrecognized

thattheirlegitimacyrestedoncontinuingstrongperformance,andtheywerenottrappedby

ideologyorpastpracticeinmakingdramaticandrapidcoursecorrections”(Fukuyama

2014:378).

Partofthesecoursecorrectionswasthestrippingofmanyoftheprofit-making

businessesbelongingtothePeople´sLiberationArmy.

AfrequentlyaskedquestionbeforeXiJinpingarrivedatthetop,waswhether

subordinateunitsofthestatehadbecomesostrongandautonomousthattop-level

supremacymightbeundermined,resistingstateandpartydiscipline.Thiscouldbethe

caseforpowerfulState-ownedcompanies(SOEs)likeChinaTelecomandChinaNational

OffshoreOilCorporation,andenormousbureaucraciesliketheMinistryofRailways

(with2.5millionemployees).

Thelackofdownwardaccountabilitytosocietyandcitizens(onlyupward)isstilla

dominantcharacteristicoftheChinesestate,creatingaseriouslegitimacyproblem.

Villageelectionsinruralareas,electingcommitteesandleaderswithlimitedlocal

powers,wereintroducedin1989.Acertaindegreeofindependenceisreportedfor

representativesallthewayuptotheNationalPeoplesĆongress,butallthisprovides

verylimitedremedytocitizencomplaints.Theseshortcomingsarepartlycompensated

byinformalfeedbackmechanisms,providedbypermissionforChinesepeasant

communitiestopresentcomplaintstolocalofficials,whointurnareoftenencouraged

byhigher-levelauthoritiestoberesponsivetosuchcomplaintsandofferco-optation

solutions(Tsai2007).Oneofthereasonsmaydefinitelybethequiteenormousnumber

ofsocialproteststakingplaceinChina(allegedly2,600perday,ref.GöbelandOng

2012).Outofthis,workerprotestsanddemonstrationsareparticularlyontherise,

doublingin2015comparedtothepreviousyear.58

EconomicproblemsinChinaarequiteautomaticallyfeltinthelabourmarket.During

the1997-98downturn,asmuchas21millionworkersatstrugglingSOEsweresacked.

Ofthese,however,13millionfoundnewjobs,morethan1millionweretransferred

58BloombergBusinessweek,14.01.16.

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internally,whileathirdlosttheirjobs.59Withneweconomicslowdownin2016,SOEs

expectedtolayoff1.8millionworkersinthecoalandsteelsectorsaspartofitsefforts

toreduceindustrialovercapacity.60

Whatwemayobserve,thus,isthatChinaseemstohavefoundanapparentlyeffective

waytomanagethiscomprehensivesocialprotest.Chen(2012)inhisstudyofthis

phenomenonintroducestheconceptofcontentiousauthoritarianism,wheresocial

protestishandledthroughwhathecalls‘routinizedcontentiousbargaining’between

thegovernmentandordinarypeople,thuscontributingtotheregime´sresilienceand

challengingtheconventionalwisdomthatauthoritarianregimeshavenoalternativeto

represspopularcollectiveprotest.Inthepresentsituation,theChineseregimemust

deliverinordertosurvive,atleastifitwantstoavoidmassiverepression.Aspointed

outbyFukuyama:

“DengXiaopingandtheleadersofthepartywhofollowedhimunderstoodthattheparty´s

survivalwoulddependonlegitimacy,whichcouldnolongerrestonideologybutwouldbe

basedontheirperformanceingoverningthecountry”(Fukuyama2014:383).

However,theDengeraisoverinChina.OneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofXi´s

leadership—completelycontrarytoDeng´s—isthenewemphasisonideology,almost

resemblingtheMaoera.AsunderlinedbyRingen(2016),inaveryinsightfulstudyof

ChinaunderXi,itseemsthatXiistryingtointroduceanewideologicallegitimacy

againstthebackdropoflesseconomicgrowth—whichisstillfaraheadofthatofmost

westernnations.ThenewChineseideologyisnotMarxism,butnationalism,thereturn

tohistoricnationalgreatnessasaguidetothefuture,‘theChinesedream’ascoinedby

Xi.Thenationandthepeople—asacollective—alwaysstandsabovethecitizen.Xi

Jinpingisnowurgingpartycadresto“embracethespiritofMaoZedong”and“givehigh

prioritytoworkwithintheideologicalsphere”.The19thNationalCongressofthe

CommunistParty(October2017)decidedtoincludehis‘socialistthought’intheParty

Constitution,placinghimalongsideMaoZedongandDengXiaopinginthepantheonof

revolutionaryleaders.Whenpresidentialtermlimitswereabolishedhalfayearlater,

ProfessorRingenclaimedthatChinadefactowasbecominga“totalitariandictatorship”, 59ChinaDaily,13.01.16.60OfficialatthehumanresourcesandsocialsecurityministryquotedbyCNBC/Reuters,28.02.16.

85

withoneunquestionableleaderandwithoutcompetingfactionsintheCommunist

Party.61

PerhapsthemostsignificantaspectofXiJinpingleadership,probablyalsonoticedin

Havana,isexactlythis:theextraordinarycentralisationofpowerhehasorchestrated,

unprecedentedsincethetimeofMao.HehascreatedandischairingthenewCentral

NationalSecurityCommissionwithjurisdictionovertheArmy,thepolice,andall

foreign-relatedandnationalsecurityagencies.HeisalsochairingtheCentralMilitary

Commission,directlylinkedtohispositionastheGeneralSecretaryoftheCommunist

Party.Furthermore,XihascreatedandtakenthechairofthenewCentralLeadingGroup

onComprehensivelyDeepeningReforms,aswellasleadershipofcentralleadinggroups

onforeignaffairs,internetsecurityandinformationtechnology(seeWo-LopLam2015).

InOctober2016,theCommunistPartyCentralCommitteeelevatedhisstatusto‘core’

leader,puttinghiminthesamereveredranksasMaoZedongandDengXiaoping.62

Chineseleadershiphasclearlychangedfrombeingcollectiveandtechnocraticduring

thetwentyyearsafterDengXiaoping,toaone-manparty-ledruleunderXiJinping.

Returningtosocio-economicdevelopment,Chinahasofcourseperformedextremely

welloverthepastseveraldecades,withasomewhatstrangecombinationofdramatic

povertyreductionandincreasingincomeinequality.63Togetherwithanimproved

provisionofbasicsocialservices,thishasapparentlyprovidedtheauthoritarianrule

withsufficientlegitimacyforthetimebeing.However,thegrowingmiddleclassinthe

hundredsofmillionsmaybeincreasinglyquestioningthisstatusquo.

Fukuyama,ingeneralsoconcernedwiththeissueofaccountabilityasaprerequisitefor

institutionalstrength,recognisesthattheexampleofpresent-dayChinastandsoutin

contrasttothis—whichisofrelevanceforCuba:

61QuotedbyAftenposten,Oslo,26.02.18.62NewYorkTimesInternationalEdition,20.10.11,p.5:”XinamedbypartyChina’s’core’leader”.63Between1980and2015,poverty(withalineabout21%higherthantheWorldBank2011lineofUSD1.9perday),wasreducedby94%inruralChina.Incontrast,theGinicoefficientofincomedistributionamongruralresidentsrosefrom0.241in1980to0.39in2011(thelatterisequaltotheUS),orby62%accordingtoofficialestimation.Thereasonforthesecontradictorytrendsisthatannualnetincomegrowthwasmuchstronger–evenpercentage-wise–amongthetopincomehouseholds(Source:ChinaNationalBureauofStatistics(2015):PovertyMonitoringReportofRuralChina).

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“ButChinaistodaygrowingrapidlywithonlyastrongstateinplace.Isthissituation

sustainableinthelongrun”(withneitherruleoflawnoraccountability)?“Willthesocial

mobilizationtriggeredbygrowthbecontainedbyaforcefulauthoritarianstate,orwillitlead

tounstoppabledemandsfordemocraticaccountability?”(Fukuyama2011:481).

Fukuyamacomesclosertoaresponseinhis2014Volume(op.cit.),whereheclaimsthat

theChineseCommunistPartyisreachingbackintohistorytoprovethatyoucancreatea

competentstatewithoutthebenefitoftheWesterntraditionsofdemocracyortherule

oflaw(p.370-385).Upagainsthis1992thesisof“theendofhistory”,itisevenmore

interestinghowhecontraststhistotheUSA(evenpre-Trump).USpoliticalparties

polarisedalongideologicallinesandpowerinterestgroups,leadthecountrytowhathe

callsa‘vetocracy’,evenwiththedangerofdegeneratingintoa‘neo-patrimonialsociety’

(Fukuyama2014:PartIVPoliticalDecay).The2016presidentialelectioncampaignand

theTrumppresidencyhavedonenothingtoreducetheseconcerns.

China´sundisputedleaderfrom2012,XiJinping,hasmadeitclearthatpolitical

liberalisationisoutofthequestion.Aninternalgovernmentmemofrom2013listed

sevenWesternvaluesandinstitutionsthatChinamuststruggleagainstatallcosts,

includingconstitutionaldemocracy,mediaindependence,civilsocietyandmarket

liberalism.TheuniversalvaluesofhumanrightswereseenasunfitfortheChinese

society,andXileavesnodoubtthattheCommunistPartywillcontinuetostandabove

anyotherinstitution,includingtheconstitutionandthecourts.64

Thereisanacademicdiscussion,highlyrelevantforCubantransformationscenarios,

aboutthesustainabilityofChina´ssocio-economicandpoliticalstructures.Acemoglu

andRobinson(2012)aremuchmorepessimisticthanthelater-dayFukuyama.The

authorsofthisstandardreferencebookdorecognise“aradicalshiftawayfrom

extractiveeconomicinstitutionsandtowardsignificantlymoreinclusiveeconomic

institutions”,65butcoincidingwithhighlyauthoritarian,extractivepoliticalinstitutions.

64Foragooddiscussionofthis,seethecoverstoryofTimeMagazine,November17,2014(pp.20-25):”EmperorXi:China´sLeaderLoomsLargeatHomeandAbroad”.65Ref.definitionoftheseconceptsinChapter2.2.Fukuyama(2014:26)suggeststhattheirconcept‘extractiveinstitution’(whatwehavecalled‘exclusive’here)ismoreorlessequivalenttowhatother

87

TheyrecognisethatDengXiaoping´smodelforsignificanteconomicgrowthcouldbe

achievedwithoutendangeringtheCommunistParty´spoliticalcontrol.Theyare

convinced,however,thattheChineseauthoritariangrowthunderextractive(whatwe

call‘exclusive’)politicalinstitutionswillultimatelycometoanendandisunlikelyto

translateintosustainedeconomicdevelopment.Itisratherdifficulttotakethis

prognosisveryseriously,consideringthestillon-goingChinesegrowth—althoughat

lowerratesthanbefore—againstthebackdropofrecenteconomicandfinancialcrisesin

thewesterncapitalistworld.Itmayseemthattheseauthorshavefallenhostagetotheir

owntheory´sabsoluteapplicationinahighlyuncertainworld.66

AcemogluandRobinsonoffersomeexamplesoflimitstofreeenterpriseinChina,which

doresemblesomeofthefoot-dragginginCuba.GSJiangZeminmadesomevery

suspiciousremarksaboutentrepreneursbyin1989,andmanyentrepreneurswere

expropriatedandevenjailedinthe1990s.Privatecompaniescompetingwiththestate

maybemetbyserioustrouble,andentrepreneursneedtoenjoythesupportofparty

cadresandoffermutualbenefitsiftheywanttohaveinvestmentsecurity.Theheadsof

bigstatecompaniesareassuminglygivenconstantordersbypartyofficials.Butmost

seriousofall,accordingtotheseauthors,isthat“Chinesegrowthisbasedonthe

adoptionofexistingtechnologiesandrapidinvestment,notcreativedestruction”(p.

438-9).TheChinesegrowth,theyclaim,“willrunoutofsteamunlessextractivepolitical

institutionsmakewayforinclusiveinstitutions”(p.441).67

AnotherpessimisticforecastforChinesesustainabilityisofferedbyFriedman(2010:88-

100).HisclaimwasthatChinesegrowthfallingfrom10-15%priorto2009toalevel

between6-7%,wouldimplysubstantialsocialandpoliticalproblems.68Heraisesdoubts

astowhetherChinawillholdtogetherasaunifiedcountry,withincreasing

contradictionsbetweentherichcoastalandthepoorinteriorregions.

authors(includinghimself)termas‘neo-patrimonialism’.Iamnotsosurethattheseconceptsaredirectlycomparable.66AlsointhiscasetheTrumppresidencyshouldbeseenasawake-upcall.67WereturntootherrelevantaspectsofAcemogluandRobinson(2012)inalatersub-chapter.68GDPAnnualGrowthRateinChinaaveraged9.66percentfrom1989until2017.In2017,theeconomygrewby6.9percent.ThegrowthinVietnamhasfluctuatedbetween5and9.5%(1995)duringthesameperiod,with7%in2017.TheOECDaverage,bycontrast,fluctuatedduringthesameperiodbetween1.3and4%growth,apartfromthefinancialcrisisin2008-2009(minus3.5%in2009).2016OECDgrowthwas1.7%.https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?cid=GPD_30&locations=OE

88

Whatalltheseobserversagreeonintermsofourpolitics-economicscorrelationmatrix

inspiredbyAcemogluandRobinson,isthatthesuccessfultransformationfrom

exclusivetoinclusiveeconomicinstitutionswillnotleadtoanysimilartransformation

alongthepoliticalvariableinChinatoday.AccordingtoFukuyama,however,Chinahasa

millennium-longstatetraditionthatcanmakeitsustainableinspiteofthis.Contraryto

AcemogluandRobinson´sforecast,heexpectsthattheeconomicsonlytransformation

maybesustainableonitsown.

Cubanleaderswillundoubtedlywatchverycarefullywhichoftheseprognoseswill

materialiseastheislandnationisseekingitsownwayforward.

4.9.5. The case of Vietnam as a reference point

VietnamsharesonecrucialhistoriccharacteristicwithChina:theveryearly

developmentofastrongstate.Vietnamwasoneoftheworld´sfirstpeoplestopractice

agriculture(some20,000yearsago).Theneedtohaveasingleauthoritytoprevent

floodsoftheRedRiverDelta(comprisingpresentcapitalHanoianditsportcity

Haiphong)madethisregionthecradleoftheVietnamesenationstate.Thiscreatedthe

firstVietnamesestateformationalmost5,000yearsago.Theneedtocooperatein

constructinghydraulicsystemsaswellasdefendingthisrichcivilizationagainstforeign

invaders,wereotherstate-strengtheningfactors.Foralongtime,Vietnamwasan

independentandself-containedstate.For1,100years,however,fromaround200BC,

VietnamwasgovernedbyasuccessionofChinesedynasties,whichalsoleftsomeofthe

samestatehoodimpactsaswehavementionedforChina.Butanotherfoundingfactor

hasbeentheconstantstruggleagainstforeigninvaders,betheyChinesedynasties,

French,JapaneseorAmericancolonialistsand/orimperialists.Anti-imperialismand

nationalautonomyarethereforeconceptswithfarlongerhistoricalrootsinVietnam

thaninCuba,andChinaisthemotherofalllaterVietnameseimperialists.

WhentheUSstarteditsstate-buildingprojectinSouthVietnaminthemid-1950s,there

waslittleunderstandingforthishistory.Onehistoricinterpretationisthatthe

catastrophicoutcomeoftheUSwarinVietnamwasadirectconsequenceoffailedstate-

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buildingeffortsbytheUSA.

TheVietnamesestatethatemergedafterdefeatingtheUSAin1975,wasbuiltona

combinationofalonganti-colonialstruggleagainsttheFrench,ledbythelegendary

CommunistleaderHoChiMinhandleadingtotherevolutionintheNorthin1945,and

thebloodybutfinallysuccessfulliberationwaragainsttheUSA.But,muchlikeCuba,

whentheUSAintroduceditsembargointheearly1960s,Vietnambecameextremely

dependentontheUSSRinanattempttorebuilditsdestroyedcountryandmodernise—

withtheexpressedobjectiveofbecominganadvancedsocialisteconomybytheyear

2000.WhentheUSSRcollapsed,itpresentedVietnamwithmuchofthesamechallenge

asCuba:“Vietnamwasforcedtoconfronttheextentofitsdependencyonexternal

supportasaidfromitserstwhilealliesevaporated[…and]thepartyleadershipwasalso

forcedtoabandonitsillusionsofaSoviet-styleforcedmarchtomodernity”(Elliott:7).

Buttherewasalsoadifferentchallenge:thestatesectorofthenon-agriculturaleconomy

wasinsignificant.Priortothereforms,theheavydependenceonUSSRassistance

“createdthecontradictorypictureofanambitiouslyexpansionaryandaid-financedstate

unabletocontrolaneconomystilllargelybasedonsubsistencefarmingandsmall-scale

localtrade”(deVylderandFforde1996:95).

Sincereunificationin1975:theVietnameseeconomywasplaguedbyenormous

difficultiesinproduction;imbalancesinsupplyanddemand;inefficienciesin

distributionandcirculation;soaringinflationrates;andrisingdebtproblems.Vietnamis

oneofthefewcountriesinmodernhistorytohaveexperiencedasharpeconomic

deteriorationinapost-warreconstructionperiod.

Alreadyin1986,beforethefalloftheUSSR,Vietnamlaunchedapoliticalandeconomic

renewalcampaign(DoiMoi—meaning‘renovation’,orBigBangassomehavecalledit)

thatintroducedreformsintendedtofacilitatethetransitionfromacentrallyplanned

economytowhatwasofficiallytermed‘Socialist-orientedmarketeconomy’.DoiMoi

combinedeconomicplanning—Vietnamstillusesfive-yearplans—withfree-market

incentives.Theprogramencouragedtheestablishmentofprivatebusinessesandforeign

investment,includingforeign-ownedenterprises,intheproductionofconsumergoods.

Furthermore,itabolishedagriculturalcollectives,removedpricecontrolson

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agriculturalproducts,andenabledfarmerstoselltheirgoodsinthemarketplace(see

Elliottop.cit.,anddeVylderandFfordeop.cit.).

WhiletheUSSRceasedtobethemainreferencepointforVietnam’sdevelopment,this

positionwasquicklytakenoverbythesuccessfulEastAsian‘Tigers’.TheVietnamese

readingofthelessonfromEasternEuropewastoallowformoreperestroika

(restructuring)inordertoavoideconomiccollapse,butlessglasnost(transparency)so

astoavoidthelossofCommunistPartyhegemony.Anexampleofthelatterwasthata

memberofthePolitburowhoopenlyadvocatedforpoliticalpluralismwassummarily

dismissed(after1989).

Theearly1990smarkedVietnam´snormalisationwiththeUS,includingtheliftingofthe

economicembargo,andthroughthatalsoaccesstoaidandloansfromtheWorldBank

andtheIMF.Bythelate1990s,thesuccessofthebusinessandagriculturalreforms

underDoiMoi,combinedwithfullengagementwiththeinternationaleconomicsystem,

wasevident.Morethan30,000privatebusinesseshadbeencreated,andtheeconomy

wasgrowingatanannualrateofmorethan7%.

Impressiveresultswereachievedinpovertyreduction.Fromtheearly1990sto2015,

theoverallpovertyrateinthecountryfellfrom58%(1993)to4.5%;decliningon

averageby2%peryearwhilethedeclineamongpoorhouseholdsinpoordistrictswas

reportedtobeonaverage5%peryear.Nearly30millionpeoplehavebeenliftedoutof

povertysincethe1990s,andthecountryhasreachedmostoftheMillennium

DevelopmentGoals.TheBostonConsultingGroupestimatesthatby2020,aboutone-

thirdofthepopulationwillbemiddleclassorhigher,.69Thatmeansincomeofatleast

714USDpermonth.TheGinicoefficient,however,fellalmostinsignificantly(from0.357

in1992to0.348in2014),butstayedsignificantlylowerthanforChina.70

Mostprosperityisconcentratedinurbanareas,particularlyinandaroundHoChiMinh

City.Ingeneral,ruralareasalsomadeprogress,asruralhouseholdslivinginpoverty

69QuotedbyForbes,20.09.17.70https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=VNBycomparison,NorwayhadaGiniindexofunder0.27(2014),accordingtotheGiniIndexestimateofferedbytheWorldBank.

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declinedfrom66%ofthetotalin1993to36%in2002.Bycontrast,concentrationsof

povertyremainedincertainruralareas,particularlythenorthwest,north-centralcoast,

andcentralhighlands,andincreasinginequalityisnowthreateningsocialprogress.71

Governmentcontroloftheeconomyandanonconvertiblecurrencyhaveprotected

VietnamfromwhatcouldhavebeenamoresevereimpactresultingfromtheEastAsian

financialcrisisin1997.Nonetheless,thecrisis,coupledwiththelossofmomentumas

thefirstroundofeconomicreformsranitscourse,hasexposedseriousstructural

inefficienciesinVietnam'seconomy.Vietnam'seconomicpolicyfollowingtheEastAsian

recessionhasbeenacautiousone,emphasisingmacroeconomicstabilityratherthan

growth.Whilethecountryhasshiftedtowardamoremarket-orientedeconomy,the

Vietnamesegovernmentstillcontinuestoholdatightcontrolovermajorsectorsofthe

economy,suchasthebankingsystem,state-ownedenterprises,andareasofforeign

trade.

Still,theinternalfactorswerethemoredecisiveones.deVylderandFforde(p.95)

interpretthepoliticalprocessasanadaptationbytheCommunistPartytothechanging

politicalstructuresbeneathit:(a)therisingstatebusinessinterests(ofarapidly

commercializedstatesector),i.a.withthemilitaryplayingaprominentroleinfood

production;and(b)thefearofmassiveurbanunemploymentasnon-viablestate

enterpriseshadtoclose,andthepotentialforsocialtensionanddisorder.

LikeChina,Vietnamhassofarmanagedtoholdbackanyseriouspoliticalreforminthe

wakeofmarketeconomyexpansion,althoughtheremay—aswecomebrieflybackto—

bemoreopennessandpluralisminsidethepowerstructurethaninChinaandCuba.The

resistanceagainstmoredemocraticstructuresseemstocometoalargedegree,froma

domesticcoalitionofthepartyandstatenomenclature,andfrommanagementandtrade

unionsinthestateenterprisesector,afraidoflosingtheirprivileges.

WhatisthenatureoftheVietnamesestate,and“whatistherelationshipofthestateto 71SeeElliott2012,particularlyChapters5And6,discussingthisprocess.Mostofthemacro-economicdatacitedbyElliottaretakenfromvariousWorldBankreports,heresupplementedbysomewhatmoreoptimisticestimatesmadebytheGeneralStatisticsOfficebasedonthe2014SurveyonHouseholdLivingStandards(seehttp://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/Culture-Society/2016/622/Poverty-reduction-in-Viet-Nam-Outstanding-achievements-and-solutions-to-overcome-limitations.aspx).

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thepolitical?”asGainsborough(2010)coinsthiskeyquestion.Hefindsthreekey

changesduringtheyearshehasbeenstudying(1996-2007):changesaffectingstate

enterprises;growingcapitalmarkets;andlastbutnotleastsignsofawideningofthe

politicalspaceandamorevibrantcivilsociety.But,hegoesontosay,certainthingsdo

notchangeveryfast,andpowercontinuouslyseekstore-createitself.Theabolishment

ofone-partyruledoesnotatallseemtobeontheagenda.Anevolutiontowards

western-styleliberaldemocracyistheleastlikelyoutcome,heargues,alsoseeingthisin

thecontextofotherSoutheastAsianpoliticalsystems.

OtherstudentsofVietnamhavefoundamorenuancedpicture.AccordingtoCarlyle

Thayer(2009),theomnipotentPartydidfacechallengestoitshegemonyasa

consequenceofDoiMoi.Theclearestexpressionofthiswaspreciselytheemergenceof

whathecallsthe‘politicalcivilsociety’,whichgrewoutofanexplosioninthe1990sof

moreordinarycommunity-basedorganisations(CBOs)atthegrassrootslevel(140,000

CBOsin2005).Theyhadquiteambiguouslegalstatusandwerethereforealso

vulnerable.Theytendedtoseetheirrolemoretonegotiateimprovedserviceswithstate

officialsandalsodeliverservicesnolongerprovidedbythestate,ratherthan

confrontingthem.NationalNGOsarematchedbythepresenceofarelativelylarge

numberofinternationalNGOs(INGOs)(180in2002accordingtoThayer),attimes

dominatingthecountry’scivilsociety.

Around2006,thesegroupsbecamemorepoliticallyactive,startingwithanumberof

smallgroups(oftenself-describedaspoliticalparties),veryoftenestablishedby

diasporaVietnamesemostoftenintheUS,whichin2006coalescedintoanidentifiable

politicalmovement:TheBloc8406.ThisgroupingissuedaManifestoonFreedomand

DemocracyforVietnam,with118signatories,amongthemteachersandlecturers,

universityprofessors,Catholicpriestsandotherliberalprofessionals.Halfofthemwere

concentratedinHueandHoChiMinhCity.Theyalsoproducedafortnightlypublication.

Thismovementconfrontedthehegemonyofone-partyrule.Afterstrongharassment

duringthe2006APECSummitinVietnamreportedlyleadingtoconsiderablegrowth,

themovementstartedmakingmoresystematicuseofsocialmediatospreadits

message.Animportanteventseemstohavebeenafarmers’movementprotestingover

landgrievancesin2007,receivingsupportfromtheBloc8406.Therewasalsofocuson

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agroupofdiasporaactivists,theso-calledVietTanParty,whichprovidedfinancialand

materialassistancetodomesticoppositiongroups.Thisphenomenonseemstobe

comparabletosomeoftheCubanexilegroups.

Thebottom-linenow,however,isthattheBloc8406leadershipappearstohavebeen

effectivelyneutralisedbyVietnam’ssecurityapparatus,justlikethepoliticaldissidents

inthe1990s.Wecannolongerspeakabouta‘politicalcivilsociety’inVietnam,probably

evenlesssothaninCuba.SocialunrestmaynotbeascommoninVietnamaswehave

seeninChina.Butatleastonekindofprotestisveryfrequent,andveryrelevantina

countrystillsodominatedbytheagriculturalandruraleconomy:landdisputes.

Accordingtosomereports,itisclaimedthatthousandsofsuchdisputesariseeachyear,

“puttinggroupsofcitizensagainstbusinessesandgovernment.Unresolvedorpoorly

resolvedpubliclandtakingdisputespresentaseriouschallengetogovernmentaland

communitylegitimacyinVietnamandcontributetosocialinstabilityandinsecurity”.

And,perhapslackingthe‘contentiousbargaining’mechanismwehavedescribedinthe

caseofChina,itisclaimedthat“consultationandmediationwastheexceptionrather

thanthenorm”,andthat“tightstatemanagementofformaldisputeresolutionhasthe

unintendedconsequenceofdrivinglandusersintonon-institutionalchannelsofprotest

anddissent”(T&CConsulting2014,allquotesfromExecutiveSummary).

Animportantelementinfavourofsomekindofpoliticalreformisthefactthattheruling

partyhasmanagedtoputinplaceastableandconstanttransferofpowertoayounger

generationofpartyleadersateachnationalcongress(andalsoallowedforinternal

dissenteventooverrulepartyelitepositions).So,whiletheeconomicchangecamein

theformofa‘bigbang’in1986,politicalchangehasbeenslowandgradual,althougha

newgenerationofleadersmaybecapableofpickingupmoreideasfromtheir

contemporarycitizens.

InVietnam,therealsoseemstohavebeenamuchmoreopendiscussionandvotingthan

inCubainthevariouspartyandstatebodies,sometimesleadingthetopleadershipto

loseoutagainsttheCentralCommittee,orthegovernmenttobeoverruledbythe

nationalassemblyincrucialleadershipstruggles.Thereareseveralinterestingexamples

ofthis.In2001:amajorityvoteinthePolitburoinfavourofthere-electionofLeKha

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PhieuasgeneralsecretaryofthePartywasrejectedbytheCentralCommittee,leading

tohisremoval(Abuza2001).In1997thenational(general)assemblyrefusedtoaccept

thegovernment´sproposedcandidateasGovernoroftheCentralBank(Saxonberg

op.cit.,quotingThayerop.cit.andothers).Andintherun-uptotheJanuary2016Party

Congress,theCentralCommitteeagaintookaclearoppositionrolebynominating

alternativecandidatesfortheelectionoftheParty´snewtopleadership,including

GeneralSecretary,disregardingthesittingleadership´sdeclarationthatsuch

nominationswereillegal(London2016).Althoughthislatterattemptfailed,itshows

thattheCentralCommitteeisconstantlyclaimingrealauthorityvis-à-visthePolitburo

innominatingandapprovingcandidates.

Whatattractedmostattentionamongforeignobserversatthe2016PartyCongresswas

ofcoursethecompetitionbetweentheincumbentGeneralSecretaryNguyenPhuTrong

andhissupportersontheonehandandthecampofthesittingprimeminister,Nguyen

TanDung,ontheother.TanDungwasseenbyforeignobserverstofavourfurther

marketliberalisingreformsandawillingnesstoexpandfreedoms.However,critics

claimthathemaybetalkingabout‘democracy’and‘humanrights’whileatthesame

timesilencingcriticsthroughdraconianmeans.Thereisalsomistrustthattheformer

primeminister,whohasbeenthoughttoseekadvicefromwesternleaderslikeTony

Blair,hasmaintainedallegedassociationwithill-gottenwealth(ibid.,seealsoLondon

2014).

Theoutcomeoftheleadershipstrugglewasthatthesitting71-year-oldGeneral

Secretarywasre-elected.InhisclosingspeechtotheCongress,Trongclaimed,perhaps

inahiddenattackonhiscounter-candidatethat“one-partyruleisafarbetter

alternativethanauthoritarianismdisguisedasdemocracy[…]Acountrywithout

disciplinewouldbechaoticandunstable[…]weneedtobalancedemocracyandlawand

order”.72

Gainsborough(op.cit.)hashisfocusonwhatistakingplacewithintheVietnamesestate.

AndthisisprobablyveryrelevantwhenstudyingtheCubancase.Thereformdrivedoes

notcomefromindependentinterestsmadeupbysocialclasses,butfromanintra-elite 72”One-partyrulethebestforVietnam,saysleader”:TheGuardian,28.01.16.

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conflictwithinthestateapparatus,asclearlyseenintheconflictbetweentheCentral

CommitteeandthePolitburo.Thetraditionalarguments(ref.e.g.BarringtonMoore

(1966)orRueschemeyeret.al.(1992))thattheemergenceofstrongmiddleclasseswill

produceavitalpro-democraticforceseemsofartohavelimitedrelevanceinVietnam,

sincetheseclassesareallsodependentonthestate.Thevariousstateinstitutionsare

strengthenedaspoliticalactors,theNationalAssemblyisstrengthened,andthe

concernsofthebusinesssectorarealsochannelledthroughstate-sanctioned(andnot

independent)institutions.

Noteworthyinthelattercategoryisthewaytheprivateeconomicsectorisorganised:

throughasemi-governmentalorganisationcalledtheVietnameseChamberof

CommerceandIndustry(VCCI)(wherealsostate-ownedenterprisesparticipate),rather

thanthroughindependentemployerorganisations.TheVCCIisnotunderthedirect

controloftheCommunistParty,butPartycommitteesmustbeestablishedinallprivate

enterprises(Thayer,op.cit:3).

ImportantforthesuccessofthemarketeconomyinVietnamwastheCommunistParty

decisionin2006toremovetheclausethatpartymemberscouldnotexploit,i.e.thatthey

wereallowedtorunprivatebusinessandhireworkersandpracticecapital

accumulation.Thiswasseenascrossingavitalideologicalline.Butitwasprobablylittle

morethanbringingthepartyinlinewithawell-establishedpractice.

ThisseemstobetheunderlyinglogictoVietnam’spoliticalsystem.Accordingto

Gainsborough,wemaytalkaboutatransitionfroma‘socialiststate’toa‘capitaliststate’,

wheretheconceptof‘reform’takesonanewmeaning,butwherethebasicideaof‘state

retreat’isquestioned.

Someforeignobserversseethedramaofthesuccessionstrugglepriortothe12thParty

Congressaspartofalargerprocessofpoliticalevolution.Inthewordsofoneofthebest

informedobservers,JonathanD.London(2016):

“InrecentyearsVietnam’spoliticalculturehasbecomeincreasinglypluralistic.Vietnamis

moreopenthanChina.Itscitizensarelesssuppressedandexhibitathirstfor

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internationalization.With30millionFacebookusersandinnumerablepoliticalblogs,the

countryhasseenarapidrevivalofinterestinpoliticsandinthelonglostartsofsocialand

politicalcommentary.Allofthisisvisibleintheleadershipstruggle.Inrecentweeks(priorto

thePartyCongress,author´scomment)partyeliteshavebeenleakingandcounter-leaking

internalmemosandaccusationsandopenlyexpressingtheirviewsovertheInternet,while

retiredandevenactivepartymembershaveopenlydemandedtheabandonmentof

Leninismaspartofcomprehensiveinstitutionalreforms”.

IfwegobacktopositiontheVietnamexperienceinourFigure2.1matrix,itcomesclose

toChinainitseconomicsfirstroute.Thereisverylittlemovementalongthepath

towardspoliticalinclusiveness.However,therearesomeelementsofintra-eliteconflict

evenquestioningthepowermonopoly,resultinginslightlydifferentiatingstatepowers.

Elementsofaninstitutionalizedeconomicsocietyarealsovisible.Yet,whatwehave

seenisthattheregimehasbeenverycarefultorollbackattemptstoestablishamore

politicalcivilsociety.Forallpracticalpurposes,therefore,theVietnamroutemustalso

bequalifiedasaneconomicsonlytransformation.

Thegeneralpictureofgreatsocialprogressandamiddleclassexplosionis

complementedbyagrowingsuper-richupperclassandincreasingsocialdifferences.

Corruptionisclearlyplayingapartinthissocio-economicdistributionprocess.Whether

thisisasufficientguaranteeforthecontinuedacceptanceofpoliticalstatusquo,remains

tobeseen.

ManyaspectsoftheserecentdevelopmenttrendsinVietnamarenodoubtcarefully

studiedinHavana.Itwillthereforebeinterestingtocomparetocontemporarytrendsin

Cuba.

4.10. Resilient post-communism and pragmatic acceptance

Inordertoputallthesedifferenttransformationpatternsintocontext,wewillinthe

followingpresentanefforttoadaptLinzandStepan´sclassicaltheoreticaltypificationof

post-totalitarianregimesmorespecificallytoCommunistorSocialistregimesin

transformation.Saxonberg(2013)hasmadeaninterestingcontributioninthisregard,

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highlyrelevantforthisstudy.Hiskeyconcepttounderstandwhy,incaseslikeCuba,

ChinaandVietnam,therehasbeenmuchmorelimitedsupportforregimechangethan

whatonemightexpectisonewehavealreadyintroduced:pragmaticacceptance.This

hastypicallybeencausedbyeconomicandsocialprogressforadominantpartofthe

population,inCubaalsocombinedwithnationalismandahighdegreeofcharismatic

leadership.Inthepresentsituation,stabilityinChinaandVietnamismaintainedthanks

topeople´spragmaticacceptanceofregimesthatproduceimpressiveandconstant

economicgrowthandsocialprogress.73Thelackofsuchprogress—rathernegative

socio-economicindicators—mayraisequestionsastowhetherthepragmatic

acceptanceinCubaisintheprocessofbeinglost.

Saxonbergdividespost-totalitarianregimesintothreevariants:early,latefreezingand

latematuring74post-totalitarianregimes(Ref.hisTable1.1,p.29-30).Inanearlypost-

totalitarianregime,ideologicallegitimacyisstillstrongandtheregimehasfew

incentivestoinitiatereform.Inthelatepost-totalitarianphase,whichiswhen

CommunistregimesaccordingtoSaxonbergwillbelikelytofall,thereisaclearlossof

ideologicallegitimacyduetoeconomicproblemsand/orpoliticalfailures,often

accompaniedbyastrengthenedcivilsociety.Inthefreezingvariantoflatepost-

totalitarianism,thelossofideologicallegitimacymaybesubstitutedbyconservative

pragmaticacceptance.Inthisinstanceaneconomiccrisisordeclinemayleadtoserious

confrontationsratherthanwillingnesstonegotiatewiththeopposition,withan

uncertainoutcomebetweenrepressionandcollapsewhenfacedwitharevolt.The

maturingtypeofpost-totalitarianregimesischaracterisedbyasituationwherelossof

legitimacymaybeopeningupaspacefordissidencewithintellectuals,workersand

ordinarypeopleseekingtogetherinanefforttostrengthencivilsocietyandperhaps

evenchallengethemonolithicpartystructure.Saxonbergdescribestwodifferent

scenariosinsuchsituations:ifthereiseconomiccrisisbutincreasingexpectationsfor

reform,therewillbeacaseforreformistpragmaticacceptancewheretheregimeis

likelytonegotiateapactwiththeopposition.Ifthereislittleexpectationofpolitical

73Asmentionedabove,ChinaunderXimayseemtoreverttoamoreideologicaljustificationofitsregime,possiblyreducingtheroleofpragmaticacceptance.74SaxonbergisslightlymodifyingsomeofLinzandStepanconcepts,usingtheterm‘freezing’ratherthan‘frozen’,and‘maturing’ratherthan‘mature’HehasalsoproposedtochangeLinzándStepan´sconceptof‘sultanist’regimes,meaningpersonaliseddictatorship,withtheconceptof‘patrimonial’,notnecessarilyequivalenttotheconcept‘neo-patrimonial’usedelsewhereinthisstudy.

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reforminthesamesituation,theregimewillbelikelytomaintainpower,andperhaps

applyincreasedrepressionforthatpurpose.

CubaisoneofthecasesstudiedbySaxonberg,althoughtheempiricaldataarelargely

secondaryratherthanprimary,oftenout-dated,andnotalwaysrelevant.75He

introducestheconceptfreezingpatrimonialism,claimingthat“patrimonialcommunismis

ahybridregimecombiningpersonalizedrulewithremnantsofdoctrinalMarxism-

Leninism”(p.135).HestatesthatFidelCastrotookCubathroughallthreestagesofhis

typology—totalitarianism(1960s),earlypost-totalitarianism(1970s)andfreezinglate

post-totalitarianism(1990s),allcombinedwithpatrimonialismandcharismatic

legitimacy.Hearguesthatthecombinationofnationalismandwelfarepolicies

permittedFidelCastrotomaintainaconsiderabledegreeofpragmaticacceptance.The

situationunderRaúlhasbeenquitedifferent,andpragmaticacceptanceforstatusquo

inpost-CastroCubaseemstobeevenmoreillusory.

4.11. What makes states fail altogether?

GivenCuba´sexpecteddeepeconomicproblemsandlegitimacychallenges,onecannot

avoiddiscussingtheissueofstatefailure.Thestandardreferencetothisconceptis

AcemogluandRobinson(2012),withtheirintriguingbooktitle:WhyNationsFail.

InChapter2,wepresentedtheirkeydichotomybetweeninclusivevs.extractivepolitical

institutionsandthesameconceptsregardingeconomicinstitutions.76

Itisdifficulttofollowtheauthorsonseveralpoints(areasoninitselfforchangingthe

extractiveconcept,ref.Chapter2).Wemaye.g.lookattheirowncountry,theUSA,which

theyseealmostperdefinitionaspoliticallyinclusive(aclaimthatinitselfmaybe

questionedwhenweobservethedeeppresentinter-institutionalconflicts).TheUS,

however,bearsmanyofthetrademarksoftheirdefinitionofextractiveeconomic 75Aswehaveaccesstoprimaryinformationhowever,thisisnotsoimportant:itistheanalytictoolsweareinterestedinhere.76ForourpurposeofconstructingFigure2.1withmorerelevanceforthestudyofexpectedCubantransformations,wehavere-baptizedthedichotomytoinclusivevs.exclusiveinstitutions.Inthissection,however,wewillkeepAcemogluandRobinson’soriginalconcepts.

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institutions(by“expropriatingtheresourcesofthemany”andconcentratingtheminthe

hands“ofthefew”).AswehaveseenearlierinthisChapter,Fukuyamaactuallygoesso

farastoclaimthattheUSunderPresidentTrumpbearsmanyofthecharacteristicsofa

failedstate.

Anotherkeyconceptispredatorydictators,whoveryoftenarethepersonal

representationofextractiveinstitutions.

AcemogluandRobinsonalsopayextensiveattentiontotheclassicalSchumpeter

conceptcreativedestruction,asavitalcomponentofeconomicgrowthandtechnological

change,replacingtheoldwiththenew(newsectors,newtechnologies):“fearofcreative

destructionisoftenattherootoftheoppositiontoinclusiveeconomicandpolitical

institutions”(p.84).Oneofthecharacteristicsofcountrieswithextractiveinstitutions,

theyclaim,istheabsenceofcreativedestruction.

Thedeclaredaim,then,isthe:

“[C]reationofvirtuouscircles,apowerfulprocessofpositivefeedbackthatpreserves

(inclusiveeconomicandpolitical)institutionsinthefaceofattemptsatunderminingthem

and,infact,setsinmotionforcesthatleadtogreaterinclusiveness[…]basedonconstraints

ontheexerciseofpowerandonapluralisticdistributionofpoliticalpowerinsociety,

enshrinedintheruleoflaw”(p.308).

So,whydonationsfail?“Nationsfaileconomicallybecauseofextractiveinstitutions.

Theseinstitutionskeeppoorcountriespoorandpreventthemfromembarkingona

pathtoeconomicgrowth”(p.398).“Whattheyallshareisextractiveinstitutions.Inall

thesecasesthebasisoftheseinstitutionsisanelitewhodesigneconomicinstitutionsin

ordertoenrichthemselvesandperpetuatetheirpowerattheexpenseofthevast

majorityofpeopleinsociety”(p.399).

TheCastro-eraCubahasnotbeencharacterizedbyeliteenrichmentattheexpenseof

thepoor.Butofcourse,therehasbeenperpetuationofpower.

Inclusiveinstitutionsmayreplaceextractiveones,theyclaim,throughmajor

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institutionalchangeandaparadigmshiftatwhattheyalsocallacriticaljuncture(which

theydefineasmajoreventsthatdisrupttheexistingpoliticalandeconomicbalanceina

society)coupledwithabroadcoalitionofthosepushingforreform(p.427).The

relevanceforpost-CastroCubaisobvious,althoughwedon’tsubscribetoalltheir

concepts.Wearereminded,however,thataworst-casescenariooffullorpartialstate

failurecannotbecompletelyruledout,asRaúlCastrohimselfhaswarned.Alternatively,

thecriticaljuncturemayalsobethehistoricalopportunitytofixthingsandmove

towardsinclusion.AcemogluandRobinson’sdiscussionofthephenomenon,withall

theirdeficienciesasaconceptualframeworkforCuba,isthereforeimportanttokeepin

mind.

4.12. The external environment and the emergence of ‘alternative world blocs’

Oneoftheeffectsofthe‘democraticfatigue’inpost-transitionsocietiesmayhavebeen

toboostthepositionofthewesternworld´srivalpowercontenderslikeChinaand

Russia.ForacountrylikeCuba,itselfobsessedsincethebirthoftheRevolutionwiththe

fearofUSintervention;theoutcomeoftheIraqandsimilarinterventionsmayhave

representedamajorreliefandanendtotheperceivedUSinterventionthreats.Thismay

beoneofthefactorsthatincentivizedthestartoftherapprochementwiththeUS.

Anotherintriguingquestioniswhetherthelossofrealismofthisinterventionthreat

underBarackObamaalsodeprivedtheCubanleadership—atleasttemporarilyuntilhe

wassubstitutedbyDonaldTrump—ofitsprincipaljustificationforlimitedfreedomsand

repressivemeasures.

Ifthemultiplecrisesandattemptedbutfailedpro-democraticinterventionshave

providedseriousquestionmarkstotheliberaldemocraticrolemodelsofthisworld,

theymaythushaveaddedrelativestrengthtoalternativepoliticalrolemodels.Inthe

wordsofWhiteheadreferringtothe2008globalfinancialcrisis:

“Theleadingcandidatestorecoverfirstandmostfullyappearedtobethemostindependent

andsuccessfulnon-Westerneconomies,withtheChineseeconomyleadingtheway.Beijing

wasoneofthemosteffectivepromotersofacountercyclical‘stimulus’packageledbypublic

investment.ButChinawasnotalone.Signsareappearingofawiderbreachbetweenthe

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excessivelyindebtedWesterndemocraciesandsomeleadingemerging-marketcountries

whererulingelitescouldrespondtothecrisisbyfavouringdevelopmentalsemi-

authoritarianism”(Whitehead2010:56).

Thisideaofalternativepoliticalrolemodels—challengingthedemocratictransition

paradigm—hasalsobeendiscussedbyotherauthors.Thisislargelythecontextleading

LevitskyandWay(2010)toapplytheconceptsof‘hybridregime’and‘competitive

authoritarianism’.Gat(2007:60)observesthat“[A]uthoritariancapitaliststates,today

exemplifiedbyChinaandRussia,mayrepresentaviablealternativepathtomodernity,

whichinturnsuggeststhatthereisnothinginevitableaboutliberaldemocracy´s

ultimatevictory—orfuturedominance”.

Thisalternativeinternationalpowerblochastoacertainextentbeenoverlappingwith

anotherglobalconceptofemergingpowers:theBRICS(Brazil,Russia,India,China,

SouthAfrica);oreventheMINTs(Mexico,Indonesia,Nigeria,Turkey),ornowRussia,

IranandTurkeycoordinatingtheirSyriapoliciesinoppositiontotheWesternpowers.It

isimportanttonotethatseveraloftheBRICSandMINTcountrieshavebeenmentioned

amongtransitionregimes,andthattheymayhavebeenadvancingorretrocedingin

differentwaysalongthedemocracypath.Butasgroups,andinspiteofrecent

backlashes,theyaredefinitelypartofwhatwemayterma‘secondworldbloc’,

challenginga‘firstworld’ofNorthAtlanticliberaldemocracies.Insomecases—butnot

always—theyrepresentwhatWhiteheadhastermeddevelopmentalsemi-

authoritarianism,orLevitskyandWaycompetitiveauthoritarianismThesealternative

modelsaresometimesreferredtoas‘large-country’contexts(particularlyinthecaseof

ChinaandRussia)or‘large-region’contextswithregionalleaders(suchasChinaforEast

Asia,BrazilforLatinAmericaetc.).Theemergenceofsuchalternativeworldblocsof

moreorlessdemocraticorsemi-authoritarianmarketeconomieshasobviously

providedacountrylikeCubawithahighlyrelevantreference—differentfromaliberal

marketeconomy—foritseconomicaswellasitspoliticaldevelopment.

SomeofthemostsignificantexpressionsofthisblochavebeenpreciselyinLatin

America,startingwiththeVenezuela-ledALBAwhereCubawasafoundingmember,

andfollowedupbymoregeneralregionalblocslikeUNASURandCELAC.Thenew

regionalinstitutionalarchitectureinLatinAmericadidprovideCubawithaverystrong

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diplomatictoolagainstUSpressure,andmoregenerallyagainstpro-democracy

expectations.ThisisaclearparalleltowhatLinz&Stepan(op.cit.)refertoasdiffusionor

zeitgeist,thatis,contemporaryspiritsortrendsincountrieswithsimilarcultural

characteristicsorwithleverageontheCubanreality.

ThequitedramaticfadingofthealternativeregionalblocALBAmayhavebeenastrong

drivingforcebehindCuba´ssearchforrapprochementwiththeUS.

Morethananything,itisChina’sreturntoworldhegemonyandthesupremacyofthe

Chinesemodelcomparedtowesternliberaldemocracy,thatmanifeststheemerging

‘secondworldbloc’ofrelevanceforacountrylikeCuba.ThisishowXinhua,theofficial

newsagency,summedupthe2017CommunistPartyCongress:

“By2050,twocenturiesaftertheopiumwars,whichplungedthe‘middlekingdom’intoa

periodofhurtandshame,Chinaissettoregainitsmightandreascendtothetopofthe

world[...]Thoughitwilltakeimmensework,thepictureisclear.Chinaissettobecomethe

world’slargesteconomy,andincomeswillbehighwithaneffectivesocialwelfaresystem,a

responsiveandpeople-servinggovernment,cleanpoliticsensuringpeople’srightsanda

beautifulcountrylovedbyitscitizens”.77

WesternobserverstendtoagreethatChinaunderXinowoffersafarmoreattractive

exampleforcountriesintransformationthatthatoftheUSunderTrump,thusalso

castingdoubtsontheabove-referredscepticismaboutthesurvivalofChinaasweknow

ittoday:

“InXi,thecountryhasthemostdisciplinedandmostpowerfulleaderinageneration.Trump,

bycontrast,isthemostundisciplinedand,judgingbyhisrecordinCongress,ineffective

presidentforgenerations.Itisastarkand,forthosewhobelieveindemocracy’sefficacies,

depressingcontrast[…]thesheer,overwhelmingtriumphalisminBeijingthisweekshould

finallyprovideawakeupcalltothoseinthewestwhohavelongbelievednotjustthatChina

wouldfail.Manywereconvincedthat,asanauthoritarianstate,thatitmustfail.Forthe

77”Commentary:MilestonecongresspointstoneweraforChina,theworld.”Xinhua,24.10.17http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702090.htm

103

moment,however,Chinaissucceeding.Ifitcontinuesonitscurrentpath,theworldaswe

haveknownitwillneverbethesameagain”.78

ItisquiteobviousthatCubanleadersarenolessenthusiasticaboutthefactthatChina

todaystandsoutasmoresuccessfulinmostwaysthantheUSandotherWestern

countries.Yet,thequestionishowmuchoftheChinesestrategy—particularlyinthe

economicsphere—Cubaispreparedtoembrace.

4.13. Exit vs. Voice?

InordertoassesspopularreactiontotheCubanrevolutionaryregime,andalso

perceptionsofpossibleavenuestotransformation,itseemsveryrelevanttomakesome

considerationsonthebasisofHirschman´sclassicaldiscussionof‘exit’vs.‘voice’

(Hirschman1970).Hirschmanappliestheseconceptstoanykindoforganisation,beita

business,anationoranyformofhumanassociation.Hisbasicideaisthatmembersof

suchassociations,citizensinthecaseofastateoranation,haveessentiallytwopossible

responsesinasituationofperceiveddecreaseinlifequalityorbenefits.Theycaneither

exitorwithdrawfromtherelationship;ortheycanvoiceorattempttocommunicate

complaints,grievancesorproposalsforchange—inshortengagepolitically.Veryoften,

thisisunderstoodasadichotomistchoicebetweenemigrationandprotest.Themost

frequentapplicationofHischman´sexitconcept,clearlyrelevantinthecaseofCuba,is

relatedtoemigration.‘Exit’willthenbeequivalenttoleavingthecountryoforiginal

citizenshipandmigratingtoadifferentnation-state,whereas‘voice’wouldbean

expressionofarticulatingprotestordiscontent,whichaccordingtoHirschman“canbe

graduated,allthewayfromfaintgrumblingtoviolentprotest”(op.cit:16).

Hirschmanseemstohavetreatedthesetwoalternativesasmutuallyexclusive,andthe

Cubanleadershipseemstohaveseenitmuchthesameway:theeasiertheaccesstoexit,

thelowerlikelihoodofvoice.Emigrationthenbecomesasafetyvalve,givingthe

discontentanexitoptionwhenthereisnoopportunitytoprotest.Hirschmaneven

referstoLatinAmericaasanexampleofthisallegeddichotomy: 78”China'sCommunistpartyhascomeofage–thewestshouldwakeup”.TheGuardian,25.10.17https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/25/chinas-communist-party-has-come-of-age-the-west-should-wake-up

104

“LatinAmericanpowerholdershavelongencouragedtheirpoliticalenemiesandpotential

criticstoremovethemselvesfromthescenethroughvoluntaryexile.Therightofasylum,so

generouslypracticedbyallLatinAmericanrepublics,couldalmostbeconsidered‘a

conspiracyinrestraintofvoice’”(op.cit.p.60).

ThislatterreferenceisobviouslymuchmorerelevantforSouthAmericanmilitary

dictatorshipsthanforCuba.

Repressionofdissentmaystimulatedeparture,eitherasawayofprotestorasan

expressionofwithdrawal.Thegeneralprincipleisthatthegreatertheaccesstoexit,the

lesslikelihoodthereisforvoicetobeexercised—andviceversa.However,theloyalty

issueisalsopartofthisequation:wherethereisloyalty,forinstanceintheformof

strongpoliticalpatriotism,exitmaybereduced,dependingonitsavailabilityand

attraction.

Butexitandvoicearenotnecessarilymutuallyexclusive;therecanalsobeinteraction

betweenthetwo.Byprovidingmorespaceforfeedbackandcriticism,exitcanbe

reduced.Inalaterarticle,observingthe1989eventsinEastGermany,Hirschmanhas

cometosimilarconclusions,acknowledgingthatnotalwaysdidexitsubvertvoice.Inthis

case,heclaimsthattheescalatingdynamicofout-migrationledthosewhowantedto

staytotaketothestreetstodemandchange.Exittriggeredvoice,andthetwoworkedin

tandem(Hirschman1993).

Anotherinterestingaspectoftherelationshipbetweenexitandvoicemaybeobserved

amongemigrantswhomaintainstrongsocialtiesandindeedloyaltytotheircountryof

origin—whilevoicingheavyoppositiontotheregime.Insuchcases,alsoveryrelevant

forCuba,theyusetheirexileplatformtoclaimasayinpublicaffairs.Exit,voiceand

loyaltythenarenolongerexclusiveoptions;infact,theverynatureofmigrant

transnationalismisdefinedpreciselybytheoverlappingandsimultaneityofthese

phenomena(Hoffmann2010).

Itisimportanttoemphasisethatthe‘exit’conceptshouldnotbelimitedtoitsphysical,

andliteralmeaning:itcanalsobementaloremotional.Inacountrywithheavy

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restrictionsonemigration,analternativetophysicalexitmaybethewithdrawalfrom

anycivicorpoliticalparticipationinthesystem.Inatotalitarianregime,thismaysimply

beasurvivalmechanismforpeoplewhoareneitherloyaltotheregimenorwillingto

risktheirlifeorwellbeingbyvoicingtheirdissatisfaction.Inadifferentcontext,for

instanceincaseswithalargesubmergedandilliciteconomy,suchmentalexitmay

simplybeawayofwithdrawingfromcontrol.Bothcasesmayatdifferenttimeshave

beenoccurringinCuba.

ItmaybearguedthatCubahasneverhadwhatwemetaphoricallymaycallacoustic

conditionsforvoice:therehasbeennorealoppositionoralternativeleaderwitha

sufficientlystrongvoicetobeheard;noMandela,noWalesa,nobodyremotely

comparabletothe1956performanceofFidelCastro—butquitealotofaccessto‘exit’

(partlypromotedbytheregimeasasafetyvalve).Thisisprobablythemainreasonwhy

exit—literallyorindirectly—hasbeensystematicallypreferredtovoiceinpost-1959

Cubabythosewhohavenotbeencomfortablewiththeregime.Thequestioniswhether

thatwillcontinueastheregimefirstlosesitssourcesoflegitimacywhileapproaching

thegenerationalchange,andthelegitimatespacefortheoppositionpotentiallymightbe

expectedtogrowtotheextentthataneasilyidentifiableexternalenemystarts

disappearing.

4.14. Some peculiar Cuban aspects to bear in mind

4.14.1. Remembering ‘Cuban exceptionalism’

WhendiscussingapplicabilityofaliberaltransitionparadigminCuba,itmustbeborne

inmindthatCubainsomanywaysisadifferentcasefromcountrieswheresuch

transitionshavetakenplace.In2003,theHumboldtUniversityconvenedaconferencein

Berlintodiscussexactlythat,resultinginahighlyinterestingbook(Hoffmannand

Whitehead2007).Oneoftheeditors,LaurenceWhitehead,gothroughsomeofthe

particularitiesinCubanhistory:

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• ThedelayedindependencecomparedtotheotherSpanishcolonies;

• Thedifferencefromtheothertwoexceptionsofearly19thcenturyindependence

fromSpain(PuertoRicoandthePhilippines)inthattheyweresimplytransferred

toUScolonialpossessionwhileCubagainedsomekindofsemi-independence;

• TheveryexperienceofCubaasthe“PlattAmendmentRepublic”undera

permanentthreatofUSinterventionagainstany‘unfriendly’act;

• TheSergeants’Revolt(ledbyBatista)in1933withalowerlevelmilitary

leadershipthanknownanywhereelse;

• Themultipartydemocracywitharelativelyprogressiveconstitution(of1940)

verysoonoverranbyanexceptionallyviolentandcorruptpoliticalsystem;

• The1959revolutionitselfasaremarkablehistoricevent;

• Cubaastheonlycommunist-ruledcountrywherethepreviouslyexistinglocal

CommunistParty—alongwiththeSovietUnion—playednoleadingroleinthe

seizureofpower;

• Perhapstheonlycommunist-ruledcountrywheretheclasswarwasbasically

solvedbyawholesaleexpulsionofthepropertiedclasstoaneighbourcountry,

leavingitlargelyintactasanexilepoliticaloppositionsupportedbythe

governmentofthatcountrywhichhappenedtobethestrongestmilitarypower

onearth;

• CubaisalsotheonlySovietbloccountrytohaveremainedunderthesame

leadershipandsystemofgovernmentasbeforethefalloftheBerlinwall;

• Cubaisalsotheonlysurvivingcommunist-ruledcountry(apartfromNorth

Korea)whereprivateownershipandthemarketuntilrecentlyremained

essentiallysuppressedbytheauthorities.

Thequestionraisedinthisbook—appearingrightbeforetheRaúlCastroerastudied

here—istherefore:doesitmakesensetosupposethatwithallthisexceptionalism,Cuba

canreadilyreverttonormalpatternsofpoliticsanytimesoon?Thequestionisstill

highlyrelevant,andonethatshouldbekeptconstantlyinmindwhenanalysingthe

Cubanchangeprocessinacomparativeperspective.

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4.14.2. Cuba´s ‘democratic birth defect’

WhenconsideringCuba´sdevelopmentoptions,andparticularlyapossibledemocratic

transition,itisunavoidabletoconsiderthecountry´sheavyhistoricalanti-democratic

burden.

FranciscoFukuyama(2014)usestheterm‘birthdefect’todescribetheoddsagainst

democraticdevelopment.Specifically,intermsofruleoflawandaccountability,inthe

SpanishandPortugueseAmericas,heclaimsthattheauthoritarianandilliberal

characteroftheirpoliticalinstitutionsgobacktotheslavery-plantationandmining

economiesoftheircolonialandevenpost-colonialhistory.Ashesays,withparticular

relevanceforCuba:“Sugardiffersfromstaplecropslikewheatorcornbecauseitisnot

suitableforfamilyfarming.Familiescannotliveonsugar;itispurelyanexportproduct”

(p.245).Slavery,ofcourse,asitpredominatedinCubauntilitwasabandonedthere

afterallothercountriesexceptforBrazil(1886and1888,respectively),lefta

particularlyheavyburdenonsocialandpoliticalpatternsofdomination.79The

monoculturedominanceofsugarwasextreme,withsugarrepresentingbetween80and

90%ofthecountry´sexportvalueaslateas1950.

Thecolonialheritageisnotjustlimitedtoslavery.TheSpanishandPortugueseimposed

theirauthoritarianandmercantilistinstitutionsontheircoloniesbutalsoreproduced

theextremelyunequalclassstructuresandauthoritarianstatesystemthatexistedat

home.TheymanagedtotransferthislegacytothelocalelitesinLatinAmerica,even

aftertheformalindependenceinthe1820s(whichtookanother75yearstomaterialise

inCuba).TheideasofEnlightenmentthatweresodecisiveindemocratisingother

Europeancountriesparticularlyfurthertothenorth,wereinspirationsforsomeofthe

LatinAmericanindependenceleaderslikeBolívar,buttheynevertookrootamongthe

Creolepopulationofthecontinent.InthewordsofFukuyama(2014:256):“Economic

eliteswereabletodominatenominallydemocraticpoliticalsystemstomaintaintheir

socialstatus,therebyblockingmoredemocraticaccesstoeconomicopportunities”.

AnotheraspectoftheoldSpanishregimewasacentralisedandauthoritarianbut

79AcemogluandRobinson(op.cit:79;81)usesthesugarplantationandslaveeconomyinBarbadosasaprototypicalexampleofwhattheycall”extractiveinstitutions”.

108

relativelyweakstate,unabletoregulateitsownelites.NewindependentLatinAmerican

stateswereunabletoestablishanyrealtax-basedstatecapacitythroughouttheir

territories,aproblemseeneventilltoday.Thisisactuallyoneofthebigdifferences

whencomparingCubandevelopmentprospectstoChinaandVietnam.

Cuba,wheretheSpaniardsmanagedtopostponeindependencefor75yearsmorethan

ontheLatinAmericancontinent,wasoneofthecountriesmostaffectedbythis

structure.DeeperstructuralchangewaspartlyheldbackwhentheUS—dominatedby

theeconomicinterestsofsouthernstateswithsimilarplantationeconomies—took

controloverthecountryafterthedefeatoftheSpaniards.TheUSmadeveryfewefforts

tothrowoffthehistoricalburden.The‘PlattAmendmentConstitution’andthepeculiar

politicalsystemitledto,oftenreferredtoas‘thesemi-independence’(or‘semi-

republic’),arejustpoliticalreflectionsoftheseeconomicrelationsofdependence.

InCuba´spre-revolutionaryhistory,though,therewasaperiodofquitesignificant

democraticinstitutionsandprocesses,basedonthe1940Constitution.Thefollowing

aresomeofthemostrelevantaspectsofthisConstitution,passedbyapopularlyand

democraticallyelectedConstituentAssemblywheretheCommunistParty(calledPURC

atthetime)wasthefourthmostvoted:

• Rejectionofalldiscriminationbasedonrace,colour,sex,classorothercriteria;

• IntroductionofaSemi-Parliamentariansystemofgovernment,bycreatinga

positionasPrimeMinisterappointedbythePresident,andafulldivisionof

powersbetweentheExecutive,theLegislative(consistingofSenateandHouseof

Representatives)andtheJudicialbranchesofgovernment;

• Establishmentofadirectpopularvoteforallelectedpositions,throughuniversal

andcompulsorysuffrageforallcitizens(menandwomen)above20years;

• Prohibitionofpresidentialre-electionforthefirsteightyearsafterfinishinga

presidentialmandate(offouryears);

• Maintenanceofthefreedomofcult,withoutotherlimitationthan“therespectfor

Christianmoralityandpublicorder”;

• Recognitionoftherighttofreeexpressionandassociation,withthequitevague

qualificationthat“thecreationandexistenceofpoliticalorganisationscontrary

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totheRepublic´sdemocraticrepresentativeformofgovernment”wouldbe

consideredasillegal;

• MaintenanceoffreeprimaryeducationprovidedbytheState,tobeconsideredas

secular,withaccesstoofferprivateeducationandestablishprivateuniversities;

• Establishmentofimportantanti-corruptionandcountervailinginstitutionslike

TribunaldeCuentasandaTribunalforConstitutionalandSocialGuarantees;

• Prohibitionofworkerlayoffswithoutpriorexplanationofcauses,introductionof

minimumsalary,eight-hourslimitsonworkinghours,righttopaidvacationand

workermaternityleave,prohibitionofnon-monetarypayment;

• Recognitionofthesocialfunctionofprivateproperty,whichshouldberespected

andprotected,whilelatifundio(large-scale)propertieswereoutlawed.80

ThiswasaConstitutionbasedontheprinciplesofliberaldemocracyandawelfarestate,

internationallyconsideredasquiteadvancedatthetime.Theproblem,however,was

thatlargepartsofitsimplementationdependedonspecificlegislationthatforthemost

partwasneverapproved,andpresidentstoalargeextentwerelefttogovernbydecree.

Duringthefollowingtwelveyears(from1940untiltheBatistamilitarycoupin1952),

Cubalivedunderaformalconstitutionaldemocracybasedontheabove-mentioned

principles,withBatistaasthefirstconstitutionallyelectedpresident(1940-1944).

SubsequentPresidentsandlegislatorsweremostlyelectedonquiteadvancedreformist

programs.However,corruptionsoongrewtoenormousproportions,andpolitical

gangsterismcametograduallydominatethepoliticalcultureofthecountry.

DuringtheSecondWorldWarCubaoffereditsfullsupporttotheUSAandtheother

alliedcountries.PresidentRoosevelt´s‘GoodNeighborPolicy’wasseenbymanyasthe

firstabandonmentofUSimperialismagainstCuba—inaccordancewiththefactthatthe

1940ConstitutionformallyeliminatedthePlattAmendment.AstheendofWWIIlaid

waytotheColdWarandgiventhewell-organisedandunionisedworkingclasswitha

strongCommunistpresenceinCuba,thecountrybecameaprimevictimofUS-ledanti-

Communism.ThiswassoinspiteofthefactthatCommunistunionleadersactually

playedaquiteactiveroleinnegotiationsofcrucialeconomicimportanceforCubae.g.

80BasedonsummaryinLópezCiveiraet.al.,2012.Fulltextofthe1940ConstitutionisavailableinPichardo,1980,TomoIV,segundaparte,pp.329-418.

110

regardingsugarquotas.

Thementionedpoliticalgangsterismthatemergedwasparticularlydirectedagainstthe

politicalleft,andanumberofprominentCommunistandunionleaderswerekilled.The

popularcredibilityofdemocraticinstitutionssoonstartedtodisappear.Avery

importantsymbolicexpressionofthiswaswhenSenatorEduardoChibás,acharismatic

andoutspokenleaderoftheso-calledOrthodoxParty,committedsuicideduringalive

radiospeechin1951.Chibáswasclearlyleadingtheopinionpollsinfrontofthe1952

elections,andhissuicidecameasadesperateactofrejectionofhowthedemocratic

principlesofthe1940Constitutionhadbeenignored.This,inmanyways,becamethe

preludetotheBatistacoupin1952,whichagaindetonatedthedecisionbyFidelCastro

andhiscomradestotakeuparmsagainsttheBatistaregime.Batista,ofcourse,opened

thedoorsfurthertotheUSmafia;corruptionandpoliticalviolencereachednew

proportions,whilethearmedstrugglegotunderway.

ThiswasthecontextinwhichtheCubanrevolutiontookplace,notleavingthe

revolutionarygenerationwithmuchillusionabouttheidealsofliberaldemocracy.81

Lookingahead,however,itisimportanttobearinmindthatCuba—despiteits

democraticbirthdefects—hasahistoricexperienceofformalliberaldemocracy.

4.15. Theoretical considerations about post-Castro legitimacy

Thewholeissueofwhatlegitimacyapost-Castroregimewillenjoyiscrucialforthis

study.Asoutlinedunderthediscussionofneo-patrimonialism(ref.3.9.1),MaxWeber,

theclassicalsourceinthediscussionoflegitimacy,distinguishedbetweenthreetypesof

legitimateauthority:bureaucratic-rationalauthority,traditionalauthorityand

charismaticauthority.Hedefinedthelatteras“restingondevotiontothespecificand

exceptionalsanctity,heroismorexemplarycharacterofanindividualperson,andof

normativepatternsrevealedorordainedbyhim”.Thecharismaticleader,hewentonto

say,“issetapartfromordinarymenandtreatedasendowedwithsupernatural,

superhuman,oratleastspecificallyexceptionalpowersorqualities”(Weber1968:46;

81SeeSzulc1986,andThomas1971,forgooddiscussionsofthehistoricalcontext.

111

48).82

Weberwasparticularlyconcernedwiththeobviousproblemofsuccessioninsituations

ofcharismaticleadership,inawaythatwemaytakedirectlytothepresentCuban

situation.Fidelhaditall:aheroicguerrillaleaderturnedcommander-in-chief;his

leadershipbymoralexample;hisoratoricalskillsanduniquecapacitytocommunicate

withthemasses,playingonquasi-religiousovertones.Moreover,hehadadiscretionary

andimprovisedleadershipstyle;thedramaticredistributiveandrevolutionaryreforms

thathepersonallyimplementedaftertherevolution,representinganalmostcomplete

breakwiththepast.

AnundisputedauthorityonthestudyoftheCubanrevolution,JorgeI.Dominguez,

excludespartsofthesequalitiesfromthepurecharismaticauthoritywhenheclaims

thatcharismaisbutoneoffoursourcesoflegitimacyintheCubanrevolution,alongwith

politicaldeliverance,distributionalperformance,andnationalism(Dominguez

1978:201).Anotherquestiontokeepinmindishowmuchofthesesourceswillbe

survivingintothepost-Castroera.

Aspecialsubjecttodiscussinrelationtothetransformationparadigmisthemovefrom

charismatictoinstitutionalauthority,upagainstmorepurelyauthoritarian/military

leadership(fromFideltoRaúlandsubsequentlytothepost-Castroera).Avery

interestingdiscussionofthisisfoundinHoffmann2006,ref.alsoValdes,2004.Asthey

pointout,FidelCastronodoubtrepresentedoneofthestrongestexamplesof

charismaticauthorityinanycountryinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Atleast

toacertainextent,Raúlhasbenefitedfromthesameauthority,althoughhislevelof

charismaissubstantiallyless.Whenthepost-Castrogenerationisabouttotakecharge

ofthecountryafter2018,itmaybeupagainstaseriouslegitimacycrisisunlessdeep

economicandpoliticalreformsleadingtosocio-economicprogressforthemajorities

takeplace.

RelatedtoSaxonberg´sdiscussionofnegotiationprospectsinamaturingpost-

82WeberusestheGermanconceptofHerrschaft,beingtranslatedquiteimpreciselytoEnglishasáuthority´.

112

totalitarianregime,onecouldimaginetheemergenceofabroadreformcoalition.The

prospectsforthis,however,haveagainbeendiminishedbyPresidentTrump´shelpto

reinstatetheenemyimagethatwasevaporatingunderObama—totheextentthatthe

liftingoftheUSembargobecamearealisticpotentialoption.83Butabruptchangesmay

alsotakethecountryincompletelydifferentdirections.ThecaseofAngola,wellknown

topartsoftheCubannomenclatureandnotleastthemilitaryelite,showedthatitmay

berelativelyeasytochangefromaMarxist-Leninistorientedcentralpoliticalcommand

tocronycapitalismasamethodofextraction.InthecaseofCuba,ofcourse,thereisa

muchmoresolidstateapparatusinplaceanditdoesnotpossesstheoilordiamond

revenuessoeasilyavailableforrent-seekingastheAngolannomenclaturehad.

Inthisdiscussionofthelegitimacycrisisloominginapost-CastroCuba,itisvery

temptingtobringinsomeconsiderationsbasedonAntonioGramsci´stheoriesof

hegemony,hegemoniccrisesandthepossibleconstructionofcounter-hegemony

(Gramsci1971;ref.alsoAnderson1976).ThisGramscianterminologywasofcourse

developedwithaviewtoanalyseconditionsforapost-capitalisteconomicandpolitical

order.InCuba,thequestiontodayseemstobemorewhetherthehegemonyofthe

revolutionarymovement,expressedprincipallythroughtheCommunistParty,isinsuch

adeepcrisisthatitwillhaveseriousdifficultiessurviving—atleastwithoutrelyingon

muchmorerepressivemethods.BorrowinganothertermfromGramsci,thereisno

doubtthattheCubanrevolutionhasexercisedmuchofitsinfluenceonthepopulation

throughitsculturalhegemony.UnderthedominationoftheCommunistParty

nomenclature,therehasbeenacombinationofintellectualandmoralleadership,based

onavarietyofsocialforcesunitedinahistoricbloc.Suchleadershipisnomorepresent.

A‘crisisofhegemony’,orof‘authority’,isverymuchthesamephenomenonasthe

looming‘crisisoflegitimacy’inCuba,althoughthedominantsocialandclassforcesmay

beverydifferentfromwhatGramscihadinmind.Yet,thealternativeGramscian

conceptsofapassiverevolutionvs.thecreationofacounter-hegemonicblocmaystillbe

ofrelevance.Intheformer,thebourgeoisie(ornomenclatureintheCubancase)would

allowcertaindemandsbygoingbeyonditseconomic-politicalinterestsandthus 83Adifferentoutcomeofthe2016elections,withHillaryClintonpromisingtomakealleffortstoeliminatetheembargo,togetherwithastrongerDemocraticpresenceinCongress,couldactuallyhaveledtotheliftingoftheembargo.

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allowingtheformsofhegemonytochange(typicallyinthewaytheNordicmodelwas

conceivedinthe1930s).ThiswouldimplythattheCubanpowerelitemighthavetolook

forasimilaradaptationofitshegemonicblocinordertomeettheemerginglegitimacy

crisis,particularlyafter2018-2021.Thealternativemightwellbethatadeeporganic

crisiswilltemptnewsocialforcestostartbuildingacounter-hegemonichistoricalbloc

aimingatsomekindofpost-socialism,ratherthan‘restoringtheold’throughapassive

revolution(ref.furtherdiscussionaboutthisinChapter11).

ItmayverywellbethattheuseofanalytictoolsadaptedfromtheMarxistclassic

Gramsci,mighthelpusunderstandoneofthemostintriguingchallengesinCubainthe

comingyears(ref.alsowhatwassaidin4.4.6onthedecisiveimportanceofdeveloping

ananti-hegemonicblocincivilsociety,withreferencetoPrzeworski).

Theroleofthemilitaryisakeyfactortotakeintoconsiderationhere.AlfredStepan

(1988)offersaclassicaldiscussiononthisinitsLatin-Americancontext,butitmust

neverbeunderemphasisedhowdifferentthehistoryofCuba´sarmedforcesis(ref.

Klepak2012).Theconceptof‘militaryprerogatives’maystillbevalidthough;giventhe

keyrolethemilitary-ownedcorporationsplayinthecountry’seconomy.

4.16. How and where does the theoretical-empirical literature fit into our

“roadmap”?

Weshalltrytosummarisehowwemayfittheliteraturewehavebeengoingthrough

hereintoourroadmap(Ref.Figure2.1):

Route1(economicsonly—fromctob):thiscorrespondstowhatwehavecalledsocialist

neo-patrimonialismorauthoritarianmarketeconomywithChinaandVietnamas

empiricalcases.SinceChinaandVietnamarewidelyperceivedbyCubanleadersto

representasuccessfulinspirationforitsownreforms,wehavemadeanefforttryingto

understandtheprocessinthesetwoAsiancountriesandmakecomparisonstowhatis

goingoninCuba.ThisisclearlytherouteattemptedbyCubaunderRaúl,althoughhis

economicreformsstoppedfarshortofthetwoAsiancases.

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Route2(economicsleadingtopolitics—fromctobandfurthertowardsa):Theliberal

theoriesthathavedominatedthetransitionliteratureduringalmosttwogenerations,

startingwithLipset(1960)andhismodernizationtheory,toalargeextentbelonghere:

claimingastrongcausalrelationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopment(forLipset

equivalenttocapitalism)anddemocracy.Mostofthelatertransitionanalystswould

ratherfallinacombinationofRoutes2and4(seelater).

Thediscussionaboutearlywinnersandearlylosers,andthenewstrugglesinevitably

createdaboutthedirectionofatransformationprocessliketheonegoingoninCuba,is

alsopartofRoute2.Hellmann(1998)andFrye(2007)provideinterestingexperiences

fromotherprocessesthatmayhelpunderstandhowdifferentactorswithpartly

contradictorysocio-economicstakesintheCubanreformsmaybepositioning

themselvespolitically,andwhichimpactthismayhaveaspushversuspullfactorsalong

thisroute.

Route3(politicsonly—fromctodwithoutcontinuingtoa):Inourliteraturestudy,we

don´tfindanyreallyvisibletraceofthispath.

Route4(Politicsleadingtoeconomics—fromctodandfurthertowardsa):Kornai

(1992)istheclearestexpressionofthisroute.Inhisstudyoftransitionfrom

communism,heclaimsthatpolitical-ideologicalchangesspilledovertoeconomic

changes—toalargeextentcontrarytotheunderlyinghypothesisofourstudy.Kornai

hasdevelopedaseriesofcriteriabothforpoliticalandeconomicreformthatconstitute

averyvaluablereferencefortheinterpretationoftheCubanprocess,wherethereseems

tohavebeenamajorconcerntoavoidglasnostasalogicalfollow-uptoperestroika,and

wherethelessonsaboutwhatledtothefalloftheUSSRhaveprobablybeenstudiedat

depth.

WewouldprobablyalsoputPrzeworski(1991)alongRoute4.Hisobservationsfrom

transformationprocessesbothinEasternEuropeandLatinAmericaareofcoursehighly

relevantforCuba.HecomesclosetoGramsci´sconceptofhegemonyandpossible

organizationofcounter-hegemony.ItisinterestingtousesuchMarxisttermsina

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countrylikeCuba,where—asitisarguedinthisstudy—thedismantlingofLeninismwill

beaprerequisiteforthedevelopmentofamoredemocraticformofsocialism.Wewill

particularlymakeuseofPrzeworski´sapproachtodiscusspossiblenegotiationoptions

ifapossiblecrisisofhegemonyweretoemerge.

ConsiderationsonthebasisofHirschman’sclassicaldiscussionof“exit”vs.“voice”

(Hirschman1970),areimportantpartsoftheassessmentofpopularreactionstothe

Cubantransformation.Sincethereareseveralhistoric-culturalfactorsworkingagainst

anytransitiontoliberaldemocracyinCuba,wehaveintroducedtheFukuyama(2014)

conceptof“democraticbirthdefects”anddiscussedhowmuchweightthisconcepthas

whenconsideringthefutureofthecountry.

Evenourdiscussionofdeliberativeandconsensusdemocracywouldpossiblybelongin

thiscategory.

Route5(Fasttrackfromexclusivenesstoinclusiveness—directlyfromctoa),is

probablywhatliberaldemocraticoptimismafterthefalloftheUSSRandtheCommunist

Blocwasprescribingatitsclimax.Huntington(1991)comingbacktolaunchhisthesisof

the“ThirdWaveofDemocracy”,andFukuyama1.0(1989)predictingthatthehistoryof

ideologicalevolutionhadreacheditsend-pointthroughtheuniversalizationofWestern

liberaldemocracy,canbeseenasexamplesofthis.Today,25yearslater,suchclaims

havedisappeared.Theentiredemocratictransitionparadigmisnowindeepcrisis,with

“post-liberalism”(ref.Gray1993and2016)representingsomekindofaretreatalong

thesameRoute.Thisisseeminglyamorerelevantcharacteristicofthepresentglobal

trendswithinwhichCubaissearchingforitsnewdevelopmentidentity.

OfficialUSCubapolicypriortoObama,whatwehavecalledPlattism,meaningregime

changethroughdemocracyimposedfromoutside,clearlyhasthischaracteristicofafast

directtracktowhatAcemogluandRobinsonwouldcalleconomicandpolitical

inclusiveness.AsarguedinthisChapter,theoutcomehas,inreality,rathertendedtobe

thecontrary:fullcollapse.

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Route6(Statefailureorcollapse):ThisisacrucialelementofAcemogluandRobinson,

andeventhetitleoftheir2012classic.SinceRaúlCastrohimselfhasclaimedthatthe

Cubaneconomyfindsitselfonthe“borderoftheabyss”,wecannotavoiddiscussingthe

disasterscenarioofafailingstate.Fukuyama(2014)alsotouchesuponthispossibility.

However,wehavetolooktoadapttheideal-typicalcategoriesofthe“roadmap”inorder

togetclosertoamoreaccuratecharacterizationofsomeofthecontributionsinthis

chapter.ThecombinationofRoutes2and4—aconstantexchangebetweenpoliticaland

economictransformations,isprobablytheonlyfaircharacteristicwecangiveofmany

ofthetheoreticalcontributionswehavediscussed:LinzandStepan,Haggardand

Kaufman,Brown,Saxonberg.ThelaterFukuyama(whatwemaycallFukuyama2.0in

histwo-volumemacro-historicalstudy(2011and2014)withhismetaphor“gettingto

Denmark”hasprescribedaparalleljourneyalongthesetworoutes.Assuch,healso

providesaninroadtodiscussrelevantScandinavianexperiences.Inthesameway,the

advocatesoftheNordicmodelbelonghere,emphasizingtheconstantinteraction

betweeneconomicsandpoliticsandtheroleofthedifferentsocialactorsthroughwhat

hasbeenlabelled“transformativedemocraticpolitics”(TörnquistandHarris201684).

Theeconomistsinthistradition(Moeneet.al)emphasizeeconomicsfirst,whilethe

politicalscientists(Törnquistet.al)arenaturallymoreinterestedinthepolitical

dimension.Butbothareclearlyawareofthemutualspillovereffects.Someofthe

variablesdevelopedinthesestudiesarealsousedasareferenceforthediscussionof

whichparadigmaticchoicesthenextgenerationofCubanleaderswillhavetomakein

theyearstocome,andhowthismayindicatethedirectionofCubandevelopment

betweenmoreorlessdemocraticorauthoritarianalternatives.Again,aparallelfocuson

routes2and4willbecrucial.

Thegeneralconsensusamongdemocracytheoriststhattheworldisnowcharacterized

bydemocraticfatigueisalsobasedonacombinationofthesetworoutes.Theemphasis

ofthelatterishoweverondemocraticandtoacertainextentmarketregression,

meaningmoreorlessabortedjourneystowardsinclusiveness.

84SelectedchaptersofthisbookhavebeentranslatedtoSpanishforspecialstudybyCubanintellectualsthroughtheSUMprojectcoordinatedbytheauthorandpublishedbycubaposible.com.

117

Thediscussionofthepost-Castrolegitimacychallengemustalsobeunderstoodas

interplaybetweenRoutes2and4.WegobacktoMaxWeber´sdiscussionoflegitimacy

(1968),distinguishingbetweenvarioustypesoflegitimateauthority.WhileFidelCastro

representedoneofthestrongestexamplesofcharismaticauthority,Raúlforlackofhis

brother´scharisma—butstillbenefittingfromhisroleintherevolution—hasdepended

moreonthebureaucratic-rationalauthority.Withoutadramaticimprovementofthe

country´seconomyandsocialsustainability,thecomingleaderswillbeupagainsta

seriouslegitimacycrisis.Thiswouldmakeitverydifficulttoachievepragmatic

acceptanceforastatusquosituation,perhapsevenencounteringacrisisofhegemonyin

theGramscianterm.Thisdiscussionwillbedecisivefortheunderstandingofprobable

post-CastroCubanscenarios.

Theoligarchicneo-patrimonialismwehavediscussed,withtherelevantexamplesof

AngolaandRussia,whereprivatisationofstatepropertytookplacethroughwhathas

beencalledstatecapture,mayalsobeunderstoodasabortedjourneysalongthe

combinationofRoutes2and4.AttemptstothrowoffLeninismandstate-runeconomies

haveresultedinsystemicpoliticalcorruptioninwhichstate,militaryandparty

nomenclatureusedtheirinfluenceovergovernmentofficialstoappropriategovernment

decision-makinginordertostrengthentheirowneconomicpositions.Thesegroups

wouldlaterbecomeknownasoligarchs(ref.WorldBank2000;Frieland2000).Wewill

beontheoutlookforanyindicationofrent-seekingandnomenclatureenrichmentin

Cuba.

4.17. The overarching issues of the study

Withthehelpofthesetheoreticalandempirical-comparativetools,wecannowoutline

theoverarchingissuesweintendtostudy.

Afirstfocusofthestudyisinwhatwaytheeconomicreformsareleadingtoan

increasingspaceforthenon-stateeconomy,mostlyonthebasisofthegrowingnumberof

self-employedworkerscarefullyopeningupasmallentrepreneurialsector.Thisalso

includesthepeculiarprocessofprivatisationinagriculture,andthenewcooperative

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sectorbothinsideandoutsideofagriculture.Wewillbeassessingtheriseoftheprivate

sector,possiblejointprivate/publicownership,andtheleasingofstateproperty.

Acloselyrelatedapproachwillbewhetherwecanseetheemergenceofaninstitutional

infrastructurethatcanfacilitatethegrowthofalegalandefficientmarketeconomy—

whichthusmayputupseriouscompetitionwithpartsofthestateeconomy.

Wewillalsokeepaneyeonthecountry´seconomicandsocialperformance,assessedup

againstthewayeconomicandsocialproblems:howitcontributedtotheunderminingof

theUSSR,andhow,inChinaandVietnam,economicsuccessandsocialimprovement

andmobilityforthemajorityofthepopulationprovidetheregimeswithconsiderable

continuedlegitimacy(pragmaticacceptance).

Relatedtotheexpectedandnecessarygrowthoftheprivateeconomyisthequestionof

howtheofficialideologyisadaptedtothechangingstate/non-statedivisionofworkand

correlationofforce,andhowthebureaucracyisreacting.ThisquestioniswhatLinzand

Stepanrefertoastheemergenceofa‘usablestatebureaucracy’,andittouchesupontwo

ofKornai´stransitiondilemmas:theideologicalresistanceinpartyandstate

nomenclatureandbureaucracyagainstthegrowingprivatesector,andtheincoherence

ofthepartialreform.Bythishereferstohowthelogicofincreasinglydeepeningreform,

andthespeedofitsintroduction,tendtounderminetheentiresystem.Thatmaybethe

motivationbehindRaúlCastro´sreformrecipe:“sinprisaperosinpausa”;“withouthurry

butwithoutpause”—thewisdomoftheturtle.Hereitalsobecomesimportanttodiscuss

theequivalentsofthetwoGorbachevconceptsofperestroikaandglasnost,andhowthey

havebeenadaptedandimplementedinChina,VietnamandCubacomparedtotheirfatal

roleinthedownfalloftheUSSR.

Aspecificpartofthestudywillbededicatedtothestudyofpost-totalitarianism,andthe

dilemmasofincreasingfreedomsandpluralismthatareexpectedtoemergeduringthis

phase.BuildingonArchieBrown,weareparticularlyinterestedintheeffectofgreater

accesstotravelandinformation(withinternetasadecisivefactor);wewanttoassess

theroleofintellectualsandacademics;andwatchpossibleinternalleadership

disagreementsorevenfissures.Thelatteraspect,alsoapossiblesourceofmorereform,

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isparticularlyimportantduringthelargegenerationalchangeexpectedtocharacterise

the2018-2021period.Adifferencebetweencivilianandmilitaryleadersandeven

militarywithpredominantlymanagerialversussecurityfunctionswillbeadditional

factorstowatch.Theultimatepoliticaltransformationquestioniswhethertheparty´s

powermonopolystartslooseningup.Thediscussionofpossibleoutcomesofpost-

totalitarianismwillbeguidedbyLinzandStepan´sandpartlySaxonberg´sattemptsto

theoriseaboutit.

WebasethetransformationscenariosagainstthebackdropofexperiencesinChinaand

Vietnam,whereparticularlythelattercountryisseenasarolemodelbyleadingCuban

officials.AmongtheaspectstoconsiderwillbewhetherCubawillpermitmore

decentralisation,whichplayedsuchanimportantroleforeconomicandpartlypolitical

innovationinthetwoAsiancountries.Further,whatcomplaintsandco-optation

mechanismswillbeputinplaceifthereismoresocialprotestwhichmaybeexpectedin

asocietywithmoresocio-economicandpoliticaldifferentiation(ref.theChinese

contentiousbargainingmechanism).Andwewillobservewhethermorelarge-scale

privateeconomicinitiativeandenrichmentwillbepermittedwiththenomenclature

forgingclosealliancesandcommoninterestswiththeentrepreneursleadingtoa

blendingofstateandnon-stateeconomicinterests,perhapswiththemilitary

corporationsasintermediaries.Thisiswhatcouldturnthecountryintowhatwehave

labelledsocialistneo-patrimonialism(authoritarianmarketeconomy)asweknowitfrom

ChinaandVietnam,oroligarchicneo-patrimonialism,followingtheexamplesofRussia

orAngola.Themostfundamentalquestioniswhetheritwillbepossibletomaintaina

monolithicpowerstructureifmoremarketeconomyisallowed,giventhehistoricand

culturaldifferencescomparedtoChinaandVietnam.

Analternativevisionofpoliticisingdemocracy,perhapsbuiltonrecentexperiencesfrom

someLatinAmericancountriesorevenelementsfromtheNordicModeldatingbackto

thecrisisofthe1930s,willalsobediscussed,althoughitsapplicationtoapost-

totalitarianregimemaybeoflimitedrelevance.Perhapstheincreasinglyauthoritarian

aspectsofleft-leaningLatinAmericanregimesappealmoretoCubanleadersthanthe

strongpopularmobilisationthatinmanycasesbroughtthemtopower.Still,

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experimentingwithnewformsofmoreautonomouscooperativesmaybeaninteresting

processtoobserveinthisconnection.

Theinternationalcontextwaschangingasaconsequenceofthenormalisationprocess

withtheUS.ThisfactorhasmostlybeenreversedbyPresidentTrump.TheSoviet

experience,thattheeasingoftheColdWarandreducedtensionswiththeWestledtoa

weakeningoftherepressionapparatusandarapidlydeclininganti-reforminfluenceof

theconservatives,iswellworthnoticing.TheissueinCubaiswhetherordinarypeople

stillbelieveinthenarrativeoftheUSrepresentinganexistentialenemy,justifyingthe

continuationofauthoritarianandanti-liberalpractices.

Thistakesusrighttothedecisivequestionofhowthepost-Castrogenerationofleaders

willsolvethelegitimacychallengethey,withallprobability,willbeconfrontedwith

whenthehistoricandcharismaticelementshavedisappeared.Theylacktheeconomic

andsocialprogressthathashelpedtheChineseandVietnameseregimesenjoyrenewed

legitimacy.TheUSenemyimagethatpreviouslycouldabsorbtheblameforalmostany

probleminCubacouldbehardtoreconstructevenwithDonaldTrumpintheWhite

House.

Aspecificareaofinterestinthenon-statesectorinstitutionalisationisthequestionof

whether,andtowhatdegree,horizontalinterestorganisationsareemerging.Thiswould

bealogicalconsequenceofperceivedcommoninterestsamongprivateentrepreneurs

andtheirneedforaproperrepresentationchannelvis-à-visthestate.Autonomous

interestorganisationhasconsistentlybeenimpededbytheregime,forfearoflosing

politicalcontrol.AsarguedbyLinzandStepansuchorganisationcouldhaveastrong

spillovereffecttothestrengthofcivilsocietyandevenpoliticalsociety.But,aswewill

show,thereisstrongreservationamongtheemergingentrepreneurstoorganiseand

thusbecomemorevisible,forfearofexposingthemselvestostateintervention,notleast

becausetheyareobligedtooperatelargelybeyondlegallimits.Thisraisesthequestion

ofwhetherprivateentrepreneursgraduallywillchangefromexittovoice,i.e.from

withdrawaltoengagementintheirrelationtogovernmentandthepoliticalarena.

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Inthenextchaptertheseissueswillbespelledoutinanumberoftransformative

challenges,hypothesesandindicators,wherecorrelationbetweenthedifferentroutes

drawnupinFigure2.1anddiscussedtheoreticallyinthisChapterwillbetestedin

practice.

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Chapter 5: Transformative challenges, hypotheses and indicators

5.1. The meeting of the practical reform agenda and the transition literature

Wewillinthischapterformulateaseriesofhypothesesaboutninecrucialchallengeswe

mayanticipateintheCubantransformationprocessduringthe2008-2018period.On

thatbasis,wewillorganisetheempiricaldiscussion,dividedbetweenthreeevolving

arenas:theeconomicarena,theinternationalarenaandthepoliticalarena.

Whiletheexplicitreformagendaformsthebasisformostoftheeconomicchallenges(1,

2and3)andalsopartlytheinternationalchallenges(No.5),thetheoretical-empirical

discussiondrawnupinChapter3willhelpusformulatechallengesandhypotheses

aboutthepotentialpoliticaltransformativeeffectsandimpactofthereforms(challenges

4and6-9).

Regardingtheevolvingeconomicarena(Chapter6),thetheoreticalconsiderationsare

particularlyrelevantforobservingwhetheragrowingmarketeconomywillprovide

non-stateactorswithmoreautonomy,andperhapsevenacountervailingeconomic

powerthatmayeventuallychallengethepoliticalpowermonopoly.InChallenge4

(Chapter7),wegorightintotheissueofpossiblepoliticalimplicationsofsocio-

economicchanges,drawingheavilyonthetheoreticalandempirical-comparative

discussion.

Thechallengeintheinternationalarena(Challenge5,Chapter8)—particularlycaused

byachangingrelationshiptotheUSA—willbetestedintermsofapossiblerelaxationof

authoritarian-repressivemeasuresandamorepragmaticforeignpolicy,ofaweakened

imperialistenemyimage.

Chapter9presentsadiscussionofpotentialtransformationsinthepoliticalarena.The

emergenceofamorepluralisticcivil,academicandmediasocietyispartlya

consequenceoftworeformmeasures:accesstocellphonesandtheInternet,andthe

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emigrationreform.Theemergenceofnewsocialspacesoutsideofstatecontrolisseen

asamajorgamechangerinthetransitionliteratureandinthestudyofpost-totalitarian

transformations.Thisisparticularlythecasewhenthereisacoincidenceofmore

autonomousnon-stateeconomicactorsandamorepoliticallyorientedcivilsociety.

Thetheorychapteralsohelpsusformulatehypothesesaboutthepossibleimpactsof

reformsontheexistingpowerstructure(Challenge7),aswellasonmovestowardsa

lessauthoritarianpoliticalsystem(Challenge8).Perhapsthegreatestofall,froma

politicalscienceperspectiveinCuba,istheneedforanewsourceoflegitimacyforthe

post-Castrogenerationofleaders(Challenge9).Thiswillalsobediscussedinthe

perspectiveoftheoreticalandcomparativeliterature.

ThestatusofthesetransformationstakingplaceduringtheRaúlCastroeraof

governmentwillbesummarisedinChapter10.Wewill,however,alsodiscusswhat

challengesthepost-Castrogenerationofleadersareleftwith,thelikelydilemmasduring

thecriticaljuncturestartingwiththeanticipated2018changeofguards(Chapter11),

directlyleadinguptothepotentialscenarioswewillbedrawingupforthisperiodwith

subsequentyears(Chapter12).

5.2. The three possible outcomes of the study

ThegeneralquestionweintendtodiscussinthisstudyiswhereCubahasbeenmoving

duringthe2008-2018period,withthreepossibleoutcomes:

1. Statusquo:Theprospectsofincreasingeconomicpluralismwillbeseenasa

threattotheverypoliticalpowermonopolyofthepresentpoliticalsystemin

Cuba.Thefearofthischainofeventsmayleadtoahaltinbotheconomicand

politicalreforms.IllustratedbyFigure2.1,thismeansthatCubawillbestuckin

cellc(exclusiveeconomicandpoliticalinstitutions).Theimplicationofthestatus

quooutcomeisthattheCubanreformprocesswillmostlybeaboutsurvival

withoutdevelopment.

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2. Economicchangespillingovertothepoliticalarena:Awideningofeconomic

pluralismmaybetakingplaceinsuchawaythatitwillleadtoincreasingpolitical

pluralismandde-concentrationofpower,andultimatelytoapolitical

transformationtolessauthoritarianandmoreparticipatoryformsofgovernment

(Route2;movementfromcellctocellb(moreinclusiveinstitutions),with

possiblemovementsfurtherontocella(whereeventhepoliticalinstitutions

becomegraduallymoreinclusive).

3. Politicalchangespillingovertotheeconomicarena:Analternativeoverall

movementmaybethatchangesinthepoliticalandpowerstructuremay

acceleratethespeedofeconomicreforms(Route4,wherepoliticalinstitutions

becomemoreinclusivebeforetheeconomicinstitutions,alsowithpossible

movementstowardcella).

Itisratherstraightforwardtoestablishthelinkbetweenthevariouschallengesandour

Politics–EconomicsCorrelationMatrix:

Challenges1,2and3(theevolutionoftheeconomicarena)belongtoRoute1or2

(Economicsfirstoreconomicsonly).

Challenge4(politicalimplicationsofsocio-economicchanges)isclearlyonRoute2

(Economicsfirst,leadingtopolitics).

Challenge5(internationalarena)isprobablyacombinationof2and4(mutualeffects

betweeneconomicandpoliticaltransformations),buttheexternaloriginofthis

challengemakesitalittlehardertolocalizeinourmatrix.

Challenges6,7,8and9(politicalarena)findthemselvesonRoutes3or4,dependingon

howmuchspillovertheyidentifyfrompoliticstoeconomics.Indicators9.3(reform

continuityornot)and9.4(newsourceoflegitimacy)alsohaveelementsbelongingto

Route2.

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ThePrincipaldilemmasduringthecriticaljuncture(Chapter11)belongtovarious

Routes,butingeneraltothemixtureof2and4.

5.3. The nine challenges with hypotheses and indicators

Foreachoftheninechallengesidentifiedhere,wewillformulateazerohypothesis(H0),

implyingstatusquowithnoorlimitedstructuralchange,andanalternativehypothesis

(H1),implyingstructuralchangewithpotentialtransformativeimpact.

Challenge1:Significantretreatofthestateintheagriculturalsectorasameasure

tomeetthemassiveneedforincreasedfoodproduction.

Insituationsofmajoreconomic-politicaltransformations,likewhatmanyexpectedwas

underwayinCubawhenRaúlCastrolaunchedhisreformagenda,whathappensinthe

agriculturesectorwillalwaysbeofprimordialimportancetowatch.Itisnotbychance

thatFukuyama(2011)considerstheroleoffarmersandpeasantsasdecisivein“theway

toDenmark”,hismetaphorforthetransformationtoliberaldemocracy.Itisinteresting

tocomparethistothewayProstermanprescribedthepromotionofself-owning

peasantryasthemosteffectivecounter-insurgencystrategyduringtheVietnamWar

(andlateralsotocountertheinsurgenceinElSalvador)(ProstermanandRiedinger

1987).WemaythenwatchhowthevictoriousVietnameseCommunistPartytoalarge

extentfollowedasimilarrecipeinthepost-wartransformationtoahighlysuccessful

privatisedagriculture.RightfromthebeginningoftheRaúlCastroera,wehaveseen

significantagriculturalreforms,butevenmoresoaconstanthesitanceandindecision,

zigzaggingbetweenpro-reformmeasuresandbacktracks.Theclearperceptionwhen

thereformerastartedwasthatthegovernment—andRaúlCastrohimself—understood

theneedforadeepstructuralpro-marketreforminagriculture.Thenationalleaders

were,however,unpreparedtofullyimplementitforfearoflettingloosemarketforces

thatalsomightthreatentheirpoliticalcontrol.Thissituationreflectsanon-goingpower

struggleabouttheverysouloftheRevolutionandthefutureofthecountry,between

opposingideologicalsectorsandperhapsbetweenthewinnersandlosersofreforms

beingputinplace.ItisafactthatsomeofthemainarchitectsoftheRevolution´sfirst

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importantpoliticalmeasure—theagrarianreformsof1959and1963—remainincrucial

decision-makingpositions.OneofthemisSecondSecretaryanddefactoCommunist

PartyCoordinatorMachadoVentura.Thestrategicdecisionwastoavoidcreatingaself-

owningfarmerclassthatmightunderminethecollectivevisionoftheRevolution(Szulc

1986:524).Thisrevolutionarycontinuityinspiredbythefirsttenyearsofthe100years

oldRussianRevolution,mayexplainthedie-hardattemptstoblockany‘kulakization’85

oftheCubanpeasantry.

HavingbeenconsideredasoneofthemainaimsoftheRevolutiontoleavebehindthe

foodimportdependency,thesituationwasthesameorworse55yearslater.The

predominantstatecontrolofproductionanddistributionoffoodproductshadleft

Cuba—acountrywithvastpotentialforagriculturalself-sufficiencyandexport—with

anacuteshortageoffoodproducts.Thecountrycannotaffordspendingcloseto2billion

USDannuallyonfoodimports,whilstonlyproducing20-30%ofitsownfood

consumption.AsarguedbyCubanagriculturaleconomistArmandoNovaandothers

(ref.NovaandGarcía2013):onlybyadmittingprivatepeasantsandfarmersautonomy

toproduceandcommercialisetheirproductswillagriculturalproductivityrise.This

argumenthasbeenconfirmedbycasesfromalargenumberofothercountries

attemptingstatecontroloftheagriculture(e.g.Nicaraguainthe1980s—seeBye

1990/1991).Agoodstateregulatorysystemcombinedwithindependentfarmers—

alternativelyorganisedincooperatives—tendtofacilitatesuchsuccess(ref.alsothe

experiencesfromtheScandinaviancountries,TörnquistandHarris2016).

InChina,the1986adoptionoftheso-calledGeneralPrinciplesofCivilLaw(GPCL)

regulatedtheusufruct(usage)rightsrightsandpractices(ref.Chapter4.9.4).

InVietnam,theDoiMoireformprogramme,rightfromthebeginning,abolished

agriculturalcollectives,removedpricecontrolsonagriculturalgoods,andenabled

farmerstoselltheirgoodsinthemarketplace.Vietnam'smajorbreakthroughin

agriculturecamein1989whenthecountryhadarecordoutputoffoodproduction. 85WecomebacktoStalin’swaronthekulaksinchapter6underchallenge1.Theconceptkulakwouldnormallymeanamiddle-sizefarmerorpeasant;afterthe1917RevolutionusedasadepreciatoryconceptforanypeasantwhoresistedhandingovertheirgraintodetachmentsfromMoscow.ThisgroupwasamongmaincontributorstotheNEPsuccess,untilStalinin1929initiatedhiscampaigntocollectivisethepeasantry,inwhatwascalledde-kulakization(Gregory2004).

127

Fromacountryfacingchronicfoodshortage,Vietnamsawastrongandfastgrowthin

agriculturalproductionandbecametheworld'ssecondlargestriceexporterafter

ensuringadequatesupplyfordomesticconsumption.Ruralpeople'slifehasconstantly

beenimproving.

Asaconsequenceofthesereforms,povertyfelldramaticallyinboththesesocialist

countriesduringthelatest25years,whiletherichestgrewevenricherandsocial

differentiationincreased.ChinanowboastsmorebillionairesthantheUS,andmanyof

themalsobelongtotheCommunistPartynomenclature.

Theseempiricalcasesbackedupbytheoreticalliterature,formthebackdropfor

studyingtheCubanapproachtoagriculturaldevelopmentandincreasedfood

production.

H1.0:Norealindependenceforindividualpeasantsandfarmers;continuedstatecontrolof

fooddistribution.

H1.1:Peasantsandfarmersgainingincreasingautonomy(transitiontofamilyfarming),

withgoodaccesstoimplementsandmarkets.

Indicatorstowatchregardingthischallenge:

• Indicator1.1:Movementfromstatetonon-statelandtenure?

• Indicator1.2:Generalautonomyandsovereigntyforpeasants/farmers?

• Indicator1.3:Fromstate-regulatedtomarket-basedcommercialisation?

• Indicator1.4:De-bureaucratisationofagriculture?

• Indicator1.5:Strengtheningoffamilyfarming?

• Indicator1.6:Sufficientfoodsupplytourbanareas,ataffordableprices?

• Indicator1.7:Reducedimportdependency?

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Challenge2:Looseningofstateeconomy—growthofnon-stateeconomy—aimingat

sustainedeconomicgrowthandemploymentgeneration.

RaúlCastrohadmadeveryclearthelimitstoprivatisationwhentheGuidelineswere

approvedatthe6thPartyCongress:

“Thegrowthofthenon-statesectoroftheeconomy,farfrommeaningasupposed

privatizationofthesocialpropertyassometheoristsclaim,iscalledontoturnintoa

facilitatorfactorfortheconstructionofsocialisminCuba.ItwillpermittheStateto

concentrateitselfonincreasedefficiencyofthefundamentalmeansofproduction”.

Earlyinthetransformationprocess,RaúlCastroandhisheadofficialsacknowledged

thatthestatesectorcouldnotaffordtokeepitshugeandlargelyunproductiveand

redundantworkforce.Inasituationwithadeepfiscalcrisis,alternativeandliveable

employmentwouldbevirtuallyimpossibletofindwithoutamajorrestructuringofthe

labourmarket.Aplantolayoffmorethan35%ofpublicemployees(1.8million

persons)waspresented,withaquiteunclearperspectiveofhowthisidleworkforce

shouldbeofferedalternativeemployment.Itwillthereforebeimportanttostudyhow

thestateenterprisesectorhasbeenre-structured—particularlywithregardstotherole

ofmilitary-managedcorporations.Whathashappenedwiththerelationshipbetween

stateandnon-stateemployment,andtowhatextenthasthelatterbeenmovingfrom

simpleself-employmenttomoreorganisedentrepreneurialformsofproduction,e.g.in

theformofmicro,smallandmediumenterprises(MSMEs),alternativelytocooperatives

inoneformoranother?

Self-employmentinCubamaybecomparedtothegrowthoflabourinformalityinLatin

America.ManyLatinAmericancountrieshaveexperiencedthatwithrural-urban

migrationtogetherwithtraditionalindustriesclosingdown,theemergenceofavast

informalsurvivalsectorandincreasingeconomicillegalitytakesoverasapredominant

sourceofsurvival(ref.deSoto1989).Ontheotherhand,asmostofthetheoryand

empiricalexperiencesfromex-socialistcountriesindicate(Kornai,Brown,Saxonberg),

suchlooseningofstatecontrolmayalsohavepoliticallytransformativeeffect.

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InacountrylikeVietnammassivelay-offsofstateworkersaftertheDoiMoimarket

reform(1986)werelargelycompensatedforbymushroomingemployment

opportunitiesinthenon-statesector,generallyofferingbetterconditionsthaninthe

companiestheyleft.ButtherearetwoimportantfactorsthatdistinguishCubafrom

Vietnamhere:

• ThehighpercentageofruralandagriculturalpopulationinVietnammayhave

easedtheprocess,bystrengtheningaccesstolandandmarketsforthepeasants;

• ThestrongandrelativelyunfetteredstimulusinVietnamtoestablishprivate

companies,leadingtoarapidsurgeinprivatesavingsandinvestments,anda

strongencouragementoftheentrepreneurialspirit.

TheroleofMSMEswascrucialinthisregard.Morethan30,000privatebusinesseshad

beencreatedbytheendofthe1990s,theeconomywasgrowingatanannualrateof

morethan7%,andpovertydeclinedfrom50to29%ofthepopulationfromthe1990s

to2005(ref.deVylderandFforde).

InCubaalso,systematicstimulusofMSMEsandperhapsofautonomouscooperatives

stoodoutasalogicalalternativetoavoidarepetitionoftherespectiveLatinAmerican

andEasternEuropeancases,inordertomovethecountryinthedirectionofthe

Vietnameseeconomicsuccess.

H2.0:Statusquo:acontinuationofstatepropertyhegemony,combinedwithanincreasing

non-stateworkforcelefttomicro-sizesurvivaloptionsand“savagecapitalism”.

H2.1:OpeningasignificantspaceforMSMEs(micro,smallandmediumenterprises)and

othernon-stateentrepreneurs(includingcooperatives),inamoreregularisedmarket

economy.


• Indicator2.1:Explicitpoliticalwilltode-monopolisethestateeconomy?

130

• Indicator2.2:Increasingde-regulationofstatecompanies?

• Indicator2.3:Continueddominanceofmilitarycorporations?

• Indicator2.4:Transferofworkforcefromthepublicsectortoself-employment?

• Indicator2.5:Privateworkforcegainingmoreindependencefromthestate?

• Indicator2.6:Growingweightofthenon-statesectorintheCubaneconomy?

• Indicator2.7:Growthofanautonomouscooperativesector?

• Indicator2.8:Incentives/dis-incentivesforotherpotentialnon-stategrowth

initiatives?

Challenge3:Massiveneedforproductiveinvestmentstospureconomicgrowthand

employmentgeneration.

TheCubaneconomysufferedafatalblowwiththedisappearanceoftheSovietUnion,

leadingtotheso-called‘specialperiod’ofthe1990swherelargesegmentsofthe

populationwerebarelysurvivingonminimumincomesandwithlittleaccesstobasic

goods.Aftersomeyearsofrecovery,toalargeextentduetotheneweconomicrelations

withVenezuela,economicgrowthfrom2009againfelltofarbelowwhatmost

economistssawasaminimumforrecovery:5%sustainedannualgrowth(Torres2016).

Perhapsmostseriously,grosscapitalformation(investmentaspercentageofGDP)fell

tounsustainablelevels(10-13%,lessthanhalfoftheLatinAmericanaverage).New

sourcesofinvestmentweredesperatelyneededinordertoavoidaneconomiccollapse,

whiletheCommunistPartykeptinsisting(PartyCongress2011)thatitwas“notyet”

preparedtoacceptprivateaccumulationasasourceofnewinvestments.Thisgoesback

toFidelCastro´sdogmathatprivateenrichmentwasethicallywrong,andthatthe

emergenceofacapitalistclasswouldunderminethepoliticalfoundationsofthe

Revolution(ref.FidelCastro´sspeechannouncing“theRevolutionaryOffensive”,on13

March1968).Undersuchphilosophy,ForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)seemstobea

lesserevilthandomesticinvestmentandthegrowthofnationalcapitalism.

H3.0.1:Noincentivesfornon-stateinvestments

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H3.0.2:ReformFDIregimeandpromoteinvestmentspredominantlythroughstate

corporations;spurringsignificantstatesectorgrowthandemploymentcreation

H3.1:Allow/promotediasporainvestmentsaswellasdomesticentrepreneurinvestment;

spurringnon-stategrowthandemploymentcreation

Indicatorstowatch:

• Indicator3.1:FDIsplayinganincreasingroleinCuba´seconomicdevelopment?

• Indicator3.2:Increaseinothersourcesofforeigncurrency?

• Indicator3.3:Familyremittancesandothersourcesofinvestmentpromoting

privatesectordevelopment?

• Indicator3.4:Increasingpartnershipbetweenforeigninvestorsandnational

enterprises?

• Indicator3.5:Capitalformationratioimproving?

• Indicator3.6:Creativedestructiontakingplace?

• Indicator3.7:Macro-economicoutcomeofRaúl’sreformera

Challenge4:Politicalimplicationsofsocio-economicchanges.

Thechangingeconomicarenamaybeposingaseriesofchallengestoapoliticalsystem

thatisresistingpoliticaltransformations.Thisfollowslogicallyfromtheclassical

transitiontheoriesfromLipset,throughHuntingtontoLinzandStepan;butalsofrom

empiricalstudiesofthefalloftheUSSR(Kornai,Brown).Kornai,however,believesthat

thepoliticaltransitionswillbenecessaryinordertobringabouteconomic

transformations(ref.Kornai’s(1992:383-386)listofcriteriaforpoliticalandeconomic

transformations).

Linz&Stepan’sfivearenas(civilsociety,politicalsociety,rule-of-law,usablestate

bureaucracy,institutionalisedeconomicsociety)mayofferausefulguidancetostudy

therelationshipbetweensocio-economicandpoliticalchanges.

132

OnesignalfromChina(and,asweshallsee,fromVietnam)iswellnoticedinCuba:there

isnotyetanysignthatthesuccessfulmarketeconomyisleadingtopoliticalliberalisation.

But,asweshallalsosee,thereismoreopennessandpluralisminsidethepower

structureinVietnamthaninChinaandCuba(London2016).

H4.0:Consistentlyresistingmoreautonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorsthatcouldfollow

logicallyfromachangingeconomicarena;thusresistingpoliticaltransformations.

H4.1:Acceptingmoreautonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorswithpotentialforpolitical

transformations

Indicatorstowatch:

• Indicator4.1:Winnersandlosersofthereformswithconflictingpoliticalinterests

• Indicator4.2:Anemergingmiddleclasswithdistinctinterests?

• Indicator4.3:Evolutionofsocialconditionsandpreviousegalitarianstructures

• Indicator4.4:Privatesectorgainingpotentialpowerposition?

• Indicator4.5:Ideologicalacceptance/resistancetoprivatepropertyandcapital

accumulation?

• Indicator4.6:Moreautonomousinterestorganisationpermitted?

Challenge5:Achanginginternationalcontext:HowtoinfluencetheUStoabandon

theembargo/blockade;and/orcompensatetheembargobyhelpofother

internationalalliances.

TheUS’commercial,economicandfinancialembargoagainstCuba,ontheCubanside

characterisedasablockade(bloqueo),hasbeeninforceandhasbeengradually

expandedsinceOctober1960.86ThestatedpurposeoftheCubanDemocracyActof1992

wastomaintainsanctionsonCubasolongastheCubangovernmentrefusedtomove

86TheCubanembargoisenforcedmainlythroughsixstatutes:theTradingwiththeEnemyActof1917,theForeignAssistanceActof1961,theCubanAssetsControlRegulationsof1963,theCubanDemocracyActof1992,theHelms–BurtonAct1996,andtheTradeSanctionsReformandExportEnhancementActof2000.

133

toward"democratisationandgreaterrespectforhumanrights".TheHelms–BurtonAct

(1996)furtherextendedtheterritorialapplicationoftheinitialembargobyapplyingit

toforeigncompaniestradingwithCuba.Moreimportantly,whilethepreviousactshad

beenexecutiveordersthatalsocouldbeabandonedbyanyfuturePresidentthrough

anotherexecutiveorder,Helms-BurtonwassignedintofederallawbyPresidentClinton,

thusrequiringaqualifiedmajorityinCongresstoliftit.Thiswouldforinstancemakeit

impossibleforPresidentObamatoabolishtheembargo/blockadewithout60

supportingvotesbytheUSSenate.BarrackObamahadbeenonrecordquestioningthe

CubanembargosinceheranforaseatintheSenatein2004,andtherewasspeculation

thathewouldtakestepsinhissecondpresidentialterm(after2013)toreachoutto

Cuba.OntheCubanside,theUSblockade,apartfromitsundoubtedseriousdamageto

theCubaneconomy,wasalsoreferredtoasthereasonwhylimitationsindemocracy

andhumanandcivilrightshadtobemaintained.87So,thiswasthemainGordianknot

(orCatch22situation)inUS–Cubanrelations,withtheUSdemandingthatdemocracy

andhumanrightshadtoberespectedbeforeliftingtheembargo,andCubaclaimingthat

theembargohadtobeliftedbeforesuchrightscouldberestored.Onecommonclaim

amongcriticsoftheCubanregimewasthatthemaintenanceoftheblockadeinreality

wasintheirpoliticalinterest,soastomaintaintheauthoritarianpolity.So,inpolitical

termsinCuba,thereisadoublesideoftheUSembargo.Anotherrelevantquestionis

whether,inthepost-liberalworldorder(ref.Gray2016),theWesternliberaldemocracy

reallyrepresentsanattractiverolemodelforacountrylikeCuba.

H5.0:TherelationshipofhostilitytotheUScontinues,thusalsomaintainingthe

justificationagainstpoliticalliberalisation.

H5.1:TherewillbeagradualaccommodationofCuban-USrelationsduringthesecond

presidentialtermofBarrackObama,allowingtheintroductionofmajoreconomicand

politicalreformsaspartofthatprocess.

87FidelCastroarguesatlengthaboutthepoliticaljustificationoflimitedciviclibertiesinRamonet2007.Forinstance,whenaskedaboutthelackofpressfreedom,hesaysthataslongasthereisaUSblockadeagainstCubaandathreatbytheUSPresident,“wecannotgivethe‘freedom’tothealliesofourenemieswhoseobjectiveistostruggleagainstsocialism’sreasonforexistence”(p.491).HehasalsoarguedthattheUSwouldbenefitmorethanCubafromnormalrelations:“IftheUnitedStatesmakespeacewithus,itwilltakeawayalittleofourprestige,ourinfluence,ourglory.”(Quotedfroma1961speechinLeograndeandKornbluh,2014:406).

134

Indicatorstowatch:

• Indicator5.1:Cubasearchingforanewinternationalrole

• Indicator5.2:US-Cubarelations:TowardstheendoftheembargoandtheCuban

“bunkermentality”88justifyinglackofcivicfreedoms?

• Indicator5.3:StrengthenedtiestoLatinAmerica—isolationofUSembargopolicy?

• Indicator5.4:Improvedrelationstotherestoftheworld?

• Indicator5.5:WhatinternationalZeitgeistisframingCubaattheendoftheCastro

era?

Challenge6:Emergenceofamorepluralistcivil,academicandmediasociety.

CivilsocietyinCubahasbeenseriouslyhamperedfromactingindependentlyofparty

andstatestructures.Thesamehasbeenthecaseforcriticalacademicdebate.Thetrend

hasbeentotreatallcriticalexpressionsas“counter-revolutionary”andserving—often

alsoclaimedtobefinancedby—“theenemy”(normallymeaningtheUS).Allowingmore

spaceforcriticalpublicdiscussion,throughamoreindependentacademiaandcivil

societyandmorepluralistmediastructures,wouldbeanimportantsteptowardsamore

pluralistpoliticalsystem.Linz&Stepan’sfourdimensionsofpost-totalitarianism

(pluralism,ideology,mobilisation,leadership)wouldbeofgreathelptoanalysethis

situation.

Therelationshipbetweeneconomicandcivilsociety,andpoliticalpluralism,hasbeen

welldocumentedinLinzandStepan´stheoryofrelationshipbetweenthevariousarenas

inatransitionprocessandmayhelpusunderstandtheroleofhorizontalinterest

organisation.Wewillbelookingathowempowermentofcitizensandsocialgroupsin

ordertoorganisestruggleforchangemayleadtowhathasbeentermed‘politicised

democracy’andtodifferentformsofsocialdemocracy(Törnquist2016).Inthiswork,

Törnquistalsodiscussestheconceptof‘transformativedemocraticpolitics’,withits3-4

88DefinedbyMerriamWebsterasfollows:”astateofmindespeciallyamongmembersofagroupthatischaracterizedbychauvinisticdefensivenessandself-righteousintoleranceofcriticism”.

135

dimensions:democraticcollectiveswithpotentialtobuildcounter-hegemony(ref.

Przeworski).Anotherangleofthisdiscussionistoanalysethecompositionofbroad

popularinterests(horizontalinterestorganisation);strongdemocraticlinkages

betweenstateandsociety;structuralconditionsandeffortsforthedevelopmentof

coalitions,socialpactsandcollectivebargainingbetweensectionsofcapitalandlabour.

ThisstandsincontrasttoChinaunderXiJinping,China´sundisputedleaderfrom2012,

whohasmadeitclearthatpoliticalliberalisationisoutofthequestion.

InCuba,likewehavepointedoutinthecaseofVietnam,thereformdriveisnot

expectedtocomefromindependentinterestsorsocialclassesasmuchasfromanintra-

eliteconflictwithinthestateapparatus.Yet,wewillbeontheoutlookforwhetherthe

emergenceofnewmiddleclasseswillproduceavitalpro-democraticforce.

H6.0:Statusquo,withheavyrestrictionsonallindependentacademicexpressions,civil

organizationandpublicdebateingeneral.

H6.1:Agradualopeningforaconstructivepublicdebate,withorganizationalexpressions

andinnovativeacademicpositionsemergingandbeingtolerated,alsobeingreflectedby

non-officialmediaoutlets.

Indicatorstowatch:

• Indicator6.1:Towardsamorepluralistcivilsociety?

• Indicator6.2:Academicsandintellectualspermittedamoreautonomousrole?

• Indicator6.3:Churchesplayinganincreasingpoliticalrole?

• Indicator6.4:Increasingroleforindependentinformationactors?

• Indicator6.5:Morerespectfordissenters?

• Indicator6.6:Emerging“agentsofchange”?

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Challenge7:DifferentiationofStatevs.Partyfunctions;divisionofstatepowers

(legislativevs.executive)?

TheLeninistpoliticalsysteminCubaisbasedonthethesisoftheCommunistParty

beingthenation´s“organisedvanguard”andthe“superiorleadingforceofsocietyand

theState”(ref.ConstitutionArticle5),representingtheundisputedcommoninterestsof

“thepeople”.AstheCubansocietygrowsmoreheterogeneous,thecomplete

concentrationofpowerinthehandsofafewpersonswithoutdistinctionbetweenparty

andstatefunctions,andwithoutanydistinctionbetweenexecutiveandlegislative

functions,becomesamajorchallenge.Itiswelldocumentedintheliteratureonpost-

CommunisttransitionshowtheabolishmentoftheLeniniststatemodelmayopenup

thesocietiesatlarge,asseene.g.withtheintroductionofperestroikaandglasnost

duringlatteryearsoftheUSSR(Kornai,Brown).Asdemonstratedinalldemocracy

literaturesinceMontesquieuarticulatedthetheoryofseparationofpowers(seee.g.

Dahl1998),thedifferentiationofstatepowershasbeenconsideredasine-qua-nonfor

publicaccountabilityandtheestablishmentorconsolidationofarights-basedsociety,

withruleoflawasthefundamentalprincipleofcitizen-staterelations.

Cuba,lackingtheConfucianandmillenniumlongstatetraditionofitsEastAsianrole

modelswiththeirun-differentiatedpowerstructures,cannotrunawayfromthelegacy

oftheEuropeanstatetraditionwithitsimplicationsforthepre-andpost-colonialstate

structuresinLatinAmerica.Thatmayhavesignificanceforthedifferentiationofstate

powersandtherelationshipbetweenstateandcitizens,settingCubaapartfromChina

andVietnamintermsofthepoliticalimpactsofdeepermarketreforms.

H7.0:Continuationofoverlapbetweenpartyandstatefunctions;executiveandlegislative

roles

H7.1:Distinctionbetweenpartyandstatefunctions;theLegislatureoperatingmore

independentlyoftheExecutive

Indicatorstowatch:

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• Indicator7.1:CommunistPartyshowinganysignofopeningup?

• Indicator7.2:WilltherebeanyvisiblestepsawayfromtheCommunistPartypower

monopoly?

• Indicator7.3:HowrepresentativearemembersandleadersoftheCommunist

Party?

• Indicator7.4:MoredifferentiationbetweenPartyandStatefunctionsandleaders?

• Indicator7.5:AnychangeintheroleoftheMilitary?

• Indicator7.6:Bureaucracyremainingasbarriertoreforms?

Challenge8:Movestowardsalessauthoritarianandmorepluralistpolitical

system?

ThetransferofpowerfromFideltoRaúlCastrosymbolisedthedefinitiveendofa

totalitarianpoliticalsystemwithatransformationfromtotalitarianismto

authoritarianism(thedifferencewaselaboratedinChapter4,ref.LinzandStepan’s

Table4.2,pp.56-60).Butstill,theauthoritarianpolityrepresentedamajorchallengeto

asustainableandlegitimatesystem,capableofsurvivingthroughtheunavoidable

generationaltransferofpower.RaúlCastrostated,whentheeconomicandsocial

‘updating’waspresentedatthe6thPartyCongressin2011,thatnopoliticalreform

wouldbeintroduced.Cubacontinuedtohaveanextremelycentralistsystem,withall

majordecisionsbeingtakenbyasmallHavanapartyelite,withouttransparencyand

publicdebate.Municipalandotherde-centralisedpartsofthestatestructurehad

minimumautonomy,alsoallowingverylittleinvolvementoflocalcommunitiesin

policy-making.Democracyandpopularparticipationishardlypossiblewithout

decentralisedandbottom-upstructuresofdecision-making.Thequestionwewantto

raiseinthecaseofCubaiswhetheritispossibletostarttransformingheavyLeninist,

authoritarian,centralist,verticalist,andopaquestructureswithoutabolishingthe

monolithicstatestructurealtogether.

InUSSRandothercommuniststates,lackoffreedomandaccountabilityintheshortrun

ensuredregimesurvivalbyobscuringandoutweighingtherelativeeconomicfailure—in

thelongrunthesefactorsbecameatleastasimportantaseconomicfailureinundoing

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Communism(Brown:587).WhatperestroikademonstratedwasthatCommunismcould

notsurvivewithradicalreformofitspoliticalsystem.Withpoliticalpluralism,fissures

emergedwithintherulingparty,spellingovertothesocietyatlarge—“theparty’s

monopolyofpowerdependedonthepreservationofdemocraticcentralism”.But,as

Brownclaims“intheSovietUnion,reformproducedcrisismorethancrisisproduced

reform”(Brown:598).

InChinaandVietnam,decentralisationhasbeenanintegralpartofthereforms.Such

trendshavehithertonotbeenseeninCuba.Willthatchange?Willtheincreasing

pluralismseenintheVietnamesetoppoliticalsystem(e.g.priortothe2016Party

Congress)alsoemergeinCuba?Whatwewanttostudyunderthischallengeishow

post-totalitarianismhasevolvedintheCubanpoliticalsystemduringtheRaúlCastro

era,comparedtootherCommunistregimes.

H8.0:Statusquo,withnosignificantpoliticalreforms

H8.1:Significantideologicalrenewalandpoliticalreformsbeingintroduced.

Indicatorstowatch:

• Indicator8.1:Newideologicaltrends?

• Indicator8.2:Moreliberalregimecharacteristics?

• Indicator8.3:LessauthoritariancultureinsidetheCommunistParty?

• Indicator8.4:Theroleofpro-regimemassorganisationmobilisation.

• Indicator8.5:Anysignofamoreopen/pluralisticelectionprocess?

• Indicator8.6:Improvedruleoflawperformance?

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Challenge9:Generationalrenewalwithanewsourceoflegitimacy.

ThenewPolitburoelectedbythe6thPartyCongressin2011hadaseriousover-age

problem,withthetwoseniorpositionsinthePartyaswellastheStatestructureboth

beingheldbymenabove80yearsofage(RaúlCastroandMachadoVentura)andthe

majorityofmembersbeingabove70years.RaúlCastrohadremovedallyounger

aspiringleadersallowedintotoppositionsbyhisbrotherFidel,andherecognisedinhis

presentationoftheCentralReporttotheCongressthelackof“areserve(ofyoung

leaders)dulyprepared,withsufficientexperienceandmaturitytoassumethenewand

complexmanagementtasks”.This,hesaid,wouldhavetobegraduallysolvedduringthe

comingfiveyears(untilthe20166thPartyCongress),addingthatduetothelawoflife,

the6thCongresswouldprobablybethelastheadedbythehistoricgeneration(quoted

byMesa-Lago2013:224).Weshallassesstowhatextentthishashappened,beforethe

historicalleadershipgenerationultimatelyretires,takingwiththemthehistorical

legitimacyoftheRevolution.Shortofarevivalofexternalenemies,anewlegitimacywill

thenunavoidablyhavetobebasedonsocio-economicperformance.

Cubahaslackedtheinstrumentsforasystematicrotationofleadershippositionsfound

inChinaandVietnam,contributingtostabilityandlegitimacyoftheauthoritarianrule

andastableandconstanttransferofpowertoayoungergenerationofpartyleadersin

thesecountries.89Willthatchangewiththeunavoidabledepartureofthehistoric

leaders?Chinahasalsoputinplacemechanismsforco-optingsocialprotest(“routinized

contentiousbargaining”),whichmaywellbecomenecessaryalsoinCuba,asthesociety

growsmorediversified.Theseareallelementsoftheperformance-based“pragmatic

acceptance”thatCubawillneedtoreconstruct.Willthathappen?

RepeatedwavesofemigrationhaveprovidedtheCubanregimewithasafetyvalve,

providingthedisaffected,invariousgenerations,anoptionfor‘exit’ratherthan‘voice’.

Thecomprehensiveilliciteconomymaybeseenasanotherformof‘exit’from

governmentcontrol.Thequestioniswhethersuchexitpositionswillpersist,or

whether—intheirabsence—youngergenerationswilloptformore‘voice’intheformof

89ThisprinciplemaybeendangeredbyXiJinping’sapparentwishtostayonafterthe2022PartyCongress.

140

socialandpossiblypoliticalprotest(ref.Hirschman´sdualconcept)?

H9.0:Therevolutionarygeneration,thosewhohavebeeninpowersince1959andother

old-timers,willclingontotheirpositionsuntilthebitterend(untiltheypassawayor

becomephysicallyand/ormentallyunfit),whilealsoavoidingthenecessaryeconomicand

politicalrenewaltoprovidethenextgenerationofleaderswithanewsourceoflegitimacy

builtonperformanceandmerits.

H9.1:RaúlCastrowillinitiateagradualtransferofpowertoyoungerleaders,andalso

introduceeconomicandpoliticalreformsuponwhichtheymaybuildanewpopular

legitimacythroughmeritsandpragmaticacceptance.

Indicatorstowatch:

• Indicator9.1:Willthe7thPartyCongress(2016)implyadeeperPartyleadership

renewal?

• Indicator9.2:HowthoroughrenewalofStateleaders(2013and2018)?

• Indicator9.3:Reformcontinuityorcounter-reform?

• Indicator9.4:Newsourceoflegitimacyemerging?

• Indicator9.5:VoiceorExit?

5.4 Some dilemmas when entering the critical juncture (2018-2021):

Thereisanumberofadditionalchallengesthatwehadinmindwhenstartingthisstudy,

whichwenowrealisewillbelefttothepost-Castroera,tobedealtwithaspartofwhat

wehavecalledthecriticaljuncture(Chapter11).Sincetheyhavenotreallybeen

handledsofar,theycannotbetestedliketheninefirstchallenges,althoughwehad

formulatedthefollowinghypotheses:

Cubaisdoomedbyhistoricalauthoritarianstructurescarriedoverfromthecolonialtothe

socialistera,plusthecharacteristicsofpost-totalitarianism,tocontinuerejectinganti-

authoritariantransformation.

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Alternatively:

Adeeplegitimacycrisisaffectingthepost-CastroCubanleadershipmayleadtothe

emergenceofcounter-hegemonicblocsandenforceapoliticalsettlementwith

transformativeimpact.

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Chapter 6: The evolving economic arena

InthisChapter,wewilladdressthethreefirstchallengesoftheCubanreformprocess:

theagriculturalsector,thenewdivisionofworkbetweenstateandnon-sectors,the

questforproductiveinvestments;andonthatbasisthepoliticalimplicationsofsocio-

economicchangesbroughtaboutbythereformprocess.

Challenge 1:

Significant retreat of the state in the agricultural sector, i.a. as a measure to meet

the massive need for increased food production

1.0.SomebaselinenotesonCubanagriculture

Theopeningupofagriculturetomoreprivateinitiativehasbeenseenasoneofthemost

crucialaspectsoftheCubaneconomicreforms,alsointermsofpotentialpoliticaleffects.

ItisnotwithoutreasonthatFukuyama(2011)putsaprincipalemphasisontheroleof

peasantsinhismetaphorof“gettingtoDenmark”,orthatProstermanandRiedinger

(1987)seelandreformasthecrucialsteptowardscapitalist-baseddemocracyin

VietnamandinElSalvador.

TheGuidelinesapprovedbythe6thPartyCongress(2011),establishedthegoal(inpoint

177):“achievethatthissector(agriculture)willprogressivelycontributetothe

country´sbalanceofpayments,inordertoceasebeinganetimporteroffood”.

ThisgoalcanbetracedallthewaybacktotheearlydaysoftheCubanrevolution,when

FidelCastroinaSeptember1959speechannouncedtheintentionofachieving

alimentaryindependence,goingindetailthroughalonglistofagriculturalproductsand

specifyingwhatquantitieshadtobeproducedandhowmuchthiswouldrepresentin

143

monetarysavings.90Satisfactionofdomesticfoodconsumptionwasamongthemain

objectivesofCuba’s1959AgrarianReformLaw(Alvarez2004).Thislaw,andthe

discussionsleadinguptoit,wasconsideredapivotalelementintheearlydaysofthe

CubanRevolution,underheavyinfluenceofCheGuevara.Itwasbasedonarecognition

that:

“[T]hepeasantswhobelongedtoourfirstguerrillaarmiescamefromthatsectionofthat

socialclasswhichmoststronglyshowsloveforthelandandthepossessionofit;thatisto

say,whichmostperfectlydemonstratesthepetty-bourgeoisspirit.Thepeasantsfought

becausetheywantedlandforthemselvesandtheirchildren,tomanageandsellitandto

enrichthemselvesthroughtheirlabour.”91

Thisfirstagrarianreformwasalsoquitemoderatecomparedtotherestrictionsin

privatepropertyincontemporarysocialistcountries.

AccordingtotheFrenchsocialistandinitiallyverypro-Castroagro-economistRené

Dumont,however,incentiveseveninthisphasewerenotbasedonrelativeperformance

efficiencybutonpurelyideologicalcriteria(Dumont1970:29-31;50-51),providinglittle

incentiveforexpandedagriculturalproduction.DumontcriticizedCastro’sintentionto

createlargestatefarmsfortheentireagricultureproduction(hemadetheexceptionfor

thesugarsector),andclaimedthatCastrowasexcessivelyinfluencedbytheSoviet

sovkhozysystemofstateagriculturalproperty(Thomas:548).

Theagriculturepolicywouldsoonbefurtherradicalized,however,fortwomain

reasons:First,thattheruralbourgeoisiehadbeensupportingthearmed

counterrevolutionaryforcesoperatinginthecountryatthetime,supportedbytheCIA

andCubanexilesinMiami.Second,thatlargefarmershadbeendecapitalisingtheir

holdings,probablyfearingtheexpropriation—therebyproducingaself-fulfilling

prophecy.

Therefore,whenrevolutionaryCuba’sagrarianpolicyreacheditssecondphasewiththe

1963AgrarianReform,ithadamuchcleareranti-privateandpro-collectivecharacter. 90”PremierseeksMobilizationofSavingsbyCubanstoInsureGrowth”,NewYorkTimes,19.09.59.91SpeechbyCheGuevaraon9April1961:Cuba:HistoricalExceptionorVanguardintheAnticolonialStruggle?:https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1961/04/09.htm

144

Thelandofmostfarmerswithmorethan67hectareswasexpropriated,givingtheState

controlover70%oftheland.Thisparticularlyaffectedthementionedmedium-sized

farmers.Littlebylittle,theremainingprivatepeasantsandfarmerswereorganised—

underquiteheavypressure—incooperativeswithlimitedautonomywiththepurpose

ofsocialisingtheirholdings.AgriculturalProductionCooperatives(CPAs)wereexplicitly

basedoncollectiveproduction,whereasCooperativesofCreditandServices(CCSs)

werebasedonindividualpropertybutcollectiveaccesstoirrigation,services(including

transport)andcredits.Neitherofthesecooperativeforms,andnoteventheremaining

individualfarmersandpeasants,normallyhadthefreedomtodecidewhichcropsto

produce.InCuba’scentrallyplannedeconomysuchdecisionsweretakenbythe

agriculturalbureaucracy,whoalsoestablishedproductionquotasandprices(typically

quitelow)forsaletothemonopolystatepurchaseagency,CentrodeAcopio.Therewere

exceptional‘genuinecooperatives’,butevenCCSswouldnormallybeputunderstrict

stateandbureaucraticcontrol.92

Therewasacleartendencythatthemorecollectiveformsofproductionreceived

preference(inthefollowingorder:state,CPA,CCS,private).Theagriculturalistswere

also—asotherinterestgroupsinCuba—organisedundercentralandvertical

CommunistPartycontrol,throughtheNationalAssociationofSmallAgriculturalists

(ANAP).FidelCastrolateremphasisedtheimportanceofpromoting“superiorformsof

productionforlandsocialization”,withthefinalgoalofnolongerhavingany

independentpeasants(PampínBaladoandTrujilloRodriguez,n.d).CheGuevara’s

promisetothepeasantsthathadfoughtfortheRevolutionthattheyandtheirchildren

wouldmanagetheirownland:graduallylostitsvalue.Theywerenolongermastersof

theirowndestiny.

Thisviciouscircleofde-capitalizationandincreasingconflictbetweenfarmersandthe

Revolutionseems,toalargedegree,tohaveoriginatedintheRevolution´sneglectofand

disregardforindependentpeasantsandfarmers.Ofparticularimportancewasthe

increasingconflictwithintermediate-sizefarmers,thosewithpropertiesbetween60-

600hectareswhomightemployacertainnumberofworkers,andwhosoldthebulkof 92RenéDumont,generallyverycriticalofthecentralistandcollective-orientedpolicy,praisedsomeexamplesofsuch’genuinecooperatives’,werepresidentswereapparentlyfreelyelected,andelectedcouncilscouldfreelyestablishproductionplans.

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theirproducts(moreandmoreontheblackmarket,duetoincreasingfoodshortage),

buthardlycouldbecalledlatifundistas(Thomas:552).

Thisconflict,however,soonprovidedtheRevolutionwithreallydangerousenemies:the

politicalandmilitarycounter-revolution.Themajorityoftheso-called‘counter-

revolutionarybandits’,withmainconcentrationintheEscambraymountains,were

probablydrawnfromformerCastrosupporters.Nodoubt,however,theroleofthe

middle-sizefarmersseemedtohavebeenimportant,notleastasliaisontoexiledCubans

andtheCIA(Aranda:189).Atthemost,accordingtofiguresprovidedbythetwoCastro

brothers,thecounter-revolutionaryforcescommandedalmost3,600men(SanMartín

andBonachea:58-59);easilythedoubleofthenumberofguerrillafighterstheCastros

themselveshadhadunderarmsatthemaximummomentoftheanti-Batistastruggle.

AlthoughtherewereapparentlyfewlinksbetweentheseforcesandtheBayofPigs(or

PlayaGirónastheCubanscallit)invasioninApril1961,theperceptionofindividual

farmersasacounter-revolutionaryclasswasclearlystrengthenedbythisCIA-supported

invasionattempt.

Onestrikingaspectoftheagriculturalpoliciesofsocialistregimesishowlittletheyhave

learntfromthehistoryofagriculturalcollectivization.WhenLeninintroducedhisNew

EconomicPolicy(NEP)in1921,itwasseenasasurvivalnecessitytowardstheendof

thecivilwar,whichhadledtomillionsdyingfromfamineandpandemics—itisclaimed

that3milliondiedoftyphusalonein1920.AndNEPworked;by1926agriculture

recoveredtopre-warlevels:”oneofhistory´smostrapid(recoveries)”(Gregory

2004:26).DuringNEP,incentivestoagriculturalproducerstogetherwithaflexibletax

policymadeitattractivetomaximisethegrowthofgrainandsellitthroughprivate

intermediaries.ThosefarmerswhowerenotopenlyagainsttheSovietregimewere

treatedasallies.ButthissuccesswassoonturnedtoanotherdisasterwhenStalin

introducedhis’waronthekulaks’(middle-sizedfarmers)or’de-kulakization’.Already

in1928-29,“extraordinarymeasureswererequiredtoextractgrainfromanunwilling

peasantry.Commandhadreplacedmarkets”(Gregory1994:112).

“ArguingthatthepeasantryhadconspiredtothwartSovietpower,playingonthefearofthe

war,andassertingthatrapidindustrializationwasimperativeandimpossibleunless

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collectivizationoccurred,Stalindemandedtheliquidationofthekulaksasaclassand

massiveandrapidcollectivizationofagriculture”(Zimmerman:56).

Deportationandexecutionofmillionsofpeasantsandtheirfamiliesfollowed.Once

again,theresultwasmassstarvation.

Thebalancingactofagriculturalpoliciesisprecarious.Thereneedstoproduction

incentivesforfarmersandsufficientfoodprovisionsatacceptablepricesforconsumers.

Howtorelatetomiddle-sizecommercialfarmersandpeasantswithoutfermenting

counter-revolutionhasbeenanightmarishdilemmaforsocialistrevolutionsandstates

during100years.Cubaisonlyoneexampleofthis.

WhenRaúlCastroinitiatedhisreformprocess,Cubawasstillplaguedbyanacute

shortageoffoodproducts,havingtospendscarceforeigncurrencyonimports,inspite

ofthecountry´svastpotentialforagriculturalself-sufficiencyandexport.Castromadeit

veryclearasearlyas2008whatwasatstake:

“FoodproductionshouldbeaprimarytaskforPartyleaders,whomustbeconsciousofthe

factthat,inthepresentandasfarasthefuturemaybediscerned,thisisamatterof

maximumnationalsecurity”.93(S/E)

Thissituationmustbeseenupagainstthelargebutlargelyunusedpotentialfor

agriculturalproductioninthecountry.ThepreviouslyreferredDumont(1970)

estimatedthatCubapotentiallycouldhavethecapacitytoproduceenoughfoodfor30

millionpeople;beforeRaúlinitiatedhisreformsthecountry´sagriculturaloutputstood

atatrivial15%ofthatpotential,forwhateverthecomparisonisworth.Tochangethis

situationwasevidentlyacrucialaimofthereforms.

TheMinistryofAgricultureitselfconsidersthat60%oftheimportedfoodstuff,

representingasmuchas1.2billionUSDannually,couldrathereasilybeproduced

domestically.94Cubaisreportedtohaveatotalof6.2millionhectaresavailablefor

cultivation(tierrasarablesdisponibles),outofwhichonly2.7million,or43.5%,were 93”RaulCastrooverhaulsCuba'sfarmbureaucracy”,Reuters,Havana(MarcFrank)01.05.08.94AccordingtoarticlereproducedinASCENewsNo.695,28.01.16:”Cubaplaneaunpreciomáximoaproductosagrícolasparafrenarencarecimiento”.

147

actuallycultivatedin2016(or,inotherwords,56.5%ofthelandavailablefor

agriculturalpurposewaslyingfallow).95Furthermore,thesameMinistryrecognisesthat

thereisextremelylowagroproductivity:only25%oftheagriculturallandproduce

above50%ofwhatiscalledcapitaldecultivo.96

Buttheproblemisnotlimitedtoinsufficientproduction.ArecentanalysisoftheCuban

agriculturalsectorbyaBasquegovernment-friendlyNGOconcludedthat57%offood

producedinCubaislostbeforeitreachestheconsumers.97Thisisverysimilartowhat

RenéDumontobservedwhenhetravelledaroundinthecountrysidein1961,afterthe

acopioshadtakenoverthewholesaleresponsibility:healsoclaimedthathalfthecrops

werenevercollectedfromthefarms.So,duringallthese56years,thefoodmarketing

systeminCubahasbeenequallynon-functional.

Forseveralyearsinthefirstdecadeofthe21stcentury,theUSwasparadoxicallythe

leadingfoodprovidertoCuba,thankstoaspecialexceptionfromtheembargolaw

allowedbytheBushJr.administration,offeringaconcessiontotheUSagricultural

industry.Thissituationhaschangedovertheyears,asfoodexportersfromother

countries—differentfromtheUS—havebeenabletoofferCubafavourablecredit

conditions.Now,withDonaldJ.TrumpasPresident,USfoodimportshaveagain

paradoxicallyincreasedinimportance.USfoodexportersareamongtheUSbusiness

groupspushinghardestforanendtotheembargoandmoreflexiblepaymentpolicies.

Thereisanalmostunanimousconsensusamongagriculturalexpertsthatthesituation

forCubanagriculturalproductionissimplyunsustainable,andthatpeasantsand

farmerswillbefarmoreefficientproducersiftheygetmoreautonomyandbetteraccess

tothemeansofproductionandtothemarket.Whatisparticularlystrikinghereisthat

privatelymanagedcooperatives98(CCSs)andprivatelyownedland,atatimewhenthey

95ONEIReport,June2017.96”Cambiosenlaentregadetierrascubanasenusufructo”:interviewwithEddySocaBaldoquín,DirectordeSuelosyControldelaTierra,MinisteriodelaAgricultura(MINAG),OnCuba,16.08.17,wherehestatedthat“itisessentialtoprovidethelandwiththeattentionitdemands,soasnottocontinuelosingtheagro-productivecapacity,giventhatonly25percentofthesoilsinCubahaveyieldsgreaterthan50percentofthecapitaldecultivo”).97ReportbytheNGOMundubat,quotedbyMartíNoticias,20.05.17. 98Seeaseparatediscussionoftheroleofcooperatives–agriculturalandnon-agricultural–inthenextsectionofthischapter.

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representedaround25%oflandholdings,produced57%offoodinthecountry(Nova

2012).99

Productivityintermsoffoodproduction,inotherwords,istwiceashighonnon-state

landcomparedtowhatitisonstateland.

Indicator1.1:Movementfromstatetonon-statelandtenure.

Thereisnodoubtthataverysignificantshifttowardsmorenon-stateproductionhas

takenplaceoverthelastyears.

Table6.1:FormsoflandtenureinCuba(%) Table 1

Agricultural

areaTotal State Non-state

CCS,usufruct

andprivate

farmers

2007 100 35.8 64.2 18.5

2011-2012 100 17.0 83.0 51.0

2015 100 25.1 74.9 48.8

2016 100 19.1 80.9 40.4

Sources:NovaGonzález2012,Table4.1p.136;GarcíaandNovaGonzáles2013,Table

6.3ref.table6.2.2015figureobtainedprivatelyfromA.Nova(March2016).2016:ONE

2016,Table9.1.(%ofsuperficiecultivada).

Addingtogetherprivatepropertyandcooperativeswherelandisworkedindividually

(theso-calledcreditandservicecooperativesCCSs)pluslandheldbyindividual

peasantsthroughleasingcontract(usufruct),theirshareoflandholdingsalmost 99MorerecentfiguresfromONEI,forthefirstninemonthsof2017,confirmthesefigures:withonly18%ofthecountry’scultivatedland,privateownersandCCScooperativistsproduced75%ofvegetableroots,78%ofplantains,81%oftomato,65%ofrice,84%offruits,83%ofcorn,73%ofbeans,84%ofpoultrymeat,66%offreshmilk(ONE:SectorAgropecuario,IndicadoresSeleccionadosEnero-Septiembre2017,Tables1.2and2.2).

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doubledfrom18.5%to35.3%between2007and2010-2011.Lateritincreasedto

around50%,beforeitagainfellquitesignificantlyto40%towardstheendoftheperiod.

Theinitialgrowthispartlyexplainedbythemassiveleasingoutofstateland,andpartly

bytheconversionoftheso-calledUBPCcooperatives(wherelandinrealityisheldand

workedcollectively,butformallynotstate-owned)toCCSs.UBPC’sshareofthelandfell

fromapproximately37%to24%duringtheperiod100followingreportsofverylow

efficiencyandheavylosses.101

Thepercentageofnon-stateproducershasincreasedinasimilarpattern:private,PCP

membersandleaseholders—usufructuarios—haveexplodedsince2007,in2012

representing55-60%ofthecountry´stotalagriculturallabourforceof1million.102

Themostimportantinitialincreaseinnon-stateagriculturalholdingshas

takenplacethroughlease-arrangements,usufructo,ofstateorsemi-stateland

lyingidle.SincethiswaslegalizedthroughaDecreto-Leypassedin2008,and

graduallymodified,wemaysummarizethestatusoftheusufructuariosas

follows:103

• Twokeyreformsintheirfavourhavebeenimplemented,apparentlyagainst

strongbureaucraticresistance:therighttobuildhousesonthelandandtopass

ontheleasingcontracttothenextgeneration(inheritanceright).

• Oneremainingreformmeasureistoprolongtheverylimitedtimeperspectiveof

theleasingcontract.Ithasbeenextendedfrom10to20yearsandisinprinciple

renewable,butmostfarmerswouldliketoseethisperiodsignificantlyextended

withreferencetosimilardiscussionsinVietnamwherelandleasinghasledtoa

veritableproductionboom.104

100ArmandoNovaGonzález(2012:136,Table4.1,laterupdatedthroughprivateinformationfromNova).101DimasCastellanos:“WhytheUBPCCooperativesFailed”,TranslatingCuba,201.1.12;DiariodelasAméricas,Miami,15.09.12.102GarcíaandNovaGonzáles(2013).AccordingtotheCubanstatisticaloffice,ONEI,theagriculturallabourforcein2011wasapproximately1million,20%oftotalworkforceinthecountry,droppingto902,000in2014andfurtherto820,000,18%ofthetotalworkforce,in2016(ONE2016,Table7.3).103ThissummaryisbasedonArmandoNova(2013ii)op.cit.,updatedininterviewwithNovainJanuary2016,andlaterfigurespublishedasspecifiedbelow.104InVietnam,underthe1993LandLaw,peoplewereissued20-yearlandleasesforagriculturalpurposes,aperiodfarmersnowwanttoseeextendedto50yearsorindefinitely.Duringtheterm,theyalsoreserverightstotransfer,leaseandmortgagethegivenland.

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• Anotherremainingproblemisthethreatthatleasingcontractswillbecancelled

iflessthantherequired70-80%ofproductionissoldtothestate,andratherto

non-statemarketoutletswithmuchbetterprices.105

• Privatefarmerswerefromthenonallowedtoleaseupto67hectares(upfrom

40).

• Thelandofferedforleasingoftendidnothaveappropriateconditions(infested

bythemarabúplant;situatedfarfromresidentialareasandinfrastructure,etc.).

• Manyofthoseobtainingsuchrightswerenotveryexperiencedfarmers,and

accesstoimplements,technicalsupport,transportationfacilitiesetc.isas

haphazardforthisgroupasforagricultureingeneral.

• Thenumberofusufructuariosimmediatelyexplodedwhenthisreformwas

introduced,reachingamaximumof250,000(25%oftheagriculturalworkforce)

in2014-15.Inmid-2017,thisfigurewasreducedto150,000.Thismeansthat

40%oftheinitiallicenseholdersreturnedtheirlicenses(orhaditinvalidated)

duringthelastcoupleofyearsoftheRaúlCastroera.Thelandtheyoccupiedwas

reducedfrom1.8to1.2millionhectares,thelatterfigurerepresentingslightly

morethanhalftheidlelandthatwasmadeavailableforleasingaspartofthe

agrarianreform.106Thesetrendshaveleftagreatquestionmarkaboutthe

successofthismodality.

Theverysignificantrelapseinnon-statelandtenurein2016isprobablyforthemost

partexplainedbythefallingnumberofusufructuarios.

105Itisquiteobviousthatfarlessthantheofficiallyrequiredpercentageisbeingsoldtothestate,buttheproblemisthatbyviolatingtheseofficialrequirements,peasantsfeelthreatenedwithreprisalsincludingthelossofleaserights.Asanexample,itwasreportedthat3500leaserightswerewithdrawninoneprovinceonly,PinardelRio,during2015.106MostrecentfiguresquotedbyCubadebate,16.08.17.

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Indicator1.2:Morepeasant/farmerautonomy.

Someimportantstepshavebeentakentowardsmoreautonomyforagricultural

producers.Buttheevolutionofpolicieshasnotbeenveryclear.Foryears,leadingCuban

agriculturaleconomists(NovaandGarcía)havebeenarguingforapackageofintegral

marketreformsinordertodrasticallyincreaseproductivityandproductionof

agriculturalproducts.107

Thestructuralchangesinagricultureneeded,accordingtotheseexperts,toinclude

propertyoruserrights,accesstoproductionimplementsandcredit,transport,and,not

least,freedomtoselltheproductsonanopenmarket—wholesaleordirectlyto

consumersincludingtohotelsandrestaurants(stateaswellasprivate).Thepossibility

toventureintoindustrialprocessingoffoodproducts—forinstancethroughsecond-

degreecooperatives(seeaboutthisunderIndicator1.3)wouldgivethepeasantsan

extraincentive.Wearethereforespeakingaboutadramaticshiftfromstatecontrolto

marketconditions,ashiftthatwouldalsounavoidablyhaverepercussionsonthe

generalbalancebetweenplanandmarketintheeconomyatlarge.Wecanassumethat

suchashiftwouldbepoliticallyveryimportant,andnolesscontroversial.

Nova(2012),establishesthefollowingfivecriteriaforamoreindependentandeffective

farmer:

1. Theestablishmentofamarketforproductiongoodsandimplements.Thereare

somepositiveelementsinthisrespectintheGuidelines(Lineamientos)approved

bythe6thPartyCongress(2011).Guideline09makesareferencetothe

developmentofmarketsforthesupplyofinputsandleasingofequipment,which

wouldalsobesupposedtosupplyservicestothenon-statesectorofthe

economy.Thisdecisionhasnotbeenimplemented.

2. Thattheproducercandecide—accordingtothemarketandsocialrequirements—

whattoproduceandwhereandtowhomtosell.Onthispoint,thedraftGuidelines 107Thefollowingrecommendationsanddiscussion,andtheinformationprovided,istoalargeextentbasedontwoarticlesbyagriculturaleconomistArmandoNovaGonzalesofCEEC(nowCIEI):NovaGonzales(2013i);andNovaGonzales(2013ii).

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hadaveryinterestingproposalofallowingcooperativestosellindependentlyof

stateintermediation,butitwassubstantiallychangedinthefinallyapproved

Guidelines:freesalewasinthefinalversiononlypermittedafterfulfillingstate

quotas,andnon-stateintermediationwasnotpermitted.Thisislinkedtothe

wholediscussionofwholesalemarkets,whichwewillcomebackto.

3. Diversificationofmarketchannels;abolishmentofstatemonopoly.Again,thereare

interestingreformproposalsintheGuidelines,proposingthegradual

abolishmentofstatemonopolyofthewholesalemarket(seelaterabout

implementation).

4. Freehiringofnecessarylabourforce.Thisisnowpartlypermitted.

5. Accesstocreditandtechnicalassistance:Limitedcreditschemesforprivate

producershavebeenopened,butonlyinnon-convertiblecurrency.

Summarisingthesereformcriteria,Novaclaimsthataconsistentreformprogrammust

givethepeasantsandfarmersanintegratedcontroloftheentireproduction-

distribution-salescycleinagriculture.

Startingin2018,anewtaxonagriculturallandpropertyandtenurehasbeen

imposed.108Thisrepresentsanothernegativeincentiveforagriculturalproduction.As

commentedbyaforeignjournalistfollowingCubanagriculturecloselyduringmany

years:“Whilefarmersinothercountriesaresubsidized,inCubatheywillnowbetaxed

evenmore—thatwillnotboostproduction”.109

Indicator1.3:Fromstate-regulatedtomarket-basedcommercialisation.

Themarketreformsduringseveralyearsresultedinagrowingshareofreported

productionbeingsoldoutsideofstatechannels.Thepreviouslycompulsorystatebuying

institutionCentrodeAcopio,infamousforitsinefficiency,wasgraduallyandsignificantly 108”Sepagaránimpuestossobreusoytenenciadetierras”,EFE(Havana),27.09.17.109FernandoRavsberg:”Laburocraciaagrariavuelveasabotearlaproducción”,CartasdesdeCuba29.09.17:http://cartasdesdecuba.com/la-burocracia-agraria-vuelve-a-sabotear-la-produccion/

153

scaleddown,andthepercentagereportedtobesoldthroughthestatefellfromabout

80%beforethereformswereintroducedtoabout50%,therestgoingthroughnon-state

channels.Butthenagain,asaconsequenceofthenewtighteningofstatecontrols

introducedin2016(seelater),thissituationwasreversedandfarmersagainwere

obligedtosellthelargerpartoftheirproductstothestate.110

Theflip-floppingpolicieswithwholesalemarketsarequiteillustrativeofhow

complicatedtheissueoffoodsaleschannelshasbeen,andhowdifficultithasbeento

implementthispartofthe2011Guidelines.

ThefirstlargewholesalemarketnearHavana,outsideofRanchoBoyero,emergedmore

orlessspontaneouslyin2012,withoutreallybeinglegalisedbutmostlytolerated.

ProductsnotonlyfromHavana´sneighbourdistrictsbutarrivinginlorriespractically

fromtheentirecountry,weresoldbyrepresentativesofcooperativesorother

middlemen,tothousandsofdifferentprivateoutletsaroundthecapital:stateand

privatemarkets,streetvendors(theso-calledcarretilleros),andtothehundredsof

privaterestaurants(paladares)poppingupinHavanaandotherCubancities.

Thenthefirstlegalandofficialnon-statemarket,ElTrigal,wasopenedveryclosetothis

informalmarketin2014.Similarmarketswereauthorizedinthetwoexperimental

provincesofArtemisaandMayabeque(nearHavana).Theseweredeclaredtobe

pilots,111butplanstosetupsimilarmarketselsewhereinthecountrywerenever

followedupinpracticeuntilalsoElTrigalwasclosedagaininMay2016afterheavy

criticismintheofficialpressfor“legalviolations,badmanagement,corruption,lackof

control”.112Withthenewrestrictionsagainstself-employmentbeingannouncedin

August2017,adecisionwastakenthatnonewpermitswouldbegiventosell

agriculturalproductsneitherinwholesalenorinretail,includingthroughcarretilleros.

Thismustbeinterpretedasapermanentbanonprivatewholesaleagriculturalmarkets

110AccordingtoFrank(2013:270),chiefreformmanagerMurillo,inaspeechtoAsambleaNacionalinJuly2012,saidthatstateshareoffoodsaleshadfallenfrom80toaround50%.ThelatestfigurewasstillquotedbyArmandoNovaearlyin2016(ref.interviewFeb2016).Othersources(e.g.Ravsberg)claimedithadagainrisento80%in2017.Itisprobable,however,thatamajorpartoftheagriculturalproductsissoldthroughinformalchannelsandnotreportedinstatistics. 111DuringtheParliamentsessioninDecember2015,ministerofEconomyandPlanningMarinoMurillodeclaredthatwholesalemarketsforfoodproductsshouldbeestablishedinordertoselltoprivaterestaurantsatprices”20%belowthoseattheretailmarkets”(Granma,21.12.15).11214ymedio,16.05.16,quotingCubadebate.

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inCuba,andadrasticreductionofprivateretailfoodsales(limitedtothoseexistingat

thetime).

Thelackofwholesaleaccessforagriculturalimplementsrepresentsanevenmore

seriousproblem.TheonlypilotexperienceinIsleofYouthprovincehasnotbeen

repeatedanywhereelseinthecountry.113

Accesstotransporthasbeenanothercriticalfactorfornon-stateproducers,going

throughmuchofthesamezigzaggingmovements.

Whileactionwasnevertakenondecisivepartsofthereformagendareferredtoabove,

andnowappeartobefurtherawayfromimplementationthanever,thingsare

happeningintheinformalCubanreality,fastoutdistancinglegality.Productiongoods

andimplementsarebeingsoldandboughtontheblackmarket;foodproductsarebeing

increasinglysoldoutsideofofficialstateandotherlegalchannels,e.g.,tohotelsand

restaurants(notablytoprivatepaladares).Althoughthestateinmostofthecountry

maintainsaformalmonopoly,informalprivatewholesalemarketshaveemergedaround

majorurbanareas;itiscommontoseeconsiderablenumbersofworkersharvesting

privatepropertycrops;creditinconvertiblecurrencyisbeingfrequentlyobtainedby

privateproducers(e.g.throughfamilyremittances),thuspermittingfarminginmuch

largerscalethanonecouldexpectfromformalregulation.

Althoughcapitalaccumulationhasbeenprohibited(seediscussionlater),thereisno

doubtthatmanysuccessfulprivatefarmershavemanagedtoaccumulateconsiderable

amountsofcash—eveninconvertiblecurrency—butwithoutaccesstoconvertitto

productivepurposes.Thismayalsobeajustificationforthenewabove-mentionedtax

beingimposedin2018.Foot-draggingisthedominantofficialresponsetodemandsfor

reform,stoppingpeasantsandfarmersfromreallyleapingwholeheartedlyintoa

qualitativelydifferentproductionmode.

Oneofthecontroversialissuesregardingagricultureandcooperativepoliciesisabout

accesstoformso-calledcooperativesofseconddegree,ameasurethatcouldhave

113SeemoreaboutthedilemmaofwholesalemarketsunderIndicator2.4.

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increasedtheeconomicandpoliticalstrengthandtherebyalsothepotentialpolitical

autonomyofthemembers.Thisprinciplewasexplicitlypermittedinthe6thPCC

CongressGuidelines(G-29),supportingthecreationofsecondarycooperatives,opening

fortheemergenceofmarketingcooperatives,bothforfoodstuffandagriculturalinputs,

basedonalreadyexistingcooperativeorganisations.Suchinnovationshavesofarnot

beenallowed(seeamoregeneraldiscussionofcooperativesunderIndicator2.7).

Thegovernmentisunwillingtoallowmoreindependentandautonomousformsof

organisationamongpeasantsandfarmers,stilldependingonahighlycentralisedand

stronglyParty-loyalANAP(NationalAssociationofSmallFarmers)withits200,000

members.SomehadexpectedtheANAPCongressin2015torepresentastepawayfrom

itsroleasaninstrumentoftheParty,inthedirectionofreallyrepresentingthe

increasingindependentstatusofpeasantsandfarmers.Thisdidnothappen.The

reluctanceofANAPtosupportopportunitiesforindividualfarmerswasagainconfirmed

whentheObamaadministrationduringthebilateralUS-Cubantalksfornormalising

relationsopenedupforimportofprivatelyproducedcoffee,thusofferinganexception

fromthetradeembargo.TheresponsefromANAP’sNationalBureauwas:

“TheobjectiveofsuchmeasuresistoinfluencetheCubanpeasantrytoseparateitselffrom

theState”,andthatthis“couldnotbepermittedsinceitwoulddestroyarevolutionary

processhavingprovidedtheparticipatorydemocracy,liberty,sovereigntyand

independence”.114(S/E)

Talkingtopeasantsandfarmersacrossthecountry,itisnotdifficulttoperceivean

increasingimpatiencewiththelackofarealinterestgroupadvocacyvis-à-visStateand

Party.AsexpressedbyPedroAntonioAlonsoPérez,oneofthefoundersofaself-

proclaimedindependentCCScooperativenamedTransiciónintheSantiagoprovincein

1997andheadofasmallstudycenter:

“ItisobviousthatANAPneitherrepresentsnordefendstheinterestsoftheCuban

(agricultural)producers.Itspurposesandobjectivesaretorepresenttheinterestsofthe

CommunistPartyandthegovernmentinpower.”115(S/E)

114Quotedby14ymedio,5.05.16.115QuotefrominterviewpublishedinASCECubanEconomicNewsClippingsService,ReleaseNo526,6.01.12,p.155.ItisinterestingtonotethattheANAPPresidentduring25years,OrlandoLugoFonte,who

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Thetwogovernment-employedagriculturaleconomistsquotedthroughoutthischapter

seemtobeofthesameopinion,astheyemphasizetheneedtopermithorizontal

organisationofpeasantsandfarmers.116

Aquestionraisedbytheleft-wingcriticofCuba’sgovernment,SamuelFarber,in2006

seemstobemorerelevantthanever:

“Mayweseeagricultureasastrategicandmoresmall-scale/democraticentrepreneurial

alternativetothemilitaryentrepreneurship—unlessthemilitaryalsomovesintotake

controlthere?Thequestioniswhetherthesurvivalissueofenhancedfoodproductionwill

obligetheopeningupoffamilyagriculturewithassociatedentrepreneurialfunctions”

(Farber:2006).

Indicator1.4:De-bureaucratizationofagriculture.

Whensomeofthereformproposalshaveslowlybeenputinplace,ithasmostoften

beenagainstheavyresistanceandbarriers(trabas)fromthehugeagriculture

bureaucracyinthecountry.ThepeasantorganisationANAPisgenerallyseenaspartof

thisbureaucracy,ratherthanworkingasaninterestorganisationforthepeasants.But

themainbureaucraticinstrumenthasbeentheMinistryofAgriculture(MINAG)on

national,stateandmunicipallevel,andnotleasttheadministrationofstate-dominated

cooperativesandlocalbuyingmonopolies(CentrosdeAcopio).Paradoxically,the

decentralisationthathasbeentakingplaceintheagriculturesector—withthesupposed

purposeofcuttingbureaucraticredtape—mayhavemadethingsevenworse,by

strengtheninglocalpowerstructuresbuiltuparoundthestate´sagriculturalmonopoly,

andtheirbosses(Frank2013:261-264).117

wasatthesametimememberoftheConsejodelEstadoandtheCentralCommitteeofthePCC,wasrelievedofthisfunctioninSeptember2012.ItcameasadeceptiontomanythatthenewANAPPresident,FélixGonzálezViego,previouslyprovincialANAPPresidentinVillaClara,nevertookanyinitiativetowardsarenovationoftheorganization,asmanyhadhoped.116GarciaandNova,2014. 117Basedoninterviewswithlocalfarmers,thisveteranCubacorrespondentdescribeshowthisworksinpractice,insituationswherethestatemonopolyonagriculturalsuppliesandcommercialisationinmostruralareasistheonlysignificantbusiness,andtraditionalbossesareafraidoflosingtheirprivileges,positionsandpowers.Thismayexplainmuchoftheresistanceagainstthenecessaryreformsthatwediscussinthefollowing.Interestingly,thesameveterancorrespondentinHavanareportedseveralyears

157

Forthelackofsurveydata,itmaybedifficulttoanalyseinobjectivetermshowthe

peasantsandfarmersperceivetheagriculturebureaucracyfunctions.Thepreviously

quotedconclusionthatmorethanhalfofthefoodproductionislostbeforeitreachesthe

consumersisoneillustrationofthis.Wehaveobservedonseveraloccasionsthat

specificproductsareunavailableinHavana,whiletheyhavebeenharvestednotfar

away,butgettinglostwhilewaitingforstate-organisedtransport.118

Apotential“bigbang”inagriculturalorganisationwasannouncedin2014,whenthe

MinisterofAgriculturedeclaredthatAcopios(formallyknownasUniónNacionalde

Acopio(UNA)),wouldbeclosedandthatasmuchas6,000‘agriculturalbureaucrats’

(41%ofadministrativepersonnelatalllevelsoftheMinistry,ANAP,state-dominated

cooperativesetc.)wouldbefired.119Thiscouldpotentiallyhavehaddeepimpact.It

seemstobethecasethatthebureaucraticburdenwithwhichpeasantsandfarmers

havebeenstrugglinghasbeenparticularlyheavyatlocallevels.Butthisannouncement

hasneverbeenimplementedtoanysignificantdegree.

Allinall,therehavebeenimportanteffortstomodifytheagriculturalproductionand

distributionstructureoverthelatestyears,butagainststrongresistance.

NovaconcludesthatthereisnotyetarealrecognitionofmarketrequirementsinCuban

agriculture.In2013,hesummedupthestateofaffairsinCubanagricultural

transformationsasfollows:

“Itisevidentthatproductiveforcesintheagriculturalsectorarestilldetained.The

eliminationoftheobstaclesthatareslowingdowndevelopmentisrequired.Transformation

earlier(2008)aboutRaúlCastro‘sbureaucraticdecentralisationinagriculture(Reuters,Havana,1.05.08,op.cit).118OneconcreteexamplewasinMarch2011whentomatoeswerenowheretobuyinHavana,whiletheyaboundedoncooperativefarmsinGüines,only50kmsoutheastofHavana,allegedlybeingstuckforlackoftransport.Asimilarsituationwasdescribedin2017:“CubaandItsRottingTomatoes”:https://www.havanatimes.org/?p=124319.TheUruguayanjournalistFernandoRavsberg,throughhisblogCartasdesdeCuba,reportsregularlyontheoverwhelmingbureaucraticbarriersexperiencedbyCubanfarmersandpeasants.Seeforinstance:“WhatCubaLosesBecauseofitsIncompetentFarmBureaucracy”,CartasdesdeCuba,19.10.17:http://cartasdesdecuba.com/what-cuba-loses-because-of-its-incompetent-farm-bureaucracy/ 119Martinoticias.com,5.07.2014.

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ofproductionrelationsinthissector,sostrategicfortheCubaneconomy,shouldcontinueto

accelerateasmuchaspossible”.120(S/E)

Afterthisstatementwasmade,developmenthasratherbeengoinginthecontrary

direction.

Indicator1.5:Strengtheningoffamilyfarming.

Onamoregenerallevel,itmayseemthatCubanagricultureismovingtowardsadual-

tracksystem:foodforthedomesticmarketisincreasinglyproducedatmiddle-size

familyfarms,whereastheplantationandagro-exporteconomy(historicallycompletely

dominatedbysugar,laterwithanimportantcitruscomponent)dominatedbylarge

statefarmssomeofwhichundermilitarycorporationmanagement,hasbeendrastically

reducedinimportance.Therehasbeenanambitiontoattractforeigninvestmenttothe

agro-exportsectorandalsocombiningitwithbio-energyproduction;sofarwithlimited

success.Theexceptiontothispatternistheproductionoftwoexportproducts,coffee

andparticularlytobacco,whichremainsmostlyinthehandsofprivatefarmers,while

theentireexportchainistightlycontrolledbythestate.

AswesawinTable6.1,therelativelyindependentlandtenuredominatedbysmall-scale

landholdingsincreasedquitedramaticallyduringthefirstyearsoftheRaúlCastroera

(althoughithasdroppedagainduringthelatestcoupleofyears),alsoreflectinga

strengtheningoffamilyfarmingattheexpenseoflarge-scalecashcropproduction.The

continuedresistancetoprovideagriculturalproducerswithmoreautonomyand

incentives,however,hasnotpermittedfamilyfarmingtoexploititscomparative

advantagestodrasticallyincreaseCuba’sfoodself-sufficiency,particularlyofstaple

goods.

Indicator1.6:Sufficientproductiontosupplyurbanareasataffordableprices?

Cubaisstillfarfrommeetingthemarketconditionsinagriculture,andthelatest

statisticalinformationconfirmsthatthemodestagriculturalreformshavefailedto

120Ibid:152-153.

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boostproduction.Accordingtopublicstatistics,theproductionoutputforsomekey

staplefoodproductshadthefollowingevolutionforthe2009-2016period:121

• Cowmilk:plus2%

• Cattle:plus3%

• Rice:minus9%

• Corn:plus32%

• Beans:plus35%

• Egg:nochange

• Potatoes:minus66%

• Tomatoes:minus36%

• Onions:minus31%

Theoveralltrendisthatproductionofbeansandcornhasincreasedsignificantly;

potatoes,tomatoesandonionshavefailedmiserably;whileproductionofrice,milk,

cattlemeatandegghasbeenmoreorlessmaintained.

Anothertrendtonoteisthatthe2016productionwasbelowthe1989production—

beforethe‘specialperiod’,forsevenkeyproducts.122Thefollowingconclusionis

unavoidable:Cubanagriculturenevertookofftoreachself-sufficiencybeforetheRaúl

Castroreformera,andtheRaúlCastrodecadereformsalsofailedwithitsintentionsto

takethedecisivestepforwardtofeedtheCubanpeoplefromdomesticproduction.

Asimilarlydisappointingtrendisthattheproductionfailurealsohasledtoconstantly

risingfoodprices.Itwasreportedtowardstheendof2015thatthepriceforabasketof

themostcommonfoodproductshadincreasedby49percentbetween2010andearly

2015,123tolevelsthatonlythenewgroupsofaffluentCubanscouldafford.Economy

121ThesecalculationsarebasedonONEAnnualReports2012(Tables9.9,9.18,9.19,9.22,9.23)and2016(Tables9.10,9.18,9.19,9.23).Therearequitesignificantvariationsin productionfromoneyeartotheother,sothesetrendsmayvarydependingonwhichyearsarecompared.122PrivateinformationfromMesa-Lago,20.01.18.123AccordingtoanarticleintheofficialnewspaperJuventudRebelde,quotedbyMarcFrankinaReutersarticlerightafterthe7thPartyCongressinApril2016.

160

MinisterMurilloclaimedearlyin2016—hardlyexaggerating—thatlowincomeCubans

spend75%oftheirsalaryonfood.124

ItisquitetellingthattheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)during2015-2018hasa

programmebenefitting900,000personsin43municipalitiesandsixprovincesaround

thecountry.125

Thesenegativeproductionandpricefiguresmustbeverydisappointingforthe

government.ThisstandsinstarkcontrasttoChinaandVietnam,wherefarmore

consistentmarketreformsinagriculturehaveledtoimpressiveproductionsuccess.

Thereducedproduction,accompaniedbyincreasingprices,havelaterbeenquotedas

mainmotivesforreformreversalsandreturnofstatecontrolincommercialisation.

Indicator1.7:Reducedimportdependency?

Theamountofhardcurrencyspentonfoodimports,standingat1,863millionUSDin

2011,hassincefluctuatedbetween1.7and2billionUSD.Therearemanywaysto

calculatethedegreeofimportdependency;ifwetakethevalueofagro-exportinto

considerationitwillbeabout60-65%.126ItmustthereforebeconcludedthatCuba’s

dependenceonfoodimportsandtheamountthecountryisspendingontheseimports,

havehardlybeenreducedduringthereformperiod.

Thisfactbecomesparticularlyparadoxicalifwecomparethepricespaidbythestateto

whatthestatehastopaywhenimportingthesameproducts:whentakingthedistorted

Cubancurrencyratesintoaccount,thestatepaysthedomesticproducersonlyaround

124InformationbasedonnewscablefromThomsonreuter,Havana,21January2016:”Inareversal,Cubatriespricecontrolstotamefoodinflation.”125PrensaLatina,27.01.18. 126ONE2016,Table8.10fortheperiod2011-2016;for2017:OmarEverlenyPérez:”RetosyresultadosparaCubadesde2017”,PregresoSemanalWeekly5.01.18,reprintedinAsceNewsNo.786).For2017,itisestimatedthatthevalueoffoodimportswillascendto2billionUSD,andfoodisrepresentinganincreasingshareofCuba’stotalimportvalue–17.3%in2016(ArmandoNova:“LaalimentaciónenCubaunavariableestratégicanoresuelta.Elpronosticadoestancamientodelaproducciónagropecuariaalfinalizar2017tendráunimpactodesfavorableenlaeconomíanacional”,inCaminoalandar,13.11.17).

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45%ofthepriceforimportedbeans,30%forriceand20%formilk.127Sothebig

questionis:whyisthestatenotwillingtopaybetterpricestodomesticproducers,and

generallyincentivisedomesticproductionmore,whensohugeamountsofforeigncurrency

arespentonfoodimports?

Thecounter-reformstartingin2016alsoaffectedtheagriculturalsectorverydirectly

(seeIndicator9.3).

127Nova(2013i:152),Table5.

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Challenge 2:

Loosening of state control and dominance of the economy – growth of non-state

economy – aiming at sustained economic growth and employment generation

Indicator2.1:Explicitpoliticalwilltode-monopolisethestateeconomy?

TheCubanregimehasrepeatedlymadeitclearthatmaintenanceof‘socialism’means

rejectionof‘capitalism’andmarketeconomy.

Theprivate(or,asofficiallyreferredto,non-state)sectorthatisallowed,isbasedon

individualsholdingpersonallicensestoworkwithinanumberofpre-definedself-

employmentcategories,plusprivatesmall-scalefarmersandcooperativesofdifferent

kinds.PrivateenterpriseswithlegalstatusforinstanceintheformofSMEs,areuntil

nownotlegallyrecognised.LegalisationofSMEswasapprovedinprinciplebythe

NationalAssemblyinmid-2017,butitmaytakealongtimeforthistobe

implemented.128

Comprehensiveprivatepropertyarrangementslikethosepermitted(andencouraged)

undertheChinese“socialistmarketeconomy”ortheVietnamese“socialist-oriented

marketeconomy”havesofarbeenrejected,althoughthereisanobviousadmirationfor

theeconomicsuccessofthese“socialistbrother”societies.AsdeclaredbyRaúlCastroin

hisreporttothe7thPartyCongress:

“Theintroductionofrulesforsupplyanddemandisnotatoddswiththeprincipleof

planning.Eitherconceptmayco-existandcomplementeachothertothebenefitofthe

country,ashasbeensuccessfullydemonstratedintheprocessesofeconomicreforminChina

128Areform-mindedCubanlawprofessor,NarcisoCobo,hasgonethroughthenecessaryconstitutionalandlegal“updating”thatwouldberequiredinordertodistinguishbetween“empleadores”y“contratistas”etc.,andaccommodatethenewprivatesectorasformalpartoftheCubaneconomy(includingdistinctionbetweenemployers’associationsandunions):NarcisoCobo:“Cuentapropismoypequeñaempresa:unamiradadesdeelDerecho”,CubaPosible,18.01.16(reprintedinASCENewsNo.698).Accordingtoaprivatesource,thelegalizationofprivatecompanieswouldfirstrequireaconstitutionalreform,andalsothere-writingofseveralspecificlaws.AsthepoliticalsituationinCubaisnow,therewouldbeheavyresistanceagainstthistohappenforthetimebeing.

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andrenovationinVietnam,astheyqualifyit.Wehavecalledit‘updating’,becausewearenot

goingtochangethefundamentalobjectiveoftheRevolution”(Castro2016:10)(S/E).

TherealityinCubaisthatmostenterprisedevelopmentthattakesplacebeyondthe

individualorfamilylevel(andasweshalldiscussinalatersectionthatisquite

considerable)isinprincipleinformalandinmanycasesalsoillicit.

Earlieroninthereformprocess,therewereexpectationsfrommanyobserversthata

dual-trackmodelmightbecomearealisticoptioninthecaseofCubanbusiness

structure,followingtheexampleofVietnam.

Therehasneverbeenanydoubtthatthestrategicsectorsoftheeconomy(sugarwith

derivatives,petroleum,nickel,bigtourismcorporations,andagricultureexport

includingprivatelyproducedtobaccoandcoffee),woulddefinitelycontinuetobe

controlledbythestate,inmanycasesbymilitary-controlledcorporations.Untilanew

foreigninvestmentregimewasintroducedin2013and2014,foreigndirectinvestment

(FDI)hadbeenexclusivelyconcentratedinthesesectors(althoughthesugarsectorwas

untilafewyearsagoblockedforforeigninvestment),plusacoupleofdomestic

consumptionsectors(Nestlé´sicecreamproductionprobablybeingthemostimportant

exampleofthis).

Iftherewasaclearinitialintentiontode-monopolisethestateeconomyandstrengthen

themarketeconomy,itappearedthatthisintentionevaporatedtowardstheendofthe

Raúlera.

FirstVicePresidentDíaz-Canel,inhisinternalpep-talktoPartyleadersinFebruary

2017—laterleakedtothepublic—waspaintingaparodicimageofproposalsforthe

introductionofmarketreforms,inrealityincludingthoseproposedbyhisown

President,andevenmorebyrolemodelslikeVietnamandChina.Takingstockofsuch

proposalsin2017,theconventionalwisdomapparentlyconsolidatingatthetopofthe

CubanCommunistPartywasthatthereisnosuchthingasgradualandcautiousmarket

reformsthatcouldtakeplaceevenwithinasolidstateregulatoryframework:itiseither

thecontinuationofthestatusquoorareturntoBatista:

164

“Whatarethey(i.e.thosearguingformarketreforms,author’scomment)talkingaboutwhen

theintentionistoimposeaplatformforthecapitalistandneo-liberalrestoration?ForCuba–

asweallunderstand–thiswouldmeanareturntotheCubawehadbefore1959.What

wouldthismeanforCuba?Wewouldloseallsocialconquests,everythingwouldbe

privatized,therewouldbeanenormousde-motivation,alienation,de-politization.This

wouldmeanabreakwithourvaluesrelatedtoouridentityasacountry,aboveallour

culturalidentity(…)Wheneveryouhearanybodysayingthatwedon´tneedastate

institution,theyaremountinganeo-liberalplatform.Onewhobelievesthatthestateisnot

necessaryinoursocietyisproposingsomethingbasedonneo-liberalism.”129(S/E)

Itishardtofindanybodyamongindependenteconomistsorcivilsocietyactors–except

forthemostpro-capitalistdissidentsontheislandandinthediaspora–whowouldeven

thinkofatotalprivatizationandareturntoBatista-eraeconomics.Ratherthanengaging

inaseriousdialoguewiththosearguingfornecessaryreformsoftheCubaneconomy,

thePartyleadershipafter2016seemstohavebouncedbacktoabunkermentalityof

rejectinganyneedforreforms,withoutconsideringalternativestostatusquo.

Indicator2.2:Increasingde-regulationofstatecompanies?

RaúlCastroatthe6thPartyCongresscalledfor:

"[T]hegradualdecentralizationoffaculties,fromtheCentralGovernmenttolocal

administrationsandfromministriesandothernationalentitiesinfavourofthegrowing

autonomyofthesocialiststateenterprise.Theexcessivelycentralizedmodelthatcurrently

characterizesoureconomymustchange,withorderanddisciplineandwiththeparticipation

ofworkers,towardsadecentralizedsystem"(Castro2011)(S/E).

Newlegislationintroducedin2013—inprinciplebutperhapsnotsomuchinpractice—

providedmoreautonomytostatecompanies.Ministrieswerebasicallylettinggooftheir

previousbusinessresponsibilities,settingupholdingcompanieswithpropercontrolof

annualplans.Theywouldbeallowedtosellexcessproductionattheopenmarketand

keepasmuchashalfoftheirprofitsforre-investment.Ifthatwasthecarrot,therewas

129http://www.diariodecuba.com/cuba/1503707216_33520.html

165

alsoaveryvisiblestick:thosestatecompanieswhichcontinuedrunningatalosswould

havetobeclosed–ortobere-organisedascooperatives(seemoreaboutthislater).

However,itwassoonannouncedthatministerialcontrolwouldbesubstitutedbyan

intermediarybureaucraticlevel,anewinstitution,calledOrganizaciónSuperiorde

DirecciónEmpresarial(OSDE),andthatmuchoftheannouncedcorporateautonomy

thuswouldnotbeimplementedinpractice.AccordingtooneleadingCubanexperton

statecorporations,“[company]directorswill[still]belackingnecessaryconditionsto

assumerisksandpromoteinnovation”,and“companiesarestillmissingkeyinstruments

forthedevelopmentofproductiveforcesinsupportofeconomicgrowth”(Díaz

Fernandez2014).(S/E)

ItisevidentlyveryhardfortheCubanleadershiptogiveupthecommandeconomyand

toincreasetheautonomyofpubliclyownedfirms,althoughthereisanintentionto

separatestateandcompanyfunctions.MinisterofforeigninvestmentMalmiercastated

(November2016)thatstatecompanies“arecalledupontoconvertthemselvestomore

andmoreautonomouscompanies,totaketheirowndecisions”,sothattheStatemay

simplyregulatethemandbehavelikeastakeholder,butwithoutdirectingthem.130

AreportfromtheControllerGeneralrecognisedthatsixoutofeverytenstate

companiesareassessedasbeingina“deficientorbad”state.131Statecompanieswere

reportedtoreceiveatotalof650millionUSDinstatesubsidiescompensatingforlosses

in2013,132hardlysustainableunderthecountry´spresenteconomicconditions.

Probablyverymuchasaresultofthis,thenumberofstatecompanies(knownasOEEs–

organizacioneseconómicasestatales)hasbeenratherdramaticallyreduced:thetotal

numberofOEEshasbeenreducedby37%between2009and2017(from2886to

1811).133Alargenumberofthesecompanieshavebeenoutsourcedtousufructuariosor

convertedtocooperatives.Evidently,muchremainstobedone.

130SpeechatHavanaInternationalTradeFair,quotedby14ymedio,2.11.16(S/E). 131“AuditoríasevidencianproblemasenaplicacióndeLineamientosenempresascubanas”.Cubadebate,31demarzode2016:http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2016/03/31/auditorias-evidencian-problemas-en-aplicacion-de-lineamientos-en-empresas-cubanas/#.WgRRMjtrxaQ132AccordingtoformerMinisteroftheEconomyJoséLuisRodríguez,2014i:“Cubaylacomplejatransformacióndelaempresaestatal”,publishedonthewebsiteCubaContemporánea07.08.2014.133SeeONEI2016Table4.1.Seealso:”Lasreformasenlasempresasestatalescubanas”,ElíasAmorBravo:Cuba-economía,11.01.18,basedonstatisticspublishedbyONEI.

166

There-organisationofstatecompanieswasexpectedtobeofparticularimportancefor

suchsectorsaspetroleumandnickel,withCUPETandUnióndelNiqueloperatingas

independentbusinessentitiesoutsideofthenationalbudgetsandaccounts134,both

reportingtotherecentlycreatedMINEM–MinisteriodeEnergíayMinas.Intheslowly

recoveringsugarindustry,thepreviouslysopowerfulSugarMinistrywasabolished,

givingwaytoaholdingcompany(GrupoEmpresarialdelaAgroindustriaAzucarera)

withits26subsidiariesreplacingtheministry´sprevious139companies.

InordertointerpretthedirectioninwhichtheCubaneconomicsystemwillbemoving

inthepost-Castroera,itmaybeindicativetowatchwhetherthesemoreautonomous

statecorporations—theonesownedbythemilitaryoroperatedasholdingcompanies

supervisedbyministries.Willtheygraduallypermittheirtopmanagementorotherhigh

state,partyormilitaryofficials(thenomenclature)toobtainpropertyinterestandnot

onlymanagementpositionsinthesecorporations?Patternsinthisregardhavebeen

differentintheprivatizationprocessinRussiaandotherpreviouslysocialistcountries

(ref.Chapter4.8.3).Sofar,itistooearlytojudgeinthecaseofCuba.Aclearindicationof

thiswillonlybevisibleinthepost-2018or-2021period.

Onesectorofveryspecialinterestistelecommunication,withthemonopolypositionof

ETECSA,oneofthestatecompaniespresentlycontributingmostcashtothestatecoffers,

withanassumedvaluein2014of3billionUSD.135ETECSAfallsunderthecontrolof

MinisteriodeComunicaciones(previouslyMinisteriodeInformáticayComunicaciones)

(MIC).136Thecompanyhasbeeninanenviablepositiontogrowastheaccessto

telecommunication(viamobilephonesandinternet)hasbeenexplodingsincemobile

telephoneswerecarefullypermittedfrom2008.137

134UnióndelNickeloperatesinajointventurewithGeneralNickelCo.S.A.,adaughtercompanyoftheCanadiancorporationSherrit.135ThisandthefollowinginformationaboutETECSAisbasedonMorales,2014.136TheownershipstructureofETECSAisasfollows:51%TelefónicaAntillana(100%ownedbyMinistryofCommunications,underministerMaimirMesaRamos),27%Rafin(thenon-bankfinancialbranchofGaesa).Politburomemberandre-electedVicePresidentoftheStateCouncil,RamiroValdeshadthesuperiorpoliticalresponsibilityforthetelecommunicationsector(plusenergyandmining). 137In2003,therewereonly43,000mobiletelephonelinesinCuba;in2014thenumberhadincreasedtoalmost2million(sourceasabove);3millionwerereachedin2015,4millionattheendof2016and5million(representing43%ofthepopulation)inApril2018(14ymedio12.05.18:

167

Lookingonlyatpre-paidmobiletelephoneusage,itiscalculatedthatETECSAduringthe

firstsixyearssince2008hadincomesamountingto2billionUSD.Diasporafamily

memberspickupmorethanhalfofthetelephonebills.Growingtourismisanothermain

source.OneveryinterestingthingaboutETECSAisthatitisprovidingcrucialserviceto

thecountry´sself-employed,inadditiontoprovideemploymenttoalargenumberof

cuentapropistas:agentssellingprepaidtelephoneticketsisactuallyoneofthemost

numerousgroups(5%)ofself-employed.

ButperhapsmoreimportantisthefactthatETECSAisprovidingthosecommunication

servicesthateffectivelyarebreakingdownthestate´sinformationmonopoly.Itsuffices

tovisitoneoftheWi-Fiareasatnighttoobservethethrivingsearchforrealitiesbeyond

Cubanshores.

Sothisisaveryprofitablemonopolystatebusinessthatatthesametimemaybe

underminingmonopolystatepower.

Indicator2.3:Continueddominanceofmilitarycorporations?

Theprominentroleofmilitary-controlledcorporationsintheCubaneconomydates

backtotheSpecialPeriodinthe1990s.Inthedeepemergencyfollowingthedemiseof

theUSSR,thearmedforces(FAR)underRaúlCastro´sleadershipwerecalledontoplay

akeyroleindealingwiththecrisis.Inthefirstplace,themilitarywouldhavetofeed

itselfandhelpfeedthenation.Itdidnottakelongbeforethemilitarywerebasicallyself-

sufficientinfood,accordingtooneclaimreaching80-90percentoftheirconsumption

(Klepak2012:58).138Additionally,theywouldhavetopioneereffortsinearningforeign

exchange.Themilitarybudgetwascutdramatically,thenumberoftroopsaswell,and

Cuba—shortlyafterpullingitstroopsoutofAngola—basicallygaveupits

internationalistmilitaryrole.Manyoftheleadingmilitaryofficerswereinthissituation

re-trainedincorporatemanagementandre-deployedtotakeonmanagementrolesin

statecorporations.Whenitwashesitantlydecidedtoopenthecountrytomassive http://www.14ymedio.com/cienciaytecnologia/Cuba-millones-moviles-America-Latina_0_2417158264.html).138CitinganinterviewwithGeneralJoséRamónFernández.

168

foreigntourism,asawayofmeetingthecrisis,thenewtourismcorporations(the

Cubanacánchainwasprobablythefirst)werelefttomilitaryofficerstomanage.This

wasalsowhenthelatersodominantBusinessAdministrationGroup,GAESA,was

establishedwithRaúlCastro´sdeputydefenceministerasthehead.But,very

significantly,thesemilitarymenturnedbusinessleadersdidnotretirefromthearmed

forces:

“Hundredsofofficers,insteadofsimplyfacingretirementintheseverydifficulttimes,were

givennewandtestingjobsandalargenumbercouldberetainedinuniformwhiletakingon

suchemployment.Indeed,givingthemthesepositionswhiletheywerestillservinginthe

forceswasconsideredessentialastheycouldthenremainactiveandsubjecttomilitary

disciplineandjusticeuntiltheirretirement,thusremainingvisiblymilitary;additionally,the

governmentcouldavoidtheaccusationofgivingplumcivilianjobstoformermilitary

officers”(Klepak2012:66).

Earlyin1985,theSoviet-styleenterpriseplanningsystem(calledSistemadeDireccióny

PlanificacióndelaEconomía)collapsed.TheArmedForcesthenmovedtointroduceits

ownSistemadePerfeccionamientoEmpresarial,SPE(enterpriseimprovementsystem).

TheSPEwasresponsibleforthemanagementofthecountry´smajormilitary-industrial

complexes(e.g.ErnestoGuevarainManicaragua,VillaClara),undertheresponsibilityof

GeneralCasasRegueiro,reportingdirectlyandpersonallytothethenMinisterofthe

ArmedForces,RaúlCastro.RaúlCastroqualifiedthisas“themosttranscendentaland

thedeepestchangeintheeconomy”todate,applyingcapitalistmanagementformswith

corporations,jointsharecompanies,andmanagementcontractswithforeign

corporations.TheSPEbecameavitalsurvivalinstrumentduringthe‘SpecialPeriod’of

the1990s.In1994,pressuredbythedeteriorationoftheeconomicsituation,Fidel

CastroacceptedthatagroupofcompaniesundertheMinistryofBasicIndustryonan

experimentalbasisjoinedtheSPE.Soon,100ofthesecompaniesbecamepartoftheSPE,

andthe5thCongressofthePCCin1997(thelastunderFidel´sleadership)approved

SPEasitseconomicstrategy.

Oneimportantimplicationofthisarrangementisthatitseemstohavebeenquite

effectiveinpreventinghigh-levelpersonalenrichmentandcorruption.ThetwoCastro

brothers’strongethicalprinciplesinthisregardarewellknown.Theseethicsseemto

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havepenetratedthemilitaryinstitution,and—atleastonthesurface—survivedinthe

newbusinessrolesofthere-educatedandre-deployedhigherofficers.Klepak(op.cit.)

saysthisimpressionispredominantamongseniorforeignbusinessmenworkingin

partnershiporjointventurewithmilitary-managedcorporations:

“[…][I]nconversationswithanynumberofseniorforeignexecutivesworkingwithCuban

seniorandnotsoseniorofficersinoronempresasmixtasissues,theoverwhelmingmajority

opinionisthatthoseofficersaregenerallyhonestandthatthedubiousapproachesforeign

firmshavetotakeinmostoftherestofLatinAmericararelyapplyinCuba”(Klepak

2012:76).139

Therehaveevidentlybeencaseswheresuchofficershavebeenfoundguiltyof

corruption.Butahigh-profileanti-corruptioncampaign,andseveralcasesoflongprison

sentences,sendaclearmessagethatthereisnoimpunityforhigh-levelcorruptionin

Cuba,contrastingdramatically—asweshallsee—withtheomnipresentpetty-

corruptioncultureintherestoftheCubaneconomy.Ifthissituationwillsurvivethe

Castrobrothersremainstobeseen.ThecloselinksbetweenCubanpolitical,military

andstatebusinessleadersandthoseresponsibleforextremecorruptionpracticesand

personalenrichmentincountrieslikeBrazil,Venezuela,AngolaandRussia,maypoint

towardsaverydifferentrent-seekingpracticeinthefuture.140

AftertenyearswithRaúlCastro´sreforms,andsoontwodecadesintothe21stcentury,

thereisnodoubtaboutthedominantroleplayedbymilitarycorporationsinthe

strategicandkeyareasoftheCubaneconomy,especiallythemostdynamicpartsofit

andthoselinkedtoforeigninvestments.Therehavebeentwoleadingmilitary

conglomerates:

139Thereareotheropinions.Atleastuntilaround2013therewasawidelyheldopinionamongforeignbusinessmenthathigh-levelcorruptionwasrampant(althoughprobablymostlyinnon-militarycorporations).Severalforeigninvestorsalsoendedupinprison,accusedofcorruption,alongwithhigh-levelpublicofficers.140RefthefollowingdocumentationofBrazilian-Cubanbusinessrelations,inmartinoticias.com(basedonBrazilianmediasources):https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrecht-cuba-parte-1/163876.html;https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrecht-cuba-parte-2/163884.html;https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrech-cuba-parte-3/165115.html.RegardingVenezuelantoppoliticians´spractices,seefollowingreportinElPaís:https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/12/13/actualidad/1513189655_511418.htmlEffortstoobtainmorerecentassessmentsofhigh-levelcorruptioninCuba,particularlyinmilitary-managedcorporations,havenogivenanyadditionalresponse.Itseemsthatnooutsidershaveinformationabouttheinternallifeofthesecorporationsortheirleaders.

170

• Cimex(CubanExport-ImportCorporation),Cuba’slargestfinancialand

commercialcorporation,saidtohavemorethan80companiesand25,000

employees;141

• Gaesa(BusinessAdministrationGroup),whichweshallcomebackto.

In2009thetwowerefusedintoone,whenGAESAtookoverCIMEX.

Thestrongestroleofthesemilitarycorporationsisobviouslyintourism,themost

dynamiceconomicsectorinCuba.AndthestrongestofallinthissectoristheGaviota

Group(seefigurebelow).

ThefollowingfigureshowsthepresentcompositionofCubaneconomicsectors,

consistingofGAESAfallingunderthecontroloftheMinistryoftheArmedForces,the

restoftheStatesector,andtheprivatesector.

141InformationbasedondifferentarticlesfromReuter’sHavanabureau,andaprivateinterviewwithaformermarketingdirectorofCimex,EmilioMorales,nowresidinginMiamiandheadingtheHavanaConsultingGroup.

171

Figure6.1:CompositionofCubaneconomicsectors(stateandnon-state):Figure 2

Source:Morales2017,Figura5:EstimatesmadebyHavanaConsultingGrouponthe

basisofofficialCubanstatisticsandownsources.

ThefollowingtwofiguresbreakdowntwoofthemainGAESAsubsidiaries,Almacenes

Universales(inchargeoftheMarielcomplex—whichwecomebacktounderChallenge

3)andGaviota(themainCubantouristcorporation):

172

Figure6.2:GAESASubsidiaryAlmacenesUniversales:Figure 3

173

Figure6.3:GAESASubsidiaryGaviotaCorporationFigure 4

Source:ArticleinASCENewsclippingsNo.692,12.01.16(withoutprovidingnameofany

specificauthor)elaboratedonthebasisofdataprovidedbyICEX(OficinaEconómicay

ComercialdeEspañaenLaHabana)andHalKlepak,2012.

174

AfteritstakeoverofCIMEXin2009,GAESAnowholdsaconglomeratewithabout60

companies,accordingtoMorales’estimatecontrollingmorethan20%oftheCuban

economy.

ThestrongestsectorforGAESAistourism,particularlythehotelbusiness.The2016

rankingofthemajor300hotelcompaniesworldwideshowstheGAESA-ownedgroup

Gaviotaclimbingto48thplaceworldwide,withatotalof28,163hotelrooms.142Annual

reportedgrowthoverthelateryearshasbeenaround10%.Theplan—atleastuntilthe

electionofPresidentTrump—wastoreachacapacityofaround50,000roomsby2020

inordertomeetthefastexpandingdemandparticularlyofUStourism.Theseplanswill

nowprobablyhavetobedowngraded,sinceGAESAhasbeenparticularlytargetedby

Trump’snewCubarestrictions.Addinganothergroup,Cubanacán,withacapacityof

around16,000hotelrooms,GAESAcombinedcontrolscloseto45,000rooms,thus

approachingthetop30hotelchainsworldwide.143

ThemoststrategicofGAESA’spropertiesmaybetheentireMarielcomplex,managedin

thenameofAlmacenesUniversales,withinthecontainerharbouratthespecial

developmentzone(ref.Challenge3).

Asymbolicallyimportantmilitarytakeoveroccurredin2016,whenthecompanywith

financialresponsibilityforthesuccessfulrenovationoftheUNESCO-renownedOld

Havana,Habaguanex,wasalsoincludedintheGAESA-empire.144Thepreviously

responsibleOfficeoftheHavanaHistorian(headedbyEusebioLealinanimpressive

efforttorehabilitatethiscolonialheritage)wasprobablynotveryhappywiththe

militarytake-over.Anun-identifiedrepresentativeoftheofficewasquotedassaying:

“Thisislikeacoupd’état.AnoffensetoLeal´sefforts…Speakingineconomicterms,

HabaguanexhasbeengrowingmuchmorethanGaviota,TRD(Gaesa-controlledtourist

shops),andallthemilitarycompaniestogether.Nobodycanrejecttheefficiencyofourwork

andourmarketingstrategy.Yesterday,[OldHavana]wasamarginalandpestilentialzone,

142http://www.hotelsmag.com/Search/Results/?SearchTerm=hotel%20ranking&SectionIDs[0]=2&SectionIDs[1]=12&SectionIDs[2]=714314ymedio6.01.16;ElNuevoHeraldo,31.01.16.144Atthetimeofthetake-over,thisconglomeratewasreportedtoinclude20hotels,56barsandcafeterias,39restaurantsandmorethan200specialisedtouristboutiques.

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borderingoncollapse.Therealitytodayisthatnotourist,beithead-of-state,diplomator

globalpersonalitycomingtothiscapitalavoidsvisitingOldHavana”145(S/E).

Afterthetake-over,therehavebeenreportsofhowtheallegedHabaguanexcorruption

casethatledGAESAtotakeover,hascontinuedandgrownconsiderablyworseunder

theresponsibilityofGAESA,andthatthetreatmentoftheprofessionalstaffhasbecome

muchworseandmorehaphazard.146

Whatthistake-overillustrates,isthatnoeconomicandperhapsnopoliticalpowerin

today´sCubacanmatchthatofGAESAandthemilitaryinstitution.147

Therestofthestate-ownedcompaniesareestimatedtocontrolaround60%ofthe

country´seconomy.Itisinterestingtonotethatthetwoleadingextractiveindustries

nickel(managedbyUnióndelNiquel)andoil(managedbyCUPET)—keysectorsfor

Cuba’seconomicfutureandinmanycountriesapreferredsourceofrent-seekingfor

militaryofficials—alongwiththetelecommunicationmonopolyETECSA,aresofarnot

controlleddirectlybythemilitarycorporations.Buttheyarenotexemptfrommilitary

influence:theyarepartofthePolitburoportfolioofRevolutionaryCommanderRamiro

Valdés,oneofthemainveteransofCuba´srevolutionary26ofJulymovement.As

mentioned—theGAESA-controlledfinancialinstitutionRafinhasa27%sharein

ETECSA.

Themanagersofcompaniesundertheseconglomerates,andperhapsparticularlythe

Marielcomplexandthetourismcompanies(Gaviotaandothers),maybegoingtoplaya

decisiveroleinthefutureCubaneconomyandindirectlyinthepoliticalstructures.The

sameisthecaseforthede-centralisedcorporationsCUPETandUnióndelNiquel,aswell

asinthenewsugarindustryconglomerateGrupoEmpresarialdelaAgroindustria

Azucarera.Thereisreasontobelievetheywillbeadvocatesforfurthermarketreforms,

butkeentosecurethatthestatecorporationskeepasmuchaspossiblecontrolvis-à-vis

145”El’Golpedeestado’delosmilitaresalimperiodeEusebioLeal–HabaguanexyotrasinstitucionesempresarialesdelHistoriadordelaCiudaddeLaHabanapasaronamanosdelasFAR”.MartíNoticias,JuanJuanAlmeida,1.08.16.146IndependentjournalistRolandoMartínez:”CORRUPCIÓN:ElverdaderorostrodeGAESAenelCascoHistóricohabanero”,21.06.17,reproducedinASCENewsclippings,No.760.147Forapresentationofprominentleaderswithinthemilitarycorporatesector,seeIndicator7.5.

176

non-stateactors.Thisisalsothecasewhenitcomestostrategicpartnershipswith

foreigninvestors,nowseriouslyhamperedbyPresidentTrump’sdecisiontoexclude

militarycorporationsfromanyUScollaborationwithCuba(seefurtherdiscussionunder

Challenge5).

Butoutsideofthesestrategicsectors,moststateindustriesandotherenterprisesare

moreorlessobsolete,andthisisexactlywheremassivedismissalsweresupposedto

takeplace.Byoutsourcingtousufructuariosorcooperatives,partofthedismissalshave

beenpostponed.

Indicator2.4:Transferofworkforcefromthepublicsectortoself-employment.

TheCubanlabourmarketisacomplicatedmixtureofstateandnon-state,formaland

informal,legalandillegalarrangements,whichweshalltrytoanalyseunderthisandthe

followingindicator.Thisdiscussionisutterlyrelevantfortheunderstandingofthe

entireeconomicreformprocess,andforthechangingsocialandpoliticalconstructionof

theCubansociety.

Fromtheoutsetoftheprocessto“updatesocialism”in2010-2011,partyleadersruled

outtheoptionofcedingsignificantpublicpropertytoprivatehands.Onlyminor

economicactivitiesweresupposedtopassovertothenon-statesector.148The

resistancetoallowmicrobusinessesdevelopintorealcompaniesshouldthereforecome

asnosurprise.

Still,foralongtime,thereseemedtobeagrowingacceptancethattheemergenceofat

leastmicroandevensmall-sizeprivatecompanieswasunavoidable,inspiteof

hesitationregardingtheprovisionofadequateincentivesforsmallentrepreneursand

148Thiswasrepeatedlymadeclearbythen-economyminister,laterheadofthecommissiontooverseetheimplementationofthe‘updating’plan(plandeactualización),MarinoMurillo,intherun-uptothe2011PartyCongress.HeevenstatedinNovember2010that”updatingshouldnotbemistakenwithreform”,since”reform”impliedcedingpropertytoprivatehands,whichhesaidwasnotontheagenda.(seeFrank,2013:230).

177

micro-small-mediumenterprise(MSME).149Yet,theneedforchangeseemedobvious:

thestatesectorrecognisedthatitsimplycouldnotaffordtokeepitspresentworkforce,

productivitywasdismal,Cubahadaseriousfiscalcrisis,andalternativeandliveable

employmentwasvirtuallyimpossibletofind.Thissituation,aswedescribeditin2012

(Bye2012)isgenerallyspeakingstillvalid.

Agiganticofficiallabourreductioncampaignwaslaunchedinlate2010throughvarious

publicdeclarations.First,RaúlCastrosaidinAprilofthatyearthatonemillionstate

employeeswouldhavetobelaidoff.150InJuly,heraisedthefigureto1.3million.151And

inDecember,theMinisterofFinanceandPricesgavethenumberof1.8millionasthe

aimforpublicsectordismissalsandtransfertotheprivatesectorfor2015.152She

estimatedthatthiswouldrepresent35%oftotalemployment.153CEPALhasobserved

thatMSMEsgenerallyinLatinAmericahave“anextremelylowproductivitycompared

tothelargeenterprises”(ref.footnoteabove).InCuba,althoughstatesector

productivityisstillhigherthaninthemicro-sizedominatedprivatesector,the

differenceseemstobelessthanintherestoftheregion.Accordingtotheestimatesin

149Weusethisterm,MSME,ratherthanthemorecommonSME,becausemostprivatebusinessesinCubaaretoosmalltobecountedasSMEs,ratherqualifyingasmicroenterprises.Thereisnointernationallyagreedstandardforthesizeofthesevariouscategories.Kenya,asanexample,countsunitswithupto10employeesas”micro”,10-50as”small”,50-100as”medium”.Accordingtothesecategories,theoverwhelmingmajorityofCubannon-stateundertakingswouldbe”micro”,asmallnumberwouldbe”small”,andveryfewwouldqualifyas“medium”(evenifweincludenon-registeredemployees).UN´sEconomicCommissionforLatinAmerica,ECLAC(CEPALwithitsSpanishacronyms)estimatesthatasmuchas99%of”theindustrialfabric”(”tejidoindustrial”)inLatinAmericaprovidingthemajorityofemployment,areMiPyMEs(”micro,pequenasymedianasempresas”),whichhowever”haveanextremelylowproductivitycomparedtothelargeenterprises”.CEPAListhereforerunningprogramsinsupportofsuchenterprises,whichneverhavebeenimplementedinCubainspiteofthehugepotentialtheycouldhavehad(http://www.cepal.org/es/temas/pymes,downloaded28.11.16).150”DiscursoenlaclausuradelXICongresodelaUJC”.Granma,04.04.10.151”DiscursoenlaclausuradelaAsambleaNacional”.Granma,01.08.10.152“1,8millionwasthetargetestablishedforlayoffsin2015,andtheMinisterofFinanceestimatedthatforthatyear,therewouldbe1,8millionworkersinthenon-statesectorinordertoprovideemploymenttothosewhowerelaidoff”:LinaPedraza,“Intervenciónacercadelaspropuestasparaelperfeccionamientoyactualizacióndelsistematributario”,Granma,16.12.10(S/E).153InterventionbyMinisterLinaPedrazainAsambleadelPoderPopular,Havana,15.12.10,furtherelaboratedin:GarcíaA,B.AnayayC.Piñeiro“ReestructuracióndelempleoenCuba:elpapeldelasempresasnoestatalesenlageneracióndeempleoyenlaproductividaddeltrabajo,”SeminarioCEEC,June,2011.Ininternalpartymeetings,top-levelMinistryofLaborofficialsclaimedthatasmuchas2,5millionstateemployeeswereinrealityredundant(informationprivatelyobtainedfromapartymemberlisteningtoaninternallectureonthesubject).

178

theprevioussection,theprivatesector(includingtheinformalpartofit)contributes

around20%totheCubaneconomy,whileemployingabout30%oftheworkforce.

Ironically,theplantolayoffonemillionpublicemployeesduringoneyearwasofficially

announcedbytheworkers’andemployees’ownandonlytradeunion,CTC,througha

statementcompletelysupportingtheobjectiveoflayingoffhalfamillionemployees

duringafewmonths,soontobefollowedbyanotherhalfmillion.154

Itisinterestingtocomparethismassivelayoffplanforpublicemployeestowhat

happenedinVietnamaspartoftheDoiMoireform,wherealternativeemployment

opportunitiesemergedinthenon-statesector.

deVylderandFforde(op.cit.)considertheVietnamesetransitiontohavebeenagreat

successwhencomparedtotheIMF-/WB-ledmacro-economicstructuralreformstaking

placeinmuchofthedevelopingcountriesandtheformersocialistcountriesofEastern

EuropeincludingtheUSSRatthesametime(late80sandearly90s):the

macroeconomicstabilityledtoarapidprocessofaccumulationandgrowth,perhapsdue

toabetterphasingofreformelements.

ConditionsinCuba,itturnedout,werequitedifferent.Soweretheresults.

TheofficialCubanplanwastoofferthosetobelaidofftogointoself-employment(i.e.to

becometrabajadoresporcuentapropia,cuentapropistas,literally“workersontheirown

account”,someonewhoworksforhimselforherself,oftenabbreviatedTCP)ortoget

landforleaseandstartagriculturalproductionasso-calledusufructuarios(seeunder

Challenge1formoreaboutthis).Forurbandwellers,estimatedtorepresent75%of

Cuba´spopulation,cuentapropismowasthealternative.Thecategoriesofnon-

agriculturalcooperativesandusufructuarioswhowerewillingtotakeoverthe

managementofmostlynon-profitablesmallstatebusinessesweretobeaddedlater(see

Indicator2.7below).

Alreadyinthe1990s,duringtheextremehardshipsofthe“SpecialPeriod”followingthe

disappearanceoftheUSSR,thegovernmentallowedpeopletoregisterasTCPs(from

1994).Butatthetime,thiswasseenpurelyasasurvivalalternative,meetingwithall 154Officialfull-pagedeclarationprintedininthePartyorganGranma13.09.10.

179

kindsofbureaucraticresistanceandarbitrariness.AspartofRaúlCastro´sreform

policies,theTCPwasnowtobeconsideredastrategic,notonlyashort-termandtactical

categoryinthelabourmarket,basedonalistof178professionsin2010,gradually

growingto201professionsandthenagainreducedto122in2016(partlybycombining

somecategories).Theseweremostlypettyservicecategories.Aswecomebackto,new

doubtsaboutthestrategicandirreversiblecharacterofthisreformemergedafterthe7th

PartyCongressin2016.

The2010announcementofmassivedismissals,andtherecommendationtofind

employmentasTCPs,ledtoanimmediateexplosioninthenumberofTCPlicenses,as

canbeseenfromthefollowingtable:

180

Table6.2:Developmentinnumberofregisteredself-employed

(absolutenumbers):Table 2

Source:Foryears2000-2010:Mesa-Lago(2013),Table30(ONEIdataelaboratedbyM-

L).

Foryears2011-2016:ONEI(AnuarioestadísticodeCuba),2016,Table7.2,elaborated

byauthor.

*2017Approximatefigures,givenbyMrMurilloinyear-endsessionofNational

Assembly.

Theexplosion,however,prettymuchlastedforoneyear(2011),afterwhichthegrowth

rateagainbecamemoremoderate(exceptfor2014andpartly2016-2017).Manyofthe

licensestakenoutinthefirstplace,ataconsiderablepricebyCubanstandards,were

soonafterreturnedifthebusinessdidnotturnouttobesuccessful,orinothercases

theywerewithdrawniftheTCPsdidnotfulfilverystrictcriteria.

Cuentapropismowasfromtheoutsetalmostseenasthepanaceatoabsorbthosewho

weredismissedfrompublicemployment.Itsoonbecameclear,however,thatthelarge

Year Number Increaseperyear

(%)

2000 153,300

2005 169,400

2010 147,400

2011 391,500 165,0

2012 404,600 3,3

2013 424,300 4,9

2014 483,400 13,9

2015 499,000 3,2

2016 540,800 8,4

2017* 580,000 7,4

181

majorityofthosewhoreceivedsuchlicenseswerepreviouslyunemployed.Only16%of

thosewhowereregisteredasself-employedby2011wereindividualswhoactuallyleft

stateemployment(Vidal&Perez2012).Thus,theabsorptioncapacityofthisalternative

whenitcomestonewemploymentcreationseemstohavebeenmuchmorelimitedthan

whatwasplannedin2010,whichtoalargedegreeexplainswhytheambitionofmoving

onethirdofthepublicworkforceoutofthestatesectorinfiveyearsfailed(seelater).

Muchofthestatisticalincreaseinnumberofself-employedisexplainedbyformalisation

ofpreviouslyillegalself-employment.Inthisway,itmaybestatisticallycorrectthat

around430,000peopleweremovedfromthestatetothenon-statesectorbetween

2010and2017(thedifferencebetweennumberofself-employedforthesetwoyears),

butmanyofthemwerebasicallydoingthesamejob.Accordingto2016figures,31%

werereportedas“young”,supposedlyinmanycasespersonswithoutprior

employment,whileanother11%wereretirees.16%maintainedtheirpublic

employmentalongwiththeirTCPlicense(partofthespecialGESPI155categorythatwe

comebackto).Gender-wise,32%werewomen,someofwhommaynothavehadformal

workbeforetheywereregisteredasTCPs.156

Itisquiteconspicuousthatcuentapropismoisnotallowedamongacademicprofessions.

Inthisway,Cubaisblockingitshighlyeducatedpopulation,itsbraincapital,from

seekingmoredecentincomeopportunitiesthanwhattheyarepresentlyofferedbythe

State.Thefirstpartialexceptionthatemergedwasasmallmostlyinformalprivate

marketintheeducationsector(calledrepasadores,ortutors).Gradually,accountants

andinterpreters,“housedesigners”(somekindofinternalarchitects),touristagents,

etc.,havebeenincludedintheTCPcategory.Realestatebrokerwasalegalcategoryfor

sometime,butmostofthemseemedtohavelosttheirlicenseinOctober2015,allegedly

duetomuchcorruption.Butprofessionalssuchaslawyers,economists,scientists(like

bioengineers),manyofwhomcouldofferhigh-levelservicestoforeignclients(andthe

emerging‘newrich’Cubans),arenotpermittedtodoso.Oneefforttocircumventthis

prohibition,averysuccessfulcooperativeofprofessionalfinancialmanagement

consultantscalledScenius,i.a.helpingtheestablishmentofothercooperatives,was

155GESPI=«Governmentemployeewithsignificantprivateincome»(ref.Table6.4).156Figuresbasedonabovequotedsourcefor2016TCPfigures:MinisteriodelTrabajoySeguridadSocial.

182

suddenlyclosedinAugust2017aspartofthenewmeasuresagainstsuccessfulnon-

statebusinesses.Asaconsequence,326ofthefewprofessionalTCPsinthecountry

wouldlosetheirlivelihood,supposedlyforprovidingservicesoutsideitsofficial

permit.157

Whatwesawinpracticeveryearlyinthisprocesswasthattheheavyrestrictionson

privatebusiness,inasituationwheredemandforemploymentwasbooming,leadtothe

mushroomingofnon-legalbusinesspractices.

TotheextentthattheTCPsectorwassupposedtoprovideasignificantemployment

opportunityforthosedismissedfromthepublicsector,therehavebeenseveral

constraints:

• Alimitedcapitalmarket,althoughfamilyremittancessoonemergedasa

prominentsourceofcapital;theaccesstosellhousesandcarsalsoprovided

businessstart-upcapitalinmanycases;

• Verylimitedandcomplicatedaccesstocredit(fewTCPsseemtohave

confidenceintheexistingcreditschemes);158

• Verylimitedaccesstoproductioninputs(notyetawholesalemarketfor

anythingbutagriculturalgoods(alsoclosedin2016)andthereforea

widespreaduseoftheblackmarket);

• Frequentharassmentbypoliceandgovernmentinspectors–oftenlinkedto

corruption;

• Disproportionatetaxes;

• Aprevioustaxexemptionforbusinesseswithlessthanfiveemployees,was

removedin2017andtaxeswereraisedforadditionalnumberof

employees;159

157DiariodeCuba,LaHabana,5.08.17.158Noneofthe25entrepreneursinterviewedbyFeinberg(2013)inHavanaandCienfuegoshadmadeuseofcreditschemes.Thesamesituationwasconfirmedbythe25TCPsinterviewedin2014/15aspublishedbyMesa-Lagoet.al(2016:57).Ref.alsoVidal(2012).Torres(2016)claimsthatthismayhaveimprovedsomewhat. 159OfficialofMinisteriodeFinanzasyPrecios,indeclarationstoGranma,07.08.17.

183

• ThelegalareasforTCPs(andinvestment)areverylimited,mostlylimitedto

pettytradeandservices,althoughsomeartisanproduction(shoes,furniture)

isallowedandisactuallygrowing(seeMulet2016).

Self-employment,althoughseeninapoliticallymorepositivelightafter2010than

before,wasstilltobeentangledinalotofrestrictions,bothintermsofwhatservices

werelegal(productiveactivitieswereonlyexceptionallylegal),heavyandnormallyflat

taxburdens,nowholesalemarkettobuyrawmaterialsandimplements,redtape,

corruption,etc.Thereseemedtobeanendlessinnovationofmeasurestomakelife

difficultforpeoplewhotriedtoestablishbusinesses,e.g.levyingstifftariffsinmid-2012

onimportedgoodsbroughtintothecountrybypeopletravellingfromMiamiorPanama

(mulas)exactlyforthatpurpose,oftentheonlysupplysourceintheabsenceof

wholesalemarkets.Anewcrackdownon“muleimports”in2014wascalculatedto

reducethevalueofproductsavailableforinformalstreetsalesfromroughly700to200

millionUSDperyear.160

Asurveycarriedoutin2014(limitedtoHavanaprovince)askedTCPsabouttheir

perceivedobstaclesforgrowth.Themainperceivedobstaclewasthelackofaccessto

supplythroughwholesalemarkets(31%),followedby“bureaucracyandlegislation”

(17%)andinadequateaccesstotheInternetandtechnology(also17%)(MesaLago

et.al.2016:66,Table21).Othersurveysidentifyhightaxesasanequallyimportant

problemastheexcessofregulations,thusconfirmingtheproblemofaninadequate

regulatoryframework.161Thedegreeofstatecontrolsandsanctionsmaybeillustrated

byanexamplefromSantiagoprovince,whereduringthefirsteightmonthsof2014no

lessthan10,000TCPswerecontrolledbystateinspectors,40%werefinedandasmany

as80%werewarnedofhavingcommittederrors.162

160The1September2014restrictionsonthevalueofgoodsbeingbroughtintothecountrylimitedthevalueto1,000USDpertravellercomparedtoapreviousaverageof3,500(totallingbetween1.7and1.9billUSDin2013,ofwhichroughly40%wassupposedtobedestinedforre-saleattheblackmarket,accordingtoasurveybyMoralesofHavanaConsultingGroup(ReportedbyAssociatedPressSeptember2,2014)(ref.AlsoTable6.6laterinthisChapter,particularlywhatthesameauthorcalls”distantwholesalemarketing”.161PavelVidal:”SmallandMediumPrivateEnterprises:aBridgeforCuba-U.S.Relations”.ASCENewsNo.721,23.06.2016.162EFE,Havana,12.09.14,citingthestateagencyAgenciadeInformaciónNacional.

184

Theseriousproblemrepresentedbythelackofwholesalemarketswasalsorecognised

bythethenministerofEconomyandPlanning,MarinoMurillo,inlate2015,whenhe

toldtheCubanParliamentthat“thecountryshouldimplementawholesalemarketfor

theprivatesector,whereimplementscouldbebought20%belowpresentretailprices”.

Thiswas,interestinglyenough,thesameParliamentsessionwhereattacksonprivate

agriculturalsaleschannelswereaired,leadingtopricecontrolandotherrestrictions.

Halfayearlater,rightbeforethe7thPartyCongress,itwasreportedthatthe

governmentwasplanningtoopen“wholesalemarketsforfoodproducts”availableto

theprivatesector.163WiththenewrestrictionsannouncedinAugust2017,however,it

wasdefinitivelyruledoutthatsuchmarketscouldberunbytheprivateactors.Private

businesseswerealsoexplicitlyexcludedfromanewmeasurelaunchedin2018tooffer

specialpricesforinputstooutsourcedstatebusinesses.164

Evenintheabsenceofalegalcategoryforprivatecompanies,thereisaspecialcategory

ofTCPlicenseforcontratistas,“contractedworkers”,(orayudantes,“supportstaff”)who

maybeemployedbyotherTCPs.Officially,thiscategoryrepresentsonly25%ofthe

TCPs,165anexpressionoftheverylimitedmultiplicationemploymenteffectintheformal

labourmarketamongTCPs:thecuentapropistashavesofarofficiallyonlygenerated

littlemorethan100,000jobs(2016)forothersthanthemselves.Whereastheglobal

averageisforoneself-employedtoemployfiveothers,166thesituationinCubaisvery

different:40%oftheself-employedofferworktoothers,butonly15%ofthemtomore

163AccordingtoarepresentativeoftheMinistryofInternalCommercequotedbyEFE,LaHabana,12.04.16.164InFebruary2018,itwasofficiallyannouncedthat”conditionshadnotbeencreated”fortheestablishmentofwholesalemarketswiththepurposeofsatisfyingtheacquisitionneedsoftheself-employedandtherestofthenon-statesector,becausethereis”noguaranteeofasafesupply”.Sheclaimedhowever,thatitwouldnowbepossibleforself-employedandcooperativestobuyproductioninputswithadiscountof20%.(Granma,quotedbyCubaNet,6.02.18).Onemonthlater,theMinisterofInternalCommercedeclaredthatthefirstwholesalemarketexclusivelyfornon-agriculturalcooperativesleasingstate-ownedbusinesses(Mercabal)hadbeenopenedinHavana,offeringdiscountsof20%.Othercooperativesandself-employed,however,wouldbeexcludedfromthemeasure(“InauguranenLaHabanamercadomayoristaparacooperativasnoagropecuarias»,MartiNoticias,17.03.18).165ReportedbyONEI,October2017(“Crecealnúmerodetrabajadoresautónomos”,OnCubaRedacción23.10.17).Thispercentagemayhavegrownsomewhatsince2014.166ILOReportIV:Smallandmedium-sizedenterprisesanddecentandproductiveemploymentcreation.InternationalLabourConference,104thSession,2015http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_358294.pdf

185

than10others.167IfCubahadfollowedtheglobalpattern,thesmallentrepreneursector

couldin2017(ref.Table6.2)havecreatedaround2.9millionjobs,representingalmost

60%ofemploymentinCuba,makingabigcontributiontosolveCuba´semployment

crisis.168Theproblem,ofcourse,isthatmostemploymentcreationinothercountries

occurswhentheenterprisesgrowtomorethan10employees,somethingthatvery

rarelyisthecaseinCuba.

Itmustbeemphasized,however,thattheseareofficialstatisticalfigures.Asweshallsee

inthefollowing,theinformalrealitymaybequitedifferent.

Indicator2.5:Privateworkforcegainingmoreindependencefromthestate?

Inthefollowing,wewillmakeanefforttoestimatethedegreetowhichtheCuban

workforcehasbeende-coupledfromthestatesectorintheperiodafter2010,whenthe

officialcampaignofslimmingthestatewasannounced,withthepurposeoftransferring

asmuchas1.8millionworkersfromstatetonon-stateemployment.

Thefollowingtableshowshowthenon-statesectorhasbeenevolvingsince2000,

accordingtopublicstatisticaldata:

167AccordingtoJesúsOtamendiz,DirectordeEmpleoMinisteriodeTrabajoySeguridadSocial(MTSS)yYamiléPérez,HeaddeONAT(NationalTaxAdministrationOffice),inMesaRedonda,DailyroundtableprogrammeonCubanTelevision,30.08.16.168EvenintheUS,30%ofalljobs(2014)areheldbytheself-employedandtheworkerstheyhire.Self-employedhiredanaverageof8.6employees,withamedianof3(PewResearchCenter,SocialandDemographicTrends,Table1,22October2015:http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/10/22/national-trends-in-self-employment-and-job-creation/

186

Table6.3:Developmentinpercentageofnon-stateemploymentTable 3

YearNon-state

employment

Self-

employment*Cooperatives

Other

private**

2000 18,1 3,3 7,0 7,8

2004 20,0 3,6 5,9 10,6

2007 17,1 2,8 5,0 9,3

2010 16,2 2,9 4,4 8,9

2011 22,7 7,8 4,2 10,7

2012 24,9 8,3 4,4 12,2

2013 26,3 8,6 4,6 11,9

2014 27,7 9,7 4,6 13,4

2015 28,8 10,3 4,4 13,7

2016 28,9 11,8 4,1 13,0

*Startingin2011,thiscategoryalsoincludesemployeesofothercuentapropistas(TCPs)

**Self-owningpeasants,land-leasingpeasants(usufructuarios),salariedworkers

(includingemployeesofjointventures–until2011alsothoseemployedbyotherTCPs)

–butaccordingtoMesa-Lagoet.Al(2016,p.21)thiscategorymayincludesome“double

counting”.

Source:Foryears2000-2010:Mesa-Lago(2013),Cuadro30(ONEIdataelaboratedby

M-L).Forlateryears:ONEI2014andONEI2016,Table7.2(elaboratedbyauthor).

ButofficialstatisticshardlygivethefullpictureofthehighlyinformalandchaoticCuban

labourmarket.Amoreindependentattempttoanalysethelabourmarketandcalculate

itscomposition,waspresentedbyFeinberg(2016).Heputstogetherofficialstatistics

andahostofothersourcestoestimatethetotalityofformalandnon-formalprivate

workinCuba:

187

Table6.4:TheCubanPrivateSector,2015(inthousands)Table 4

Privatesectoremployment(officially

registered)

Registeredself-employment(TCP) 505

Serviceandcreditcooperatives 353

Landleasefarmers(usufructuarios) 172

Privatefarmers 50

Jointventureemployees 40

Newurbancooperatives 6

Sub-total 1,126

Otherprivateactivities(estimated)

Self-employed(fulltime,unregistered) 185

Self-employed(parttime,GESPI*) 400–800

Independentartists unknown

Migrantfarmworkers unknown

Religiousworkers unknown

Sub-total 600–1,000+

Total 1,700–2,100

*GESPI=“Governmentemployeewithsignificantprivateincome”.

Source:Feinberg(2016:137,Table6-1),basedonONEI:AnuarioEstadísticodeCuba

(2014),plusawealthofothersources.Weknowthatthistablewasputtogetherafterin-

depthdiscussionswithleadingCubaneconomists.

ArchibaldRitterhasalsomadehisownestimatesaboutthesizeofinformalemployment

inCuba.169HeclaimsthatFeinbergisexaggeratinghisguesstimateforunregistered

employmentinthesmallenterprisesector.Buthemaynothavetakensufficientlyinto

considerationtheGESPIcategoryinFeinberg´stable—whichmayevenhavebeen

169SeeASCENewsNo.701(February2016).

188

under-estimated(10-20%ofthepublicsectorworkforce)—whenweconsiderthat

hardlyanypublicemployeemaydependonlyonanofficialsalary.

IfweacceptFeinberg´sestimate/guesstimate,wemayconcludethatsomewhere

between37and46%oftheCubanworkforcearefullyorpartlyworkingoutsideofthe

statesector.170Inreality,eventhatmaybeasignificantunder-estimate.

Asshownbefore,themorethan3.5millionpublicemployees171canonlyexceptionally

covertheirbasicneedsbasedontheirofficialsalaries.Theymayeitherusetheirjobsto

siphonofforembezzlepublicgoodspassingitovertotheprivatesectorbyusingitas

inputsforproperbusinessorsellingittoothers;exchangeservicesforabribe;receive

remittances;orfindextraincomefrominformalself-employmentactivities(allknownin

Cubanpopularslangasresolver).Itisonlythelattercategorythatiscapturedby

Feinberg´sGESPIconcept,accordingtohisestimatesrepresentingbetween50-70%in

additiontothoseofficiallyregisteredinthenon-statesector.Whatallthisshowsisthat

thereisastronginter-dependencebetweenpublicemploymentandnon-stateincomes:

Peopledependlessandlessonpublicsalaries,andmoreandmoreonillicitlyacquired

stategoodsandservices.Forthelatterreason,publicemploymentisstillacrucialpart

ofpeople´ssurvivalstrategies—althoughnotprincipallybecauseofthesalary.

Theofficialnumberofnon-stateemployeesin2010was800,000(16%of5million).In

2016ithadrisento1.33million(29%ofalmost4.6million).So,comparedtothe

declaredaimoftransferring1.8million,theactualfigurereachedwasonlyslightlyover

halfamillion,thesamenumberthatwasestablishedforthefirsthalfyearaftertheplan

wasannounced.TheCuban-AmericanveteraneconomistMesa-Lagocametothesame

conclusion:heconcludedin2017thatthestatehadfreeditselfofapproximatelyhalfa

millionemployees,i.e.lessthan30%oftheintendednumber.172Anotherprominent

170ThetotalnumberoftheofficialCubanworkforcewasin2016reducedtoslightlyunder4,6million,downfrom5millionin2011(accordingtoBravo,August2017,basedonnewONEIfigures).171WiththelatestfiguresfortotaleconomicallyactivepopulationinCuba,quotedabove,havingbeenreducedfrom5to4.5millionpersonsbetween2011and2016,whiletheofficialpercentageofthoseemployedoutsideofthestateaccordingtothesamesurcesis30%,theupdatednumberofpubliclyemployedshouldratherbe3.15millon.Yet,inordernottocomplicatematters,westillcalculateonthebasisofatotalworkforceof5million.172CarmeloMesa-Lago:“ElGobiernocubanoentróenpánicotraslavisitadeObama”,interview(fromMadrid),publishedin14ymedio,01.06.17.

189

Cubaneconomist,PavelVidal,calculatedthatstateemploymentwasreducedfrom2009

to2014by663,700workers,whilethenon-statesectorgrewby561,000.New

businessesdonotcompensateforbusinessesthathavecloseddown,thatis,thereisa

negativenetexpansionrate,accordingtoVidal(2016).

Althoughthesefiguresarenotidentical,theyrevealprettymuchthesametrend:wesee

thatnon-stateemploymentattheendoftheRaúleraofficiallyrepresentscloseto30%

ofemploymentinCuba,butthatonlyaminorityofthenon-stateworkforcehaveleft

Stateemployment.ThetargetedreductionofStatepayrollshasbeenachievedonlytoa

limiteddegree.Consequently,thereisstillalargenumberofredundantemployeesin

statebureaucracyandcompanies,continuingthebloodlettingofapubliceconomyin

crisis.

Thereasonforlimitedsuccesswiththereductionofpublicpayrollsisobviouslya

seriousworryaboutincreasingunemployment,inasituationwhererobust

employment-creationcapacityintheprivatesectorhasnotbeenallowedtodevelop.

Themostimportanttransferseemstohavebeenfromformalstateemploymenttofully

orpartlymakingalivingintheinformallabourmarket.Contrarytowhatisperhaps

generallybelieved,themajorityofthismovementisnotduetocuentapropismo.Only

about15-20%(between65,000and85,000)ofthenewlicensesweretakenoutby

formerstateemployees,accordingtopreviousestimates.173Thedifferenceismadeupof

youngpeopleandprobablyalargenumber—particularlywomen—whowerenot

registeredinthelabourrecordsinthefirstplace,plusanumberofretiredpersons.

Anotherphenomenontotakeintoaccounthereisthatmanyofthoseworking“ontheir

own”arenotlicencedandregisteredasTCPs.TheGeneralComptrollerforinstance

claimsthatthemajorityofthoseemployedbyotherTCPs,so-calledcontratistas(or

ayudantes),areworkingwithoutalicense.Licensedcontratistasrepresent20%of

formallyregisteredTCPs,174i.e.around116,000,sowemayconservativelyassumethat

thereareasimilarnumberofnon-licensedworkersinthiscategory.Itisimpossibleto

173FiguregivenbyOmarEverlenyPerezatCEECConferenceinSantaClara,07.11.13.174Samesourceasprevious.

190

determinehowmanyofthemwerepreviousstateemployeesbutgiventhegrowthrate

oftheTCPsduringthisperiod,andthatthenumberofbusinessesofacertainsize

perhapshasgrownevenmore,wemayassumethatthemajorityofthese110,000are

peoplewhohaveleftthestatesector.

WithreferencetoTable6.1(formsoflandtenure)andbasedonthequitedramatic

increaseinnon-statelandtenureparticularlyintheformofCCSandleasingagreements

(usufructo)duringthefirstyearsoftheRaúlera,wemaymakesomeroughestimates

aboutsimilarmovementsintheagriculturalsector.Thepercentageofthosemoving

fromstateorheavystate-controlledformsofagriculture(includingthecooperative

categorycalledUBPC),tothemostautonomouscooperativeform(CCS),thosewith

leasingcontract(usufructuarios)plusprivatelandholders,wemayveryroughly

estimatethatmovementtobeabout40%ofthetotalamountofthoseemployedin

agriculturein2010,920,000(ONEI2014,Table7.3),thatistosay370,000.

Wemaythereforeassume,althoughonthebasisofsomewhatspeculativeestimates,

thatthemajority(conservativelyabouttwothirds)ofthosewhohavemovedfromthe

statetotheformalnon-statesectorareruralpeople,linkedtoagriculture.

Whatwemayconcludefromallthisisthatasignificantlyincreasingpercentageof

Cubanbreadwinnershavebeenleavingthepublicsectorduringthesefiveyears,almost

doublingthenon-statesector(formalaswellasinformal),whichnowrepresents

betweenonefourthandonethirdoftheworkforce.Additionally,asignificantshare

(conservatively15-20%)ofstateworkersarealsopartlyengagedintheprivatelabour

market(mostoftheminformally).Othershavefoundotherformsofrelatingtotheblack

economy,throughillicitappropriationofstateproperty.

Overall,atleasthalftheCubanworkforcedependsfullyorpartly,formallyorinformally,

onthenon-statelabourmarket.Inspiteofthat,however,thestatehasnotbeenableto

relieveitselfofaheavilyoverburdenedandlargelyunproductiveworkforce—oneofthe

mainaimsofthereformprocess.Thereasonissimple:maintenanceofstateemployment

ispartoftheCubanparasiticsurvivalstrategy.

191

Eventhosewhohavebeenabletofindsustainableemploymentinpubliccompanies,

withasufficientsalarytomaintainafamily,haveoftenhadtomakeuseofbribe

techniques.Anecdotalevidence,ofcommonknowledgeinHavana,tellsthatyouhaveto

payaconsiderableamountofmoney—perhapsonlyavailableifyoureceivefamily

remittancesfromabroad—ifyouwanttoobtainattractivejobsinthetourismsector.

Anywherefrom600USDtobecomeataxidriverforCubataxi(theyellowtaxisnormally

occupiedbytourists),tobetween5,000and10,000USDifyouwanttoworkforthe

Gaviotarent-a-carcompany,particularlyintheirmostattractivebureauslikethe

InternationalAirportinHavana.175Thelogicisthatyoubribeinordertogetalicensein

ordertobribeevenmoreonceyouhavegotit.

Thevastmajorityofthepopulation,therefore,isderivingmostoftheirearningsfrom

thesymbioticrelationshipbetweenthetwosectors.Thissituationofillicitsymbiotic

interdependencebetweenstateemploymentandnon-statesurvivalstrategiesofcourse

exposesworkersinbothsectorstoahighdegreeofvulnerability.Theyalsofallvictims

tothewhimsofallkindsofcontrolsbypolice,labourinspectorsandlawenforcement

institutions,whothemselvesalmostasarulemakeuseofillicitmethods(bribery)for

theirownsurvivalstrategies.

Oneissueregardingtheissuestudiedinthisdissertationiswhatimpactthisfundamentally

changingsocialarchitecturehasonpeople´sloyaltytothestate,andonthestate´spower

overordinarycitizens,inshort,thesocialcontractbetweenthestateanditscitizens.That

isaquestionwewillcomebacktoinChapter11.

Rulesforself-employedwork(TCP)havebeenmaintainedmoreorlessthesamesince

thebeginningoftheneweconomicreformdrive.Itisstilldifficulttoseethisopening

evolvingintoamoregeneralpermission,letaloneincentive,toconvertprivate

entrepreneurshipfromasurvivaloptionintoabasisforseriousbusinessdevelopment.

ThelackofwholesalemarketsforcestheTCPsintoillicitpractices.Thedisadvantageous

taxsystemrepresentsatemptationtosystematicallyunder-reportonsales,oron

175”Pagarportrabajar:¿cuántocuestaunempleoenCuba?Estemercadoclandestinoseasientaenlasempresasestatales”:ErnestoPérezChang,Cubanet,14.08.17,basedonanumberofstatements,someofthemfrompreviousworkersinsomeofthesecompanies.

192

numberofemployees.Allthiscontributestoinflatethediscretionarypowersheldby

localauthorities,policeandlabourinspectorstoclampdownonprivateentrepreneurs.

Contrarytobeingstimulated,TCPsareveryoftenperceivedbythestatebureaucracyas

anecessaryevil,andaseasytargetsforharassmentthatplaysacrucialroleinthe

survivalstrategyofpublicemployees.

EthicalstandardsinthechaoticCubanlabourmarketaredefinitelyathingofthepast.

Indicator2.6:Growingweightofthenon-statesectorintheCubaneconomy?

TheGuidelines,withtheirupdatingoftheEconomicandSocialModel,hadasits

objective,saidRaúlCastroatthe6thPartyCongress:

“[T]oguaranteethecontinuityandirreversibilityofsocialism[…]Thegrowthofthenon-

statesectoroftheeconomy,farfromsignifyingasupposedprivatizationofsocialproperty,

assometheoreticiansaffirm,isdestinedtobecomeafacilitatingfactorfortheconstruction

ofsocialisminCuba,sinceitwillallowtheStatetoconcentrateonimprovedefficiencyofthe

fundamentalmeansofproduction”(Castro2011)(S/E).

Morales(2017)hasmadeanattempttoestimatetherelativeweightofstateandprivate

sectorsintheCubaneconomy.SomepreviousestimateshaveclaimedthatGAESA

controlsasmuchas70%oftheCubaneconomy.Thisseemstobelargelyexaggerated,

whileMorales’estimateappearstobequiterealistic.

Withoutincludingthehome-marketagriculturalsector(whichmayleadtoasignificant

revisionbecause—aswehaveseen—oftherelativeimportanceofthenon-statesector

inagriculture)hehasarrivedatthefollowingdistribution,basedonpercentageofgross

incomesintheCubaneconomy:

193

Table6.5:Estimatedcompositionofstateandnon-statesectorsintheCuban

economy:Table 5

Military-controlledcompanies*: 3.8billionUSD 21%

Restofstate-ownedcompanies**: 11.1billionUSD 61%

Privatesector: 3.2billionUSD 18%

*ofwhichGAESA3.7billion=97%

**themostimportantbeing:sugarexport,niquel,petroleumderivates,medicalservices,

rum,tobacco,seafood,biotechnology,telecommunication

Source:(ref.Morales2017,asreproducedinFigure2.1).

Theprivatesector’sshareofofficialGDPisonlyabout7%,butthesharehasdoubled

duringRaúl´spresidency(from3.7%in2006to7.2%in2014).176

Ifwelookbeyondtheofficialfigures,however,wefindaCubanprivatesectorthatis

gaininganincreasinglysignificantspace,andpotentiallymorepower,intheCuban

economy.

Thefollowingtableisthemostcredibleestimateencounteredoftheprivatesector

compositioninCuba:

176InformationbasedonprivateinformationfromPavelVidal,calculatedonthebasisofdataforaggragatedconsumptionprovidedbytheofficialstatisticalyearbookduringseveralyears.

194

Table6.6:Estimatedinvoicingindifferentprivatesectors,2016Table 6

Sector No.oflicences

Min.estimated

invoicevalue

(mill.CUC)

Max.estimated

invoicevalue

(mill.CUC)

Restaurants

(paladares)

1,712 370 693

Bodytreatment* 17,837 80 120

“Distantwholesale

marketing”**

- 1,500 2,000

Lodging*** 35,066 164 430

Shoeproduction 7,902 104 143

Telecom 24,440 97 129

Transport 54,350 215 287

Others 393,693 50 80

Total 535,000 2,580 3,882

*Thisincludesbeautysalons,makeupservice,barbers,manicure,personaltrainers,

masseursetc.

**Thissector,fullyunregistered,isacalculationofthevalueofgoodsforsaleor

productioninputsbroughtintothecountryaspassengerluggage

***Thisaddstogetherlodgingpaidbothinconvertibleandnationalcurrency

Source:Morales(2017,Figure3),basedonstatisticspublishedbyMinisteriodeTrabajo

ySeguridadSocial

Iftheseestimatesaretrustworthy,18%oftotalrevenuecreationinCuba—outsideof

home-marketagriculture—comesfromtheprivatesectorifweincludeboththeformal

andtheinformaleconomy.Comparedtotheofficialprivateshare(7.2%ofGDP),it

meansthatmorethan60%ofCuba’snon-stateeconomyisinformal,orthattheprivate

economyistwoandahalftimesthesizeofwhatisofficiallyregistered.Still,giventhat

about30%oftheworkforceisofficiallyemployedoutsideofthestate,itmeansthatthe

averageproductivityissignificantlylowerintheprivatethaninthestatesector—

195

althoughthedifferenceseemsmuchlessthanwhatthepreviouslycitedCEPALfigures

revealaboutthesituationelsewhereinLatinAmerica.

Thistableneedssomefurthercomments.Firstofall,asalreadynoted,itdoesnot

includeagriculturewherethenon-statesectoraswehaveseenhaveincreasedits

weightconsiderably.Thelargestprivateactivityineconomicterms,accordingtothis

estimate,iswhattheauthor(MrMorales)callsmercadomayoristaadistancia,“distant

wholesalemarketing”,theinformalwayofprovidingCubanbusinesseswithinputsfor

thelackofaproperwholesalesystem.Thistakesplacethroughpersonalimportsof

goods,eitherprovidedbyvisitingrelativesorfriendsorso-called“mules”(asmentioned

above):Cubanstravellingtoneighbouringcountrieswiththespecificpurposeof

importinggoods.AllthisendsupinthegiganticCubanblackmarket.177Amongthe

registeredbusinesssectors,restaurants(paladares)isclearlythemostprofitablesector,

estimatedtogenerate50%moregrossincomesthanbed&breakfastbusinesses,in

spiteofonlyrepresentingafractionofthenumberoflicences.

Thesectorwiththelargestnumberoflicencesistransport,ofpersonsaswellasgoods,a

sectorwherethepubliceconomyhasrevealedgreatvulnerability.Butitisalsoasector

wheretheprivateserviceprovidershaveshownanimpressiveadaptabilityinthegrey

zonebetweentheformalandtheinformaleconomybypullingoutandwiththeir

incredibleingenuitykeepingafloatthelargefleetofpre-revolutionarycarsandtrucks.

Although,aswecomebackto,aconsiderablenumberofCubans,inthehundredsof

thousands,havebeenabletomakearelativelygoodlivinginmanyofthesebusinesses,

themajorityoftheTCPs,principallythethreequartersfallinginthe“others”categoryof

Table6.6,arededicatedtoavarietyofpettyserviceswithminisculesales.Mostofthem

areekingoutamarginalincomeandstrugglingtosurvive.Theyincludesmallsidewalk

cafeterias,directsaleoffood(ref.thecategory“elaborationandsaleoffood”with

almost60,000licensesinmid-2017),saleofclothesandothersmallretailbusiness,

carpentry,plumbingandothercrafts,minorrepair,etc.Suchactivitiescanhardly

employmorethanoneorveryfewpeople,andmostlygenerateverylimitedprofits—

althoughoftenmuchbetterthanpublicsalaries.Thismajorityofcuentapropistasenjoy

177Thisdoesnotincludetheimmensestealthofpublicpropertythatendsupontheblackmarket,ortheinformalprivatewholesaleofagriculturalproducts.

196

littlemorethanasurvivalopportunity.Theyarealsoexposedtosomanyrestrictions,so

muchredtapeandsuchheavytaxingpolicies,implementedbygovernmentinspectors

apparentlyactingunderthelogicthatcuentapropistasshouldnothavetheopportunity

togetrichorenjoyasubstantiallyhigherincomethanthatofpublicemployees.Thereis

ajungleoflegalprovisionsthatmaybeapplied,178inasituationwheremostofthemicro

entrepreneursarelefttoinformalandillegalactivitiesinordertosurviveandprosper.

Inthissituation,thewhims(caprichos)orcorruptionofpubliccontrollersareoften

whatdecideswhetherasmallbusinesssurvivesornot.AsclaimedbyHenken(2002)

longbeforetheperiodunderstudyhere,andstrengthenedbyWig(forthcoming),this

oftenamountstoazero-sumgamebetweenrisk-takingandprofitability.

Wewillinalatersection(underIndicator4.4)comebacktothepotentialpower

positionoftheprivatesector,particularlyinthetourismsector.

WemayhaveseenthegrowthofaCubanprivatesector,nowrepresentingasmuchas20%

ofGDP,providingalivelihoodforhalftheCubanpopulation.However,thishasmostly

happenedthroughinformalandlargelyillicitmechanisms.Nostrategicdevelopmentplan

providingseriousincentivesforprivateentrepreneurshasbeenformulated.Asoneleading

economisthasclaimed:“The[state]institutionsdonotconsiderthenon-statesectorasa

strategiccomponentofdevelopment”.179

Indicator2.7:Growthofanautonomouscooperativesector?

Thepotentiallydecisivecontributiontothenon-stateCubaneconomicsocietycouldbe

comingfromanewandpotentiallymoreindependentcooperativesector.Ideologically,

therehasbeenadeclaredintentiontostimulatecooperativeformsofpropertyasa

“higherlevelofsocialorganisation”thanprivatebusiness,andthereforeclearlytobe

preferredinaccordancewiththe“updatedCubansocialism”(ref.variousstatements

from‘ReformCzar’Murillo).

178Justtomentiononeexample:iftheholderofacuentapropistalicenseisnotphysicallypresentattheworkplaceduetoillness,pregnancyorwhateverreason,thelocalauthoritieshavethepowertowithdrawthelicenceuntilthepersonisback(Resolución41/2013,No.20,Article12).Itwasreportedin2017thatthisrestrictionwouldbeflexibilized.179OmarEverlenyPerez,interviewedbyArielTerrero(2014):“Doceeconomistasenpugna”(”Twelveeconomistsinconflict”),publishedonthewebsiteCubaprofundahostedbyaninstitutionbelongingtotheMinistryofCulture(S/E).

197

TheroleofagriculturalcooperativeshasbeendiscussedunderChallenge1.

Inanevidentefforttostimulatenon-stateenterpriseswithoutnurturingprivate

capitalism,theGovernmentstartedstimulatingthecreationofnon-agricultural(or

urban)cooperatives.Itwasfirstannouncedthatexperimentswith“mid-size”non-state

cooperativesinsectorsrangingfromfoodservicesandfisheriestotransportationwould

beginbytheendof2012.Theseco-opswouldbegivenpreferenceoverprivatesingle-

ownedbusinesses.Abudgetsupportof100millionUSDwassupposedtobesetasidein

ordertostimulatethissector.180

Twolegalmeasureswereapprovedinlate2012(Decree-Law305andDecree309ofthe

CouncilofMinisters),181establishingsomecompletelyinnovativeprinciplesforCuban

cooperativeorganisation.Ultimateauthorityinthesecooperativeswouldbelefttothe

GeneralAssembly(GA),whichincludesallmembers.TheGAwouldhavethepowerto

electaPresidentandotherdirectivesbysecretballot.Financialmanagementofthe

cooperativewoulddependonsizeandcomplexity:lefttoasinglememberinsmall

cooperativesandafinancialcommitteeinlargerones.Thelegalprinciplesforthese

cooperativesarenottoodifferentfromtheInternationalCooperativeAlliance(ICA)

principles.182Ratherthan“democraticmembercontrol”theCubanstatutesspeakabout

“collectivedecisionsandequalityofrights”;ratherthan“autonomyandindependence”

thereisaconceptcalled“autonomyandeconomicsustainability”.Thereisnoreference,

though—asthereareintheICAprinciples—toeconomicparticipation,open

membershipandtraining/information.

During2013,agroupof200urbancooperativeswereapproved,signallinganew

categoryofcompaniesofpotentiallygreatsignificanceinCuba.Thereweretwoquite

differentcategoriesofnewcooperatives,basedontheoriginoftheinitiative.

180AnnouncementmadebyCuba’s‘economyczar,’MarinoMurillo,atasessionofCuba’sParliamentinJuly,2012(accordingtoacablefromAssociatedPress,datedHavana23.07.12). 181PublishedinGacetaOficialNo.53,2012.182http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles.TheInternationalCo-operativeAlliance(ICA–ACIwithitsSpanishacronyms),foundedin1895,isthemostimportantworld-wideco-operativeorganisation.IthasastrongpresenceinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.TheICACongressestablishedsevenbasicprinciples,whichallcooperativesaresupposedtofollow,in1995.

198

Thefirstgroupiswhatwemaycallstate-initiatedcooperatives,previouslystate-owned

businesses,veryofteninabadfinancialstatewhereworkershavebeengiventhechoice

betweenclosureanddismissal,andthere-organisationintocooperative.Weare

speakingaboutgroupsofpeoplewhorentpremisesorproductionmeansfromtheState

fortenyears(thiscontractmayberenewed),withthepossibilityofdefiningpricesand

distributingtheprofit.183

Butasecondmodalitywasalsomadepossible:cooperativessetupinalliancebetween

cuentapropistas,whichwemaycallTCP-initiatedcooperatives.Thismayforinstancebe

anopportunityforindividualartisanstodevelopintosmall-scaleindustrialproduction.

Someveryfewcooperativesofprofessionals(around10reportedinearly2016)have

alsobeenestablished,butmostofthemhadverylimitedpracticalfunctionalitysince

theyareonlyallowedtoofferthesamecategoriesofservicesasthoseallowedforTCPs

(ref.thepreviouslymentionedcaseofScenius,closedbythestatein2017).

ThepoliticalsignalwasthatcooperativeorganisationinCubawouldenjoyseveral

advantagescomparedtoothernon-statebusinesses(basedonself-employment).The

mostimportantwasthatcooperatives,aslegalisedcompanies,wouldbeeligibleto

receiveforeigninvestmentaccordingtothenewforeigninvestmentlaw(ref.Challenge

3.1).Thatwasnotthecaseforself-employmentinitiativesconvertedtoinformal

“companies”,sincetheylackedalegalpersonalitystatus.

Oneoftheproblemswiththenewurbancooperatives,whichthelegislationpresented

as“experimental”andupforreappraisalandmodificationafterthefirst200hadbeen

allowedtofunctionforawhile,hasbeentheterriblycumbersomeapprovalprocess.

EverysingleofthemhastobeapprovedbytheCouncilofMinisters,afterprevious

assessmentsoffinancial,legalandotheraspectsbyspecialcommissionsatlocal,

provincialandnationallevel.Theneedforfirmcontrolstillpenetratestheofficial

thinking,inanalmostabsurdcaseofcentralism.

183Analternativewayof‘out-sourcing’suchstateenterpriseswouldbethroughtheusufructuariomodality,discussedinaprevioussectionofthisChapter.

199

By2014,atotalof570suchcooperativeshadbeenauthorised,184butonlyabouthalf

hadactuallybeenconstituted.Threequartersofthemwerestate-initiated,whereas25%

wereTCP-initiated.Mostwereinthesectorsofcommerceandrestaurants,somein

construction,veryfewinindustryorproduction.80%wereconcentratedinthegreater

Havanaregion(includingthetwoexperimentalprovinces—alongwithHavana—

ArtemisaandMayabeque).

Ahighlyinterestingreviewoftheexperienceswiththesecooperatives(limitedto

Havana,onlycoveringperioduntilfirstquarter2014)showedthatthenon-statebased

cooperativesweremuchmoresuccessfulthanthestate-based,inspiteofverylimited

accesstoinformationandincentives.Membersofthiscooperativecategoryhadfor

instanceexperiencedatriplingoftheirincomes.Inbothcategories,however,the

principleofinternaldemocracywasreportedtobefrequentlyviolated(Piñeiro

Harnecker2014).Thestudyobservedthatnorealcooperativeculturehadbeencreated;

itwashardlytobeexpectedaftersuchashortperiod.

Thesamequasi-internationalcooperativeprincipleswerealsointheoryestablishedfor

themostindependentagrariancooperatives,thepreviouslymentionedCCSs,atleast

judgingfromofficialtrainingmaterial.Acooperativetrainingprojectwithinthe

agriculturalsector—organisedjointlybetweenUNDPandtheMinistryofAgriculture

withEUfunding(partoftheso-calledPalmaproject)—developedsomeveryinteresting

trainingmaterial185wherethebasicinternationalprinciplesofcooperative

organisation186wereemphasised.Theseincludesuchremarkableprinciplesinthe

Cubansocietyasopenandvoluntarymembership,democraticcontrolbythemembers

(onemember,onevote;fullaccountabilityofelectedleaderstomembers),economic

participationbythemembers(democraticcontrolofthecapital,wheremembersalso

decidehowthesurplusistobeused),autonomyandindependence(organisationsshould

befullycontrolledbymembers;implicitlybeingindependentofgovernment).This

trainingprogramwassupposedtoberolledoutamongcooperativemembersinatotal 184Granma,24.09.14.185MinisteriodeAgricultura(2013):GestiónIntegralCooperativa:Guíaparaformadoresyfacilitadores(LaHabana).186ThetrainingguidepreparedforthepurposeofthisprojectinCubarefersdirectlyto,andisbasedupon,theseprinciples.

200

of37municipalitiesinfivedifferentprovincesalloverthecountry.Iftheseprinciples

hadbeentakenseriouslyandrespectedasabasisforexistingornewagricultural

cooperatives,itwouldalmostimplyarevolutioninthewaycooperativememberscould

takecontroloftheirowneconomicsituationinCuba.ThefactthattheMinistryof

Agricultureputitsstampofapprovalonthistrainingmaterialandactivelysupported

thetrainingwasinitselfquiteextraordinary.

Atleastjudgingbytheselegalprinciples,membersofthecoopsshouldbeableto

exercisesubstantialcontrol,almostresemblingtheworkers´managementsystemin

Tito´sYugoslavia.Butofcourse,theproofisinthepudding:thequestionaskedfromthe

beginningofthisexperimentwaswhetherthelocalnucleioftheCommunistPartyreally

wouldacceptdemocraticgovernanceinthesenewcooperativesandavoidtaking

controloverworkersássemblies,andthusalsostayoutoftheenterprisemanagement

functiontheynormallycontrol?Ifthathadhappened,itwouldreallyhavebeen

innovativefortheCubansociety,withapossiblespreadeffectintothepolitical

system.187Thereality,however,seemstobethatthePartyneverdaredtoletthese

principlesruleinpractice.188

Evenwithallitslimitations,theGovernmentseemedtobeveryworriedthat

experimentationwiththenewcooperativemodelcouldacceleratetoomuch.Ina2015

meetingoftheCouncilofMinisters,PresidentCastromadeacallagainst“massive

creationof(non-agricultural)cooperatives;thepriorityoughttobetheconsolidationof

theexistingonesandadvanceinagradualway”.Healsoemphasisedthatthese

cooperativeshadanexperimentalform,andthatoneshouldnotgotoofast:“weneedto

accommodatetotherhythmofevents”,hesaid(S/E).189

Weseesomeofthesamecautionsignalsinthewaynewcooperativesarebeingtreated

whentheyapproachstatecompaniesforbusinessopportunities,particularlyregarding

187AgoodpresentationofthesemeasuresistobefoundontheblogoftheCanadianeconomistandCuba-watcherArchibaldRitter(October7,2013),publishedinASCENewsclippings.188Theauthorhasmadeseveralattempts–invain–togetaccesstoUNDP’sinternalevaluationofthisinterestingtrainingexperience,butaccordingtoinformalinformantstherehasbeennochangefromthetraditionaltop-downstyleofmanagement.189LeticiaMartínez(2015),”Cooperativas,SistemasdePago,CorrupciónySistemaBancarioenlamiradelarecientereunióndelConsejodeMinistros”,Cubadebate,1.06.15(S/E).

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oneofthemainobstaclesfortheirdevelopment:accesstowholesalemarkets.Such

accessshouldinprinciplebeavailableforcooperativeswiththeirownlegalstatus.The

perceptionofmanycooperativeleaders,however,isthat“thebureaucracyofstate

companiesappliesdifferentwaysofpresentingobstaclesinordernottolosecontrol”,

particularlywhenitcomestoaccesstoproductioninputsfromwholesalemarkets.

“Uptillnow,effortsbynon-agriculturalcooperativestoenterintocontractswithcertain

stateenterprisesfailtomaterializebecausetheseenterprisesdelayorde-stimulate

whatevercommercialagreement,duetothefactthatsuperiorinstanceshavenotelaborated

theproceduresthatnormalisecontractualrelationsbetweentheparties”.190

Theintentiontoopenupforcooperativesofseconddegree,asstatedinthe2011

Guidelines,hasneverbeenimplemented.Agoodopportunitytoincreasetheeconomic

andpoliticalstrengthandtherebyalsothepotentialpoliticalautonomyofthe

cooperativemembershasthusbeenmissed.

Inhisreporttothe7thPartyCongress(April2016),RaúlCastroacknowledgedthat

restrictionsinaccesstowholesalesuppliesandservicesrepresentedadeficiencyfor

non-agriculturalcooperatives,andtheGovernmentdidpresentaplantoallowsome

previousstatebusinessesconvertedtocooperatives(whatwehavecalledstate-initiated

cooperatives),tobuysuppliesfromprivateproducersandwholesalers.191

190OsmarLaffitaRojas(2015),”Tribulacionesdelascooperativasnoagropecuarias”,published14April2015,reproducedinASCENewsclippingsno.658(S/E).191EFE,LaHabana,12.04.16.Castroalsoincludedsmallrestaurantbusinesses–perhapsinareferencetotheusufructuariomodality–inthisplan.

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Table6.7:Evolutionofvariousformsofcooperatives(absolutenumbers),2011-

2016Table 7

CNA UBPC CPA CCS

2011 - 2165 1002 2644

2012 - 2038 1006 2644

2013 198 1811 909 2502

2014 345 1754 903 2504

2015 367 1699 897 2510

2016 397 1593 887 2471

CNA:Non-agricultural(=urban)cooperatives

UBPC:BasicUnitofCooperativeProduction(transformedfrompreviousstatefarms

duringtheSpecialPeriod,in1993)192

CPA:AgriculturalProductionCooperatives,wherethelandisworkedcollectivelyand

accordingtocentralizedeconomicplanning,butoperatedatagreaterlevelofautonomy

fromthestatethanaUBPCorastatefarm

CCS:CreditandServiceCooperative,wheremembershavethehighestdegreeof

autonomyandinprincipleworktheirownplotofland(eitherprivatelyownedorheld

inusufruct

Source:ONE2016,Table4.1

Weseefromthistablethatthegrowthofnon-agriculturalcooperativeswas

considerableduringthefirsttwoyearstheywerepermitted(2013-2014),butthen

stagnated(7%annualgrowth2015-2016).ThreequartersoftheCNAswerelocatedin

HavanaandthetwopreviousHavanaprovincesArtemisaandMayabeque.193The

numberofUBPCswerereducedby25%duringthissix-yearperiod,CPAsby9%,while

thenumberofCCSshasfallenby7%.

192ThenegativeperformanceofUBPCsisdiscussedunderIndicator1.1.193ONE2016,Table4.2.

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Inanefforttoavoidrealindependenceforthecooperatives,ithasbeenreportedinthe

Cubanpressthatthegovernmentispreparingaprogramwherebythecooperatives

applyingforauthorisationneedtorespondtocentralplanningandacceptstate

managementcontrols.

ArchibaldRitterhasdiscussedtheoptionof“mixedeconomywithintensified

cooperativization”asoneofseveralscenariosforCuba.Inhiswords:

“[T]hiswouldinvolvepermittingcooperativesinallareas,includingprofessionalactivities;

openingupthecurrentapprovalprocesses;encouraginggrass-rootsbottom-upventures;

providingimport&exportrights;andimprovingcreditandwholesalesystemsforcoops”

(Ritter2016).

Inhisratherspeculativeforecast,acooperativesectorinCubacouldemployasmuchas

35%oftheworkforce(1.7millionworkers),vs.4.6%atpresent.Forwhateverthese

numbersareworth,theyillustratethatthereisahugepotentialforcooperativesector

expansioninCuba.TheprominentCubaneconomistJuanTrianaforecastedaslateas

2016that13,000state-ownedbusinesseswouldbeconvertedtocooperatives“inoneor

twoyears”.194

Therealityhasshownthatthegrowthofcooperativeshasbeenfarfromthese

expectations:nomassiveurbancooperativizationhasbeenpermittedtotakeplace.This

sector,whichwasthoughttobecomeamajorformoflabourorganisationinCuba

betweenthestateandtheprivatesector,hadhardlybecomesignificantbeforenew

heavybrakeswereturnedoninAugust2017.Bytheendofthefirstsemesterof2017,

431non-agriculturalcooperatives(abbreviatedCNA),withatotalofnomorethan

12,000affiliates,wereoperatinginthecountry.Thelargestnumberswerededicatedto

servicesrelatedtohotelsandgastronomy,andtocommerceandrepairofpersonal

effects.Smallernumberswereactiveinconstructionandmanufacturing.60%were

concentratedinHavana.195

194JuanTrianainterviewedbyOnCuba,June2016.19514ymedio9.08.17,basedonfiguresprovidedbyONEI.

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Thestatedintentionwasthatthe2012decreeswouldbesubstitutedbyageneral

cooperativelawafteraperiodofexperimentation.But“experimentation”isstillthe

nameoftheCNAcooperativegameinCuba.Aslateasmid-2017,PresidentCastrowas

stillfullofhesitationabouttheroleofsuchco-operatives,apparentlyreflectingaworry

thattheymayescapethestrictpoliticalcontrolratherthanadeterminationtofinallylet

themflourishasasignificanteconomicsector,referringtonumerousproblems,

illegalities,abuseofpowerbyleadersoftheseinstitutions,and“anexcessofenthusiasm

andwishestoadvancemorerapidlythanwearereallycapableof”(S/E).196Aspartof

thereformprocesshaltannouncedinAugust2017,theGovernmentalsodecidedto

paralysethecreationofnewcooperatives,onceagainwithreferencetotheneedto

“perfeccionarsufuncionamiento"197.

Thewell-informedUruguayanjournalistandlong-timeCubaresidentFernando

Ravsbergmadetheironiccommentarythatthesinofthecooperativeswassimplythat

theyhadbeentooefficient.Hedocumentedthiswithreferencetoareportbymembers

oftheNationalAssemblytoitsJuly2017session,basedonaseriesofvisitstoCNAsin

differentpartsofthecountry.TheParliamentarianshadnotedthattheCNAswere

”increasingtheircontributiontosectorsofhigheconomicandsocialimportancetothe

country,contributingtotheimprovementoftheirmembers’qualityoflifeandsatisfying

thedemandsoftheclients,aboveallintheconstructionsector”.Theproblem,they

noted,wasthatthis”couldnegativelyaffectthehumancapitalofstatecompanies,since

theexodusofqualifiedpersonneltowardsthecooperativesisincreasing”,plusthatthey

wereoperatingoutsideoftheirownterritory,”thuslimitingtheaccesstocontroland

fiscalization”(S/E).198

Ifthegovernmenthadliveduptoitsownlegalandpoliticalcommitmentstoletagrarian

aswellasurbancooperativesdevelopintoautonomousanddemocraticinstitutions,

whichmightactuallyhavechangedtheentirestatevs.non-stateequation.Itmighthave

producedsomeofthedesperatelyneededresultsintermsoffoodproduction,job

196CastroinhisclosingspeechtotheJuly2017sessionoftheNationalAssembly:”RaúlCastrocriticalasirregularidadesenelsectorprivadoycooperativo”,14ymedio,14.07.17(S/E).Thefollowingmonth,agovernmentofficialwasmorespecificbyaccusingthecooperativedirectorsofoperatinglikeprivatebusinessowners(14ymedio9.08.17).197Granma,8.08.17.198FernandoRavsberg’sblog,13.07.17:”Peligro!!!Lascooperativassondemasiadoeficientes”(S/E).

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generationandproductivegrowthinCuba.Ofparticularimportancecouldbethe

appearanceofserious“seconddegree”productioncooperativesthatmightgrowintoa

manufacturingindustry,forinstancelinkedtoagricultureandconstruction.

Inpractice,however,thesameover-cautiousnessoflosingstatecontrolhasuntilnow

beenpredominanthere,bothintermsofauthorisingnewcooperativesingeneral,and

particularlywhenitcomestoallowingmoreautonomousformsofcooperative

organisation.Acompletelynewpolicydirectionwouldberequiredinordertomakethe

cooperativesectorthriveinCuba.

Thebigpoliticalquestionishereis—aswiththerestofthereformprocess—whether

thestatewillletgoofitscompletetop-downcontroloftheeconomy,andwhethera

strongcooperativesectorshallbeallowedtodevelopasautonomousandpeople-

controlledstructures.AdemocraticcooperativemovementinCubacouldalsobeakey

buildingstoneinadevelopmenttowardsmoregeneraldemocracyinthecountry.Itis

difficulttoobservesignsinthatdirectionsofar.

Indicator2.8:Incentives/dis-incentivesforotherpotentialnon-stategrowth

initiatives.

The17thofDecember2014(laterreferredtoas17D)jointUS-Cubandeclarationsto

startaprocesstowardsnormalisationwithagradualbutstillonlylimitedliftingofthe

USembargo,mighthaveofferedahistoricopportunityforastrengthenedandrelatively

autonomousprivatesectortoemergeandflourishinCuba.Oncetheembargois

completelylifted,anautonomousandnationalsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs)

sectorwouldprobablyhaveseriousdifficultiestoflourishincompetitionwitharapid

influxoflargeandworld-classefficientcompaniesfromtheUSandelsewhere.Ifthe

Cubangovernmenthadpermittedtheemergingentrepreneurstodevelopmorerobust

businesseswiththehelpoftheincreasedfamilyremittancesandtradethatwasnow

permittedbytheObamaadministration,andhadallowedthelegalrecognitionof

MSMEs,itmightalsohavefreedthestateofmuchoftheredundantandnon-productive

workforce.Whatismore,itcouldhavecreatedastrongernationaleconomythatwould

206

belessvulnerabletotheexpected—oratleastdesired—delugeofUSandothercapital

oncetheembargo/blockadehadbeenlifted.

Oneclearperception,however,isthatthroughoutthisperiodofhistoricopportunitythe

systematicdiscriminationofdomesticentrepreneurscontinued,evenwhencompared

totheconditionsofferedtoforeigninvestors(ref.HenkenandRitter2015Chapter7;

Torres2016).AswewillcomebacktounderIndicator5.2,wemayevenhaveseenan

increasinggovernmentresistancetoallowarealentrepreneurialdevelopmentinthe

post17Dperiod,andthattheopeningofrelationswiththeUSactuallyhamperedrather

thanstimulatedacceptanceofthissector(Bye2016).Therewereearlysignalsthat

certaingovernmentcirclesconsideredUSeffortstofosterentrepreneurshipasasinister

plantounderminesocialism—somegoingasfarasclaimingthattheeternalenemiesin

theCIAwerebehindsuchplans,i.a.byusingtheCatholicChurchastheirtool.199Such

conspiracytheoriesseemtohavegainedincreasinginfluenceonpubliceconomic

strategies,graduallyendingupasageneralresistancetomoresystematicmarket

reforms.

17Dnodoubtopenedmanynewopportunitiesforprivatesectordevelopment.In

additiontoremovingmostlimitsonremittances(asdiscussedlaterunderIndicator

3.3),PresidentObamaalsoexplicitlyallowedUScompaniesto“supporttheemerging

Cubanprivatesector”.Thiswaspartofhis“empowermentthroughengagement”policy

(whichofcoursedidhaveaside-objectivetostrengthenpoliticalpluralisminCuba).

DifferentformsofstimuliwerenowallowedfromtheUSsidewhiletheembargowas

stillinplace:

“DirectU.S.engagementwithCubanentrepreneursthroughfreertravelandmore

remittances;accesstobankingandotherfinancialservices;increasedexportsofbadly

neededinputstoislandcuentapropistas;theimportofprivateorcooperativelyproduced

CubangoodsandservicestotheU.S.;andtechnologyandknow-howtransferareall

encouragingelementsofObama’snewCubapolicy.Thesechangeshavethepotentialtoboth

199SeeArthurGonzales(2013):”The#CIAandthemanipulationoftheCatholicChurch”,posted30.10.13bycubainsidetheworld,http://cubainsidetheworld.wordpress.com/2013/10/30/the-cia-and-the-manipulation-of-the-catholic-church/,downloaded2.12.13,wheretheauthorinterpretsplansbytheCubanCatholicChurchtotrainentrepreneursinSantiagoandHavanaaspartofthesubversiveplansoftheUSgovernmentagainsttheCubanrevolution,withthepurposeofreplacingsocialismwithcapitalisminCuba.

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‘empower’individualentrepreneurs—thestatedgoaloftheU.S.policyshift—andincentivize

theinitial,ifexceedinglycautious,privatesectorreformsalreadybegunbytheCuban

government”(HenkenandVignoli2015).

InFebruary2015,theUSStateDepartmentstatedthatindependentandself-employed

CubanproducerswouldnowbeallowedbyUSlegislationtoexportanumberof

productstotheUS.Alistofproductsthatcouldnotbeexportedwasdrawnup,leadinga

customsattorneyinMiamitoanalysethecomplicatedUSHarmonizedTariffSchedule,

andcomeupwithwhathecalledhis“yeslist”—importsfromself-employedworkers

thatwerepermittedevenwhiletheUStradeembargoagainstCubaremainedinplace:

“TheStateDepartmentsaysitsnewrules[forproductsthatindependentCuban

entrepreneurscouldsellintheUnitedStates]willencourageprivateCubanentrepreneursto

developproductsforexport.Whileallliveanimalsandanimalproductsareprohibited,raw

hides,skins,leather,furs,saddleryandharnesses,handbags,andtravelgoodsareallowed.

Soarepaperproducts,plasticsandrubberarticles,ceramics,glassandglassware,articlesof

stone,plasterandcement;footwear,hats,umbrellas,toysandgames,artificialflowersand

feathers.

Independententrepreneurswhomakesoap,cosmetics,candles,waxesandpolishes,

perfumeorphotographicorcinematographicgoodsarealsointheclear.Jewellerymakers,

includingthosewhoworkwithpearlsandpreciousandsemipreciousstones,alsogota

greenlightasdidproducersofcutleryandtools.

ImportationintotheUnitedStatesofanarrayofhomegoods,includingfurniture,lamps,

illuminatedsigns,bedding,mattressesandcushions,clocks,wickerproducts,baskets,and

articlesmadefromwood,corkandstraw,isallowed.Watchesandmusicalinstrumentsare

onthe‘yes’list,too”.200

YetanotherrelaxationcameinApril2016,intheaftermathofPresidentObama´s

historicalvisittoCuba,whentheUSgovernmentannouncedthatitwouldpermitthe

importofcoffeeandtextileproductsproducedby“independentCubanentrepreneurs”,

200”CubanentrepreneurscanselleverythingfromshoestosoapintheUnitedStates”,MiamiHerald,23.02.15.

208

previouslylimitedtoCubanartisans.201TheUSalsomade300millionUSDavailablefor

tradewithCubain2016.202

Ifprivateproducershadbeenallowedandevenstimulatedtotakeadvantageofthenew

USmeasures,theprivateshoeindustryandsimilarsectorsmightpotentiallyhave,quite

quickly,developedintoathrivingpartoftheCubaneconomy.

Theproblem,however,wasthatsuchUS-Cubanbusinessrelationswereneverallowed

bytheCubangovernment(ref.Indicator1.3,withthequotedrejectionbyANAP,the

Party-controlledpeasantorganisation,toturndownthecoffeeexportinvitation).

Consequently,thetwosidescouldnotcometotermsaboutsuchprivatesectorrelations.

PresidentObama’sSecretaryofCommerce,PennyPritzker,characterisedthe

negotiationsonrenewedcommercialrelationsasgoingmuchslowerthantheUSwould

like.AUSproposalthatCubangovernmentagenciesfacilitatetradewiththenon-state

sectorwasflatlyrejected.PritzkermetwithCuba´sMinisterofForeignCommerceand

Investments,RodrigoMalmierca,inFebruary2016.Shenotedthatwhilethenormative

changesinUSpolicywerenotexpectedtobemetwithareciprocalresponse,theCuban

governmentwouldneedtopermitthecountry´sprivatesectortohaveaccesstothese

newmeasuresinordertounblocktheopportunitiesfortheCubanpeople.203

TheoppositionCubaneconomistElíasAmorBravonoted:

“USofficialsquietlyacknowledgethatwhilethecurrentstructureoftheeconomydepends

exclusivelyongovernmententities,traderelationsbetweenthetwocountrieswilladvance

little,verylittle[…]FromtheUSside,thepossibilityhasbeenraisedinthenegotiationsthat

importinggovernmentagenciesontheisland,allstate-owned,takecaretofacilitateUS

exportswhileatthesametimeUSemployersmightcontactprivateCubanentrepreneurs

directlyanddobusinesswiththemwithoutgoingthroughthegovernmentcircuit.This

proposalhasbeenmetwithanabsoluterejectionbytheCastroregime.Insuchconditions,

everythingwillmoveveryslowly”(S/E).204

201EFE;Havana,22.04.16.202”EEUUautorizóya$300millonesparanegociosenCubaesteaño”.Postedon18.02.16byCaféFuerte.203CaféFuerte,op.cit.204ElíasAmorBravo(2015),“LareanudacióndelcomercioconCubaeslenta”,inCubaeconomía,posted1April2015,reproducedinASCENewsClippingsno.658(S/E).

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TheCubangovernmentshowednosignofpickingupthenewopportunitiesofferedby

theObamaadministrationintermsofeconomiccollaborationwithCuba’sprivate

sector,apparentlyoutoffearofUSpoliticalconsiderationsaboutstimulatingacapitalist

sectorwiththepurposeofunderminingthepoliticalregime.Aswecomebacktounder

Indicator9.3,theparadoxicaleffectofUSengagementthereforeseemstohavebeena

Cubancounter-reform.TheTrumppresidencywillnotbeofanyhelpinthisregard,

either.

Thefoot-dragginginresponsetotheinvestmentpotentialoftheCuban-American

diasporamayalsohaveprovidedasignificantsignalregardingacrucialquestionfor

Cuba’spoliticalfuture:whetherincreasingco-investmentopportunities—whenthey

ultimatelyemerge—willbedominatedormonopolisedbytheCubanstate,notleast

militarycorporations,orwhethernon-militaryCubanentrepreneurswillbeallowedto

developsuchlinks.Theleft-wingCuban-AmericanacademicSamuelFarber(2006)

predictedtheresponsemorethanadecadeago,possiblyinaquitepropheticway:

“AmorelikelyscenarioisthattheheadsoftheCubanarmywillwelcometheinvestmentsof

theCuban-Americancapitalistswiththeclearunderstandingthatthearmywillpolitically

runtheshow.Ofcourse,overthelongerterm,thesetwoforceswouldtendtomergewith

eachother.Thesearmyleaderswillbeinaposition,asweindicatedabove,tomakedeals

directlywiththeevenbiggerU.S.capitalists,withouthavingtodependonorneedtheCuban-

Americancapitalistsasintermediaries,althoughmanyofthelattermayfeelencouragedto

playthatrole”.

TheopenandmutualinterestbetweenleadingUScapitalsectorsandCubanmilitary-

controlledcorporationsduringtheObamaera(ref.Indicator3.4)isagoodillustrationof

thepotentialinthisrelationship.

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Challenge 3:

Massive need for productive investments to spur economic growth and

employment creation

Indicator3.1:ForeigninvestmentplayinganincreasingroleinCuba’seconomic

developmentandemploymentgeneration.

”Ina2011officialdocumentoutliningproposedreforms,foreigninvestmentwasderidedas

“complementary”,asecondaryafterthought.Incontrast,whenaddressingHavana’sannual

internationaltradefairin2017,Raúl’sministerforforeigntradeandinvestmentsangavery

differenttune:‘Todayforeigninvestmentceasestobeacomplementandhasbecomean

essentialissueforthecountry.’”(Feinberg2017)

UntilanewforeigninvestmentregimewasintroducedinCubain2013/2014,such

investmentswereverylimitedandactuallyfallingbyasmuchas50%sincethe

beginningofthecentury,riddledwithallkindsoflegaluncertaintiesandpoliticalfoot-

dragging(seeFeinberg2012andPerez2014).Consequently,therewerefewsignsofthe

countryattractingsignificantforeigninvestments.Someestimates(orperhapsrather

‘guesstimates’)putthe2013levelofaccumulatedforeigninvestmentsinCubaat

anywherebetween3.5and5billionUSD,averylimitedamountforthesizeofthe

countryanditseconomy205.

Thesituationofchronicdeficitsoftradeandpaymentbalance,andaverylimitedand

expensiveaccesstointernationalcredit,makesFDIevenmoreimportantforCuba.

TheFDIappetitewasobviouslystimulatedasthefirstoptimismaboutoffshoreoil

drillingsubsidedafter2012,andtheeconomiclifelinetoVenezuelastartedgetting

increasinglyuncertainafterthedeathofPresidentChávezandgrowingeconomic

problemsinthatcountry.AdramaticincreaseinFDIwasalsoseenasanecessityfor

205Feinberg´sestimateoftotalFDIin2012was3,5billionUSD;Perezéstimatewas5billionUSD.Feinberg,inapresentationattheASCEconference,Miami,1-3August2013,consideredthe2013levelofFDIinCubatorepresentapproximately15%ofwhatwouldbenormalforCuba´ssize.3billionoutofthe3.5billioninvestments,heconsidered,areconcentratedin20companies,withatotalof35,000workers.

211

improvingtheextremelylowgrosscapitalformationfromitspresentlowlevels(ref

Indicator3.5below;seealsoTorres2016).

Twolegalstepsin2013and2014wereintendedtochangethissituation.Thefirst

(2013)wasrelatedtoanewstrategicprojectfortheestablishmentofaspecial

developmentzone;thesecondwasanewgenerallawonFDI.

TheMarielContainerPort,andtherelated460squarekilometresSpecialDevelopment

Zone(ZonaEspecialdeDesarrolloMariel—ZEDM)located45kmwestofHavana,was

inauguratedbyPresidentsCastroandRousseff(Brazil)inJanuary2014.80%ofthe1

billionUSDinfrastructureinvestmentwasprovidedbyBrazil´sstatedevelopmentbank,

BNDES,andconstructionsmanagedbytheBrazilianmega-companyOdebrecht,which

continent-widecorruptionscandalexplodedsoonafterandalsocametoinvolveits

operationsinCuba.206SomeobserverswentasfarasseeingZEDMasCuba´sversionof

China´s“onecountry,twosystems”,theconstitutionalconceptcreatedbyDengXiaoping

forrelationstoHongKong,MacaoandTaiwaninthe1980s.207

ThelegalframeworkdrawnupfortheZEDM(DecretoLey313/2013)tobeoperatedbya

Singaporecompanyastounderlinethatthisisseriouscapitalism—includesa10-year

taxholiday,almostcompletefreedomtoimportrawmaterialsandrepatriateprofits,50-

yearcontracts,upto100%foreignownershipofbusinesses,guaranteesagainst

expropriation.Thehopewasthatthiswouldluremanufactureplantsaswellasresearch

centresandoperationalhubstoCuba.Thespecialobjectivewiththedeep-water

containerportistohandlethenewwaveoflarger‘Post-Panamax’shipsexpectedto

dominateglobalcommerceaftertheexpandedPanamaCanalbecameoperationalfrom

mid-2016.TheCubanshadparticularexpectationsthatChinesefirmswouldbelooking

206Seee.g.”OperaciónanticorrupciónenBrasilponepuntofinalaobrasdeOdebrechtenCuba”,Martinoticias.com,11.12.16.ForamorecomprehensivereportonOdebrecht´squestionableoperationsinBrazil,notleastex-PresidentLula’sinvolvementinthem,seethefollowingthreearticlesbymartinoticias.com,fromMarch2018:https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrecht-cuba-parte-1/163876.html;https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrecht-cuba-parte-2/163884.html;https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrech-cuba-parte-3/165115.html207SpecialDevelopmentZoneorSpecialEconomicZone(SEZ)isnormallyageographicalregionthatisdesignedtoexportgoodsandprovideemployment.SEZsareexemptfromfederallawsregardingtaxes,quotas,FDI-bans,labourlawsandotherrestrictivelawsinordertoproducethegoodsmanufacturedintheSEZatagloballycompetitiveprice.

212

foramodernshippingcontainerterminalintheCaribbean,buttherewilldefinitelybe

competitionfromothercountriesintheregionthathavealreadyestablishedSEZs,like

DominicanRepublicandJamaica.208

ThebigdrawbackwithwhichMarielwasstrugglingfromtheoutsetwasofcoursethe

USembargo,whichhasprohibitedshipsthatstopontheislandfromcallingatUSports

duringthefollowingsixmonths.ThisbanwasliftedbyPresidentObama,209butre-

introducedbyPresidentTrump.IfandwhentheUSembargoonedayislifted,theport

mayevidentlybecomeanidealpointforUS-Cubantrade,i.asincemostportsonthe

southcoastoftheUSaresituatedatriverestuarieswithquitelimitedcapacity.210There

isallreasontobelievethatthisperspectivehasbeenpartofthemotivationbehind

ZEDM.

OneofthegreatdisincentivesforforeigninvestorsinCubasofarhasbeenthatlabour

forcecanonlybehiredthroughaCubanstateemploymentagency,whichkeepsthe

lion’sshare(oftenasmuchas90%)ofthesalaries.Directrecruitmentisruledoutin

Mariellikeintherestofthecountry,butworkersinZEDMkeepamajorpartoftheir

salaries,thusprovidingmuchmoreincentives.211Thatmayincreasetheattractionfor

investorsandworkersalikeandbeanincentiveforbetterproductivityeliminatingthe

pressureonforeigninvestorsinCubatoofferextra-officialbenefitstoworkers.But

manycompaniesarestillreluctanttoengagewiththeCubanlabourregime.212

208seehttp://cubainsidetheworld.wordpress.com/2013/11/06/mariel-special-zone-the-jewel-of-the-cuban-economycuba/;orNickMiroff(2013):”AtMarielPort,CubafollowsChineseblueprint”,inGlobalPost,23/11/13. 209AspartoftheOctober2016PresidentialExecutiveOrder,theUSamendedtheCubanAssetControlRegulationstoeasethe180DayRuleprohibitingvesselsfromcallingatUSportsfor180daysafterleavingaCubanport.IfaforeignvesselcallsatCubawithcargofromathirdcountrywhichwouldnotbesubjecttotheUSExportAdministrationRegulationsorCommercialControlListforanti-terrorismreasons,thatvesselwouldnotbeprohibitedfromthereaftercallingataUSport.VesselscarryingCubangoodsorpassengersmightnotenteraUSport,unlessexpresslyauthorizedtodoso.210Asanillustration,itwasinterestingtonotethegreatinterestshownbythePortsAssociationofLouisiana,controlling5ofthetop15portsintheUS,situatedonthesoutherncoastlinerightacrossfromMariel(messagefromEngageCuba,25February2016).211ThespecialpaymentrulesinMarielareasfollows:theemployeeskeep80%ofthesalariespaidbytheforeigninvestor(normallyitistheotherwayround),butreceivesonly10CubanpesosperUSD(vs.officialvalueof24:1).ThenetresultisthataMarielemployeeearns12timesthatofanaverageCubanworker.(OmarEverlenyPerezinterviewedby14ymedio,1.08.16).212In2016,theFrenchcontractorcompanyBouygues,oneofthemajorforeignconstructioncompaniespresentinCuba,wasallowedtoimportseveralhundredconstructionworkersfromIndiainordertoacceleratetheconstructionofhotelsinHavana,withasalaryof1,500Eurospermonth–asmuchasfifty

213

AfterestablishingtheZEDM,thenextstepwasthepassingofthenewlawonforeign

directinvestment(Ley188/2014)inMarch2014.Theintentionofthenewlawwasto

offermorefiscalincentives,moretransparencyandlessdiscretionthantheprevious

lawfrom1995.Themaindrawbacks,highlightedbypotentialinvestors,isthatnon-state

Cubanbusinesses(apartfromcooperatives)areexcluded,thementionedstatecontrol

ofemploymentriddingCubanworkersofmostincentives,thattherearelimitedrule-of-

lawguarantees,thattheCubanlabourforcehaslimitedexperiencewithmodern

assemblyplantsandadvancedtechnology.ThelimitedaccesstotheInternetandother

infrastructureweaknessesareothernegativefactors.

AnothernegativefactorforFDIsisthehighuncertaintyaboutCuba´swillingnessand

capacitytopermitprofitrepatriation,alsolinkedtoCuba’sdebtsituation.Cubareached

aParisClubdealinDecember2015,thatforgave8.5billionUSDofthetotaldebtof11.1

billionofficialdebtithaddefaultedonsince1986.Repaymentoftheremaining2.6

billionUSDdebtwasstructuredover18years,withthefirstpaymentofabout40

millionUSDdueby31October2016.Itwasseenasaverysignificantsigninthisregard,

andreceivedwithgreatreliefbyforeigninvestorsinHavana,whenthefirstinstalment

waspaid,actuallyaheadofschedule,inOctober2016213,andagainin2017.These

paymentswereseenasanindicationthatCubawasnowfinallygettingseriousaboutits

intentionstohonourinternationalpaymentcommitmentsmoreingeneral,

understandingthisasanecessaryconditionforFDIofanymagnitudetobeforthcoming.

However,EconomyMinisterCabrisashintedinhisspeechtothe2016year-endsession

oftheNationalAssemblythatCubawouldbeunabletohonourallitspayment

obligations.214

Moreover,Cubaprovidesnotimelyinformationonitsfinances.Westernbankersand

creditorsestimatedthatthegovernmentfellbehindbymorethan$1bninits2016

timesaCubansalary.Bouyguesofficials,interviewedbytheauthor,claimedthattheimportofthisworkforcewasjustifiedbytheirhigherlabourefficiency. 213”CubabeginstopaydebtstoWesterncreditors,beatsdeadline”.ReutersBusinessNews,Havana,27October2016.214TheLondonClub,coordinatingcommercialcreditorswithatotalof1.4billionUSDclaimsagainstCuba,reportedin2018that«significantdebtrelief»wouldbeofferedduringon-goingnegotiations.Noresulthadbeenachievedbymid-May,2018.

214

paymentstocreditors,andclaimedthatCubawasseekingpaymenttermsoftwoor

moreyears.215AwesternfinancierwithlongCubaexperienceaddedafterHurricane

IrmahaddevastatedthecountryinSeptember2017:“Theperceptionwillbethatcredit

worthinesshasbeenaffected[byIrma],andtheCubangovernmentwilldoubtlesstake

advantageofthoseperceptionstopushthroughwhateverdeferralstheycan.”216Such

perceptionswilldefinitelynothelpattractmoreFDI.

BasedonapersonalexperienceasadvisortoanFDIinitiativeintheFreezone(ZEDM)

andelsewhereinCuba,217thereislittledoubtthattheCubanbureaucracyisveryill

preparedtohandleforeigninvestors,intermsofinstitutionalculture,tenderandvetting

procedures,andaminimumoftransparencyinthehandlingofdecisions.Without

addressingtheseshortcomings,itwillbeverydifficulttoattractseriousforeign

companies.Anotherbarrieristheverylimitedaccesstointernationalcreditaslongas

Cubaisnotamemberofanymajorinternationaldevelopmentbank(partlybecauseof

USvetoandpartlybecauseCubamaintainsitsideologicallymotivateddecisionnotto

applyformembership).

ManyCubaneconomistsperceiveatechnicalassistancerelationshipwiththeIMFasa

desirablefirststeptoapproachinternationalfinancialinstitutions,notleastinorderto

facilitatethelongoverdueunificationofCubancurrencies(VidalandScottBrown,

2015).

SomepossiblerelieftoCuba’sisolationfromtheinternationalfinancialinstitutions

appearedinsecondhalf2016,butthiswasofcoursebeforetheUSpresidential

elections.LatinAmerica´ssecondlargestdevelopmentbank(afterIDB),Corporación

AndinadeFomento(CAF),signedanMOUwithCubawiththeimmediateintentionof

providingtechnicalassistance.AtripartiteMOUwasalsosignedbetweenCuba,CAFand

theMoscow-basednewlyrevivedInternationalInvestmentBankwhereCubaisa

215AccordingtoananonymoussourceintheDirectorateforForeignInvestment,MinistryofForeignTradeandForeignInvestment,”thedebtwithinvestorsnowamountsto1,300millionUSD”(S/E),quotedbyUlisesFernández:”Cuba:lacrisisiráapeordurante2018”,5.02.18(articlere-printedinASCENewsNo.790,10.02.18.).216Reuters’veteranHavanacorrespondentMarcFrankinacablefromHavana,14.09.17.217Workingasanadvisortoapotentialforeigninvestorinthehighprioritysolarenergysector.

215

memberdatingbacktotheoldSovietera.218Inasimilarmove,CubainAugust2017

becameamemberoftheCentralAmericanBankforEconomicIntegration(CABEI),with

therighttodrawonitsportfolio.219CubanmembershipinCABEI,andperhapsinCAF,

couldbeabreakthroughforaccesstointernationalfinancing,anditisquiteclearthat

theprincipalinternationalfinanceinstitutions(IMF,WB,IDB)arecarefullyobserving

thisrelationshipasapossibledooropenertoitsownengagementwithCuba.

Onvariousoccasions,ithasbeenstated(amongothersbyForeignTradeand

InvestmentMinisterMalmierca)thatCubaneedsannualFDIsofatleast2.5billionUSD

inordertoreachanacceptablegrowthrhythm.Optimisticinvestmentplanshavenot

beenmissing:theofficialportfoliopresentedtopotentialforeigninvestorsatthe

HavanaTradeFairin2016amountedto9,500millUSD,withanother3,500million

beingaddedin2017.Therealityisdramaticallygloomier.Theofficialfigurefor2015-

2016isthattotalFDIsapprovedreachedaround1,350millionUSD,i.e.675millionUSD

peryear,sayingnothingaboutactuallyimplementedFDI.220Atyear-end2016,economy

ministerRicardoCabrisassaidthatFDIswereonlyexpectedtorepresent6.5%ofthe

2017investmentplan,and0.5oftheGDP,whichwouldrepresentaround400million

USD.Basedonthesenumbers,FDIswouldnotplaythefundamentalroleforthe

country´seconomicdevelopmentasestablishedbythe7thCommunistPartyCongress.221

Oneyearlater,atyear-end2017,MrCabrisasannouncedthattheambitionfor2018

wouldbetoimplementFDIsatavalueof600millionUSD.

218Accordingtoapressrelease,CAFandIIBagreed"toestablishacooperationschemeforidentifyingandpromotingprogramsandinitiativesofmutualinterest,includingtechnicalassistanceforthedevelopmentofmicro,small,medium,andlargeenterprisesinCuba."(”Cubacontinuestoedgetowardsmultilateral credit”,CubaStandard,27.09.16)AprivatemailmessagereceivedfromCAF´sdeskofficerforCuba(19.10.16)clarifiedthestateoftheagreement:”CubaisnotyetamemberofCAF,weareworkinginthatdirection,butforthemomentitisnotpossibleforCAFtofinanceprojectsinCuba.”219”CubaingresacomosocioaBancoCentroamericano”,ElNuevoHerald,28.08.17:http://www.elnuevoherald.com/ultimas-noticias/article169810512.html220ThisfigurewasgivenbyForeignInvestmentMinisterMalmiercainNovember2016,alsoquotedbyEx-financeminister(nowCIEMAdvisor)JoséLuísRodríguez:”Laaconomíacubana:actualizandoel2016yunaprimeramiradaal2017”(II),articlereproducedinASCENewsClippingsNo.766,26.07.17,saysthat”FDIsduringthetwolatestyearsaccumulate1,346milliondollar”.RaúlCastroalsosaidinhistraditionalend-of-yearspeechtotheNationalAssemblyinDecember2016thatCubahadapprovedjust$1.3billionworthofprojectssincethenewlegalregimeonFDIwaspassedmorethantwoyearsearlier.Thisofcoursesaysnothingabouthowmuchhasbeenorwillbeimplemented.AccordingtoReuters,twoofthoseprojectswereforluxurygolfcourses,valuedatacombined$900million,butnogroundhadyetbeenbrokenatthesites.Thatwouldleaveonly$400million,oranaverageof$200millionperyear.221CabrisasspeechatDecember2016NatAssemblysession,December2016.Cuba´sGDPstandsataround80billionUSD;0,5%ofwhichwouldbe400millionUSD.

216

Wemayconclude,therefore,thattheambitiousplanofattracting2.5billionUSDin

annualFDI,hasbeendowngradedtoaroundonefourthofthatamount.222Tourismis

theleadingFDIsectorinCuba,with27jointventures.223

AsanillustrationoftheslownessinimplementingFDIs,thefirstever100%foreign

investmentinCuba,a67millionUSDsolarenergyprojectinMarielEDZ,awardedtoa

Britishcompany(HiveEnergy)in2015,tooktwoyearstoreachaformalpower

purchaseagreement(January2018),butstillwithouthavingreachedafinancialclose.

Chinaseemstobetheonlyfinancialsourceforprojectsofthischaracterandmagnitude

inCuba,asaresultofCubanothavingaccesstoanyoftheinternationaldevelopment

banks.224

CubahasaworserecordthananyotherLatinAmericancountrybothintermsofFDIas

percentageofGDP,andaspercentageofgrosscapitalformation.Still,FDIplaysa

decisiveroleforCuba´sexports:companieswithmixedcapitalrepresentapproximately

twothirdsofthevalueofCuba´sexportofgoods.Ithasalsobeencompletelydecisivefor

thedevelopmentofthecountry´stouristindustry,todayoneofthemainsourcesof

foreigncurrencyincomes,andfortheonlyoperativemineralindustryinthecountry

(nickel).225

PresidentCastro,inlightofthisquitepessimisticprospect,hasemphasizedtheneedto

"overcometheobsoletementality,fullofprejudicestowardsforeigninvestment[…]We

arenotgoingtowardscapitalism,butwecannotbeafraidof,orputobstaclesintheway

of,thatwhichwecandowithinourlaws"226(S/E).

222Moreoptimisticreportsdoexist.Atthe2017HavanaInternationalTradeFair,theMinisterforForeignTradeandInvestment,Malmierca,claimedthat”Cubahadmanagedtoattractforeigncapitalofmorethan2billionUSDin2017”.Hesaidnothing,however,abouthowmuchofthishadactuallymaterialised(”¿Crecelainversiónextranjeraen2017?”Cubadebate,2.11.17).223TravelTradeCaribbean,17.01.18.Someofthem–liketheU.S.Mariott–haveonlymanagementcontractswithoutFDI.TheSpanishhotelcorporationMeliárepresents69%ofthehotelroomswithforeigncapitalinthecountry,distributedamong29hotels,andannouncedplansforthebuildingofanother11hotelsin2018(DDC18.01.18). 224http://www.cubatrademagazine.com/hive-energy-foreign-owned-solar-park-cuba/225JuanTriana:”Inversiónextranjeraydesarrollo”,24.10.17,reproducedinASCENewsClippingsNo.780.226Reuters,Havana,27.12.16,andGranma,27.12.16.

217

Thelion´sshareofFDIs—plannedoractuallyrealised—seemstohavebeen

concentratedintheFreezone(ZEDM),reportedinMarch2017tohave“captured”966

USDasFDI(24companiesfrom10countries),withapotentialemploymentgeneration

ofonlyalittleover1,000jobs.227ConsideringthatMarielhasbeenpresentedasajob-

generationprogram,thatfiguremustrepresentagreatdisappointment.228

Indicator3.2:Familyremittancesandothersourcesofinvestmentintheprivate

sector.

WhenmarketreformswereintroducedinCuba,andparticularlywhenPresidentObama

launchedhisnormalizationpolicy,itwasexpectedthatDiasporainvestmentscouldplay

animportantroleinkick-startingamarketeconomyinthecountry,thesamewaythey

hadintheearlyphaseofthereformprocessinChinaandVietnam.Therewere

increasinglystrongsignsthatrichCuban-Americansweregettingreadytoinvestin

Cuba,butmanyofthemwereconcernedthatalsoCubannationalsbeallowedtotake

partincommonenterprise.Oneofthemostvocaladvocatesofthisvisionhasbeen

CarlosSaladrigas,aninfluentialCuban-Americaninvestorwithstronglinkstothe

CatholicChurchinCuba:

“TheCubanentrepreneurinexilehasalottocontributeinfutureCuba.Wearepartofthat

enormoushumancapitaloftheFatherland.IknowalmostallbigentrepreneursinMiami

[…],Iknowwelltheinteresttheyhaveincontributingtheirtalentandtheirtreasuretohelp

aprosperingandprogressingCuba…WealsobelieveintheneedtocreateaCreole,Cuban

capital.WeareworriedaboutaCubawherethecapitalonceagainbecomesmostlyforeign.

Aftersomanyyearsstrugglingforsovereignty,itwouldbeironictoreturntoaCuba

dominatedbyforeigncapital.…[I]twouldbeethicallyinacceptabletoallow[theDiaspora

entrepreneurship]toinvestinCuba,asforeigninvestors,ifthesameopportunityisnot

offeredtoCubanslivinginCuba[…]ManyexileentrepreneurswillliketoinvestinCubain

associationwithCubansfromtheIslandwhoknowintimatelythepeculiaritiesoftheCuban

marketandtheidiosyncrasyofcontemporaryCuba”229(S/E).

227Cubadebate,9.03.17.Again,weareprobablytalkingaboutapprovedprojects.Byyearend-2015,itwasreportedthatZEDMhadapprovedonlyeightprojectswithacumulativeinvestmentvalueofabout$200million.228TheissueofinvestmentsandothereconomicrelationswithdifferentcountriesindiscussedunderChallenge5. 229CarlosSaladrigas,interviewedbyOrlandoMárquez(2011):“Noesfácilcambiar,perolohice,”PalabraNueva,LaHabana,May2011.EvensomeleadingfiguresofthemostsuccessfulconservativeCuban-

218

Saladrigas’concernaboutmuchbetterconditionsbeingofferedtoforeigninvestorsthan

toCubannationalswerenotremoved;itremainstobeagreatparadox(ref.Torres,

2016,ref.alsopreviousremarksaboutpricingofdomesticagriculturalproduction).

ButthiswindowofopportunitydidnotseemtoprovokemuchinterestinCubanpower

circlesatthetime.ItmusthavebeenhighlyfrustratingforpeoplelikeSaladrigasto

observethelukewarmreceptionfromForeignMinisterBrunoRodríguezata2012

meetinginNewYorkwithagroupofwould-beCubandiasporainvestors.Itwasdifficult

toavoidtheinterpretationthatthedevelopmentofsmallandmediumentrepreneurship

spurrednorealinterestintheCubangovernment,whentheForeignMinisterwas

quotedassayingthat“Cubaislookingforinvestmentsofamagnitudethatnormally

doesnotcomefromtheemigration.”Thegovernment,hesaid,ischasingthousandsof

millionsofdollarsratherthansomefewhundredthousand.230

ThiswassaidatamomentwhentheCubangovernmenthadunrealisticexpectations

aboutitsabilitytoattractFDI,includinginoffshoreoilexplorations.

ItshouldbeaddedthattheConsulGeneralatthethenUSInterestSectionin

Washington,LlanioGonzales,gavequitedifferentsignalsduringavisittoMiamione

yearlater,bysayingthattheCubanGovernmentwantstopromoteandfacilitatethe

repatriationofthediasporaCubanswho”duringmorethanfivedecadeshave

accumulatedcapitalandawishtoreturntotheircountryandinvestthere”231(S/E).

Still,theimpressionisthattheCubangovernmentismoreinterestedinanotherbrand

ofUSinvestors:thereallybigones,someofwhomhaverootsallthewaybacktotheold

compradorbourgeoisiethatleftCubain1959232.Atypicalcaseofthesewouldbethe

Fanjulfamily,thesecondbiggestsugaroperatorinCubapriortotherevolutionandnow

Americanfamilieswithleadingeconomicrolesinpre-CastroCubaarenowreturningtoCubatofindoutwhethertheongoingreformsofferpossibilitiesforinvestmentsinthecountry,perhapsafraidof“missingthetrain”:PaulL.Cejas(aformerUSAmbassadorandclosefriendoftheClintonfamily),andAlfonsoFanjul(whosefamilywasoneofthemajorsugarindustryentrepreneurs)bothvisitedCubainApril2012,andatleastFanjulhasbeenbackonseveraloccasions.230QuotedinASCENews,No.541,dated2/10/12.231ElPaís,Madrid,11/07/13.232Forarathercompletelistofthis,seeJimenez,2008.

219

producingatotalof6milliontonsofsugarperyear(threetimestheCubanproduction)

inFloridaandtheDominicanRepublic.Partofthisfamilyhasexpressedstronginterest

ininvestmentsinCuba.

Thepotentialforrapidgrowthofprivatebusinessisthere,thinkingofpossible

productiveuseoffamilyremittancesfromtheCubandiasporainFloridaandelsewhere.

A2011survey-basedanalysisshowedthatrestrictionsfromboththeUSandCuba

seriouslylimitedtheemploymentcreationpotentialofremittances,limitingtheeffect

basicallytoeconomicsurvival:

“Thefindingsshowthatremittancescontinuetoplayanimportantroleintheeconomic

survivalofCubans,withmoneycomingfromtheU.S.andotherpartsoftheworld.Wefind

thatanimportantproportionofrecipientswantstoownabusinessandsomealreadyhave

establishedone.Thebusinessesthatremittancerecipientshaveestablishedoraspireto

establisharegearedtowardtheservicesectorandledbymicro-enterprisesaimedat

achievingself-subsistenceratherthanwealthgeneration”(OrozcoandHansing2011).

Thissituationhaschanged,particularlywiththeObama-initiatedeasingofUS

restrictions.PriortotheObamaAdministration,CubanemigrantsresidingintheUS

wereabletosendonly$300everythreemonthstofirst-degreerelatives(parents,

brothers/sisters,grandparents).TheObamaAdministrationinitiallysetthelimitat

$2,000perquarter,andlaterraiseditto$10,000pertravellertoCuba.Thesemeasures

completelychangedthesituation.

OnerathermoderateestimateofmoneytransfersisdonebytheInter-American

Dialogue(Orozco2016).Basedonthecombinationofasurveyamong100Cubansin

Miamianddatafromavarietyofothersources,heconcludesthat750,000Cubansin

Miami(50%ofthoselivingthere),sendsanaveragemonthlyamountof200USD,

totalling1,800millionUSDin2015.233This,ofcourse,doesnotincludemerchandise.

233Thisfigurewasconveyedinaprivateemailexchange(28.11.16)andisslightlyhigherthantheonepublishedinthequotedsource.

220

Themostquotedsource,arrivingatmuchhigherestimates,istheCuban-American

Miami-basedconsultantEmilioMoralesofHavanaConsultingGroup.234Hisestimateis

thattotalremittancesin2017reachedarecordsumof3,575millionUSD,100million

morethanthepreviousyearinspiteofnewrestrictionsimposedbytheTrump

administration,235andthatthetotalamountsenttoCubabetween2009and2016

amountedtoanalmostincredible21billionUSD.Ifmerchandiseremittancesare

included,theamountfromthelatestyearsmaybealmostthedouble,about6,400

millionin2016(Morales,2016and2017).Orozcobelievesthatthesefiguresareclearly

exaggerated.236Othersbelieve—andwetendtoagree—thatMorales,withhisnetwork

ofinsiderinformantsinthemoneytransfersystemonbothsidesoftheFloridaStrait,is

aquitereliablesource.237

Itisinterestingtocomparetheseobservationswithotherstudiesofremittancesin

neighbourcountries.StudiesfromGuatemalaandElSalvadorconcludethatsuch

transfersenabletherecipientstospendrelativelymoreoneducationandhousing,

significantlyraisinginvestmentinbasichumanandphysicalcapitalandquite

dramaticallyreducingtherateofschooldrop-out(byasmuchas54%inurbanareasof

ElSalvador)(AdamsandCuecuecha2010;EdwardsandUreta2003).InCuba,education

isinprinciplefree,whereasspendingonfoodandhouseimprovementsmaybe

expectedtoconsumemainpartsofthereceivedfunds.AstudyfromMexicois

particularlyrelevantsinceitrevealsdataaboutinvestmentinmicroenterpriseswith

lessthan15workers.Theauthorsfindthatinternationalmigration(totheUS)is

associatedwitha35to40%increaseinthelevelofcapitalinvestedinsuchenterprises,

particularlyintoolsandvehicles(WoodruffandZenteno2007).Onewouldexpectto

findquitesimilarresultsforCuba.

WhatevertheexactamountoffamilyremittancesflowingtoCuba,thereisnodoubtthat

thishasbecomeastrongweaponinthehandsofthenon-statesectorincompetition

234MoraleswasanemployeeoftheCubanmilitary-controlledconglomerateCIMEX,beforehesettledinMiamitoestablishtheHavanaConsultingGroup.Hehasbeendoingsystematicresearchoftheremittancessincearound2012.235MartíNoticias,6.03.18236Privateemailtoauthor,29.11.16237TheauthorhashadaquiteextensiveexchangeofQ&AwithbothOrozcoandMoralesandhasarrivedattheconclusionthatMoraleshashadthebestaccesstosourcesandprobablyisarrivingataquitereliableconclusion.

221

withthestateforanextremelyscarceresourceinCuba:investmentcapital.Although

perhapsthemajorpartoftheremittancesisspentonconsumption—byapopulation

thatcannotsurviveontheirsalaries—observersandexpertsdisagreeaboutthe

percentageofremittancesendingupascapitalinvestmentsinsmallbusinessesand

amongself-employed,withinavariationbetweenaquarterandahalf.238

AcomparisonwithourestimatesaboutthesizeofFDI(seeprevioussection)is

interesting:IfweuseMorales’figures,andassumethat30%oftheremittancesareused

forinvestmentpurposes,wemayestimatethattheprivatesectorreceivesaround1

billionUSDperyear,easilythedoubleofFDIdirectedatthestateeconomy.Amore

moderatefigureisestimatedbyCubaneconomistJuanTriana:healsoassumesthat30%

ofremittancesaredestinedtoinvestments,butestimatestotalremittancestobe2,000

USD,concludingthatremittance-basedinvestmentswouldbearound600mill

USD/year239—anamountthatalsocomparesveryfavourablywithFDIinthestate

sector.

Sincetheremittancesenterthecountrywithoutanyrawmaterialorproductioncosts,

andmostprofitsnormallystayinthecountry,thenetcontributiontotheCuban

economyisalsomuchlarger.

So,inspiteofaveryconsciouspolicyofreservingforeigninvestmentsexclusivelyfor

thestatesector,theprivatesectorseemstoattractatleastasmuch—oreven

considerablymore—foreigninvestmentthanpubliclyownedcompanies.Inaddition,

thereisofcoursealsoconsiderablere-investmentfromaccumulatedprofitsinprivate

businesses.

238EconomicanalystJorgeSalazarCarrilloestimatedthatbetween30and40%ofremittanceswenttoinvestments,ataJuly2016ConferenceorganizedinHavanabyInternationalMoneyTransferConferences(IMTC)(Martinoticias,17.07.16).Abouthalfofthe25cuentapropistacasesstudiedbyFeinberginHavanaandCienfuegoshadbenefittedfromfamilyremittancestosetupthebusiness(Feinberg,2013:15),whereasthesurprisinglylowshareof12%ofthe25TCPsinterviewedbyMesa-Lago&al(2016:56)saidthesame(vs.24%ofallnon-stateeconomicactorsinterviewed,p.171-172).Theauthorsbelievethatmanyoftheintervieweeswishedtohidethisinformation,sinceitisnotstrictlylegaltouseremittancesforbusinessinvestment.239https://elestadocomotal.com/2018/01/09/dos-decadas-de-inversion-en-cuba-antesala-del-momento-chino-de-la-reforma/

222

Thesefactorspointingtowardsconsiderableinvestmentdynamismintheprivatesector

againstheavyoddsmayinfactbeoneofthereasonsbehindrecentmeasuresagainst

privateentrepreneurs.Oneofthesemeasuresisexactlytoblockthemfromexpanding

theirbusinesses,eveniftheyhavecapitalavailable.Weknowsuccessfulentrepreneurs

withplansreadyforbusinessexpansion,whohavenootheralternativethanspending

theirearningsonfrequenttravelsoverseasincludingtoEuropeandotherdistantand

high-costdestinations.Othersareundoubtedlyinvestingininformalandillicitprojects.

Soonequestionishowmuchofthepotentialinvestmentcapitalinthehandsofthe

privatesectorcanpossiblybemobilizedforproductiveandemploymentgenerating

purposes,withoutthegovernmentrestrictions.

NewrestrictionspassedbytheTrumpadministrationcouldbeexpectedtohavequite

dramaticeffectsonfutureremittanceflowsfromtheUS,potentiallybanninghundreds

ofthousandsofCubancitizens—everybodywithanylinktomilitary,securityorParty-

controlledinstitutions—fromreceivingsuchtransfers(ref.Indicator5.2).Inspiteof

seriouspotentialhumanitarianconsequences,thismeasurewillperhapsnothitmost

Cubansusingremittancesforinvestmentpurposes.

Anotherpossiblesourceofinvestmentsinthenon-statesectorwasopenedupwiththe

legalizationoftradewithrealestate,whichbecameeffectiveby2012.Thishadaquite

immediateimpactintermsoftheemergenceofaninvestmentcapitalmarket,the

expansionofdomesticdemand,andthusthecreationofnewentrepreneurialincentives

(withrisksandbenefits).Thismayhavebeenanopportunity,butitalsocontained

seriousrisks:

“Thecentralchallengeforthegovernmentnowistocreateasystemofcontractsand

institutionstotapthispotentialincreaseinproductivity,whileavoidingpredatoryand

corruptpractices.Acorruptionboomisapermanentthreattothetransitiontoamixed

economysincethecurrentCubanpowerstructureisfilledwithrentseekingopportunities

andlackssupervisorycapacityandtransparency”(López-Levy2011ii)(S/E).

Aswehavenotedbefore,theofficialcreditsystemseemstohavehadmarginal

relevancefortheprivatesector.

223

AnothersourceofinvestmentsinsmallbusinessisCubanreturnees,bringingbacksome

capitalandentrepreneurexperiencetosetupbusinessinCubaundertheTCPmodality.

IftheyhavestayedinaEuropeancountryandobtainedapassportthere,theydonot

needtogiveuptheirnewcitizenship,whereasitisstillillegal(undertheembargolaws)

forUSresidentstorunabusinessinCuba.Therearenoupdatedstatistics,but

immigrationofficialsgavethenumberofrepatriationcasesin2012tobearound1000.

Theycanreturnwithashippingcontainer´sworthofgoodsandaratherunlimited

amountincash,buyingrealestate,settinguppaladaresandhousesforrentingout

rooms,orrunningconsultingbusinesses.Thisisagroupofentrepreneursthatcould

potentiallydeveloptomedium-sizebusiness.240

Theremayhoweveralsobeanegativecapitalmovement,causedbythebanonre-

investmentbyprivateentrepreneurs.Ratherthanre-investinginCuba,theymaybring

theirearningsoutofthecountryandinvestinsmallbusinessesorpropertiesthere.Itis

ofcourseimpossibletoquantifythiscapitalflight.241

Indicator3.3:Increaseinothersourcesofforeigncurrency?

ApartfromFDIandfamilyremittances,whicharetheprincipalCubansourcesofforeign

currency?242

Thefirstsourceisprofessional(mostlymedical)servicestoothercountries.Theofficial

figuregivenforthisis11.5billionUSDatthepeakin2013,ofwhich9.5billionearnedin

Venezuela.Thereareestimatesofdrasticreductionsofthisamountin2016and2017

duetothecrisisinVenezuelaandBrazil,thetwomostimportantreceiversofthe

services.243Thesituationinthesetwocountriesrepresentsagreatthreatwith

240NickMiroff(2016):”Amidahistoricwaveofemigration,someCubansarereturninghome”.TheWashingtonPost,1January2016.241EmilioMoralesofHavanaConsultingGroup(Miami)hasestimatedtheannualamountofthiscapitalflighttobebetween280and350millionUSD,whichwouldrepresentalmosthalftheofficialFDIs.Thebasisforsuchcalculationsisnotknown.(EFE,Miami,20.02.18:”Lastrabasdelrégimenalsectorprivadogeneranunafugademillonesalexterior”).242Thefollowingestimatesofcurrencyearners(notfullyreportedinofficialstatistics),arebasedonaninterviewwitheconomistOmarEverlenyPerez,14ymedio,1.08.16.243AccordingtoofficialdailyGranma,Cubain2016hadapproximately55,000healthworkersin67countries,includingmorethan25,000doctors.ThecrisisinVenezuelaresultedinsignificantcutsinoilshipmentsgoingtoCuba.Thus,thetwocountries'long-standingarrangementtoprovidecheap

224

devastatingconsequencesfortheCubanaccesstooildeliveries,foreigncurrencyand

balanceofpayments.Oneguesstimateisthatincomesfromtheseservicesmayhave

beenhalved—toaround6billionUSD.

TheexportofCubanhealthserviceshasbeenthesourceofgreatcontroversies,i.a.due

tothequitemassivedesertionofCubanhealthworkersonmissionabroadtotheUS

(8,000desertionsfrom2006to2016).244

Thesecondcurrencysourceisfamilyremittances,whichaswehaveseencouldamount

tomorethan3billionUSDperyear.Thismonetaryinflowendsupinprivatehands,

althoughtheStatereceivessomecommissionfromitandofcoursebenefitsfrom

whateverisspentintheState-dominatedconsumptionestablishmentsinCuba.

Tourism,thethirdcategoryofcurrencyincomes,hadanestimatedannualturnoverin

2016of4billionUSDbasedon4millionforeigntouristsvisitingthecountryinthatyear

(uptoalmost4.7millionin2017).Accordingtoestimatesofnon-stateinvoicinginthe

tourismsector(restaurantsplusaccommodation—referredtounderIndicator2.6),

between500millionand1billion,asmuchasonefourthofthetotalvalueofthetourist

industryisinvoicedbytheprivatesector(Morales,2017).Butonlyafractionofthe

grossincomesinthetourismsectormaybecalculatedasnetincomeafterthededuction

ofimportedgoodsandmerchandisenecessaryfortheoperationofthisindustry.An

unofficialestimateclaimsthenetincomestobeaslowas25to30%oftotalturnover,

representing1–1.2billionUSD.245AmoreofficialestimateconcludesthatCubain2017

VenezuelanoilinreturnforCubanprofessionalservices,aswellasVenezuela'sroleasasponsorofCubanmedicalaidtothirdcountries,becameincreasinglyuncertain.ThechangeofgovernmentinBrazilin2016alsoseemedtohaveconsequenceswithaplannedonethirdreductionofthemedicalcooperationfrom2016to2017.(Source:VitoEchevarría:“Forcedtodiversify–crisesinVenezuelaandBrazilputsCuba´smedicalserviceexportstothetest”,inCubaStandard,27.09.16).SeealsoMarioJ.Pentón:“NuevascifrasrevelancuántoganaCubaconlaexportacióndeprofesionales”,ElNuevoHerald,17.04.17,i.a.quotingex-MinisteroftheEconomyJoséLuisRodríguez;andCamiloMesa-Lago.Mesa-LagoclaimsthatthereductioninmedicalserviceincomesfromVenezuelafellbyonethirdin2016,toatotalof6.3millionUSD.SimilarincomesfromBrazilwerealsoreducedsubstantially.244MarioJ.Pentón:”CubasuspendeenvíodemédicosaBrasilportemoradeserciones”,ElNuevoHerald,14.04.17. 245EstimatesmadebyCarmeloMesa-Lago(sameMadridinterviewasquotedabove).

225

willhaveanincomeof2.5–3billionUSDfromtourism246.Therealitymayliesomewhere

inbetweentheseestimates,perhapsaround2billionUSD/peryear.

Officialexportincomesfor2015totalled1.4billionUSD(vs.animportvalueof6.8billion,

resultinginanegativetradebalanceingoodsof5.4billionUSD).Compositionbyexport

sectorswasasfollows:247

• Rawsugar:378mill

• Rolledtobacco:213mill

• Refinedpetroleum:148mill248

• Hardliquor:98.8mill

• Nickelmattes:89.7mill

WeseethatexportofgoodscountedforaminorpartofCubancurrencyincomes—

correspondingroughlytothenetincomefromtourism(accordingtoMesa-Lago´s

estimate;onlyhalfofitaccordingtothatofRodríguez´s),andthatprofessionalservices,

remittancesandtourismweretheservicesectorscompensatingforthenegativetrade

balanceingoods.Whattheyarefarfromabletocompensateisthebudgetdeficit,

estimatedtoreach12%ofGDPfor2017,afigurethatcertainlyisgoingtobeeven

higheraftertheenormouslossescausedbyHurricaneIrma.249

246AccordingtoJoséLuísRodríguez,formerministerofeconomy,thecountryhad1,5billionUSDin”incomesdirectlyassociatedwithtourism”infirst-half2017,expectedtoriseto2,755billionforthewholeyear.ThiscalculationwasmadepriortothedevastatingeffectsofHurricaneIrma(September2017).JoséLuísRodríguez,“Laeconomiacubana:actualizandoel2016yunaprimeramiradaal2017”(I),re-printedinASCENews766,26.07.17.IthasbeenpointedoutthatCubaisgettingmuchlowernetprofitspertouristthanotherCaribbeancountries.247ObservatoryofEconomicComplexity(OEC),officialtradefiguresfor2015http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/cub/248Thisisre-exportofpetroleumimportedfromVenezuela(aspaymentforprofessionalservices),refinedinCuba.DuetoreductionsindeliveriesfromVenezuela,nosignificantexportvalueisexpectedfor2017(accordingtoinformationfromEx-EconomyMinisterJLRodríguez).Theseincomesareoffsetbyahigheramountofimportofthesameproduct:174mill.USDfor2016,substantiallymorein2017.249 “If the budget deficit for this year had been estimated to around 12 percent, that would undoubtedly have increased with these enormous losses”. Omar Everleny Pérez, quoted by Reuters, Havana, 13.09.17. Official figures put the losses caused by Hurricane Irma at 13.5 billion USD, the double of a full year’s import value (cited by Economy Minister Murillo at December 2017 session of National Assembly)

226

IfwereturntoMorales’estimates,hecalculatesthatthenetprofitfromallexports

(excludingprofessionalservices)in2016wasonly1,14billionUSD,whereasthenet

incomefromremittancesofcashplusmerchandisewas5.6timeshigher.250Onemay

havedoubtsaboutthereliabilityoftheseestimates,buttheynodoubtillustratethe

relativestrengthofthenon-statepartofCuba’sforeigneconomy.

Cuba’screditworthinesscontinueditsnegativetrendthroughouttheRaúlreformera.

Moody’screditratingagencyoperateswithabaselinein1999of‘Caa1Stable’,fallingto

‘Caa2Stable’inApril2014,risingslightlyto‘Caa2Positive’inDecember2015,andfalling

againto‘Caa2Stable’inNovember2017.251Themainreasonsforthenegativetrendare

saidtobe“reductioningrowthperspectives;limitedexternalfinancing;high

dependenceonimports;andthelackofdatatransparency”.252

Indicator3.4:Increasingpartnershipbetweenforeigninvestorsandnational

enterprises?

Oneparticularlyrelevantissuetowatchinthecomingyearswillbethepossiblealliance

buildingbetweenCubanmilitarycorporationsandbigforeigncapital.DuringtheObama

administrationintheUS,therewereclearsignsthatmanybigcorporationsofthat

countrywereactivelyontheoutlookforinvestmentopportunitiesinCuba.Thefactthat

PresidentTrumphasbeenparticularlyeagertoprohibittheserelationsdoesnot

excludethepossibilitythattheyinthefuturewillbecomedecisive.

DuringtheObama-eradétente,therewereseveralinterestingsignsofsuchrelation

building.TexasGovernor,RepublicanGregAbbott,onvisittoHavanainlate2015,

expressedaspecialinterestinbusinesslinkswithCIMEX(nowpartofGAESA).Looking

atthemapittakeslittleimaginationtoseetheinterestoilandothermajorTexas

businesses(includingHouston-based)havewithaccesstotheMarielport,built

explicitlytoservethenewgenerationofPanamaxshipsnowabletopassthroughthe

expandedPanamaCanal,oncetheUSembargoislifted.Wehaveabovenotedthe

250 Private e-mail correspondence, 12.05.18 251Caa2indicates“acountrywithadifficulteconomicsituationrepresentingveryhighcreditrisks”. 252Moody’sannualcreditanalysis;Cuba;7.12.17.

227

interestshownbythePortsAssociationofLouisianaindealingswiththeMariel

Containerharbour,alsooperatedbyaGAESA-controlledcompany.

AmoreconcretesignwastheadministrationcontractsignedinMarch2016—

symbolicallyduringPresidentObama´svisittoHavana—betweenGaviota(andthereby

GAESA)-ownedHotelQuintaAvenidaHabana,lateralsoHotelInglaterra,andthemajor

UShotelchainStarwoodHotelsandResortsWorldwide.Thisoneoftheworld´slargest

hotelcompanieswhichaccordingtoitsownwebsiteowned,managed,orfranchised

over1,200propertiesemployingover180,400people.253Thiswasthemostsizeable

businessdealtobeclosedundertheembargolaw.Itwas,however,metwithheavy

protestsfromRepublicanPresidentialcandidatesCruz,Rubioandotherdefendersofthe

embargo,whotogetherpresentedalawproposalthatwouldexplicitlybanbusiness

agreementsbetweenUSandmilitaryCubanenterprises.254Thisisexactlythelogic

behindPresidentTrump´snewCubarestrictions.WhatStarwoodhasisonlyan

administrationcontract—theonlywaytogetintotheCubanmarketaslongas

investmentsareincompatiblewiththestillexistingembargolaw.Sofar,thiskindof

existingdealsarenotthreatenedbyTrumppolicies.

ThelargenumberofUSairlinesopeningflightstoCubain2016duringthedétente,

obviouslyhadtocollaboratewiththeCubanpublicsector—includingthemilitary.The

USagriculturalsectorreachedamaximumexportof685millionUSDtoCubain2008,

pickingsignificantlyupagainin2016and2017255—alsotradingwithCubanstate

importers.Allthesecompaniespulledtogetherconsiderablelobbyeffortsvis-à-visthe

newTrumpadministrationin2017.Thismayhavesucceededtoreducetheeffectofthe

turn-aroundinUS-Cubanrelations.

Themostimportantrelationshipwithforeigninvestorsisinthetourismsector,where

Spanish,Dutch,FrenchandCanadianhotelchainsandtourismagenciesareworking

closelywithCubanmilitarypartners,eitherinco-investmentsorinmanagement 253InSeptember2016,StarwoodwasacquisitionedbyMarriottInternationalfor$13.6billion,togetherbecomingtheworld'slargesthotelchain.254”EEUU,Negocios,Hoteles:MilitaresyHoteles.LosnegociosestadounidensescontinuansuavanceenCuba,pesealaslimitacionesylaspresionesentodosentido”.RedacciónCE,Madrid.ReproducedbyASCENews,No.719.255USDepartmentofAgricultureForeignAgriculturalService,reproducedasFigure1in:https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44119.pdf

228

contracts.Anotherprominentandlong-lastingpartnershipistheonebetweenthen

CanadianmineralcompanySherriotandthestatemonopolycompanyCubaniquel,not

directlypartofthemilitarycomplex.

ForacountryofCuba’ssize,however,theseratherfewexamplesaretellingofone

tremendouschallenge:thelackofsignificantforeigninvestmentsthatarebadlyneeded

inordertogetthecountryoutofitseconomictrap.

Sincenoforeigninvestmentispermittedoutsideofthestatesector(inprinciplewith

theexceptionofcooperatives),thereisofcoursenoinvestmentpartnershipdeveloping

betweenforeigncorporationsandtheCubanprivatesector.TheonlybigUScorporate

interestworkingwiththeCubanprivatesectorisAirbnb.256Onaminorscale,many

foreigntouroperatorsareworkingwithprivaterestaurantsandothertourism

businesses.

Itisquiteclear,however,thattheCubangovernmentwantstoreserveforeignbusiness

relationsforthepublicsector,wherethemilitarycorporationshaveapreferential

position.Itwillbeinterestingtoobservewhatwillhappentotheserelationsasa

consequenceofPresidentTrump’simposedtotalbanonUScompanieshavinglinkswith

Cubanmilitarypartners.

Indicator3.5:Capitalformationratioimproving?

TheoverallinvestmentrateintheCubaneconomyisverylow—muchtoolowfora

necessaryeconomicrecoverytotakeplace.DuringtheRaúlCastroera,capitalformation

ratioaspercentageofGDPhasbeenfluctuatingbetween12and14%(withone

exceptionof14.8%in2008)257,abouthalfoftheLatinAmericanaverage.InVietnam,for

acomparison,theaverageinvestmentratiohashoveredaround30%duringthelastten

years.Inspiteofalleffortstomobilizeadditionalresourcesi.athroughFDIs,thereare

256AirbnbreportedinFebruary2018thattheycountedwith32,000rentoptionsinCuba,havingrealized1millionreservationsduringthethreeyearsoftheiroperationsthere.(BrianChesky,AirbnbCEO,quotedinanotepostedbyCartasdesdeCuba,23.02.18:”AirbnbllegaalmillóndereservasenCuba”.257Torres(2016),Table1,basedonONEI,variousyears.Duetonegativeeconomicgrowthandaseriousnegativeimpactonbalanceofpaymentsin2016and2017,capitalformationratioisprobablyalsofallingfortheseyears.

229

norealisticexpectationsthatthesewouldhelpraisethisratiounderpresent

circumstances.258

Indicator3.6:Creativedestructiontakingplace?

FewcountriesneedwhattheclassicaleconomistSchumpeter(2017)hascalledcreative

destructionmorethanCuba.Thisisabouttheeconomicreplacementoftheoldwiththe

new:resourcesbeingmovedfromoldtonewsectors;existingskillsandtechnologies

givingwaytonewones.AsAcemogluandRobinson(2012:84)havepointedout:

“Theprocessofeconomicgrowthandtheinclusiveinstitutionsuponwhichitisbasedcreate

losersaswellaswinnersinthepoliticalarenaandintheeconomicmarketplace.Fearof

creativedestructionisoftenattherootoftheoppositiontoinclusiveeconomicandpolitical

institutions”.

Withitsobsoleteeconomicstructures,thisneedismassiveinCuba.Butwithout

replacingthedestructionoftheoldwithcreationofsomethingnew,thesocialcost—the

priceforthelosers—wouldbecolossal.Thatiscertainlythereasonwhyinevitable

decisionskeepbeingpostponedorlaidontheshouldersofthepost-revolution

generation.InAcemoglu/Robinson’slogic,however,thisispreciselytherecipeforstate

failure.

InSchumpeter´svision,theinnovativeentrepreneursarethebasicagentsforthe

creativepartofthisprocesstotakeplace:peoplewhocomeupwithideasandembody

thoseideasinhigh-growthcompanies.TheCubanself-employedcouldhaveplayedsuch

arole,iftheabundantprofessionalhumanresourcesavailableinCubahadbeenallowed

to;ifprivatebusinesseshadbeenpermittedtogrow,expandandre-investwithinthe

frameworkofsupportiveregulatoryinstitutions,coupledwiththeproductiveuseof

familyremittances.Instead,itseemsthattheCubangovernmenthaspreferredtostarve

innovationandincentiviseillicitcapitalism:ratherthansupportingSchumpeterian-style

258Aspreviouslyquoted,economyministerRicardoCabrisassaidthatFDIswereexpectedtorepresent6.5%ofthe2017investmentplan,whichinturnwouldcorrespondto0.5oftheGDP.Thatwouldimplyaninvestmentratioof13%.

230

entrepreneurswithinawell-balancedmixedeconomy,ithaspromotedsavage

entrepreneursanddittocapitalism.

ThemosturgentlyneededmeasureforcreativedestructioninCubaistheeliminationof

thedualCubancurrencysystem,wheretheCubanpesoisworthonly1/24ofthe

‘convertiblePeso’,theCUC.Thiswasannouncedinthe2011Guidelines.InMarch2014,

threeresolutions(19,20and21)werepassed,layingoutthejudicialprocessto

eliminatethedualmonetarysystem.Nospecificdeadlinewasannounced,apartfroma

mysterious‘DayZero’.Sincethen,nothinghashappened,andtheRaúlCastroerais

runningoutwithoutanyimplementationofthiscrucialmeasure.Theeffectofthishas

beensummedupasfollows:

“Thepostponementofmonetaryreformhasinnowaybeenfavourable.Itisimpossible

achievingasignificantandsustainedimprovementintheproductivityofaneconomythat

operateswithtwonationalcurrencies,withmultipleexchangerates,andanexcessively

overvaluedofficialexchangerate.Thepricepaidbytheeconomyduringallthistime,in

termsoftransactioncosts,competitivity,accountingtransparency,andinefficientallocation

ofresources,isincalculable.”259

Fromamacro-economicperspectivethereis,beyonddoubt,needforthemonetary

unification.However,thedrasticshort-termeffectsintermsofinflationandsocialcosts

areprobablywhathascausedthepostponement:a24timesdevaluationofthelocal

currency,requiring‘shockabsorptionfunds’whichintheabsenceofaccesstoforeign

creditsmayonlybeobtainedthroughFDI.260JuanTrianahasmadesomequitedramatic

calculationsaboutthepotentialimpactofthemonetaryunification,obligingstate

companiestoimportaccordingtoUSDratherthannationalcurrencyrates.Triana

claimsthat—withoutcompensatorymeasures—thismightimplytheclosingofmore

than60%ofstatecompaniesandthedestructionoftwomillionjobs(almost40%of

totalCubanjobs),261leadingtomassiveunemploymentandasocialdisaster.Such

considerationsmayhelpusunderstandthejustificationofinitialplanstoreducethe

statesectorpayroll.AnotherCubaneconomist,PedroMonreal,hasproposedatwo-

stagestrategyinordertoavoidthisdisaster:heclaimsthatmonetaryunificationcan 259CubaStandardEconomicReports:”EconomicTrendReport,ThirdQuarter2017”.260RemarkbyCubaneconomistPavelVidalatCubaPosibleseminarinNYC,26.05.16.261QuotedinRavsbergblog,May2017.

231

onlytakeplaceafteraprocesswhere,first,thenon-statesectorisstrengthened,and

then,non-profitablestatecompaniesareclosed;i.e.amuchmorefundamentalmarket

reformthanuntilnow.262

Sinceothersourcesofinvestmenthavealsobeeninsufficienttopermitthestateto

createalternativeandsustainableproductionandemployment,wemustconcludethat

Cuba’slongoverdueneedforcreativedestructionhasnotbeenmet.

Indicator3.7:Macro-economicoutcomeofthereformera.

Wemaynowsummarisewhatthereformerahasledtoinmacro-economicterms.

Firstofall,onemustbearinmindthespectaculareconomicdownturninCubacausedby

thedemiseoftheUSSR,fromwhichthecountryhasneverrecovered.TheCuban

economistPavelVidalfoundGDPpercapita—takingpurchasingpowerintoaccount—to

havefallendramaticallyby35%from1985to2014(to6,205USD/capita),263

representingonlyonethirdoftheLatinAmericanaverage.

AttheendoftheRaúlCastroreformera,Vidaloffersthefollowingoverviewofthe

intendedeconomicrecovery:

”[...]from2008to2016theeconomicreformbroughtaboutamajorriseintheweightof

serviceswithintheaggregatedvalueofnationalproduction.Inspiteoftheprioritythegoods

productionsectorseeminglyenjoyedinthe‘actualizaciónoftheeconomicmodel’,itsweight

dropsfrom25%to18%in2016[…]Thisproductivestructure,whichfailstocoincidewith

themostpressingneedsoftheeconomyandfamilies,couldbeindicativeofthe

disproportionaterelationsandanomaliesoftheCubaneconomicmodel.It´saresultthat

producesacountrywithoutstandingsocialindicatorsthatcoexistwitheconomicindicators

onasubsistencelevel.”264

262PedroMonreal:“UnProgramadeEstabilidadEconómicaparaCuba”,CubaPosible,14.11.17.263Thiscalculationisbasedon“themediumcurrencyexchange”,whichgivesafigurethatisabouthalftheofficiallyreported–butitstillincludesthefreesocialservices(health,educationandhousing).264CubaStandardEconomicReports:”EconomicTrendReport,ThirdQuarter2017”,p.7.

232

Table6.8givesanoverviewofgrowthandsomeotherkeymacro-economictrendsin

CubaduringtheRaúlCastroera:

Table6.8:Selectedmacroeconomicindicators,Cuba(2008-2018)Table 8

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

RealGDPgrowth

(%)

4,1 1,4 2,4 2,7 3,0 2,7 1,0 4,4 -0,9 1,6*

Budgetbalance

(%ofGDP)

-6,9 -4,9 -3,6 -1,7 -3,7 -1,3 -2,3 -6,9

**

-11,0

**

Grosscapital

formation(%of

GDP)

14,8 12,7 12,3 13 13,6 13,7 12,9

Tradebalance

(goodsand

services)

(mill.USD)

-2300 1245 3119 2240 3771 2991 3947 1900

**

2000

**

Source:Torres2016,Table1,plusONE2016andsourcesmarkedwith*:

*OfficialestimategivenbyEconomyMinisterCabrisasinspeechtoNationalAssembly

endofDecember2017;seriouslyquestionedbyindependenteconomists.265

**EIUestimate(EIUCountryReportNovember2017)

Concludinghisanalysisin2017,Vidalfoundthatthereformshaveproducedamodest

growthinincomesaswellasinproductivity,sothatthereforms“aremovingintheright

direction,buttheyarestillfallingshort”.266

265PavelVidalestimatesthattherealgrowthcontinuedtobenegativein2017:somewherebetween-0.5and-1.4%(privatecommunication,February2018).Mesa-Lagohadthefollowingcommenttotheofficialfigure:“Theabnormaldelayinthemacroeconomicindicatorsfor2016castsdoubtontheofficialestimateforGDPgrowthin2017[…]HowisitpossibleauthoritiescanreleasethatestimateattheendofDecemberandnotreleasetheentirenationalaccountsfor2016morethanoneyearlater?”(MarcFrank:”Cubaneconomyevermoreopaqueasdataomittedfrom2016accounts”.ReutersHavana15.01.18).Eventhenegativegrowthfigureinitiallygivenfor2016(-0.9%),waslateradjustedtoa0.5%growth(ONEFebruary2018:CuentasNacionalesdeCuba2016),butsuchfiguresfailedtoconvincethecritics.

233

“ThereformhadpromisedaGDPgrowthof5.1%,whichwaslateradjustedto4.4%.Whatwe

knownowisthattheannualaveragegrowthduring2008-2016hasonlybeen2.3%(...)Nine

yearswithPresidentRaúlCastro´sreformshavenotbeensufficientinordertoprovidethe

promiseddynamismtoeconomicgrowthinCuba,ataskthatwenowknowwillstaypending

forthenextgenerationofleaders”267(S/E).

TheeconomistveteranCarmeloMesa-Lagosummarisesthesituationinmuchthesame

way:

“IhaveinnumerouspublicationsanalysedthestructuralreformsimplementedbyRaúl

between2007/08and2016,concludingthattheyarethemostimportantduringthe

revolution,thattheyintendtosolvetheproblemsinheritedfromFidel,andthattheyareon

therighttrack.Buttheyaretooslow,theyencounterseriousobstacles,hightaxesand

disincentives,reasonsforwhichtheyhavenotuntilnowachievedapalpableimpactonthe

economyandthesocialservices.Infact,someofthereformshavebeenreversed[…]”268

(S/E).

Thegrosscapitalformationonaveragerepresented13%(ofGDP)between2008-2015

(andithasprobablydroppedevenfurtherin2016and2017althoughofficialfigures

havenotbeengivenforthetwolatteryears),onlyhalfofthe25%thatisrequiredfor

sustainedeconomicgrowth.TheGDPin2016was23%belowthe1989level,and35%

belowthe1985level.Theindustrialproductionin2015was38%underthe1989level

(Vidal2017).269Asimilardropisregisteredinagriculturalproduction(ref.specific

figuresgivenforIndicator1.6)Thestructuralreformshavehadnegativeeffectsonthe

socialindicators(ref.Indicator4.3)WhileCubausedtobeonthetopinthe(Latin

266PavelVidal:“Lareformaquedaráincompletasinonosdespegamosdelmodelodeeconomíacentralmenteplanificada”,CubaPosible(NewYorkSeminar),20.09.17.267PavelVidal:ComentarioalasmedidasanunciadasporCabrisasendiciembre2016(IPS,30.12.16).2016wasofficiallyayearofnegativegrowth,andVidalestimatesthatthe recessioncontinuedthrough2017withanegativegrowthbetween-0.5and-1.4%(Skypeinterview26.01.18). 268Mesa-Lago:“AfindeenmendarellegadodeFidel,aRaúllequedapocomásdeunañoparaaceleraryprofundizarsusreformasestructurales.”ASCENews742,13.01.17.269TheveteraneconomistCarmeloMesa-Lagoawardedgreatimportancetothisstudy,commissionedbytheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank:“Ihavespent55yearsstudyingtheCubaneconomy,andthereisnostudythatismoreimportantthanthisone”,hewasquotedbyElNuevoHerald(22.01.18)assaying.Thestudyisbasedonare-calculationofCubaneconomicindicators,followinganewindexmodeldevelopedbyVidalwhereerrorsoriginatingintheuseofofficialcurrencyratesinCubannationalaccountsareeliminated.RealGDPpercapitain2014,itisarguedinthestudy,stoodat3,016USD,only42%oftheofficialfigureofUSD7,177.WhileCubain1970hadaneconomy5.3timeslargerthantheLatinAmericanaverage,thisrelationshipwasin2011reducedto1.5,accordingtothisstudy.

234

American)regionintermsofequality,thereformshavechangedthissituation

completely,duetoanon-stategroupwithhighincomescoincidingwithinsufficientstate

salaries(ref.Indicator4.3).

AttheendoftheRaúlCastroera,Cubaisexperiencingitsworsteconomiccrisissince

the1990s.WithTrumpthrowingoutmostofObama´srapprochementmeasures,and

thereformsmovingbackwardsratherthanforwards,theCubancrisiswillnotbeeased

withoutradicalmacro-economicreform.DrasticcutsinCubanimportsareoccurring

between2015and2017,inmostcasessimplybecauseofCuba‘sseriouspayment

problems:270

• ImportsfromChinaarefallingby30%

• ImportsfromBrazilarefallingby25%

• ImportsfromSpainarefallingby26%

• CommercialexchangewithCanadaisfallingby35%

ImportsfromVenezuelaarereducedfrom8.5billionUSDinthepeakyear2012to1.6

billionin2017,whileVenezuelaisalsopullingoutofthepetroleumrefinerycomplexin

Cienfuegosoncepresentedasapieceofstrategicbilateraldevelopment.Venezuela´soil

deliveriesdroppedbyalmost50%frommid-2016,271all-buteliminatingthecurrency-

valuablere-exportopportunityandobliginga28%cutinfuelallocationtostate

companiesinmid-2017andrationingofelectricpower.272Brazilispullingoutofthe

sugarbiogasindustryleavingthefutureoftheCubansugarindustryinevenmore

uncertainwatersthanbefore.273ThewiderimpactonCuba’seconomyissubstantialbut

difficulttoquantify.

270FiguresbasedonstudyfromHavanaConsultingGroup,published5.05.18271AccordingtoJorgePiñon,oneoftheleadingexpertsontheCubanoileconomy,thereductionsweremorethan40%(ElNuevoHerald(Miami),23.03.17).CarmeloMesa-Lago,ininformationprovidedprivatelytotheauthorinFebruary2018,estimatesreductionstobefrom105,000to55,000bpd,closerto50%.272”VenezuelaoilexportstoCubadrop,energyshortagesworsen”:Reuters,Havana,13.07.18https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-cuba-oil-exclusive/exclusive-venezuela-oil-exports-to-cuba-drop-energy-shortages-worsen-idUSKBN19Y183”Slimpickings.CluelessonCuba’seconomy”:TheEconomist,30.09.17. 273SeefiguresquotedbyReutersHavana,6.12.17;andEmilioMoralesinASCENewsNo.785,29.12.17.Accordingtoanothersource,thecorruption-implicatedBrazilianmega-companyOdebrechtalsopulledoutofitsmostimportantCubansugaroperation,themanagementcontractwithperhapsthemostmodernCubansugarfactory(5deseptiembreinCienfuegosprovince),whereithadmadeinvestmentsinthemagnitudeof60millUSD,duetolackofreturnpaymentsbytheCubansugarmonopolyAZCUBA:https://www.martinoticias.com/a/oscuros-negocios-odebrecht-cuba-negocio-azucarero/165163.html

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Chapter 7: Political implications of socio-economic changes

Challenge 4: Political implications of socio-economic changes

Indicator4.1:Winnersandlosersofthereformswithconflictingpolitical

interests.

TheCubansocietyhasundergoneaquitedramaticsocio-economicdifferentiation

duringtheyearsoftheRaúlCastroreforms.Raúlhimselfsignalledveryclearlyatthe6th

PartyCongressthatCubacouldnomorecontinuetooffereverythingforfree.He

insistedthattheprincipletofollowwouldbethesocialistprincipleof“fromeveryone

accordingtotheircapacityandtoeveryoneaccordingtotheirwork”.

Wediscussedinthetheorychapterthatbothearlylosersandearlywinnersmight

representspecificchallengesinasocialtransformationprocess.

InCuba,thewinnerssofarhavebeen:

• Managersandofficialsofsuccessfulmilitarycorporations;

• Ownersofprivaterestaurants;

• Ownersof“bed&breakfast”-houses;

• Othersuccessfulsegmentsoftheself-employedworkers(e.g.inthetransport

sector);

• Recipientsoffamilyremittances;

• Peopleworkingintourismandactivitiesrelatedtotheconvertiblecurrency

economy(privateaswellasstatesectors);

• Privatefarmers.

Amongthesegroups,onlythefirstmayhaveaccumulatedbotheconomicandpolitical

power,whilethetwonextinmanycaseshavebenefittedfrompropertyeitherleftover

fromprominentpre-revolutionaryfamiliesorfromthenomenclature.Recipientsof

236

familyremittancesaremostlyconcentratedtothewhitepopulation,mostfrequently

livinginHavanaandtoalesserextentinothermajorcities.Thereisaheavy

concentrationofsuchremittancesamongaminorityofthepopulation—themajority

receivingverylittle,ifanythingatall.Asanindicator,82%ofthosewhosend

remittancesfromMiamiarewhite(comparedtotheofficial65%ofthetotalCuban

population),12%arecouleredandonly6%areblack.274Soreceiptofremittancestoa

largeextentseemtorepresentare-productionofpre-revolutionaryprivileges.Onthe

otherhand,asignificantportionofthesuccessfulself-employed,andothersreaping

benefitfromtheconvertibleeconomy,owetheirsuccesstoinformalandoftenillicit

activities.

Turningtothe“earlylosers”,itisobviousthatthosewhodonotbelongtotheabove-

citedwinners,andalsoreceivenoorverylittleremittances,arethemosttypicallosers

ofthereforms.Oldretireeswithoutfamilyconnectionsabroadhaveseentheirincomes

andaccesstobasicgoodsdrasticallyreduced.Afro-Cubansareclearlyover-represented

inthisgroup.Representingthehistoricalcoresupportersoftherevolution,andbeing

concernedaboutwhatthealternativetothestatusquowouldbe,theydonotyetseem

torepresentaseriouspoliticalchallenge.

Animportantsectionofthisgroupoflosersisalargepartofstateandpartyemployees,

thosewhohavefewifanyresourcestoofferintheinformalexchangeeconomyandwho

relyontheextremelylowpublicsalaries.Peoplewithprofessionaleducation,suchas

teachersandhealthworkers,areoftenincludedinthisgroup(althoughdoctorsand

otherswithleadingjobsinthehealthsectorhaveseentheirsalariessubstantially

increasedoverthelateryears).Thereisnodoubtthatalargepartofthebureaucracy,

includinglow-levelofficialsinthepartyandmassmovementstructures,arealsoamong

thelosersofthereforms,althoughmanypublicemployees—particularlyinhigherand

decision-makingpositions—nodoubtfindwaysofbenefittingfromtheirpositionsof

influence.Ratherthanbeingusableforthemarkettransformationortransformingitself

intoatoolthatmayhelpfacilitatethereforms,thebureaucracy,wheremost

functionariesfindthemselvesonthelosingsideofthereformprocess,ismainly

274AccordingtoasurveycarriedoutbyHavanaConsultingGroupin2014,conveyedinaprivatee-mailon12.05.18

237

perceivedbyentrepreneursasabarrierandastumblingblockagainsttheir

opportunities.ItisnotbychancethatmanyCubansclaimthatthe‘internalblockade’

maybeevenmoreofaproblemthantheUSblockade.

ThereactionfromJuanCarlos,ataxiownerwhoclaimstohaveafleetofold

almendronescirculatinginthestreetsofHavana,expresseshiscontemptforthe

bureaucratsonthelosingsideofthereforms:

“ThisispureMarxism:agroupofbureaucratshasthepowerbutlivemiserably,theyeatbadly,

theydressworse,andforthatreasontheydon´tacceptthatwe—anothergroupofCubans—make

moneybecausewehavenotlostourtimewithmeetingsandslogans”.275

Resistanceagainstreformsisobviouslycomingfromseveralofthelosergroups,

particularlythosewithastrongideologicalcommitmenttothesocialisttraditionsofthe

revolution.Thesegroupsarewellrepresentedamongpartyrank-and-files,andhave

probablycontributedtothelaterreformbacklash,forinstanceatthe7thPartyCongress.

Manyofthemhavebeenpersonallyhitbyrisingfoodpricesinthenon-statemarkets,

andhaveunderstandablyarguedforthepricecontrolsthatwereintroducedin2016.

Thismaybeaparalleltowhatwehaveseeninpost-socialistsocietiesinEasternEurope.

Someobserversarguethattheright-wingpopulismandneo-authoritariantendencies

nowmanifestingthemselvesinseveralEasternEuropeancountriesmaybeseenasa

vengeancefromthelosersofthetransition.276

MostinfluentialinthisgroupinCubaarethepublicandpartyofficialsindecision-

makingpositionsondifferentlevels.Thisisalsowherewewouldfindthecoreofwhat

Raúlusedtorefertoasthe‘bureaucraticresistance’toreforms.277Whatalternativethey

seeforCubaisnotatallclear,apartfromthecontinuationof‘socialism’inoneformor

another.Marketeconomy,orcapitalism,isoftendespised,apositionfrequentlyfinding

275FromconversationduringataxirideinHavana,March2017(S/E).276UweOptenhagelinCubaPosibleSeminar,NYC26.05.16.277SuchcriticismfromPresidentRaúlCastro,stronglyexpressedearlyinthereformprocess,laterseemtohavedisappearedfromhisvocabulary,whenthisresistanceprovedtobeevenstrongerbutnowmostlyreflectedintheofficialpositionsoftheCommunistParty.

238

itsechoinofficialrhetoricandinopinionarticlesonofficialorquasi-officialswebsites

likeCubadebate.cu.278

Butwhatdothe‘earlywinners’want—inwhichdirectionaretheypulling

transformations?Sincethearguablymostimportantgroupamongthewinners—

managersofmilitary-controlledenterprises—alsohavesignificantpoliticalinfluence,

thisisprobablythemostcriticalgrouptowatch.However,verylittleisknownabout

theirthinkingandfutureambitions.

Theleadersofmilitarycorporationsareprobablytheonlygroupwithinthepartyand

statenomenclaturethatreallyhasbenefittedfromRaúl´sreform.AccordingtoHellmann

(1998:i),theymayhaveincentivestofreezethereformsinordertokeepthegainsto

themselves.ThatisobviouslyalsoonepossibilityinCuba.Itismoreprobable,however,

thattheywanttoexpandtheirpowerfurther,getaccesstoamuchmoreprivilegedlife

stylethanpartyethicssofarhasallowed,andpossiblyusetheirconnectionstoforeign

investors—includingtherichCuban-Americanelite—toreallyjointhehigherranksof

theglobaleconomicelite.Thatcouldimplymuchdeepermarketreforms,butprobably

notallowingavastspacetosmallandmediumenterprisesthatcouldchallengetheir

positions.

Togoanyfurtherinforecastingtheirambitions,forinstancewhethertheywouldaspire

forRussia-likeoligarchpositionsorwouldbehappywithmoremanagerialpositionsas

inotherpost-Communiststates(referthediscussionaboutrecirculationofpost-

communistelitesinChapter4.8.3,ref.Coenen-Huther2000;Windolf1998),wouldat

thispointbepurespeculation.Thefollowingreasoningmayhoweverberelevant:

“Militaryinvolvedinbusinesscanbeproblematic,notonlyintheverylongterm.Cutofffrom

ordinarypeople'sinterests,theycontributetothecontinuityofthesystem.Buttheyare

alwayshauntedbytemptations.Contactwithforeigncapitalistspromotesgreedand

corruption.Thishasbeentakingplaceforyears.Whentheyfeelthattheirprivilegesandthe

propertyleftintheircustodybythepatrimonialstatearethreatened,theirloyaltytothe

278Seeforatypicalexample,partyorganGranma’sfront-pagetitlewhenreportingonPresidentCastro’sspeechattheyear-endNationalAssemblysessioninDecember2016:”Wearenotgoingnorwillweeverbegoingtowardscapitalism;thatistotallyruledout”(”Novamosniiremosalcapitalismo,esoestátotalmentedescartado”).Granma,28.12.16.

239

bossesortheirsuccessorswillbetested.Wewillseethenwhathappens”(Álvarez2016)

(S/E).

Onequestioniswhethermilitarycorporationswillputpressuresonthefurtheringof

marketreformsinCuba,inasituationwheresuchreformsareputonholdandthe

economyingeneralisconstantlydeteriorating.Oneexamplemaybethe2010decision

tomassivelylayoffidlestateemployees,firstbeingpartlyandtemporarilymoderated

butthenagaintriggeredbytheneweconomichardshipsstartingin2016(whenthe

solutionshasbeenmoretooutsourcestatecompaniesthantodismisstheworkers).Will

theleadersofmilitarycorporations,withtheunquestionablepoliticalpowertheyare

accumulatinginCuba,acceptanotherdelayofnecessarylayoffsandothermarket

economyreforms?Theremaybeaconflictloomingwiththeintransigentpartyleaders

onsuchanissue.Andiffurtherlayoffsorclosingofunprofitablestatebusinessesare

allowedtotakeplace,willtherebeariskforsocialunrest?Willinthatcasethemilitary

actasaunitedinstitution,orwillthereberiftsbetweenactiveofficersandex-officers

whohaveshiftedtoacorporatecareer,stillwaginggreatpoliticalinfluence?Theseare

openquestionsatthispoint.

Manyofthesuccessfulself-employed,thenewmiddleclassaswecomebackto,wouldof

courseliketoseetheirbusinessgrowintomedium-sizeenterprises,perhapseven

attractsignificantinvestmentsfromCuban-Americanpartnersorotherforeigninvestors

tobecomelarge-scaleeconomicactors.TherearemanyindicationsthattheCuban

diasporaintheUSismorethanreadytoinvestinCubaandbepartofsuchaprojectif

permittedbyUSlaw—anoptionthatofcoursehassufferedatemporarysetbackby

PresidentTrump’sreversaloftherapprochement.Duringthereformyearsithas

becomeincreasinglyclear,however,thatsuchentrepreneurshipisnotreallynotwanted

bytheCubanleadership,probablybecauseofafearfortheemergenceofan

entrepreneurialclassbeyondthefullcontrolofthestate,partyandmilitarysystem.

Theremaybeaconflictofinterest,here,withtheoperatorsofmilitarycorporations,and

byimplicationtheprivilegedorevenmonopolisedaccessofthenomenclatureto

constituteitselfasanewentrepreneurialclass.Itseemsquitelikelythatthetough

CubanresistanceagainsttakingadvantageoftheObamaadministration´sinvitationsto

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letprivateentrepreneursbenefitfromrapprochementbeforeeconomicrelationswith

thestatesectorispermitted(Ref.Indicator2.8),maybepartlyexplainedbythisfear.

Thiscontradictionisnotmadeeasierbythefactthatmanyofthemostsuccessfulofthe

newprivateentrepreneurshavetheiroriginintheolduppermiddleclass,orevena

bourgeoisoraristocraticpropertyownergroup,withhousesofhighqualitycombined

withsubstantialinvestmentsoftenoriginatingwithdiasporafamilymemberswith

availablecapital.Totheextentthatownersofsuchtourist-relatedbusinessesmaytake

thesteptoformanewprivatebusinessclassinCuba,theyareoftendescendantsofold

pre-revolutionaryelitestakingtheopportunitytore-claimtheirancestorsélitestatus.

Inothercases,theymayberetiredhigh-rankingmilitaryofficersorformerofficialsfrom

leadingstate-ownedcompanies,withimportantconnectionsbothinandoutsideofthe

island,andwithexpertiseandknow-how.Or,theyarechildrenoftheseofficialswho

inheritedthebest-situatedhousesthattheirparentsreceivedforfreefromtheStatein

compensationfortheirhigh-rankingpositions.Theyhaveusedtheirconnectionsto

acquirevaluablepropertyandfounddifferentwaystotransformsimilarpropertiesinto

sophisticatedpaladaresorcasasparticulareswithgreatappealtotouristslookingfor

nostalgictreatmentinsocialistCuba.Thisisaparadoxworthdwellingin,inacountry

nowsearchingforanewidentity.

Inthemeantime,aslongasthereisnoincentiveforthelegalexpansionofprivate

business,thedangeristhatCuba´spre-revolutionarytraditionofillicitandevenmafia-

controlledbusiness(ref.theconcept‘savagecapitalism’,Hogan2009)willcontinueto

flourishbeyondwhatwehavecalledSchumpeterianentrepreneurship.279

Indicator4.2:Anemergingmiddleclasswithdistinctinterests?

Conventionalthinkingabouttransitionstoliberaldemocracyputsmuchemphasison

theappearanceofamoreindependentpeasantry(oftenthemainelementin

predominantlypeasantsocieties,ref.BarringtonMoore1967;Fukuyama2011)or

middleclasses(inmoreurbanisedsituations,ref.Linz&Stepan1996).

279Ref.Schumpeter2017,definingentrepreneursas“individualswhoexploitmarketopportunitythroughtechnicaland/ororganizationalinnovation”.

241

AswehavediscussedunderChallenge1,theCubanpeasantryisemergingasmore

autonomousthaneversincethe1959revolution,inspiteofanarrayofbarriersand

resistancetorecognisethemasindependentactors.Theurgentneedtoletloosethe

marketforcesinagriculture,recognisedbymostCubanagricultureeconomists(Nova

2012;GarcíaandNova2013),willonlybecomemoreaccentuatedunderthepressureof

failingfoodproduction.

Weidentifiedthedecisivepoliticaldecisionsfortheroleofpeasantstobethedegreeof

marketautonomy,thedegreeoforganisationalfreedom,andthedegreeofautonomyfor

agriculturalcooperatives.Alltheseissueswillhavedeeppoliticalimplications.

Inspiteofallthelimitstoreforms,thereisnodoubtthatmanyindependentfarmers

havebeenaccumulatingconsiderablewealth(byCubanrelativestandards)inrecent

years.Therearenoreliablestatisticsconfirmingthisbecausethiscapitalismostlykept

underthemattress,butthereareplentyofanecdotalindications.InGüiradeMelana,

municipalcapitalofoneofthebestagriculturalareasofCubarightsouthofHavana,

thereisaneighbourhoodcalled“elBarriodelosRicos”.Thequalityofthehouses,

furnitureandelectronicequipmentaswellasthenumberofoldandwell-maintained

Americancarsparkedinfront,leaveslittledoubtabouttherelativewell-beingofthe

privatefarmerslivingthere.

TheofficialreactiontothisemergingfarmermiddleclassamongtheCommunistParty

conservatives,whohavebeenincreasinglycallingtheshotsoverthelastcoupleofyears,

seemtobemoredictatedbyaMarxistinterpretationofthisnew-richphenomenonas

somekindofaKulakclassaccordingtoLenin´sclassicalanalysis.Suchanalysisconverts

themtoclassenemiesofthepoorerpeasantsandindeedofthepoorurbanpopulation.

Thisapproachdoesnotlookverypromisingforeconomicreformstocontinueinthe

agriculturalsector.

Lookingbeyondagriculture,someobservers(Feinberg2013,Morales2017)claimthat

Cubaalreadyhasavibrantmiddleclass.Evensubtitlinghisreport“emerging

entrepreneursandmiddleclasses”,Feinberggoesontosay:

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“[So]byseveralmeasures—suchaseducationalattainment,womenworkingoutsideofthe

home,women´saccesstocontraceptionandreproductiverates,andcommonindicesof

economicsecurity—Cubalooksverymuchlikeamiddleclasssociety.Butthereisone

measurewherebyCubawouldcertainlynotqualify:accesstoindividualconsumeritems”

(Feinberg2013:42).

Notleastforthelatterreason,andthefactthatmostofthosebenefittingfromother

middle-classcharacteristicsdependonameagrepublicsalary,itisdifficulttoconsider

Cubansingeneralasamiddleclass.Whathastakenplaceduringthereformyearswe

studyhere,however,isthataverypeculiarCubansocialgrouphasvisiblybeen

emergingwithspectacularnewconsumptionpatternsbyCubanstandards.Theyare

mostlybasedintheentrepreneurs280growingoutofthecuentapropistacategoryand

additionallyfuelledbyincreasingfamilyremittances.Thisnewgroupofrelativelywell-

offCubansdoesinmanywaysfitthetraditionalconceptofanewmiddleclass.The

followingexamplemaybeillustrative:

Ataxidriver,theownerofanoldbutwell-functioningalmendrón,marriedtoadoctor

withhighmanagementresponsibility,earnsasmuch(ormore)inconvertiblecurrency

asshewithoneofthehighestpublicsalariesinCubaearnsinCubanpesos.Herincome

of2,000Cubanpesos,about85USD/month,insufficienttofeedafamily,isdwarfedby

1:24upagainstthetaxi-drivinghusband’sincome.Thankstohistaxibusiness,the

familyenjoysagoodmaterialstandard,awell-equippedhouseandnoshortages,and

maytaketheluxuryofspendingaweekeveryyearwiththeirsmallsonataluxury

beachhotel.

AsdocumentedbyMorales(2017),thenumberofCubanswhofoundtheopportunityto

visitforeigncurrencyhotelsincreaseddramaticallyfrom60,000in2008toalmosta

millionin2016.Inasimilarsignofanemergingmiddleclassofhundredsofthousands

ofCubans,670,000Cubanstravelledabroadaftertheliftingofthetravelrestrictionsin

280AnEntrepreneurmaybedefinedasanindividualwhoorganizesoroperatesabusinessorbusinesses.TheIrish-FrencheconomistRichardCantillondefinedthetermas”apersonwhopaysacertainpriceforaproductandresellsitatanuncertainprice”andwhois”makingdecisionsaboutobtainingandusingtheresourceswhileconsequentlyadmittingtheriskofenterprise"(seeAnthonyBrewer(1992:51).Inpoliticaleconomy,entrepreneurshipisaprocessofidentifyingandstartingabusinessventure,sourcingandorganisingtherequiredresourcesandtakingboththerisksandrewardsassociatedwiththeventure.

243

2013untiltheendof2016,realisingatotalof1.7milliontravelstoothercountries.

Thesenewconsumptionpatternsarenotonlyexplainedbyincomesfromprivate

businesses,butalsobythereceiptoffamilyremittancesandthevisitsofrelativesliving

abroad(particularlyintheUS)thattaketheirrelativesalongtogoodhotelsand

restaurantsorinvitethemtovisittheirnewcountryofresidence.

WemayhavereservationsaboutseeingthenewandverypeculiarCuban

entrepreneurialsectorasequivalenttoamiddleclass,281withthepoliticalinterestsand

rolessuchclasseshavebeenexposinginothertransformationprocesses.Lipset(1959)

arguedthatthemiddleclasseshavebeentheprimarypromotersofdemocracy,while

Rueschemeyeretal.(1992)sawthewaythemiddleclassesenteredintoclassalliances

asdecisivefordemocraticoutcomes.Wehavearguedagainstcomparingthegeneral

socialsecurityachievements,whichthemajorityofCubanshaveenjoyedduringthe

largerpartofthepost-1959period,asmiddleclasscharacteristicsinthesociological

andpoliticalmeaningoftheword,asFeinberg(2013)seemstodo.Themainreasonfor

thisisthatthesesocialgainsuntilrecentlyhavebeensocompletelydependentonstate

sectorperformance.Wehaveshownhowprivateeconomicactorsandstateemployees

morerecentlyarecaughtinsomesortofsymbioticmutualinterdependence,withclear

parasiticalaspectsintheirrelationshipwiththeState.Amongyouthtodayitis

borderingonanobsessiontolackallthe“gadgets”thataretakenforgrantedinalmost

allothersocieties,eveninmarginalneighbourhoodsaroundLatinAmerica.Morales’

argumentsaboutnewconsumptionpatternsispartlychangingthispicture,andperhaps

weareseeingthebeginningofareturntothepre-revolutionaryCubanmiddleclass

culture,whichdisappearanceisdescribedinthefollowingnostalgicwaybyMorales:

“NevermorecouldtheCubansbuyahouseoracaronthefreemarket[…]Totravelabroad

wasconvertedtoaprivilegeforthefew,justasstayingatahotel.Thewhiteshirtandtie

disappearedfromtheCubanpublicscene,likethegoodmanners,disappearinglittlebylittle

withtheimpositionofthenewpolitical-economicmodel”(Morales2017:1)(S/E).

281Amiddleclassmaybedefinedinrelativeincometerms(e.g.between0.5and1.5timesthemedianincome),occupationstatusandlevelofincome,ownershipofassetssuchasaproperhouseorconsumerdurables,etc.,seeFukuyama(2014:440-441).

244

So,manyCubanscaninthissensenowatleastbeseenasaspiringformiddleclassstatus,

andwiththatqualificationwecanfollowFeinberg´sargument:”Whetherthesemiddle

classeseventuallychallengestatepowerordecidetoco-existwithastrongstatesector

willdependon,amongotherfactors,whetherthestateiswillingtoaccommodatetheir

interests,orwhetheritclosesoffopportunitiesatitsownperil”(Feinberg2013:45).

Indicator4.3:Evolutionofsocialconditionsandpreviousegalitarianstructures.

RaúlCastrorecognisedatthe2011PartyCongressthattheproposaltoeliminatethe

rationingcard(halfwayapprovedbytheCongress,ref.Indicator8.1)wastheissuethat

hadcreatedmostdebate.However,heargued,“thisinstrumentofdistribution[…]has

overtheyearsbecomeanunbearableburdenfortheeconomyandadisincentiveto

work,inadditiontogeneratingvariousillegalitiesinsociety”(Castro2011)(S/E).

TheeconomicandsocialcollapseoftheUSSRanditsneighbourhoodblocwasprobably

themostimportantde-stabilisingfactorexplainingtheirregimebreakdown,as

frequentlyquotedbye.g.Brown(2009)andKornai(1992)intheirrespectivehistoric

andeconomicanalysis.InChinaandVietnam,ontheotherhand,bythetimetheUSSR

collapsecameaboutthetwoAsiannationscouldstartblessingtheirpopulationswith

sustainedeconomicgrowth.Mostnotablythepartiallydramaticprocessofupward

mobilityandsocialsecurityimprovementforincreasingsegmentsofthepopulation,

liftingmillionsoutofpovertyandintothegrowingmiddleclasses.

ThisiswhatismissingforCubanstoday(apartfromasmallaspiringmiddleclass).

Cubansexperiencedquiteuniquesocialimprovementsandupwardmobilityforthe

majorityofthepopulationduringthefirst30yearsoftheRevolution,reachingalmost

incomparablethirdworldlevelsinhealth,educationandsocialsecurity.MostCubans

hardlycaredaboutthefactthatthenecessarystrengthoftheireconomyforsustaining

socialprogresshadbeendecidedlydeterminedbythe“disinterestedaidoftheSoviet

Union”,asitwasofficiallyknowninCuba,muchmorethanbyarationaldomestic

economicpolicy.AsoneofCuba´sleadingeconomistshaspointedout:“Ratherthan

beingproductive,Cubahasalwayshadarentiereconomy,byapplyingasurchargeof

245

240-300%onthepriceofimportedproductorwiththere-exportoffueloil—inthe

SovieteraandlaterwithVenezuela”.282(S/E)

Whatmatteredwas“theachievementsoftherevolution”—loslogrosdelarevolución.

Theseachievementswereofferedtothepopulationintheverypaternalisticmannerso

typicalfortheCubanRevolution.Benefitsweretricklingdownthroughthehighly

centralizedandverticalstateinstitutions,notassocialandpoliticalconquestsbasedon

citizenandmassmovementstruggleslikeinotherwelfarestatesocieties,andwithout

beingcodifiedbyasocialandcivicrightsregime(ref.Chaguaceda2014ii;Acosta2018).

WhentheState-dominatedeconomicandwelfaresystemendedupinadeepcrisis,as

wesawinthe1990s,thecitizenshadnoinstrumenttodefendtheseachievements.

OrdinaryCubanshavenorealchannelforexpressingcomplaintsanddemands,andno

stakeinbudgetaryprioritysetting—notevenonthelocallevel.Thedramaticlossin

socialsecurityduringthisso-called‘specialperiod’—whenthebasicsofthehealthand

educationregimesurvivedbutwiththequalityofbothbeingseriouslyundermined—

couldinnowaybemetbypopularmobilisation,andithasneverbeencompensated.By

someaccounts,ithasratherbeenaccentuatedduringthereformera:

“Thereformsinitiatedin2008[…],althoughsomeofthesocialpolicyprinciplesand

mechanismsimplementedbetween1959-1989werenotdismantled,theyhavebeenunable

todetainthedeteriorationofalmostallindicatorsandsocialservicesthatonlyachieveda

partialrecoverywiththemodestmarket-orientedreformsbetween1994-1996[…][N]ewor

renewedsocialproblemsrelatedtopoverty,inequalityandunequalaccesshaveappeared

andincreased,althoughnothomogenously[…]Thistakesplaceinacontextofre-

stratificationofthecurrentCubansociety”(Acosta2018:3)(S/E).

Thenegativesocialeffects,firstfromthedeepeconomiccrisisinthe1990s,andlater

fromthenotverysuccessfulmarketreformsoftheRaúlCastroera,havebeen

aggravatedbyadoubledemographicphenomenon:

“[T]hesustainedincreaseinemigrationhascontributedtothe(social)deterioration,

especiallysincethedisplacementshavebeendominatedbyanincreasingnumberofyoung

peopleandwomen[…]Consequently,theeconomicprospectsofanaging,under-

industrializedcountrywithnoreplacementofitsworkforceareuncertain,inordertosolve

thegrowingproblemsthatarisefromtherelationshipbetweenmigratoryandaging

282OmarEverlenyPerezinterviewedby14yMedio,1.08.16.

246

processes”(ibid)(S/E).

TheexistenceofreliablestatisticaldataonsocialconditionsinCubaisverylimited,283

butsomeindicatorsareavailabletoillustratetheunfoldingdrama.

People´sincomeshavefallendramaticallytofarbelowsubsistenceminimum.In2013,

thepurchasingpoweroftheaverageincomerepresentedonly25%ofthe1989level

(Vidal2015:7).A2014surveyonpovertyinCuba—whereagainpublicstatisticsare

missing—concludethatabout25%ofthepopulationliveinpoverty.284Accordingto

personalandextra-officialinformationprovidedbythen-MinisterofEconomyMurillo,

thecanastabásica(‘basicbasket’ofnecessityconsumptionwhichisnotrevealedin

Cubanstatistics),i.e.whatisneededtosurvive,wasin2015calculatedtobeCUP1,450

perpersonpermonth,whileaveragesalaryaccordingtoofficialfigures,wasCUP740

(mid-2016).Thatistosaythatafamilyoffourwithtwobreadwinnerswouldcoveronly

25%ofthefamily´sbasicneedsthroughtheiraverageincomes.285Itisinterestingtosee

howthehighestCubantradeunionleader,CTCSecretaryGeneralUlisesGuilartede

Nacimiento,alsomemberoftheParty´sPolitburo,characterisesthisincomegap:itis

“recognizedbythemajority—andthetradeunionmovementagrees—thatsalariesare

insufficienttocoverthenecessitiesoftheworkers[…]Thisprovokesapathy,disinterest,

andsignificantlabourmigration”.286(S/E)

Theeconomiccrisisisalsohavingitseffectonsocialservices.Mostindicatorsofsocial

assistancefellsignificantlyevenbeforethereformerastarted(Mesa-Lago2012),and

283ThisisreflectedinthefactthatintheannualreportsoftheUNEconomicCommissiononLatinAmerica(ECLA/CEPAL),dataonCubaaremissingregardingpoverty,GiniIndex,socialprotection,coverage/accessofsocialservices(exceptforeducation).Thereisnoinformationonbasicfamilybasket(canastafamiliar),purchasingpower,etc.284AstudycarriedoutbyagroupofyoungresearchersthroughtheNGOCentroFélixVarelaandtheCubaChapterofFLACSO,undertheguidanceofthetwoprestigiousresearchersMaríadelCarmenZabalaandMayraEspina.Thereisnoprecisedefinitionofwhichdegreeofpovertythepercentagerefersto,beyondwhatistermed”belowthesubsistencethreshold”.ThestudywasreferredtobyMonreal2017,andwasoriginallyreportedon:“JóvenesinvestigadoresanalizanlapobrezaenCuba”,IPSCuba,20.09.14:http://www.ipscuba.net/sociedad/jovenes-investigadores-analizan-la-pobreza-en-cuba/ 285ThefigureswerepresentedbytheCubanMinisterofFinanceandtheleaderoftheeconomicreforms,MarinoMurilloJorgeinameetingwitheconomystudentsattheUniversityofHavanaonApril23rd2015(obtainedfromaprivatesourcethatwaspresentatthemeeting).Itisunclearwhetherthesefiguresincludethesubsidisedfoodeveryfamilyisgiventhroughfoodcoupons,supposedtocoverapproximately10daysofbasicfoodsuppliespermonth.WhenaskingseveralCubanfamilieswhetherthesefiguresarerepresentative,thegeneralresponseisthattheyarerathertoooptimisticthantoopessimistic.Thisestimatecoincidesquitewellwitha2105householdsurveyfromConsejoPopularSantaFequotedbyMonreal2017.286EFE,LaHabana,31.07.17.

247

hascontinuedinthesamedirectionsincethen.287Thenumberofhospitalshasfallenby

32%overthelasttenyears.Healthpersonnelhavebeenreducedby22%(partlydueto

currency-earningforeignmissions).TheoncesosuccessfulfigureofFamilyDoctor

(MédicodelaFamilia)nowhasonly40%ofpositionscovered.Manypatientsnowneed

tobetransferredtohealthcentresfarfromtheircommunities.288Duringthesame

period,theshareofGDPgoingtoeducationfellfrom14.1%to10.2%,andaserious

shortageofteachershasbeenreported.Thegovernmenthasrecognisedadeterioration

ofschoolachievementslikeorthographyandlevelsinscienceandmathematics.School

enrolmenthasfallenratherdrasticallysincetheturnofthecentury,withtheshutdown

ofruralschools,reductionoftheemergingteachers’programme,andanendtothe

previouslysoambitiousmunicipalisationofuniversities.

Thosewhohavebeenhardesthitbytheerosionofthewelfarestate(accordingtomost

ofthequotedstudiestheyincludeelderly,Afro-Cubans,unsupportedsinglemothers,

handicappedetc.)havealsoexperiencedadrasticreductioninsocialwelfarespending.

Between2006and2015,socialassistancefellfrom2.2to0.4oftheStateBudget,while

theshareofthepopulationreceivingsuchassistancefellfrom5.3to1.6%.

So,howdramaticissocio-economicdifferentiationinCubanow?MesaLago289hasmade

thefollowingestimateofdifferencesinannualincomes2015-2017,basedona

comprehensivecollectionandelaborationofpublicdata:

• Theminimumannualstatesalary(2,700CUPor108CUC)isworth30%of

theaveragestatesalary;

• Theaveragestatesalaryis8,244CUPor330CUCperyear,hererepresenting

the1.0factor;

287ThefollowingfiguresarequotedfromananalysisofthenewCubanpovertybyprominenteconomistMesa-Lago:”Mesa-Lago:Cortesenayudasocial,preciosenlasTRD,hanexpandidolapobrezaenCuba”.MartiNoticias,17.03.17.OtherfiguresarequotedbyMesa-Lago2017.Accordingtotheauthor,theyarebasedonofficialfiguresprovidedbyONEI,variousyears.288Officialstatistics(ONEAnnualReport2016,Chapter9SaludyAsistenciaSocial)reportedthatthenumberofhospitalswerereducedfrom215in2010to150in2016,andevenmorecriticallythatallruralcentroshospitalariosandso-calledruralhealthpostswereclosedin2011,andreorganisedaspoliclinics.289CarmeloMesa-Lago:“ElestadoactualdelbienestarsocialenCuba”,Cubaanálisis,PalabraNueva,Primeraparte,Cuadro2:EjemplosdeDesigualdadesExtremasdelIngresoAnual,2015-2017:http://www.cubanalisis.com/ARTÍCULOS/EL%20ESTADO%20ACTUAL%20DEL%20BIENESTAR%20SOCIAL%20EN%20CUBA.htm

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• Anaverageself-employedorworkerinthetourismsectorearns5.8timesas

muchastheaveragestatesalary(1,900CUC);

• Theownerofaluxurypaladarearns285timesasmuch(94,000CUC);

• Theownerofaluxuryroomrentalmansionearns424timesasmuch

(140,000CUC).

Themostextremedifference,betweentheowneroftheluxurymansionroomrentaland

thesocialsecuritybeneficiary(20%ofaveragesalary),isanastonishing1413:1.

Inequality,forinstancemeasuredthroughtheGiniindex,isnotofficiallyreportedin

Cuba.Butoneunofficialattempttomeasurethis,undertheresponsibilityofoneof

Cuba´smostrespectedexpertsinthisacademicfield,concludedthattheGiniIndex

increaseddramaticallyfrom0.24in1986to0.4in2013(Espina2014);i.e.from

NorwegiantoChineseandUSlevels.290

Tobepoorinandofitselfishard.Tobefallingfromarelativelyacceptablesocio-

economicstatusinacountrywithminimumsocialdifferences,allbroughtaboutbythe

Revolution,toasituationwhereyousimplycannotmakeendsmeetwhileaneweliteis

perceivedassuper-rich(byCubanstandards),isofcoursenotatallcompatiblewithany

ideaofsocialjustice,theverybedrockoftheCubanRevolution.Thisisoneofthegreat

differencescomparedtoChinaandVietnam,evenifsocialinequalitymaybeaboutthe

samelevel.

Thedownwardspiralforthelowestincomestratahascontinued,withnewhardships

beingsignalledasaconsequenceofVenezuela´ssurvivalcrisis,totheextentthat

warningsaboutanother‘specialperiod’werefrequentlyheardfrommid-2016

onwards.291People,andparticularlytheyouthandevenmoreparticularlytheeducated

youth,areincreasinglygivingupanyhopeforadecentfutureinCubaunlesstheycan

finditinthenon-stateandoftenillicitactivity.Additionally,theyarelosingany

confidenceinthecapacityofitspoliticalleadershiptomanagethecountryina 290AccordingtoWorldBankestimates,someofthecountriesweuseascomparativecasesintheanalysisofCubahavethefollowingGiniindexscores:Angola(2008):0.42;China(2012):0.42;US(2013):0.41;Russia(2015):0.38;Vietnam(2014):0.35.Norway(2014)had0.27.NoofficialdataisavailableforCuba(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?,downloaded12.04.18).291ThegeneralimpressionfromthesituationofordinaryCubansinearly2018isthatthefearofanother‘SpecialPeriod’hassofarnotmaterialized.

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sustainableway.Thisisagenerationwithoutanypropermemoryofpre-revolutionary

times,thereferencepointforthosewhoreallybelievedintheachievementsofthe

revolutionandthereforerepresentedCuba´sversionofpragmaticacceptance,

particularlywhencombinedwithFidel´scharismaticleadership.292

ItissimplyinconceivablethatthepresentCubanpolitywillsurviveanotherperíodo

especial.

Indicator4.4:Privatesectorgainingpotentialpowerposition?

Whilefrequentwarningsagainstthegrowthofthenon-statesectorareheardfrom

politicalleaders,thereisalsoanalternativeofficiallogic;anincreasingrecognitionover

theseyearsthatthestateisincapableofrunningsmall-servicebusinesses,eventhatthe

non-stateactorsmustbeseenasapartofalargerstrategy.Thefollowing2014

statementbytheHavanaturPresidentiswellworthnoting:“Thestatemustfreeitself

fromactivitiesthataren'tdecisivefortheeconomyandthatexperienceisshowing

functionbetterprivately”.293Inthetourismsector,stateagencieshaveannouncedfora

whilethattheywouldbemakingincreasinguseofprivateestablishmentsforforeign

tourists,somethingpreviouslyunheardofbutgraduallyacceptedasnecessaryinorder

toaccommodatethefastincreaseofforeigntourism.

Asaresponsetothis,anumberofverysuccessfulbusinesseshaveemerged,thatmay

employaconsiderablenumberofpeople.Privaterestaurants(paladares)nowhavea

limitof50chairs(exceptforspecialestablishmentspermittedtoorganisemusicand

danceevents),whichofcoursemeansthatasizeableworkforceisrequired.Inmany

cases,thislimitisnotrespected.Private‘bed&breakfast’-facilities(casasparticulares),

292Thisisofcourseaverysubjectiveassessment,withoutbasisinanyopinionpolls–butbasedonconversationswithanumberofCubanyouth(particularlyintellectuals),andsharingtheclaimwithmanyotherobservers. 293AssociatedPress,Havana,27September2014.Stateagenciesareincreasinglysendingtheirtouriststoprivatepaladares:theownerofoneofthebestpaladaresinTrinidadreportsthatasmuchaseightdifferentstatetouristagenciesaresendingtheirtouriststohisrestaurant.

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whichtendtoofferacertainrangeofservicestotourists,andtransportationbyprivate

vehicles,areotherexamples.294

Tourismisobviouslyaspecialcase,astrategicsectorwhereprivatebusinessisnow

puttingupstiffcompetitiontothestateintwoofthebasicservices(accommodationand

restaurants)inthiscrucialcurrency-gainingsector.Theprivateareparticularly

dominantindestinationswheremoreindividualtourismdominates,i.e.outsideofthe

largerbeachtouristresorts.Withthesteepincreaseintourism,dependenceonprivate

businessesisexpectedtoincreaserapidly,partlythroughremittance-basedinvestments

inprivaterealestate.Thereisinsufficientstatecapacity,andrecognitionthatprivate

establishmentsareoftenofferingbetterservicethroughapersonalisedattention

preferredbylargesegmentsoftouristscomingtoCuba.Inmid-2017,thesystemby

whichstate-ownedtouristagenciesarereferringforeigntouriststoprivaterestaurants

andB&Bhouses,wasreportedtohavebeenputonhold.295Thecaseofthecolonial

touristmagnetTrinidadisemblematic,aspointedoutbyoneoftheprominent

entrepreneursthereinlate2016:

“Problemsbetweentheprivateandstatesectorsareconstantlybeingsortedout.Thestate

tourismactorsusedtothinkthatweintheprivatesectortookawaytouristsfromtheir

hotelsandrestaurants,buttheyhavecometorealizethatweareimportantforthetourism

developmenthere”.296(S/E)

Thestatemanagersofthisprincipalmoney-makingmachineofthemilitary

corporationsclearlyrecognise—asforinstanceexpressedbytheMinisterofTourism

whohimselfhasamilitarybackground297—thattheyneedtoworkwithhigh-standard

294Theurbanprivatetransportsolutionsvaryfromcitytocity.InSantiagodeCuba,practicallyallpublictransportinthecityisnowlefttoprivately-ownedpre-revolutionarylorriesinconspicuouslygoodcondition,adaptedwithsittingfacilities(althoughquitecrude)forpassengers.Atthesametime,literallythousandsofmotorcycletaxisarealsoprovidingasignificantpartoftheurbantransportduringrushhours.Inanothereasterncity,Holguín,aswellasinCienfuegos,mosturbantransportisprovidedbybicycletaxisandhorse-drawncarriages.InHavana,theenormousfleetofsurvivingoldAmericancars,knownsasalmendrones,areprovidingcollectivetaxiserviceatanaffordablepriceforthosewhohaveincomesabovetheaverage.295IPSHavana,10.07.17. 296BasedonemailexchangewithaprominentTrinidadPaladorowner(12.11.16),alsorepeatedlyinterviewedbefore.297ManuelMarreroCruzwasa40-year-oldarmycolonelwhenhewasappointedtoheadtheMinistryofTourismin2004,aposthehasmaintainedsincethen.ItwasthenseenasasignthattheArmedForceswouldsecuretheircontrolonthisimportantcurrency-earningsector.

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privatepaladaresandtouristhostelsasasignificantsegmenttoattracttouriststothe

country.298

Thereareatotalof1,700privaterestaurantsreportedtoexistinCuba(2016ref.Table

6.6,comparedtoonly300in2012).Intermsoflodgingcapacity,theprivatesector

representedaround25%ofavailabletourismroomsinCubabymid-2016(68,000

ordinaryhotelroomsvs.23,000roomsindollar-permittedcasasparticulares).299The

casasparticularesmayevenbeconsideredasanalternative‘hotelchain’,secondin

capacityinCubaonlytothebiggeststatechainGaviota,andwithampleinformal

exchangeandreferencemechanisms,butnotallowedbythestatetoformallyorganise

assuch.300InplaceslikeTrinidad,Cienfuegos,Viñales,Baracoa,thecolonialpartof

Havana,crucialareasforinternationaltourismandconsequentlyforcurrencyincomes,

privatesectortourismisprobablystrongerthanthestatesector(ref.Simoni2017).301

Thisisalsothesectorandgeographicalareaswhereitismostviablethatnon-stateself-

employmentmaygrowintorealbusinesscompaniesinCuba,againstheavyodds.Inthe

tourismsector,businesseswith25andevenupto50employeesdooccur;insome

cases,thesamefamilymayberunningacombinationofroomrenting,restaurant,a

makeshifttravelagency,perhapsemployingseveraldozenworkers.302

Thetransportsectorisanothercasewhereprivateservicesaregainingaverystrong

position,afterdecadesofcollapsingpublictransportsystems.Accordingtotheofficial

weeklyTrabajadores,the2millioninhabitantsofHavanaareservedbyatrifle700

298AprominentownerofalargepaladarhastoldmeoffrequentmeetingsandstrategydiscussionswiththeMinisterofTourismandhiscolleagues,andofpartnershipwithalargenumberofstatetouristagencies.299EconomistJuanTrianaquotedbyNewsAgencyEFE:”TurismoflorecienteenCuba:expectativas,retosynuevosrécords”,EFE,LaHabana,3.01.16–inJuly2016articleupdatedto68,000vs.23,000.InJanuary2018,thesamefigureisstillgivenforstatesectorhotelroomcapacity,but5,000roomsareplannedtobeaddedduring2018(TravelTradeCaribbean,17.01.18).300Accordingtoseveralprivateentrepreneursinterviewedbytheauthor.301ThroughconversationswithrestaurantownersinTrinidad,oneofCuba´sfavouritetouristdestinations,wecanconcludethatthereareaboutthedoublenumberofbothrestaurantchairsandtouristbedsavailableintheprivatesectorcomparedtothestatesector(2016:87restaurants,1,400privaterooms,inadditiontotaxis,artisanshops,musicians,touristguidesetc.,allthatkeepstourismrunninginTrinidad).302Cienfuegosmaybeanexample,wheretheMINTURdelegaterecognizedthattheserviceprovidedbytheprivatesectorwas”morepersonalized”and”comfortable”,alsorepresentingacompetitionthathasobligedthestatehotelstoimprove.InCienfuegos,eighthotelshavethetotalcapacityof860rooms,whereasthenumberofprivateroomstoletwassaidtobe1,497,meaningthat63%ofaccommodationcapacitywascoveredbytheprivatesector.(EFE,Havana,9.06.17).

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omnibuses,whichonlycover50%oftheneed.303Thismeansthatmosttheother50%is

servicedbytheprivatesector,mostlyprivatetaxisbutalsoincludingcooperatives.304

TheMinistryofInteriorCommerce(MINCIN)announcedin2014thatthegovernment

plannedtoselloff9,000cafeteriasandsmallrestaurantstotheprivatesector.305Rather

thanselling,apracticewasinitiatedofleasingouttheseandotherpublicly-owned

businessesliketaxiservices,hairdressingshops,bakeriesetc.totheemployees,who

thenwerelefttorunthesebusinessesontheirown.Numbersfrommid-2017showthat

MINCINhadleasedoutatotalof4,271businessunitstoprivatemanagement;

representing33%ofthetotalMINCINnetwork.Theoverwhelmingmajorityofthese

wereleasedoutenusufructo,accordingtotheofficialCubanterm.Thesestate

businesseshaveveryoftenbeenrunningatheavylosses,andmanyofthemwouldgo

bankruptiftheylosestatesubsidies.Thissituationdoesnotprovidemuchincentivefor

workerstotakeoverattheirownrisk,butthishasoftenbeentheonlyalternativeto

beinglaidoff.AninitialintentiontoincentivizeMINCINemployeestoform

cooperatives—e.g.byprovidingthemwithpreferentialaccesstostatewholesales—has

apparentlynotbeensignificantlyimplemented,sinceonly174cooperativesofex-

MINCINbusinesshadbeenformedatthesametime.306

FewprivateproductionsectorshavethrivedinCubasofar.Onestudycarriedoutinlate

2014andearly2015aboutoneofthefewexamplesofthis—namelyshoeproduction—

givesusaveryinterestingpicture(MuletConcepción2016).Theproductivechainof

footwearinCubaisfundamentallymadeupofself-employedworkers,someofthem

organisedthroughaspecialculturalfund.Thestudydocumentshowthissectorhas

completelyoutdistancedstateproduction—by4:1—mostlyrelyingontheinformal

(black)market,andhowthelackofpublicincentivesishamperingitsintegrationinto

theformalstructuresoftheeconomy.

303Inearly2018itwasreportedthatmanyoftheHavanabusdrivershadlefttheirjobs,apparentlyattractedbybetterincomesintheprivatetransportsector,makingitincreasinglydifficulttokeepthepublicbusfleetmoving.304DiariodeCuba,28.02.17,quotingSeminarioTrabajadores.305CNN,19.09.14.306AccordingtoinformationprovidedbyanMINCINofficial(RamírezSantana),quotedbyFernandoRavsbergina12.07.17blog.From2018,thissectorwasgivenpreferentialsupport(20%lowerprices)throughthenewlyestablishedMercabalwholesalemarket,ref.Indicator2.4.

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OtherinterestingcasesofquitesuccessfulsmallbusinessesarefoundintheITsector;

whatwecouldcalldotcomstart-ups,developingquitesophisticatedapplicationsforthe

country´semergingdigitalmarket.TheCubangovernmentforsometimeappearedto

havetakenlittlenoticeofthecountry’sgrowingstart-upcommunity,butthereare

growingfearsaboutincreasingrestrictionsagainstit.Whileeconomicreformsthat

beganin2008haveopenedthedoortoanincreasingnumberofprivatebusinesses,

therearenoprovisionsfortechstart-ups,oftenmakingthemillegalandinsomecases

obligingyoungtalentstofleethecountryratherthandevelopingapromisingindustry

ontheisland.307

TheprivatesectorinCubaischaracterisedbyanincreasingdifferentiationbetween

thosetryingtostaywithintherelativelegality,andotherpartsthataremoreorless

completelyoperatingillicitly(withorwithoutlicense).IfCubawantsaseriousand

development-orientedprivatesector(withSchumpeterianentrepreneurs,aswehave

calledthem),muchstrongerincentivesforthelegalandformalexerciseofprivate

businessarerequired.

Similarly,onthestateside,wemayperhapsperceiveanincreasingdifferenceinattitude

betweenthosestateactorsstrugglingtokeepupwithincreasinginternationalmarket

demands—toalargeextentmilitarycorporationsinthetourismsector,andthose

politicallyinchargeofthemacroeconomy.Thismaybecomeapoliticallyquite

interestingsituation.

Indicator4.5:Ideologicalacceptance/resistancetoprivatepropertyand

enrichment.

Thelong-delayedprocessoflegalisingprivatebusinesseshasbeencloselylinkedtothe

discussionabout‘accumulationofcapital’.Ithasbeenatthecentreoftheideological

discussioninCubasinceRaúlCastroraiseditwhenpresentingthe‘updatingguidelines’

atthePartyCongressbackin2011,explicitlyrulingitoutasbeingincontradictionto

307”Cuba’semergingstartupscenegivenaCanadiantechboost”PostedonFebruary1,2016byArchRitter,SpecialtoTheGlobeandMail,Canada,reprintedinASCENewsNo.701.

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theessenceofsocialism,308andthenadding‘enrichment’through“concentrationof

wealth”tothesinsatthe2016Congress.

Manyinthepartyleadershipstillseesuchthingsascontradictorytotherevolutionary

principles.Theproblemwiththislogicofcontinuingtotreattheprivatesectoras

informalandbanthere-investmentofprofitsisofcoursethatitholdsbackthe

developmentofaformalandwell-regulatedprivatesectorintheeconomy.

Still,theremayhavebeenforcesinthePartythatbehindthesceneshavecriticisedRaúl

Castroformovingtoofartowardsprivatization.HerecognisedinhisReporttothe2016

PartyCongressthattherehadbeenforcesatplaywith“veiledaspirationsforthe

restorationofcapitalismassolutiontoourproblems”,butalsothatmanyhadsuspected

therecognitionofprivatepropertytobeafirststepinthatdirection.“Inmyconditionas

FirstSecretaryoftheParty´sCentralCommittee”,hestated,“Ihavethedutytoassure

thatthisisnot,intheleast,thepurposeofthisconceptualidea”(Castro2016)(S/E).

RaúlCastrohimselfmayhavebeensurprisedbytheexplosionofnewmiddle-class

consumptionpatterns—asdocumentedabove—andhowthischallengedthetraditional

egalitarianvaluesoftheCubanrevolution.Heremarkedinamid-2017speech:

“Malfeasancehasbeencommitted;thereisinformationaboutcaseswherethesameperson

alreadyhastwo,three,fourandevenfiverestaurants—notinoneprovince,butinseveral”,

Castrosaid.Healsomentionedanentrepreneurwhohadtravelledmorethan30timesto

differentcountries.“Wheredidhegetthemoney?Howdidhedoit?”Castroasked309(S/E).

Thedebateabouttheprinciplesofpersonalenrichment,upagainstthecriticalneedto

promotegrowthinacrisis-riddeneconomy,apparentlyprovokedheavyinternal

contradictions.Thismadeitimpossibletopresentaconsensusaroundthestrategy

308InhisspeechtotheCongress,Castrosaidthattherehadbeenatotalof45proposalstopermitcapitalaccumulationwhenthedraftlineamientoswerediscussedintherun-uptothePartyCongress.Thiswould”forthetimebeing”continuetoberuledout,hesaid,buthepromisedtocomebacktotheissue.Andindeedhedid!309”RaúlCastrocriticalasirregularidadesenelsectorprivadoycooperativo”,in14ymedio,14.07.17.

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documents310tothe2016PartyCongress,andevenpostponingtheapprovalofthese

documentsformorethanayearafterthatCongress.

ThefollowingpointsinthedocumentspresentedtotheCongressshouldbeemphasised

regardingtheroleoftheprivatesector:

• Thereisrecognitionofthecomplementaryroleofprivatepropertyof

determinedmeansofproduction(developmentmodelpoint91).

• Medium,smallandmicroenterprisesmayberecognisedaslegalpersons,i.e.

aslegallyregisteredprivatecompanies(developmentmodelpoints128and

182)—aprinciplethataswehaveseenhasnotyetbeenimplemented.

• Smallandmediumcompanieswillbepermittedtoassociatewithpublic

companiesinsectorswithlowcapitalrequirement,andwheretheycan

contributetoreductionoffixedcosts(developmentplanpoint248).

• Concentrationofpropertyandwealthamongnaturalorlegalnon-state

personwillnotbepermitted(developmentmodelpoint104)(butthispoint

wasasweshallseelatermodified).

Partofthediscussionthathadbeentakingplacebehindcloseddoorsemergedinpublic

whenthe‘reformczar’MarinoMurillore-appeared(aftermorethanayearofbeing

invisible)attheJune2017NationalAssemblysession:

“Wearerecognizingamulti-sectorialmodelintheeconomy,andthepossibilityof[private

employers]hiringalabourforce,whichnecessarilyleadstoeconomicsurplus(…)Wehave

tocontinueadjustingtherulesgoverningtheself-employed,becausethereisanegative

phenomenonthatisalreadyoccurring,andnodocumentcandefinehowtofaceit(…)Where

thereisprivatepropertythereisacertainlevelofconcentrationofwealth.Weneedtoknow

whatwemeanbyconcentrationofwealth.Thenwehavetoevaluatethetaxregimethatwe

310ThreestrategydocumentswerepresentedasdraftstotheCongress,butonlyapprovedinmid-2017:ConceptualizationoftheCubanSocialEconomicDevelopmentandSocialModel;PolicyGuidelinesforthePartyandtheRevolutionfortheperiod2016-2021;andtheBasesoftheEconomicandSocialDevelopmentPlanthrough2030:VisionoftheNation,thePriorityandStrategicSectors.AswecomebacktounderChallenge7,theNationalAssemblywasnotinvitedtovote(approveordisapprove)onthesedocumentssupposedlyapprovedbytheCommunistParty,onlyto‘support’theminitsJune2017session.

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have,toformanadequatetaxpolicythatallowsustoadequatelyredistributeincome“311

(S/E).

Murilloacknowledgedthatthishadbeenoneoftheissuesmostdebatedinthe

consultationsaboutthedocuments,representingoneofthemajorriskswiththereform

process.

RaúlCastrohimselfthrewmoresuspicionthaneveronprivateentrepreneurs,ina

NationalAssemblyspeechonlytwoweekslater,althoughasalwaysassuringthatthere

wasnointentiontoquestionthejustificationofthenon-statesectorassuch.Hespoke

aboutthe“policydeviation”ofthenon-statesector(includingcooperatives),i.a.through

“theuseofrawmaterialsandequipmentofillicitorigin”andthe“sub-declarationof

incomeinordertoevadetaxobligations”312(S/E).

However,whiletheseharshremarksweremade,thewordingofPoint104about

“wealthconcentration”quotedabovehadapparentlybeenquietlymodifiedina

significantway,alongthelinesofMurillo’sstatement.Theoriginalwordingofpoint104

ofthedevelopmentmodel,presentedtothe2016Congress,wasinmid-2017finally

approvedwiththefollowingwording:

“Theconcentrationofmaterialandfinancialpropertyandwealthwithnaturalornon-statelegal

personswillbetheobjectofregulation,inordertoavoidaconflictwiththeprinciplesofour

socialism”(S/E).

Thiswasfurtherelaboratedthroughprinciplesforre-distributionthroughtaxes.313So,it

isnowofficiallyrecognisedthatprivatepropertywillunavoidablyleadtowealth

concentrationandsocio-economicdifferentiation,butthatthewaytohandlethis,rather

thanprohibitingit,isbyredistributionthroughtaxation.

311QuotedbyHavanaTimes,1.07.17. 312RaúlCastroquotedin14ymedio,14.07.17,op.cit.313Conceptualización� delmodeloeconómicoysocialcubanodedesarrollosocialista,datedJuly2017(Chapter2,p.20;Chapter3,pp.36-37)http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Conceptualización%20del%20modelo%20economico%20social%20Version%20Final.pdf

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AscommentedbytheoppositionjournalistReinaldoEscobar:“Thechangeinnuance

showsthatpragmatismprevailedoverorthodoxy”(S/E).314Whenthiswaswrittenin

July2017,hewasobviouslyunawareofwhatwastocomeshortlyafterwards(see

Indicator9.3).Nonetheless,wemayconcludethatthebattlebetweeneconomic

pragmatismandorthodoxyintheCubanpowercirclesisacontinuousone.

Indicator4.6:Moreautonomousinterestorganisationpermitted?

Oneoftheexpectedpoliticalimpactsoftheincreasingnon-statesectoroftheeconomy

isthatthoseoperatinginthissectorwillstartvoicingdemandsonthebasisoftheir

propercommoninterests.Untilrecently,wehaveseenveryfewcasesofthis,butthey

startedtopopuptowardstheendoftheRaúlera.Therearesignsthatthismaybecome

anewpattern,whichtheauthoritieswillhavedifficultiestohandlewithoutprovoking

furtherprotest.

InSeptember2013—onlytwomonthsafterthefirstnon-agriculturecooperativeswere

approved—membersofnewlyestablishedtransportcooperativessentalettertothe

StateCouncilwithsomeveryinterestingdemands,including:propertyrightstotheir

vehiclesinordertoavoidthat“ourcompanywillcontinuetorelapseinstate

bureaucracy”;theestablishmentofa“properlegalframework”,aswellasa“rational

tributarypolicy”,insteadofstimulating“illegalityandcorruption”;awishtowork

“underaregimeofdemandandsupply“and—importantly—toconstitute“an

independentassociation”.315

Aboutthesametime,anewgovernmentdecreebanningthesaleofimportedclothing

andothergoods,provokedstrongreactionsfromsmallstreetvendorswhosellsuch

goodsbroughtininformally—inmoreorlessorganisedways—byrelativesandother

travellers.Themotivebehindthebanmayhavebeenaninteresttoprotectstate

monopoly.AccordingtoaReuterscablefromHavana,thismeasuremaypotentially

affectasmuchas20,000smallbusinessesandtheiremployees—andperhapsevenmore

critical—theirmuchlargernumberofclients.Officialunionistsseeminglyalsoechoed

314ReinaldoEscobarcommentaryin14ymedio,19.07.17.315DiariodeCuba17September2013,reproducedinASCENewsclippingsNo.582.

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protests:"Wecallontheauthoritiestoreconsider.Wehavealotofproductandmoney

investedinthis",JustoCastillo,arepresentativeoftheofficiallabourfederationwhohad

triedtoorganisetheself-employed,saidaccordingtotheReutersreport."Banningthis

meansunemploymentforthesepeopleforcingthemtodowhatever.Theywillmove

intotheblackmarket,returntoillegalactivity",hesaid,asthecrowdthathadgathered

applauded.316

Thefirstminorconcessiontothisprotestwasthattheimplementationoftheban—

whichstrictlyspeakingwasonlyanenforcementofapreviouslyexistinglegal

situation—waspostponeduntiltheendof2013.Butprotestscontinued,alongwith

protestagainstaclampdownonprivate3Dmovietheatres.Eventhepartyorgan

Granmacarriedquiteobjectivearticlesonthecomplicationsaroundthisissue,andhigh-

levelmeetingswerereportedtohavetakenplaceinaclearrecognitionofgrowing

pressureonthegovernmentforspeedinguptheeconomicreforms.317

Attemptstosetupinterestgroupsbeyondstatecontrolhavebeeneffectively

discouragedthroughoutthereformprocess.Thereisnotyetanysignthatthestate

recognisesanyindependentorganisationofprivateentrepreneursorbusinessesthat

mayrepresenttheirinterestsvis-à-visthestate,norhasthestateestablishedanyformal

negotiationmechanismwithnon-stateeconomicactors.

Somevagueattemptshavebeenmadetosetupindependenttradeunions,buttheyhave

beenmetbyveryresolutereactionsandpermittednospacetoorganise.Anorganisation

calledTheindependentTradeUnionCoalitionwasnotallowedtoconveneameetingin

2016whenthevenuewherethemeetingwastobeheldwassurroundedbyplainclothes

policeofficers,severalactivistswerearrested,othersbesiegedintheirhomesand

threatened.318

Informalmechanismsdoexist,andthereareseveralcasesofTCPsmakingspontaneous

protestsinfrontofprovincialgovernmentofficesleadingtotalksandinsome

316Reuters,Havana,3.10.13.317Ref.aReuterscablefromHavana,dated22/11/13:”Cubanentrepreneursreelingovercrackdownon3Dmovietheatres”.318”CubanRegimeHarasses,ArrestsandDissappearsIndependentLaborLeaders”,DiariodeCuba,25.09.16.

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exceptionalcasestogovernmentconcessions.Themomentsuchconflictresolution

mechanismsbecomeformalised(ref.the”contentiousconflictresolutionmechanism”

discussedinthecaseofChina—ref.ChiChen2012),itwouldrepresentasignificantstep

towardsaneconomicsocietyintheLinz/Stepanmeaning(ref.Chapter4).

Self-employedworkers,includingde-factoentrepreneurs,arestronglyencouragedto

affiliatethemselves‘voluntarily’totheofficialandonlytradeunionconfederationin

Cuba,theCTC,underfullcontroloftheParty.Accordingtoreportsfromprovincial

meetingspreparingforthe7thPartyCongressinApril2016,therewasastrongdriveto

strengthenunionisationofTCPs,usufructuarios,cooperativeandprivatefarmers.Until

theendof2015,70%ofTCPsweresaidtobeunionised.319Thepoliticalmessage,as

expressedbyVicePresidentMiguelDíaz-Canel,wasthat“thepresentcontextimposes

newchallengesontheideologicallevel,wheretheenemiesoftheRevolutionaretrying

toimposeanewplatformofcapitalistandneoliberalrestoration”(S/E).Thosewhoso

farhadstayedoutsideoftheofficialtradeunionweresubjecttoheavypressuretojoin;

independentfarmersandeventheirfamilymembersandemployeeswerepressuredto

joincooperatives(CCS)andanewphenomenoncalledorganizacionesdebase,basis

organisations.Aspecialeffortwasdirectedatthe30%ofTCPscharacterisedas‘young’

(withoutspecifyingage),because—asreportedfromalocalpartyassemblyinVillaClara

province—thisgroupis“theprincipalfocusofattentionforpolitical-ideological

subversion”.

Bymid-2017,thepercentageofTCPunionisationwasclaimedtohaveincreasedto

81.9%,organisedin16separatesectorunionswiththepurposeofsupporting“a

thrivingsectorthathascometostay”,butthatstillisthevictimof“muchlegal

dispersion”.AccordingtoGranma,“itseemsthatCTCofficialsarerecruitingworkers

individually,visitingeachbusinessandspeakingwitheachworker,withoutdistinction

[…]sothattheyseeinusawaytosolvetheirdoubtsanddifficulties”.Therehaveeven

319Thisfigureandtheinformationinthefollowingparagraphsaboutneweffortstokeepprivatesectorpractitionerswithinparty-controlledunions,isbasedon:AleidaYanes(2015):”Lasindicalizacióndeloscuentapropistascubanos”,inEconomíaAnalisis,1.12.15,reproducedinASCENewsclippingsNo.686,4.12.15.

260

beenconsiderationsaboutthecreationofaseparateunionforallnon-stateactors,

whichsofarhasnotbeenseentobefeasible.320

Theimpressionfromtalkingtodozensofself-employedlicenseholdersaroundthe

countryisthattheydonotatallconsidertheCTCtoberelevantforthedefenceoftheir

interests,eveniftheyfeelobligedtobeunionised(ref.Wig,forthcoming).

Thereareseveralcasesofhowthegrowingstrengthofcertainprivatesectorgroups,

andthestate´sdependenceonthem,isforcingthestatetoimplicitlyacceptextra-official

expressionsofprivatesectororganisation,oratleastcoordination.Thismaytaketwo

differentforms:throughthetradeunionchannel,orindirectconfrontation.

Perhapsthemostinterestingexampleofaninstitutionalisedinterestrepresentationis

foundinTrinidad.BothprivaterestaurantsandprivateB&Bestablishments,aswellas

taxiandhorsecartowners,haveorganisedliaisondirectlyvis-à-visgovernmentbothon

municipal,provincialandnationallevels,partlyusingthetradeunion(CTC)towhich

bothemployersandemployees(bothofficiallyconsideredasself-employedworkers)

belong,asachannel.Theintention,itseems,hasbeentosetupspecific‘bureaus’within

thehotelandtourismunion(SNTHT)oftheCTCforindependenttourismagents.Asone

oftheentrepreneursbehindthisinitiativesays:

“Thisservesuswelltoraisewhateverproblemweencounter.Theylistentous,andthey

attendourrequests.Problemsofanationalcharacterevidentlytakemoretime,butwedo

getaresponse.Wearerecognisedasentrepreneurswithinourterritory.Wemeetevery

threemonthswithunionleaderstodiscussissuesandproblemsthathaveoccurredinthe

previousperiod[…].Theissueofawholesalemarkethassofarnotbeensolved.Ourrequest

toexpandtherestaurantcapacityisnowawaitingaresponsefromthemaximumauthorities.

WealsohavecontactwithentrepreneursfromotherplaceswhohavecometoTrinidadtobe

informedaboutourworkandbringthereferencetotheirrespectiveprovincialauthorities.

Trinidadhasbecomeanationalreferencemunicipalityregardingself-employedwork”321

(S/E).

Theseemployerrepresentativesinthetourismsectorevenhaveaccesstoregularbi-

annualmeetingsonministerlevelthroughalabourunionchannel,discussingtheir

320Granma,10.05.17;25.05.17.321QuotedfromamailreceivedfromtheownerofaTrinidadpaladar(12.11.16).

261

indispensableroleinthecountry´stouristindustry.322Aslongasnoentrepreneurial

organisationisallowed,theTrinidademployershavecreativelychosenthisquite

paradoxicalapproachtoseekrepresentationthroughthetradeunion.323

Wesawanotherexampleofthedefactorecognitionofprivaterestaurantsasan

economicsector,whentheHavanamunicipalgovernmentinOctober2016summoned

theownersofsomeofthemostwellknowncapitalrestaurantstowarnthemagainst

allegedillegalactivities(seedetailsunderIndicator4.4).324Thiswasprobablythe

clearestexampletothatdateofthegovernmenthavingacollectivemeetingwitha

wholesectorofprivateentrepreneurs.

Aninterestingcaseemergedinlate2017,inresponsetoPresidentTrump’sattemptto

discourageUStourismtoCuba.Presentingthemselvesas“anassociationofCuban

businesswomen”,theyaskedforameetingwithRepublicanSenatorMarcoRubioof

Florida—oneofthemainlobbyistsbehindTrump’sCubameasures—toexplainthe

impactonthecountry'snascentprivatesectorofrollingbackthedétenteinUSrelations.

"WewanttoinvitehimorpartofhisteamtocomeandlearnaboutCuba,theCubans

hereandourbusinesses",saidNiurisHigueras,owneroftheAtelierrestaurantin

Havana,whereshesaidbusinessisdown60percentfromayearearlierduetonegative

impactoftheTrumppolicy.Otherpersonsbehindtheletterwerealadyrentingvintage

USautomobiles,Nostalgicar,andathirdladywhorunsa10roombedandbreakfast

business.TherehasbeennoofficialGovernmentreactiontosuchinitiatives,butit

showsthattheprivatesector,ifallowedtobeorganised,couldbecomeacriticalallyin

thestruggleagainsttheTrumpadministration’srestrictivemeasures.325

Otherexamplesofattemptstoorganiseself-employedhavebeenregistered.OneHavana

groupcallingitselfAsociaciónCubanadeHombresdeNegocios(ACHN),hasasanexplicit

aimto”empowernon-statemanagement”,countingwithlegaladvice,trainingin

322TheauthorhadaccesstodiscussthisexperienceindetailwithoneoftheemployerrepresentativesafterameetingtheyhadwiththeMinisterofTourismandotherhigh-levelgovernmentrepresentativesinMarch2017.Granma(10.05.17)recognizedthattheprivatetourismsectorthroughtheirunionchannelbenefittedfroma‘directattention’bytheMinistryofTourism,consideringtheirimportanceasthesecondmostimportantincomesourceforthecountry.323ThisexamplewasalsodiscussedinBye(2014i:35).324Thomsonreuters20.10.16op.cit.AccordingtothequotedHavanamunicipalgovernmentofficial,therewasatthattimeatotalof500privaterestaurantsregisteredinHavanaand1700acrossthecountry.325”CubanbusinesswomenseekRubiomeetingasU.S.policybites”.Reuters(MarcFrank),17.11.17.

262

marketing,businessadministration,accounting,etc.326

Inapotentiallyimportantsignalthatsuchinitiativesamongprivateentrepreneursare

beingtakenseriouslyandconstructively,itwasreportedthat‘highofficials’ofthe

MinistryofWorkheldameetinginlateDecember2017withtwoprivatesector

representatives.Keyconcernslikewholesalemarkets,accesstoimportproduction

inputs,taxissuesandnotleast“theneedtomaintainspacesofdialogue”werediscussed,

onthebasisofalettersentby41cuentapropistasfourmonthsearlier.327

TheconclusionwemaydrawfromtheseexamplesisthattheCubangovernmentisvery

slowlyrealisingtheneedtoopenacertaindialoguewith—andperhapsagainstitsown

intentionsofferingastimulustotheinstitutionalisationof—a‘non-stateeconomic

society’.WhatispushingtheGovernmentincreasinglyinthisdirectionisnodoubt

recognitionofthemoreandmorestrategicroleforthecountry´seconomyplayedbythe

privatesector—andtheincreasingpoweritcommands.

Thecaseofindependentcollectivetaxis(calledboteros)inHavanaisquitedifferent.

BasedonexchangewithagreatnumberofprivatetaxidriversinHavana,itmaybe

concludedthattheydonotperceivetheofficialtradeunionasameaningfulchannelfor

theirinterests.Theyhaveratherpreferredmoreopenconfrontation.328

Everybodywhowantstoknowisawarethatthesetaxis,aswellasothernon-state

transportproviders,havebeenworkingalmostexclusivelywithblack-marketpetrol,

boughtatabouthalftheofficialpricefromworkersinstateenterprises.Theverysystem

forsaleofblackmarketpetrolisinthefirstplaceanexpressionofaninformalandquite

effectiveorganisation.329

InJuly2016,whenVenezueladrasticallyreduceditsoilprovisionstoCuba,asimilar

326OsnielCarmonaBreijo:”AsociacióndeHombresdeNegocios,unaapuestacontralastrabasdelGobierno”,19.05.17,ASCENews756.Itisnotclearwhetherthisisthesamegroupofbusinessmenthatalsoappliedforlegalstatus,withoutevengettingaresponse(reportedbyAssociatedPress,Havana,1.06.17).327”ElMinisteriodelTrabajoaceptadialogarconungrupodecuentapropistas”,DiariodeCuba,5.01.18.328Officialunionleadershaveclaimedthat10,000privatetaxiowners(boteros),truckowners,bicycletaxis,tirerepairers(poncheros)etc.inHavanaareunionized,inasectorwithconsiderablelabourconflicts(source:RomilioSalazarLora,SecretarioGeneraldelSindicatoNacionaldeTrabajadoresdelTransporteyPuertos,Havana).329ThissituationwasreportedinanarticlebyOrlandoGonzález,publishedbyASCENewsno.719(8.08.16):”Boteros’aumentanun50%elpreciodelpasajeenLaHabana”.Theaccountwasconfirmed,withmoredetails,byataxidrivertowhomIhaveaccessofconfidenceinHavana(October,2016).

263

reductionofpetroleumquotastostateenterprisesoccurred,resultinginblackmarket

pricesrisingbyabout50%.Thetaxidrivershadnootherchoicethanincreasingtheir

tariffsasmuch,leadingtostrongpublicprotestsandthegovernmenttryingtointroduce

maximumprices(justastheyhaddonewithfoodproducts).Taxisthenstartedto

disappearfromthestreets,inashowofstatepowerlessness,soonobligingthestateto

restorepartsofthepreviouspetrolquotassothatillegalpetrolagaincouldbeprovided

insufficientquantitiesandtomoreacceptableprices,andtaxitariffsalsoreducedmore

orlesstopreviouslevels.Accordingtooursources,therewasnoexplicitorganisationof

taxidriversbehindthis,butinformalcontactturnedouttobeveryeffective.

AnewroundofconflictwiththeHavanataxidrivers,spreadingtotherestofthe

country,tookplaceinFebruary2017,whenanopenstrikewasorganisedandappeared

tosuccessfullyrebuff—atleastforthetimebeing—newgovernmenteffortstointroduce

pricecontrolandotherrestrictions.Oneofthestrikershadsomeinteresting

observationsaboutthisoccurrence:

“Thetransportworkerslearntthatbyuniting,theymayachievethingsandthatthe

Governmentisafraidofthem(becausetheydependonthem).Theideaaboutthestrikedid

notcomefromoneperson;itwasanideathatemergedspontaneouslyamongmany

transportworkersfromalloverthecountry[…]Thereisnoformallyexistingnetwork.The

boteros(taxidrivers)informeachother,uniteandhelpeachotherspontaneouslyaslarge

groupoffriends[…].ThestrikestartedthesamedayastheGovernmentannouncednew

maximumprices.Manycarsceasedtoworkortheyworkedverylittle.Thenagroupof

transportworkersdecidedtocallanationalstrikestartingon27February,urgingthatno

carshouldcirculate,thuspressuringtheGovernmenttopermitwholesalemarket,reduction

oftaxes,etc.”330

Thisstrikewassummarisedbytheabove-quotedstrikeras“apartialsuccess”.Butthe

powerstruggledidnotendthere.Aspartoftherestrictionsannouncedon1August

2017,newmeasuresagainsttheboteroswereannounced,includingnewmeasuresto

eliminatetheblackmarketgassales,maximumprices,strictertechnicalcontrols(ofold

carsthatinmanycaseswouldnotpasssuchcontrols),frequentcontrolsofall

documentationalongtheroutes,andanattempttoorganisetheprivatetaxisinstate-

controlledcooperativeswithaccesstopreferentialgaspricesandwholesalepricesfor

330Privatee-mailcorrespondencewithapersonwithintimateknowledgeoftheaction(S/E).

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sparepartsandtools.331Thetaxiownerssawthesemeasuresasjustanotherattemptof

unwantedstateinterference.However,reportsfromearly2018indicatedthatthetaxi

ownersanddriverscontinuedtofindelegantwaysaroundtheserestrictions,e.g.byre-

organizingtheirroutes.Thestateseemsincapableofwinningthisbattle,simplybecause

ofthemarketshareandtherebythepowerpositionoccupiedbytheprivatetransport

sector.

Transportworkershavebeenorganisingprotestsalsoinotherpartsofthecountry,

dependingonthemostcommonmeansoftransportation:horsecartdrivers(cocheros)

inHolguín,SantaClaraandCienfuegos,motorcyclists(motoneteros)inSantaClara,

SantiagoandGuantánamo,and—asmentioned—almendronesinHavana.

Otherprofessionalgroupsverticallyorganisedunderstrictpartycontrolhavealso

attemptedtoobtainamoreautonomy.Thereareclearsignsthatjournalistsandartists

arebecomingincreasinglyindependent,inspiteofrecentattacksonjournalistsin

officialmedia,whosimultaneouslycontributeinnon-officialmediaoutlets.332

Asshownintheagrarianreformsection,thegovernmenthasbeenequallyunwillingto

allowmoreindependentandautonomousformsoforganisationamongpeasantsand

farmers.

AnybodyvisitingthewholesalefarmermarketElTrigaloutsideofHavanawhenit

existed(seediscussionofwholesalemarketsunderChallenge2),wouldhaveobserved

thattherewasaninstitutionalisednon-stateeconomicsocietyinthemaking.Farmers,

transportproviders,middlemenandretailersofallkindswereminglinginahectic

marketeconomy,butfrequentlyoversteppingthenarrowlegalborders.Forover-

cautiousguardiansofsocialistprinciples,thedecisiontoclosethisbiggestspontaneous

marketexperimenttodateinCubamusthavebeenaneasyone.Similarsignsofahectic

marketlifecouldbeseeninotherpartsofthecountry,astheonereportedlysetupby

theprovincialPartySecretaryinCamagüeyaround2015.

331MinistryofTransportofficialindeclarationstoGranma,1.08.17.332Accordingtoprivatelyobtainedinformationearlyin2018,themostrecentgenerationsofjournalistgraduatescarelessandlessaboutofficialrestrictions:tothem,employmentinofficialmediaisnowsolittleattractivethatsanctionthreatsagainstthemhavehardlyanyeffect.

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Theemergenceofvirtualmarketmechanismslikethewebsiterevolico.com,where

almostanygoodsandservicesmaybeboughtandsold,availableonthememorystickEl

PaquetewhichsomanyCubansbuyeveryweek,isanotherexpressionofhowreally

existingmarketinstitutionalisationistakingplace,upagainstheavyofficialresistance.

Thegovernmentmaydecidetoclosedownphysicallyexistingrealestateagencies(asit

seemstohaveintendedinlate2016),buttheycannotclosevirtualchannelslike

revolico.com.

Inasituationwithincreasingeconomicandinformationindependenceandwith

increasingsegmentsofthepopulationpayingscantattentiontotheoldpower

structures,itremainstobeseenhowwellthePartywillsucceedtorepressindependent

andhorizontalinterestorganisationorcoordinationamongnon-stateeconomicactors.

WhentheCubangovernmenthasbeensoresistanttoallowmoreindependentinterest

organisation,itmayalsobebasedonaworryabouthowsocialprotesthasincreasedin

ChinaandVietnamafterthegrowthofthemarketeconomy.Thepoliticalstructureof

theChinesereformprocessseemstohaveencouragedavarietyofsocialactorsto

pursuetheirinterestsandclaimtheirrightsbystagingcollectiveprotests.Firstamong

themarefarmers—clearlywithanincreasedlevelofindependenceasaresultofthe

reforms,whereasitisuncleartowhatextentthenewurbanmiddleclasseshavebeen

prominentinsuchprotests.Butworkers,pensioners,disabledpeopleandnottoforget

demobilisedsoldiershaveplayedprominentroles,toalargedegreecontrolledthrough

‘contentiousauthoritarianism’(ref.Chen2012).

Attheendoftheday,thisisallaquestionoftheCommunistParty’spowermonopoly.As

SamuelFarber,aself-declaredchampionof”revolutionarydemocraticsocialismfrom

below”,pointedoutmanyyearsago:

“[But]thereisalsothequestionofpoliticalpower,andthecentralbureaucracyisn'tgoingto

sharepowerwithnewlymintedcapitalistsunlesstheytotallyassimilateintotheruling

bureaucracy.ButthishasalsohappenedinChina—youhavecapitalistsjoiningthe

CommunistPartyandbecomingapartofit”(Farber2006).

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HecouldhaveaddedthatthesamepatternisseeninVietnam.Whetherasimilartrend

willappearinCubaisstillimpossibletopredict—simplybecausewecannotyetspeak

aboutacapitalistclassperseinCuba.Butitwillbeanaspecttowatchcarefully.

Thestatedintentionsofamassivepromotionofcooperatives,andeventhepossibilityof

lettingthemorganiseindependentlyofstateandpartystructuresaccordingto

internationalcooperativeprinciples,wouldhavebeenanotherimportantfactorfor

autonomousinterestorganisationinCuba.Thereisreasontobelievethatthe

Government’sover-cautiouspolicywiththeproliferationandauthorisationofurban

cooperativesisanotherexpressionofthefeartoseesuchinterestorganisationrunning

outofcontrol.

Themainconclusionisthatearlyandcarefultrendstowardstheestablishmentofan

institutionalisedeconomicsociety,basedontheemergingnon-statesector,isbeingmet

byanideologicalcounter-offensiveandheavy-handedmeasurestostopindependent

interestorganisation.Therearesignals,however,thatthere-structuringofthesocio-

economicrealityinthecountryhasalreadycometoofartokeepthislogicalpolitical

impactatbay.Thefinaloutcomeofthisisstillhighlyunclear.

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Chapter 8: The evolving international arena – fitting into a new

context

Challenge 5: A changing international context: How to influence the US to abandon

the embargo/blockade; and/or compensate the embargo by help of other

international alliances.

8.0.Thesetting

ItisimpossibletodiscussthepoliticalprospectsofCubawithouttakingthe

internationalcontextintoconsideration.Cubahasalwaysbeendependentonforeign

powers:Spainduringthecolonialera,theUSduringthefirst60yearsofthe20th

century,andtheUSSRsincetherevolutionuntilthedemiseoftheSovietsuperpower.

Duringthedeepcrisisofthe1990s,followingthefallofitssocialistbenefactor,

revolutionaryCubasawitselfobligedtotakeitsfirstturntowardsthecapitalistworld:

directforeigninvestmentshadbeenlegalisedalreadyin1988—particularlyinthe

tourismsector.ThiswaslargelyasaconsequenceofGorbachev’sperestroikapolicy

signallingreducedsubsidiestotheCubaneconomy;cuentapropismo,agricultural

marketsandthecirculationoftheUSdollarwerealsolaterlegalised(1992-94).333When

noexternalsupporterwasathand,HugoChávezcametopowerinVenezuelaandsoon

offeredCubaanewlifelineintermsofoildeliveriesandothercrucialsupportin

exchangeformedicalandotherprofessionalservices.WithChavez´death,andhis

successorNicolásMadurosteeringthecountrytowardsadeepandperhapstotalcrisis,

Cubaisonceagainseeingabenefactorgraduallydisappear.Noothercountryis

preparedtotakeoverasimilarprotectionrole.Rightistpoliticalforcesaredefinitelyon

theoffensiveinLatinAmerica.Cubaisactivelydiversifyingitsinternationalrelations,

333TheconsequencesofthedisappearanceoftheUSSRweredramaticforCuba:between1989and1993,Cuba’sexportsandimportswerereducedby75-80%,grossinvestmentsby60%,andGDPby35%.Whilesugar(mostlybeingsoldtotheUSSR)representedmorethan90%ofexportrevenuein1990,tourism(mostlyfromWesternEuropeandCanada)hadbecomethenumberoneexportearner(45%)in2000,whilehealthservices(mostlytoVenezuela)hadthesamepositionin2006(withsugarandtourismeachrepresentingabout25%).SeeSánchez-EgozcueandTrianaCordoví(2010),figures1and4.

268

andnosinglecountrynowaccountsformorethan20%oftotalmerchandisetrade—

withChinaandVenezuelaasmaintradepartnersbutwithVenezuela’srolefast

diminishing.WithUSrelationsslidingbacktofullconfrontationunderPresidentTrump,

thisinternationalcontextisoneoftheratherpessimisticframeworkconditionsasCuba

ispreparingforthepost-Castroera.

Indicator5.1:Cubasearchingforanewinternationalrole.

CubaunderFidelCastrousedtobethenon-disputedchampionofanti-imperialism,with

orwithoutthetutelageoftheGreatSocialistFatherland(theUSSR).Itisnow

convincinglydocumentedthatCubawastheactivedriverofmilitaryandpolitical

supporttotheanti-colonialwarsinAfricaoftenagainstthestrongwilloftheUSSR(ref.

Gleijeses2002).ItwasalwayswellknownthatCuba´ssupporttotheanti-imperialist

strugglesonitsowncontinentwasitsowninvention—alsoverymuchagainstthewish

oftheUSSRandinmostcasesthelocalcommunistparties(ref.Wickham-Crowley

1992).

Aftertenyearsofwanderingintheinternationalwildernessinthe1990swhenthe

USSRshadceasedtoexist—almostleftaloneinastubbornandall-butsuicidalrejection

ofwhatsomecalled“theendofhistory”,Cubaaroundtheturnofthecenturyfounda

newinternationalaffiliationamongtheemergingLatinAmericanleftistregimes.An

agingFidellefttheinternationalanti-imperialistfrontpositiontoHugoChavez,whowas

atthesametimewillingtospendhisamplepetrodollarsonanewsolidarityaxiswith

Cuba,tosomeextentcompensatingforthelossofSovietinternationalism.Atthesame

time,giventhenewcorrelationofforcesinLatinAmerica,Cubacouldnowpatiently

solidifydiplomaticandpoliticalrelationstotheentireLatinAmerica,irrespectiveof

politicalcolours,tothepointofisolatingtheUSembargopolicy.Sosuccessfulwasthis

effortinbuildingregionalalliancesthatitwasthesuperpowerthatintheendhadto

blinkand‘cryuncle’,obligedtoinitiateanormalizationprocesswithCubaasa

necessarypriceforacceptanceinLatinAmerica.TheparadoxisthatCubaby

befriendingObama´sUSandhelpingtheoldenemyrebuilditsrelationstoLatin

America,atthesametimeastheLatinAmericanleftandCuba´sbestfriendslostthe

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regionalhegemony,helpedtheUSpartlyreconqueringitswesternhemispheric

hegemony.

AnotherimportantroletakenbyCubainthiscontextwastohostandco-facilitatethe

peacenegotiationsinColombia.So,almostinparallel,Cubahelpedfinalisethelast

remnantoftheColdWar(USvs.Cuba)andalsoofinternalcivilstrifeintheWestern

Hemisphere(inColombia,althoughitremainstobeseenwhetherthepeaceaccordwill

besuccessfullyimplemented).

MuchlessknownistheroleRaúlCastrowasdiscretelyplayingduringcomplicated

multilateralnegotiations.DuringthepreparationsoftheCOP21summitinParisin

November-December2015,theALBAalliance—towhichCubabelongs—threatenedto

blockthisessentialagreementforwhichtheentireworldwaswaiting.Inthissituation,

ex-PresidentHollandeofFrance,thesummithostwhohadinvestedsomuchprestigein

theoutcome,wasreportedtohavecalledonRaúlCastrotointervenewithhisfriends

andalliestoabstainfromsabotagingtheagreement.Hedidso,andsuccessfullyhelped

themosthistoricagreementonclimatechange,sofar,beingadopted.Asareward,

PresidentCastrowaspromptlyinvitedonofficialstatevisittoFrance,inhiscasethe

firstevertoaEUcountry.334

OneofthenoteworthyevolutionsfromFidel´stoRaúl´spresidency,then,wasachange

inCuba´sinternationalrolefromananti-imperialistvanguard—almostanoutcastamong

mostwesterncountries—toadiplomaticfacilitator.

Indicator5.2:US-Cubarelations:TowardstheendoftheembargoandtheCuban

‘bunkermentality’justifyinglackofcivicfreedoms?

TheUS-Cubanrapprochement,initiatedbythequitesensationaldeclarationsby

PresidentsObamaandCastroon17December2014(referredtointhefollowingas

334 This account is based on conversation with a high-level French diplomat, intimately involved in the preparation of the state visit. President Hollande made a similar phone call to President Morales of Bolivia (according to a personal account to the author by a minister who was present when President Morales took this call).

270

17D),didofcoursehaveadirectimpactontheCubanpoliticalsituation,directlyor

throughitseffectontheeconomy.

Firstofall,itisimportanttoseethenewsituationemergingpre-andpost-17Dasa

relationshipbeingplayedoutbetweendifferentactorsineachcountry.Inmanyways,

thecorerelationshipwastheonebetweenthetwopresidents,bothclearlyexpressinga

wishtomarchtowardsnormalization,ofcoursewithouthidingtheirpolitical

differencesandthedifficultroadahead.

WhenthetwopresidentsmetforthefirsttimeattheSummitoftheAmericasinPanama

inApril2015,therewasonekeystatementfromeachofthemthatmarkedtheir

respectivewishforthefutureprocess.PresidentCastrosaidofObama:“Inmyopinion,

PresidentObamaisanhonestman[…]Iadmirehim,andIthinkhisbehaviourhasalot

todowithhishumblebackground”.PresidentObama´skeystatementwasthefollowing,

givenasanansweratthepressconferenceattheendofthemeeting:“Wearenotinthe

businessofregimechange.WeareinthebusinessofmakingsurethattheCubanpeople

havefreedom,andshapetheirowndestinyandtheirownlives.Andsupportingcivil

society[…]”335

Bothstatementsmustbeunderstoodintheirhistoriccontext.ThepreviousUSregime—

thatofGeorgeW.Bush—wasclearly“inthebusinessofregimechange”.Bysettingup

theinfamous‘CommissionforAssistancetoaFreeCuba’in2003,Washington’sfirm

beliefatthetimewasthatitwastheUnitedStates’right,and,indeed,itsduty,todecide

Cuba’spoliticalfuture.TheCommission’smandateamountedtonothinglessthana

programofgovernmentforaforeigncountrythathadneveraskedforthiskindof

assistance.TheBushAdministrationevenappointeditsownmodern-dayversionofaUS

ProConsul,calledtheCubaTransitionCoordinator.TheCubangovernment,quite

unsurprisingly,describedhismissionas“partofabroaderUSplanforCuba’s

annexation”.Whatthisillustratedwasthat,untilDecember172014,theUS’Cubapolicy

essentiallyadheredtothePlattAmendmentphilosophyfrom1901,whichallowedthe

335BothquotesarebasedontheCNNreportfromthemeeting,11.04.2015.

271

UStointerveneunilaterallyinCubaninternalaffairswhenevertheUSGovernmentsaw

anyreasontodoso.336

ItisinterestingtoseethisincontrasttoUSmilitarythinking,andthefactthatPentagon

sincethe1990snolongersawCubaasamilitarythreat(ref.theGrahamamendment

andPentagon´sresponse,Klepak2017),andthatmilitaryleadersofbothcountriesquite

consistentlywerelookingforwaystoengageinsuchaconstructivewaythatitcould

buildamorepositivepoliticalrelationship(seeKlepak2012:84-85andfollowing).

Theinterventionphilosophy(inCubanSpanishtermedplattismooranexionismo),so

crucialinCubanpoliticaldiscussionssincethebeginningofthe20thcentury,has

influencedbothsidesformorethan100years.Ontheonehand,plattismohasbeenthe

US’justificationfortheembargoandfortheestablishmentandmaintenanceofthe

GuantánamoNavalBase.IthasbeenembracedbyCubandissidentsandexileleaders

andhasbeenperceivedbytheCubangovernmentassupportingannexation.Onthe

otherhand,ithasalsobeenusedbytheCubangovernmenttojustifylimitstocivic-

politicalfreedoms,andtorepressmostofitsinternalopposition.Amajordividinglinein

Cubancivilsocietyhasbeenbetweendefendersandopponentsofthe

embargo/blockade:theformerwereautomaticallyconsideredasenemiesofthe

fatherland,whereasthelatterweretoleratedundercertainconditions(seeBye2015).

ThistakesustothecontextforCastro´sdescriptionoftheUSPresident,untilthatpoint

theultimateenemyimageoftheCubanrevolution.InJanuary2015,inFidelCastro´s

firstpubliccommentstothesensationalannouncementonemonthearlier,thehistoric

CommanderoftheCubanrevolutiondisplayedaverydifferenttonethanthatofhis

brother:“IdonottrusttheUSpolicynorhaveIexchangedawordwiththem[…]”337

(S/E).

ItisamatterofspeculationwhetherornotFidelwaseversupportiveofRaúl´sdecision

tostartthenormalisationwiththeUS.ItmaybepointedoutthatFidelCastro

approachedallnewUSpresidentscomingandgoingduringhisreign,withproposalsfor

336Ref.https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/50346.htm 337QuotedinHavanaTimes,26January2015,fromalettertotheFederationofUniversityStudents(FEU).

272

betterrelations.AsstatedbyLeoGrandeandKornbluh(2014:405)intheirstate-of-the-

artdocumentationonUS-Cubannegotiationeffortssince1959:

“AlthoughFidelCastroprofessedtobelievethattheimperialistUnitedStatescouldnever

acceptCubansocialism,everytimeanewpresidenttookofficeinWashington,Castroheld

outanolivebranchtoseeifthenewadministration—nomatterhowconservativeor

antagonistic—mightbeopentobetterrelations”.

Buttheyalsogoontoobserve—inatextpublishedbefore17D:

“Finally,RaúlCastroisnotFidel.WhereasFideltookacertainsatisfactionindefyingthe

UnitedStatesandexploitedU.S.hostilitytorallynationalistsentiment,Raúlhasfocusedon

Cuba´sdomesticproblems.Anti-U.S.diatribesfeaturemuchlessprominentlyinhisspeeches,

andheblamesCuba´seconomicproblemsontheshortcomingsofCubanpolicyratherthan

theembargo.IfFidelwasmotivatedtomaintainanacrimoniousrelationshipwith

Washingtonfordomesticpoliticalreasons,Raúlisnot”(p.407).

Itmaybediscussedtowhatextentthequiteunenthusiasticpost-17DcommentbyFidel

hasservedasinspiration,orjustification,forthecontinuedorperhapseven

strengthenedgeneralmistrustabouttheUSthat,fromtheverybeginning,seemedto

dominatetheattitudeofCommunistpartyhardlinersintheaftermathofthehistorical

stepsofrapprochement.Thisattitudewasforawhiledifficulttoexemplifywithexplicit

quotes;itwasratherimplicitinthelackofenthusiasm,callsofcaution,non-public

statementsandoff-the-recordinstructions(orientaciones)topartycadres,basicallywith

themessagethat“USimperialismisstillouttheretodefeatus—beonthewatchand

keeptheguardup!”338Asanexample,itwasnotedthatseveralofficialcommentators

sawSecretaryofStateKerry´svisittoHavanaon14August2015toraisetheStarsand

StripesovertheUSEmbassyinHavanaas“acontinuationofimperialism´sdestructive

strategy”,whereasothersontheeveofKerry´svisitcharacterisedhisremarksasmuch

moreconstructive.Inasignofincreasingpluralism,orperhapsofincreasinginternal

contradictionsthatnomorecouldbehiddenfromthepublic,thesetwocontradictory

338SeveralCommunistPartymembersconveyedsuchmessagesinprivatetotheauthorduring2015andearly2016,beforetheyweremadeinpublic.

273

viewswereopenlydisplayedintheveryofficialTVprogramMesaRedondaonthat

historicday.339

Anothersignofmistrustwasthecontinueddetentionofpeopletakingpartinopposition

manifestations,forinstanceawaveofdetentionsinthedaysimmediatelyafterMr

Kerry´svisit.AsimilarpatternwasrepeatedduringthevisitbyPopeFrancisin

September2015.Oneoftheleadingirreconcilabledissenters,GuillermoFariñas,

claimedthatsincetheCubanGovernmenthadnomoreexternalenemies,“the

confrontationisnowwiththeCubancitizen,becausetheenemyisthepeople”.340In

August-September2015,itseemedtohavebecomestandardproceduretodetainthose

participatingintheSundaymarchesofDamasenBlanco,totheextentthatevena

ChileanMPparticipatinginthemarchwasdetainedinSeptember,inanembarrassing

signthattheMinistryoftheInteriorwasactingagainstthemostelementarypolitical

wisdom.Therewerealsoclearsignsofanarrowingspaceforpartsofthecivilsociety

thatpreviouslyhadbeenaccepted,forinstancewhenacademicsemployedby

universitiesandotherstateinstitutionswerenowwarnedtostayawayfrommore

independent-thinkingandliberal-mindedinstitutionslikeCubaPosible.341

OntheUSside,therewasstillconsiderableconfusionevenwithintheObama

administrationabouttheaimofitsownpolicies,perhapsdependingontheaudienceto

whichamessagewasdirected.AmantrastillbeingappliedbyleadingStateDepartment

officialswhenspeakingtoCuban-Americanaudiences,wasthattheobjectivesand

strategiesoftheUS’Cubapolicyhadnotchanged;onlythetactics.Whencomparedwith

theexplicitobjectivesoftheBushadministration—whichobviouslywasregime

change—suchstatementsmayhavebeenhelpfulinordertocalmdownoppositionin

CongressandCubananti-dialoguegroupsinHavanaaswellasinMiami,butitalso

providedtheopponentsofrapprochementwithintheCubangovernmentwithall

necessaryammunitiontocontinueharassinganddetainingoppositionactivists.

339SeePedroCampos(2015),”NotasalmargendelavisitadeKerryaCuba”,14ymedio,17deagosto2015.34014ymedio,17August2015.341Alltheseobservationsweremadebytheauthorthroughquiteclosecontactwithbothacademicsandcivilsocietyactorsduring2015-2016.

274

WhenJohnKerrymadehisspeechduringtheflagraisingceremonyinHavana,hemade

itveryclearthat“Cuba’sfutureisforCubanstoshape.Responsibilityforthenatureand

qualityofgovernanceandaccountabilityrests,asitshould,notwithanyoutsideentity;but

solelywithinthecitizensofthiscountry”.Thenheadded,inawaythattheCuban

governmentcouldhardlyconsiderasundueinterference,basedongenerallyaccepted

rulesforinternationalco-existencewithintheframeworkoftheUN:

“ButtheleadersinHavana—andtheCubanpeople—shouldalsoknowthattheUnitedStates

willalwaysremainachampionofdemocraticprinciplesandreforms.Likemanyother

governmentsinandoutsidethishemisphere,wewillcontinuetourgetheCuban

GovernmenttofulfilitsobligationsundertheUNandInter-Americanhumanrights

covenants—obligationssharedbytheUnitedStatesandeveryothercountryinthe

Americas”.342

ThisUSpolicyofabstainingfromregimechangeeffortsbutprovidingpoliticalsupport

towhattheUSseesaspro-democraticforces,increasinglybecameabasicprincipleof

PresidentObama´sforeignpolicy,bymanyconsideredan‘Obamadoctrine’.President

Obamaelaboratedonthisinthefollowingway:

“YoutakeacountrylikeCuba.Forustotestthepossibilitythatengagementleadstoabetter

outcomefortheCubanpeople,therearen’tthatmanyrisksforus.It’satinylittlecountry.It’s

notonethatthreatensourcoresecurityinterests,andso[there’snoreasonnot]totestthe

proposition.Andifitturnsoutthatitdoesn’tleadtobetteroutcomes,wecanadjustour

policies.ThesameistruewithrespecttoIran,alargercountry,adangerouscountry,one

thathasengagedinactivitiesthatresultedinthedeathofU.S.citizens,butthetruthofthe

matteris:Iran’sdefensebudgetis$30billion.Ourdefensebudgetiscloserto$600billion.

Iranunderstandsthattheycannotfightus.[...]YouaskedaboutanObamadoctrine.The

doctrineis:Wewillengage,butwepreserveallourcapabilities”.343

ThismustbeexactlythekindoflegitimateUSpositionsthatPresidentRaúlCastrohad

inmindwhenhesaidinhisD17speech:“weshouldlearntheartoflivingtogetherina

civilizedformwithourdifferences”,alsoreiteratinghiswillingnesstodialogueaboutall

342QuotebasedonUSStateDepartment´sofficialversion,downloadedfromtheirwebsite19.08.15.343ThomasL.Friedman(2015):”IranandtheObamaDoctrine”,NewYorkTimes,5.04.15.

275

ofthedeepUS-Cubandifferencesregardingnationalsovereignty,democracy,human

rights,andforeignpolicy.344

ThoseopposingtherapprochementinCongress,aswellastheirsupportersamong

Cuban-AmericansandtheCubanopposition,continuedtoargueasiftheUSstillhasthe

legitimaterightanddutytochangeregimeinCuba,i.e.thePlattAmendmentlogic.The

factthatregimechangewasnotincludedinthebilateraldialogueduringtheObama

administration,wasseenbythemasproofthatthedialoguewascompletelyfutile.

ItwasinterestingtonotethedifferentviewswithintheCubanoppositionregardingthis

situation,clearlydemonstratedduringMrKerry´s2015visittoHavana.The

“irreconcilables”chosenoteventobepresentinHavanaonthishistoricday,andrather

organisedameetinginSanJuan,PuertoRico(ElEncuentroNacionalCubano),andissued

adeclaration,LaDeclaracióndeSanJuan,aimingat”thefulllibertyoftheCubanpeople

andagenuineRuleofLaw”.345WhenMrKerryinvitedagroupofthedissenterstoa

separateconversationattheUSEmbassyResidenceinHavana,thoseinvitedalso

reacteddifferently.Atleasttwoofthemostprominentirreconcilables,AntonioRodiles

ofEstadodeSatsandBertaSolerofDamasenBlanco,turneddowntheinvitation,

whereasagroupofadozendissidents—thoseinfavourofthenewUSpolicy—metwith

MrKerryinwhattheycharacterisedas”30fruitfulminutes”.Thesamepro-dialogue

opponentsalsoclearlyrecognised—liketheObamaAdministration—thatCubanregime

changewasnottobenegotiatedwiththeUS,butmustresultfromapoliticalprocessin

Cuba.Thefollowingquotefromtheco-editoroftheoppositiononlinedaily14ymedio,

twodaysbeforeSecretaryKerry´shistoricvisit,isaquitesignificantsignthatthe

supporttotheUS-CubandialoguewasexpandingontheCubanoppositionside:

“Whatwillnotbecomingbythatway(US-Cubantalks)isdemocracy,justasindependence

didnotfollowbehindtheNorthAmericangunships.Thepoliticalsystemthatwedeserve

shouldoriginatefromourownefforts,independentlyofwhateversolidaritythatcomesfrom

theoutside”.346(S/E)

344QuotebasedonGranma´sofficialversion,uploaded17.12.14at13:12:32.345”OpositorescubanosreunidosenPuertoRicoapoyanplebiscitoafavordeeleccioneslibres”,14ymedio,16.08.15. 346ReinaldoEscobar(2015),”QueCubanodebasudemocraciaaEstadosUnidos”,14ymedio,12.08.15.

276

Thesamemessagewasrepeatedbytheeditor-in-chiefofthesamedailyontheday

whenPresidentObama´shistoricvisittoCubawasannounced:“[…]theUSPresident

cannotchangeCuba,andhe´dbetternotintendto,becausethisnationalinjustice

(“entuerto”)isourresponsibility”.347(S/E)

Thepatternwasquiteclear.ThetwoPresidentsandtheirrespectivegovernment

apparatusengagedinaseriousdialogueprocesswiththeaimofliftingthe

embargo/blockade,fullyacceptingtheirpoliticaldifferencesincludingwhetherornota

differentpoliticalregimeinHavanawouldbedesirable.

• OntheUSside,thispositionhadthesupportofapopularmajority,evenamong

Cuban-Americans,andbytheDemocraticcandidatelargelyseenasthefavourite

forthe2016Presidentialelections,HillaryClinton.ThemajorityinCongress,

mostlyRepublicanbutincludingsomeDemocrats,andallRepublican

presidentialcandidatesinitiallywiththeinterestingexceptionofDonaldTrump,

promisedtodoeverythingtoboycottandchangethispolicy.

• OntheCubanside,allindicationswerethattheimmensepopularmajoritywasin

favourofthenormalizationprocess.348Twoverydifferentgroupsseemedto

coincideinworkingagainstthedialogue,withverydifferentmeansand

objectives.Agroupofirreconcilabledissidents(peoplelikeFariñas,Solerand

Rodiles)statedtheiroppositiontothenewObamadialoguepolicy,claimingthat

onlyanegotiationaboutregimechangewouldbemeaningful.Theytherefore

sidedwiththemajorityintheUSCongress.Theydidhowevertakeadvantageof

thedialoguetotestoutnewlimitsforcivilsocietyprotestinCuba,butbyso

doingtheyalsoprovokedreactionsfromforceswithintheregimethat—like

themselves—werenegativetothedialogue.

347YoaniSánchez(2016):”Unavisitamássimbólicaquepolítica”,14ymedio,18.02.16.348InapollofresidentsontheislandconductedbyBendixenandAmandiInternationalforUnivisionNoticiasandFusionincollaborationwithTheWashingtonPostinMarch2015,oneofthequestionswas:"DoyouthinkthatthenormalizationoftherelationshipbetweenCubaandtheUnitedStatesisgoodforCuba,badforCuba,ordoyouthinkthatitisnotofimportanceforCuba?”Anoverwhelming97%respondedthatitisgoodforCuba.(WashingtonPost,8.04.15:https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/cuba-poll-2015/).

277

Thelattergroupwasofcoursemuchmoredifficulttoidentifyexplicitly.Nobodywithin

thePartyorgovernmentinstitutionswouldprotestopenlyagainsttheirownPresident.

ButtherewereclearindicationsofaninternaloppositiontoRaúlCastro´sofficialpolicy:

thereferencetounfortunateUSstatementsabout“samestrategybutnewtactics”as

proofthatthegoalofdestroyingtherevolutionremainedintact;thewaveofdissident

detentionscontinuingwiththesamejustificationofgoingagainstthosewhoserve

‘enemyinterests’;plus,theapparentlyincreasingoppositiontoeconomicreforms.

Twoprincipalforcesseemedtobeatplay.Onewasideological,comingfromparty

hardlinersmostlyoftheoldgeneration,perhapscoincidingwithforceswithintheparty

thatalsoworkedagainstthegeneraleconomicreformprocess.Manyofthesewere

amongthesocio-economiclosersofthereforms(ref.Indicator4.1).Theyseemedtobe

partofawarningcampaignatworkplacesandinneighbourhoods,apparentlywiththe

IdeologicalDepartmentofthePartyasthemainsource.

Thesecondsourceofoppositionagainstthenormalizationprocesswouldcomefromthe

securityandintelligenceapparatus,organisedundertheMinistryoftheInterior.349They

mayhavebeenmotivatedbythefearoflosingrelevanceandlegitimacy,asthenarrative

ofUSimperialismasthehistoricenemywaslosingground.Areferencetohowtheend

oftheColdWarimpactedontheinternalcorrelationofforcesintheUSSRmaybe

indicativeforwhatwashappeninginCubaduringthisperiod(priortoPresident

Obama´svisit):whileColdWartensionsworkedinvariablytotheadvantageof

hardlinerswithintheUSSRandinEasternEuropeingeneral,theendofthisglobal

conflictandthedisappearanceofhistoricalenmitywiththeWestledtoaweakeningof

theMinistryofDefenceandtheKGB,andfurthermoretoarapiddeclineintheanti-

reforminfluenceofconservativecommunists.350

349QuiteindicativeoftheseattitudesmaybesomerarepubliccommentsbyAlejandroCastroEspín,thesonofRaúlCastro.CastroEspín,theseniormemberoftheCommissionondefenceandnationalsecurity(ConsejodedefensaySeguridadNacional)waspartofthetop-secretCubanteamnegotiatingthestartofthenormalizationprocesswiththeU.S.Heseemedtohavemaintainedthesameandstronganti-imperialistrhetoricandrejectionof‘bourgeoisdemocracy’evenafterhisfatherinitiatedthenormalizationprocess(see16January2015interviewinAcropolis,Athens,publishedinProjectCensored,27February2015:http://projectcensored.org/interview-with-alejandro-castro-espin/).Yet,CastroEspínwasapparentlypresentatbothpersonalencountersbetweenthetwopresidentslaterin2015(AprilinPanamaandSeptemberinNewYork).350ThisargumentiswelldevelopedinBrown(2009:Chapter5).

278

Whatthesetwosourcesofopposition(ideologicalandsecurity-based)hadincommon

wasthefearoftheirownsituationincaseofregimechange.The14ymedioco-editor,

whosupportedtherapprochement,mayhavebeenrightwiththefollowingpessimistic

statementonthefirstanniversaryof17D:

“InCubathereisarepressiveapparatuscomposedoftensofthousandsofindividualsin

chargeofrejectingthatthoseinoppositionexpressthemselvesormeet.Ifthecountryturns

democratic,theywouldnotonlylosetheirjobandtheirprivileges,buttheyalsofear

becomingvictimsofrevenge”.351

TheobviousclimaxofUS-CubanrapprochementwasPresidentObama’sMarch2016

visittoHavana.

CommunistPartyorganGranmabroughtaneditorialpriortoObamavisitwhichmay

havebeenillustrativeoftheschizophrenicattitudetohisvisit:itwaswelcomingObama,

butclearlydemandingthatWashingtonceasemeddlinginitsinternalaffairs.

"Theinterventionistprogramsaimedatprovokingdestabilizationandpolitical,economic,

andsocialchangesinourcountryshouldbeeliminated.Thepolicyof‘regimechange’should

bedefinitelyburied.Also,thepretenceoffabricatinganinternalpoliticalopposition,paidfor

withmoneyfromUStaxpayers,shouldbeabandoned"352(S/E).

OnthemagicfirstdayofPresidentObama´shistoricvisittoCuba,onPalmSunday20

March2016,withlivecoverageonallmajorUSandinternationaltelevisionnetworks

butremarkablynocoverageonCubanstatetelevision(whichinthefirstplaceproduced

theimagestelevisedinternationally),bothFidelandRaúlCastroverysymbolicallychose

toreceiveVenezuela´shard-pressedPresidentMaduro.PresidentCastrowasnot

personallypresenttoreceiveObamaattheairport—bysomeobserverserroneously

seenasasnub:FollowingCubanprotocol,evenChina´sPresidentXiwasnotreceivedat

theairportbyhisCubancolleaguewhenhearrivedonanofficialvisittoCubatwoyears

earlier.Ontheotherside,Castrowentoutoftheprotocoltoseehimofftwodayslater.

HavanaresidentsweremostlykeptawayfromthestreetswhenPresidentObama

walkedthroughOldHavana—perhapspartlyforsecurityreasonsbutprobablyalso

351ReinaldoEscobar:”17D:Cómoseesfumaeloptimismo”,14ymedio,17.12.15. 352Granma,8.03.16.

279

becauseofconcernthathewouldbetooenthusiasticallyapplauded.Earlierthesame

Sunday,anumberoftheDamasdeBlancowereroutinelybulliedbypro-government

mobsanddetainedbythepolice,afterreportedlyhavingbeenwarnedbysecurity

officerstocanceltheirSundaymarchonthatday.Itisdifficulttoreadtheseeventsas

anythingbutaquiteclumsyattemptbytheoldideologuesandthesecurityapparatusto

downplaytheimportanceoftheObamavisit,keepordinaryCubansfromwatchingit,

andmutetheenthusiasmaroundthevisit.ThemessagewouldbethataUSPresident

hasnopowertochangethingsinCuba.PerhapsevenPresidentCastrodidnothavefull

controlofthescriptofeventsduringthesehistoricaldaysinHavana.Aninternalpower

strugglequiteobviouslywentonbehindthescenes.Oneofthecharacteristicsofthe

transitionstageLinz&Stepan(op.cit)calledmaturepost-totalitarianism,isthat

oppositionoftensucceedtocreate‘asecondculture’or‘aparallelsociety’.Whatseemed

tobeconfirmedinHavanathisweek,withObamabeingfollowedbyTheRollingStonein

concertandamonthlaterbyChanel´sfashionshowonPaseodelPrado,wasthattheold

guardPCCsimplywasabouttoloseitsculturalandsocialhegemonyinCuba.

TheObamavisit,however,becamearemarkablegeopoliticalsuccess—forboth

presidents.Obamawasallowedtomeetwithallinternaldissidents—manyofthem

experiencingrepeateddetentionbothbeforeandafterwards—inaclosedmeetingatthe

USEmbassy.Severalofthemhadpreviouslyarguedstronglyagainsttherapprochement

andforinstanceturneddowntheinvitationforameetingwithStateSecretaryKerry

halfayearearlier.NowtheoppositiontoObama´sdialoguelineseemedtohavemuted.

Healsometwithagroupofentrepreneurs,and,ofcourse,hemadeahistoricspeechin

theelegantandnewlyrenovatedGranTeatro,transmittedliveonCubantelevision,with

RaúlCastroandmostotherleadersintheaudience.Thesharedpressconference

betweenthetwopresidents,aftertheirpoliticalconsultation,wasaveryrare

opportunityforjournaliststoaskquestionstoCastro,asituationwithwhichhe

obviouslyfeltveryuncomfortable.ButallthishappenedwithCastro´sacceptance.

AgeneralworrysoonemergedinHavanapartycirclesaboutthevisitandtheway

Obamawascharmingthecountry.Itseemsthattherewasacollectivefeelingamong

Partycadresofhavingbeentrappedandoutsmartedbytheenemy.ThewayFirstVice

PresidentDíaz-CanelexplainedthisinaleakedbriefingwithPartyleadersinFebruary

2017isquitetellingofhowtheyfeltmanipulated:

280

“They(theNorthAmericans)arepickinganaspectofacountry´shistory,theymodifyitand

puttogetherthepiecesinwayswherethegreatwinnerandheroistheNorthAmerican.

Theyusecommunicationasashow,allissetupintentionallyasaHollywoodproduction,in

ordertodrawattentiontoleadersthatareattractiveandcharming,withawideuseof

symbols.PresidentObama´svisitwasatypicalcaseofthis.Wesawitfromthemomenthe

arrivedattheairport,holdingtheumbrellaforhiswifeandhisdaughters,thewayhe

presentedhimselftothepublic,thethingshedid,thecontentsofhisspeechintheGrand

TheatreinHavana,thewayhebehavedintheTeatroLatinoamericano(sic),allthisispartof

theset-up”.353

Inlatersections,wewillelaborateonhowthehardlinersinthePartytooktheoffensive

atthe7thPartyCongressonlyfourweeksaftertheObamavisit,e.g.byapparently

obligingthetwomainresponsibleforthevisit(CastroandforeignministerRodríguez)

tomakestronglyanti-Obamaspeeches.Here,wewillseehowthecontradictionsabout

thereadingofthenewUS-CubapolicywentonduringthelastmonthsofObama´s

presidency.

Oneofthedocumentsofprinciplepresentedtothe7thPartyCongressmaintainsthe

traditionalcharacteristicofhow“theUSanditsalliesstruggletoconservetheir

positionsofimperialistdomination”,andfollowsupwiththefollowingresponsetonew

US-Cubanrelations:

“Infullexerciseofindependenceandself-determination,indefenceofsovereigntyand

nationalinterests,wewillrespondtothechallengesandopportunitiesarisingfromprogress

inrelationswithUnitedStatesofAmerica,inparticulartoanychangesthatmayoccurinthe

applicationoftheeconomic,commercialandfinancialblockade”354(S/E).

ForeignministerandPolitburomemberBrunoRodríguez,photographedwiththesame

broadsmileasPresidentObamawhenhereceivedhiminHavanaonemonthearlier,

nowsaidatthePartyCongress:"Inthisvisit,therewasadeepattackonourideas,our

history,ourcultureandoursymbols"355(S/E).

353http://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/diaz-canel-vuelve-el-ala-dura-del-regimen-cubano-n4129974.WhenDíaz-Canelsaid”TeatroLatinoanericano”,heobviouslymeant”EstadioLatinoamericano”,wherethetwopresidentweresittingtogethertowatchahistoricUS-Cubanbaseballmatch.354Conceptualizacióndelmodeloeconómicoysocialcubanodedesarrollo.socialista,points324and328,respectivelyoftheoriginaltextpresentedtothePartyCongress,reproducedinfullinaGranmaSupplementandsoldonthestreetfor1USD.Theseparagraphsweretakenoutofthefinalversionsapproved15monthslater(publishedinJuly2017,ref.Indicator8.1).355Granma,18.04.16.

281

Ontheotherhand,hissubordinate,thechiefresponsiblefornegotiationswiththeUS

(andnewlyelectedmemberoftheCentralCommittee),JosefinaVidal,saidata

ConferenceinNewYorkattheendofMay:“theObamavisittoCubawasanimportant

impulsetoadvancethenormalizationprocess”.356

Inspiteoftheseattacks,PresidentObamacontinuedhisrapprochementpolicytowards

Cubaasheapproachedtheendofhisadministration,fallof2016,withinthebrutal

contextoftheClinton-Trumppresidentialcampaign.Threeweeksbeforethe

presidentialelectionsheissuedapresidentialdecreeassuminglywiththeintentionof

makinghisCubapolicyirreversible.357MsVidal,thechiefnegotiator,recognisedthe

decreeasa“significantstepintheprocesstowardstheliftingoftheblockade”:“Forthe

firsttimeinanofficialdocumentoftheUSgovernment,appearstherecognitionof

Cuba´sindependence,sovereigntyandself-determination[…][Thereisalsoa

recognition],alsoforthefirsttimeoftheCubangovernment´slegitimacy”.Furtherdown

shenotes:“ItismadeclearthattheUSAdoesnotpretendtoimposeanewmodelonour

country,andthatitisuptotheCubanpeopletotakeitsowndecisions”.358(S/E)

Theofficialmedia,however,traditionallycontrolledbytheIdeologicalDepartmentof

thePCC,respondedwithstrongercondemnationthaneverofUSimperialismand

interference(injerencia)inCuba’sinternalaffairs.359Inpreparationforthenextannual

UNGeneralAssemblyvotetorejecttheUSCubaembargo(wheretheUSforthefirst

356Accordingtoownnotes(theauthorwaspresent).357”ObamamovestomakeCubapolicies‘irreversible’”,inMiamiHerald,14.10.16http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article108195527.html358JosefinaVidalinaddresstoastudentmobilizationagainsttheblockadeattheUniversityofHavanaon17October2016,reproducedinextensoinGranma20.10.16underthetitle:“PresidentObamaisleaving,buttheblockaderemains”.Vidal´sspeechandalongroundofQ&Awiththestudents,wasprintedinaspecial12-pageannextoGranmaonthisdate,wherealsoatranslationtoSpanishofPresidentObama’sdecreewasreproducedinfull,withthefollowingexplanationattheend:“Granmaisprintinginboldthosesectionswhichitconsidersas‘injerencistas’(meddlinginCuba´sinternalaffairs)orremnantsofthepastpoliciesbetweenCubaandtheUnitedStates.”Duringthesameweek,CubanofficialmediaranastrongcampaignagainsttheUSblockade,seenforinstanceinGranma’s22Octoberprintededitionrunningthefull-spacecovertitle:“Condemnationofahomicideandobsoletepolicy”.359Themostconcreteobjectofprotestwastheso-calledpro-democracyprogrammes(supporttoNGOsincludingRadio/TVMartí)whichcontinuedunderObama,probablyasapoliticallynecessarytrade-offwithhisopponentsinCongressthathesharedthegoalofdemocracyinCuba.Accordingtooff-the-recordremarksbyCubahandlersinStateDepartment,seenbytheauthor,theywouldbedelightedifCongresswouldendthefundingorrepealtheprogrammesthemselvesbyrepealingHelms-BurtonoritsSection109,whichauthorizesthem.

282

timewenttotheextremeofabstainingfromaresolutioncondemningitsownpolicy),a

popularmobilisationeffortwaslaunchedagainsttheUS,tryingtoreviveoldanti-

imperialistsentiments.AbattleforordinaryCubans’heartsandmindsintheeventofa

possiblecompleteliftingoftheembargoafterUSelections(atthattimegenerally

expectedtobewonbyanti-embargocandidateHillaryClinton)seemedtobegoingon.

However,twoweekslater,DonaldJ.TrumpwaselectedasthenewUSPresident.Mr

TrumphaschangedpositionontheUSCubaembargotimeandagain.Inthe1990s,

whenhisrealestatebusinesswasindeeptrouble,hemusthavebeeninaquite

desperatemoodwhenhehadthecrazyideaofsettingupaCasinobusinessinHavana.

Later,hecourtedtheanti-CastroCubansinMiamiforsupport.Atthebeginningofthe

Republicannominationprocesshewastheonlypre-candidatewhoexpressedfew

problemswithPresidentObama’snormalisationprocess.Butattheheatofthe

presidentialraceheonceagainwantedtodistancehimselffromHillaryClinton´s

approvaloftheObamaline,hopingtogettheCuban-Americansupportbysayinghe

wouldreversetherapprochementtowardsCuba.

Sincethenormalisationprocessbegan,USbusinessestookseveralstepstowardsthe

Cubanmarket,withinthelimitedspaceofferedastheembargowasstillinplace,made

possiblebyPresidentObama´sexecutiveordersandregulatorychanges:AMiami-based

cruiselinebegansailingtoCubanports;UStelecomcompaniesestablishedroaming

agreementswithCuba;commercialairlinesstartedflyingfromUScitiestoCuba;

Marriott—throughitsacquisitionofStarwood—enteredintoajointventuretomanage

someCubanhotels;andCubabecameAirbnb’sfastestgrowingmarket.A

pharmaceuticaljointventureforclinicaltrialsintheUnitedStateswasprepared;other

UScompanieswerepreparingdealswithCuba;andtraveltotheislandbyAmericans

citizensexpandedrapidly.

OntheeveofPresidentTrump’sinauguration,CubaandtheUnitedStatessignedan

agreementtocooperateinthefightagainstterrorism,drugtrafficking,money

launderingandotherinternationalcriminalactivities.MrObamaalsomadeanother

concessiontoCubabyendingthelongstanding‘wetfoot,dryfoot’policythathad

allowedautomaticpermissionforCubanstoarriveintheUnitedStateswithoutavisa.

283

Thislast-minutemeasurewastakenagainstthebackdropofMrTrump’sgeneralanti-

immigrationattitudes,thushandinghimanearlydilemmavis-à-visthestaunchestanti-

CastroCuban-AmericanswhowouldhavelikedthefreeentryofCubanmigrantstohave

beenmaintained.

ThewarmingofrelationswiththeUSobviouslymadeitdifficultfortheCuban

leadershiptomaintaintheUSimperialismenemyimageinfrontofitspopulation,at

leastuntilPresidentTrumphandedthemanotheropportunitytokeepitalive.In

January2017,atthebiggestentertainmenttheatreinHavana,TeatroKarlMarx,thefour

favouriteCubanhumouristspresentedtheshowÉstaesotrahistoria.Byfarthebiggest

applauseandtheloudestlaughterwasreleasedbythefollowingcommentfromEl

Médico,aclumsyfigurerepresentingthePartyandtheSystemamongthefourfigures:

“Whatadifficultywefindourselvesinnow,thatourmainenemyisdisappearing.Ithink

theonlysolutionisthatwefindanotherenemyonwhomtoblameourproblems!”360

(S/E)

PresidentTrumpwaitedhalfayearaftertakingoffice,beforeheannouncedanewCuba

policy,reflectingthefactthatCubawasfardownonhisforeignpolicyagenda:infactit

wasprobablymuchmorerelevanttohiselectoral-tacticalconsiderations.Whenhe

finallydeliveredhisfirstCubaspeech,loadedwithheavyanti-Castroconfrontation

rhetoric,itwasinMiamitoanenthusiasticaudienceofCuban-Americans,inashowof

gratitudetowhatheapparently—buterroneously—believedwastheirdecisiverolein

winningFloridaaspartofhiselectiontriumph.361

360Recollectionfrommemory(noavailablemanuscript),TeatroKarlMarx,Havana,Sunday22.01.16(secondperformanceat9pm).DuringthreeweeksinJanuary/February,therewereatotalof18performances,allsoldout,withatotalnumberofspectatorsabove50,000.361“TrumpoutlinesnewCubapolicyinspeechinMiami'sLittleHavana”,USAToday,16.06.17:https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/16/donald-trump-cuba-miami/102917748/TrumpclaimedinthisspeechthattheCuban-Americancommunity”supportedusbytremendousmargins”inthepresidentialelections.Thisissimplywrong:Post-electionanalysesshowedthatClintonactuallywontheCuban-dominatedMiami-DadedistrictoverTrumpby290,000votes(63.7vs.34.1%),withwidemarginsinthemostheavilyCuban-Americanneighbourhoods.Accordingtoa2016CubapollbyFloridaInternationalUniversity,withasampleof743Cuban-AmericanvotersinMiami-Dade,nearly70percentsaidtheysupporttheUSdecisiontoopendiplomaticrelationswithCubaand63percentopposetheUSembargooftheislandnation.(”WasvotebyMiami’sCubancommunityareferendumonObama’spolicy?”,MiamiHerald16.12.16:http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/article121426379.html#storylink=cpy).Alsoseehttps://www.npr.org/2016/11/08/501084734/florida-2016-presidential-and-state-election-results

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WhenanalysingTrump´sCubaspeechinMiami,362onecrucialquestionisthis:didhe

returntothepre-ObamapolicyofpromotingregimechangeinCuba?Thewordinginthe

speechoffersnoclearresponsetothat.Phraseslike“withGod’shelp,afreeCubaiswhat

wewillsoonachieve”,and”AmericawillexposethecrimesoftheCastroregimeand

standwiththeCubanpeopleintheirstruggleforfreedom”maypointinthatdirection,

andlikewisehissalutetotheBayofPigsVeterans.Butthefollowingphrasedoesnot

promiseanydirectregime-changingintervention:”Weallacceptthatallnationshave

therighttocharttheirownpaths—andI’mcertainlyaverybigbelieverinthat—sowe

willrespectCubansovereignty”.Trump´sgeneralpreferenceformoreinternational

isolationismmayinthiscasebeacomforttoCuba.

Theconclusion–atleastsofar-seemstobethatPresidentTrumpisfullofanti-Castro

rhetoric,butstopsshortofdesigninganotherregimechangestrategy.

ThemoreconcretepolicyrevisionswereannouncedinNovember2017.363Most

relevantamongthemwerethefollowingmeasures:

• Aprohibitiononengaginginany"directfinancialtransactions"with

businessescontrolledbytheCubanmilitaryorsecurityforcesifthey

"disproportionatelybenefit"thoseforces.Thisisapotentiallysignificant

prohibitionhitting20%oftheCubaneconomy,particularlydominantinthe

touristsectorbutalsoinbankingandportmanagement.Alistofprohibited

enterprisesincludes180entities,including84hotels.Thenewregulations

exemptexistingcontractsfromtheprohibitionondoingbusinesswith

military-linkedenterprises.

• Aftertwoyearsofrestoreddiplomaticties,newUSregulationsonCubaare

bringingbackanumberoftravel,financialandtraderestrictions.Thegoalof

theserestrictions,accordingtoPresidentTrump,istostarvetheCuban

governmentofmoneyfromtravel,remittancesandcommercialties.Butthe

immediatevictimsofthenewsanctionswillbeCubanfamilieswhodependon

remittancestosurvive,thestrugglingCubanprivatesector,aswellasUS 362https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba/363https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf

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residentswhoserighttotraveliscurtailed—therebyalsoaffectingprivate

servicesofferedtotourists.Indirectcontradictionoftheinterestofprivate

entrepreneurswasthenewrulethatindividualprivatetripswere

particularlyrestricted.Asaconsequence,privaterestaurantsandlodging

establishmentslostdisproportionatelymorebusinessin2017.364

• ThenewregulationsalsobanremittancesfromUSnationalsto"prohibited

officialsoftheGovernmentofCuba",includingallemployeesoftheMinistry

oftheRevolutionaryArmedForcesandMinistryoftheInterior,thousandsof

CubansworkingvoluntarilyforlocalCommitteesfortheDefenceofthe

Revolution,aswellasseniorgovernmentandpartyofficials.Thenew

definitionmaypotentiallyencompasshundredsofthousandsofpeople,since

thearmedforcesmanageasignificantnumberofcommercialenterprises,

againespeciallyinthefast-growingtourismsector.

WhilePresidentTrumpchosenottofollowthepressurefromthemostconfrontational

Cuban-Americanlobbytobreakoffdiplomaticrelations,amysteriousclaimofinjuries

broughtuponUSdiplomatsinHavana,allegedlycausedbyacousticsignalsaffecting

theirtelephonecommunications,365ledtoa60%reductionofdiplomaticstaffinHavana

andalsotheexpulsionof15CubandiplomatsinWashington.Thiscameasaserious

additionalblowtobilateralrelations,leadingtointensifiedrhetoricexchanges.

PresidentTrumpsaidinhisspeechattheUnitedNations(September2017)that

sanctionswouldnotbelifteduntiltheCaribbeanislandrestoresdemocracyand

capitalism.Cuba’sFirstVicePresidentDíaz-Canelresponded:“Cubawillnotmake

concessionstoitssovereigntyandindependence,nornegotiateitsprinciplesoraccept

theimpositionofconditions[…]ThechangesneededinCubawillsolelybecarriedout

bytheCubanpeople”(S/E).366

Whilethismayhavesoundedasveryconfrontationalanti-imperialistCubanlanguage,it

isactuallythesameprincipleastheonerepeatedlyexpressedbytheObama

administration:itisuptotheCubanpeopletochooseitspoliticalsystem.Perhaps

364”Trumpcontralosemprendedorescubanos”,ElNuevoHerald,19.01.18.365”MysteryofsonicweaponattacksatUSembassyinCubadeepens”,TheGuardian,14.09.17:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/14/mystery-of-sonic-weapon-attacks-at-us-embassy-in-cuba-deepens 366Reuters,Havana(MarcFrank),8.10.17.

286

somebodyinHavanarealisedwhichhistoricopportunitytheyhadlostbyturning

againstPresidentObamaafterhisHavanavisit.

ThehypothesisthatstepstowardsnormalisationofrelationstotheUSwouldleadtoa

relaxationoftheguardandthebunkermentality367inCuba,removingthejustificationof

missingcivilliberties,hassofarbeenprovenwrong.FidelCastroseemedtoundermine

therapprochementfromtheverybeginning,followedupbyincreasedratherthan

decreasedhardlinerattacksonUSimperialism,claimingthatex-PresidentObamawas

practicingthesamestrategyonlywithnewandeveninsidioustactics.ThisCuban

rhetoricandthenarrowingofthespaceforcivilsociety(ref.Challenge6),reachinga

climaxrightbeforethe2016USelectionsthatweregenerallyexpectedtobewonbythe

stronglyanti-embargoHillaryClinton,canhardlybeinterpretedasanythingbuta

tremendoussnubtoMrObama´sextendedolivebranchandabadlyveiledconcernfor

thelossofanti-democracyjustifications,cleverlypickedupbyPresidentTrump.368

WithPresidentTrump’snewdiplomacyvis-à-visNorthKorea,onemayofcourseask

whetheranewCubadiplomacymightalsoappearonhisagenda.Itisdifficulttosee

whatthatwouldentail,shortofdemandingthattheCubanside‘criesuncle’andgivesup

allhistoricprinciplesofnationalsovereignty.Cubahasnonuclearbombstoputonthe

negotiationtable–theywereremovedbackin1961.Whatisprettyclearisthatany

diplomaticmovemadebyPresidentObamaareconsideredas“baddeals”byPresident

Trump.So,anewCuba–USnegotiationwouldhavetostartfromacompletelydifferent

angleaslongasMr.TrumpistheresidentoftheWhiteHouse,andaslongasheuses

MiamiCubanslikeSenatorMarcoRubioashisdiplomaticstand-insinthehandlingof

Cuba.

Indicator5.3:StrengthenedtiestoLatinAmerica–isolationofUSembargopolicy?

LatinAmericatookalmostaU-turntotheleftduringthefirstdecadeofthe21stcentury,

providingCubawithmuchfriendlierregionalrelations,rangingfromdirectpartnership

367DefinedbyMerriamWebsterasfollows:”astateofmindespeciallyamongmembersofagroupthatischaracterizedbychauvinisticdefensivenessandself-righteousintoleranceofcriticism”.368ThisargumenthasbeenfurtherelaboratedinBye2016.

287

throughtheALBAalliance(Venezuela,Ecuador,Bolivia,Nicaraguaandsomesmaller

Caribbeannations),significantpoliticalandeconomictiestocountrieslikeBraziland

Argentina,andalsoimprovedrelationswiththerestofthecontinent.Theothersideof

thesamecoinwasthatUSinfluenceinLatinAmericafellsignificantly,leadingtothe

unanimousOASvotein2009torepealthenearlyhalf-centurybanonCuban

membershipintheregionalorganisation.369TheUSwastheonlycountryinthewestern

hemispherewithoutdiplomaticrelationswithCuba;andseveralnewregional

organisationsexcludingtheUSbutincludingCubaemerged,withCELAC(the

CommunityofLatinAmericanandCaribbeanStates),establishedin2010asapotential

substitutefortheOAS:sotosayan‘OASwithouttheUS’.

ThepoliticaleconomyofLatinAmericaintheearlydaysofRaúl’sreformeraoffereda

veryinterestingcontextfortheeconomicreformsinCuba:marketeconomywith

increasingstateinterventionandtheapplicationofKeynesianregulatoryandanti-

cyclicalpolicies,andalsovibrantcivilsocieties.Politically,LatinAmericawasbasically

ruledbydemocraticandpopularlyelectedgovernments.Growthratesweregenerally

oncompetitiveinternationallevels,withaquitepositivere-distributioneffectoverthe

firstdecadeandahalfofthe21stcentury.ThiswasaregionalcontextwithinwhichCuba

might—mucheasierthaneversincetherevolution—findanechoforeconomicandeven

politicaltransformations,withoutgivinguponitsbasicrevolutionaryvisions.

AllthesecharacteristicsoughttobeattractivetothenewgenerationofCubanleaders

lookingforafutureCubanmodelofdevelopment.Theycouldseethattheirpolitical

friendsbeingrepeatedlyre-electedandperhapsobservedthattheirlegitimacywas

moresustainablethantheonetheythemselvesmightimaginetoenjoyinapost-Castro

Cuba.WewerethereforeobservingthatCubawasincreasinglyapproachingaLatin

Americannormalcy,withprospectsforsomedegreeofdemocraticopeningwiththe

maintenanceofsignificantauthoritarianaspects(seeBye2014i).

Atthesametime,however,thenewLatinAmericanleftexposedevidentsignsof

authoritarianismanddemocraticdeficienciese.g.intermsofanon-independent

judiciary,restrictionsonpressfreedomandthespaceforcivilsocietyincludingonquite

369ButCubaconsistentlyrefusedthisinvitationtorejointheOAS.

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friendlyinternationalNGOsinseveraloftheLatinAmericandemocracies(bothALBA

countriesandothers).370ItwasquiteillustrativethattheInter-AmericanCommissionon

HumanRightsandeventheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights,institutionsthathad

beenfundamentalinthedefenceofmovementsbringingtheleftistgovernmentsto

power,wereincreasinglyquestionedbymanyofthesamegovernmentsasthe

Commissionstartedtobringissuesagainstthem(evenincludingBrazilduringthe

PresidencyofDilmaRoussef).371Whatthismeantinpracticewasthatthedemocratic-

authoritariandichotomysimplybecamemoreblurred.Cuba—whenlookingforitsown

developmentpath—couldfindmanyrolemodelsbothonitsowncontinentand

elsewherewithformaldemocraticsystems,butwithincreasingrestrictionsinciviland

politicalrights.

WhenCubashowednointerestinreturningtotheOAS,fromwhichitwasso

dramaticallysuspendedin1962,itwaspartlyduetoprideandpartlybecausetheOAS

wasperceivedtobelessandlessrelevantcomparedtothemanynewandparallel

regionalorganisationsthatwereemerging.ThemostimportantforCubawasCELAC,

withoutproperresourcesbutwithasymbolicsignificance.Attheendof2012,the

conservativeChileanpresidentSebastiánPiñerahandedoverthe2013one-yearCELAC

PresidencytonootherthanCuba´sRaúlCastro,inatellingshowofpoliticalsupport

fromaLatinAmericawheretheUSwasclearlylosingitsdominance.

Inhindsight,itmayverywellbethattheCubanleadershipmayregretnottohavetaken

somedifferentstrategicdecisionsduringtheheightofitsdiplomaticsuccessvis-à-vis

boththeUSandLatinAmerica,forinstancebylettingpragmatismoverruleideologyand

re-jointheOAS,approachingtheIDBandtheinternationalfinancialinstitutions,and

accepttheinternationalmarketeconomywithfareasieraccesstoforeigninvestments

asaframeworkfortherehabilitationofitsowneconomy.Bycomparingwithhowsuch

keydecisionscontributedtoVietnam´seconomicsuccessstory(ref.3.9.5),ahistoric

opportunitymightappeartohavebeenlosthere.

370AveryseriousexampleofthisistheDecember2013decisioninBoliviatoexpeltheDanishNGOIBIS,whichhasbeenworkinginsupportofsocialmovementsveryclosetoPresidentMoralessincelongbeforehebecamePresident,apparentlybecausesomeoftheirnationalpartnershavebecamemorecriticaltohim.371TheInter-AmericanCourtorderedthehaltofagiganticdamconstructioninBrazilduetoitsexpectednegativeeffectsontheenvironmentandtheindigenouspopulation.

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ThedifferencewithVietnamisofcoursealsoexplainedbyfundamentalgeostrategic

differences.BothcountriesreceivedUSPresidentObamaonofficialvisitin2016(in

Vietnam23-25May).Thesettingwasmuchofthesame:acarefulUSPresidenttryingto

balancecorrectbilateraltalkswithmeetingswithcivilsocietyandopposition.

Apparently,thereweremorerestrictionsinthisregardinVietnamthaninCuba,witha

numberofindividualsfromtheoppositionbeingpreventedfromattendingameeting

withthePresident.But,asObamawasstillpreventedfromliftingthetradeembargo

againstCuba,inVietnamhecouldgomuchfurtherandliftthearmsembargo.The

contrastbecameevenstarkerwhenPresidentTrumpvisitedVietnaminNovember

2017withthewords"today,wearenolongerenemies,wearefriends",372whileCubais

definitelybackinhisenemycamp.InMarch2018,forthefirsttimesincetheendofthe

VietnamWar,aUSNavyaircraftcarrier(USSCarlVinson)paidahistoricalvisittothe

country,withtheobviouspurposeofcounteringChina’sallegedaggressionintheSouth

ChinaSea.373WhatthisillustratesisthefundamentaldifferencebetweenCuba´sand

Vietnam’sgeostrategicpositionvis-à-vistheUS:Vietnammayplayonitsneighbourhood

conflictwithandhegemonicinferioritytoChinainordertogainaroomofmanoeuvre

towardstheUS—whichiscompletelyunavailabletoCuba.

ThecrisesinVenezuelaandBrazilandpoliticalshiftstotherightincountrieslike

Argentina,PeruandChilemeantthatCubafromaround2016nolongerenjoyedthe

samecosyrelationstotheregion.ThelossofeconomicsupportfromVenezuelaand

generousinvestmentsfromBrazilbegantodealseriousblowstoCuba´seconomy.

TheVenezuela-Cubabartertradeexchangeofoilforprofessionalserviceshasbeena

lifelinefortheCubaneconomysincetheearlyyearsofChávezpresidency.Venezuela´s

crisisisevidentlydealingamajorblowtoCuba´seconomy(ref.Indicators3.3and3.7).

DuringthegovernmentsofLulaandRoussef,Brazilwasinthepositiontobecome

Cuba´smainsourceofFDI,basicallyfinancingtheconstructionoftheMarielharbour

andexportzonewithinvestmentsofaround850millionUSD.Since2016,thissource

372CNN,10.11.17.373https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/03/asia/vietnam-us-uss-vinson-intl/index.html

290

hasdriedup,furthercomplicatedbytheOdebrechtcorruptionscandalthataffected

CubalikesomanyotherLatinAmericangovernments.374

ItremainstobefullyseenhowCubawillreacttothenewregionalsituationwiththeleft

losinghegemonyinLatinAmerica,theincreasingauthoritarianismontheleftwith

effortstoextendexecutivemandatesbeyondwhatusedtoberegulatedbythe

Constitutions(ref.countrieslikeBoliviaandNicaragua—butdifferentfromEcuador),

thelossofvitaleconomicpartnershipsandthenewgeopoliticalsituationmorein

general.

AnotherfactortobearinmindisPresidentTrump’sconflictwithMexicoandLatinos,

andhisthreatsagainstVenezuelaincludingamilitaryoption.Thismayonceagainbe

leadingtoalossofUSlegitimacyinLatinAmerica,withpossiblenewelementstobearin

mindforCuba´sexternalrelations.Whenex-StateSecretaryTillersonmadehisfive-

countrytriptoLatinAmericainFebruary2018,hewasmetwithscepticismand

negativepopularopinionssimilartowhattheBushadministrationexperiencedten

yearsearlier,evenbeforeTrumpfurtherstrengthenedthehawkishdominanceofhis

administration.TheApril2018SummitoftheAmericas,wheretherehadbeenacertain

expectationthatCastromightshakehandswithTrumplessthanaweekbeforeleaving

thepresidency,endedwithnoneofthemattendingandclearsignsofanotherleft-right

confrontationinLatinAmericawithCubaagainraisingitsanti-imperialistrhetoric.

Duringthe2018Summit,andclearlyconfirmedbytheLatinAmericanreactionstothe

hand-overofthePresidencyfromCastrotoDíaz-Canel,Cubawaslosingmuchofthe

politicalanddiplomaticcapitalithadbeenconstructinginLatinAmericaovertherecent

years.OnlyaminorityoftheLatinAmericanpresidentsextendedcongratulationtothe

newCubanpresident.ThedeclarationoftheOASSecretaryGeneralAlmagrowasquite

illustrativeofthenewclimate.Callingthe“ascension”ofDíaz-Canelan“illegitimate

transition”oftheCuban“dictatorship”,hewentontosay:

“ThepresidentialsuccessionthatwehavebeenwitnessinginCubaisanintendedperpetuationof

anautocraticregimeofafamilydynasty.Thatiscalleddictatorship.”375

374http://www.bbc.com/news/business-39194395 375https://www.nodal.am/2018/04/comunicado-de-luis-almagro-secretario-de-la-oea-sobre-cuba-una-transicion-ilegitima/

291

ThecoldwaroftheAmericaswasnotyetover,afterall.InspiteofLatinAmerica’s

indignationwithUSPresidentTrump,itseemedthatCubaagainwastheoddmanouton

thecontinent,againleftinthecold.

Indicator5.4:Improvedrelationstotherestoftheworld?

Cuba’s relations to theEuropeanUnion had formore than20years (since1996)been

seriously limited by the so-called ‘Common Position’, approved after heavy pressure

from the then staunchly anti-Castro Spanish PrimeMinister JoséAznar. Thismeasure

madethenormalisationofeconomicandpoliticallinksdependentondemocratisationin

Cuba.

NegotiationsfornormalisationofEU-Cubarelationshadbeengoingonsincebeforethe

US-Cubanrapprochementwasannounced.Then,rightbeforetheObamavisittoHavana,

theEUandCubasignedanagreementinHavanatoestablishnormalrelations,bringing

Cuba further into the international fold and paving the way for full economic

cooperationwiththe28-memberbloc.CubawastheonlycountryinLatinAmericaand

theCaribbeanwithoutsuchanagreementwiththeEU.

Bilaterally, most of the major EU countries had maintained normal economic and

political relationswith Cuba, and also voting consistently in favour of the annual UN

condemnation of the US embargo. Still, this lifting of the ‘Common Position’ was

importantforCuba.376

CanadamayhavebeentheNATOcountrywithclosestcooperationwithCuba,andalso

byfarthecountrysendingmosttouriststhere.

376EU’stopdiplomatFedericaMogherinivisitedHavanainJanuary2018,signallingthattheEUwasreadytofillthevacuumleftbehindbyPresidentTrump’sreversalofUSrapprochementtowardsCuba.Shestatedthat“TheEUhasbecomeCuba’sfirsttradepartnerandwasalreadythefirstininvestmentanddevelopmentcooperation...whichmeansitispossibletoincreasethelevelofeconomicrelationsandinvestments”.Shesaidcooperationagreementsinrenewableenergy,sustainableagriculture,cultureandexpertisevaluedat49millioneuros($59.1million)wouldbesignedshortly,andthatadelegationfromtheEuropeanInvestmentBankwouldvisitCubalaterinJanuary.(“EUdiplomatmeetsCubanPresidentatendofvisit”,Reuters,Havana,5.01.18).

292

As Venezuela increasingly was obliged to reduce its economic support due to its

economiccrisis,itwasparticularlyRussiaandChinathatmovedintopartially,butfar

fromentirely,compensatethepoliticalandeconomicrelations.377

RussianevercutofftheCubanrelationsfromtheSovieteracompletely,butitwasonly

duringthelateryearsoftheRaúlpresidencythatthetwocountriesstartedareturnto

whatmayresembleastrategicalliance.VladimirPutinvisitedCuba in2014;andRaúl

Castrowent toMoscow the followingyear.ThehugeCubandebtwasmostly forgiven

whilethelast10%wasconvertedtopotentialRussianinvestments.WhatCubamostof

all is seeking from Russia is probably oil deliveries that may partly compensate for

drasticallyfallingshipmentsfromVenezuela—alifelinethatmaybeindangerofbeing

lostcompletelyifthecrisisinVenezueladeepensfurther.Sofar(April2018)theamount

of oil received from Russia is but a trifle of what is needed, but the Cubansmay be

hoping for a further increase.378Russia greeted the new Cuban President with a

declarationthatthecountryispreparedtoincreasetheenergycollaboration,notablein

offshore exploration, as a counter-measure to the US embargo.379While still being a

relativelymoderate but growing trade partner, Russia is investing in development of

infrastructure, energy, aviation, and telecom. Most importantly, the military and

intelligence cooperation—once thebedrockofCubansecurityandof great concern to

the US—is being geared up, with Russia now delivering logistics and software to

modernisetheCubanmilitary,andevenrethinking its2002decisiontoclosethehuge

Lourdesintelligencebase.

The common interests between Russia and Cuba are no doubt determined by their

sharedworryaboutUSforeignpolicy.MrPutin´shopeforimprovedrelationstotheUS

after the Trump election does not seem to materialise. He has no problem sharing

Cuba´sconcernforwhathecallsMrTrump´s‘ColdWar-rhetoric’againsttheisland,just 377InaspeechpriortohisLatinAmericatripinFebruary2018,SecretaryofStateTillersonwarnedaboutLatinAmericancountries’“excessiverelianceoneconomictieswithChina”,andRussia’ssaleofarmsandmilitaryequipmentto“unfriendlygovernments”(obviouslyincludingCuba),ironically(intheperspectiveofUShistoricalpolicies)saying“theregiondidnotneednewimperialpowers”:https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-latam-china/latin-america-should-not-rely-on-china-u-s-secretary-of-state-tillerson-idUSKBN1FL6D5378Algeriareportedtohavedelivered2.1millionbarrelsin2017,withtheintentionofdoingthesamein2018.Thisrepresentsapproximately20days’needsofoilimports.(Reuters,11.01.18).379“RusiaabresusbrazosalnuevopresidenteCubano”,RedacciónSputnik,19.04.18.

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as Cuba supports Russia’s controversial policies in Ukraine and Syria and its general

conflict with theWest. Perhapsmore important than seeking new strategic military-

security tieswith a Cuba that nomore has global ambitions,Mr Putin´s interestmay

rather be to retaliate what he perceives as the US and NATO mingling in Russia’s

neighbourhood,andthenewColdWarrelationstakingholdduringMarch-April2018.

ChinahasduringmostoftheRaúlerabeenCuba’ssecondtradingpartner—numberone

inprovisionofnon-petroleumgoods—withexportsfluctuatingbetween1-1.5billion

USD/year.ParticularlyafterPresidentXi’svisittherein2014,therehavebeenstrong

expectationsfromtheCubansidethatChinawouldprovidemuchofcriticallyneeded

foreigndirectinvestments.PlentyofinvestmentagreementsweresignedwhenChinese

PrimeMinisterLiKeqiangvisitedthecountryin2016,includingforacarassembly

plant,anewnickelprocessingcomplex,biotechnologycollaboration,etc.Verylittleof

thishasmaterialised,however,andChinaisstilllaggingbehindSpain,CanadaandBrazil

asinvestornationsinCuba.CubaisnotamongthetopLatinAmericancountriesfor

Chineseinvestments,probablyforlackofChineseconfidenceinCuba’seconomicreform

processanditspaymentcapacity.380Itwillprobablytakeadecisiontofollowthe

ChineseandVietnamesestyleofdeeperpro-marketreforms,beforeChinaiswillingto

makeCubaapriorityinvestmentcountry.

ChineseexportstoCubapeakedatabout2billionUSDin2015butwereexpectedtofall

sharply(byalmostonethird)backtolittlemorethan1billionin2017.Thereasonfor

thisisobviouslyCuba’sseriouspaymentproblems,381showingclearlythatChinahasno

intention of playing a solidarity gamewith Cuba beyond its ownpragmatic economic

interests.ThiscontrastswithanofficialCubanreadingofthebilateralrelationsasbeing

atan“all-timehigh”inmid-2017.382Assuch,thedrasticreductionofChineseexportsis

anindicationofCuba’sincreasinglyseriouseconomicsituation.

Therehasalsobeenexchangeofhigh-levelmilitaryvisits,includingtheChinesedefence

ministervisitinginMarch2017.Littleinformationisavailableaboutconcretefollow-up

380”China-CubaRelations:AssessingUSStakes”,TheDiplomat,24.12.16(i.a.basedoninterviewwithEmilioMorales).381”China'sexportstoCubaslumpasisland'scashcrunchdeepens”;ReutersHavana(MarcFrank)6.12.17.382”Cuba-Chinarelationsatall-timehigh”,Granma(Englishedition),2.06.17.

294

of verbal agreements to strengthen military cooperation. But just as in the case of

Russia,suchdeclarationsareprobablymeanttosendasignalofcautiontotheUS.

Indicator5.5:WhatinternationalZeitgeistisframingCubawhenenteringthe

criticaljuncture?

InChapter3.12wediscussedtheimportanceoftheexternalpoliticalenvironmentfor

countriesintransformation,theemergenceofalternative’worldblocs’orrolemodels,

andtheconceptsofinternationalandregionalzeitgeistordiffusion.Thezeitgeist

surroundingCubawhenlookingforrolemodelsintoday’sworldisclearlymoreilliberal

thanliberal.

Wehaveoverthelastdecade,coincidingwiththeraúlistaregime,witnessedaseriesof

quiteseriouscrisesininternationalcapitalism,whichforthatreasonhaslostmuchofits

magicalattractionamongcountriesandpoliticalactorsintheSouth.ManyCubansmay

evenbeaskingthemselveswhetherFidelintheendwillbeprovenright:thatcapitalism

hasnofuture,andmanywouldpossiblyalsoagreethat‘authoritariancapitalism’(or

‘socialistmarketeconomy’)aspracticedinChinaandVietnamin2018seemstooffera

betteralternative.

Liberaldemocracy,atthesametime,isinacriticalshape.Cubacanseethatmanyofits

internationalpartnerstakerelativelylittleinterestinsomeoftheliberal-democratic

idealsthatwerebelievedtobecomeuniversalafterthefalloftheSovietsystem.One

thingisthattworolemodelslikeChinaandVietnamhavequitesimilarpoliticalsystems

tothatofCuba.AlsoworthnotingisthefactthatRussiaandmanyoftheformerSoviet-

alliedcountriesinEasternEuropeandCentralAsiaaresoclearlymovinginamore

authoritariandirection,withliberalvaluesseenasaseriousthreattonationalvalues

andnationalsecurity.Putin´sRussiamayseemtohavebecomeadefaultsettinginterms

ofinternationalrolemodelsforcountriesandpopulistpoliticalmovementsontheright

andleftalike,atoddswithliberalwesternvalues.Cubaisnoexceptionhere.

IntheUS,thedeepinter-institutionalcrisisandthe2016electioncampaign—letalone

theunexpectedoutcomeofthoseelections—donotexactlyaddtotheattractionof

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western-styledemocracyforacountrylikeCuba.Mounk(2018)makesacomparison

betweenilliberaldemocraciesincountrieslikeHungaryandPolandandundemocratic

liberalismemerginginWesternEuropeandtheUSInthelattercases,heclaims,people

havemaintainedtheirformalrights,buttherealpowerholdersare“billionairesand

bureaucrats”alongwithinternationalinstitutions.Thisiswhathasbroughtaboutthe

populistreactions,assymptomsofthecrisisoftraditionaldemocracy,andthatinthe

worstofcasesmayrepresentthebeginningofapopulisteratakingtheplaceof

democracyasthepoliticalsystemweintheWesthavetakenforgranted,accordingto

Mounk.

Andperhapsevenmoreimportant,internationalterrorismhasobligedwestern

democraciestoclampdownonastringofliberalfreedoms,strengthenedthepolicing

andsurveillancestructuresandingeneralincreasedauthoritarianaspectsofour

societies,alsocurbingcriticismofauthoritarianregimesthatformpartofthe

internationalanti-terroristalliance.Turkeymaybeanexampleofthis.Thewhole

experiencewith‘theArabspring’,startingwithpopularuprisingandendingwith

terriblecivilwarsinmanycountries,doesnotatallserveasaninspirationforrebellion

inCuba.TelevisionimagesofchaosinmanyArabnationsarehardlyanincentiveto

initiateasimilarsocialexperiment.ThestabilitythatCubansafterallareenjoyingisfor

mostpeopleclearlypreferabletothefearsofheadingtowardsafailedstate.These

differentglobaltrendsmayalsocontributetohelpthepoliceandintelligenceforces

maintainapowerfulhandinCuba.

Comparedtotherepeatedterroristthreatstothewayoflifeweareaccustomedtoin

westernsocieties,Cubastandsoutasahavenofsafety.TherefugeechallengesinEurope

andintheUShavealsoweakenedcertainhumanrightsstandardsthatwepreviously

tookforgrantedinwesternsocieties.

InCuba´sownregion,LatinAmerica,thepoliticalpendulumhasincreasinglybeen

swingingtowardsneo-authoritarianism.GiventheCubanelite’slargelywesternsocio-

culturalheritageandthesuccessofcapitalistdemocracythatforseveralyears

dominatedinmanyLatinAmericancountriessuchasBrazil,asimilarstyleof

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governmentcouldforawhileseemtorepresentadiffusioneffectinthecaseofCuba.383

Butsoonitbecamemoreprobablethatneo-authoritariantrendsinLatinAmerica,asin

manyotherpartsoftheworld,wouldratherworkagainstaliberalmarketmodelin

Cuba.

InhisstudyoftheRussianandEasternEuropeantransformationprocess,Kornai(1992)

putheavyemphasisontheoutsideexampleandthepossibledominoeffect,atthattime

dominatedbytheso-calledthirdwaveofdemocracy.Thiswaveisdefinitelyover,anda

similarimpactonCubantransformationcannotbeexpected.

Kornaiisalsodiscussinghowthegradualopeningtowardsthecapitalistworld,

includingthroughmorewidespreadpersonalandprofessionalrelations,contributedto

theRussianandEastEuropeantransformationtomarketeconomy.Toacertainextenta

similartrendmaybeobservedinCuba.Withtourismexplodingfromthe1990s,such

contactsbecameaneverydayoccurrenceforpeopleinHavanaandothertourist

destinations,butalsoelsewhereinthecountry.Withtheabolishmentofexitvisain

2013,Cubansgotanunprecedentedopportunitytotravelthemselves.Thereare

increasinginternationalintellectualandbusinesscontacts,includingwiththeUS.The

normalisationwiththenorthernneighbour(evenifitispartlyrolledbackbyPresident

Trump),anewagreementwiththeEU,andanewregimeforforeigndirectinvestment,

areallelementsworkinginthesamedirection.Butagainthecrisisoftheglobalmarket

economymaycooldownenthusiasm,andtheconcernforpoliticalimpactofacapitalist

economymaypartlyexplaintheneweffortstoslowdownmarketreformsinCuba.

Ononepointthereislittlechange:thepartyleadershipprotectsitselfverycarefully

againstcontactswithwesternregimes.Apartfromofficialstateandpartyvisits,thereis

nominglingwithoutsiders.EvendiplomatsinCubahaveverylimitedaccesstothetop

leadershipofstateandparty.DifferentfromFidel,topleadershardlyevergivepress

interviews.ItismostlyamysterywhatthenewgenerationofCubanleadersarethinking

aboutthecountry’sfuture,apartfromofficialstatements.Cuba´sleadershipismore

protectedfromexposuretotheoutsideworld,andtheystandoutasmoremonolithic,

383ComparetowhatGainsborough(2010)describedastheauthoritarianregionalfactorsimpactingonthetransitioninVietnam.

297

thanleadersinalmostanyothercountry(ref.the‘autism’phenomenondiscussedunder

Indicator6.2).

Ontheoppositesideofthezeitgeistequation,thereisagrowingneedtocometo

accommodationwiththeinstitutionsrulingtheglobaleconomy.Inasituationof

returningeconomichardships(asobservedfromsecondhalf2016onwards),the

countrywillmorethaneverneedforeigndirectinvestments(FDI)inordertokeepits

economyafloat.Aswehaveseen(Challenge3),ithasnotbeensufficienttoreformthe

FDIregimeinordertolureforeigninvestorstothecountry.Forthattohappen,a

completeturnaroundofCuba´srejectionoftheinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs),

seenastheultimatesymbolsofinternationalcapitalism,willberequired.Without

accesstothese,themassiveinflowofFDIthatthegovernmentrecognisesasasinequa

nonforeconomicrecoverywillnotoccur,andthelong-delayedmonetaryunification

willrepresentanalmostexistentialchallenge.ContinuedideologicalrejectionoftheIFIs

isbecomingmoreandmoreofadead-endstreetforeconomicrehabilitation.Likein

ChinaandVietnam,thereisnoalternativetointernationaleconomicpragmatism.Aswe

haveseen,evenChineseinvestmentsinCubaareheldbackduetothisanti-imperialist

stubbornness.

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Chapter 9: The evolving political arena

Challenge 6: Emergence of a more pluralist civil, academic and media society

Indicator6.1:Increasingcivilsocietypluralism.

LinzandStepan´sdefinecivilsociety,theirsecondtransitionarena(aftereconomic

society),asself-organisedgroups,movementsandindividualsthatoperateinrelative

autonomyofthestate.Acommonassumptionisthatreinforcementofanindependent

economicsocietywillalsocontributetoastrengthenedcivilsociety,andprobablyvice-

versa.ThereisnodoubtthatsuchacausalrelationhasoccurredinCubaduringthe

reformperiodwestudyhere.Althoughatleastupuntil2015therehasbeenatrendto

permitawiderspaceforcivilsocietyactivityanddebate,civilsocietyinCubaisof

coursestillweakandvulnerable,justastheeconomicsocietyis.

Letusfirstlookattheconstitutionalbasisforrestrictionstocivilsocietyfreedom

inCuba.384

TheCubanConstitutionof1976,initsArticle1,upholds“theenjoymentof

politicalliberty”asoneofitsfoundingprinciples,andArticle9“guaranteesthe

fulllibertyanddignityofman,theenjoymentofhisrights,theexerciseand

fulfilmentofhisdutiesandtheintegraldevelopmentofhispersonality”.

Article7goesontosay:

“TheCubansocialistStaterecognisesandstimulatesthemassandsocialorganisations,

emergedinthehistoricalprocessofthestrugglesofourpeople,gatheringintheirmidstthe

varioussectorsofthepopulation,representingtheirspecificinterestsandinvolvingthemin

thetasksofbuilding,consolidatinganddefendingthesocialistsociety”.385

384AllquotesfromtheConstitutionaretranslatedbytheauthor(S/E).385ItisinterestingtonotethatArticle7oftheConstitution,”recognizing”and”stimulating””socialorganizations”representing”specificinterests”ofthe”varioussectorsonthepopulation”,ifpermittedtobefreeofStateandPartycontrol,wouldtakethecountryalongwaytowardsestablishingwhatwe

299

Article53recognises“freedomofwordandpress”—but“inaccordancewiththe

aimsofthesocialistsociety”,adding:“Materialconditionsfortheexercise(ofthat

liberty)areprovidedbythefactthatthepress,radio,television,cinema,and

othermassmediaarestateorsocialpropertyandcanneverbeprivateproperty”.

Article54recognisesthe“righttoreunion,manifestationandassociation”,and

Article55“libertyofconsciousnessandreligion”.

Thesefreedomsforindividualsandorganisations,however,mustbeunderstood

aspartof“thehistoricalprocess”ofstrugglesleadingtoa“socialistworkers´

state”,asalsostatedinArticle1.Butmostimportantly,asemphasisedbyCuban

constitutionalists,theyaresubordinatedtotheprincipleof“lavoluntadsoberana

detodoelpueblo”,“thesovereignwillofallthepeople”(Article69about

AsambleaNacionaldelPoderPopular).Whatthismeansisthatthewillofthe

peopleisoneandunited,expressedthrough“Cuba´sCommunistParty[…],the

organisedvanguardoftheCubannation”and“thehighestleadingforceofsociety

andtheState”(Article5).

Or,toquoteoneofFidelCastro´skeyphrasesabouttheextentandlimitof

freedoms:“WithintheRevolution:everything—againsttherevolution:nothing”.

ItseemsthatRaúlCastro,assoonashetookoverasCuba´sformalleader,hada

seriousintentiontodosomethingabouttheserestrictions.Thetwobasichuman

rightstreaties(ICCPRandICESC)weresigned,butannouncementsabouttheir

ratificationwereneverfollowedup.386

termedan‘economicsociety’underChallenge4.ItisimportanttorememberthattheConstitutionwasformulatedbyaverydifferentsociety,beforeeconomicinterestsbecamesodifferentiatedastheyaretoday. 386InJuly,2017,TheCommissiononinternationalrelationsoftheCubanAsambleaNacionalmadetheirobservationstoadeclarationfromtheEuropeanParliamentabouttheirconcernabouthumanrightsinCubawhenendorsingThePoliticalDialogueandCooperationAgreementbetweentheEUandCuba:Theconcernswerecalled”unnecessaryandinterfering”:”WedonotrecognizeanyrightfortheEuropeanParliamenttoaddressissuesaboutwhichtheCubanpeoplehasexclusiveresponsibility,apeoplethatcontinuesbuildingasovereign,independent,socialist,democratic,prosperousandsustainableNation”(S/E).Themessageisclear:HumanrightsinCubaarenotthebusinessofanyforeigninstitution.Thevarietyofdocumentationsubmittedtothe2018UniversalPeriodicReviewofCuba(undertheUNHuman

300

Whatmayexplainthissequenceofevents?387Accordingtotwoobservers,the

ratificationofinternationalhumanrightscovenantswaspartofapoliticalagendaRaúl

Castrobroughtwithhimwhenhetookover,alongwithnormalisationofrelationswith

theChurchandwiththeUS,economicreformsandre-negotiationofthecountry´s

foreigndebt.Thefirstissuehelaunchedwashumanrightsratification.Itwas

immediatelymetbymobilisationforfasterandmoregeneralpoliticalreformsfromcivil

societyforces,givingtheopportunitytohardlinersintheParty(particularlythe

IdeologicalDepartment)tostartacounter-mobilisationbyattackinghumanrights

defendersascounter-revolutionary,thusobligingRaúltodropthisintention.Therestof

thisagendahasbeenquitesystematicallyimplemented—butalwaysmetwithresistance

andwateredoutbythesameforces.388

Inspiteofthefactthattheinternationalhumanrightslawhasneverbeen

properlydomesticatedinCuba,therehasbeenaninterestingmovementtowards

anexpandedspaceforcivilsocietyduringtheyearssinceRaúlCastrotookover

asheadofstate,verycloselylinkedtotheeconomicreformswearestudying.The

trendtowardspermittingawiderspaceforcivilsocietyactivityanddebate,can

beseenasanaspectofageneralredefinitionofcitizen-staterelationshipthat

followsfromthefactthatthestatehasallowedmorespaceforprivateeconomic

activity,whatwerefertoasanewsocialcontractbetweenthestateandits

citizens.Thistrend,however,hasnotmanifesteditselfwithoutresistance,leading

toreversemovementsparticularlyfrom2016.

TwoaspectsofthechangingCubansocietyhaveimpactedonthecivilsocietyspace

morethanothers:thetravelandmigrationlawthatcameintoeffectin2013,andthe

informaticsandtelecommunicationrevolutionthatfinallyalsoreachedCuba.

RightsCouncil)offersagoodcrosssectionofassessmentsaboutthehumanrightssituationinCuba:https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/056/17/PDF/G1805617.pdf?OpenElement;https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/066/23/PDF/G1806623.pdf?OpenElement;https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/060/00/PDF/G1806000.pdf?OpenElement387OnemayspeculatethatthemotivationforratificationofthebasichumanrightstreatieswasrelatedtoCuba´sstronginterestinthemembershipoftheUNHumanRightsCouncil.Cubahassucceededtositalmostcontinuouslyonthisbodysinceitwasre-organisedin2006withastrongappealthatmembersshouldratifybasictreaties.ButCubamanagedtomaintainthispositionwithoutratifyingthetreaties,andhassincebelongedtoagroupofcountriesrepeatedlyaccusedbymostinternationalhumanrightsorganisationsforspoilinganactivehumanrightsadvocacywithintheCouncil.388InterviewwithRobertoVeigaandLenierGonzales,February2016.

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ThenewtravelandmigrationlawthatwasmadeeffectivefromJanuary2013wasoneof

therealgame-changersforpeople´sindividualfreedominCubasincethe1959

revolution.Peoplenolongerneededtheexitvisa,andadecisiontotravelabroadand

seeothercountries—adreamnotleastforyoungCubans—wasfromnowfullypossible

withouttakingtheterribledefinitivedecisionofleavingthemotherlandbehindby

askingforlasalidadefinitiva(“definitiveexit”).Suddenly,Cubanscouldtravelabroad

andreturnwhenevertheywanted(normallywithinatimelimitoftwoyears).Itbecame

quitecommonforyoungCubanstogotoMiami,findajobthere,andreturntovisittheir

familyinHavanaseveraltimesayear,ofcourseconditionedbytheeconomicmeansto

doso.Evenpoliticaldissentersnowhadthisrightandusedit.Oneoftheconsequences

ofthiswastheemergenceofwhatwemaycallan‘oppositiondiplomacy’:Cuban

dissenterstravellingtheworldtoprotestagainsthumanrightsviolationsinCuba,

gatheringsupportandevenfinancialresourcesfortheircaseandthenreturningtoCuba

mostoftenwithouttheharassmenttheyhadnormallybeenexposedtobefore(until

theyengagedinwhatwasstillseenasillegalpoliticalactivityinsideCuba).Two

examplesofthisarequitetelling:theoppositionbloggerYoaniSanchezwasabletotour

alargernumberofcountriesinLatinAmerica,EuropeandtheUSin2013,raising

sufficientfundstosetupanindependent,andgraduallyquitehigh-levelqualityinternet

dailyinCuba(14ymedio).Eventhoughitisstillblockedfrombeinglegallyaccessedin

thecountry,itisemergingasaprominentsourceofalternativejournalism.Thesecond

exampleisfromtheAmericasSummitinPanamainApril2015,whenPresidentsCastro

andObamahadtheirfirstface-to-facemeeting,whenasizeablegroupofCuban

dissentershadaverytoughconfrontationwithregimesupportersinthestreetsof

Panama,andafterwardsreturnedtoCubawithoutbeingpenalised.

AspartoftheshrinkingspacetowardstheendoftheRaúlCastroera,however,persons

identifiedwithoppositiongroups(moreandmoregenericallycalled“counter-

revolutionaries”)experiencedincreasingtravelrestrictions.Oneexamplewaswhentwo

farmerswithoutanypenalrecordwerestoppedfromtravellingtoFloridainFebruary

2018totakepartinaseminarorganisedbythethink-tankCentrodeEstudios

Convivencia,withtheonlyoral(nowritten)explanationthattheseminarwas“unrelated

totheGovernment”(“noesafínalGobierno”)andthattheyappearedas“regulated”ona

nationalIDsystem(SUIN).Suchepisodesseemtohavebecomepartofageneralpattern

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in2018,alsowithreferenceto“badbehaviour”onprevioustravelsabroad.389Another

evenmoreseriousexampleisthewaydozensofnon-officialactivistswerebarredfrom

travellingtoGenevatotakepartinsessionsrelatedtotheexaminationofCubainthe

UniversalPeriodicReview(UPR)oftheUNHumanRightsCouncil,whichtookplacein

May2018,inaclearviolationoftheprinciplesforthisimportantinternational

procedure.390ThispracticewasalsoofficiallydenouncedbytheUNHighCommissioner

forHumanRights(OHCHR).391

TheinformaticsrevolutionhasalsohitCubaduringthesereformyears.Cubawasthelast

countryintheWesternHemispheretojointheInternet(1996),havingdecrieditearlier

inthe1990sasanimperialistweaponusedtosubverttheRevolution(seeSánchez

Villaverde1995).Publicaccesstoownmobilephoneswasonlyallowedin2008.The

countrystillhasaverylowInternetpenetrationparticularlywhencomparedtoits

literacyrate(39%,number118intheworldin2017,butadramaticandrapidincrease

fromthenegligibleaccesstenyearsearlier;andasignificantincreasefrom25%in

2015).392AsignificantleaptookplacewiththeestablishmentofpublicInternet

navigationpoints(morethan1,000inNovember2016),andevenmorewiththemore

than500publicWi-Fihotspotsaroundthecountry.Particularlyyoungpeople

congregateinparksandotherpublicopen-airspacesaroundthecountrytoaccesswhat

theyliterallyperceiveandappreciatemorethanmostotherpeoplearoundtheworldas

joiningaworldwideweb.393Intermsofthenumberofmobilephonesubscriptionsper

capita,Cuba,inspiteofdoublingitsratefrom2011to2016andreachingatotalof4.5

389”NopudieronsalirdeCubaporquererasistiraunevento’noafínalGobierno’”.14ymedio,16.02.18.390«ExigenalGobiernocubanocesarhostigamientoarelatoresdelaONU»,CubaNet,13.03.18;http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/Gobierno-escala-prohibiciones-viajes-opositores_0_2417158266.html391EFE,11.05.18:http://www.14ymedio.com/internacional/ONU-Cuba-bloquear-activistas-derechos_0_2434556526.html392DownloadedfromWikipedia9.12.17:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_Internet_usersDataisbasedonalistofcountriesbynumberofInternetusersasofmid-2016,withinternetusersdefinedaspersonswhoaccessedtheInternetinthelast12monthsfromanydevice,includingmobilephones.EstimatesarederivedfromeitherhouseholdsurveysorfromInternetsubscriptiondata.CubaistheonlycountryintheAmericasreportinga100%adultliteracyrate,accordingtotheWorldBank:http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS/countries.ThemostrecentfiguregivenbyETECSAisthat5millionmobilelineswerereachedinApril2018,representing43%ofthepopulation,butitisnotknownhowmanyoftheseweresubscriptionsopenedbytouristsordiasporaCubans(14ymedio12.04.18:http://www.14ymedio.com/cienciaytecnologia/Cuba-millones-moviles-America-Latina_0_2417158264.html).393250,000dailyusers,accordingtonationaltelecomcompanyEtecsa,November2016.

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millionmobilephoneusersin2017.Thisisstill,byfar,thelowestintheWestern

Hemisphere(35per100inhabitants,butupfrom22in2014),onlybetteroffthanfour

othercountries:NorthKorea,Eritrea,CentralAfricanRepublicandSouthSudan.394A

countrylikeVietnamhas128mobilephonesubscriptionsper100inhabitants,Chinahas

97.

Yet,useofmobilesmartphonesandtheInternetisprobablythesecondbiggestgame

changerforcivilsocietyinCubaovertheseyears,largelyduetotheimpressive

innovativeandcreativecapacityofyoungCubans,makingitimpossibleforthe

governmenttostemthisinformationtsunami.Hoffmann(2016)listsfourphenomena

demonstratinghowthedigitaltechnologiesareleadingtoa“pluralisationofCuba´s

publicsphere”and“reshapingthecountry´smedialandscape,bringinginnewactors

andnewmodesofsocialcontestation”:Thefirstisanumberofincidentswheredigital

voicehasimpactedpubliclife.Thesecondisthespreadofwhatwemaycall‘offline

Internet’withanexplosionofblogsandothernewunofficialdigitalmediaemerging.

Thethirdhecalls“theemergenceofdigitalmediaplatforms´frombelow´”,withCuba

probablybeingoneofthecountriesintheworldwiththemostcommonuseofmemory

sticksforexchangingInternet-basedinformationfromhandtohand.Andfinallythereis

theriseofoppositionorindependentjournalismandmedia,withtheabove-mentioned

14ymedioheadedbyYoaniSánchezasoneofthemostwellknown.

Outsidethepartyandstateapparatus,therearemanyactorswhoseimportancehas

clearlyincreaseduntilrecently.

• Someacademicswithrelativeautonomy,especiallyeconomistswhohavemore

legitimacytodebatereformrequirementsthanothersocialscientists;

• Bloggersandindependentjournalists;

• Afewindependentthink-tanks,amongwhomCubaPosibleisthemostwell-

known;

394AccordingtoWorldBankstatisticsfrom2016:http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2,downloaded9.12.17.

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• WhatwegenerallymaycallNGOs,whichinCubaneverhavehadreal

independencefromstateinstitutions(perhapswithacertainexceptionfor

churchgroupsofferingcharitysupport,suchastheCatholicCaritas);

• Theemergingentrepreneurs,whatsomehavecalled“thenewCubanmiddle

class”,isstillquiteinvisibleasactorsinpubliclife;

• ThehierarchyoftheCatholicChurch,whichusedtoplayanactiveintermediary

anddialogueroleduringthefirstyearsofRaúlCastro´sreforms,andthen

criticisedbysomeforbeingtoofriendlytoCastro.Thisrolehasbeenlargely

downplayedoverthelatestyears.

Thesegroupsconstitutewhatsomehavecalled“agreyzone”inCubansociety,

describedasfarbackas2011inthefollowingway:

“Agreyareahasemergedwhereintellectualsandgroupsthatpromotecitizeninterests

withoutdirectlychallengingthestate’spoweraretolerated.Theseeffortsincludewomen

rights,oppositiontoracialdiscrimination,consumers’rights,gayrights,protectionagainst

anti-religiousdiscrimination,theenvironment,anti-abortiongroups,deathpenalty

abolitionists,therighttofreedomofmovement,amongmanyothernon-overtlypolitical

groupsthatdonotchallengethemonopolyofpowerofthePCCbutdemandpoliciesthat

addresstheirconcerns”(LópezLevy2011i:384-385).

Wehavenotincludedtheopendissentersinthisgroup,butwillbecomingbacktothem

later.

AspointedoutbyHoffmann(op.cit.)fiveyearslater,thereisnodoubtthatcivilsociety

wasabletoekeoutanincreasingspaceoutsideofstateandpartycontrol,inspiteofnew

effortstolimitit.ProminentCubanhistorianRafaelRojas,livinginMexicobutfollowing

theCubansituationclosely,hastitledoneofhisarticles“civilpluralismandpolitical

authoritarianisminCuba”(Rojas2015).Thatwasprobablyquiteanaccurate

descriptionuntilacoupleofyearsago.Newandgenuineexpressionsofpeople

organisingspontaneouslyemergeconstantly.Youngbloggers,musiciansandartists,

independentjournalists,newsoutletsandmagazinesbeyondstatecontrol,

organisationsofsexualminorities,CubaPosiblebringingupdebatesoncrucialmatters

aboutCuba´sfuture,andparticularlytheincreasinginvolvementofcriticalacademics—

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manypartymembersamongthem—insuchactivities,wereallexpressionsofthis.But

thispartofthechangingCubansocietyhasalsosufferedacertainbacklashduringthe

lastcoupleoftheRaúlerayears.

Weshallnowlookalittlecloserattheroleplayedbyseveralofthesecivilsociety

categories.

Therehavebeentwolimitsforcivilsocietyactivitiestobetolerated:thereshouldbeno

explicitquestioningoftheexistingpoliticalpowerregime;and—perhapsevenmore

important—suchgroupsshouldnotoccupythestreets,seenastheexclusivearenafor

party-affiliatedgroups.Bothlimitshavebecomemorevisible.Atopendiscussionforums

forinstanceorganisedbyCubaPosible,verycriticaldebateswithbroadparticipation

thatweretolerateduntil2015,areimpossibletoorganisetoday.Thosedissentergroups

thatdaretodemonstrateinthestreets,likeDamasdeBlanco,areincreasinglyharassed

anddetained.

Thelidonautonomouscivilsociety,andoncensorship,washeavilytestedduringthe

normalizationprocesswiththeUS.Thejustificationofthesedemocraticlimitationshas

alwaysbeentheneedtokeepastrongdefenceagainstthehistoricenemy,US

imperialism.Aslongastheenemyimageseemedtobeweathering,howcouldthese

limitationsthenbedefended?Thathasagainbecomeeasierwiththechangefrom

ObamatoTrump.Accusedunderthelabelcentristas(ref.Indicator8.2),itisparticularly

thosebelongingto‘thegreysector’ofthecivilsocietythathavebeensingledoutfor

heavyandincreasingattackduring2016andevenmoresoin2017,totheextentthat

thisgroupofferingconstructivecriticismanddialoguearounddevelopmentalternatives

hasseenitsspaceofoperationseverelylimited.Itmayseemthatthehegemonicforces

inthePartytowardstheendoftheRaúlCastroerafeelmorethreatenedbythis‘loyal

opposition’,assomeofthemcallthemselves,thanbydissentersopenlysupporting

PresidentTrump’snewpolicyandcallingfortheoverthrowoftheregime.While

dissentersaremostlyrepressedthroughpro-regimemobsandarbitrarydetentions,the

‘centrist’groupshavebeenincreasinglysubjecttomorediscreteStasi-likesupervision,

threatanddivide-and-rulemethods.Theregimealsoseemstohavesucceededin

threateningEuropeandiplomatstokeepmoredistancefromthisgroupthantheyused

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tosomeyearsago,thuscontributingtofurthersilencemostoftheconstructivedebateat

amomentwhenitoughttobemorecriticalthanever.395

Indicator6.2:Moreautonomousroleforacademicsandintellectuals?

Theroleofacademicsandintellectualsiscrucialinanytransformationprocess,soalso

inCuba.

Asapointofcomparison,itmaybeusefultorefertotheroleofintellectualsinthe

transformationprocessintheUSSR.AccordingtoBrown(2009),highlyeducatedcity

dwellersandfull-timeofficials(well-educatedspecialists)hadadisproportionately

largepresenceintheparty,withaverystrongreformistinfluence.USSRwasatypical

caseofliberalisationfromabove,likeHungary,asopposedtoliberalisationfrombelow

asthecasewasinPoland.IntheUSSR,thevastmajorityofleadingspecialistsinthe

socialsciences(academiclawyers,economists,sociologists,politicalanalysts)were

partymembers,fromwhomthemostinfluentialideasforchange(economicaswellas

political)emanated.

BrownalsoremarksthatGorbachevneededreform-mindedpeopleonestepdowninthe

partyhierarchyinordertowintheideologicalbattlethatfollowed.However,hestates,

“onlychangeattheapexofthepoliticalhierarchycoulddeterminewhetherfreshand

criticalthinkingwouldremainamereintellectualdiversionorwhetheritwould

influencetherealworldofpolitics”(p.594).

AccordingtoRafaelHernandez(2014),40%ofPCCmilitantesareacademics.Itis

thereforeofinteresttowatchwhetheracademicsandintellectualsinCubawillbecomea

morevisiblepro-reformgroupwithinthepartyorinstatebodies.Asweshallsee,no

suchfactionhasbeenvisibleafterthe7thPartyCongressin2016,andpracticallyno

academicfromoutsidethePartyhierarchywasincludedintheCentralCommittee

electedthere.ThesamepatternwasrepeatedwiththecompositionofthenewNational

395AveryworrisomeaccountofthesetrendswasreportedbytheDirectorsofCubaPosible(VegaandGonzales),themselvessubjecttopersonalthreats,inaninterviewinFebruary2018.”Overthelatestyear,’thegreyzone’hasalmostbeenwipedoutinCuba”,theyclaim.

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AssemblythatcametogetherinApril2018.TheStateCouncilelectedtherehadallegedly

onenon-Partymember:asportscelebrity.

Amongacademics,itisparticularlytheeconomistswhohavebeenpavingtheway,

understandablysinceeconomicreformshavebeenthemostvisibleandofficially

promotedchangeissue.Theypossesstheexpertisethegovernmentneedsinorderto

findawayoutoftheeconomiccrisisofthecountry:economistsinresearchinstitutes

formallyunderthecontrolofuniversitiesandevenpartybodies,mostofthemparty

members,aremoreandmoreoutspokenandcriticalaboutthereformprocess,generally

claimingitistoomodestandtooslow.Quitefundamentalcriticismoffoot-dragging,

slownessintheeconomictransformations,andoftheincreasingcontradictionsinthe

Cubanmodelhavebeenexpressedbythisgroup.Moreorlessopenargumentsforthe

introductionofmarketreformsduringmostofthereformeraseemedtobetaken

constructivelyatleastbythereform-orientedsegmentsofthegovernmenthierarchy.

Attheoutsetofthereformera,thethen‘economicczar’,FirstVicePresidentand

supposedsuccessorofRaúl,then56-yearsoldCarlosLage,expressedastronginterest

inhavingarealdialoguebetweenspecialistsanddecision-makers(twoyearsbefore

Raúlremovedhimfromhisposition):

“Weneedatruedialoguebetweenthesocialscientistsandthedecision-makers.Whatsense

doesitmaketocreateinstitutionsandaskthecomradestostudyandafterwardsdon´ttake

themintoconsideration,notevencallonthemtoseewhattheythink?Errorshavebeen

committedinspiteofhavingspecialistsavailable.[…]Nothingcanjustifythis”396(S/E).

Manyoftheseeconomistshaveparticipatedinformalconsultationmechanismsas

advisorstothe‘PermanentCommissionforImplementationandDevelopmentofthe

Guidelines’,headedbythe‘reformmanager’whowasappointedin2009whenLageleft,

MarinoMurillo.Thepatternhaslargelybeen,however,thattheseleadingacademics—

mostofthemPartymembers—havebeeninvitedtopresentobservationsandproposals

totheCommission.Butthereisverylittle,ifany,dialoguebetweenthepowereliteand

externaladvisors,andalmostnoosmosisbetweenleadingpartyandstatecadresand

396”SobrelatransiciónsocialistaenCuba:Unsimposio”(2007):Temas:51-52,126-162.

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academicinstitutions.397TheCubanpoliticaleliteislivinginabubble,without

interactionwiththeoutsideworld,beitacademics,journalists,diplomatsorother

groupsthatinmostothersocietieswouldbefrequentdialoguepartners.Thereisno

opendebatewiththepoliticalleadersalthoughtheymayreadorlistentoproposals;

theyveryrarelyengageindirectdiscussions,andtheyshyawayfromexpressingtheir

ownviewsoncontroversialsubjects,atleastuntilthereisanofficialpartystandpoint,

normallydefinedbyRaúlCastrohimself.Thoseoutsidetheinnercirclesareleft

completelyinthedarkabouttheoutcomeoftheseprocesses,evenmoresoafter

2015.398OneisalmosttemptedtosaythatthetopCubanleadershipsuffersfromanautism

syndrome.

Yet,atthesametime,thesameacademicsdoexpresscriticisminscientificpapersand

lectures,andeveninthemediaandpublicwebsites(seetheextensiveinterviews

presentedinTerrero2014).399

Thesecriticalvoicesofprominenteconomistsgetreallyinterestingwhentheycrossthe

borderfromeconomicstopolitics—abordercrossingthatmayamounttoaquestioning

oftheveryfoundationoftheCubanpoliticalsystem.Thequiteremarkablequotewe

reproducebelowcomesfromananonymousresearcheratoneofCuba´smost

recognisedeconomyinstitutes,theCentrefortheStudyoftheCubanEconomy(CEEC),a

dependencyoftheUniversityofHavana,inresponsetothebacklashforpro-market

reformsinearly2016,whentheGovernmentintroducedpricecontrolsonfoodproducts

andremovedthelicenseofstreetvendorswhohadbecomeanimportantchannelfor

foodproductsinmosturbanneighbourhoods.Therealproblem,heclaims,isthehyper-

controloftheStateanditsfearoflosingmonopolycontrol: 397FormerMinisterofEconomy(1998-2009)JoséLuísRodríguezisoneoftheveryfewexceptionsofex-ministersorpersonswithasimilarlyrankingbackground,whoretreatedtoanacademicpositionfromwheretotakepartinacademicdebate.Morerecently,HumbertoPérez,economicczarfortenyearswhenhewasMinister-PresidentofJuntaCentraldePlanificación(1976-1985)andVicePresidentoftheCouncilofMinisters,re-appearedinacademicdiscussions.Hewasanadvocateofpro-marketreformswithpeasantmarketsandmajorenterpriseautonomy–reformssupposedlysupportedbyRaúlCastro–beforeFidelCastrosackedhimaspartofa‘rectificationcampaign’.398Theseobservationsarebasedonalargenumberofconversations,overmanyyears,witheconomistse.g.attheprominentpro-reformCenterfortheStudyoftheCubanEconomy(CEEC),andsimilarinstitutions.399ThefactthatthewebsiteCubaprofunda,andtherebyimplicitlytheMinistryofCulturegivessomuchattentiontothesecriticaleconomistsisagoodillustrationofthedegreeofcriticismbeingtoleratedandperhapsevenencouragedbythosewithinthepowerstructureswhoarepromotingtheeconomicreformsinCuba.

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"Theprivatesector,inafewyears,hasproventobeefficientandhasgrownineveryaspect

comparedtothesocialiststateenterprise.Althoughthiscouldseempositive[...]itrepresents

adangerforthestabilityofanautocraticpoliticalsystemthatbasesitsstrengthon

repressionandstrictcontrolofall[...].Themoretheprivatesectorisenriched,themoreit

winsinautonomy,thustransformingitselftoapoliticalforcewithwhichaconsensusmust

bereached.[…][Inthissituation]theCubangovernmentwillattempttocreate,byallmeans,

mechanismsthatcurbitsgrowth,andinstilfearinthemassesinordertocreateanimageof

theprivatesectorasthesourceofallevil,contrarytothesocialiststateenterpriseasthe

paradisepromised.[...]Introducingpricecontrolandblamethestreetvendorsand

intermediariesfortheproblem[ofhighfoodprices]seemfoolish,it´sindeedatactic,because

iftheyaregoodatanything[referringtotheCubangovernment]itistoescaperesponsibility

bydemonizingpotentialopponentsbeforetheyreallybecomeopponents.[...]Peoplearenot

stupid,butwhenalieisrepeatedtirelessly,sometimesitbecomesatruth.[...]Peopleonthe

streetrepeatthesamethingasthegovernmenttellsthem:priceswillstabilizebyeliminating

themiddlemen.[...]Butwhoarethemiddlemen?Thestreetvendors?Peopledonotrealize

thattheintermediaryisthestateitself,butthegovernmenthasledthemtothinkthatithas

nothingtodowiththeproblembecausetheypointtothecause,oroneofmany,butthey

transfertheblametosomebodythatisnotresponsibleforit”400(S/E).

Apparently,however,judgingforinstancefromthehighlyironicremarksmadeby

MiguelDíaz-CaneloneyearbeforehewaselectedPresident(seeIndicator8.3),all

alternativeideasaboutCuba´seconomicandpoliticalfuturehavefallenonrockyground

evenamongthefutureleaderswithinthetophierarchy,writtenoffasneo-liberalor

outrightcounter-revolutionary.ItseemsthatCarlosLage´scallfor“atruedialogue”was

neverheeded.

Otherprofessionalandacademicgroupswhooftenhaveplayedcrucialrolesinthe

politicaldebateduringtransformationprocessesinothercountries,suchaslawyers,are

veryrestrictedbythefactthattheexerciseoftheirprofessionisheldwithinthe

boundariesofofficialguilds.Nobodyoutsideoftheofficialbarassociationcanactas

courtdefenders,andnoindependentlawfirm(bufetesdeavogados)ispermitted.

LawyersdefendingpoliticaldissentersincourtmustalsobelongtotheofficialBufete.

400ErnestoPérezChang(2016):”Lapropiedadprivadasiguesiendoeldemonio.”Articledated26.01.2016,reproducedinASCENewsNo.695,28.01.2016,quotinganinterviewwith”aprominentresearcher”attheCEEC,whoseidentity”forreasonsofsecurity”isnotrevealed.

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Anthropologists,sociologistsetc.doplayacertainrole.Aswehavenotedelsewhere,

thereisnopoliticalsciencecareeratCubanuniversities,seriouslylimitingthemore

systematicstudyoftheCubanpowerstructuresanddecision-makingprocesses.

Oneofthefewarenasforopendebateaboutissuesofpoliticalsignificancehasbeenthe

monthlymeetings(takingplacesincethebeginningofthecentury)“ÚltimoJueves”,

organisedbyRevistaTemaslinkedtotheMinistryofCulture.Herethediscussionhas

beenremarkablyopen,andintellectualstakingpartdonotseemtoshyawayfromheavy

criticism.Thesemeetingshaveaveryspecialcharacteristic:thepanelmembers,offering

anintroductiononaspecialissueeverymonth,isnormallymadeupofpeople

presentingmoreorlessofficialpositions,whereasthecommentsandthequestionsfrom

theaudienceoftentakesonaverycriticalcharacter.Buttwogroupsareconspicuously

absent,althoughfordifferentreasons:politicalleadersononesideareofteninvitedbut

donotturnup,andanti-systemdissentersontheotherareapparentlynotpresent.The

participantsherearethosewhocriticisefromwithin,whilethosewhowouldbeableto

respondtothiscriticismandtakeproposalswiththemwhendecisionsaremade,donot

takepart.Therelevanceofsuchforamaybelessnowthatthepublicdebatehasmoved

muchmoreontotheInternet.

Whatarethecriticalintellectualforcesaimingat?CamilaPiñeiroHarnecker(2012)has

madeaninterestingefforttoidentifythree“principalpositionsorvisionsaboutCuban

socialism”,particularlyamongacademiceconomists.Shedistinguishesbetweenastatist,

aneconomisticandaself-managementvisionof“whatisnecessarytosavetheCuban

socialistproject”.Thestatistalternativeisbasicallythestatusquo“centralizedstate

withaverticalstructure”.Theeconomisticapproachisequivalentto‘marketsocialism’

followingtheChineseandVietnamesemodel;whereasself-managementideasaremore

utopianbutperhaps,accordingtoher,toacertainextentpracticallyapplicablethrough

cooperativeideas.Noliberaldemocraticalternativewithpromotionofpersonal

freedomsisrepresentedintheseapproaches.

Sometheoreticaldiscussionshavebeengoingonamongareducedgroupofintellectuals

inmagazinessuchasTemas,EspacioLaical,andPalabraNueva(thefirstlinkedtothe

MinistryofCulture,thelasttwototheCatholicChurch),alsoreflectedinlettersfrom

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readerspublishedinofficialCubandailies,andinagrowingnumberofwebsitesand

evenglossymagazineslikeOnCuba,401thatallmaintainalanguagethatmakesitdifficult

toaccusethemofbeingvoicesof‘theenemy’.402

Perhapsthepoliticallymostinterestingpro-politicalreformdocument,releasedin2013,

camefromtheso-calledLaboratorioCasaCuba,asmallgroupofintellectualswhoused

toworkwithEspacioLaicalandwithlinkstotheArchbishop´sofficeinHavana—but

withquitevariedideologicalorientation.TheypreparedamanifestcalledCuba

soñada—Cubaposible—Cubafutura(theCubawedreamabout,thepossibleandfuture

Cuba).Thisdocumentisinrealityademandfortherecognitionoffullliberaldemocracy

inCuba,including:

• “Direct,free,secret,periodicandcompetitive”elections;

• Enjoymentofcivil,political,economic,socialandculturalrights;

• Separationoflegislative,executive,judicialandelectoralpowers;

• Accesstouniversal,freeanddiverseinformationwithoutcensorshipnor

monopolyaswellasmassiveandparticipatoryaccesstointernet;

• Systemsfortransparencyandaccountabilityofpublicaffairs;

• Eliminationoftheinfamousprincipleof“pre-offensedanger”(peligrosidad

predelictiva)and“pre-offensesecurity”—frequentlyusedaslegalbasisfor

arbitrarydetentionsandpreviouslyalsoforpoliticaltrials.

Thesensationalcharacterofthismanifestwasthatitcamefromagroupcallingitself

‘LoyalOpposition’,atthetimeoperatingfullywithintheCubansystem,andthatthere

wasnoattemptbytheGovernmenttostopitsactivityorthecirculationofthe

401OnCubapresentsitselfas”acommunicationplatformlegallybasedinHavanathroughapressBureau,recognisedbytheCenterforInternationalPress(CPI)oftheCubanMinistryforForeignAffairs...ownedbypublicU.S.company”.OnCubaMagazine(www.oncubamagazine.com)isaprintedmagazineinEnglishwithabstractsinSpanish.Its22000copiesarebimonthlydistributedintheUnitedStatesand“alsotravelsonboardofalmostalltheflightsfromtheU.S.toCuba”.ThenVice-PresidentDíazCanelinFebruary2017,however,threatenedthatthemagazinewoulddisappear.Thisdidnothappen,butthemagazine’sCuban-AmericanHavanacorrespondents(whohadtheirofficeinabuildingbelongingtotheStateCouncil)havefeltobligedtoleavethecountry.IthasbeenpointedoutthatthismagazinemayrepresentanimportantbridgetotheUSthatmaybeparticularlyusefulunderPresidentTrump.402SeelistofrelevantpublicationsundertheAppendixSources.

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document.403AsdescribedunderthepreviousIndicator,however,thistolerancehas

sincedisappeared.

Withthepublishingofthisdocumentandthegenerallymoreopenpoliticalreform

demands,thisgroupthathaditscorewithintheeditorialboardofEspacioLaical,

becametoooutspokenforanincreasinglyservileandover-cautiousCatholichierarchy

inCuba.ItendedwithabreakawayfromtheCatholicmagazineandtheCatholicChurch

ingeneral;andthefoundationofanewthink-tankandwebjournalcalledCubaPosible,

headedbythetwoex-editorsofEspacioLaical,RobertoVeigaandLenierGonzales.Cuba

Posiblehassince2014becomethecentreofpoliticalreformthinkinganddialoguein

Cuba.SincethisgrouplostitsprotectionfromtheCatholichierarchy,however,ithas

becomemuchmorevulnerabletothegrowingintellectualrestrictions,beingopenly

attackedbyPartyintransigents,andhavingtoregisterasanon-governmental

associationinSpainratherthaninCuba.Since2015thishasblockeditofffrom

organisingopendialogueeventsinCuba.Thewebsiteandthecrucialreformdebate

continueshowever,andCubaPosiblehasarguablybeenthemostimportantreference

pointforcriticalpoliticaldebateamongforeigndiplomatsandpro-dialogueUSCuba

watchers.DuringthethawinCuba-USrelationsandthegenerallymoreactivewestern

diplomacy(2014-2016),therewashardlyanyforeignhead-of-stateorprominent

politicalpersonalityvisitingHavanawhowasnotholdingameetingwithCubaPosible.

Thechallengetoconqueranopendomesticplatformforthisdebatewasneverreached

beforethespaceonceagainstartedtoclose(ref.Indicator6.2).

Indicator6.3:Churchesplayinganincreasingpoliticalrole?

TheCatholicChurchhaslongbeensupposedtobethebestorganisednon-state

organisationinCuba:theonlynon-stateandnon-partystructurewithphysicalpresence

inpracticallyeveryCubancommunity.Perhapssurprisingly,however,theCatholic

Churchhasbasicallyresignedfromitsopportunitytotakealeadasanalternativevoice

inthecountry.DespitethreePopevisitsin20years,andapotentialstrength

403Thedocumentwasreproduced,alongwithseveraldiscussionarticles,intheCatholicjournalEspacioLaicalno.3,2013,ajournalthatinprincipleisdistributedthroughall CatholicchurchesinCuba.ThedocumentwasalsoreproducedandcommentedbyseveralprominentintellectualsonthewebsiteoftheculturalmagazineTemas,issuedwithsupportfromtheMinistryofCulture.

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demonstratedwhentheCardinalandex-ArchbishopofHavana,JaimeOrtega,negotiated

thelibertyof75politicalprisonersin2010(ref.Frank2013),theChurchhasremained

almostmuteinthegeneralpoliticaldebate.Andmorerecentlyithasactuallylimitedthe

internalspaceforpoliticaldebate(ref.thechangeofeditoriallineinthemagazine

EspacioLaical).404Butthischangeoflinemayhavecontributedtoopenaspacefor

independentassociationsorthinktanks,aswiththenewgroupCubaPosible,although

therearestillinsurmountablebarrierstoobtainlegalrecognitionforanythingthatis

notfirmlycontrolledbythestate.

OneoftheambitionsoftheCatholicChurch(alsoraisedbythePopeduringhis2012

visittoCuba)istobeallowedtoestablishnon-stateeducationinstitutions.Thefirst-

evernon-stateMasterprogram,inBusinessAdministration,wasestablishedbyCentro

CulturalPadreFélixVarelainHavana,butitwasdiscontinuedduetostateresistance

aftertwocoursesfinalised.Nevertheless,thismaybeaninterestingbeginningofanew

trend.Aroundthecountry,theCatholicChurchisrunningseveralbusinesstrainingsfor

smallentrepreneurs.

InApril2016,JuandelaCaridadGarcía,formerBishopofCamagüey,wasappointedas

newArchbishopofHavanaandthePrelateoftheCatholicChurchinCuba,followingthe

resignationofCardenalOrtegaforthereasonofage.Oneofthefirstquitepolemic

statementsbythenewCatholicPrelatewasthathedidnotwantCubatomovetowards

”capitalismoranythinglikeit,butratherthatsocialismmakesprogressforward[...]

towardafairandjustsocietywithbrotherhood”(S/E).405Hevowedtocontinuetheline

followedbyCardinalOrtega,alsoacceptedbyPopeFrancisduringhisofficialvisitto

Cuba,implyingthattherewillbenoopenconfrontationwiththeGovernment.

WhiletheofficialCatholicleadershipkeepsaverylowprofile,apparentlyinagreement

withtheVatican,thereisasmallgroupofCubanpriestswhospeakopenlyoutagainst

thegovernment,demandingeconomicandpoliticalopening,warningthat“timeis

404TheauthorfollowedtheeventsaroundthedepartureoftheformereditorsofEspacioLaical,andtheirdecisiontosetupCubaPosible,atcloserangebecauseofcollaborationwiththisgroup.ThereisnodoubtthattheseeventsreflectedadecisionbytheCatholichierarchyinCuba,withsupportfromandperhapsledbytheformerVaticanNuncio(Ambassador)toHavana.ThishappenedbeforePopeFrancistookover,butlittlehasinfactchangedsince.40514ymedio,27.06.16:http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/arzobispo-Habana-quiere-socialismo-progrese_0_2024797511.html

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up”.406AnotherCatholicgroup,ConvivenciawithbasisinPinardelRío,runsbothathink

tankandamagazinewithcriticalalternativedebates.

Non-Catholicchurcheshavealso,generallyspeaking,keptaverylowpoliticalprofile.

Thesameisthecaseforthesanteríacommunities.

Indicator6.4:Increasingroleforindependentinformationactors?

OneofthemostcriticalphenomenaforincreasingpluralisminCubaistheroleplayed

bybloggersandotheractorsinnewsocialmedia,andtheindependentjournalists.

AlthoughCubaisamongthecountriesintheworldwiththehighestInternet

restrictions,thegovernmentandthesecuritypolicefinditveryhardtostoptheir

activities.ItisdifficulttojudgehowfartheyreachinsidetheCubansociety,butthey

probablyhaveasignificantaudienceamongyoungpeople,mostlyacademics.The

followingcharacteristicfrom2012hasbecomemoreandmorerelevantoverthe

followingyears:

“Thankstothenewtechnologiesfordigitalreproduction[inCubathememorysticksare

clearlythemostusedtoolintheabsenceofgeneralinternetaccess—commentaddedbythe

author],[civilsocietyactors]havemanagedtoarticulatedebateamongcertainpublic

spheres.ViaelectronicmailandInternet,thousandsofcitizens,principallyinthecities,have

hadaccesstopoliticalproposalsanddebatesonthenationalreality,atthemarginofthe

officialcircuitsforthecirculationofideas.Thismixtureofbulletins,blogs,websites,journals,

videoreproductionplatforms,simplee-mailsamonggroupsoffriends,andsoon,constitutes

arealpoliticallaboratorywherethefutureofCubaisbeingcooked”407(S/E).

Theworkofbloggersthatusedtobeseenasacceptablebygovernmentbecamemore

intolerableaspartofthenewideologicalcampaigninitiatedin2016.Oneexampleof

thiswastheblogcalledPeriodismodeBarrio,ledbyElaineDíaz,withthepurposeof

406ThreeCatholicpriestsinanopenlettertoPresidentCastroon24January2018,alsourgingthePopetospeakout:”SacerdotescubanosllevanalPapasupeticióndedemocraciayeleccioneslibres”.CadenaSer.comInternacional,6.02.18.Oneofthesepriests,JoséConradoRodríguez,hasbeenalong-timewell-knownhumanrightscriticoftheCubangovernment,particularlywhenhewastheparishpriestofPalmaSoriano,closetoSantiago,wherehewasaccusedofbringingyoungpeopleintooppositionactivities(seee.g.Padraza2007).407LenierGonzález,roundtablediscussion,inEspacioLaical,atwww.espaciolaical.org/contens/esp/sd_160.pdf

315

reportingoncommunitiesaffectedbynaturaldisasters.Winneroftheprestigious

HarvardUniversityNiemanscholarshipforinvestigativejournalism,shewasfirst

officiallymentionedasaconstructivealternativetowhatpro-governmentsources

termed‘cyber-terrorists’.ButinconnectionwithhercoverageofhurricaneMatthew´s

devastatingimpactinBaracoaandneighbouringcommunitiesinSeptember2016,she

andhercolleaguesweredetainedanddeportedtothecapital,withreferencetothe

existingstateofemergency.Themessagewasclear:theofficialmediadoesnotwantany

alternativejournalisminasituationofemergency.

Admittedly,theheavyInternetrestrictionsinCubarepresentaneffectivebrakeonthe

proliferationofnewsocialmedia,comparedtomostothercountries.Thesecurity

serviceshaveevidentlydecidedtodotheirutmosttoavoidarepetitionofeventslikethe

ArabSpringwherethesocialmediaplayedacrucialrole.408

YoaniSanchez,Directoroftheweb-baseddaily14yMedio,madethefollowingstatement

inmid-2016,whenaskedwhetherindependentjournalismwaspossibleinCuba:

”It’spossible,it’spossibleand‘14yMedio’demonstratesthat.We’readailythatnotonly

focusesitssightsonimprovingthequalityofthejournalismwedo,butinadditionwe’re

financiallyautonomous.Wedon’treceiveacentfromtheCubangovernmentnorfromany

governmentintheworld.Youcanproducefree,autonomous,independentjournalismof

qualityfromtheisland”.409

ThePartyhierarchyisgettingworriedthattheverypowermonopolyisnowatstake,

tryingdesperatelytostopthisfromhappening.Itseemsveryunlikely,however,that

thesetrendscanbeturnedaroundwithoutamuchmorerepressivesystem.

Thespaceofbloggersandindependentmediaalsooffersasmallwindowofopportunity

tojournalistsinofficialmediatosellarticlesforapayperpiecethatmaycorrespondto

afullmonth´ssalary,thusbothavoidingtheextremelynarrowlimitsofofficial

408Anotherexample,probablystudiedcloselybyCubanintelligence,washowtheaccesstointernetwasblockedinIranduringtheprotestmovementaroundnew-year2017/2018:http://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/31/middleeast/iran-protests-sunday/index.html409”YoaniSanchezTalksAboutCuba’s'Changes'”.TheHavanaTimes,14.06.16http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=119362

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journalismandgettingsomehighlynecessaryextraincome.However,thenewworries

about‘agentsofchange’expressedatthe7thPartyCongress(ref.Indicator6.6)evidently

ledtoacampaignagainstsuchpractice.Aprotestletterfromagroupofyoung

journalistsintheofficialnewspaperLaVanguardia(publishedinSantaClara),affiliated

withtheCommunistYouthLeague(UJC),leakedtooneofthesenewmediaoutlets,

broughtanewideologicalbattletothesurface:

“Recenteventsreveal[…]effortsbytheGovernmenttocensurenotonlyindependent

journalists,butalsothosewhotrytobreaktheroutinesoftheofficialpress,controlledin

eachprovincebytheso-calledIdeologicalDepartmentoftheProvincialBureauoftheCuban

CommunistParty.[…]Weareexperiencingthatforcesunrelatedtothejournalistic

professionareinvestigatingusonourworkplacesandthroughtheneighbourhood

committees(CDRs),theyfollowusstepbystepandcallustoaccountforcommentsor

polemicarticlesthatwemayhavepublished[…]Webelievethatthefreeandresponsible

exerciseofopinionneithercannorshouldbedetained”.

Evenmoreinterestingly,thelettergoesontoreferthispolemictothehighestechelons

ofthePartyandtopossibleideologicaldifferencesthere:

“AlthoughCubanFirstVicePresidentMiguelDiaz-CanelBermudez,awareoftheroleof

journalisminCubatoday,saidrecentlythatthemedia‘nolongerhavetowaitforguidancefrom

above’,censorshipisfarfromdisappearing”410(S/E).

So,whatisthemessagehere?Weareevidentlyseeingthatthecarefulandgradual

openingforamorepluralisticsocietyandtheactuallossoftheinformationmonopoly,

alongwiththelossofthestate´seconomicmonopoly,hasproducedamorecritical

attitudetothepoliticalsystem.Thishasoccurredevenamongtheyouthofthe

CommunistPartyitself,areflexionofthegeneraldisengagementofthecountry´syouth

withtherevolution´shistoricgriponthepopulation.

CarefulbutfrankcriticismhasalsobeenexpressedbysuchParty-controlled

organisationslikeUNEACandUPEC(writersándjournalist´sunions,respectively),

denouncingthelimitedInternetaccessanddeclaring“waragainstsecrecy”.FirstVice

410”CartadeprotestadelComitédeBasedelaUJCdeldiario'Vanguardia’”,publishedandcommentedinDiariodeCuba,1.07.16.

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PresidentDíaz-Caneldidengageinanapparentlyconstructivedialoguewiththese

intellectualsabouttheirclaims.411

Cubacontinuestooccupyoneofthelowestratingswhenitcomestopressfreedomin

theworld.ThefollowingassessmentbyReporterswithoutbordersmaybeover-

simplified,butstillexpressingwhatmanyindependentinformationworkersperceive:

“Arbitraryarrestsandimprisonment,threats,smearcampaigns,confiscationofequipment,

andclosureofwebsitesarethemostcommonformsofharassment.Thesepracticesare

ubiquitousandarebuttressedbyanarsenalofrestrictivelaws.Unlessforcedtofleethe

islandtoprotectthemselvesortokeepworking,thefewindependentbloggersand

journalistsmustcopewithdrasticrestrictionsonInternetaccess”.412

Takingstockofthesituationinaconversationwithaleadingbloggerinearly2018,it

seemsthattheGovernmentisratherpowerlessinitseffortstocurbthenewinformation

agents,particularlythenewsocialmedia.“Anewparallelculturehasestablisheditselfin

waysthattheGovernmentcannotcontrol”,heclaims:

“Thenewgraduatesfromthejournalismacademyshownoworryaboutworkingwith

unofficialandheavilyquestionedmedia,althoughthismightstopthemfromhavingacareer

asofficialjournalists.Suchcareersarenomoreattractive–youngpeoplenowfinditmuch

moreattractivetomakealivingoutsideoftheofficialCubansystem”(S/E).413

Inthissituation,theUSStateDepartmentdidnothelpindependentinformationworkers

withitslatestmeasure:tosetupataskforcetoexaminetechnologicalopportunitiesfor

expandingInternetaccessandindependentmediainCuba,rejectedbytheofficialCuban

newspaperGranmaasameasure“destinedtosubvertCuba’sinternalorder”.414

411SeewebsiteofUniondePeriodistasdeCuba(UPEC):www.cubaperiodistas.cu412https://rsf.org/en/cuba,2017edition,rankingCubaasno.173outof180countriesonits“PressFreedomIndex”(butwithascorewellaheadthatofbothVietnamandChina).Thesameorganizationalsopublishesalistof‘internetenemies’,whereCubaappearsasoneof12countries(alsoVietnamandChinaamongthem).Itisnoteworthy,though,thatnojournalistwaskilledinCuba,differentfromotherLatinAmericancountrieswithabetterpositiononthisranking.413Skypeinterview21.01.18withNorgesRodríguez,temporarilyresidingintheUS. 414”USStateDepartmentcreatesCubaInternetTaskForce”,Reuters,Havana,24.01.18.

318

Oneofthefewarenaswhereyoungpeoplecanexpressandexchangefrustrationsand

protestpubliclyisthroughmusic.Thesubculturesofhip-hop,rapandparticularly

Reggaeton,areattractinghugeinterestamongCubanyouth,andthetextsareoften

extremelycriticalanddirectlyconfrontational,condemningandinsultingaboutthe

Cubansystemanditsleaders,whileoftencheeringcapitalistandconsumerismvalues.

Thissubcultureevidentlyrepresentsacomplicatedchallengebutisgenerallytolerated.

Themusicbeingmostlyproducedandcirculatedunofficially(bicycletaxisbeingoneof

thesalesoutletsinHavana,forinstance).

Thebigquestioniswhetherthisculturemayleadyoungpeopleintoprotest,social

mobilisationofsomekind.Isitasafetyvalvefortheregime,orasourceofpotential

politicalmobilization?ItisinterestingtonotethateventheCommunistYouthLeague

(UJC)triestoattractpeoplebyorganisingReggaetonevents,inatoughbalancingact

betweenstayingintouchwithyouthtrendsandinspiringanti-regimesentiments.The

CubansociologistNoraGámezinaPhDdissertationaboutthisphenomenon,discusses

whetherthismusicis“arehearsalofpolitics,[or]aformofpoliticsitself”;“apainful

reminder[…]oftheincreasinggapbetweenemergentvaluesrootedineverydaylife

experienceandsocialistideology”:

“Atthedeepestlevel,though,Reggaetonconstitutesachallengeforthedominantideology

[…]inwhichtheunderclasshasmanagedtobreakintotheculturalspherewithout

permission.[…][R]eggaetonposesachallengetothedominantideologyanditssymbolic

controlovertheconstructionofreality,overtheconstructionofidentitiesandthe‘right’,

‘correct’valuesinanallegedlysocialistsociety.[…]WhatReggaetonrevealsdramaticallyis

whatthestatepreciselywantstoconceal,thatineverydaylife,socialistvalueshavelost

considerablespaceandthatpeoplehavestartedtoadjusttheirmentalitiestothekindof

post-socialisteconomywehavehadforthepasttwodecades”(GámezTorres2012)(S/E).415

Indicator6.5:Morerespectfordissenters?

Theconcept‘dissenter’(disidente)intheCubanpoliticalvocabularynormallymeansa

personoragroupthatrejectstheentirelegitimacyofthepresentregime.Butthereare

415AshorterversioninSpanishappearedinRevistaTemas,No.68/2011.NoraGámezTorreshaslatersettledinMiamiandbecomealeadreporteronCubanissuesinMiamiHeraldandElNuevoHerald.

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ofcoursegroupsthatfindthemselvesindifferentplacesbetween‘thegreyzone’we

referredtoabove,andthedissentercategory.

OneofthebeststudiesofthisspectreofpoliticalexpressionsisthePh.D.dissertation

donebyGeoffrey(2012),coveringthe1989-2009period.TheveryFrenchtitleofher

dissertation,ContesteràCuba,leavesconsiderabledoubtsaboutthephenomenonsheis

discussing:theFrenchwordcontestermaybetranslatedasdifferentlyaschallenge,

dispute,contestorevenprotest.Herobjectivehasbeenpartlytounderstand“how

contentiousdynamicshaveemergedandenduredthroughtimewithoutundergoing

severerepression”,andpartlyto“graspwhattheexistenceofthistoleratedcontention

tellsusaboutthewaypoweriswieldedinsuchacontext.”This“hybridrepertoire”of

practices,sheargues:

“[A]llowsthemtonegotiatespaceforaction,accordingtothelevelsofgovernment.

Authoritiesgrantthemsomespacebecausethatthisallowsfortheregulationand

containmentofcontention,throughtheuseofaspecificmodeofcoercion,whichisbasedon

uncertaintyandarbitrariness.”416

TheCubandissentercommunitythatexpressesanopenconfrontationtotheCuban

regimeandarguesforitsoverthrow,hassofarhadminimalinfluenceandrelevance

insideCubaasopposedtotheconsiderableattentionithasreceivedinternationally.This

ispartlybecausetheyhaveverylimitedmeanstocommunicatewithinCuba.Butitis

alsoveryquestionablewhethersignificantsegmentsoftheCubanpopulationreally

wantanall-outconflictthatwouldlogicallyfollowfromthepositionstakenbythe

dissentercommunity.

TherearedozensofdissentergroupsinCuba.Thebestknownamongthese—all

consideredbytheCubanGovernmentaspawnsoftheUSgovernment—aretheDamas

deBlanco,LadiesinWhite,consistingofwivesandmothersofpreviouspolitical

prisoners;theCubanHumanRightsandNationalReconciliationCommission;andthe

416QuotestakenfromtheEnglishrésuméofherdissertation:http://www.theses.fr/2010IEPP0027

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importantVarelaproject417,headedbyOswaldoPayáuntilhewaskilledinacar

accidentinJuly2012.AfterPaya’sdeaththerewereaccusationsfromhisfamilythatthe

Cubangovernmenthad,inonewayortheother,maybebeeninvolvedinaplotagainst

him.Afterhisdeath,hisdaughterRosaMaríaPayáhascontinuedtheworkinhisname

buttakenamuchmoreconfrontationalpositionthanherfather,e.g.condemningex-

PresidentObama´srapprochementpolicyandsupportedPresidentTrump.Sheisnow

directingtheorganizationCubadecide,withaproposal(similartothatofherfather)to

haveabindingreferendumwiththequestionofwhetherpeoplewantachangetowards

democracy.418ShehasachievedaquiteimpressivesupportfromseveralLatinAmerican

ex-PresidentsandtheOASSecretaryGeneralLuísAlmagro,expressedforinstance

duringtheApril2018SummitoftheAmericas.419

TheCubandissentercommunityhasmanyfaces,butgenerallyitarguesforatotal

changeofregimeanditsquickestpossibledissolution.Oneofitsmoreprominent

representatives,AntonioRodiles,wholeadstheorganisationEstadodeSats,responds

withanabsolute“no”whenaskedwhetherhebelievesinreconciliation,adding:“What

Castroismhastodoisdie.Itwouldbelikereconcilingwithsuchnefariouscharactersas

PolPotorVidela”.Likemanyothersamongthedissenters,heopenlyopposedthe

Obamanormalizationpolicy(andtoldMrObamaso,inwhatwasconsideredquite

impoliteterms,whenhetookpartintheUSpresident´smeetingwiththedissentersin

HavanainMarch2016),andlikewiseconsiderstheTrumpelectiontobegoodnewsfor

Cuba:”[B]ecauseitwillendtwoyearsofindolencetowardswhathappensinour

country.Ifounditexcellentthathe(MrTrump)calledCastroa‘brutaldictator’whenhe

diedandthatheisintegratingintohisteamCuban-Americanscommittedtothecause”

(S/E).420

417Theprojectmanagedtocollectmorethantheminimum10,000signaturesrequiredtodemandareferendumonaproposalforaconstitutionalreformthatwouldhaveintroducedaseriesofcivicandpoliticalfreedomsinCuba,laterrejectedbytheNationalAssembly.418https://cubadecide.org41914ymedio11.04.18:http://translatingcuba.com/paya-award-winners-former-presidents-in-support-of-democracy/420”AntonioRodiles,opositorcubano:’DonaldTrumpesbuenanoticiaparaCuba’”.ElPaís,24.12.16.AsanexampleofthewideningspaceevenforanunconditionalenemyoftheregimelikeRodiles,thisinterviewwasmadeinMiami,afterhisvisittoMadrid,afterwhichhereturnedsafelytoHavana(whereheisthevictimofconstantharassmentanddetentions,butstillcarriesonhispoliticalactivism).Veryinterestingly,itwasRodiles’organisationEstadodeSatsthatmanagedtogetholdoftheinfamousvideoofMiguelDíaz-CanelfromFebruary2017.Manyobserversareaskingthemselveshowthiscouldhappen,andwhetherthishadbeenpossiblewithoutsomekindoflinksbetweenhisorganisationandtheCubanintelligence.

321

RodilesisopenlyarguingfortheneedtooverthrowthepresentCubangovernment.But

heisstillallowedtotraveloutofthecountryandreturn.

ThecrackdownondissenthasbeenfluctuatinginCuba.Aftertheconvictionof75

dissenterstolongprisonsentencesin2003,itwasseenasanothersignofRaúlCastro´s

reformprogramwhentheCardinalsucceededtonegotiatetheirliberationin2010.

Sincethen,‘dissenter’movementshavegenerallybeentolerated,althoughfrequently

subjectedtotheinfamousactosderepudio(demonstrationsofrepudiation)bypro-

governmentthugswhentheydemonstratepublicly,andthenbeingdetainedforsome

hoursbeforebeingreleased.Thispatternofshort-termarbitrarydetentionhasbecome

moreandmorethenorm,probablyincreasingaftertherapprochementwiththeUS

started.Thisisexpressedthroughconstantintimidationandbullying.TheCubanHuman

RightsCommissionclaimsthatthenumberofarbitrarydetentionshassteadily

increased,from2,074in2010to9,351in2016,butthensurprisinglyenoughdropped

quitedrasticallyagainto5,155in2017.421Thereasonmaysimplybethatsomany

dissentershaveleftthecountryorbeensilenced.422Inacontrarytrend,therearesigns

thatrestrictionsfordissentersandindependentjournaliststotravelabroadhave

increasedin2017,withtheGovernmentincreasinglyapplyingsomeoftheexception

rulesofthereformedMigrationLaw.

Thesamehumanrightscommissionclaimsthatthereare140politicalprisonersinthe

country,whileAmnestyInternationalinits2016/2017Reportfoundonlyone‘prisoner

ofconscience’.423

Itisdifficulttoforecasthowmuchtolerancetherewouldbeifthequiteharmlessprotest

anddissentthatexistsnowturnsintoamorethreateningconfrontation,whichquite

421http://ccdhrn.org/informes-mensuales-de-represion-politica/422ThisistheexplanationgivenbythetwodirectorsofCubaPosible,interviewedinFebruary2018.423Inits2015/2016reportonCuba,AIsummarisedthehumanrightssituationinthefollowingway:“Despiteincreasinglyopendiplomaticrelations,severerestrictionsonfreedomsofexpression,associationandmovementcontinued.Thousandsofcasesofharassmentofgovernmentcriticsandarbitraryarrestsanddetentionswerereported.”https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/Regardingprisonersingeneral,Cubaisnumber7onthelistofprisonerspercapitaintheworld(510per100,000inhabitants),alistheadedbytheUS(730).RussiahasaboutthesameindexasCuba,whileChinaandVietnamhavemuchlowerfigures(seeInternationalCentreforPrisonStudies,http://www.prisonstudies.org/).

322

likelycouldoccurasmorepluralistsocialstructuresandsocio-economicdifferentiation

emerge,andsocialmediabecomesmoregenerallyavailable.Thiswillparticularlybethe

caseinthepost-Castroera,withtheprobablereductioninsupportandlegitimacythis

wouldimplyfortheregime.IfweuseChinaasanexample,whereonaveragethereare

reportedly2,600strikes,riotsandconfrontationswiththepoliceeveryday(Göbeland

Ong2012),thiswouldrepresentapproximately20suchconfrontationsdailyinCubaif

wecomparetothepopulationsize.Thatwouldbeareallytoughchallengetohandle,

andtherewouldbeanincreasingdilemmabetweenlosingthepoliticalcontroland

takingverytoughsecuritymeasureswhichmightriskpropellingtheconfrontationand

internationalprotestevenmore.Itisprobablyfarmoredifficulttocontrolsuch

contradictionsinCubathaninculturallymorecollectiveandclosedsocietieslikeChina

andVietnam.

Anti-systemcritics,ofcourse,directtheirattacksatthePartyandtheState,andthe

Castrosthemselves.Thiscriticismisnowalittlemorevisibleforthosewhohaveaccess

totheInternet,throughbloggersandevenanindependentinternet-dailylike14ymedio,

andthroughanincreasingnumberofindependentjournalistnetworks(ref.Noteon

Sources,Appendix2).Theproblem,ofcourse,isthelimitedInternetaccessandthefact

thatcriticalwebsites(like14ymedio)areblockedfromordinaryInternetaccessinCuba.

Buttheexistingnetworkofnon-officialinformantsisnowsowidelyspreadaroundthe

countrythatthereishardlyanyprotest,confrontation,ordetentiontakingplacewithout

beingreportedandmadeavailabletothepublic.

TheUSInterestSectioninHavanarecognisedthisinacommuniquéalreadyin2009,

latermadepublicbyWikileaks,sayingthatitsawverylittleevidencethatthemessage

fromtheprincipaldissidentorganisationshadanyresonanceamongtheordinary

Cubans,andthatthebloggersrepresentafarmoreseriouschallengetothe

Government.424

Perhapsinanefforttochallengethissituation,a15daystaywithSolidarityleaderLech

WalesainPolandinmid-2013mayhaveconvincedsomedissidentleaders,amongthem

424”US-CubaChillExaggerated,butOldWaysThreatenProgress”,Wikileaks,USInterestSectioncable,January62010.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10HAVANA9.html

323

thewinneroftheEuropeanParliament´sSakharovprizeGuillermoFariñas,tochange

strategy,realisingthatpoliticaldemandsarenotwhatmobilisepeople.

“Walesatoldusthat[…]wewerefocusingonpoliticaldemandsandthatweshouldrather

concentratemuchmoreonsocialproblems[...]theideaistodothingssothatpeople

perceiveusastheirdefenders.[…]Wewillrelegatethepoliticaldemandsbecauseweneed

morepopularsupportbeforewecanpromotethem”,hesaidinatelephoneinterviewwitha

Miamijournalist.425

Attemptsbythedissidentstoteamupwithprotestsbyself-employedworkershaveso

farnotbeensuccessful.Thepositionofthedissidentmovementsimplyseemstobetoo

weaktomakeitattractiveforthosewhoareexpressingsocialprotest—itmayratherbe

seenasacounterproductivemovetobeassociatedwiththedissidents.

Arelativelynewphenomenonperhapsworthwatchingistheso-calledMunicipiosde

Oposición(Municipalitiesinopposition),ofwhichafewhavemadesomepublic

appearancesparticularlyinSantiagodeCuba.Theparticularityoftheirworkisthatthey

claimtobecollectingconcretecomplaintsanddemandsfromthepopulationand

presentthemdirectlytothelocalauthorities,andthenpublishtheresultoftheirwork

throughtheInternet.426

Althoughopenoppositionordissidentmovementsareratherunknownamongordinary

Cubans,theyoftenreceivemuchinternationalattention,e.g.leadingtheEuropean

ParliamenttoawardnolessthanthreeCubandissenterstheprestigiousSakharovPrize:

OswaldoPayáin2002,LadiesinWhitein2005,andGuillermoFariñasin2010.Frankly,

noneofthesegroupsrepresentanysignificantpoliticalforceinthecountry,partlydue

toaveryeffectivegovernmentpolicytoinfiltrate,silence,ignore,andbanthemfrom

publicprotest.

Theofficialinternationalhumanrightscommunity,representedbytheUNhumanrights

system,hasheldarelativelylowprofilewhenitcomestohumanrightsviolationsin

Cuba.OfcourseCuba´smaincritics,ledbytheUS,hasusedtheUNHumanRights

CounciltocriticiseCuba.ButbymobilizingsympatheticcountriesfromtheThirdWorld,

425JuanTamayoinElNuevoHerald,30.10.13. 426http://www.municipiosdeoposicion.com

324

andbythatsucceedtositalmostcontinuouslyontheUNHumanRightsCouncil,Cuba

hasbeenabletocounter-attack.ThefactthattheUNHighCommissionerforHuman

RightsinDecember2015forthefirsttimesincelongexpressedastrongcondemnation

ofarbitrarydetentionsandotherhumanrightsviolationsinCuba,maymarkan

increasingmainstreaminternationalconcernandnewquestioningofCuba´smoral

status.

IfCubawouldconsiderintroducinganelectronicsurveillanceandblacklistingsystem

similartotheChineseSocialCreditSystem,itcouldmeanadrasticincreasein

repression.427Thismeasureshowsthefrighteningpotentialofinformaticstechnologyin

anauthoritariansociety.

Indicator6.6:Emerging“agentsofchange”?

AkeyquestioninatransformationprocessliketheoneinCubaistoidentifytheagents

ofchange.WhoaretheagentsofchangeintheCubansociety?Theveryconcepthas

becomeutterlysensitive,aftersomeofRaúlCastro´sopeningspeechremarksatthe7th

PartyCongress,apparentlyasaresponsetoPresidentObama´sappealtothesupportfor

reformpreciselyfromsomeofthesesocialforces:

“Wearenotnaïve,nordoweignoretheaspirationsofpowerfulexternalforcesthatare

committedtowhattheycalltheempowermentofnon-stateformsofmanagementinorderto

generateagentsofchangetoendtheRevolutionbyothermeans"(Castro2016)(S/E).

ThereislittledoubtinourviewthatchangeinCubawillcontinuetooriginatefrom

withinthebroaderframeworkoftheofficialleadershipandtoleratedcritics—perhaps

increasinglyfromdisaffectedself-employed,andperhapsfromanincreasingexchange

betweenthetwo.Thespaceforintellectualandcriticaldebatehasebbedandflowed

overthelatestyears.Theneweconomicactorsarecautiouslystartingtogetorganised

andmobilisedindefenceoftheirinterests,andthegovernmentisgettingincreasingly

confusedabouthowtodealwiththis.RaúlCastroisprobablyrightthatthislattergroup

willbecrucialforthestrengthoftheagentsofchange,particularlyifmoredialogueis 427Seehttps://theconversation.com/chinas-social-credit-system-puts-its-people-under-pressure-to-be-model-citizens-89963

325

establishedwithacademics(economistsandothers)andthepro-dialogueandreform-

orientedpartofcivilsocietyinthepost-Castroera.

WhenitcomestothenewgenerationofleadersgraduallytakingoverafterApril2018,it

isobviouslyveryimportanttodiscussfromwheretheycome,whotheyare,andwhat

theystandfor.Wecandothis,aswehavedonepreviouslyinthischapter,by

distinguishingbetweenpartyandgovernmentinsiders,militaryandothertechnocrats,

academicsandintellectualsworkingwithinthesystem,newentrepreneurs,church

people,anddissenters.WewillreturntothisdiscussionunderChallenge9.

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Challenge 7: Differentiation of State vs. Party functions; division of state powers

(legislative vs. executive)?

Indicator7.1:CommunistPartyshowinganysignofopeningup?

AslongastheCommunistPartyhasamonopolystatuswithatotalcontroloverstate

affairs,thepoliticalarenaisbasicallynotinthepositiontochange.InRaúlCastro´s

statementtothePartyConferenceinJanuary2012(afollow-uptotheSixthParty

Congressheldhalfayearearlier),428heannouncedthatthereshouldbeanincreasing

differentiationofstateandpartyfunctions.Thishas,onlytoaverylittleextent,been

followedup,apartfromsomeexperimentationintwopilotprovinces(Artemisaand

Mayabeque).AcademiccentresthatusedtofallundertheCentralCommitteehavebeen

movedtovariousgovernmentinstitutions;andvariouspoliticalvettingprocedureshave

alsobeentakenoutofpartycontrol.Butmoreimportantly,thepartyseemstobe

constantlylosingitspositionasanarenaforpoliticaldebateandinitiatives.

Ofcourse,withRaúlCastroleavingthePresidencyoftheRepublictoDíaz-CanelinApril

2018,butstayingonasPartyleader,therewilldefactobeaseparationoffunctions.

AlthoughDíaz-CanelassuredtheNationalAssemblyonhisfirstspeechafterbeing

electedthatRaúlCastrowouldstillbeconsidered“theleaderoftherevolutionary

process”(seemoreunderIndicator9.2),whileRaúlsaidthatDíaz-Canelwouldtake

overaspartyleaderin2021.ItremainstobeseentowhatextentDíaz-Canelwillbeable

toekeouthisownpoliticalspaceandthusestablisharealdistinctionbetweenPartyand

Stateleadership.

ItisinterestingtocomparethesituationinCubatothatinVietnam,wheretherehave

beenfrequentcasesofpoliticalinitiativesfromlowerpartyorgansmanagingtooverrule

thewillofthePartyhierarchy,includingatthe2016PartyCongress(ref.chapter4.9.5).

Suchopeninternaldissentaboutelectionstotoppoliticalpositionsissofarunheardof

inCuba.PracticallyalldecisionsoftheNationalAssemblyareunanimous,inaccordance 428PartyConferencewasanewinstitutioninCuba(heldneitherbeforenorafter),intendedtodiscussthepoliticalissuesthatwerenotproperlydiscussedatthePartyCongress.Thisonlyhappenedtoaverylimiteddegree,anditwasgenerallyconsideredasagoodintentionbyRaúlCastrothatitwasneverpossibletorealize.

327

withtheofficialproposal,andwehardlyeverhearaboutanydisagreementintheParty

CentralCommitteeletalonePolitburo,evenwhentherewereapparentlytough

contradictionsasinthepreparationtothe7thCongress.RaúlsaidintheAsamblea

NacionalinJune2015thattheintentionwastodefine‘anewsocialistmodel’and‘anew

socialpact’tobeapprovedbythe2016PartyCongress.Afterseveralsessionsofthe

CentralCommittee,noagreementonthesedocumentswasreachedbeforetheCongress,

andtheCongresshadtorefertheproposalstofurtherdebate.Therewereapparently

heavycontradictions,butthepost-7thCongressdebatenevergavearealopportunityto

theanti-authoritarianforcestoexpresstheirviewappropriately,perhapsoutoffearfor

theemergenceofcleareralternativefactionswithintheparty.Thatpublicdebatewas

oncemoreputoff,untilthedocumentsofprinciplewerefinallyapprovedinmid-2017,

withoutanysignificantideologicalorpoliticalrenewalbeingnoticed.429

IncontrasttotheVietnamesePartyCongress,whichtookplacethreemonthsbeforethe

7thPartyCongressinCuba,therewasnoopendebatetakingplacewithintheCuban

CommunistParty;wehardlyeverheardaboutdivergingpositionsamongtheparty

leaders.ThelevelofexternalmonolithicunityinCubahasbeenquiteuniquecompared

toothersocialistsystems,presentorformer.WhetherthiswillchangeaftertheCastro

brothersleavepowerremainstobeseen.

ProbablythemostopenrecentpoliticaldiscussionwithinCuba´sCommunistPartytook

placeinthemonthsleadinguptothe6thPartyCongressin2011,i.a.withanopendebate

inanumberofwebsites(includingCubadebate).AccordingtoRaúlCastro´sopening

speech,atotalof8.9millionpeoplehadparticipatedindiscussionmeetingsaboutthe

Guidelines,andtwothirdsoftheoriginalproposalswereamended.Noneofthemwereof

greatideologicalorpoliticalimportance(perhapsapartfromthedivergingopinions

aboutthecontinuationoftherationingsystem.ButRaúldidstate,probablyhonestly:

“therewasinnowayunanimity[abouttheGuidelines],andthatwaspreciselywhatwe

wantedifwetrulypretendedtohaveademocraticandseriousconsultationwiththe

people”(Castro2011)(S/E).

429ThedocumentsaresummarisedunderIndicator8.1.

328

WhenthePartywaspreparingtheideologicaldocumentsforthe7thPartyCongressfive

yearslater,thedebate—differentlyfromfiveyearsearlier—waskeptbehindclosed

doors.

Indicator7.2:WilltherebeanyvisiblestepsawayfromtheCommunistParty

powermonopoly?

WhenRaúlCastro’sreformprocessstarted,formalisedatthe6thPartyCongressin2011,

therewasageneralexpectationthatthenextCongressin2016wouldtakethe

qualitativestepsforwardtoconsolidateanddeepenthereforms,renewtheleadership

oftheParty,anddefineanewfutureforCuba.

Forthesereasons,andinordertounderstandhowtheCubanCommunistPartyworks,

wehavemadearatherdetailedanalysisofthelatestCongress,the7th,inApril2016.

The7thCongressofthePCCtookplaceagainstthebackdropofandonlyfourweeksafter

USPresidentBarackObama´shistoricandspectacularvisittoCuba(ref.Indicator5.2),

inmid-April2016.Ifmostobservers—thisauthorincluded—hadbelievedthatthevisit

hadservedtostrengthenthepro-reformforcesoftheParty,alsointheirrapprochement

totheUS,itwouldsoonbecomeclearthattheimmediateeffectofthevisithadrather

beentomobilisestrongcounter-forces.Itwasconspicuoustoseehowquicklyand

radicallythehighlypositiveatmosphereinwhichPresidentObamawasreceivedbyhis

Cubancounterpart,waschangedtoacoolanddirectlyhostileattitudetoPresident

Obama,andtheUSingeneral,atthePartyCongress(seeBye2016).

Thecounter-forceswerefasttopresenttheirstrongobjectionsthroughtheState

TelevisionandotherPartymediatheverymomentObamahadfinishedhishistoriclive

speechthroughthesamechannel;initselfatremendousconcessiontothehistoric

enemywhichmayhavetriggeredpartofthecounter-reaction.Buttheseriousnessof

thesereactionswasmostsignificantlyconfirmedafewdayslater,throughavery

negativeandsarcasticcommentarybyex-PresidentFidelCastro,reprimandingMr

329

Obamaforhiswishtolookforwardstoanormalisedrelationshipratherthan

succumbingtotheelderCastro´snever-endinginsistenceonhistoricenmities.430

ThereisreasontobelievethatthisReflexiónbytheRevolution´shistoricleadergavethe

greenlighttotherenewedcampaignbypartyhardlinersorintransigents431thatcameto

fullfruitionatthePartyCongress.ItwashardtorecogniseRaúlCastro´ssmilingand

friendlyencounterwithObama,intheharshwordshepresentedinhislongopening

speech,theCentralReporttothePartyCongress(Castro2016).Raulclearlyechoedhis

elderbrother’sunmistakenpushbackagainstObama’ssoft-powercharmoffensive.He

defendedCuba’ssingle-partyandmonolithicpoliticalsystem,accusingWashingtonof

seeking“todivideusintoseveralpartiesinthenameofsacrosanctbourgeois

democracy",andcontinued:

"Iftheymanagesomedaytofragmentus,itwouldbethebeginningoftheend—don´tyou

everforgetthis—iftheymanagetofragmentusitwouldbethebeginningoftheendinour

homeland,oftheRevolution,socialismandnationalindependence[…]"(S/E).

EvenmoreconspicuouswerethehardwordsdeliveredtothePartyCongressbyForeign

MinisterRodríguez,themostdirectlyinvolvedintheObamavisit,whichhenowsaid

hadproduced“anattackindepthonourunderstanding,ourhistory,ourcultureandour

symbols”432(S/E).

ItwasasifthosewhohadorganisedPresidentObama´svisit—andperhapseventhe

rapprochementmoreingeneral—nowfeltobligedtoexpressstrongself-criticismand

confessionofsins,andadmitthatthefearsoftheintransigentswerefullyjustified:the

previousrecognitionofObama´shistoricaldeparturefromthePlattistdoctrinewasno

morerelevant.Whatwasevenmorestrikingaswediscusselsewhere:severalsignals

nowindicatedareversalofbotheconomicandpoliticalreformtrends.

430FidelCastro,”ElhermanoObama”,publishedinGranma27.03.16.431Amorepreciseconcept,ratherthan’hardliner’or‘conservative’,maybetheSpanishconcept’intransigente’,whichmaybebesttranslatedtoEnglishas’uncompromising’.Fidelwasalwaysproudofbeingseenasintransigent,andhismostloyalfollowerssawthisasoneofhismostvaluablecharacteristics.Thisisprobablyaveryimportantinspirationforthosewhocontinuetodefendthehistoricaspectsofrevolutionaryprinciplesupagainstthereformprocess,beitintheformofmarketreformsorappeasementwiththeUS.Wewillthereforemostlyusethisconceptinthecontinuation,whenreferringtothosewhoseemtobeattemptingtorollbackthereformtrendsfollowingthe7thPartyCongress.432Quotedby14ymedio,19.04.16.

330

Castro´sCentralReporttothe7thPartyCongressalsoannouncedasurprisingreturnto

anideologicaloffensive,referringexplicitlytotheyouth,theintellectualsandtothose

whowereworkinginthenon-statesector,“thosesectorsthattheenemyidentifyasthe

mostvulnerable”,goingontostatethatthePartyneedsto:

“[…][S]afeguardthepeople'shistoricalmemoryofthenationandrefinethedifferentiated

ideologicalwork,withspecialemphasistowardsyouthandchildren,wemuststrengthen

amongusananti-capitalistandanti-imperialistculture,fightingwitharguments,conviction

andfirmnessthepretensionstoestablishpatternsofpettybourgeoisideologycharacterised

byindividualism,selfishness,theprofitmotive,banalityandexacerbationofconsumerism”

(Castro2016)(S/E).

Thelatterquotemaysignalthatthisabout-turninthereformprocessandinthe

warmingofrelationswiththeUSwasmoreideologicallythaneconomicallymotivated.

TheprominenteconomistCarmeloMesa-Lago(2016)presentedthefollowing

hypothesistoexplainwhathappened:“theObamavisitgeneratedasupportinthe

populationandachangedynamicforwhichtheCubangovernmentwasnotprepared”.

Inalaterinterviewheadded:“TheGovernmentpanicked.Fromthenontherehasbeen

aparalysis[ofthereforms].Thehardlinergroup,themostorthodox,cameout

strengthened”.433

ThefearofthePartyhardliners,itseems,wasthatthedisappearanceoftheenemy

imageofUSimperialism,togetherwiththeopeningofeconomicrelationsnot

completelycontrolledbythestate;andtheemergenceofnewsocialactorswiththe

characteristicsofamiddleclassthatcouldendangerthemonolithicpoliticalpower.It

mustprobablybeunderstoodasanattackonthedangersrepresentedbythecausal

effectsdiscussedinthisdissertation:thepoliticalconsequencesofeconomicreformand

rapprochementwiththeUS.

433CarmeloMesa-Lago:“ElGobiernocubanoentróenpánicotraslavisitadeObama”MaiteRico,ElPaís,Madrid,1.07.17(re-printedin14ymedio).

331

IntheweeksandmonthsfollowingthePartyCongress,wesawseveralexamplesofa

newideologicaloffensive,carriedoutbyagroupoforthodoxPartyactivists(seethe

sectiononIdeologyunderIndicator8.2).

Beforethe7thPartyCongresscametogether,conventionalwisdomamongCuba

watcherswasthattheapparentlyincreasingoppositiontonormalisationwiththeUSin

certainpartsofthepowerapparatusmightbeseenasalatespasmfromforcesthat

werelosinglegitimacy.Astheabovequotesillustrate,theseforcesactuallyseemedto

havestrengthenedtheirpositioninthetopechelonsoftheParty,resistingademocratic

openingandastrengthenedmarketeconomy.

Thecontradictionduringthespringweeksof2016betweentheeuphoricreceptionof

thecharismaticPresidentObamawithfullfamily,theRollingStonesfreerockconcert,

thespectacularChanelfashionshowonHavana’smainpromenadestreetPaseodel

Pradoandallothersignsofchangeononeside,andasecretivePartyCongress,ledbya

groupofover-agedmenrepresentingthepastratherthanthefutureandbasically

rejectingallcallsforchange,couldnotbemoreconspicuous.

ThejustificationofdemocraticlimitationsinCubahasalwaysbeentheneedtokeepa

strongdefenceagainstthehistoricenemy,USimperialism.So,neweffortswouldnow

havetobemadetostopthisenemyimagefromfallingapart,sotosaybydefusingthe

friendlyfaceofPresidentBarrackObama.Cuba’sleadershipwasprobablyaslittle

preparedastherestoftheworld,foranextUSPresidenttobeelectedhalfayearlater:

DonaldJ.Trump.ButtheironicfactisthataUSPresidentwithMrTrump´s

characteristicsandpoliticaldiscourseagainstCubaismucheasiertofitintotheanti-

imperialistpicturethanthatofhispredecessor.

332

Indicator7.3:HowrepresentativearemembersandleadersoftheCommunist

Party?

Basedontwodifferentstudies434(Hernandez2014;LopezLevy2015),wemay

emphasisesomeinterestingaspectsofthedemographicandsociologicalcompositionof

thePCP.

Untilrecently,membershipoftheCubanPartywassignificantlyhigherthanthatofmost

countrieswithcomparableregimes(ChinaandVietnam,asthemostcommonlyused

cases).Figuresfrom2012435showthefollowing,withcomparativenumbersfiveyears

later):

Table9.1:MembershipintheCubanCommunistParty(PCC+UJC)Table 9

MembersofPCC: 769,318(670,000in2016)

MembersofUJC: 405,830

Total 1,175,148

PCCas%ofpopulation(11,4mill): 6,7%(5,9%in2016)*

PCC+UJCas%: 10,3%(9,1%in2016)*

PCC+UJCas%ofworkforce: 22,2%(Approximately20%in2016)*

*The2016percentagesdonottakeintoconsiderationapossiblereductioninUJC

membership,sincethisinformationisunavailable.

Sources:Hernandez2014;Castro2016

434López-Levysaidabouthisdatabasisthatheis”usingthedataIcollectedasacoderfortheGlobalLeadershipproject(Gerring,Oncel,Morrison,&Keefer,2014)andthedatacollectedbyRafaelHernandez(Hernandez,2/2014).MysampleincludedtheleadersofthePolitburo,theCentralCommittee,thefirstsecretaryofthepartyintheprovinces,thePCCSecretariat,theCouncilsofState,andtheCouncilofMinisters,themembersoftheNationalAssemblyandthepresidentsoftheProvincialAssemblies.”435FigurestakenfromHernández(2014),op.cit.

333

Bythetimeofthe7thPartyCongressfiveyearslater,RaúlCastrorevealedthatthe

numberofPCPmembershadfallenby100,000(to670,000),i.e.by13%(Castro2016).

Thegeneralimpressionisthatasignificantnumberofpeoplecontinuereturningtheir

membershipcardsinthePartyaswellastheyouthorganisation,andthatyoungpeople

generallydonotcaretojointhePartyranks.Whatusedtobeanecessityinorderto

makeacareerinCubaisbecomingirrelevant—alsobecauseofficialcareersarelosing

attraction.

Forthesakeofcomparison,thepercentageofcombinedmotherpartyandyouthwing

CPmembershiprelativetothepopulationis6.5%inChina,and4.7%inVietnam

(Hernandezibid.).436Totheextentthesefiguresarereliable,themembership

percentagewasstillsubstantiallyhigherinCubathaninitstwoCommunistsister

countries.Relativetotheworkingpopulation,1ofeach5workingCubanwasamember

oftheCommunistPartymovementin2016.Suchimpressivefiguresmayexpressa

situationofthepast.

Anotheraspecttonoteis—aswehavesaidbefore—that40%ofthepartymembersare

academics.

AsshowninTable9.2,thenon-whitepopulationhadexactlythesamepercentageof

partyaffiliatesastheirshareofthepopulationatlarge(35%),whilewomenwere

significantlyunder-represented(39%ofaffiliates).Intermsoftherepresentationofthe

twogroupsindecision-makingbodies,non-whiteswerenotfarfromtheirdemographic

shareofthepopulationintheCentralCommitteeandintheNationalAssembly.

436FigurestakenfrompubliclyavailablesourcespublishedonWikepedia.

334

Table9.2:PercentageofcolouredandwomeninleadingCubanbodies,2016Table 10

General

Population

Members

ofthePCP

Central

Committeeof

thePCP

Politburo National

Assembly

Blackand

mulatos

35% 35% 31% 26%(2011)

29%(2016)

36%(2013)

41%(2018)

Women 49.9% 39% 42%(2011)

44%(2016)

7%(2011)

24%(2016)

45%(2013)

53%(2018)

Source:Hernández2014,formembershipofthePCPandthe2011numbers;the2016

numbersarebasedonofficialinformationwhenthenewCentralCommitteewas

presented,Granma,20.04.16.2018figuresfortheNationalAssembly:cubadebate.cu,

12.03.18

Womenwereactuallyover-representedcomparedtotheirshareofpartyaffiliationin

boththesebodies.Inthetopdecision-makingbody,however,thePolitburo,therehas

beenaseriousunder-representationofbothgroups,althoughitwasimprovedthrough

electionsatthe2016Congress:thenon-whitesharerosefrom26to29%,whereasthe

femalepresencequadrupled,percentage-wisefrom7to24%.437

TherepresentationofwomeninleadingpoliticalbodiesinCubahasgonethrougha

gradualprogression.TheirrepresentationintheCubanParliament(AsambleaNacional

delPoderPopular)isshowninTable9.3.

437The2016numbersarebasedonofficialinformationwhenthenewCentralCommitteewaspresented,Granma,20.04.16.

335

Table9.3:RepresentationofwomeninCubanParliament:T

Year Percentageofwomen

1976 21.8

1981 22.7

1986 33.9

1993 22.8

1998 27.6

2003 36.0

2007 42.4

2013 45

2018 53.2

able 11

Source:(1976-2007):ProveyerCervanteset.al2015:417,Table42.1.2013-2018:Same

asTable9.2

Asof2018,Cubaisthethirdcountryintheworldwithamajorityofwomeninthe

nationalparliament–withRwandahavingadistantlead(61.3%)andBoliviabeingatan

equallevelofCuba.438

InthemoreselectiveparliamentarybodyStateCouncil,practicallyspeakingthehalf

(15/31)arewomen,whereasinthemoredecision-makingPresidencyofthisbodythe

femalerepresentationfallsto37.8%.

IntheParty’sdecision-makingbodies,womenhavealsoincreasedtheirpresencebut

fromamoremoderatepointofdeparture.TheCentralCommitteeelectedin2016has

44%women.Thetopdecision-makingbodyoftheParty,thePolitburo,hadavery

limitedfemalerepresentationbefore2016(only1outof14=7%).Thiswas

significantlyimprovedto4/17=23.5%in2016.Itseemstobeagreatconcerntohave 438 Official statistics of Inter-Parliamentary Union, downloaded 13.05.18: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

336

formalequalfemalerepresentationinthelargerbodies,whereasthepyramidnarrows

asitgetshigher.Thiscoincideswiththesituationinthelabourmarket.Inthehealth

sector,forinstance,70%ofallworkersand56%ofdoctorsarewomen,buttheyare

clearlyunder-representedinmanagementpositions.GenderresearchersinCuba

thereforestilltalkabouta“glassceiling”thatpreventswomenfromreachingdecision-

makingpositions(ProveyerCervanteset.al2015).

Intermsofincome,genderdiscriminationisprohibitedbylaw.Inreality,thereisstilla

salarygapforonemainreason:womentakemorefamilyresponsibility,particularlyfor

children,andthereforearemorefrequentlymissingwork.

Theprofessionalbackgroundofpartycadresisanotherrelevantfactor.Primaryand

middleschoolteachersareprominentatprovinciallevelandintheparty-affiliated

socialorganisations.Atthehigherlevel,inthePolitburoandintheCouncilofMinisters,

thedominantprofessionisengineers,someofthemcivilianandothersmilitary.Andthe

military,ofcourse,haveadominatingpositioninthePolitburo(seelaterinthissection

plusIndicator7.5).

Indicator7.4:MoredifferentiationbetweenPartyandStatefunctionsandleaders?

Cuba´slegislativebody,the605-memberstrongAsambleaNacionaldePoderPopular—

theNationalAssembly439—hasonlytwobriefordinarysessionseveryyear.In-between

thesesessions,thedefactolegislativefunctionistakencareofbythe31-memberstrong

ConsejodelEstado—theStateCouncil.

TheexecutivebodyistheConsejodeMinistros—theCouncilofMinisters.440

Thereisanoverwhelmingoverlapbetweenleadingpositionsinparty,legislativeand

executivebodiesinCuba,althoughitwassignificantlyreducedfrom2013to2018.

439Thenumberofdelegatesseemstohavebeenreducedfrom612in2013to605in2018.440ThecompositionofthenewPresidentDíaz-Canel’sCouncilofMinisterswillonlybeannouncedinJuly2018,afterthisThesiswassubmitted.Itremainstobeseenwhetherhewillsignificantlymodifytheheavyoverlapbetweenthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesofgovernmentthatweshowinthefollowing.

337

Table9.4:OverlapbetweenStateCouncilandPartyLeadershipTable 12

2013 2018

ShareofStateCouncil

Presidencydrawnfrom

Politburo

6/7=85% 4/7=57%

ShareofStateCouncil

generalmembersdrawn

fromPolitburo

12/15=80% 9/15=60%

ShareofStateCouncil

drawnfromCentral

Committee

23/31=74% 19/31=61%

• TheShareoftheStateCouncilPresidencydrawnfromthePolitburooftheParty

wasreducedfrom85%to57%.

• TheshareoftheStateCouncilmembersdrawnfromthePolitburowasreduced

from80%to60%.

• TheshareofStateCouncilmembersdrawnfromtheCentralCommitteeofthe

Partywasreducedfrom74%to61%.Weregisterthatonlyoneofthe11new

membersoftheStateCouncilelectedin2018wasamemberoftheCentral

Committee.

• 8ofthe15PolitburomembersarealsomembersofexecutivebodyCouncilof

Ministers,which7-memberPresidencyhasonlytwomembersfromoutsidethe

Politburo.OnlyonememberofCouncilofMinistersPresidencyisNOTmemberof

theCentralCommittee(EconomyMinisterRicardoCabrisas).

Furthermore,thereisageneraloverlapofmembershipbetweenthelegislativeand

executivebodies,thatistosaythatthesecrucialgovernmentfunctionshavenoreal

distinctionsintheircomposition:

• 5ofthe8membersofCouncilofMinistersPresidencyarealsomembersofthe

StateCouncil.

338

• 4ofthe7membersofStateCouncilPresidencyarealsomembersoftheCouncil

ofMinistersPresidency.

Fivetopcadrespersonifiedtheperfectcoincidencebetweenthepartyandthetwo

governmentbodiesuntil2018:

RaúlCastropersonallycombinedthetoppositionsofallthreebodies:FirstSecretaryof

theParty,PresidentoftheCouncilofMinistersandtheCouncilofState.

MachadoVenturawasSecondSecretaryofthePartyandleaderofitsSecretariat,and

memberofthePresidencyofbothCouncils.

Díaz-CanelwasmemberofthePolitburo,andFirstVicePresidentofbothCouncils(and

defactodeputyHeadofState).

RamiroValdéswasmemberofthePolitburo,andmemberofthePresidencyofboth

Councils.

MarinoMurillowasmemberofthePolitburo,memberofthePresidencyoftheCouncilof

Ministers,andordinarymemberoftheCouncilofState.Untilmid-2016hewasMinister

ofEconomyandPlanning;afterthathewasrelievedofthatpositioninorderto

concentrateonthetaskofcoordinatingtheCommissiontoimplementtheeconomic

reforms.

Ofthese,onlyDíaz-CanelandValdéswereelectedtothenewStateCouncilin2018,

whileMoralesOjedawasadded.

Thebottom-linehereisthatthereisnoconsiderationforchecksandbalancesinCuba´s

systemofgovernment:therehasbeenacompletecoincidenceofresponsibilitiesbetween

thetopoftheParty,theLegislative,andtheExecutivebodiesofGovernment.Raúl

Castrosignalledthatpartyandgovernmentfunctionsmustbemoredistinguished.It

remainstobeseenwhetherthereductioninoverlapbetweenPartyandStateCouncil

notedin2018willbeapermanentfeature,oronlyatemporaryconsequenceofthe

339

generationalchange.InhisfarewellspeechtotheNationalAssemblyinApril2018,Raúl

CastrodrewupaplanforDíaz-CaneltocombinethePartyandStateleaderfunctions

from2021(seeIndicator9/2).

Cubawasuntil2018basicallygovernedbyagroupof“12Apostles”ofwhichtherewas

aninnercoreofthefivelistedabove.Thesearetheelevenmenandonewomanwho

werere-electedtothePolitburoin2016:fivetopmilitary,tenwhite,threeintheir

eightiesandfourintheirmid-orlate-seventies.441

441WedidnotincludethefivenewcomerselectedtothePolitburoatthe7thPartyCongress,sincetheywereatthetimestillquiteinexperiencedintheCubanpowergameandmostofthemhadnoclearproperpowerbase(perhapswiththeexceptionoftheCTC(TradeUnion)SGNacimiento).ThisinnercircleofpowerbrokersprobablyalsoincludestheeconomyministerandVicePresidentoftheCouncilofMinisters,RicardoCabrisas,Raúl’ssonAlejandro,coordinatoroftheCommissionforNationalDefenseandSecurity,perhapssomemembersoftheCentralCommitteeSecretariatandafewofthemilitarycorporationmanagerslikeGAESACEORodríguezLopez-Callejas.

340

Table9.5:“TheTwelveApostles”ofCuba

(Until2018)Table 13

Born Partypos.

Legislative

(State

Council)

Executive

(Councilof

Ministers)*

Military

RaúlCastro 1931 1stSecr. President President Commander-in-

Chief

Machado

Ventura

1930 2ndSecr. Vice-Pres. Vice-Pres. SierraMaestra

Veteran

Díaz-Canel 1960 Politburo 1stVice-Pres. 1stVice-Pres. Sub-off,Mission

toNicaragua

Lazo

Hernandez

(black)

1944 Politburo Pres.Nat.As.

R.Valdés

Menendez

1933 Politburo Vice-Pres. Vice-Pres. Rev.

Commander

ValdésMesa

(black)

1950 Politburo Vice-Pres.

CintraFrías 1941 Politburo Member Min.ArmedForces General

Rodríguez 1958 Politburo Min.ForeignAffairs Officer,Angola

Murillo 1961 Politburo Vice-Pres.

(“Economicreform

czar”)

GraduateofNat.

DefenceCollege

Mercedes

Lopez-Acea

(coloured,

woman)

1964 Politburo

(Party

Secretary

Havana)

Vice-Pres.

LópezMiera 1943 Politburo Member 1stVice-Min.Armed

Forces

General

Espinosa

Martín

1939 Politburo Vice-Min.Armed

Forces

General

*AsitwascomposeduntilJuly2018

341

Ofthesetwelve,onlysixremainedintheirlegislativepositionsafterApril2018,while

onenew(MinisterofPublicHealthMoralesOjeda)wasadded.

InthehypotheticalcasethatadisagreementshouldemergebetweentheParliament

(includingStateCouncil)andtheParty,thereisnodoubtthatthePartywouldhavethe

finalsay.AnillustrationofthiscamewhentheNationalAssemblyinits1June2017

sessionwasinvitedto‘support’,butnotto‘approve’,thestrategydocumentsthat

originallyhadbeenpresentedtothe7thPartyCongress.FirstVicePresidentDíaz-Canel

madeitclearthat“everythingthatisapprovedhere[intheNationalAssembly]are

recommendationstobevaluedbythehigherinstancesoftheParty”442(S/E).Theofficial

launchofthefinalversionsofthesedocuments,onbehalfoftheParty,cameinthe

followingmonth(July2017).

Indicator7.5:AnychangeintheroleoftheMilitary?

“InCuba,thesupremepowerliesinthearmedforcesandnotintheState,the

GovernmentorevenintheCommunistParty”.443

442ReinaldoEscobar:”ElParlamentosecolocasunuevacamisadefuerza”.14ymedio,Havana,1.06.17.443RobertoÁlvarezQuinonez,ex-analystofGranmaandCubanTelevision,nowanalystwithTelemundo,quotedinElNuevoHerald(Miami)31.01.16“Cuba:JerarquíaySuceción”.

342

Theroleofthemilitaryinstitutionsandhighermilitaryofficersinthepartyand

governmentstructuresinpresent-dayCubamustbesoughtinacombinationofthe

militaryoriginsoftheCubanrevolution,andthenewroleascribedtothemilitary-

controlledcorporationsduringtheSpecialPeriodofthe1990s(ref.Indicator2.3).The

keytounderstandthisishowRaúlCastrobroughtinhismosttrustedmilitary

colleaguesforcrisismanagementofthestatecorporationsduringtheSpecialPeriod,He

repeatedthisthroughafullCabinetrenewalonceinfullchargeofthecountryafter

Fidel´sillness,afterfiringthe‘youngTalibans’thatFidelhadpromoted—allinMarch

2008.ItisimportanttorememberthatFidelleftittoRaúltotakefullcontrolofthe

ArmedForceseversincehebecamedefenceministerfromtheverybeginningofthe

revolutionaryregime,in1959.

The Cuban military hierarchy

• Raúl Castro Ruz, Comandante en Jefe (Four-star), Head of State and Government, First Secretary of PCC

Ramiro Valdés, Comandante histórico de la Revolución, Vice-President of State Council and Council of ministers, Member of Politburo PCC

• Leopoldo Cintra Frías: General de cuerpo de ejército (Three-star), Minister of Armed Forces, Member of Politburo PCC

• Álvaro López Miera: General de cuerpo de ejército (Three-star), First Vice Minister of Armed Forces and Joint Chief of Staff, Member of Politburo PCC

• Joaquín Quintas Solá: General de cuerpo de Ejército (Three-star), Vice- Minister of Armed Forces, Member of Central Committe PCC

• Ramón Espinosa Martín: General de división (Two-star), Vice Minister of Armed Forces, Member of Politburo PCC

• Julio César Gandarilla: Vicealmirante (Two-star), Minister of the Interior, Member of Central Committee PCC

• Onelio Aguilera Bermúdez, General de División (Two-star), Head of Oriental Army, Member of Central Committee PCC

• Raúl Rodríguez Lobaina, General de División, Head of Central Army, Member of Central Committee PCC

• Lucio Morales Abad, General de División (Two-star), Head of Occidental Army

• Leonardo Ramón Andollo Valdés, General de División, Deputy Joint Chief of Staff, Deputy Head of Gaesa and military representative in economic Reform Commission, member of Central Committee PCC

• José Amado Ricardo Guerra, General de Brigada, Secretary of the Council of Ministers (until 2018)

• Humberto Francis Pardo, General de Brigada, Head of Dirección de Seguridad Personal, Ministry of the Interior (and responsible for the elite anti-disturbance troops)

343

However,thereisadifferencebetweenthesetwocases:whilemanyofthecorporate

managerswererelativelyyoungerandalsoconstantlyreproducedthemselvesby

incorporatingyoungerpeople,veryfewyoungerofficershavebeenpromotedtoleading

politicalpositions.Itmaythereforeappearthattheincreasingmilitarydominanceinthe

economiclifeisnotmatchedonthepoliticalarena—wheremilitaryinfluenceactually

seemstobediminishing.

LookingatthemilitaryinfluenceinPartyandGovernmentinstitutions,therearesome

quitesignificantfacts:Threegenerals(RaúlCastroplustheMinisterandViceMinisterof

Defence)weremembersofallthreetoppowerbodiesuntil2018(Politburo,Councilof

MinistersPresidency,StateCouncilPresidency),andsowastheComandantedela

Revolución,RamiroValdés.

ThePolitburo,theleadingdecision-makingbodyoftheParty,isstill(afterthe2016

PartyCongress)anarenacontrolledbythe“Históricos”andtheoldmilitaryofficers.Two

areComandantedelaRevolución,anotherthreearefullgenerals,andatleasttwoothers

(MachadoVenturaandMurillo)haveamilitarybackground.Thethreetopmembersof

thecountry´smilitaryhierarchy,theMinisterandtwoViceMinistersofDefence,oneof

themalsotheJointChiefofStaff(LópezMiera),444allremainattheapexofthe

CommunistParty;whereasthenewMinisteroftheInterior,JulioCesarGandarilla

(replacingColoméIbarraandhissubstitute,FernandezGondín,whodiedinJanuary

2017)isonlymemberoftheCentralCommittee(notthePoliburo).445

Whilethemilitarydominancemightseemtobeoverwhelming,percentage-wiseitis

actuallyfalling.Evenmorenoteworthy,theremaininggeneralsatthetoparemorethan

70yearsoldandnoteligibleforre-electiontoPartypositionsin2021.Interestingly,no 444Bornin1943,LopezMieiraistheyoungestandallegedlythemostcapableofthe"historic"generals.HewasunderFidel’spersonalprotectionsince,attheageof14,hewentuptotheSierraCristaltofightagainstBatista'sarmy,alwaysunderFidel'sdirectcommand.LópezMieraistheFirstDeputyMinisteroftheMINFAR,headoftheGeneralStaff,andinpracticesaidtobemoreinday-to-daychargeoftheMinistrythantheminister,GeneralLeopoldoCintraFrías(“Polo”).445GeneralGondínwasthedeputyheadofthefirstreconnaissancemissionsentbyFidelCastrotoAngolainJuly1975(headedbyRaúlDíazArgüelles),preparingwhatbecamethelargestCubanmilitaryoperationabroad.HediedinJanuary2017andwasreplacedasMinisteroftheInteriorbyGandarilla,previouslyHeadofthedepartmentofcounter-intelligencefor16years,amanreportedtobeveryclosetoRaúlCastro.

344

youngerofficershavebeenaddedtothePolitburoonRaúl´swatch,noteventoreplace

thosegoingout(RosalesdelToroin2011,ColoméIbarrain2016),ortobalancethefive

youngerciviliansthatwerebroughtintothePolitburoin2016.Themilitarydominance

inthePolitburodroppedfrom50%(57%ifweincludeex-officers)to40%from2011to

2016,andwithoutnewpromotionsitwillalmostdisappearin2021.

IntheCentralCommitteeelectedin2016,wehaveidentifiedsevenremainingmilitary

officersalongwiththefivegenerals/ComandantesonthePolitburo,foratotalofless

than10%(withoutincludingothersthatmighthaveamixedcivilian-military

background).AmongthemaretheMinisteroftheInterior(Gandarilla),theoneVice

MinisterofDefence(JoaquínQuintaSolas)whoisnotonthePolitburo,andtwoofthe

threeregionalarmycommanders:OnelioAguileraBermúdez,ChiefoftheEasternArmy;

RaúlRodríguezLobaina,ChiefoftheCentralArmy.LucioMoralesAbad,Chiefofthe

WesternArmy,wasnotre-electedtotheCentralCommittee.Allthreeofthesearmy

generals,nowintheirfifties,werepromotedtotheirkeymilitarypositionsbetween

2007and2008,substitutingthepresentministerandviceministersofDefence.Theyall

hadahistoryofserviceinAngolaand/orEthiopia(LópezLevy2015).So,theCentral

Committeecontainsapowerfulgroupofmilitaryofficerswhomaycontinuebeyondthe

generationalchange,sotosaytherunners-uptothosesittingonthePolitburo.Butthey

representarelativelysmallshareofthissecond-hierarchicalbodyoftheParty.

Inthegovernmentbodies,themilitarypresencehasalsosubsidedsignificantlysince

RaúlCastrofilledtheministerialpositionswithhismilitaryconfidentsin2009.As

showninTable9.4,therewasaquitedramaticreductionofmeninuniforminthenew

StateCouncilelectedin2018,andbothhereandinthefullNationalAssemblytheynow

representquiteasmallgroup.Wheretheystillholdastrongpositionisinthe

PresidencyoftheCouncilofMinisters(atleastpriortotheappointmentofanew

CouncilofMinistersinJuly2018),wherepracticallyalleightmembersapartfromDíaz-

Canelarehigherofficersorhaveamilitarybackground.Theonlylineministriesstill

headedbymilitaryofficersareDefence,theInterior,InformaticsandCommunication

(MesaRamos),Transport(YzquierdaRodríguez—thelatterforsomereason

disappearedfromthePolitburoin2016),andTourism(MarreroCruz).

345

ApartfromthePresidencyoftheCouncilofMinisters,stillwaitingforthenew

President’sappointments,themilitarythereforeseemtohaveasignificantlyless

prominentroleinstatebodiesthantheyusedtohave,andlessthaninpartybodies.This

couldbeaninterestingdevelopment.

Table9.6:MilitarypresenceintopPartyandStatebodies

(Includingpersonswithprominentmilitarybackgroundnolongerinactivemilitary

service;inNationalAssemblyonlyactivemilitaryofficers)Table 14

2011-2016 2016-2021

Politburo 8/14=57% 6/17=35%

CentralCommittee 15/142=11%

2013-2018 2018-2023

StateCouncil 7/31=23% 3/31=10%

CouncilofMinisters* 13/33=40%

Lineministers 6/22=27%

NationalAssembly 22/605=3,5%

*UntilJuly2018consistingofthePresidency(8includingSecretary),22lineministers,

plusfournationalinstitutionswithministerialrank:BancoCentraldeCuba,Instituto

CubanodeRadioyTelevisón,InstitutoNacionaldeDeportes,EducaciónFísicay

Recreación,InstitutoNacionaldeRecursosHidraúlicos).

Source:OfficialCubansources

AllthisseemstobeinaccordancewithpreviousstatementsfromPresidentCastro,that

thedominantroleofthemilitaryappointedtotopgovernmentresponsibilitiesright

afterhetookoverasPresident,wasnotmeanttobepermanent.446

446Frank(2013:204)tellsofaninterestingepisodefromameetingbetweenRaúlCastroandCardinalOrtegawhentheymetinApril2010todiscussthereleaseofpoliticalprisoners:”TheCardinalaskedRaúlwhyhehadappointedsomanymilitarymentohisgovernment.Raúlsaidsimplythatthecountrywasincrisisandhehadturnedtomenheknewandtrusted,butthatthiswouldchangeovertime”.

346

Thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthemilitaryarelosingthepoliticalhegemonyin

Cuba.Whereciviliansbecomedominantamonglineministers,theymayinmanycases

beactingundersupervisionbymilitaryandsecurityheavyweights,sittingonthe

PresidencyoftheCouncilofMinisters.ThreeoftheCouncil´sVicePresidents(untilJuly

2018),havenolineministerresponsibilitybutratherasuperiorpoliticalresponsibility

vis-à-vislineministries:RicardoCabrisas,takingoverfromMurilloasMinisterof

Economyinmid-2016,isapreviousintelligenceofficer(fromDGI),andintimate

Fidelistaloyalist.447Hehasplayedakeyroleininternationaleconomicandinvestment

affairs,andisalsoseentobeasupervisoroftheMinistryofForeignTradeand

Investment.GeneralUlisesRosalesdelToro,memberofthePolitburountil2011,isa

previousJointChiefofStaffwhoisnowoverseeingtheministriesofagriculture,sugar

andfoodindustry.448AndRamiroValdés,theold-timerComandante,hasasimilarrolein

theenergy(andpossiblymining)sector.

WhendiscussingtherelativepowerpositionbetweentheMilitaryandtheParty,ithas

beenemphasisedthat—accordingtotheCubanConstitution—theMilitaryare

accountabletothePartyintheirqualityasPartyMembers(MilitantesdelPCC),butnot

theotherwayaround.AccordingtoArticle5oftheCubanConstitution,theCommunist

Partyissuperiortoallotherpowersofthecountry,includingtheNationalAssembly

(whichhastheprerogativetoelectallleadingmembersofthecountry´sexecutiveand

judicialpowers).Aslongastherehasbeenanalmosttotaloverlapbetweentheparty,

military,andgovernmentstructures,thiswasmoreofanacademicquestion.After2018,

however,withanon-militaryHeadofState(PresidentedelConsejodeEstado)whoisalso

byimplicationCommanderinChief,thatquestionmaybecomecrucial.Toputitbluntly:

willPresidentMiguelDíaz-Canelbeabletoexercisehissuperiorpowersvis-à-visthe 447CabrisasRuiz(bornin1938,manofcolour,fromapoorHavanafamily),wasneverpartoftheSierraMaestraguerrilla,didparticipateintheclandestineurbanactivitiesoftheJuly26thMovement.After1959hejoinedCuba’sGeneralIntelligenceDirectorate(DGI),becomingadistinguishedoperativeandchiefofDGI’sstationinCanadaforseveralyearsuntilhewasappointedDeputyMinisterofForeignTradein1970.Later,heworked directlywithFidelCastro(asspecialenvoy)inmattersconcerningCuba’sparticipationininternationalandregionalorganisations,andalsounderRaúlhemaintainsanimportantroleinCuba’sforeign policy.(Source:CubaTransitionProject,UniversityofFlorida,http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Organizational/Biographies/Ricardo%20Cabrisas%20Ruiz.pdf,downloaded7.07.16).448RosalesdelToro(bornin1942),veteranfromSierraMaestra,wasmemberofthePolitburountil2011.Hewaspartofthefirstinternationalmilitarymission(Algeria,1963),alsoinVenezuela(1967),andinAngola(whereheheadedtheSouthernTroops).During17years(1981-1997)hewasheadoftheGeneralStaff,beforehewasappointedtotwoministerialpositions(firstsugar,thenagriculture).(Source:CubaTransitionProject,op.cit.).

347

ArmedForces?ThatmaybethecrucialquestionaboutCuba´spoliticalfuture.Aslongas

hisMentorRaúlCastro,theundisputedauthorityinthearmedforces,staysinthe

positionasPartyLeader(until2021),thatisDíaz-Canel’sbestguaranteethatthe

generalswillbeloyal.Whathappensafter2021isanotherballgame.Ithasbeennoted

thatDíaz-Canelworkedcloselywithfourkeygeneralsinhispreviouspositionsas

provincialpartysecretary:twoofthedefenceviceministers(EspinosaMartínand

QuintasSolá),andwiththeyoungerandpossiblefuturetopcommandersAguilera

BermúdezandRodríguezLobaina.

Cuba´sNationalDefenceCouncil(ConsejodeDefensaNacional)ismandatedbythe

Constitutiontoexercisefullemergencypowerwhenastateofwaroremergencyhas

beendeclared.ThisCouncilhasuntilnowneverbeeninfunction.Duringsuch

exceptionalsituations,however,itwillbethemaximumorganofstateandpolitical

power,includingmilitarypreparationandarmedstruggle;interiorandsecurityorder;

foreignpolicy;economicandsocialactivities;thejudicialsystem;andcivildefence.The

DefenceCouncilwillconsistofthePresidentandVicePresidentoftheStateCouncilplus

fivemembersdesignatedbytheStateCouncil(i.e.theLegislature),followingproposal

byitsPresident.449

Thisconstitutionallybasedbodyhasuntilnowneverbeeninfunction.Instead,another

bodywithoutanyformallegalmandateandquitemysteriousrolewasestablishedand

seemedtoplayaprominentrolebehindthescenes:theNationalDefenceandSecurity

Commission(ComisióndeDefensaySeguridadNacional),whichaccordingtosome

observers“functionslikeaparallelgovernment”,450headedbyRaúl’sson,Interior

449Ref.homepageofCuba´sMinistryofDefence(MINFAR):http://www.cubadefensa.cu/?q=constitucion#(downloaded24.01.18).450JuanJuanAlmeida(sonofthelateguerrillacommanderJuanAlmeidaBosque,thedefactonumberthreeinCuba´spoliticalhierarchyaftertheCastrobrothersformanyyears),nowlivingintheUSandactingasaleadingcriticoftheCubangovernment,apparentlywellinformedaboutcertainsecretaspectsoftheCubangovernmentandmilitary,writingforMartíNoticias,downloaded1.08.16.AlmeidaclaimsthatthisCommissionisstructuredmuchinthesamewayasFidelCastro´sold“GrupodeApoyo”,withextra-officialsuperiorpowersaboveallformalinstitutions.HealsohasatheoryaboutsuperiorpowerstobeexercisedfromRaúlCastro´sresidence(LaRinconada),wherehegathershisfamilyforSundaylunchandtakesallmajorpartyandstatedecisionstogetherwithhisclosestfamilymembers.

348

MinistryCoronelAlejandroCastroEspín,whoissupposedlyalsotheCoordinatorofthe

IntelligenceandCounterintelligenceServices.451

“This‘parastatal’groupwithunlimitedpowersandwithoutanylegalprovision,worksasa

parallelgovernmentwithi.a.thefollowingfunctions:planning,directingandinspectingthe

servicesoftheministriesandthebodiesofStateSecurity;participatingintheregulationand

controlofallentitiesascribedtoandlinkedwiththecentralbodiesofStateadministration;

exerciseandsupervise,underhisresponsibility,thefunctionsentrustedbythePresidentof

theRepublic”(Almeida,asquotedinpreviousfootnote,op.cit.).

AccordingtosourcesinHavana,sofarnotofficiallyconfirmed,thisCommissionceased

toexistshortlybeforetheelectionofanewPresidentinApril2018.452Therehasbeena

lotofspeculationabouttheroleofAlejandroCastro,withmanyexilecommentators

claimingthathehasbeenselectedbyhisfathertosucceedhimasthefuturesuperior

leaderofthecountry.

AlejandroCastrowasalsopartofthetop-secretgroupthatpreparedtheprocesstostart

normalisationbetweenCubaandtheUS.TheUSnegotiatorsactuallytalkverypositively

abouthisroleinthatprocess,inspiteofhisheavyanti-imperialistrhetoric.453Hehas

alsobeenveryactivelyengagedinsecuritycollaborationwithRussia.Stillwiththe

militarydegreeofCoronel,itwaswidelybelievedthathewouldbepromotedtoafull

GeneralandincludedintheCentralCommittee(ifnotPolitburo)atthe7thParty

Congress.Neitherhappened,andheisalsoabsentfromthenewNationalAssembly

comingtogetherin2018,amongwhosemembersthenewPresidentwaselected.After

theallegeddissolutionoftheComisióndeDefensa,hispowerpositionisevenmoreinthe

blue.WemaytakethisasasignthattheCastrobrothersdidnotwanttheestablishment

ofeternalfamilynepotisminCuba.454

451InSpanish:JefedeCoordinacióneInformacióndelosServiciosdeInteligenciayContrainteligenciadelasFARydelMinisteriodelInterior.452JuanJuanAlmeida,MartíNoticias,5.03.18:https://www.martinoticias.com/a/gobierno-cubano-reestructura-poderosa-comision-defensa-seguridad/163542.html453Hisquitedogmaticanti-imperialismandlackofesteemforliberaldemocracy,wasclearlyexpressedinthequiterareinterviewhegaveinJanuary2015,shortlyafterthere-establishmentofrelationswiththeUSthathehimselfhadbeenactivelynegotiating:http://projectcensored.org/interview-with-alejandro-castro-espin/.Castro,beingpresentedasDoctorofPoliticalScience,wasinterviewedinAthenswherehepresentedthesecondeditionofhisbook“EmpireofTerror”thatwasoriginallypublishedinCubain2009.454Almeida;andMarthaBeatrizRoqueCabello,”Desecretosygenerales”,Cubanet,29.02.16.SeealsoIndicator9.1.

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Managersofmilitaryandotherstateenterprises:455

TheundisputedheadofGAESA,itsExecutivePresident,isaverydiscretepersonality,

GeneralLuisAlbertoRodríguezLópez-Callejas.HeismoreoverChiefofthecrucialFifth

DepartmentoftheArmedForces,inchargeofitsbusinessinterests.Until2013,hewas

alsoRaúlCastro´sson-in-law,andisstillseenbysomeobserversastheCastrofamily´s

linktothecountry´seconomicelite.456Atthe7thPartyCongressinApril2016,

RodríguezLopez-CallejaswasalsoelectedasamemberoftheParty’sCentral

Committee.RodríguezisbymanyseenastheCastrofamily’spersonalrepresentativein

themilitary-economicwebofinstitutions.457Heisobviouslyapersontowatchclosely

whenitcomestofutureleadershippositions,economicallyaswellaspolitically.

Asecondtopmilitarytowatchfromthemilitary-controlledcorporationsisGeneral

LeonardoAndolloValdés,whoin2016ledGAESA´sinterventionoftheHabaguanex,the

institutionpreviouslycontrolledbyHavana´sofficialHistoriantooverseeinvestmentsin

OldHavana.AndolloValdésisDeputyHeadoftheJointChiefsofStaff,andmilitary

representativeintheComisióndeImplementaciónofthereforms,secondonlytoMarino

Murillo.AndolloValdés,oneoftherelativelyyoungertopmilitaryofficers,isalsoa

memberoftheCentralCommitteeofthePCC,andarisingmilitary,political,and

economicleadertokeeptabson.

Generallyspeaking,leadersofGAESAandothermilitarycorporationsareclearly

candidatestoplaydominanteconomicaswellaspoliticalrolesinpost-CastroCuba.

Thereisagreatquestionmarkabouttherealpoliticalrolethemilitarywillhavewhen

RaúlCastroleavesthestagealongwithhisfellowhistoricalbrothers-in-arms,firstas

HeadofStatein2018andthenasHeadofthePartyin2021(ifheisstillaliveandinfull

capacity).Hehaspersonalizedacompletecontrolofthemilitaryinstitutionsince1959.

Thereisnoobviouscandidatetotakeoverthisrole.Thereareclearsignsthathehas

reducedthedirectpoliticalroleofthemilitaryoverthelateryearsonhiswatch,while 455Foradiscussionofthemilitarycorporations'roleintheCubaneconomy,seeIndicator2.3.456Againstsomeodds,RodríguezLopez-CallejassurvivedpoliticallythedivorcefromRaúl´sdaughterDeborah,andseemstomaintainstrongfamilylinksbybeingthefatherofRaúl´sapparentfavouritegrandsonandheadofhispersonalsecurity,RaúlGuillermoRodriguezCastro,alias“ElCangrejo”(“TheCrab”).457Samesourcesasquotedinpreviousnote.

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itseconomicroleisincreasing.So,thequestioniswhethertheinstitutionispreparedto

continueitsdominantrolepost-Raúl,orwhatnewroleitwilltakeunderwhat

leadership.

Indicator7.6:Bureaucracyasbarriertoreforms?

“[...][T]hathugemonsterthathasconfiscatedsociety”(”[...][E]seaparatajedescomunal

quehadecomisadolasociedad”).

(AlfredoGuevara(1925-2013),founderandPresidentoftheCubanfilminstitute

(ICAIC),closefriendofFidelCastroandtheonewhoprobablytaughthimthefirst

lessonsofMarxism).

ThefifthofLinzandStepan´stransitionarenasisastatebureaucracythatis“usableby

thenewdemocraticgovernment”,withaneffectivecapacitytocommand(monopolyof

legitimateuseofforce),regulate(preparelaws)andextract(compulsorytaxation).

Whereasinmanycountriesintransitiontheproblemmaybethelackofacompetent

state,thesituationinCubaisquitethecontrary:anomnipresentstatemonopolising

mostfunctionsinsociety.RaúlCastrohimselfhasbeencomplainingaboutthe

bureaucracyasabarrieragainstreformthroughouthistimeasheadofstate.“Iwarn

thatallbureaucraticresistancetostrictcompliance[withthereforms]willbeuseless”,

hetoldtheNationalAssemblyon1August2011,shortlyafterthe6thPartyCongresshad

approvedthereformprogramme.458Athindsight,itmayseemthatthisbureaucratic

resistancehasnotbeensouseless,afterall.Itisperhapsindicative,thatinhis12,500

wordslongCentralReporttothe7thPartyCongressin2016,theword‘bureaucracy’is

completelymissing.

ItisobviousthattheCubanbureaucracyhasbeenmuchmoreofahindrancethana

facilitatorofanyreformpointingtowardsthereductionoftheroleofthestateinthe

economy.Totheextentthatpoliticalreformsareseriouslyputontheagenda,

458”RaulCastroshowingimpatienceatslowreformpace”,Reuters,Havana,23.08.11.

351

oppositionfromthestatebureaucracyhasbeenevenstronger,notevenovercomewhen

therehasbeenaconcertedeffortfromthetophierarchytochangeit.Onedifference

betweenFidelandRaúlinthisregardisthatFidelcouldgetthebureaucracysquarely

behindalmostanydecision,howhaphazarditmightbe.Raúl´sontheotherhand,while

insistingonamuchmoreinstitutionalisedformofgovernment,isparadoxicallyhavinga

hardertimetogetthebureaucracyinline,probablybecausehedoesnotpossessthe

uniquecharismaticpowersofhiselderbrother.WhenRaúlCastrohasaccusedthe

bureaucracyofboycottingorslowingdownmanyofthereformprocesses,wecan

almostinterpretthisasawidespreadpracticeof‘civildisobedience’withinthestate

bureaucracy.ItmayseemthatRaúlhasgivenuphiseffortstoparalyzethisresistance.

BertHoffmann(2016:1731)hasdiscussedtheprocesswhenFidelCastrowasforcedto

leavethecentrestageofCubanpolitics:“[…]whatfollowedwasnotthereplacementof

thecharismaticleaderwithanewonetotakehisplace,butratherthedismantlingofthe

deeplyentrenchedpersonalistcharacterofCuba’spoliticalorder.Charismaticsocialism

wasreplacedwithbureaucraticsocialism”.Hespeaksaboutaprocessofre-

institutionalisation,andafarewelltopersonalistpolitics.

HalKlepak(2012:93-98)writesaboutRaúlCastro´s‘militaryway’ofgoingabout

businessasastateleader,”thequietbuteffectivewaythathewassowell-knownforin

theFAR[ArmedForces],onkeepingtheRevolutiongoing[...]toensurerevolutionary

survival”.“Withoutmicro-management,noconstantcallstoprovideprogressreports,

butstrictjudgementofthequalityoftheproduct,Raúlhadconfidenceintheinstitutions

whereFidelwantedapersonalhandonallprocesses”.

TheproblemmayhavebeenthatthemilitaryinstitutionthatRaúlwasheadingformore

than45yearswasamuchmorehomogenousandwell-functioninginstitutionthanany

otherpartoftheCubanstatebureaucracy.Thelatterwassimplynotmanageableinthe

sameway.

Cuba’sstrongstatemaybeanenvyofmanythirdworldcountrieswithhardly

functioningstates.ButtheCubanstateapparatusisgettingincreasinglyineffectiveand

irrelevanttoregulate.RaúlCastro’sinsistencein2012onaclearerdistinctionbetween

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therolesofthepartyandthestatemaybetakenmoreseriouslyonthebureaucratic

thanonthepoliticallevel,butthebureaucracyhasnotshownimpressivecapabilityto

implementsuchchange.Thelackoftransparencyandthebureaucracy´sunwillingness

tosupportreformsputaquestionmarkonwhetherthisconditionmayeasilybe

fulfilled.

UnderChallenge1and2,wehaveshownhowthisresistancetoeconomicreformhas

manifesteditselfinpractice.Whatisthebasisforthisresistance?Istheresistanceto

reformssimplyfoot-draggingbasedonfearforchange?Isitaconsequenceofthe

myriadofpartlycontradictorylawsandregulationswherethebestprotectionfora

bureaucratafraidofcommittingerrorsistoputupalotofredtape?Orisitmore

ideologicallyinspired,perhapspayingallegiancetothemostprominentenemyofthe

marketeconomy,FidelCastrohimself,aslongashewasstillaround?Thelatterthesisis

maintainedbySamuelFarber(2006),himselfastrongcriticofmarketreforms,referring

tothisresistanceas‘neo-Fidelismo’:

"Whileneo-Fidelismoisgoingtobeanimportantpoliticalcurrentresistingtheneoliberal

trendinCubanpoliticsduringapost-Communisttransition,itwilldosointheonlywayit

knowshow:inabureaucratic,authoritarianandpaternalistmannerunabletotapthe

democraticrootsofthepopularresistancetocapitalistneo-liberalism”.

Oneproblemhereisthelackofincentives.Withthemiserablesalariesofferedforstate

employees,dedicationtotasksingovernmentagenciesisminimal.Muchoftheworking

hoursarespentonsolvingprivatenecessities.Theonlyincentivemaybeinaccessto

bribes.Corruptionisthrivingintheprovisionofservicestothepopulation,and

efficiencyisverylow.

Butperhapsthemostimportantcauseofthisbureaucratic‘civildisobedience’hasbeen

thefactthatstateandpartybureaucratshavebeensoprominentamongtheearlylosers

ofthereforms(ref.Indicator4.1).

Oneofthedisincentivestoreforminthebureaucracystemsfromthenegative

attitude—inmanycasesjealousy—thatoftenexistsvis-à-visthosewhoaresettingup

businessoutsidethestate.HerewefindproblemsrelatedtoLinzandStepan´sfifth

353

transitionarena:theprivatesectorandbureaucracy.AsclaimedbyKornai(1992:450):

“[A]lthoughoneofthebureaucracy´smentalcompartmentsisawarethatitneedsthe

privatesector,anothercompartmentofthesamemindnursesasmolderingdistasteand

hatredforprivateownershipandindividualactivity”.

Oneoftheconsequencesofthisarbitrariness,asobservedbyKornaiduringthe

transformationoftheUSSRandotherex-socialistcountries,isthegrowingblackand

greymarkets,where“massesofpeopleperformsemilegal,informaleconomicactivity

toleratedbytheauthorities”(p.452).Theresistanceagainstlettingsmall-scale

businessesgrowintoseriouscompaniesthroughamyriadoflegalorpoliticalmeasures

iscontinuouslymanifestingitselfinsuchprocesses.Thereisageneralarbitrariness

withoutaccesstoredress.KornaiisagainhittingtheCubanreality,whenhespeaks

aboutaviciouscircle:

“[P]rivatesectorunderreformsocialism[…]oftenshow[…]theworst,notthebestsideof

capitalism.Thatheightenstheantipathytowardthem,whichisastimulusandargumentfor

thebureaucracytobeevenmorehostiletowardthem[…]resultinginabittercoexistence”

(p.455).

CarlosSaladrigas,oneofthediasporaentrepreneurswhohasshownmostinterestin

contributingtosupportislandcolleagues,hasstatedveryclearlythatthecharacterof

theCubanstatehastochange,froman”obstructioniststate”toa”facilitatorstate”,in

ordertoattractinvestmentsfromthediaspora.459

Thereisofcourseabigparadoxhere:pro-reformforceswithinthesystem—likeRaúl

Castrohimself—tendtoblameallproblemsontheabstractconcept‘bureaucracy’,while

everybodyknowsthatthebureaucracyisbasicallytheexecutivebranchofthestate

underthecommandofthecountry´sPresident.

459SaladrigasquotedfromCubaPosibleSeminar,NewYork,May2016(accordingtoauthor´snotes).

354

Challenge 8: Moves towards a less authoritarian and more pluralist political system

Indicator8.1:Newideologicaltrends?

The2016PartyCongresswassummarisinghowmuchoftheGuidelinesapprovedfive

yearsearlierthathadbeenimplemented—asintended—duringthefive-yearinterval.

AsrecognisedbyRaúlinhisCentralReporttotheCongress(Castro2016),only21%—

onefifth—ofthe313Guidelineshadbeentotallyimplemented,while77%weretobe

foundindifferentphasesofimplementation.

Wehavenotedthroughoutthediscussionofthepreviouschallengeshowthereform

processhasbeenzigzaggingduringtheperiodwearestudyinghere,probablyreaching

aclimaxaround2015.During2016-2017,itisdifficulttocharacterizewhathappenedas

anythingbutacounter-reform.

Threeideologicaldocuments,accompaniedbyanotedefiningbasicconcepts,were

presentedtothe7thPartyCongressinApril2016,afterseveralmonthsofinternal

discussionsandseveralfailedattemptstoreachaCentralCommitteepre-Congress

agreementonit.ThedocumentswerefinallyadoptedbytheCentralCommitteemore

thanoneyearlater:460

• ‘Conceptualizacióndelmodeloeconómicoysocialcubanodedesarrollo

socialista’;461

• ‘LineamientosdelapolíticaeconómicaysocialdelPartidoylaRevoluciónparael

peródo2016-2021;462

• Aceptacióndealgunostérminosutilizadosenlaconceptualizacióndelmodelo

económicoysocialcubanodedesarrollosocialistayenlasbasesdelPlanNacional

deDesarrolloeconómicoysocialhastael2030.463

460http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2017/07/13/lea-los-textos-definitivos-de-la-conceptualizacion-del-modelo-cubano-y-la-actualizacion-de-los-lineamientos/#.WgBOrraDrwc(downloaded6.11.17). 461Conceptualizacióndelmodeloeconómicoysocialcubanodedesarrollosocialista–pdf510kb.462LineamientosdelaPolíticaEconómicaySocialdelPartidoylaRevoluciónparaelperiodo2016-2021–PDF321kb

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Thefirstofthese,theconceptualización,isanattempttopresentthe‘modelforCuban

socialisteconomicandsocialdevelopment’thathadbeenmissingfromthe2011

‘updating’.Thesupposedmodelwastobebasedonthefollowingeightbasic‘socialist

principles[…]thatsustaintheModel’(paragraphs58-73ofthedocument):

Thefollowingisabriefsummaryofthemainelementsofthisdocument(S/E):

1. Aseriesofbasichumanisticsocialvalues—oddlymixedwith‘anti-imperialism’:

“Thehumanbeingisthemainobjectiveandprotagonistsubject;hisdignity,full

equalityandfreedom,carrierofnationalcultureandidentity,andvaluessuchaslove

fortheHomelandandHumanity,heroism,patriotism,anti-imperialism,solidarity

andinternationalism.Otheressentialvaluesofourideologyare:loyalty,honesty,

modesty,industriousness,responsibility,altruism,humanism,disinterest,respect

forothersandtheenvironment.”

Inapreviousversion,thesequalitieswerepresentedastheoppositeofbadvalues

like“selfishness,individualismandpredatoryconsumerism.”Thereferencetothese

‘anti-socialist’valueswereinterestinglytakenoutofthefinalversion.

2. TheCommunistPartyasthevanguard:

“TheleadingroleoftheCommunistPartyofCuba,theuniqueandorganisedvanguard

ofthenation,(representingthethinkingofJosé)Martí,Marx,LeninandFidel,

superiorleadingforceofsocietyandthestate,expressionoftheunityofallCubans

undertheleadershipoftheRevolution,ofthehumble,bythehumbleandforthe

humble,onthebasisofitsprestige,moralauthority,exemplarityandlinkswiththe

people.”

463AcepcióndealgunostérminosutilizadosenlaConceptualizacióndelmodeloeconómicoysocialcubanodedesarrollosocialistayenlasbasesdelplannacionaldedesarrolloeconómicoysocialhastael2030–PDF176kb

356

3. Theinclusionoftheconceptof‘democracy’wasapparentlythesubjectofgreat

discussion—butitendedupasoneofthebasicprinciplesoftheCubanmodel,with

thequalification‘socialistdemocracy’,basedonaninterestingmixtureofdirectand

representativedemocracy:

“Socialistdemocracybasedontheactiveparticipationofitscitizens,intheexercise

ofsovereignpowerofthepeople,fromwhichoriginatesallthepower,expressed

directlyorindirectlythroughrepresentativebodies,suchastheassembliesof

People'sPowerandotherorgansoftheStateandGovernmentthatderivefrom

them….”464

4. Thesocialiststateasthebasisforpreservationofallnationalvalues,andas

guarantoroftheCubanversionofhumanrightsandruleoflaw:

“Thesocialiststateistheguarantorofequalityandfreedom,independence,

sovereignty,popularparticipationandcontrol,developmentofthecountry,

preservationofnationalidentity,heritageofthenation,itshistoricalmemory,

cultureandotherconquests.Itguarantees,inturn,theexerciseandprotectionof

economic,social,culturalandcivic-political,individualandcollectiverightsand

duties,inaccordancewiththeConstitutionoftheRepublicandthelaws.”

5. “Socialistpropertyofallthepeopleofthebasicmeansofproduction,asthemain

propertyformofthesocio-economicsystem,basisfortherealpowerof

workers.”ThisimpliescommonownershipbyallCubancitizens,andlegitimises

theirrightstoparticipateinmajordecisionsontheuseofwealthandbenefit

fromuniversalandfreesocialservices.

6. Socialistplanning,afundamentalcomponentofthemanagementsystemof

economicandsocialdevelopment.

464ThisisinrealityverysimilartowhatalreadyisintheConstitution,wheretheword‘democracy’ismentionedonlyonce,alsowiththeadjective‘socialist’(Art.68:“Stateagenciesaresetuptocarryouttheiractivitybasedontheprinciplesofsocialistdemocracy”).

357

7. NationaldefenceoftheCubansystem:

“NationaldefenceandsecurityareessentialobjectivestowhichtheParty,theState

andtheGovernmentgivemaximumattention,withtheconceptionoftheWarofthe

Peopleasthestrategicfoundationofthedefenceofthecountry.Aslongas

imperialismexists,therevolutionaryguardwillneverbeneglected.Historyteaches

tooeloquentlythatthosewhoforgetthisprincipledonotsurviveerror.”

8. Equalopportunitieswithoutanyformofdiscrimination:

“Themoralandlegalrecognitionofequalityofrightsanddutiesofcitizenshipand

theguaranteestomakethemeffectivewithequity,inclusion,socialjustice,political

participation,overcomingsocialgaps,respectfordiversityandconfrontationwith

allformofdiscriminationbyskincolor,gender,genderidentity,sexualorientation,

disability,territorialandnationalorigin,religiousbeliefs,ageandanyother

distinctionthatisharmfultohumandignity.”

Specifyingrighttowork,health,education,citizensecurity,information,

communication,culture,decenthousing,etc.

Ifweshallsummarisewhatthismodelisabout,wemaysaythatCubansocialismis

definedasdeeplyhumanisticopposedtoindividualisticconsumerism;withequal

opportunitiesandwithoutanyformofdiscrimination;guaranteeingaCubanversionof

humanrightsandruleoflaw;providinguniversalandfreesocialservices;allguidedby

avanguardcommunistparty;rulingthroughamixtureofdirectandrepresentative

‘socialistdemocracy’;stateownershipofthebasicmeansofproduction;andbasedon

centralsocialistplanning.

Wemayconcludethattheseprinciplesrepresentneitheranyideologicalrenewal,nora

realdevelopmentmodel,forfutureCubandevelopment.Theybasicallyconfirmwhatthe

CubanRevolutionhasbeenaboutsinceitfounditsMarxist-Leninistidentity.

Therearedeepcontradictionsbetweengloriouscollectivegoalsononeside,andmeans

ontheothersidethatarelittlemorethanwishfulthinkinginthecontextofthedeep

358

crisisofthe‘reallyexistingCubansocialism’(initseconomicorpoliticalmanifestation).

Aswearearguinginthisdissertation,theCubanversionofhumanrightsandruleoflaw

isnotuptobasicinternationalstandards;theuniversalandfreesocialservicesthat

oncerepresentedthemostfundamentalconquestoftheCubanrevolutionareunder

seriousthreatwithopportunitiesgrowingincreasinglyunequal.Thepositionof

‘VanguardCommunistParty’intheCubansocietyatlargeisprobablyweakerthanever

sinceitwascreatedandgraduallylosingitshegemony.The‘socialistdemocracy’is

hardlyperceivedasverydemocraticbymostordinaryCubans.Stateownershipisin

mostcasesthreatenedbydeepinefficiencyandmassivetheft,whichmaythreatenits

capacitytosurviveandprovideemploymenteveninsomeofthemoststrategicsectors

oftheeconomy.Centralplanningismoresymbolicthanreal.Therealchallengeistofind

asustainableeconomicsystemthatiscapableofproducingthesurplusneededfor

‘Cubansocialism’tosurvive.Thecontinuedrejectionofnon-statecapitalaccumulation

andafunctioningmarketeconomywillmostprobablyatsomepointhavetobeleft

behind,alongwiththehesitationtointegratewithglobalmarketstructures,ifafull

collapseoftheCubansystemistobeavoidedandparadoxicallyifthehumanisticand

socialistvaluesofthismodelshallsurvive.

Thepretendedmodelof‘Cubansocialistdevelopment’remainstobedefinedinpractical

terms,andisveryhardtoseehowitmaybecomesustainableinitspresentform.

Indicator8.2:Apoliticalevolutiontowardsmoreliberalregimecharacteristics?

RaúlCastrohasinsistedduringhisreformerathathis‘updating’projecthasbeensolely

abouttheeconomy,notaboutpolitics.Severalobservershavebeenquestioningthis.

Hoffmann(2016)claimsthatCubanpoliticshaveundergoneamajorchangeunderRaúl

Castro´sleadership,inspiteoftherhetoricofcontinuity.Hefindsfourmainareasof

changeduringtheseyears:

1. Thedepersonalisationandre-institutionalisationofthepoliticalstructures;

2. Thede-factosurrenderoftheinformationmonopolyparticularlythrough

newaccesstodigitalmedia;

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3. Theliberalisationoftravelandmigration,withitstransformativeimpacton

state–citizenrelations;

4. Theturntoamoderateforeignpolicy,ashighlightedbytherapprochement

withtheUnitedStates,withitsimplicationsforthelegitimising

underpinningsofCubansocialism.

HoffmannhasassignedthetrademarkCuba’sbureaucraticstate-socialismtotheRaúl

Castroera:“[I]sinevitablyinreformmode,asitneedstorespondtodomesticsocial

demandsandeconomicimperativesaswellastochangingexternalconditionswhichare

allexertingpressuretoevolvefurther”(p.1740).

Monreal(2015)claimsthattheon-goingtransformationshaveobviouspoliticalaspects

withoutquestioningbasicpowerrelations(i.e.theabsolutehegemonyoftheCommunist

Party).Hebelievestherehasbeenatriplestatereformunderway:modificationofthe

state´sinstitutionalcapacities(rulesandregulations),technicalcapacities

(macroeconomicpolicies)andadministrativecapacities(managementofstate

infrastructure).Hethereforequestionswhether‘themainthrust’ofthereformsis

economicandnotpolitical:

”[…][I]tisnecessarytoemphasizethat‘theupdatingoftheeconomicmodel’,isanepisode

markedlysubordinatedtothepoliticalquestion.It´sthepolitical‘thing’(‘thing’here

understoodinitsontologicalsenserelativetotheessence)thatisdeterminingandtherefore

subordinatingtoitthedesignandthedynamicoftheeconomicupdating,andnottheother

wayround”(p.5)(S/E).

Onemayquestionwhetherallthesechangeshavebeentheresultofconsciouspolitical

decisionsorsimplyaquestionofanecessaryadaptationtonewrealitiesand

technologies(e.g.thedigitalrevolution).Forwhateverreason,thereisnodoubtthat

theyhavetakenplace.

360

Weshallnowtrytounderstandwhetherpro-pluralistchangeshavebeentakingplace,

startingwithadiscussioninthelightofLinzandStepan´s(1996)fourregimetype

criteria,developedintheirclassicalapproachtotheanalysisofpoliticaltransitions(ref.

Chapter4).

Increasingeconomicandpoliticalpluralism:

WehavenotedthattheeconomicreformsbeingimplementedunderRaúlCastro´s

leadershipareleadingtoanincreasingthoughstillquitelimitedspaceforthenon-state

economy,mostlyonthebasisofthegrowingnumberofself-employed(TCPs),the

peculiarprocessofprivatizationinagriculture,andthenewcooperativesectorboth

insideand(stilltoamuchlesserextent)outsideofagriculture.Theleasingofstate

propertyisanotherexpressionofthisspace.Butwehavealsonotedthatsomesmall-

andevenmedium-sizebusinesseshavedeveloped.

Acloselyrelatedissueiswhether,andtowhatdegree,thishasledtothe

institutionalisationofthenon-stateeconomy.InLinzandStepan´swords,themarket

requiresaninfrastructureofinstitutionsthatdonotexistinacommandeconomy.There

hasbeenheavyresistanceagainsttheconversionofsmallbusinessesnormally

establishedbyTCPsintoSMEs,letalonemediumorlarge-scaleprivatecompanies.This

isexpressedbythefactthatprivatecompaniessofarcannotbelegallyregistered,

implyingi.a.thattheydonothaveaccesstocompanycreditorforeigninvestment.The

7thPartyCongressopenedforsuchregistrationinprinciple,buttheimplementationof

thisisexpectedtotaketime.Thezigzaggingpolicyregardingwholesalemarkets,

concludedbythemid-2017decisiontostopgivingnewlicensesfornon-state

commercialisationoffoodproducts,isalogicalpartofthisresistance.Thisleavesthe

independententrepreneurswiththechoicebetweendependenceoninefficientand

economicallydisadvantageousstateinstitutionsordealingwiththeblackmarketand

thusoperatingillegally.Mostseemtopreferthelattersolution,inspiteofrisking

repressivemeasures.

Thequestioniswhetherwecanobservetheemergenceofaninstitutionalinfrastructure

thatcanfacilitatethegrowthofalegalandefficientmarketeconomy—whichmaybe

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deprivingthestateeconomyofmuchspace.Formallyspeaking,thisisnotallowedto

occur.Butinformally,wehavedescribedseveralexamples(taxidrivers,ownersof

privaterestaurantsandhostels)ofhowprivateentrepreneursdefactohavebeen

meetinggovernmentattemptstolimittheirspacewitheffectiveresponsesinprettywell

organizedandco-ordinatedways.

McCormick(1998:129)summarisedthesituationinChinaandVietnamasearlyas1998

asfollows:

“(T)hereformshavesignificantlyweakenedthestate´scontroloversociety.Groupssuchas

farmers,workers,entrepreneurs,foreigninvestors,andevenintellectualshavemore

autonomyandagreaterchanceofbeingheardthaneverbeforeinthehistoryofthese

regimes”.

Aswehaveseen,inboththesecountriestherehasalsobeenanincreasedfrequencyof

strikesandpublicprotests.Onemayspeakaboutanimportantsegmentofpermitted

semi-opposition,althoughthespaceforthismayonceagainbeshrinkinginChina.As

longasthereiseconomicgrowthandimprovinglevelsofprosperityandsocialmobility,

thisdoesnotneedtorepresentaseriousthreat.Thebigquestioniswhatwillhappenif

andwhentheeconomicgrowthcomestoanend.

WehavesofarnotseenasimilarincreaseinsocialprotestactionsinCuba.Sincethe

Cubaneconomyisperformingsobadly,willtherebelessflexibilityforoppositionand

protestthere,andwillsuchoppositionbemorethreateningtothesystemthaninChina

andVietnam?Areallycriticalsituationwillemergeifandwhentheseelementsappear

together;e.g.ifdissatisfactionwiththeeconomyleadstoprotestwhichinturnleadsto

increaseinrepression,orifthebureaucraticarbitrarinessinthehandlingofnon-state

economicactorsreleasesimilarchainreactions.

Wehavediscussedhowtheregime-independentcivilsocietyhasexpandedoverthese

years,andhowthegovernmenthasineffectlostitsinformationmonopolythroughthe

rapidexpansionofsocialmedia,theemergenceofunofficialmediaandindependent

journalism.Whilethesetrendsareunstoppablewithouttheintroductionofhighly

repressivemeasures,thereareseveralsignsofincreasingnervousnesscoincidingwith

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andprobablycausedbytherapprochementwiththeUS,particularlyafterPresident

Obama´sCubavisitinMarch2016.Afterasignificantincreaseinthespaceforcivil

society(seee.g.Hoffmann2016),thisspacestartedtoshrinkagainin2016,particularly

affectingthemoderatevoicesarguingfornationaldialogueratherthanopen

confrontation(seeCameron2016).AlthoughtheGovernmentappearsquitepowerless

initseffortstocurbthe‘virtualcivilsociety’,i.e.alternativeinformationanddiscussion

engagingincreasingnumbersparticularlyofyoungerpeople,thiscounter-reformmay

seriouslycomplicateanyformofnegotiatedtransformation.

Ideology:

Inasocietymovingtowardspost-totalitarianism,therewillbea“growingempirical

disjunctionbetweenofficialideologicalclaimsandreality”,whereperformancecriteria

takepreferenceoverideologyasthesourceoflegitimacy.Inacontextofgrowing

economiccrisis,LinzandStepanclaim,regimecollapsehasoftenoccurredwhen

midlevelfunctionariesofthecoerciveapparatusstarthavinggrowingdoubtsabout

repressionofprotest.

TherecanbenodoubtthatoneofthedefiningdifferencesbetweenFidel´sandRaúl´s

regimeshasbeenthemarkedchangeinpoliticalpreferencefromideologyto

performance,fromrepeatedideologicalbattlestoamuchmoreinstitutionalizedand

pragmaticpolicy-orientation.InthewordsofKornai(1992),wehavebeenobservinga

looseningoftheoriginaldogmaoftheRevolution,withtheconceptof‘communism’

hardlybeingusedand‘socialism’stillbeingusedasanideologicalreferencebuthardly

beingdefinedintermsofitspracticalapplication(ref.the“conceptualizationofthe

Cubaneconomicandsocialmodelforsocialistdevelopment”).Asalreadydiscussed,the

processofnormalisationwiththeUSalsothreatenedtorendertheanti-imperialist

rhetoricmeaningless,untilPresidentTrumpwithhisconfrontationalrhetoricrendered

anewboosttothoseCubanleadersthatwanttomaintaintheimageoftheimperialist

enemy.

Paradoxically,itseemstohavebeenthefailuresoftheveryhalf-heartedpro-market

policiesinCuba—togetherwiththethreatofpeople´sgrowingattractiontothehistoric

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enemy—thatobligedRaúlatthe7thPartyCongresstoreturntomoreemphasison

ideology.ThishasbeenfollowedupbyagroupoforthodoxMarxist-Leninistsconstantly

attacking‘liberal’academicsandcivilsocietyleaderswhowerearguingforalternative

thinkingwithoutconsideringthemselvesasdissenters.Underthelabelofcentristas,

theywereaccusedfornottakingaclearpositionintheoverarchingstruggleagainst

imperialism.Nordicsocialdemocraticexperiences—seenasrelevantbymanyCuban

intellectuals—wereparticularlynegativelyportrayed.

Themostremarkablewiththisnewoffensivewasitsapparentinformalityand

‘outsourcing’:theIdeologicalDepartmentoftheParty,formanyyearsledbythe

infamous‘Alfonsito’Borges,seemedtohavedisappearedatthe7thPartyCongress(and

BorgeswasnomorememberoftheCentralCommittee).Instead,anti-reformactivists

withoutanyformalpositionsinthePartynowmanagedtotaketheideological

hegemonythrough‘Opinion’piecesforinstanceinthewebpublicationCubadebate.cu.465

Oneofthemostprominentofthesevoices,whichisneverchallengedbymoremoderate

Partyvoices,hasbeenIroelSánchez.466Itiscommonlyassumedthatthese‘activists’are

workingonbehalfofthemostconservativepartyfaction—assuminglyledbySecond

Secretaryandde-factopartyaffairscoordinatorMachadoVentura;thusside-liningRául

Castroandhisreformeffortsandundermininghisattempttore-institutionaliseparty

andstateaffairs.Whatisparticularlyworrisomeforreform-orientedobserversisthe

crucialroleapparentlyplayedbyDíaz-Canelintherun-uptohispresidentialposition,

bytakingapersonalleadroleinthenewideologicalcampaign.467

Theprobabilityisthatthiseffortwillbeashalf-heartedasthemarketreforms:Itis

difficulttoseehowtheCommunistPartyinitspresentform,withoutFidel´scharisma

andwiththeincreasinglydeepmistrustfromthepopulation,standsanychanceof

succeedingwithanotherideologicaloffensivetakingrootamongthepopulation.Fidel

465Cubadebatepresentsitselfas“thevoiceofPeriodistasCubanoscontraelTerrorismo,anorganisationcreated[…]withthepurposeofdenouncingactionsorganisedandfinancedbytheUSgovernmentagainstourcountry”.AppearinginSpanishandsevenotherlanguages,itclaimstocountwithnootherresourcesthanthe“non-remuneratedtimeandworkofitscollaborators”.NoofficiallinktothePartyorGovernmentappearsonitspages.466IroelSánchezpresentshimselfas”Cubanengineerandjournalist.WorksfortheOfficefortheinformatizationoftheCubansociety.WaspreviouslyPresidentoftheInstitutoCubanodelLibro.”.467Accordingtowell-informedsources,untilhetookoverasPresident,hewasleadingaweeklyMondaymorningmeetingtoplantheideologicalcampaignsforeachweek.

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Castro´sdeathandthenationalmourningandnostalgiaprocesssucceedingitmayhave

giventheremainingideologuesatemporaryopportunitytoreverttooldideological

slogans.Butthiswillhardlyhaveanylong-termimpactonthepopulationmajority´s

heartsandminds,comparedtotheirdailystruggletomakeendsmeet.Tocompareonce

againwithChina,itisverydifficulttoseeRaúl—oranyofhissuccessors—beingcapable

offollowingtherecentexampleofChina´sXi’sreturntomoreideologicallydriven

government.AsshowninStåleWig´sstudyofself-employedstreetvendorsinHavana

(Wigforthcoming),the“growingempiricaldisjunctionbetweenofficialideological

claimsandreality”(againquotingKornai1992)couldnotbemorestrikingthanwhat

weobserveintoday´sCuba.

Kornaiasks“whataretheconstantandthevariableelementsinofficialideologyabout

therelationshipbetweenpublicandprivateownership”,andclaimsthattheanswerto

thisquestionprovidesoneofthemostcriticalcriteriaforthepossibilityofpolitical

reform.InCuba,ideologicalacceptanceofprivateownershiphasratherbeenreduced

duringthereformera.

Kornaiholdsupacoupleofotherpossibilitiesfortheeconomicreformstotakehold

suchasjointpublic-privateownershipandtheleasingoutofstateproperty.Thelatter

hastakenplacetoasignificantdegreeinCuba(usufructoflandtenure;attempttolease

outunprofitablestate-ownedpettybusinesses).Thepublic-privatepartnershipisa

modelthathasbeenfloatedasanideabutsofarnotbeenpromotedinpractice.468

Oneofthebigchallengesaheadwillbehowtheofficialideologymaybere-craftedto

copewiththechangingdivisionofworkandcorrelationofforcesbetweenthestateand

thenon-statesectorsoftheeconomy,andhowthebureaucracycanbepreparedto

handlethischangeinarationalway.ToreturntooneofLinzandStepan´sdemocratic

arenas:howcanthestatebureaucracybemade‘usable’foradifferentreality,withmore

468Theideaofpublic-privatepartnershipwasproposedbyanex-MinisterofEconomy,nowresearcherand‘advisor’attheCentrodeInvestigacionesdelaEconomíaMundial(CIEM),JoséLuísRodríguez.Hehasalsobeenproposingthecreationoffinancialmechanismsforwhathecalls“socialparticipation”infamilyremittances“enteringthecountryascapital”,i.e.akindoftripartitejointventuresthatwouldalsoimplyadefactolegalrecognitionofforeigninvestmentinprivatecompanies.JoséLuisRodríguez:“Cubaylacomplejatransformacióndelaempresaestatal”,publishedonthewebsiteofCubaContemporánea07.08.2014.

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marketeconomyandmorepoliticalpluralism?

Mobilisation:

Closelylinkedtothisrelativereductionofideologyistheevolutioninmobilisation

capacity,comparedtothehistoricroleofregime-createdpopularorganisations,witha

progressivelossofinterestinthesewhere“boredom,withdrawalandultimately

privatisationofthepopulation’svalues”takesprominence(inthewordsofLinzand

Stepan).OnemaybeoverwhelmedbythecontinuedmassiveturnoutforMayDay

parades,oreventheabilitytocontinuemobilisingstudentstotheannualMarchofthe

TorchesforJoséMartí(onJanuary27everyyear).Obviously,thenation-widemourning

mobilisationafterFidelCastrohadpassedawaywasalsoanimpressiveexampleofthe

same.Thismayhoweverhaveturnedouttobealastopportunityforsuchregime-loyal

mobilisation,unlessthenewUSPresidentTrumpwillaffordtoprovokenewnationalist

sentimentsintheCubanpopulation.

Butmorerelevantistheobservationofhowmuchpeopleoutsideofthe

constantlyshrinkingpartyloyalistsarereallycaringabouttheworkof

neighbourhoodcommittees(CDRs),party-affiliatedunionsandother

organisationscloselylinkedtotheParty.Citizenparticipationonlocallevel,beit

inwhatinCubaistermed‘socialistcivilsociety’orinelectoralprocessesis

writtenoffbycriticsaspseudoparticiption(ChaguacedaandGeoffrey2015),

althoughtheofficialnarrativeconveyedtoforeignvisitorsisthatparticipation,

andbyimplicationwhatisreferredtoas‘participatorydemocracy’,isreal.

Wemustmakeonequalificationwhenwetalkabouttheerosionofmobilisation

capacity:whenconfrontedwitharealcrisisofnaturaldisasters—andthatseemsto

happenwithincreasingfrequencyinCubaduetoclimaticchange—theCubansociety

commandsauniquemobilisationcapacity.Thisisofcourseareflectionofthe

mobilisationtraditionoftheCubanRevolution,stillmaintainingsufficientstrengthtobe

activatedwhenexposedtonaturaldisasters,combinedwiththestrengthofthemilitary

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institution(includingcivildefence).469Onemayeasilyimaginethatasimilar

mobilisationcapacityisavailableinthequiteunlikelyeventualityofamilitary

confrontation,althoughitmaybedifficulttoforeseehowdomesticideologicaland

politicaldivisionsmightimpactontheunitarymilitarymobilisationcapacityinany

givensituation.

Leadership:

Wehavepointedoutthatthelossofcharismaticleadershiphasbeenoneofthemost

strikingdifferencesbetweentheFidelandRaúlperiods,anditwillprobablybeeven

moresointhepost-Raúlera.FidelCastro´scharismawasofcourseunique,andhis

youngerbrotherhasnotevenmadeanyefforttoliveuptothat.Itisstrikingtoseehow

theyoungerleaders,thosewhohavebeensupposedtotakeover,havebeenrefraining

completelyfromshowingtheirpoliticalcardspublicly,andfrombuildingtheirown

publicleadershippositionsthroughpublicappearanceandspeech,interviewsetc.The

newPresidentMiguelDiaz-Canelhasprobablyarrivedatthatpositionpreciselybecause

hehasbeensodiscrete.Heisaveryunenthusiasticpublicspeakerwhowillhaveahard

timebeingseenastheleaderoftheCubannation.

TherecouldofcoursebenosimilartransferofauthorityfromRaúltoDíaz-Canel,asthe

oneFidelcouldpartlytransfertohisbrotherandlife-longdeputy.“However

successfullytheregimehasmanagedthepost-Fidelsuccession,theexperienceinnoway

establishesarolemodelforfutureleadershipchanges,”saysHoffmann(2006:237),

addingaquotefromValdés(2004:251):“Thereis‘noequivalentRaúl’forRaúl.”

WeshallelaboratemoreontheleadershiptransitionunderChallenge9,andasweshall

seeitwasdesignedtoestablishanewmodel.

469Thelossofelevenlivesduringthe2012hurricaneSandy(http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/hurricane-sandy-leaves-destruction-wake/story?id=17588956),andtenlivesduringthe2017HurricaneIrma(http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/11/americas/irma-cuba/index.html),werenotedwithgreatconcerninacountrythatnormallypridesitselfwithanextraordinarymobilizationcapacityavoidingthelossofhumanlivesduringnaturaldisasters.

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Futureconstitutionalchange:

ForthosewhohadhopedthatRaúlCastroafterallwouldendtheLeninistpolitical

structureinCuba—orpreparesuchatransitionbeforeheleftpower—musthavebeen

frustratedtolistentowhathesaidaboutthisinhislastspeechasPresident.The

constitutionalmodificationthathecouldnotimplementonhisownwatchwouldcome,

hesaid,buttherewouldbe“nochangeofourstrategicobjective”inrelationtotherole

ofthePartyandthattherewas“nointentiontochangethecharacterirrevocable

socialismnortheleadingrole[...]oftheParty”.TheproposednewConstitutionwould

needapprovalthroughareferendum,heannounced.470

Indicator8.3:LessauthoritariancultureinsidetheCommunistParty?

Someofthoseatthetop,andRaúlCastroinparticular,maywelcomecriticismand

debate,whileothersareeffectivelyblockingit.Mostoftheintellectualcritics—andhere

weareentirelytalkingaboutpeopleworkingwithinthesystem—identifytheSecond

SecretaryoftheParty,JoséRamónMachadoVentura,asthepersonalisedguardianof

thisoldlineandthemainbottleneckformoreopennessandreform.Mostofthemclaim,

however,thatthepersonbehindMachadoVenturawasuntilhisverydeathFidelCastro

himself,probablymostoftenwithouttakingexpressivelypartininternaldiscussions:it

wasmoreaquestionaboutwhathehistoricallyhasstoodforandwhatthepartybosses

assumethathispositionwouldbe.

Manyoftheseinsiderobservershaveuntilrecentlyperceivedaveryinteresting

situationbetweenMachadoVenturaasnumbertwointhePartyandDiaz-Canelas

numbertwoandsincelongexpectedtobenumberoneintheGovernmentstructure:the

traditionalistanti-changeold-timer‘Fidelista’versustheyoungerandchange-oriented

‘Raulista’.Whenpushcomestoshoveoncriticalpoliticalissues,ithasbeenclaimedthat

thepartybosswasstillcallingtheshotsatthecostoftheappointedheir—whoafterall

hasonlybeenanordinarymemberoftheParty´sPolitburo.Therehavebeenconcrete

caseswhereDíaz-Canelhasintervenedinfavourofmoreliberalacademicswhenhewas 470RaúlCastro’sfarewellspeechasPresident,19.04.18:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LruOv7JeeAQ&feature=youtu.be

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theMinisterofSuperiorEducation(beforebeingpromotedtoFirstViceChairmanofthe

CouncilsofStateandMinisters),wheretraditionalistheadsofacademicinstitutions—

assuminglyundertheprotectionofMachadoVentura—subsequentlyhavereturnedto

previousanti-liberalpositionssinceDíaz-Canelnolongerhadtheoperational

responsibilityforthissector.

Onthisbackground,manyobserversweresurprisedandscared—othersnotsomuch—

whenavideorecordingwasleakedofaninternalDíaz-Canelbriefingwithpartycadres

inFebruary2017.Hisspeechwasunmistakablyhard-lineandanti-liberal.Hemadea

distinctionbetweentwogroupsof‘enemyprojects’:onethatispursuing

“confrontationalcounter-revolution”,andanotheroneinfavourof“theconformation

andconsolidationofanewcivilsociety”.Itisparticularlyhisinclusionofthesecond

groupas“enemyproject”thatprovokedreactions:

“Thesearepeoplewhouseawell-structuredlanguageandspeech.Theydonotconfrontthe

CubanRevolutiondirectly.Theyuseasocialdemocraticspeech.Theyarenotidentifiedas

counter-revolutionary.Theyhavesolutionsforeverything(theCubaneconomy,politics,

elections).Peopledon´tseethemasprojectsagainsttheRevolution”(S/E).

Inthisgroup,heexplicitlyreferredtothethink-tankCubaPosible,themagazineOnCuba

whichhesaidwouldbeclosed471,andtowebsites,unofficialpressmedia,illegalWi-Fi

networks.HealsoaccusedseveralforeignembassiesinCubaof“widesubversive

activity”,includingNorway,Spain,Germanyandthe(Catholic)Church,andhewentfar

inclaimingthattheUSwastryingtoconvertthenon-stateentrepreneursto“asectorin

oppositiontotheRevolution”.472

Inthisway,afutureleaderwhohadbeensupposedtorepresentamorepluralisticand

inclusivepoliticalprojectforCuba,oneyearbeforehetookoverthePresidency,came

outinthisveryconfrontationalwayinaninternalPartypeptalk.Thecommon

interpretationofthiswasthatDíaz-Canel,withoutanyfirmbasisofhisowninsidethe

471SeeIndficator6.2.472TheremarksweremadeduringaninternalconferencewithpartycadresinFebruary2017,andleakedtothepublicinAugustthatyear(interestinglybytheprominentconfrontationaldissenterAntonioRodiles):‘Díaz-Canelmuestrasuperfilmástalibán’,DiariodeCuba,LaHabana,21.08.17http://www.diariodecuba.com/cuba/1503333729_33423.html(accessed29.09.17).

369

PartyapartfromanoutgoingPresidentclearlyonthedefensive,hadnootherchoice

thandemonstratingtothehegemonichardlinersthatheisatrustworthycontinuista:

suchtoughinternalspeecheswouldservetolegitimisehiminternally.Byleakingthe

speech,however,somethingthatnobodyoutsideoftheinternalpowercirclescould

havedone,hewasatthesametimemiserablyde-legitimised—amongthosewhostill

mighthavehadillusionsthathewouldintroduceanewpoliticaleraforCuba.

Assumptionsaboutinternalstrivesandideologicaldifferences,aswellasanyname-

droppingabouttopleadershipcandidates,havebeenverydifficultforoutsidersto

assess,inasystemthatisextremelyopaque.HardlyanybodyinCubahasbeenableto

identifyanyfactionswithinthePartyapartfromagroupofclearlyorthodoxorascribe

anyideologicallabelstopersonsinleadingpositionsorthoseaspiringfortopleadership

intheParty.Itisanybody´sguessinwhichdirectionDiáz-Canelorotheryounger

leaderswilltakethecountry,inspiteoftheveryheavy-handedlanguageinrecent

internalspeeches.Consideringtheterriblydifficultdecisionsthesepost-Castroleaders

willhavetotakeintheverynearfuture,itisquiteconspicuoushowlittleweknow

abouttheirthinking.Theymustindeedhavesomehardmomentswiththemselveswhen

goingthroughthedifferentscenariostheymayimagineforthecountry,withoutbeing

abletodiscussitopenly—orperhapsnotevenwiththeirclosestcolleagues.

Itisinterestingtonotehowmuchmoreopenanddebate-orientedpoliticalculturewe

mayfindinacountrylikeVietnam(ref.Chapter4.9.4),wheretherewasanopen

leadershipstrugglebeforethelatestPartyCongress,includingdemandsforthe

abandonmentoftheLeniniststructureoftheParty.Similarsignshavesofarnotbeen

visiblewithintheCubanCommunistParty.

Indicator8.4:Theroleofpro-regimemassorganisationmobilisation.

UnconditionaldefendantsoftheCubanpoliticalsystemclaimthatitcontainsa

multitudeofmechanismsfordirectinvolvementsindecision-makingthatoften

aremissinginliberaldemocraticregimes.August(2013)representsagood

exampleofsuchargumentation,particularlyinPartIIIofhisbook.

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Mostacademicanalystsclaimthattheseformsofparticipationaremostlyformal,

moreorlesscompulsory,withoutofferinganyrealinfluenceonimportant

politicaldecisions.Issuesthatareopenforpopularinfluencearemostlylimited

toneighbourhoodaffairs,publichygiene,recreationandsportetc.Asclaimedby

someobservers,(ChaguacedaandGeoffrey,2015:60-61),thesestructures“in

practiceareinoperative,dysfunctionalandobsolete”:

“[…]theparticipationofCubansinmassorganizationsthatformthenucleusofwhatis

officiallycalledthesocialistcivilsociety–particularlytheCommitteesfortheDefenseofthe

Revolution(CDR),theCubanWorkersÚnion(CTC)andtheCubanWomen´sFederation

(FMC)–islessandlessmassiveandabovealllosinginqualityandcommitment.

Participationintheiractivitiesispurelyformal,limitedandsymbolic,although(popular)

discontentisnotreflectedinpopularactionsforchange,duetothelackofanalternativeand

legalizedcivilsocietyandthesurvivalmentalityinwhichtheCubansocietyfindsitselfand

thelossoftheveryconceptofacitizenasanactiveandautonomousbeing”(S/E).

Theofficiallydenominated‘massorganisations’,workingundertheguidanceof

theCommunistParty,includetheoneandonlytradeunionconfederation(CTC),

theWomen´sFederation(FMC),theneighbourhoodcommittees(CDR),the

peasantorganisation(ANAP),thestudentorganisation(FEU),andothers.The

mostillustrativeexampleisthat—ofall—theCTCwasleftwiththeresponsibility

toannounce,inSeptember2010—themassivesackingofasmuchas1million

stateemployees.Thefunctionoftheseorganisationsisgenerallytosupportthe

government,toruncampaignsforincreasedproductivity,andtoclaimvery

limitedandspecificreformsinfavouroftheirmembersandtargetgroup.Itmay

be,though,thattheyexertcertaininfluencebehindcloseddoors.Whenthe

massivedismissalofpublicemployeesthattheCTChadannouncedinthefirst

placewasclearlyreducedanddelayed,itmayverywellbethatcounter-pressure

fromtheCTCdidplayarole.

So,summingup,howrelevantistheCubanCommunistPartynowas‘theVanguardofthe

Cubanpeople’?Inspiteofitsofficialmonopolypowerposition,theinevitableperception

isthatthePartyisrapidlylosingitssocialandculturalhegemonyamongyoung

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generationsofCubans.Suchlosscouldeasilyalsospillovertotherealmofpolitical

hegemony.

Inspiteofitsofficialpowermonopoly,politicalobserversarebeginningtoaskquestions

aboutits‘realpowerquota’,thusimplyingthatthepowermonopolynolongerexists.

ChaguacedaandGeoffrey(2015:76-77),inanarticlewrittentheyearbeforethe7th

PartyCongress,claim:

“[I]tisnotablethatthePCCisnotanorganizationthatanylongerpossessesmuchlifeand

internaldynamics.ThePCCmaintainsimportantfunctionsofpoliticalandideologicalcontrol

overthepopulation(includingthecontainmentoftheintra-systemicdissidence,through

sanctionsandideologicalprophylaxis),butitdoesnotleadthesocietyandithaslost

symbolicandrealspace.[…]althoughthePCCisstillconsideredasthesuperiorbodyofthe

Stateandthesociety,asestablishedbytheConstitution,thechanges(broughtaboutbythe

reformprocess)areerodingitsfunctionandinfluence,asmoreandmoreofthereal

decisionsaretakenbytheCouncilofMinistersandtheStateCouncil,whiletheparty

apparatusremainsinthehandsofconservativefigureslikeMachadoVentura.Forallthose

reasons,thefunctionofthePCCandthepolitical-ideologicalformationislosingterrainin

frontoftheneedtosearchforefficiencyandpragmatismorientedtowardsthematerial

results”(S/E).

Itwasprobablyinrealizationofthisrealitythatthe7thPartyCongress,alsobybringing

onthevisiblyfragilehistoricleaderFidelCastrohalfayearbeforehepassedaway,made

whatmayhavebeenalastattempttore-takeapoliticalinitiative,evenbytryingtoside-

linekeyaspectsofthereformprocessincludingtheideologicaldisarmamentwiththe

US.Whilethismaycausesomeuncomfortablesituationsforthemorereform-oriented

factionsoftheparty,itwillclearlyleadtoamorepolarisedpoliticalsituationeven

withinthepartyleadership,andpossiblyamoreopenpowercompetition.

Indicator8.5:Anysignofamoreopen/pluralisticelectionprocess?

SinceFebruary2015,therehavebeenannouncementsaboutbothConstitutionalReform

andanewelectorallaw,thatwould“respondtoconditionsthatarechangingovertime”

sincethepreviousConstitutionwasapprovedthroughaReferendumin1976,according

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toRaúlCastro.473This,togetherwiththedeclarationsaboutmaximumagelimitsanda

ten-yearlimitontheholdingofleadershippositions(confirmedbythe2016Party

Congress;seeChallenge9),createdcertainexpectationsthatelectionsin2017/2018

concludingwiththeendoftheCastropresidentialera,mightbeofasomewhatmore

competitivecharacter.Somewerehopingforanevolutiontowardsadifferentiation

betweenlegislativeandexecutivepowers,andsomekindofdirectlegislativeand

presidentialelectionsin2018inacontextwhereindependentcandidatesmightgetthe

opportunitytopresentthemselvestothevoterswithoutpriorvettingbyparty

structures.ThismighthaveledtotheNationalAssemblybecomingmorethanan

assemblylineforunanimousdecisions.Sinceeconomicandsocialpowerisnolonger

monolithicinCuba,amorerepresentativecompositionofthelegislatureislong

overdue.

Thepreparationofthesereformscompletelylackedtransparency.OneofCuba´smost

prominentconstitutionexpertssaidthathewasawareoftheexistenceofaconstitution

reformcommission,withoutknowinghowitwascomposedorwhatitsmandatewas.474

ThePresidentoftheCommissionforConstitutionalandLegalAffairsoftheNational

Assemblysoonmadeitclearthatthenewelectorallawunderpreparationwasintended

toreducethenumberofdeputies(probablyadjustedtothelimitednumberofseatsin

therenovatedNationalCongress),andtoestablishaprofessionalandpermanentbody.

HeruledoutthatdirectelectionofPresidentwouldbeconsidered.475

Later,itbecameclearthatneithertheConstitutionnortheelectorallawwouldbe

reformedbeforethe2018changeofguards.476

473EFE,Havana,24.02.15,basedonreportsinofficialmediafromXPlenaryofPCCCentralCommittee.474JulioAntonioFernándezEstrada,ProfessorattheCentrodeEstudiosdeAdministraciónPública,UniversityofHavana:”ReformaconstitucionalenCuba:porqué,cómoyconquién”,enSinpermiso.info,13.02.16:http://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/reforma-constitucional-en-cuba-por-que-como-y-con-quien-0475JoséLuisToledo,presidentedelaComisióndeAsuntosConstitucionalesyJurídicosdelaAsambleaNacional,alportaloficialistaRazonesdeCuba,24.07.17.http://razonesdecuba.cubadebate.cu/articulos/elecciones-preguntas-y-respuestas-parte-iii/476ConfirmedbyRaúlCastrointheJuly2017sessionoftheNationalAssembly.

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TheelectoralprocessinCubastartswithnominationmeetings(asambleasde

nominación),assuminglynumberingmorethan40,000,ineachneighbourhood(barrio),

underthescrutinyofthedefencecommittees(CDRs).Noelectioncampaignispermitted,

apartfromthepresentationofthecandidates’CV.Inthisfirstinstanceofdirectvoting,

byashowofhands(i.e.nosecretvoting),candidatesforthemembersofthemunicipal

councilsarenominatedwhentheygetmorethan50%ofthevotes—ifnecessaryintwo

rounds.Electionformunicipalcouncils—bycastingofballots—tookplaceon26

November.Thoseelectedmembersofthemunicipalcouncilsinturnthenelectmembers

oftheprovincialcouncils.

Severalindependentinitiativeswerepresentedforthe2017/2018elections.Somos+,

headedbyEliécerÁvila,presentedatotalof170candidatesaroundthecountry,while

#Otro18,ledbyManuelCuestaMorua,claimedtohavepresented106candidates.An

electoraltrainingprogramme,ReddeFacilitadoresElectorales(REDFE)wasalsoactive.

Theindependentcandidateswereattackedbytheharderanti-regimedissidentsfor

“playingthegameoftheregime”.Themselves,theysaidthattheywerenotlookingfor

confrontationbutforaconstructiveanddemocraticcompetition.Someevenreferredto

theexamplefromMexico,whereanewelectorallawin1977markedwhatwascalledan

elite-leveltransitionfromthequartercentury-longauthoritarianquasi-monopolyrule

oftheInstitutionalRevolutionaryPartytoamulti-partysystem(seeKlesner1997).

TheseinitiativesweremetwithdirectaggressionbythePCC,CDRandotherpro-regime

forces.FirstVice-PresidentDíaz-Canel,thenewPresidentattheendoftheprocess,

warnedthatanycandidateotherthanthosepresentedbyofficialorganisationswere

“counter-revolutionarypeople”.“Ifthesedissidentsareelected,”hesaid,“theywillcome

totheMunicipalAssembliesandtheymaycometotheProvincialAssemblies.Ifthey

entertheParliament,itwouldbeawayoflegitimisingthecounter-revolutionwithinour

civilsociety”.Thiswillnotbeallowed,headded:“Wearenowtakingallthestepsto

discreditthis,sothatpeopleperceivetherisktheyrepresent”.477

477QuotedbyReinaldoEscobar:”MiguelDíaz-Canelincurreenundelitoelectoral.14ymedio,28.08.17.

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Therewerenumerousreportsaboutindependentcandidatesbeingsystematically

harassedbythepoliceorotherpro-regimerepresentatives,andmostofteneven

hinderedfromparticipatinginthenominationmeetings.478

Theoutcomewasthatnotoneoftheseindependentcandidateswasevennominatedin

thefirstinstance,letaloneelectedtoeventhelowestleveloftheassemblies.479But

therewasalsoanotheroutcome:themunicipalelections—theonlydirectpopularvote

onthewaytowardselectionsofParliamentandPresident—hadahistoricallyhigh

percentageofwhatwewithsomereservationsmaycalla‘protestvote’:atotalof21%

eitherabstained(16%)orcastablankorvoidvote.480Untiltenyearsago,lessthan5%

oftheelectoratemadeuseofthisopportunitytoexpressdisagreementorapathyvis-à-

vistheCubanpoliticalsystem.

On11March,theCubanvoterswereinvitedtocasttheirvoteinconfirmationofthe605

pre-selectedcandidatesfortheNationalAssembly,puttogetherbytheNational

CandidatureCommission.TheCommissionismadeupofmembersofparty-controlled

massorganisations.Aroundhalfofthedeputies,electedforfiveyears,aredrawnfrom

theelectedmembersofthemunicipalassemblies,whiletheotherhalfcomefromthese

organisations.

Thereweresomeinterestingresultsinthislastround:theturnoutwashistoricallylow

(85.7%,vs.90.8%in2013and97%in2008).Almost20%ofthosewhocasttheirvotes

didnotvoteforallcandidates.Thepercentageofinvalidvoteswasonthisoccasion

quitelow(5.6%).481So,althoughnooppositioncandidateswereallowedtorunforthe

elections,thevotersdidexpressunusualunconformitycomparedtopreviouselections,

withahistoricallyhighabstentionandvariousotherformsofprotest.

478'ELECCIONES'2018:CandidatosporelCambio:'Hayquereconoceralaotraparteparaentrareneljuegodemocrático'.JuanManuelNúnezDíaz,14ymedio,14.08.17.479”NingúncandidatoindependientelogranominaciónamunicipalesenCuba”,EFE,reproducedbyASCENews,3.11.17.480ReinaldoEscobar:”Un21%deloscubanossequedaalmargendelprocesoelectoral”,14ymedio,28.11.17.481EFE,LaHabana,13.03.18(reproducedin14ymedio):http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/Gobierno-destaca-masiva-participacion-electoral_0_2399160062.html.Theturnoutpercentagewasupdatedon19March.

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Indicator8.6:Improvedruleoflawperformance?

ThefourtharenainLinzandStepan´stransitiontheoryisruleoflawtoensurelegal

guaranteesforcitizens’freedomsandindependentassociationallife:allsignificant

actors,especiallythedemocraticgovernmentandthestate,mustrespectandupholdthe

ruleoflaw,embodiedinaspiritofconstitutionalism—aclearhierarchyoflaws,

interpretedbyanindependentjudicialsystemandsupportedbyastronglegalculturein

civilsociety.

TheR-o-Lconceptisoperationalizedinmanydifferentways.Oneofthemostcommonly

usedR-o-Lindexes,theWorldJusticeProjectRuleofLawIndex,482includeseight

performancefactors.SinceCubaisnotincludedontheWJPIndex,wecannotgiveany

score.Thefollowingassessmentisentirelyqualitative,basedonproperobservations:

1. ConstraintsonGovernmentpowers:

Factor1measurestheeffectivenessoftheinstitutionalchecksongovernmentpowerby

thelegislature,thejudiciary,andindependentauditingandreviewagencies,aswellas

theeffectivenessofnon-governmentaloversightby themedia andcivil society,which

serve an important role in monitoring government actions and holding officials

accountable.Thisfactoralsomeasurestheextenttowhichtransitionsofpoweroccurin

accordance with the law and whether government officials are held accountable for

officialmisconduct.

Cubaisnotatallwelloffonthisdimension,andlittleprogresshasbeenseenduringthe

reformperiodbeingstudiedhere.Thereisnotevenaformaldivisionofpowersbetween

theexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernment,withaheavyoverlapofmembers

betweentheCouncilofState(actingaslegislaturebetweentheraresessionsofthe

NationalAssembly)andtheCouncilofMinisters(tobere-appointedinJuly2018),and

thePresidentoftheRepublicheadingbothofthem.Thejudiciaryalsolacksreal

482http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index(2015).

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independencefromtheothertwostatepowers.483Allrealdecision-makingpowerin

Cuba´sMarxist-LeninistsystememanatesfromtheCommunistParty—whosePolitical

BureauandCentralCommitteemembersalsoaswehaveshownheavilyoverlapswith

theexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernment.Thereisthereforenoreal

institutionalcheckongovernmentpower,withacertainexceptionfortheContraloría

GeneraldelaRepública,theGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,seemingtohavegrown

substantiallyinpowerandcriticalindependenceunderRaúlCastro,toholdgovernment

officialsaccountableforofficialmisconductandknockdownoncorruption.Itisa

paradox,however,thattheContraloraisalsomemberofthelegislativebodiesNational

AssemblyandtheCouncilofState(butnotoftheCouncilofMinisters,norofanyleading

bodyoftheParty).Herrealindependenceisthereforerelative,andprobablysubjectto

greenlightfromthePresident.Theofficialmediaandparty-loyal‘civilsociety’playa

verylimitedroleinmonitoringgovernmentactionsandholdingofficialsaccountable.

Thegrowingspaceofindependentmediaandcivilsociety,ontheotherhand,isafactor

tobeincreasinglycountedwithregardingthisdimension.

Trends:RaúlCastroannouncedatthe2011PartyCongressthattheCommunistParty

shoulddistanceitselfmorefromstateresponsibilities,somethingthatmayimprove

Cuba´sscoreonFactor1iffollowedup.Thesamewouldbethecaseifmoredistinction

betweenexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernmenthadbeenimplemented,as

wellasmoreopenelectionprocedures.NeitherhappenedbeforetheendofRaúl

Castro’spresidency.However,theeffectiveendoftheinformationmonopolyandthe

increasedspaceforcivilsocietywillgraduallyhavepositiveimpactsonthisR-o-L

dimension.

2. Absenceofcorruption

Factor2measurestheabsenceofcorruptioningovernment.Thefactorconsidersthree

formsofcorruption:bribery,improperinfluencebypublicorprivateinterests,and

483ThisproblemwashighlightedbytheUNCommitteeagainstForcedDisappearance,whichsaidinaconsiderationofprincipleaboutCuba(whereforceddisappearancedoesnotoccur),thatthehierarchicalsubordinationoftheJudiciarytoNationalAssemblyandtheStateCouncilmayaffectitsindependence.Thiswasconcludedinspiteoftheassurancesbytheauthoritiesthatthishierarchicalsubordinationdoesnotimplyinterventioninthejudicialfunctionsorinthesettlementofanycaseinparticular(EFE,Geneva,17.03.17).

377

misappropriationofpublicfundsorotherresources.Thesethreeformsofcorruption

areexaminedwithrespecttogovernmentofficersintheexecutivebranch,thejudiciary,

themilitary,police,andthelegislature.

CubadoesnotfaretoobadlyontheTransparencyInternationalcorruptionperception

index(CPI),ranking62among180countries,withascoreof47outof100(practically

stableoverthelastsixyears).OnlythethreeusualbestperformersinLatinAmericaon

similarindexes,Uruguay(23rdpositionwithascoreof70),Chile(26st)andCostaRica

(38th)areperceivedasbetteroffthanCubainthisregion,wellaheadofregionalheavy-

weighterslikeArgentina(85th),BrazilandColombia(96th),Mexico(135th),allwith

scoreswellbelow40/100andallapartfromArgentinafallingontheranking.484This

relativelypositivesituationforCubaisprobablynotleasttheresultoftheanti-

corruptioncampaignheadedbytheContraloraGeneralmentionedundertheR-o-L

Factor1,andtheheavypenaltiesimposedonanumberofhigh-levelpublicofficials.But

iftop-levelofficialcorruptionisnotbadinCubawhenwespeakabout“improper

influencebypublicinterests”,“misappropriationofpublicfunds”ontheotherhandis

moretherulethantheexception,withpublicofficialssteepedinpetty-scalebribery.

Thesepractices,however,areprobablynotcommonlyperceivedbythosereportingon

thisTIindex.485

Trends:Thereisreasontobelievethatmoremarketeconomyandmoreinterestfrom

foreigninvestorsmayleadtomorecorruption.Thefirstsignsof‘cronycapitalism’have

484https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017485TheCPIdrawsonanumberofdifferentsurveysandassessmentsfromdifferentinternationalinstitutions,amongthemtheBertelsmannFoundation,theEconomistIntelligenceUnit,FreedomHouse,GlobalInsight,theWorldEconomicForum,theWorldBankandtheWorldJusticeProject.CountriesmustbeassessedbyatleastthreesourcestoappearintheCPI.Thesurveys/assessmentsareeitherbusinesspeopleopinionsurveysorperformanceassessmentsfromagroupofanalysts.InthecaseofCuba,theordinarygrassrootscorruptionmaynotbefullyperceivedbytheseinstitutions–withverylimitedpresenceinthecountry–orbyforeignbusinesspeople.AnotherTIindex,calledtheGlobalCorruptionBarometer(GCB),wouldprobablyhaverevealedmoreoftheproblematicCubanpractices,like‘misappropriationofpublicfunds’andpetty-scalebribery.GCBispresentedas”theworld'slargestsurveyaskingcitizensabouttheirdirectpersonalexperienceofcorruptionintheirdailylives”.Cubaishowevernotincludedinthisindex,whereLatinAmericaasaregioncomesoutverynegatively,headedbyMexicoandtheDominicanRepublic:(https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_on_the_rise_in_latin_america_and_the_caribbean).WhereasintheLatinAmericanregionthepoliceisperceivedasthemostcorruptinstitution,followedbyelectedrepresentatives,localgovernment,presidentsandjudges,inCubaitwouldprobablybegovernmentofficialswhowouldtakethisquestionableprize.

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beenregistered,somethingsooftenassociatedwith‘patrimonialstates’ifthatpattern

weretobereinforced.Itseemsthatparticularlysomesonsoftheoldrevolutionary

leadersareplayingthisroleasdooropenersforwould-beforeigninvestors.

3. Opengovernment

Factor3measureswhetherbasiclawsandinformationonlegalrightsarepublicized,

andassessesthequalityofinformationpublishedbythegovernment.Italsomeasures

whetherrequestsforinformationheldbyagovernmentagencyareproperlygranted.

Finally,itevaluatestheeffectivenessofcivicparticipationmechanismsandwhether

peoplecanbringspecificcomplaintstothegovernment.

Cubaisobviouslyabadperformerwhenitcomesto“opengovernment”.Characterised

withoneword,Cubanpublicadministrationisopaque,i.e.thecontraryoftransparent.

BasedonaproperexperienceaccompanyinganFDIinitiative,inresponsetoavery

concretegovernmentinvitation,itisobviousthatCubahasalongwaytogotoliveupto

basicinternationalexpectationswhenitcomestobusinesstransparency.Basiclawsand

legalrightsmaybepublicizedasamatterofroutine,butrightsareoftenso

contradictoryandthe‘greyarea’betweenlegalityandillegalitysowide,thatcitizens

wouldoftenbeindeepdoubtsabouttheborderlines,thusbeingexposedtothewhims

andbribeoffersofpublicofficials.Civicparticipationandcomplaintsmechanismsare

weakornon-existent,inaveryverticalandcentralizedgovernmentstructure.

Trends:todate,therearefewobservablechanges,butmorepluralismandmore

presenceofforeigninvestorswillnecessarilyimplypressuresforincreased

transparency.

4. Fundamentalrights

Factor4measurestheprotectionoffundamentalhumanrights,includingeffective

enforcementoflawsthatensureequalprotection,therighttolifeandsecurityofthe

person,dueprocessoflawandtherightsoftheaccused,freedomofopinionand

expression,freedomofbeliefandreligion,therighttoprivacy,freedomofassemblyand

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association,andfundamentallabourrights,includingtherighttocollectivebargaining,

theprohibitionofforcedandchildlabour,andtheeliminationofdiscrimination.

ThehumanrightssituationinCubaisverydivided,betweenhighscoresoneconomic,

socialandculturalrightsandcomparativelylowscoresoncivicandpoliticalrights.A

similardistinctionmaybemadebetweencollectiveandindividualrights.Effective

enforcementoflawsisoftencomplicatedbytheircontradictorycharacter(ref.Factor3),

andindividualcivilrightsarelimitedbyanauthoritarianstate.Freedomofreligionis

nowgenerallyguaranteed(thiswasnotthecaseinearlierphasesoftherevolutionary

regime).Itisaparadoxthatastateputtingtheworkingclasscentre-stageisviolatingso

manyfundamentallabourrights—includingtherighttocollectivebargaining.Thiswill

obviouslybecomeamorepressingissuewiththeincreaseofthenon-stateeconomyand

foreigninvestments.

Trends:Economicreformsmayhaveledtolowerenjoymentofsocio-economicrights,

whiletheremaybesomeimprovementsincivic-politicalrightsduetogenerally

increasedpluralism.

5. OrderandSecurity

Factor5measuresvariousthreatstoorderandsecurityincludingconventionalcrime,

politicalviolence,andviolenceasameanstoredresspersonalgrievances.

ThisisaverystrongfactorforCuba.Securityisexceptionallygood,conventionalcrime

islow,andstreetviolenceisalmostabsent.Politicalviolenceexistsinthesensethat

oppositiongroupsaresubjecttointimidationbypro-governmentmobs(turbas)and

arbitrarydetentionwhentheytrytomakepublicappearance.Violenceasameasureto

redresspersonalgrievancesseemstobeveryrare,particularlycomparedtoother

countrieswithsimilarculturalcharacteristics.Itisaparadox;therefore,thatCubahas

suchahighprisonpopulation.486

4867thhighestintheworldwith510per100.000inhabitants(USissecondwith666):http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All

380

Trend:Difficulttoseeacleartrendduringthereformperiod,althoughtheremaybea

changeinsanctionsagainstpoliticaloppositionfromlongprisonsentencestorelatively

short-termarbitrarydetention.

6. Regulatoryenforcement

Factor6measurestheextenttowhichregulationsareeffectivelyimplementedand

enforcedwithoutimproperinfluencebypublicofficialsorprivateinterests.Italso

includeswhetheradministrativeproceedingsareconductedinatimelymannerwithout

unreasonabledelaysandwhetherdueprocessisrespectedinadministrative

proceedings.Thisfactoralsoaddresseswhetherthegovernmentrespectstheproperty

rightsofpeopleandcorporations.

Regulatoryenforcementisoftenassociatedwithastrongstate,andinthatsenseCuba

hasahighcapabilityonthisdimension.Thestateapparatus,however,ismoreeffective

thanefficient—efficiencyprobablybeingverylowandunreasonabledelaystherefore

rampant.Itisprobablyaclearindicatorofthiswhentheregime´sownassessmentis

thatonly21%oftheapprovedGuidelines(Lineamientos)approvedbythe6thParty

CongresshadbeenfullyimplementedbythenextCongress.Thisisnotaconsequenceof

improperinfluence(althoughRaúlCastrohasattimescomplainedaboutaslowly

movingbureaucracy),anddueprocessinadministrativeproceedingsseemstobe

generallyrespected.Butlawsareoftencontradictoryandcharacterisedbyarbitrary

interpretationsandimplementation.Muchoftheeconomicactivityisobligedtooperate

illegallyorinthegreyzone,soastomakeitveryvulnerabletostatesanctions.

Trends:Respectforpropertyrightsmaybeontheriseinresponsetoacertainstate

retreatfromtheeconomy,mostclearlyseenintheliberalizationoftherealestate

market.OneofthemostvisiblechangesfromtheeldertotheyoungerPresidentCastro

isthatthereismuchmoreadherencetoinstitutionalprocedures.FidelCastroobviously

hadastrongerpositiontogetdecisionsimplementedthanhisyoungerbrother,butsuch

decisionswereoftenveryloosely—ifatall—foundedonformalprocedures.Thisisalso

asignthatdueprocesshasbeenstrengthened.

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7. Civiljustice

Factor7measureswhetherciviljusticesystemsareaccessibleandaffordable,freeof

discrimination,corruption,andimproperinfluencebypublicofficials.Itexamines

whethercourtproceedingsareconductedwithoutunreasonabledelays,andifdecisions

areenforcedeffectively.Italsomeasurestheaccessibility,impartiality,andeffectiveness

ofalternativedisputeresolutionmechanisms.

CiviljusticeseemstobeformallyquiteindependentinCuba,withdiscrimination,

corruptionandimproperinfluencebypublicofficialsbeingrare.Theexception,of

course,isforcaseswithpoliticalaspectsinvolved,wherepoliticalcontrolis

predominant.Theyarenormallyhandledbythespecialcourtforstatesecurity(Salade

laSeguridaddeEstado).Courtproceedingsmaybepainstakinglyslowandbureaucratic,

butdecisionswillnormallybeenforced.Alternativedisputeresolutionmechanismsare

notformalized.

Trends:Noparticulartrendshavebeenobserved.

8. Criminaljustice

Factor8measureswhetherthecriminalinvestigation,adjudication,andcorrectional

systemsareeffective,andwhetherthecriminaljusticesystemisimpartial,freeof

corruption,freeofimproperinfluence,andprotectiveofdueprocessandtherightsof

theaccused.

TheCubancriminaljusticesystemisprobablybetteroffthanthatofmostcomparable

countries,whenitcomestoimpartiality,corruptionandimproperinfluence.Due

processandtherightsoftheaccusedseemtobegenerallyrespected,withclear

exceptionforpoliticallyinclinedcaseswheresuchrightsaredefinitelynottakencareof.

Correctionalsystemsareprobablyalsoinbettershapethaninmostothercountriesof

theLatinAmericanregion,andsystematictortureisnotbeingapplied.Butas

mentioned,itisaparadoxthatCubaissohighupintermsofprisonpopulation,andit

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mustbenotedonthenegativesidethattheICRChasbeendeniedaccesstoCuba

prisons.

Trends:Noparticulartrendshavebeennoted.

OntotalR-o-Lscores,onlysixLatinAmericancountriesfallintheupperhalfofthelist,

whereas14endupintheupperhalfonEIU´sdemocracyindex487.Apartfromthethree

bestcountriesinallsuchrankings(Uruguay,CostaRicaandChile),beingrankedinthe

lowormiddle20samong102countries,acountrylikeBrazilisrankedno.46,and13

outof19oftheincludedLatinAmericancountriesarefoundinthelowerhalf.There

maybesomeculturalorregionalbiasesinsuchrankings,whenwenotethat23outthe

first38countriesaretobefoundintheEU,theEESandNorthAmerica(theUSactually

onlyslightlybeforeUruguay).ButthesefindingsconfirmageneralimpressionthatLatin

America,havingundergoneanimpressivetransitiontodemocracyoverthelatter30-

oddyears,isstillstrugglingwithseriousR-o-Lproblem.Cubaisnotnecessarilymuch

worseoffthanmanyotherLatinAmericancountrieswithbetterscoreonformal

democracyindexes.

However,therule-of-lawdeficienciesareexpectedtocomeunderheavypressurefrom

foreigncompanieseventuallybeingluredtoinvest.TherecognitionthatForeignDirect

Investmentsarecriticallyrequiredinordertorestoretheeconomymayobligethe

governmenttomakethejudiciarymoreindependent.Criminalcasesagainstforeign

businesspeople,basedonwhattheircompaniesperceiveasarbitraryapplicationof

rules,areoneofthefactorsthatthreatenforeigninvestors.TheCEOofaCanadian

companywithtwodecadesdoingbusinessinCubawasin2013sentencedto15yearsof

prison(ofwhichheservedthree),alongwithtwoCanadiancolleaguesandnine

governmentofficials,allegedlyforbribingCubanofficialswithrelativelyminor

incentives.Themostprominentamongthelatter,aviceministerofsugar,endedupwith

20yearsbehindbars.TheCanadiancompany,Tokmakjian,stronglyclaimsthatthe

processwasriggedandcompletelylackedtransparency,anditiswarningother

487Thesetwoindexesarenotdirectlycomparable,though,becausethenumberofcountriesonthedemocracyindexismuchlargerthanontheR-o-Lindex(167vs.101),wheremanyoftheLDCsandconflict-riddencountriesareincludedintheformerbutnotinthelatter.

383

potentialforeigninvestorsagainstthelackofrule-of-lawinthecountry.488Inasituation

whereFDIsaresocriticallyrequired,suchpressuremaybecomeapositivechange

factorintheyearstocome.Alsointhiscase,increasingvoiceforconstitutionalchange

maybeanaccompanyinginternalfactor.

DemocracyIndex:

ItisworthnotingthatLatinAmericaasaregionisconsideredlesswelloffintermsofR-

o-Lcomparedtodemocracy,whenthelatterismeasuredbytheEIUdemocracyindex.489

CubaisheretheonlycountryinthewesternhemisphereapartfromHaitiandVenezuela

placedinthelowestcategory,‘authoritarianregimes’,positionedasno.131outofthe

167listedcountries,afterAngolabutbeforecountriesofrelevantcomparisonlike

Angola,Russia,VietnamandChina.Withanoverallscoreof3.31/10(downfrom3.52on

the2015Index),Cubascoresrelativelywellonvariablessuchas‘functioningof

government’(4.29—wellafterChinaandwellbeforeVietnam)and‘politicalculture’

(4.38),whilethescoreon‘electoralprocessandpluralism’isverylowandfalling(1.33).

Scoreon‘politicalparticipation’isaboveCuba´stotalscore(3.89),whilethescoreon

‘civilliberties’iswellbelowandalsofalling(2.65).

488https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-corruption-canada/cuba-frees-canadian-businessman-tokmakjian-after-three-years-in-jail-idUSKBN0LP0QA20150222489TheEIU2017democracyindex(whereNorwayalongwiththeotherNordiccountriesoccupythetoppositions):http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWW1ZNU16STVaRGt6TnpCayIsInQiOiJYNFpEMGJ0dFp6d3U4MUpLXC9JMXhKQlZPVmdYMU5IR3Y3NUNGT1NkS0ptbE9Na3RnaUlHT21QRUtCMzQ3RW1EUWhmRE5mMnA2WWpWZjZ6TXczUmQyZjRMYnY5NjVNXC9RRFVvMW1TbXRNRFArMzFHS01ra2NSOEtYNW9WWHA1dEx5In0%3D

384

Challenge 9: Generational renewal with new source of legitimacy

Underthisindicator,wewilllookattheprocessoftransferringresponsibilitiestoanew

generationofleaders,inthePartyandinthesuperiorStatebodies.Wewillfocusonthe

recruitmentprocessandcompositionoftheleadingCommunistPartybodies(Politburo

andCentralCommittee)aftertheApril20167thPartyCongress(supposedlysitting

throughthefive-yearperioduntilthe8thCongressinApril2021),andtheStatebodies

aftertheApril2018presidentialtransfer.

AsRaúlCastroemphaticallystatedin2011,by2018boththeCastrobrothersand

probablyallother‘foundingfathers’oftheCubanrevolutionwouldbeoutofallformal

Governmentpositions.Atthe6thPartyCongresswherehemadethiscommitment,Raúl

alsocomplainedthatthePartyhadfailedtoprepareanewgenerationofleaderswith

thecapacitytotakeover—aparadoxinlightofthefactthathehimselfhadsackeda

largegroupofyoungleadersonlyafewyearsearlier.Inhiswords:

"Althoughwedidnotstopmakingseveralattemptstopromoteyoungpeopletomain

positions,lifeprovedthatselectionswerenotalwayssuccessful.Todaywefacethe

consequencesofnothavingareserveofdulypreparedsubstitutes,withsufficientexperience

andmaturitytoassumethenewandcomplextasksofleadershipintheParty,theStateand

Government,anissuethatwemustsolvegraduallyoverthefive-yearperiod(until2016,

author’sremark),withoutprecipitationorimprovisation,butstartassoonastheCongress

concludes"(Castro,2011)(S/E).

Fiveyearslater,atthe7thPartyCongress,hehadtorecognisethathisintentionof

retiringtheentirehistoricalleadershiphadfailed.Whenhefinallylefttheresponsibility

ofHeadofStateandGovernmentinApril2018,heexplainedthatthenewPresidentwas

theonly“whohadsurvived”amongtheyoungerleadersbeingpreparedtotakeover

aftertheCastros.“Wefailedtomaterializetheirpreparation[…]wecommittedtheerror

ofacceleratingtheprocess”(…)butwithDíaz-Canel“wehitthenailonthehead”,he

said.490

490RaúlCastrospeechtoNationalAssembly19.04.18:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LruOv7JeeAQ

385

TheCubanpoliticalsystemundertheCastrobrothershadevidentlyfailedforlongtoput

inplaceanorderlytransitionprocess.Finally,atthe2016PartyCongress,RaúlCastro

announcedtheintroductionofamaximumoftwofive-yearperiods,andstrictagelimits,

forholdinganyofthe“fundamentalpoliticalandstateresponsibilities”.Recognisingthat

hisintentionofretiringtheentirehistoricleadershiphadfailed,henowproposed:

“Wethereforeproposetoestablish60yearsasthemaximumageforenteringtheCentral

Committee,and70yearsforholdingleadershippositionsintheParty[…]soastoguarantee,

fromthebase,thesystematicrejuvenationofpartyresponsibilities”(Castro2016)(S/E).

SuchlimitshadsincelongexistedinChinaandVietnam.

Thisproposalcameagainstthebackdropofspeculationspriortothe2016Congress

aboutrenewalinthepartyleadership,includingwhetherornotRaúlCastrohimself

wouldtakeanotherfive-yearperiodasFirstSecretaryoftheParty(hehadlongago

announcedthathewouldstepdownasPresidentin2018).Notleastwasitexpected

thatanewSecondSecretarywouldbeelectedtoreplacethe86yearsoldleading

intransigentJoséRamónMachadoVentura,soastoineffectselectthefutureparty

leader.Infact,ifthenewagerestrictionshadbeenappliedatthe7thCongress,noless

thantwothirdsoftheincumbentPolitburomembers(9outof14)—includingRaúl

himself—wouldhavebeenretired.491

Accordingtowesternmediareports,Raúl’sproposalwasnotexactlymetwith

enthusiasmbythePartyCongress:

491ThefollowingPolitburomemberspriortothe7thPartyCongresswereabove70yearsofageinApril2016:FirstSecretaryRaúlCastro(85),SecondSecretaryJoséRamónMachadoVentura(86;leaderoftheCentralCommitteeSecretariatandinpracticefull-timepartyleader),LeopoldoCintraFrías(75;MinisterofDefense),AbelardoColoméIbarra(77;MinisterofInterior),RamónEspinosaMartín(77;ViceMinisterofDefense),EstebanLazoHernandez(72;PresidentoftheNationalAssembly),ÁlvaroLópezMiera(73;FirstViceMinisterofDefense),RamiroValdés(83;VicePresidentoftheCouncilsofStateandMinistersandtheonlyremainingComandantedelaRevoluciónremaininginleadershippositioninadditiontoRaúlCastro),AdelYzquierdoRodríguez(71,MinisterofTransport).The”younger”Politburomemberswere:MiguelDíaz-Canel(56,FirstVicePresidentoftheCouncilsofStateandMinistersandde-factoDeputyHeadofState),LázaraMercedesLópez(52,PartySecretaryforHavana),MarinoMurillo(55,economicczar),BrunoEduardoRodríguez(58,foreignminister),andSalvadorValdésMesa(66,formerPresidentofthenationaltradeunion,CTC).

386

”HiscommentsduringatwohourspeechattheinaugurationoftheCommunistParty's

twice-per-decadecongressweremetwithsilence,perhapsbecausesomememberswere

disappointedwiththeidea.‘Soserious!Whatsilenceiscausedbythissubject.Don'tthink

thatjustbecauseyoucan'tbeintheleadershipofthecountryyoucan'tdoanything,’Castro

said,suggestingthattheelderlycontinueaspartyactivistsandspendmoretimewiththeir

grandchildren.”492

However,itwassoonclarified,thisnewrulewasonlytobeappliedatthe8thParty

Congressin2021,andonlypartlyattheelectionofnewStateleadersin2018.

Indicator9.1:Willthe7thPartyCongress(2016)leadtoadeeperPartyleadership

renewal?

Politburo

Withtwoexceptions(MinisteroftheInteriorColoméIbarra(knownasFurry,who

retiredforhealthreasons)493andMinisterofTransportYzquierdoRodríguez(whose

departurewasnotexplained),allincumbentPolitburomemberswerere-elected,

including85yearsoldMachadoVenturaasSecondSecretary.So,notopleadership

renewaltookplaceatthe7thPartyCongress.Butinasignofsettingtherenewalin

motion,fivenewandrelativelyyoungercadreswereelectedtothenewPolitburo,now

countingatotalof17members.494Inspiteofthistransfusionofnewblood,halfofthe

memberswerestillwellabovetheretirementageof70yearswhenelected.Fourofthe

17werefromnowwomen(upfromone),whilefivewerenon-white,blackormulattos.

CentralCommittee

Whenmovingonestepdownthepartyhierarchy,totheCentralCommittee,aquite

significantrenewalprocessdidtakeplacein2016.Asfaraswehavebeenableto

492Reuters,Havana,17.04.16:http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-congress-age-idUSKCN0XE04V493ColoméIbarrawasoneoftheonlythreeministerswhohadcontinuedfromtheFideltotheRaúlCouncilofMinisters;hewasseenasakeyRaúlloyalistinthe1989Ochoaaffair. 494Thenewmemberswere:UlisesEspinosaMartín(therecentlyelectedSGofCTC),RobertoMoralesOjeda(MinisterofPublicHealth),MiriamNicadoGarcía(RectoroftheInformaticsUniversity),TeresaAmarelleBoué(SGoftheWomen´sFederationFMC),Marta AyalaÁvila(Vice-DirectorGeneralofthecountry´sbiotechnologicalcomplex;CentrodeIngenieríaGenéticayBiotécnología).

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establish,77ofthe142members(welloverthehalf),werenewlyelectedatthe7th

Congress.All55newmembersoftheCentralCommitteewereunder60yearsofage.

TheaverageageofthenewCentralCommitteeatthemomentofbeingelectedwasas

lowas54years,andasmuchas44%(62)arewomen.Itisalsointerestingtolookalittle

closeratthecompositionofthisnewCentralCommittee,fromwhichthenewgeneration

ofleadersatthenextPartyCongresswillhavetobeselected.Asfarasithasbeen

possibletoestablishbystudyingtheofficialpresentationofthe142membersofthenew

CentralCommittee,wemayidentifythefollowingcomposition:

Table9.7:CompositionofPCCCentralCommittee2016-2021:Table 15

Partyofficials: 39(27%)

Governmentofficials: 26(18%)

Militarybackground: 15(11%)

Representativesofmassorganisations: 12(8%)

Statecorporationleaders: 10(7%)

Source:CalculatedonthebasisofthelistpresentedinGranma,20.04.16

Itisworthwhilenotingthatthereisnocuentapropistaorotherrepresentativeofthe

non-stateeconomicsectorontheCentralCommittee,apartfromafewmembersof

farmercooperatives.Also,therearenoactive(full-time)academics,nocultural

personalities(apartfromaballetdancerandtheprominentHavanaHistoriador,Eusebio

Leal),andnorepresentativeoftheautonomous(notparty-affiliated)civilsociety.Sothe

CentralCommitteeisstillexclusivelydrawnfromstrictpartyloyalists.

AmongthepartyofficialsontheCentralCommittee,itisparticularlysignificantthat

almostallprovincialfirstsecretaries(14outof16),thosewhoarerunningpartyaffairs

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intheprovinces,arenowmembersalongwith6municipalsecretaries.495Thismeans

thatthepresenceofthedecentralizedlevelsofthepartystructurehasbeensignificantly

strengthenedattheapexoftheParty.Thesecadresaresupposedlythosewhoaremost

closelyexposedtothepopulation,moredirectlyreceivingcomplaintsandmoreableto

interpretsocialtrendsaroundthecountry.Butthroughvisitstoseveralprovincesand

conversationswithdozensofordinaryCubansduring2016and2017,theimpressionis

thattheProvincialPartySecretariatsandtheirhugestaffarelessandlessvisibleintheir

communities,onlyrarelyinteractingwiththepopulationoutsideofceremonial

activities.So,evenwithyoungercadresfromtheprovincesincreasinglyfillingthe

spacestobeleftbytheoutgoinggeneration,theywouldnotbringwiththemacultureof

minglingwithcriticalthinkers.Thiscouldofcoursepotentiallybechangedwhenthe

newgenerationisfullyincharge.Also,theprestigeoftheprovincialsecretaries

probablyvariesquitealotfromcasetocase.

AmongthegovernmentofficialssittingontheCentralCommittee,therewerefive

contemporaryministers,twoviceministers,morethanfifteenheadsofmain

governmentagencies,andfourdiplomats(amongthemthechiefnegotiatorwiththeUS,

JosefinaVidal,laterappointedasambassadortoCanada).

Amongstatecorporationleaderswithhighmilitaryranks,thetwotopGAESAmanagers

andGeneralsRodríguezLópez-CallejaandAndolloValdéswerebothelectedtothe

CentralCommittee.

Alsosignificantly,nobodyapartfromRodríguezLopez-CallejafromtheCastrofamily

waselectedtotheCentralCommittee.Asalreadynoted,itwasalmostremarkableto

notethatRaúl´sson,the‘IntelligenceCzar’AlejandroCastroEspín(seeIndicator7.5),

amongmostobserversatthetimeassumedtoaspireforaleadingpoliticalrole—and

perhapsevenasthefuturetopleader—wasnotelected.NeitherwasRaúl´sdaughter

MarielaCastro,directorofCENICEX,andalsorumouredtoaspirefortoppositions.496

495HowimportantthepositionasProvincialFirstSecretaryisasasteppingstoneforapartycadrecareer,isconfirmedbythefactthat6ofthe17membersofthe2016Politburohavehadthisposition,includingthedesignatedheirasHeadofState,Díaz-Canel.496Thereis–notsurprisingly–alotofspeculationaboutthefuturepoliticalroleofthesetwoleadingmembersoftheCastrofamily.AlejandroCastrowasalsonotelectedforthenewNationalAssemblyin2018,whereashissisterMarielawas.PartsoftheoppositionkeepholdingtheopinionthatAlejandro

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Afinalobservationfromthe2016Partyelectionsisthattheformerpowerfulheadofthe

Party´sIdeologicalDepartment,Alfonso‘Alfonsito’Borges,disappearedbothfromthe

CentralCommitteeandfromtheSecretariatoftheCentralCommittee.Indeed,thereis

nomentionoftheIdeologicalDepartmentinthenewlyelectedSecretariat497.Thisledto

severalquestionsofinterpretation—buttheideologicalbattleseemstobewagedwith

thesameorstrengthenedintensity(seeIndicator7.2).

TherecruitmentprocesstoCPleadershippositions

ThecadrerecruitmentandpromotionprocessintheCubanCommunistPartyandby

implicationtotoppositionsinGovernmentwasforalongperiod,underFidelCastro,

characterisedbypersonaland—itcouldappear—verysubjectiveandwhimsydecisions

bythecharismaticCommanderinchief.Itisdifficulttoseeanyotherreasonwhyso

manyyouthandstudentpoliticalleadersendedupinFidel´sinnercircle,andfromthere

wentontooccupysomeofthemostprominentgovernmentpositionswithoutfollowing

theinstitutionalladders.

OneoftheclearestexpressionsofthetransitionfromFidel´scharismatictoRaúl´s

rational-institutionalstyleofleadershipcanbeseenpreciselyinthisrecruitment

process.ThefirstandquitedramaticeventmarkingthistransitionwaswhenPresident

RaúlCastroinMarch2009madeasuddendecisiontofiresomeofthecountry´smost

prominentyoungleaders:VicePresidentandexpectedpresidentialcandidateCarlos

Lage,foreignministerFelipePérezRoqueandotheryoungleaderswhohadsurrounded

thethenretiredCommander-in-chief,alongwithanothertenministers.The

circumstancesaroundthismajorcabinetsweepandthesackingoftheyoungleaders

wasdramatic:itwascommunicatedthroughaseriesofvideopresentationsexclusively

CastrowillbethenextCubanstrongman,independentlyofhisformalpositioninGovernment.Seeforinstance”MustAlejandroCastroBePresident?”,byRobertoÁlvarezQuiñones,23.01.18,publishedinAsceNewsNo.788.497TheSecretariatoftheCentralCommittee,inchargeoftheday-to-daymanagementoftheParty,consistsoftheHeadsoffivesectoraldepartments,includingtheDepartmentofOrganizationandPoliticalCadres,thevettingbodyforrecruitmentandascendencytotheParty´sleadershippositions.TheSecretariatisledbySecondSecretaryMachadoVentura.TheIdeologicalDepartment,previouslyseentobeperhapsthemostpowerful,isnowabsentonthenewSecretariatstructure.

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showntotheCPmembersaroundthecountry,andbyinsidersdescribedasmore

dramaticthanthesoapoperasbywhichmostCubansareentertained.498

Themostremarkabledetailinthiscriminalnovel-likethriller,withdetailsprovidedby

securitypolicesurveillance,wasthemomentwhenMrLage,theaspiringcandidatefor

thenewnumbertwopositionintheGovernment—FirstVicePresidentoftheCouncilof

Stateandrunner-uptoPresidentCastro—witnessedthePolitburodecisionofbypassing

himandinsteadpromotingtherevolutionaryveteranJoséRamónMachadoVentura,at

thetime77yearsold,totheposition.Themainreasonforthisfailuretopromotethe20

yearsyoungerMrLagemaywellhavebeensomehighlyun-elegantremarksbyhisclose

friendscaughtbysecuritypolicemicrophonesthatthis‘dinosaur’—astheyhadcalled

MrMachadoVentura—shouldhavebeenmadeawaywithwhenoneofthemhadhim

undersurgicaltreatment.

ForCubaninsiders,itwasnoco-incidencethatpreciselyMrMachadoVenturawas

chosenforthesecond-in-rankpositionwhentheyoungercandidatewasconsidered

unfitforit.Andthe‘dinosaur’wentontosurvivetwomorepartycongressesastheman

closesttoRaúlintheParty.Hehadhimselfhadthekeyvettingpositionforallsignificant

promotionssincethefirstPartyCongressbackin1975,bywayofheadingtheParty

Secretariat´sDepartmentofOrganisationandCadresduringalltheseyears.499

MachadoVentura,medicaldoctorbytraining,wasoneoftheSierraMaestraveterans

whohadfoughtalongsideFidel,RaúlandCheGuevaraduringtheguerrillastruggle,

holdingtheprestigioustitleofComandantedelEjercitoRebelde.Hewasafounding

memberoftheCubanCommunistPartyandamemberofthePolitburosinceits

establishment(heisnowtheonlypersonalongwithRaúlCastrotohaveservedun-

interruptedlyonthePolitburo).HehadbeenministerofHealthandFirstParty

SecretaryinHavana,butmostofallhehadbeena100%Fidelloyalist500andtheperson

498Theevents–whichneverweremadepubliclyknownoutsidethepartycircles–weredocumentedindetailbythemostveteranforeigncorrespondentinHavana,MarcFrank(2013:144-153).499ThedescriptionofthedecisivecadrerecruitmentroleplayedbytheDepartmentofOrganizationandCadresanditsHeadduringmorethan35years,isbasedonLopez-Levy2015.Lopez-Levyhashadintimateknowledgeofthisstructurebasedonhisownexperience.500MaxLesnick,whogrewuptogetherwithMachadoVentura(hecallshimhis‘cousin’withouthavingformalfamilyrelations)andjoinedstudentandanti-Batistapoliticstogetherwithhim,claimsthatmore

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whomorethananybodyruledoverwhowouldriseandfallinthepartyandstate

hierarchy.

TheDepartmentledbyMachadoVenturabetween1975and2011hashadtheroleof

approvingorsubmittingtotheconsiderationofthePolitburoandprovincialparty

structurestheappointmentofallleadersonanylevel—frommunicipaltonational.It

alsohasadecisiveroleintheselectionofleadersofstatecompaniesandparty-affiliated

massorganisations,aswellashigh-levelministrypositions,onlyexceptingthe

ministriesofDefenceandtheInterior.Militarypromotionshavebeenreservedforthe

personaldecisionoftheCastrobrothers.Appointmentstokeypositionsinhigher

education(universitiesetc.)andparty-affiliatedresearchcentres,partycadreeducation,

mediaorganisationsaswellasdiplomaticappointmentsarealsocontrolledbythisbody.

Theworkisbasedonsystematiccollectionofinformation,asexplainedwiththewords

ofLopez-Levy(2015):

”Bythetimesomeoneisamanagerofamajorstatecompanyoramemberoftheprovincial

committeeoftheCommunistParty,theorganizationdepartmenthasathickfileabouttheir

life,friends,family,personalbiographieswithmomentsofself-criticismabouttheirpast

mistakesortheirexplanationsaboutwhytheydidopposetocertainpartypolicies[…]Atthe

endoftheprocess,onlyFidelandRaulCastrocanbypasstheorganizationdepartment’s

filters.”

Inotherwords:MachadoVenturahassince1975beenthechiefgatekeeperyouneeded

topassbyifyouwantedtoriseintheCubansystem,withtheonlyexceptionofsome

youngcadreshandpickedbyFidelwhoalldisappearedunderRaúl;andtopmilitary

appointments.

TheoutcomeoftheextensiveleadershipreshuffleoneyearintoRaúlCastro´s

presidencymarkedaclearvictoryforthemilitarystructurethathehimselfhadbeenin

chargeofandthustrustedmorethananyotherCubaninstitution.Tenactiveandretired

generalswerenominatedtotopgovernmentpositions,andotherofficialswereputin

keycivilianeconomicpositions.Gradually,theserelativelyoldmilitaryleaderswere

thansubscribingtoanyideologicalconviction,MachadoVenturaisanuncompromising‘fidelista’loyal(interviewwithMaxLesnickinMiami,31July2014).

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substitutedbyprovincialpartyleaders,inwhatLopez-Levydescribesas“theabsolute

victoryofthecoalitionoftheArmedForcesHighCommandandprovincialpartyczarsin

thefactionaldynamicsthatsurroundedFidel’ssuccessionbyRaul”.Thisalliance,he

claims,”indicatedthestrengthandbolsteredtheinfluenceoftheDepartment(of

OrganizationandCadres)asthedecisivemakerofCuba´spoliticalbalance”.

Atthe20116thPartyCongress,whenMachadoVenturawasalsoformallypromotedto

thedeputypositioninthePartystructure(SecondSecretary),AbelardoAlvarezGilwas

madethenewHeadofthepowerfulDepartmentofOrganisationandCadres,butstill

underMachadoVentura´sleadershipasHeadoftheentirePartySecretariat.

Indicator9.2Howthoroughrenewalofstateleaders(2013and2018)?

RaúlhadformanyyearsmadeitclearthathewouldnotrunforanothertermasHeadof

StateandGovernmentafterthe2017/2018elections.Itwasexpectedthat2018would

betheyeartoendtheCastroera,andthathisentiregenerationofrevolutionary

comradeswouldaccompanyhimoutoftheStateleadership.

In2013,twoyearsafterthe6thCongresswhereRaúlhadcomplainedaboutthelackof

suitableyoungercadres,achiefsuccessorwasfound,whentheNationalAssembly

electedthen53years-oldMiguelDiaz-CaneltosucceedMachadoVenturaastheFirst

VicePresident,secondonlytoRaúl,oftheCouncilsofStateandMinistersandthe

intendedheirtotheHeadofStatepositionin2018.Again,thisselectionwouldnothave

beenpossiblewithouttheacceptanceofMachadoVenturahimself,althoughitseemsto

havebeenRaúl´spersonaldecision.Atthesametime,55%oftheCouncilofState—

fillingparliamentaryfunctionsin-betweenthetwobriefannualsessionsofthePopular

(National)Assembly—waschanged.

VeryfewoftheyoungermemberselectedtotheCouncilofStatein2013wereknown

outsideoftheinnercircles,andevenlesswasknownabouttheirthinking.Thetop

powerstructureinCubaremainedtoappearasmonolithicasever,maintaininga

hermeticveilofsecrecyabouttheirinternaldiscussions.Themainreasonwhythese

cadreswereselectedandsurvivedinthesepositionsisprobablyexactlythattheyhave

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notexpressedanyopinionsdeviatingfromtheofficialline—andthisalsogoesforDíaz-

Canel.

Sofinally,in2018,theleadershiprenewalprocesswassupposedtoculminate.

ThecompositionofthenewNationalAssemblycomingoutofthe2017/18election

process(ref.Indicator8.5)whichwouldconfirmthenewStateleaders,wasasfollows:

• 90%arebornaftertheRevolution(averageage49years);

• 56%arenew;

• Morethan40%arenon-white;

• Morethan53%arewomen.501

However,only5%ofthedeputieswerenon-membersofCommunistPartyoritsyouth

chapter.502

Finally,theNationalAssemblydeputieson19April2018asexpectedelectedMiguel

Díaz-CanelasPresidentoftheRepublic(CouncilsofStateandMinisters)andthe30

additionalmembersofConsejodelEstado,inasecretvotebutalsoonthebasisofa

proposalfromtheCandidatecommission(ref.Indicator8.5).

ThequestionraisedbymanywaswhetherthisreallywastheendoftheCastroera?

ThenewStateCouncilthatwaselectedrepresentsasignificantrejuvenation,with13of

the31beingnewcomersandthreequartersbelow60andbornaftertheRevolution.

Comparedtothecompositionpriorto2013,therehasbeenverythoroughgenerational

renewal.Mostofthehistoricalleadersarenowabsentfromthislegislativebody.Of

particularimportanceisthedeparture—alongwithRaúl—ofMachadoVentura,seenas

theleadingorthodoxhardliner,andallthemilitaryhierarchywithoneexception:the77

501AccordingtoGranma,reproducedin:https://america.cgtn.com/2018/03/09/explaining-how-cubas-election-system-works502ReinaldoEscobar:”Todoelpoderalamilitancia”,14ymedio,12.03.18:http://www.14ymedio.com/opinion/poder-militancia_0_2398560126.html

394

yearsoldministerofdefenceCintraFrías.Theyhavekepttworeallyold-timers,thetwo

ComandantesdelaRevoluciónRamiroValdés(86),guerrillaveteranfromthevery

beginningin1952,andGuillermoGarcíaFrías(90),thefirstpeasanttojointheSierra

Maestraguerrilla.RamiroValdés,re-electedasoneofthesixVicePresidents,who

alwaysstayedveryclosetoFidel,mayperhapsbeconsideredtheleadingremaining

orthodoxoftheStateCouncil.TheControllerGeneralandanti-corruptionczarGladys

Bejerano(71),acloseRaúlconfident,hasalsobeenpromotedtoVicePresident.

ThenewFirstVicePresidentandDíaz-Canel’sdeputy,SalvadorValdésMesa,istooold

(72)tobeconsideredafuturecandidatefortoppositions.Heisblack,aprevioustrade

unionbossandmemberofthePolitburo.TheotherVicePresidentsoftheStateCouncil

areyoungerandmustbeconsideredthemainrisingstars:theministerofhealth

RobertoTomásMoralesOjeda(50),thePresidentoftheNationalHydraulicInstitute

InésMaríaChapman(52),andthePresidentoftheprovincialParliamentinSantiago

BeatrizJhonson(48).TheywereallpromotedfromordinaryStateCouncilmembersto

vicepresidents.AnotherfutureleadertowatchisprobablyUlisesGuilartede

Nacimiento,SecretaryGeneraloftheTradeUnionFederation(CTC),alsomemberofthe

Politburo.

TworathersurprisingdepartureswerethoseoftheeconomicczarMarinoMurilloand

ofthePartySecretaryinHavanaLázaraMercedesLópezAcea,bothamongtheyoungest

membersoftheParty’sPolitburoandassuchtippedtoaspirefortoppositions.Buthalf

ofthe17PolitburomembersarestillmembersoftheStateCouncil,sotheParty

dominanceisstillveryclearalthoughboththetwotopleadersofthePartyhavenow

left.

Anotherinterestingobservationisthereducedmilitarypresence(ref.Indicator7.5).

ThenewStateCouncilhasonlyonemanleftfromthemilitaryhierarchy:Generaland

DefenceMinisterLeopoldoCintraFrías.503Noneoftheyoungerofficershavebeen

promotedtotaketheseatsleftemptybyoldgenerals.

503Whenwesaythatonlyonememberofthetopmilitaryhierarchy(CintraFrías)remains,wearereferringtoofficersinactivemilitaryduty.ValdésandGarcíaFrías,bothComandantesdelaRevolución,arenomoreinactivemilitaryservice.

395

TheNationalAssemblythatconvenedinApril2018alsohadthemandatetoelectthe

newCabinetofMinisters(ConsejodeMinistros),butDíaz-Canelaskedtohavethis

postponedforanotherthreemonths(untilJuly).Thismustbeinterpretedasgiving

himselftheopportunitytoputtogetherhisowncabinetteam,inanefforttotakefuture

policy-makingmoreintohisownhands.Untilhewaselected,hehadnottakenany

properpolicyinitiatives.

ThetransferfromRaúlCastrotoMiguelDíaz-Caneltookplacewithfullassurancesfrom

boththeoutgoingandtheincomingpresidentaboutcontinuity—notsostrangegiven

thecircumstancesoftheCubansystem.Herewasanewpresidentwhohadnotbeen

abletomakeanycampaign,nortospeakabouthisvisionforthecountry,noteven

revealanyambitionuntilhesuddenlystoodthereasthecountry´snewHeadofState

andGovernment.Therewasnoperiodbetweenelectionsandinauguration.Althoughit

wasgenerallyexpectedthathewouldbeelected,heformallyspeakingwaslaunchedas

acandidateandhadtoassumefullresponsibilityinamatterof24hours.

Díaz-CanelstatedinhisfirstspeechasPresidentthatCastrowouldremainasthe“leader

oftherevolutionaryprocess”,thathewouldstillbe“leadingthedecisionsofgreater

importanceforthepresentandthefutureofthenation”,andthattherewasnointention

about“transition”or“restaurationofcapitalism”.504(S/E)

Onhisside,RaúlCastrodrewupthefuturetransferprocessindetail,untilhehimself

turns100in2031.HesaidthatDíaz-CanelshouldonlystayasHeadofStatefortwo

periods(tenyears),thathewouldalsotakeoverasPartyLeaderin2021andthathe

wouldstayinthatpositionforanotherthreeyearsaftertheelectionofhissuccessoras

President(presumablyin2028).“Thesamethingthatwearedoingwithhim,hehasto

dowithhissubstitute...tomakeasafetransitionfeasible”.InthenextConstitution,

Castroadvanced,thepositionsasPresidentoftheStateandMinisterCouncilsplusparty

leadermayagainbeunited,sothatthatpersonmayexercise“allthepowerand

504Díaz-Canel’sfirstspeechasPresidentofCuba:http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2018/04/19/miguel-diaz-canel-la-revolucion-no-termina-con-sus-guerrilleros/#.WtnGvmbJJsM

396

influence,evenifthereis,itmaybe,aprimeministerwhoattendsthegovernment"505

(S/E).

ThereisobviouslynoworryabouttheeternalvalidityofthepeculiarCubanpolitical

system,andthereisnoplantointroduceanyseparationofpowers.

Whoarethenewcomersandhowdifferentarethey?

Althoughthereseemstobearesistancefromthehistóricostogiveuptheleadership

untiltheverylastmoment,acompletechangeofguardsunavoidablyisunderwayinthe

Cubanregime,whichwillhavetobecompletedprettysoon.

Whowerethenewcomersfillingtheleadingpartyandgovernmentbodiesin2016and

2018?

Theybelongtoagenerationbetweenlate-fortiesandlate-fifties.Theygrewupduring

the‘goldenera’oftheCubanrevolution;manywerestudyinginthesocialistcountries

whenthesocialistregimesunravelled—sotheylivedthroughperestroikathere.But

theyarealsoexposedtopressurefromthenextgenerationwhogrewupduringthe

PeríodoEspecial,whomaybeexpectedtopressurethefirstpost-Castrogenerationto

renewthesystem—verydifferentlyfromthewayRaúlCastrodesignedthecontinuityat

themomenttoretreattoleadthePartyforhislastthreeyears.

Onewaytotrytounderstandwhatpoliticalchangesthatmighttakeinthewakeof

unavoidableeconomicreformsis—aswehaveseeninothertransitionprocesses—to

watchdifferentkeyactorgroupsandtheirchangingbehaviour.

Thefirstgrouptowatchwouldobviouslybethenewgenerationofstateandparty

leaders.Arethereidentifiabletendencies,factions,ideologicalandpoliticaldifferences,

orevenmore:isthereapowerstrugglegoingonbetweensuchfactions,preparingfor

thepost-Castroera?Theanswerissimplythatpracticallynosuchsignsarevisible 505RaúlCastro’sfarewellspeechasPresident,19.04.18:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LruOv7JeeAQ&feature=youtu.be

397

neithertoexternalobserversnoreventopartymembersandhigh-levelofficialsoutside

oftheabsolutepowerelite(PolitburoandCentralCommittee).Cubantopleadersare

extremelytight-lippedandtheymaintaintheappearanceofabsoluteandmonolithic

unity,eveninasituationwherealmosteveryaspectofCubansocietymustnecessarily

beundercriticalconsideration.

While—aswehaveseen—thereisacertainintellectualdebateaboutsocialist

alternatives,peoplewithleadingpositionsinthepartyandstateinstitutionshardly

expressanyopinionsorpreferences.Onecanonlyspeculateaboutthereason,assuming

thattheremustbedifferentopinionsaboutallthefundamentaldecisionsaheadforthis

country:withalltheyoungerleaderskickedoutofpoliticalpositionsovertheyearsand

particularlysinceRaúlCastrotookover,nobodywithsurvivalinstinctsiswillingtostick

outhisorherneckandriskbeingthenextvictimofpartypurges.Thatishowaperson

likeDíaz-Canelsurvived.Thatleavesuswiththequestionofwhetherheandhisteam

reallyhaveanystrategicvisionaboutthewayaheadforthiscountry.Itis,forinstance,

verydifficulttofindoutwhichyoungerpartycadresatvariouslevels,startingwiththe

provincialfirstsecretaries(almostallofthemalsomembersoftheCentralCommittee

andthusprobablyamongthecandidatesforfuturetopleadershiproles),aredriversfor

oragainsteconomicand/orpoliticalreforms.

Oneaspecttowatchcarefullyisthefutureroleofthemilitaryinstitutionandthe

youngerofficers.ItmayberelevanttorefertoChinaandthewayPresidentXihas

managedtoconcentrateallmilitaryandcivilianpowerinhishands.Inthepresent

leadershipcrisisinCuba,itisratherunthinkablethatanewgenerationofpost-Castro

leaderswouldbeabletoconcentrateanysimilarpowerposition.

Indicator9.3:Reformcontinuityorcounter-reform?

Signsofacounter-reform,oratleastthat‘pause’hadtakenpreferenceover‘hurry’

(prisa)inRaúl’sterminology,actuallystartedtoappearalreadyin2015.InaMay2015

meetingoftheCouncilofMinisters,PresidentRaúlCastrosignalledahaltinthe

authorisationofnewnon-agriculturalcooperatives,inrealityreversingaprevious

policyofprioritisingcooperativesas“ahighersocialformofeconomicorganisation”.

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Thenumberofregisteredself-employed,continuouslyincreasingsince2010,suddenly

startedtodecreasefrommid-2015(butlaterreturnedtogrowth).

InJanuary2016,followingrapidlyincreasingfoodpricesandaccusationsagainst

speculators,thede-regulationoftheagriculturalsectorsufferedaseriousblow,witha

returntostrengtheningratherthangraduallyclosingdowntheinefficientstate

monopolypurchaseinstitutionforagriculturalproducts,centrosdeacopio,theclosureof

thesofaronlyexistingwholesalemarketforagriculturalproducts(ElTrigalright

outsideofHavana),introductionofmaximumprices,andthewithdrawaloflicensesfor

ambulantstreetvendors.506

Giventhenegativeresultsoftheflip-floppingagrarianreformefforts,itmaynothave

comeasabigsurprisewhen,asaresponsetoconstantpriceincreasesinthenon-state

markets,2016becameayearofseriousreformreversals.SecondSecretary(andDeputy

Leader)oftheCommunistParty,JoséRamónMachadoVentura,ledaformidable

campaignagainst“unscrupulousmiddlemenandspeculators”,507respondingtocalls

fromsomedeputiesintheNationalAssemblyinlate2015.PresidentCastroechoedthe

warnings,saying“asolutionmustbefoundtobringpricesinlinewithpublicwages”.

EconomyMinisterMarinoMurillowasapparentlymadeascapegoatofthisharsh

criticism.Hepracticallydisappearedfromthepubliceyeforoneandahalfyear,during

whichhewasalso“relievedofhisfunctions”asMinisteroftheEconomy,whilehe

maintainedthepostasreformcoordinator—forreformsnowinpausemode.

InJanuary2016,effortsstartedtorestorepricecontrolson23basicproducts,

introducingdistributionrestrictions,anddistributingandsellingmorefoodatfixed

prices.Privatelyownedtruckswereorderedtounloadatstatemarketsinsteadofretail

outlets,andmoststreetvendorsapparentlylosttheirlicenseorwerescaredoffthe

street.Thestatealsostartedopeningnewoutletstosellbasicfoodatfixedprices,

reversingaprevioustrendtogetoutoftheretailfoodbusiness.508

506Thomsonreuters(2016):”Inareversal,Cubatriespricecontrolstotamefoodinflation”.CablefromHavana,21.01.16.507Ibid.508TheseobservationsweremadeduringtwovisitstoHavanaandotherpartsofthecountryduringfirsthalf2016,visitingmarketsandtalkingtoalargenumberofvendorsandclients,plusdiscussionswithCubanagriculturalexpertsandPhDstudentStåleWig,studyingstreetcommerceinHavana.

399

MachadoVenturamadeitclearthattheaimwastoreturntothesystemofchannelling

thebulkofallfoodproductsthroughstatechannelsasameasureagainstspeculation

(thissharehadfallenfrom80%to50%,nowheintendedtoraisetheshareto85%

again).ThesemeasureswereconfirmedbythePCCCongressinAprilofthesameyear,

votingtoeliminatelicensesforprivatewholesalefooddistribution.RaúlCastropaid

homagetoMachadoVenturaforreactingsodecidedlytoattacktheproblemofrising

prices.

Themaineffectoftheserestrictionsmayhavebeentheconsolidationoftwomarket

segments,particularlyinHavana:therelativelybetteroffplusprivaterestaurantswould

findmarketswherepricecontrolwasnotrespected—inspiteoffrequentpresenceof

inspectors—andgoodqualityproductswereavailable,whereaslower-incomegroups

couldfindsomebasicproductsatothermarketswheresupplywaslimitedandquality

waslower.509

The7thPartyCongressinApril2016,onemonthafterthehistoricPresidentObamavisit

toHavana,hadbeenexpectedtoacceleratethereformtrends.Infact,however,the

abovenotedreversetrendswereclearlyconfirmedbythe7thCongress,withharsh

attackson‘speculators’inthenewmarketeconomy.RaúlCastrohimself,whohad

arguedsystematicallyforthesemarketreforms,nowechoedcriticismfroma

conservativelikeMachadoVentura,inwaysthatmostobservershadnotexpectedto

hearfromPresidentCastroatthispointofthereformprocesshehimselfhadsetin

motion:“Wecannotremainwithfoldedarmsinfrontofthecitizensírritationbythe

scruple-lessmanipulationofthepricesonthepartofintermediarieswhoonlyare

thinkingofhowtheycanearnmoreandmore.”(Castro2016)(S/E).

Afirstwaveofattacksonsuccessfulprivatebusinesses,ofwhichthepaladaresaremost

prominent,startedinthefallof2016.InanapparentparalleltonewattacksonUS

imperialism,newwavesofmeasuresagainstself-employedtookplace. 509Accordingtoareportin14ymedio,25.11.16.ConversationsinHavanainJanuary2017confirmsthisdual-markethypothesis:forordinaryconsumers,bothsupplyandpricesseemtohavebeenprettystableduring2016-2017,continuinginto2018.Formoredemandingclients,includingpaladares,therewereclaimsofapriceincreaseofasmuchas20%,withsupplyofhigh-qualityproductsbeingmuchlessreliablethanbefore.

400

Atthesametime,therewereseveralmassiveraidsandinspectionsdirectedagainst

pettytraders.Forinstance,inthebusytradingstreetMonteinHavana,alargepolice

forceclosedofftheentiretradingblocswhilealargegroupofinspectorswentthrough

Twooftheprovinces,CamagüeyandLasTunas,wereparticularlyhardhitbythe2016

attacksonprivatebusinesses.Severalsuccessfulrestaurantswereclosed,manyofthem

almostemptiedfortheirbelongings,andsomeownersdetainedforweeks.The

accusationsincludedthepossessionofproductswithoutbeingabletoproducereceipts,

workerswithoutcontracts,delayswithpaymentoftaxes.Evenownerswithconnections

togovernmentorquasi-governmentofficials(inonecasetheownerwasthesonofa

MinistryoftheInteriorcoronel,inanothercasethewifewasthepresidentofthe

neighbourhoodcommittee),werenotsparedforsuchharshreactions.1

ThemunicipalgovernmentinHavanacalled134ownersofprivaterestaurants

(paladares)toameeting(129attended),informingthatnonewlicensesforthetime

beingwouldbeissued,warningthemagainstvariousillegalaspectsoftheirbusiness

practice:havingmorethanthelegallyestablishedmaximumof50chairs,buyingfood

productsdirectlyfromprivateproducersandmarketsratherthanfromthestate,using

un-registeredworkforceandentertainers/musicians,illegalpurchaseofbuildings,

dubioussourcesofcapital,stayingopenafter3a.m.anddisturbingneighbours,

contractingentertainmentoutsideofofficialchannels,eveninsomecasespromoting

prostitution.1Inthemidstofpraisesfortheprivatesector´scontributiontotheeconomy

andtourism,awarningofstrengthenedinspectionsoftheirfacilitieswasgiven.The

reactionfromseveralownersandmanagersinterviewedbytheauthorinHavanathose

days,wasacombinationofashrug(“thisisanexpectedreaction,buttheyknowitwill

notwork”),toastrongrejectionsayingthatitissimplyimpossibletoofferthequality

andpriceleveloftheserestaurantsifthedirectaccesstoprivatefoodproducersis

closed.“Ofcoursetheyaretechnicallyright,weallbendtherules,butwehavelittle

choice,”saidoneoftheownerspresentatthemeetingwhenIinterviewedhim

afterwards.Headdedthattheyhaveaconstantchallengetoproducereceiptsforallinput

goods.

Aftersomeweeks,theissuingofnewlicenseswasresumed,and‘businessasusual’again

ruledintheprivaterestaurantsectoratleastinHavana,inanothercaseofthezigzagging

publicpolicytowardstheprivatesector.

401

thebusinesseson11October2016,leadingalmosttopanickyreactions.ManyTCPs

wereheavilyfinedandseveralalsolosttheirlicenses.Theonlyconsequenceofsuch

governmentactions,however,seemstobethatthebusinessismovedfurther

underground,wherethecombinationofillegalitiesandcorruptionofofficialinspectors

takesanotherturnofgrowth.510

Thenextsectortobesingledoutforseriousscrutinywasthetaxisector,particularlyin

Havana(refdiscussionunderIndicator4.6interestrepresentation).

Butthemostseriousbacklashforthepromotionofprivateentrepreneurship,camewith

agovernmentannouncementon1August2017,makingitclearthatnonewlicences

wouldbegiventothemostlucrativesectorsofthenon-stateeconomy:restaurantsand

cafeteriasaswellasroomrentalforforeigners.Forthesesectors,thecancellationwould

betemporary”untiltheperfectingprocessforself-employedworkhasbeenconcluded”.

Forallsaleofagriculturalproducts,however,beitwholesaleorretail,includingambulant

streetsellers(carretilleros),thecancellationofnewlicenceswasdeclaredasdefinitive.511

Afterthisdate,evenoldexistinglicencesheldbythisgroupweregradually

withdrawn.512

Otheractivitiestobefrozeninthesamemannerincludedhouseandelectronic

equipmentrepairs,programmingofapplicationsformobilephonesanddigitalsites,

musicclassesandstudenttutoring.Themeasuredidnotaffectthosewhoalreadyhada

licence.Significanttaxincreaseswerealsoannounced.AnofficialoftheMinistryof

LabourandSocialSecurityclaimedthatthesemeasuresdidnotrepresentanystepback

forthenon-statesector—andthesamewaslaterrepeatedbyReformCoordinator

Murillo—theywereonlycallingitanecessarymeasureagainsttheuseofinputsand

materialsof‘illicitorigin’,taxevasionsand‘insufficientcontrol’.513Onceagain,however,

thegovernmentknocksdownonexactlythoseillicitpracticesthattheself-employed

510InterviewwithPhDstudentStaaleWik,Havana,22.10.16.511LaGacetaOficialExtraordinariaNo.31,1.08.17,ResolucióndelMinisteriodeTrabajoySeguridadSocial(MTSS).512”Régimencubanoanulamásdemediocentenardelicenciasdecarretillero”.DDC,23.01.18513ResolucióndelMinisteriodelTrabajoySeguridadSocial,LaGacetaOficialExtraordinariaNo.31,1.08.17,anddeclarationsbyMartaElenaFeitóCabrera,viceministraprimeradeTrabajoySeguridadSocial,toGranmaalsoon1.08.17,aswellasdeclarationsbyMarinoMurilloattheDecember2017sessionoftheNationalAssembly.

402

findthemselvesobligedtomakeuseofintheabsenceofanorderlyregulatedmarket

economy.ThisistheCatch-22realityoftheCubansalvagecapitalism.Inthefollowing

daysandweeks,therewasavirtualoutcryofmisbelief,protestanddesperationfrom

Cubanself-employedandentrepreneurs,declaringthattheyhadlostconfidencein

Raúl´spreviouslydeclaredintentionofcreatingastrategicspacefortheprivatesector.

Claimsofareal‘counter-reform’—theabolishmentoftheentireRaúlCastro-initiated

reformprocess,werefrequentlyheard.514

Upagainstthiscounter-reform,thegrandoldmanamongCuban-Americaneconomists,

CarmeloMesa-Lago,claimsthatthegrowingCubannon-statesectorifallowedto

flourish,couldrepresentnothinglessthantherescueofthecrisis-riddenCuban

economy(Mesa-Lago(ed),2016):

“Ifthenon-statesectorweregivenmorefreedom,ratherthanbeingsubmittedtoallthese

restrictions,taxes,inspectionsandfines,therewouldbeanenormousgrowthoftheCuban

economyandwelfare”.515

Themeasuresagainstnon-stateeconomicactorswereaccompaniedbyseveral

expressionsofpoliticalbacklash,asdocumentedinothersectionsofthisChapter.

Severalimportantlegalinitiativesthathadbeenannouncedwereneverimplemented,

startingwiththeconstitutionalreform,reformoftheelectorallaw,alegalframework

forprivatecompanies,newlawsforassociationsandthemedia.

Together,thisconstituteswhatwehaveclaimedwasacounter-reformfrom2016

onwards.

Wehavetoask,then,whathavebeenthepoliticalmotivesbehindthiscounter-reform,a

matterwehavetoucheduponindifferentcontextsthroughoutthisdissertation.

514SeeAsceNews767-770,August2017.515QuotefromthepresentationofthenewbookinOctober2016.EFE,Madrid,14.10.16(reprintedinASCENewsNo.732)(S/E).

403

Summarisingthisdiscussion,wewillstatethatthefollowingelementshavebeen

decisive:

1. Therewasapartlyunderstandableworrythatthegrowingmarketeconomywas

creatingsocio-economicdifferencesatoddswiththeegalitarianprinciplesofthe

CubanRevolution,forinstancethatfoodpricesreachedlevelsbeyondthe

purchasingpowerofmoststateemployees.Thecounter-argumenttothiswas

thatitwasthecharacteroftheemergingmarketrelations,intheformofwhatwe

havecalledsalvagecapitalism,thatmorethananythingledtothesedistorted

socio-economicrelations;

2. Itbecameclearforthosewhomanagedanddefendedstatepropertythatthey

wereincreasinglyoutcompetedbyprivateeconomicactors;

3. Theperceptionofbeingonthelosingsideofthereformswasstrongamong

party,stateandmassorganizationleadersandbureaucrats.Theremayalsohave

beenasignificantelementofenvyhere;

4. Theoverarchingworry,however,hasprobablybeenthattheintroductionof

marketeconomicmeasures,andbythatthestrengtheningofprivate

entrepreneursandanewmiddleclass,mightunderminethepoliticalpower

monopolyoftheCommunistParty.Thereisaparticularconcerntobanany

independentinterestorganizationofneweconomicactors,whichcould

representachallengetotheentireLeninistprincipleoffullunityoftheentire

peopleundertheunquestionabledirectionoftheCommunistParty.When

coupledtopoliticalreforms,thisworrybecameunbearablefortheParty

intransigents.Therehasobviouslybeennoconfidenceinthecapacitytocopythe

Sino-Vietnamesemodelofmarketreformswithmaintenanceoftotalpolitical

control—rather,theexampleofwhatunderminedtheUSSRhasprobablybeen

studiedindetail;

5. Theremayhavebeenaparticularworryabouttheemergenceofatoo

autonomousindividualpeasantry:akulakclassasitwasknownduringthe

404

RussianRevolution,seenasapotentialcounter-revolutionaryarchenemywhose

growthhadtobeavoided.

However,thesecounter-reformeffortsareprobablynotcapableofturningtheclock

back.AspointedoutbyEugenioYáñez,thechangeofgametowardsmarketeconomic

conditionshasalreadyoccurredbyconvertingordinaryCubanstorealestateowners,

producingincreasingcontradictionsalsointhepoliticalsphere.Whetherthiswillhave

inevitableimplicationsforachangeofthepoliticalgame—asintheUSSR—orwhethera

marketeconomyafterallcanco-existwithanauthoritarianpoliticalsystemasinChina

andVietnam,areamongthethrillingquestionsofthefuture.Wewillprobablyknow

moreaboutthisastheeventsduringthepost-Castroeraunfolds.InYáñez’words:“I

thinkthatRaúlCastroknowsthatheiscreatingconditions—notforhimtomake(the

deeperchanges)—butforthosecomingafterhim,whoeveritmaybe,tohavethe

necessaryconditionstostraightenoutaseriesofproblems”516(S/E).

ThefirstdilemmaencounteredbyDíaz-Canelandthepost-Castroleadershipwillbe

whethertocarryonandacceleratethereformsoriginallyinitiatedbyRaúlCastro,orto

continuethecounter-reformprocess.

Indicator9.4:Newsourceoflegitimacyemerging?

Whensearchingfornewsourcesofauthority,letususeMaxWeber’s(2005)three

categoriesasourtheoreticalguide.

Inmanyways,CubaunderCastro—particularlyFidel—hasbeenaprototype

combinationoftwoofWeber´saspectsofauthority:patrimonialism(powerbeing

wieldedonthebasisofpersonalrelations,discretionaryexerciseofpowerbythe

ruler—whileWeber´scriterion“nodifferentiationbetweentheprivateandthepublic

sphere”hasnotbeensoclearlypresent),andcharismaticauthority.Thereisnodoubt

thatRaúlhasstrengthenedthethirdWeberiancategoryofauthority,legal-rational

authoritywhilehehasdefinitelyweakenedthetwoothers,sothatRaúl’sregimehas 516https://vimeo.com/37390077

405

beenacompletelyhybridmixtureofallthreeformsofauthority.Thepost-Castroera

maytakethismixintwodifferentdirections:whilecharismaticauthoritywilldefinitely

befurtherreducedorcompletelydisappear(unlessanewstrongleader—unknown

today—emerges),powerexercisemayeithermovetowardsmorepatrimonialism

(blurringoftheseparationbetweenprivateandpublicspheres,morecorruption,

nepotismandrent-seeking),ortowardslegal-rationalauthority.Theformerisvery

muchrelatedtoascenarioofauthoritarianmarketeconomy;thelatterwillclearly

strengthenmoreliberaldemocraticformsofgovernment.

AlltheseelementsweredirectlyassociatedwithFidel´sundisputedleadership,andthey

pointdirectlytoasuccessiondilemma:Untilhewasforcedtoleavethestageforhealth

reasons,hardlyanybodycouldimaginethecontinuationoftheCubanrevolution

withoutFidelCastro.

ThedetailsoftheFidel-Raúltransferarequiteinteresting,asdescribedinthe

IntroductiontothisStudy.RaúlwasofficiallyelectedasPresidentbytheNational

AssemblyonlyinFebruary2008,fivedaysafterFidelhadstatedthathehadno

intentiontostandagainforPresident.Hewasre-electedforanotherfive-yeartermin

2013,thenalsoannouncingthatthiswouldbehisfinaltermandthathewouldnotseek

re-electionin2018.ThesamesessionelectedMiguelDiaz-CanelastheDeputyHeadof

StateandGovernment.

Raúl´sformalelectionasFirstSecretaryoftheCommunistPartyonlytookplaceatthe

SixthPartyCongressinApril2011.Hewasre-electedforasecondandlasttermin2016,

whereheconfirmedhisfirmintentiontostepdownatthe8thCongressin2021.

ThisprocedureillustratesanotheruniquecharacteroftheCubanrevolution:thefact

thatFidel´syoungerbrotherRaúl,secondincommandsincetheguerrillaera,couldpass

ontothenumberonepositionsoundisputedly,andinsodoingevenmaintainingagood

partofFidel´sauthority.

“ThetoweringfigureofFidelledobserverstooverlooktheimportanceoftheroleplayedby

RaúlCastro:astheeternalandunquestionablyloyalnumbertwo,hewasacrucialpartof

406

Cubanexceptionalism;heimmunizedFidel´sruleagainstthetypicalinstabilitiesstemming

frompowerstrugglesaroundthesecond-in-commandposition”(Hoffmann2009:236).

ItisobviousthatRaúl´sleadershipstyleisquitedifferentfromthatofFidel:whereFidel

wasrunningthecountryinahighlypersonalistmanner,Raúlhastoahighdegree

institutionalisedstateandpartyaffairs.Someobservers,however,havepointedoutthat

thereareobviouslimitationstothisevenunderRaúl:”theCubanrevolutionaryregime

wasnevercompletelyinstitutionalised.TheCastroregimecanbestbedescribedasa

communistbureaucracyranbyapurelyLatinAmericancaudillo-typeofleadership”

(Grenier,2016:157).

Thisbeingsaid,alreadyunderFidelaconsiderabledegreeofwhatWebercalls

‘routinizationofcharisma’tookplace,inthesensethatstatematterswereformally

institutionalised,notablyduringthe1970swhentherewasanofficial‘processof

institutionalisation’.Lateron,however,duringthe1990s,acertainde-

institutionalisationtookplace,inthesensethatthefive-yeartermsoftheCommunist

PartyCongressceasedtoberespectedafter1997(thenextCongressonlytookplace14

yearslater,in2011,withRaúlastheactingFirstSecretarysinceFidelhadstepped

down),andthatparallelstructuresofyoungnon-electedcadreswhoseauthoritybuilt

directlyonFidel´sselectionemerged.Alltheseso-called‘talibans’werelaterremoved

byRaúl.ItisprobablycorrecttoqualifytheCubanmodelasadualismofcharismatic

andbureaucratic-rationalauthority.ButiftheemphasisunderFidelwasonthe

charismaticpart,itdefinitelyshiftedtothebureaucratic-rationalpartunderRaúl.And

Raúlhimselfpubliclyannouncedthischangeofleadershipstyle,inaninterviewwith

Granmashortlyafterheprovisionallytookovertheleadershiprole:

“Asapointoffact,Iamnotusedtomakingfrequentappearancesinpublic,exceptattimes

whenitisrequired…Moreover,Ihavealwaysbeendiscreet,thatismyway,andinpassingI

willclarifythatIamthinkingofcontinuinginthatway.Butthathasnotbeenthe

fundamentalreasonwhyIdon´tappearveryofteninthemassmedia;simply,ithasnotbeen

necessary”.517

517InterviewwithRaúlCastroinGranma,18August2006;EnglishversioncitedfromtheCubanForeignMinistryhomepageandquotedinHoffmann(2009).

407

Raúlhassubsequentlystickedtothisclearlyanti-charismatictestament.Butstill,being

aCastrowiththerevolutionarycredentialshehas,heandthegenerationofleadersstill

occupyingmostseniorpositions“remaincriticallydependentonrecoursetothe

charismaticleaderforlegitimacy”,asHoffmann(2006:241)veryaccuratelyunderlines,

continuing:“Asthecharismaticleaderbecomesthelegitimator,thesuccessor

governmentneedstocontinuallyvalidateitsactionsthroughrecoursetohislegacy”.

Whatthistellsus,isthatRaúlCastro´sleadershiptoalargedegreehasbeenbasingits

legitimacyonFidelCastro´scharismaticauthority.Thereallegitimacychallengewas

thusinawaybeenpostponeduntil2018.NowDíaz-Canelisattemptingthesame—

referringtothelegacyofFidelandRaúl.Itmaybedifficulttoseethatasaworkable

strategyvis-à-vishisowngenerationandevemoretheyoungerCubansin2018.

Anotherdiscussioniswhatpoliticalimplicationsmaybedrawnfromthepassingaway

ofFidelCastro,inNovember2016.Withlittlemorethanoneyearleftbeforehewas

supposedtoleaveofficeasheadofstate,wouldthatmakeanydifferenceinRaúl´s

policy-making?ConventionalwisdomhadbeenthatRaúlhadbeenrulingintheshadow

ofFidel.ThefollowingforecastwasmadebytheMadrid-basedCubanpoliticalscientist

CarlosManuelRodríguezArechavaleta,onlyfivemonthspriortoFidel’sdeath,with

referencetoapreviousstatementbyProfessorJorgeI.Domínguezin2009thatCuba´s

futurewoulddependonwhetherFidelwasaliveornot:“TherealCubantransitionwill

onlystartwiththephysicaldeathofFidelCastro.Thephysicaldeathofthehistoric

leaderiswhatwilldetonateachangewithoutmasks”518(S/E).

Infact,itseemsthatFidel´spoliticaldeathinthissensehasbeenpostponed—atleast

untilRaúlstepsdownasPresidentandpossiblyuntilhealsoleaveshistoppositionin

thePartyin2021.

Anotherbigquestioniswhatwillhappentothemonolithicpowerstructureinthepost-

518Arechavaleta,CubanpoliticalscientistoftheUniversidadIberoamericana,Madrid,inadebate”Escenariosposiblesdelfuturocubano”,organizedbyFlacsoatCasadeAmérica,Madrid,June2016:”Cambios,Castro,Reformas:¿“NoCastronoproblem”,otravez?TransiciónenCubanocomenzaráhastamuertedeFidelCastro,segúnexpertosenMadrid”).EFE,Madrid,30.06.16(reprintedinCubaencuentro.com).

408

Castroera,andparticularlywithanon-militarypersonlikeMiguelDíaz-Canel519—the

questionissimplywhetherhewillobtaintheauthorityofthearmedforces.Then,for

thefirsttime,theFirstSecretaryofthePartywillnotbetheformalcommander-in-chief

oftheArmedForces,asthesocialistConstitutionstipulatesthatitfallsuponthe

PresidentoftheCouncilofStateto"assumetheSupremeCommandofallarmed

institutionsanddeterminetheirgeneralorganisation”.520Ontheotherhand,the

ConstitutionalsoestablishesthatthePartyis“theleadingforce”oftheCubansociety.

Raúl,inadditiontostayingonaspartyleaderforanotherthreeyears,isalsothe

unquestionablehighestauthorityofthearmedforces.AslongasDíaz-Canelmaintains

hiscloseassociationwithandprotectionofRaúl,hewillprobablyalsobeabletokeep

theloyaltyofthemilitary.Thequestioniswhetherthiswillstillbethecaseafter2021.

Thischoicemaytoalargeextentbedecidedbythecorrelationofforcesinthenew

generationofleaders,betweencivilians(membersofthetopstateandpartyorgansand

provincialleaders)andmilitary(thelatteralsodividedbetweenmilitaryandState

Securityofficersononehandandleadersofmilitarycorporationsontheother),a

correlationthatalsowillbeplayedoutinternallyintheCommunistParty.

Furthertotheoutcomeofinternalpowerstruggles,thelegitimacychallengeofthenew

generationofleaderstakingoverin2018mayseemtobeformidable,particularlyif

thereisnofastimprovementofCuba´sdeepeconomiccrisis.

WeintroducedtheconceptofpragmaticacceptancetoexplaintheresilienceofSino-

Vietnamesesocialism.ThesituationinCubaisveryfarawayfromconditionsfavouring

pragmaticacceptanceoftheregime.Thefailuretoimplementreformswithaprofound

combinationofgrowthandadistributiveeffect,leavesameagerinheritancetothepost-

RaúlleadershipinCubasearchingforanewsourceoflegitimacy.

ThisdilemmahasbeenconstantlyemphasizedbyCubawatchers:

519Díaz-Canelusedtohaveamilitarydegreeaslieutenantcolonelsincehewastrainedasanelectricalengineerinamilitarytrainingregimeandlaterservedasa‘politicalcommissary’intheCubanmilitarymissiontoNicaragua,buthelaterretiredfromtheArmyandisinnowaypartofthemilitaryhierarchy.520SeediscussionbyRobertoAlvarezQuinones:”WhoWillSucceedRaulCastro?”DiariodeCuba,14.01.16.

409

“ACubangovernmentwithoutneitherFidelnorRaúlCastro,lackingthehistoricallegitimacy,

needstoconstructaproperpoliticallegitimacythroughitseconomicmanagement,andalso

itscapacityforinclusionandtoleranceoftherealpluralityinthecountry.Itisveryprobable

that–accordingtothisscenario–thedemandsforpoliticalreformwillincreaseandthatthe

newgovernmentwillbeobligedtonegotiateitsauthoritythroughthefulladoptionofan

authoritarianregime,orinthebestofcases,atransitiontodemocracy”(Valdés2004:253).

Thequestion,then,iswhetherRaúlCastro´sreformshavecontributedtore-establisha

newlegitimacyamongyoungergenerations,basedonsocio-economicmeritsand

politicalexpectationsforinclusion.Theanswertothat,asarguedthroughoutthis

dissertation,isquiteclearlynegative.So,accordingtothislogic,aquitedramaticchoice

mayemergefortheDíaz-Canelpresidency:drasticsocio-economicimprovements—

requiringmuchdeeperreforms,moredemocraticparticipation—ormorerepression.

Again,acomparisontoChinaseemstobeofrelevance.WedescribedinChapter4the

‘routinizedcontentiousbargaining’mechanisms,providingadecisivecontributiontothe

regime´sresilience,combinedwiththeDengXiaopingphilosophythattheparty´s

survivalwoulddependonalegitimacybasedonperformanceratherthanideology,

resultinginaphenomenoncalledcontentiousauthoritarianism.This,bytheway,has

beenlessprominentinVietnamthaninChina.Withverylittlemeritstoshowthe

youngergenerationandthuslackingtheconditionsforpragmaticacceptance,and

withoutestablishingdialoguemechanismswith(potential)protesterscomparabletothe

Chinesecontentiousbargaining,itisdifficulttocatchsightoftheprospectsforanew

legitimacycapableofavoidingconfrontationandrepression.

IthasbeenclaimedthatMiguelDíaz-Canelwouldbemorelikelytosearchforlegitimacy

byreferringtoideologythantoeconomicimprovement.AgainstthebackdropofFidel’s

uniquelycharismaticauthorityandthevacuumleftbyRaúlinthisregard,Cárdenas

(2018)believesthatDíaz-Canelhasagoodopportunitytore-conquerlegitimacybeyond

economicmeritsandwhatwehavecalledpragmaticacceptance:“themostfertile

groundinCubatoobtainlegitimacyispoliticalcommunicationandideology[...]

Ideology,theconstructionofsymbolsandpublicpolicyingeneral,aredebtsinthe

country´sleadership”(S/E).Itisdifficulttoseehowthiswouldbepossible,without

410

takingveryseriouslyontheeconomicproblemspeoplehavetogothrough,alsothinking

ofDíaz-Canel’sverylimitedcharismaticpersonality.

Incasethenewgenerationofleadersfailtoestablishanewsourceoflegitimacy,the

questionofwhetheryoungerCubanscontinuetochooseexitratherthanvoiceasa

reactiontothelossofbeliefinaCubanfuturewillcontinuetohaunttheCubannation.

Indicator9.4:VoiceorExit?

Buildingonwhatwassaidaboutthedichotomyconceptsofvoicevs.exitlaunchedby

Hirschman(1970)inChapter4,itisconspicuoustoregisterthatCubanssystematically

havechosenexitratherthanvoicewhentheyhaveanissuewiththeregime.Veryfew

Cubansarediscretewhenvoicingtheiropinionsinprivate.Inpublic,however,their

agitatedvoiceisnormallysilenced.

ThemigrationrelationshipbetweenCubaandtheUS,havinggonethroughsomany

stagessincethe1959revolution,reachedanotherphasesincethe17-D.Thefirstwave

ofpost-revolutionCubanexitwasrepresentedbythosewhofledduringthefirstyears

after1959.ItstartedwiththeclosecollaboratorsoftheBatistaregimeandgradually

comprisingpeoplewhofeltbetrayedbyCastro´sinitialcommitmentstoademocratic

regimewhenhestartedturningtowardssocialism,Marxism-Leninism,andthe

partnershipwiththeSovietUnion.Mostofthosemigrantsundoubtedlycamefromthe

upperandmiddleclassesofwhiteCubanswhofeltthreatenedbyradicalpolitical

transformations.Therevolutionaryregimewasprobablyonlygladtogetridofthis

generationof‘counter-revolutionaries’,amountingtoperhapsasmuchasamillion

(10%ofthepopulation)uptotheendofthe1970s.Thepricetobepaidwasthatby

‘exporting’theenemiesoftherevolution,therealCubanoppositionstartedestablishing

itselfinexile,principallyinMiami,FloridaandtheUS,withtheadditionaleffectof

gainingadecisivesayonUSCubapolicies.

TheothersideofthecoinwasthatthisanimosityfromtheallianceoftheUS

governmentandtheCubanexilesintheUSgavetheCubangovernmenttheopportunity

tosystematicallyappealtonationalismandanti-imperialism,referringtotheMiami

411

CubansandeventheinternaloppositionreceivingsupportfromtheUSassell-outsand

‘enemiesoftheFatherland’(vendepatrias).Thisrelationshiphasjustifiedmostofthe

democraticrestrictionsinCuba.

WhenthedesiretoemigratetookholdamongwiderpartsoftheCubanpopulation,

actuallythreateningtheentiredemographicbalanceontheisland,thegovernment

founditnecessarytointroducestrictemigrationrestrictions,theso-calledWhiteCard.

Byapplyingtheserestrictions,anotherstrongemigrationdesireaccumulatedoverthe

years,possiblyatsomepointthreateningpoliticalstability.ThisledtheCuban

governmenttoopenthesafetyvalveonrepeatedoccasions,particularlyattwo

historicalmoments:

In1980,anestimated125,000disaffectedCubanswereallowedtoleaveaftera

significantnumberhadsoughtrefugeinthePeruvianEmbassy.Theyassembledand

werepickedupfromtheMarielharbour,rightwestofHavana,bysmallboatscoming

acrossfromFlorida.ThiswascalledtheMarielboatlift,andthosewhoarrivedintheUS

wereoftenreferredtoasmarielitos.

Duringthehardtimesofthe1990srepresentedby‘theSpecialPeriod’inCuba,a

constantwaveofyoungCubans(thebalseros—peakingwith37,000in1994)setouton

precariousembarkations,oftennomorethaninnertubesofcartyres.Thosewhowere

luckytomakethecrossing—whilealargenumberdrownedatsea—couldtake

advantageoftheso-calledwetfeet,dryfeetimmigrationpolicyintroducedbytheUS

throughtherevisionoftheCubanAdjustmentAct(originallyfrom1966),essentially

allowinganybodywhofledCubaandmanagedtosetfootonUSsoiltoclaimresident

statusayearlater,andeventuallyUScitizenship.Followinganagreementnegotiated

betweenCubaandtheClintonadministration,aCubancaughtatseabetweenthetwo

nations(with‘wetfeet’)wouldsummarilybesenthomeortoathirdcountry.Those

whomadeittotheUSshores,ontheotherhand(with‘dryfeet’),wereallowedtostay.

Therewasalsoathirdterm,‘dustyfeet’,usedtorefertothosewhoreachedtheUSby

crossingtheborderfromMexico.

412

ThisconstantoutflowofCubanstotheUSclearlyqualifiedforwhatHirschman(1993)

referredtoas‘exitsubvertingvoice’,thusrepresentingasafetyvalveforthe

revolutionaryregime.DifferentfrompreviousmigrationwaveselsewhereinLatin

Americawheretheremayhavebeenacommunalityofinterestbetweenemigrationand

immigrationcountries,thisphenomenonbetweenCubaandtheUSwasneverpartof

whatheinhisfirstbookonthesubjectreferredtoasexitrepresenting“aconspiracyin

restraintofvoice”.Onthecontrary,theshiftingUSgovernmentswouldnodoubthave

preferredthatthesedisaffectedCubanshadstayedinCubatoorganiseprotestand

eventuallyoverthrowtheCastrogovernment.Instead,theUS,byacceptingthese

migrants,maytacitlyhavehelpedsilenceoratleastreduceprotestinCuba,while

accommodatingastrongpoliticalvoiceinthedecisiveswingstateFloridathatineffect

managedtodictateUSCubapoliciesupto2014.Thisisanexilegroupthat,in

accordancewithHirschman´sterms,hasmaintainedstrongloyaltiestotheCuban

nation,withequallystronghatredoftheCubanstateanditsgovernment.

IfwecomparetoHirschman´sreflectionsonwhathappenedinthefinalyearsbefore

Germanre-unification,wheretherewasaninteractionwithexittriggeringvoice,this

maytoacertainextent(butmuchlessthaninGDR)alsohavebeenthecaseforalong

timeinCuba.Butwiththepassingawayofthefirstgenerationofpost-revolutionary

migrants,theirchildrenandgrandchildrenalongwiththelatergenerationsofmigrants

developedaverydifferentattitude,resultinginasignificantweakeningofthis‘exit-

triggering-voice’mechanism.ThemajorityofCubansinFlorida,maintainingtheir

loyaltyoratleastcuriositytothenationandtheirCubanfamilies,arenowmuchmore

indifferenttothestateandtheregime.Thepoliticalimplicationofthisisthatthey

supportedex-PresidentObama’spolicytonormaliserelationswithCuba.521

OnlyonemassivestreetconfrontationhastakenplaceinHavanasincetherevolution:

theso-calledMaleconazoinAugust1994.Thiswasattheworstsocio-economicmoment

ofthePeríodoEspecial,provokingtheabove-mentionedbalserocrisis.Themassive

departuremostlyhappenedwithoutresistancefromtheGovernment,seeingitagainas

anexitalternativetovoice.Whatwasnotacceptedwasthehijackingofseveralboats

521Asquotedearlier,almost70%ofCuban-AmericansinMiamiDadesupportedthisnewnormalisationpolicy(ref.2016Cubapoll).

413

settingcoursefortheUSinpreviousweeks.Themostspectacularactwasthehijacking

inJulyofaferryboatanditssinkingbytheCoastGuard,with62passengersonboard.

On5August,rumourswerespreadinginHavanathatseveralvesselswereontheirway

topickupthosewhowantedtoleave.Suddenly,hundredsofyoungpeoplegatheredon

theMalecónbeachavenueinHavana,startingaspontaneousprotest,attackingpolice

anddestroyingshopwindowswithstonesandsticks,andcryinganti-Fidelslogans.After

severalhours,thepolicesucceededtocontrolthesituation,detainingabout100

persons,butwithoutcausinganydeaths.Atthatmoment,FidelCastrohimselfarrivedat

thesiteandmanagedtocalmdownthesituation.HisdeclarationtoaCubanTV

journalistaskingwhetherthiswasthebeginningof“anotherMariel”,ineffectconfirmed

thattheCubangovernmentwoulddonothingtostoptheprotestersfromleavingthe

country:“Wearenotopposedtoanything;thosewhowanttoleave—letthemleave.

Eitherthey[i.e.theUSgovernment]establishcontrol,orwewillstopprotectingtheUS

coastline”522(S/E).

AftertheMaleconazo,massivepublicprotests,civilianmovementsinthestreetsetc.,

havenotbeenontheagendainCuba.Ifyoungpeopleweretostartopenprotest,

probabilityisthatitwouldratherbeoverdemandsforbetteraccesstomaterial

improvements—orperhapstotheInternet—thanfordemocracy.Thenewopportunity

toleavethecountrytakingadvantageofthereformedmigrationlawhasonly

strengthenedthisprognosis.

Also,accordingtouniversityprofessors,politicalapathyandacompletelackof

ideologicalknowledgeanddebateseemtodominateamongCubanuniversitystudents

today.523Itisthereforequestionablehoweasyitwouldbetomobilisepopular

upheavalsamongyoungpeopleinCuba,inspiteoftheobjectiveconditionsthatmight

existduetothewidespreadcomplaintsgenerallyexpressedbyyoungCubansabout

theirlifeprospects.

522SeeNoraGámezTorres:”ElMaleconazo:a20añosdelacrisisdelosbalserosenCuba”,ElNuevoHerald,5.08.14,forawelldocumentedarticleonwhathadhappened20yearsearlier:http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/cuba-es/article2038059.html523Thisobservationisbasedonmanyconversationswithuniversityprofessorsandotherintellectuals,generallybelongingtoapoliticisedgenerationofintellectuals,oftenhighlyfrustratedwiththegeneralapathyandlackofbasicintellectualcuriosityamongthepresentgenerationofstudents.

414

ThereisaquitegeneralobservationamongpeoplewhogrewupwiththeRevolution,

thattheyouthoftodayisbecomingmoreapathetic.Thefollowingstatementbyacritical

journalistisprobablyquiterepresentative:

”Thereisabacklashagainstideologicalsaturation,asubmissivenesswhichconditioned

almosteveryactofyourlifetoobedience,topoliticalsubordination,whetherpickinga

universitycareer,ajoboranappliance,anything.Everythingwasaslogan,everythinga

roadblock.Thishassubsidedsomewhat,butpreviously,itwasimpossibletotakeastep

withouthearing‘Motherlandordeath,wewilltriumph’andgo,go.[...]Theinvestigations

theyundertooktoseeifyoubelongedtotheCommitteefortheDefenceoftheRevolution[...]

theyouthoftodayhavenotexperiencedthatbombardmentof‘theenemythatharassesus’.I

didnotbringupmykidsthatway,onthecontrary,Itriedtodetoxifythem.Sothis

generation,thechildrenoftheparentsofdisenchantment,grewupdevoidofthatandareat

amorepragmaticlevel,evenatamarketingone,whosegreatestdreamistoleavethe

country”.524

The2013emigrationreformwasexactlythenewexitopportunitythousandsofanother

generationofyoungCubanshadbeenwaitingfor.Duringthethreefollowingyears,a

totalof121,000CubansemigratedtotheUS(24,000in2014;43,000in2015;54,000in

2016),comparedtoatotalof46,000duringthepreviousfouryearsandonlyaround

15,000in2017(butonly2,000afterthedoortotheUSagainwasclosedinJanuary).525

Andthisexitwasapparentlyonlythetipoftheiceberg.AUniversityofChicagosurvey

carriedoutin2016foundthatmorethan50%saidtheywouldliketoleavefromCubaif

giventhechance.Ofthose,nearly7in10saidtheywouldwanttogototheUnited

States.526

Whenthenewexodusgotunderwayin2014,inadirectresponsetothenormalisation

processwiththeUS,onemighthaveexpectedthatthespacefor‘voice’wouldincreasein

52414ymediojournalistMiriamCelayainconversationwithNYTEditorErnestoLondoño(14ymedio6.12.15).525Figuresuptoandincluding2016givenbytheUSCentreforImmigrationStudies,quotedbyvariousnewsmedia16.10.17.The2017estimate:http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article190040244.html526AsurveyfundedandconductedbyNORCattheUniversityofChicago,featuringanationalrandomroute-sampleofadults18yearsandolderinCuba,basedonin-personinterviewsof840adultswithamainfieldperiodbetweenOctober3andNovember26,2016.http://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/Pages/survey-of-cuban-public-opinion.aspx

415

Cuba.ButCubansonceagainchosethesamereactionasalways:expressingthemselves

withtheirfeetratherthanwiththeirvoice.

Againstthebackdropofincreasingsocialdissatisfactionandalsothe—afterall—

increasingspaceforcriticism,itisstillamysterytomanyCubanwatcherswhythereis

nomorepublicprotest.WhyisitthatCubanyoutharesopassivewhileyoungpeopleare

marchingandprotestinginsomanyotherpartsoftheworld,includinginLatin

America?Thereshouldbenolackofreasonforprotestinacountrywhereanentire

youthgenerationseemstohavelostbeliefinfutureopportunities.Yet,streetprotestsin

Cubaarerare,sporadicandnevermassive.Themostcommonexplanationforthis

passivityistheexistenceofaveryeffectivesecurityapparatuswithcapacitytosurvey

andcontrolmostsuspiciousbehaviour,andfearofeverythingfrombeingjailedtobeing

punishedinotherandmoresubtleways,thusbeingdeprivedofwhateverfewand

limitedopportunitiespeoplemighthave.Throughabove-mentionedactosderepudio,

therapidresponsebrigadesandcivilianpoliceputupcounter-demonstrationsbefore

theprotestersarebeingdetained.Theseactsarenotreportedintheofficialmedia,but

therewillalwaysbeabloggerorindependentjournalisttopickupandspreadthenews.

Incaseswherecuentapropistasandsimilararebeingmaltreated,opendiscussionsin

publicplacesmayoccur;itisalsonotreportedinthepublicmedia,butdefinitelyinthe

alternativemedia.Aswehaveseentherehavebeensomeattemptsbypolitical

dissenterstocapitaliseonsocialprotestbydisaffectedTCPs,apparentlywithoutmuch

success.

ButrepressioninCubaislightcomparedtomanyothersocietieswherepublicprotestis

common.Sothefearelementcannotexplainitall.Perhapsthisfactmayofferanother

partoftheexplanation:whererepressionisharsher,wherepeoplearekilled,

disappearedortortured,repressioninitselfmaypropelmoreprotestinaspiral-like

fashion.SoperhapsrepressioninCubaiskeptatalevelwherethisspiraleffectis

avoided.AccordingtooneoftheclosestobserversoftheCubanArmedForces(FAR),

preparationfortheuseofmilitaryforcesagainstthepopulationwasnoteven

consideredduringthehardshipsoftheSpecialPeriod(1990s):”FARdidnotevenbegin

riotcontrolorotherminorinternalsecuritytraining”(Klepak2012:80).Inconnection

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withtheMaleconazouprising,hesays:”Raúl[…]hadbeenarguingthroughoutthecrisis

thatreactiontopopulardispleasureinvolvingthearmedforcesweresimplynot

thinkableoptions”(ibid:81-82).

AnotherexplanatoryelementmaybethefactthatmostCubansareobligedtocommit

illegalitiesinordertogoabouttheirdailylife.Thisputstheminanextremelyvulnerable

positionvis-à-visthepoliceandotherauthoritiesofpublicorder.Aslongastheydon´t

makeanyfussabouttheirproblems,andevenmoreiftheymanifestsomedegreeof

symbolicsupporttotheRevolution,theywillnormallyhavenoproblemwiththemyriad

ofpettyillegalitiestheymaycommit.Assoonastheyareseenas‘conflictive’,raising

theirvoiceinanycriticalway,committedillegalitieswillsoonberememberedandmay

beusedagainstthem.Better,thus,tokeepsilentandavoidproblems.

WhentheArabSpringwasatitsapexbackin2012,andmanyaskedthemselves

whethersomethingsimilarcouldhappeninCuba,MarcFrank,theveteranforeign

correspondentinHavana,madeaninterestinglistofreasonswhyhesawthatashighly

improbable:527

1. ThereisnosignificantInternetorsatelliteTVpenetration;

2. Thedemographicsarecompletelydifferent;

3. Itisrelativelyeasyforyoungpeopletoemigrate;

4. Thereisrelativelygoodfreehealthandeducationforall;

5. Thepolicedonotsystematicallybrutaliseandbloodythepopulation;

6. TheleadersarenotstealingtheoilwealthandfoolingaroundatEuropean

casinos;

7. Youareallowedtohavesexandparty; 527MarkFrank(2011):“NotesontheCurrentSituationinCuba”,ASCE2011.

417

8. Womenarerelativelyliberated;

9. Thereisnodevelopedbusinessclass;

10. TheUnitedStatesdoesnothavediplomaticandeconomicrelationswithCuba.

Someoftheseelementshavemeanwhilechanged:accesstoInternetandother

alternativesourcesofinformationhaveincreasedsubstantially;therelationwiththeUS

hasbeeninnormalizationmood;ithasbecomeeveneasierforyoungpeopleto

emigrate;andasmall‘businessclass’isatleastsomewhatmorevisible.Butonbalance,

manyofthesereasonsarestillineffect.Severalofthesepointspointinthedirectionof

exitratherthanvoice,particularlyifwetakethe‘exit’optionbothinaliteralandmore

indirectmeaning.Point7aboutayouthculturefullofmusic,partying,accesstojoyand

sexisprobablythemostsignificant‘internalexit’opportunitywhichmakesyoung

peopleforgetaboutdailyproblemsthatunderothercircumstancesmighthaveledto

moreprotest.

Anotherindirectformof‘internalexit’isthewayneweconomicactors,particularly

cuentapropistas,behave.Asshowninthestudyofshoeproducersthatwehavereferred

to(Indicator4.4),potentialentrepreneursinCubatendtostaysmall,unorganised,

operateundertheradar,ratherthangrowandorganisetodefendtheirinterests(move

towardswhatwehavecalled‘economicsociety’).Theirargumentisthataslongasthey

aresmallandshutup,theStatewillleavethemalone.Inthecontrarycase,theywillbe

upagainstallkindsofproblems.

Onemightarguethateventhoseelectedtopublicoffice,theAssembliesofPopular

Power(AsambleasdePoderPopular)onnational,provincialandmunicipallevelarealso

practicingsomekindof‘exit’fromactivepolicy-making.Bybeingpartofunanimous

approvalsofanyproposalcomingfromabove,theydonotexercise‘voice’inany

meaningfulway(ref.2017/2018elections,Indicator8.4).

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ButofcoursethemostimportantformofexitinCubahasalwayssincetherevolution

beeninitsmostexplicitform:leavingthecountry.Thedecisivegrouptowatchhereis

urbanyoungpeopleofallcolours.Theyseemtoenjoyincreasingdegreesofcultural

freedom,butalsotolosefaithintheprospectforseriouschangeandattractivelife

opportunities.Theurbanyouthculturedefinitelydeservestobestudiedmore

systematicallytofindoutabouttheirexpectedfuturemodeofpoliticalbehaviour.

Withthewaningoutofpoliticallegitimacywemaybeapproachinganewsituation,

comparabletotheonediscussedbyHirschmanintheGDR,where‘exittriggeredvoice’,

andtheescalatingdynamicofout-migrationledthosewhopreferredtostaytotaketo

thestreetstodemandchange.Thisscenariomaybeofparticularrelevancenowthatthe

exitoptionagaingetsclosed:oneofex-PresidentObama’slastexecutivedecisionswas

toabolishedthe‘wetfeet,dryfeet’elementoftheCubanAdjustmentAct,thusdepriving

theCubansoftheirautomaticandfreeentrancetotheUSiftheysucceededtocrossthe

border.So,from2017mostyoungCubanssuddenlyagainhadnootheropportunitythan

tostay.This,togetherwithreductionsinaccesstoattractiveself-employment

opportunities,andnovisiblesignsofpoliticalreforms,mayhaveanimpactonhow

youngCubanswillbehaveduringthepost-Castroera.Maybetherewillnowfinallybeno

alternativetovoice.Inwhatform,andhowthenewgenerationofleaderswillhandleit,

isliterallyspeakingthe10,000-dollarquestionaboutCuba’sfuture.

419

Chapter 10: Status of transformations (testingtheninehypotheses)

"ThedeathofFidelCastronowexposesCubatothisdilemmabetweenanorderly

transitionwithoutrevengeoracollapsethatwouldgenerateviolence,preventeconomic

reconstructionandcausethemigrationofmillionsofCubans."

(JoaquínVillalobos,ExGuerrillaleaderfromElSalvador)528

Wewillnowtrytosummarisethestatusoftransformationsthathavetakenplacein

CubaduringtheRaúlCastroreformera(February2008-February2018),byrevisiting

thechallengesandhypotheseswedrewupinChapter4.

Challenge1:Significantretreatofthestateintheagriculturalsector,i.a.asameasureto

meetthemassiveneedforincreasedfoodproduction.


fooddistribution.



Thepointofdeparturewasaheavilyunderperformingagriculturalsector,fetteredby

twogenerationsofoverwhelmingstateandbureaucraticplans,controlsand

instructions.Cuba,acountrywithallclimaticconditionstobeself-reliantinfood

production,findsitselfinthesituationofimportingthelargerpartsofitsconsumption

(70-80%),resultinginabloodlettingofitsveryscarcecoffers(upto2billionUSDper

year).Thisrepresents30%ofthecountry´stotalimportvalue;morethanthetotal

annualexportofgoods.Yet,thereisachronicallackofaccesstofoodproductsinthe

528“UnanuevarevoluciónenCuba”,ElPaís,29.11.16(S/E).

420

country,andpricesareoftenbeyondordinarypeople’spurchasepower.Changingthis

situationwasoneoftheprincipalgoalsofthereforms.

Therehasbeenabasicagreementamongexperts—andonemayassumeamongmost

farmersalthoughnoreliableopinionpollexists—abouttheneedtoleavemuchmore

landtenuretotheproducers,andgivethemmuchmoreeffectivecontrolover

production,transport,sale,accesstoimplements,creditsandservices.Inshort,theidea

hasbeentointroducemoresystematicmarketmechanismsandletthefarmersand

peasantsbemastersontheirownland,ofcoursewithinaframeworkofreasonablestate

regulations.Thefirstoftheseconditionswasalsoquitequicklyimplemented:the

privateshareofagriculturallandtenurerosefastfromunder20%toaround50%

beforeitstartedfallingagaintoaround40%in2016).Thiswasdonethroughpromotion

ofmoreindependentcooperatives(CCS)andusufructlicensesonformallystate-owned

land.Combinedwiththedrasticreductioninsugarproduction(whichhadoccurredin

the1990s),Cubaforthefirsttimeinitshistorystartedtolooklikeafamily-farming

country.Manyoftheproducershadgoodearningsandaccumulatedconsiderable

capital,buttheyhadhardlyanyinvestmentopportunities.Theimportoftractorsfor

privateuse,forinstance,wasbanned.Thenextnecessarystepsinthatprocessnever

materialised:anearlydecisioninprincipletoclosetheinefficientstate-buyingsystem

(acopios)andreplaceitwithachainofwholesalemarketsbothforsalesaswellas

implementsnevercamepastapilotphase,beforeeventhepilotswereclosed.The

notoriouslyinefficientstateunitsonceagainreturnedtoprominence(downfrom80%

to50%offormalmarketing,andthenin2016backto80%again—althoughthese

officialfiguresprobablyhidethelargeinformaltrade).Intentionstocutdrastically

downontheagriculturalbureaucraciesparticularlyonlocallevelweremetwithso

muchresistancefromthoseinvolvedthattheywereatleasttemporarilyshelved.Stated

principlesofturningthecooperativesintoself-rulingunitsinaccordancewith

internationalcooperativeprinciples,andtopromotesecond-degreecooperativesthat

alsocouldhaveplayedaconstructiveroleinagro-industrydevelopmentandprovision

ofimplementsandservices,neverbecamemorethangoodintentions.Aswecomeback

to,andverysignificantlyfromapoliticalperspective,farmerswerenevergiventhe

accesstoorganiseahorizontalinterestgroup,independentlyofstateandpartycontrol.

From2016,asaresponsetoincreasingfoodpricesinthecities,statestructures

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regainedalmostpre-reformcontrols.Foodsuppliesstayedfarbelowdomestic

demand—manyreportssuggestedthatproductsoftenfailedtoreachthemarket—and

currency-requiringimportsremainedasaheavyburdenonthecountry´sforeign

exchange.

Criticshaveclaimedthroughouttheseyearsthattheagriculturalreformshavefailed

becausetheyhavebeenimplementedinapiecemealandcontradictoryfashion,that

centralplannershavecontinuedtoassignscarceinputsanddictatewhattoplant,and

thatthecounter-reformintroducedin2016and2017wouldbefutile,alsoleadingto

evenmoreblackmarketing.

Thetwoquotedagriculturaleconomistsconcludedseveralyearsagothatsustainable

growthanddevelopmentintheeconomyatlargeis“unlikelywithouttake-offinthe

agriculturalsector”,andthatsuchtake-offisnotyettakingplaceinspiteofseveralyears

ofcautiousreforms(GarcíaandNova2014).Thisconclusionmaybeevenmorere-

enforcedtoday.

Wemaynowconcludethatthetransformationprocessinitiatedintheagriculturesector

earlyintheRaúlCastroera,asintherestoftheeconomy,hasbeensetinreversemode

during2016-2017.

Indicator1.1:Movementfromstatetonon-statelandtenure?Therewasaquitedramatic

suchmovementearlyinthereformprocess.Closetohalfthelandand55-60%ofthe

farmingpopulationwereorganisedinvariousnon-stateformsoftenurearound2015.

TowardstheendoftheRaúlCastroera,asignificantreversemovementwasnoted,

mostlybecause40%ofthosewhoinitiallyleasedlandfromtheState(usufructuarios)

returnedorlosttheirlicense.

Indicator1.2:Generalautonomyandsovereigntyforpeasants/farmers?Thiswasnever

implementedinthewaysstronglyrecommendedbyleadingagriculturaleconomists.

Indicator1.3:Fromstate-regulatedtomarket-basedcommercialisation?Astrategic

decisioninthisdirectionwastakenearlyintheprocess—andevenbravermeasures

422

wereproposedinthedraftversionbuttakenoutofthe2011Guidelinesbeforefinal

approval:itseemsthatRaúlCastrooriginallyhadintendedtogoquitefartowards

market-basedfoodsales.Howeverprivatewholesalesonlyreachedapilotphasebefore

theywereclosed;thepromotionofsecond-degreecooperativesasapprovedin

Guidelineswereneverpermittedtomaterialise;percentageofnon-state

commercialisationwasfirstsignificantlyincreasedbeforeitwasreducedtoprevious

levelsagain(from2016);othernon-stateinfrastructurewasneverformallyestablished.

Theoutcomeofallthiswasthatblack/informalchannelscontinuedtodominate.

Indicator1.4:De-bureaucratisationofagriculture?Initiativesinthisdirectionwerenot

implemented.

Indicator1.5:Strengtheningoffamilyfarming:Thishashappenedtoaconsiderable

degree,butfarmershavenotbeengiventheindependencethatwouldberequiredto

reallyboostproduction.

Indicator1.6:Sufficientfoodsupplytourbanareas,ataffordableprices?No,thisdidnot

occur.

Indicator1.7:Reducedimportdependency?No,thiswasnotachieved.

Thegeneraloutcomeofchallenge1isthattherehasbeenaverysignificanttransferof

agriculturallandtenure—notproperty—fromstatetoprivatehands,butwithoutthestate

offeringrealautonomyforindividualpeasants/farmersorco-operatives.Thishasbeen

mostvisibleinthechainoffooddistributionandtheprovisionofimplements:thevital

greenlighttonon-statewholesalemarketshasneverbeengiven;eventhepilotprojects

havemostlybeenclosed.Asexperiencesfromothersimilarprocessesstronglyindicate,the

hoped-formassiveincreaseinfoodproductionandreduceddependenceonimportscould

notmaterialiseundertheseconditions.Thestateseemstopreferpayingsubstantially

higherpricesforimportedfoodthanwhattheypaytheirownpeasants.Theoldsocialist

orthodoxytoavoidcreatinga‘kulak’classofpeasantsseemstoremainasabasicpremise.

Foodshortages,speculationandblackmarketscontinuetodominate.Whenthishas

423

harmedthepoorest,itbecomesajustificationtoreverseratherthanspeedupstructural

andmarket-orientedreforms.

So,partofthealternativehypothesiswasconfirmed:familyfarminghasbeen

strengthened.Butstill,thezerohypothesishasbyandlargebeenconfirmed:Noreal

independenceforpeasantsandfarmers;continuedstatecontroloffood

distribution;noincreaseinsupplyoffoodproducts.

Conclusion:Challenge1wasnotmet.

Challenge2:Looseningofstatecontrolanddominanceoftheeconomy—growthofnon-

stateeconomy—aimingatsustainedeconomicgrowthandemploymentgeneration.

H2.0:statusquo:acontinuationofstatepropertyhegemony,combinedwithanincreasing




economy.

Therewasanearlyrecognitioninthereformprocessthatadrasticdownsizingofthe

statesectorintheeconomywasrequired.Theharshmessagewasthatasmuchas1.8

millionstateemployees(onethirdofthecountry´stotalworkforce)wasbasically

unproductiveorredundantandshouldbetransferredtonon-stateemployment.This

wassupposedtohappenthroughamassivepromotionofself-employment

(trabajadoresporcuentapropia),leasingofstatelandtoindividualorcooperative

farmers,andthepromotionofcooperativesbothinagricultureand—whatwasnewin

Cuba—innon-agriculturalandbasicallyurbansectors.

Itsoonbecameclearthatsuchamassivedismissalofstateemployeeswascompletely

unsustainablewithoutgeneratingalternativeemploymentandwouldhaveledtoafull

dissolutionofthecountry´ssocialfabric.Yet,havingreachedbetweenonefourthand

onethirdofthisdeclaredobjectiveaftersix-sevenyearsisnosmallachievement,andit

424

isatellingillustrationofthesignificanttransformationprocessthatafterallwastaking

placeduringthefirstyearsofRaúlCastro’sreformsinCuba.Butitalsotellsabouta

reformprocessfallingincreasinglybehinditsinitialambitions.

Asindicatedbythismassiveplanforthedownsizingofthepublicsector,moststate

companiesareinaverybadshape,inmanycasessurvivingonconsiderablesubsidies.

Reformsarebeingattemptedwiththepurposeofleavingmoreresponsibilityto

companymanagement,withtheriskofbankruptcyifnosurplusmaybeproduced.But

suchde-centralisationhasoftenbeenmetwithnewbureaucraticstructurestomaintain

centralcontrol:thecentralistthinkingseemstobepartoftheveryDNAoftheCuban

bureaucracy.

Thereis,however,oneinterestingexceptiontostatecorporationinefficiencyinCuba:

themilitary-managedconglomerate—mainlyundertheumbrellaofonecorporate

structureGAESA—whichcontrolsthemostdynamicsectorsoftheCubaneconomy.By

someestimates,GAESAcontrolsaround20%ofCuba´sGDP.SinceGAESAwassingled

outasthemaintargetofPresidentTrump´srestrictionsonUSeconomicrelationswith

Cuba,itwillbeinterestingtoseehowCubawillreacttothisandhowitmayaffectthe

militaryconglomerates’dominantpositionintheCubaneconomy.Whileithasbeen

generallybelievedthatGAESAhasbeenthe,relativelyspeaking,mostprofessional—and

perhapsleastcorrupt—partoftheCubanstatesector,someconsiderationsaboutits

questionablebehaviouraftertakingoverHabaguanex(thestatebusinessesinColonial

Havana)servetoquestionpartofthatassumption.

GAESAisreallythestatewithinthestateinCuba’seconomy,andsupposedtoplayalead

rolenegotiatingforeigndirectinvestment(FDI).Afewimportanteconomicsectorsdo

notfalldirectlyundermilitarycontrol,likepetroleumandenergyingeneral,nickel(the

onlycriticalmineraloperation,dominatedbyaCanadianinvestor),sugarwithderivates

(havinglostitsdominantpositioninCubatwodecadesago),andbiotechnology.But

mostofthesesectorsarecontrolledbyministrieswherethemilitaryhierarchyiswell

positionedinthepoliticalloop.

425

Whathasbeenmissingasapreconditionforamorecompleteimplementationofthis

transferfrompublictonon-publicemployment,isthepoliticalwilltoopenastrategic

spaceforathrivingformalprivatesectoroftheCubaneconomy;toletnational

entrepreneursdevelopreasonablyprofitablebusinesses,accumulatecapitaland

reinvestinwhatcouldhavebecomerobustprivateenterprises—growingfrommicro

andsmallintomedium-sizecompanies.IntwoconsecutivePartycongresses(2011and

2016),privatecapitalaccumulation—asinequanonforprivateinvestment,hasbeen

explicitlyruledoutwithsomenuancesintroducedin2017(differentfrome.g.Vietnam

wheretheCommunistPartyacceptedthisasanecessityformarketreformsuccess).

Themajorityofthosewhohaveleftpublicemploymenttobecomeself-employedhave

littleincommonwithamiddleclass.Theyhavemoresimilaritieswithalumpen

proletariatinotherLatinAmericancountries,strugglingtoekeoutamarginalliving

withillicitbusinesspractices,balancingrisksversusopportunitiesinaconstantcat-and-

mousestrugglewithpublicinspectorsandthepolice.Thereseemstobeaconventional

thinkingamongpoliticalhardlinersandbureaucratsthattheself-employeddon´t

deservetoearnmorethanthemeagreincomesyougetasapublicemployee.But

nobodycanliveonsuchanincomeinCuba,coveringonlyaminorpartofthebasic

necessities.Asaresult,publicemployeesandself-employedendupinsurvival

strategiescharacterizedbyastrangle-holdofsymbioticinter-dependence,exchanging

illicitlyobtainedgoods,servicesandbribes,exposingeverybodytofallvictimofanti-

corruptioncampaigns,andbreakingdowntheethicalstandardsthattheCuban

Revolutiononceconsidereditspride.Itishardtounderstandhowpoliticalleaderswith

supposedlyhighmoralobjectivesfortheircountrypreferthissadoutcomeofthe

revolutionaryprocess.Thecampaignsofknockingdownonsuchillegalbusiness

practicesthatthesysteminrealityhavemadeinevitable,arehardtointerpretas

anythingbutanotherpretexttoharmnon-statecompetition.Itbecomesincreasingly

clearthattheproudsocialachievementsoftheRevolution—health,educationandsocial

securityaswellasdignityforitscitizens—cannomoresurvivewithoutaformally

functioningmarketeconomy.Thatwillberequiredtogeneratetheemploymentthatthe

socialiststatecannomoreaffordwithoutthemassivesubsidiesoncereceivedfromthe

SovietUnionandlatertosomeextentfromVenezuela.

426

Yet,asignificantprivatesectorhasemergedinCuba,accordingtosomeestimatesnow

representingcloseto20%ofGDP(almostsimilartothemilitarycorporations).A

smallerpartofthenon-statesectoristhriving,againstalloddsandthecontinuous

suspicionofpoliticalleadersandbureaucrats.Particularlyinthetourismsector,a

virtualprivatechainofrestaurantsandBed&Breakfastestablishmentsplusamyriadof

otherservicesareputtingupstiffcompetitiontowhatisalsothemostdynamicpartof

thestateeconomy,controlledbythemilitary-managedcorporations.Asmuchasone

fourthofthisvitalcurrency-earningsectorforthecountryistodayinprivatehands,

nowrepresentinganunavoidableandoftenpreferredpartofservicestoforeigntourists

andmostlyacceptedassuchbythetourismauthorities.Smallprivateentrepreneurs

alsohaveasubstantial—ifnotdominant—shareintransportandinsuchproductive

sectorsasshoeandfurnitureproduction.Buthereagaintheinformalstructuresare

predominant.

Thedecision-in-principletolegalizeprivatecompanies,finallytakenbythe2016Party

Congress,isnotexpectedtomaterialiseanytimesoon.Thisdecisionwascontradictedby

anotherdecisionatthesameCongress:tocontinueresistanceagainstcapital

accumulationandconcentrationofwealth.Thereseemstohavebeenaheateddebate

aboutthisduringtheyearlongperiodbetweentheApril2016Congressandthemid-

2017approvalofthethreedocumentsofprinciplediscussedattheCongress.Arguments

abouttheneedforprivatesectordevelopmentweremetbyargumentsaboutthedanger

ofgrowingsocialdifferentiationandtheRevolution´ssocialistprinciples.Acompromise

wasreachedintheend,buttheideologicalresistanceagainsttheexpansionofprivate

companiesisstilloverwhelminginthePartyhierarchy.

Ratherthansupportingemergingsuccessfulentrepreneurs,thetrendafterthe2016

PartyCongresshasbeenaconstantquestioningoftheirsuccessasanexpressionofan

undesiredcapitalistmentality.Thepredominantillicittransactionpracticeshavemade

itrelativelyeasyforstateinspectorstodocumentbusinessirregularities.Severalofthe

mostsuccessfulprivaterestaurants(paladares)andotherbusinesseshavetherefore

beenclosed.Thosewhohaveearnedgoodprofitsarenotallowedto—ordonotdare

to—re-investsothattheirbusinesscouldgrowandtheprivatesectorthusrepresenta

significantalternativesourceofemployment.

427

Therehasbeenastatedpolicyoftransferringtheresponsibilityinlargepartsofthe

uncompetitiveservicesectorfromstatetonon-stateunits,byincentivisingthe

establishmentofco-operativesandleasingarrangements.Thishasmostlybeendoneby

puttingpressureonformeremployeestoacceptoutsourcingsolutionsthatstillfunction

underheavystateandpartycontrol.Thenewunitsmaybeformallyspeakingnon-state,

buttheymostlycontinuethebureaucratizedandinefficientformerpractices,incapable

ofgrowingintosuccessfulbusinessesthatcouldexpandandattractmoreworkforce.

Attheoutsetoftheeconomicreformprocess,therewasaclearprioritytopromotea

morevitalcooperativesector,firstinagriculturebutlateralsointhenon-agricultural

andurbansector.Theexplicitphilosophywasthatcooperativesrepresented“ahigher

formofsocialorganisation”thanprivatecompaniesandwouldthusbemorein

accordancewithsocialistprinciplesthanordinarycapitalistenterprises.Inpractice,

however,thecooperativesectorhassufferedfromthesamebureaucraticandpolitical

resistanceagainsttheabolitionofcentralgovernmentcontrol.Goodintentionsto

implementcommoninternationalcooperativeprinciplesofmemberdemocracy,

autonomyandtheleastpossiblecentralgovernmentandpartycontrolhavenevertaken

rootinpractice.Whenitcomestourbancooperatives,theyhavetogothroughan

extremelycumbersomeauthorisationprocessfromlocaltocentrallevel,intheend

requiringcentralgovernmentcabinetapprovalineachcase,nevermindthesizeofthe

proposedcooperative.Asaresult,onlyaminimumnumberofurbancooperativeshave

yetreachedoperativestatus,sothatthisintermediateeconomicsectorisstillof

marginalemploymentrelevanceoutsideofagriculture.

Labourrelationsinnon-statebusinessestendtobemuchmorearbitrarythaninstate

companies,forthesimplereasonthattheyaremoreinformalandbecauseindependent

unionsarenotpermitted.Employeesareoftenbetterpaid—andtheymayreceivepart

oftheirearningsinconvertiblecurrencies(particularlyinthetouristindustry).But

privatecompaniesoftendonotrespectofficialregulationsonworkingconditions,

includingguaranteesagainstarbitrarydismissal.Peopleoftenpreferworkingina

privaterestaurantratherthanastate-ownedduetovastshort-termadvantages,risking

428

theirlong-termlaboursecurity(whichmaynotbemuchworthinthefirstplacegiven

thebadshapeoftheCubaneconomy).

Indicator2.1:Explicitpoliticalwilltode-monopolizethestateeconomy?Apparently,the

‘updating’oftheeconomicmodel(codewordfor‘reform’)impliedastrategicdecisionto

allowanon-statesectortooperatesidebysidewiththestateeconomy,withaquite

dramatictransferofworkforce.Gradually,thestrategiccharacterofthedecisionwas

undermined.

Indicator2.2:Increasingde-regulationofstatecompanies?Formalde-regulationwas

soonfollowedbynewbureaucraticmeasures.

Indicator2.3:Continueddominanceofmilitarycorporations?Themilitarycorporations

continuedtostrengthentheirposition,directlycontrollingthe20%mostdynamicpart

oftheCubaneconomyandindirectlyinfluencingevenotherstrategicsectors.

Indicator2.4:Transferofworkforcefromthepublicsectortoself-employment:A

significanttransferhastakenplace,butneverofthemagnitudeoriginallyintended.

Considerableredundancyinpublicemploymentpersists.

Indicator2.5:Privateworkforcegainingmoreindependencefromthestate?Yesandno.

Thereismoreformalindependence,butstatecontrolandharassmentmayhave

increased.Inreality,thereisanillicitsymbioticinterdependencybetweenstateand

non-stateemployment.

Indicator2.6:Growingweightofthenon-statesectorintheCubaneconomy?Yes,thenon-

statesectorhasundoubtedlygrowninimportanceandpotentialpowerinstrategic

sectorssuchastourismandtransport.Someestimatesconcludethatalmostonefifthof

totalrevenuecreationinCuba—outsideofagriculture—comesfromtheprivatesector

(almostasmuchasthemilitarycorporations),twoandahalftimesthesizeofwhatis

officiallyregistered.Thismeansthat60%oftheprivateeconomyisinformalandlargely

illicit,thusescapingthestateregulatorycapacities.

429

Indicator2.7:Growthofanautonomouscooperativesector?Therealcooperative

sector(excludingState-controlledfarmscalled‘cooperatives’—CPAsandUBPCs)

hasgrownsignificantlyinagriculture.Buttheurbancooperatives,thoughtto

becomeamajoreconomicsector,havebeenthevictimsofheavyandalmost

inexplicablefoot-dragging.Earlyexpressionsofintentiontoprovidecooperatives

withmoreautonomyinaccordancewithinternationalprincipleshavenotbeen

implemented.

Indicator2.8:Incentives/dis-incentivesforotherpotentialnon-stategrowthinitiatives?

Othergrowthinitiativesandpotential,asthoseemergingduringtheObamaera

rapprochement,weremetwithdis-incentivesratherthanincentives,seenina

conspiracycontextofold-styleanti-imperialism.Inthisway,ahistoricalopportunityto

dealaheavyblowtotheUSembargoandhelpbuildamuchstrongerprivatesectorwith

agrowthpotentialfortheentireeconomy,waslost.

Conclusions

Thestatehasnotletgoofitspropertyhegemony;themilitary-controlledcorporationsare

dominantwithsomeotherstatesectorsalsounderfirmbureaucratic-militarydominance.

However,thelabourmarkethasundergoneasignificantchangewithperhapsonethird

nowbeingemployedinthenon-statesector.Evenmoreimportantisthehighdegreeof

overlapbetweenthestateandthenon-statesectors,whereamajorityoftheCuban

workforcelivesinasymbioticinterdependencebasedonillicitexchangeofgoodsand

services–withparasiticcharacteristicsvis-à-vistheState.Whilewehaveseenthe

emergenceofafewquitesuccessfulprivateentrepreneurswithuptoasmuchas50

employees,theyarethetargetofconstanthostilitybystatecontrollers.Mostofthose

workingprivatelyasself-employedarethereforelefttomicro-sizesurvivaland‘savage

capitalism’,justaspredictedinthezerohypothesis.Thealternativehypothesisofopening

asignificantandlegalspaceforMSMESsandindependentco-operativeshassofarnot

materialised.Theendresultofthisisthatnon-stateemploymentgenerationhasbeen

muchlessthananticipated.Theentrepreneurialsectorhassofarnotbeenassigneda

strategicroleintheCubaneconomy.Sustainableemploymentgenerationasanalternative

toredundantstatesectorjobshasonlytakenplaceinamuchmoremoderatewaythan

430

intendedattheoutsetofthereformprocess.Butinsomeofthestrategicsectorslike

tourismandtransport,theprivatesectordoesoccupyaquitepowerfulpositionthatthe

Statecannotignore.

Thegeneraloutcomeonchallenge2ispredominantly,butnotexclusively,infavour

ofthezerohypothesisofStatusquo:acontinuationofstatepropertyhegemony,

combinedwithaprivateentrepreneurclasslargelylefttomicro-sizesurvival

optionsand“savagecapitalism”.Butasignificantsegmentofsuccessful

entrepreneurshavealsoemerged,withapotentialpowerpositioninsomestrategic

sectors.

Challenge2waspartlymetintheearlyphaseofthereformera,butlaterpartly

rolledback.

Challenge3:Massiveneedforproductiveinvestmenttospureconomicgrowthand


H3.0.1:statusquo:banonprivatecapitalaccumulation,anddisincentivesfornon-state

investments


corporations;spurringsignificantstatesectorgrowthandemploymentcreation

H3.1:Allow/promotediasporainvestmentsanddomesticentrepreneuraccumulationand

investment;spurringnon-stategrowthandemploymentcreation

Foreigndirectinvestments(FDIs)havealwaysbeenacomplicatedissueinsocialistand

anti-imperialistCuba.Inthe1990s,asmallnumberofFDIswithrathermoderate

amountswerepermitted,butafulloverhauloftheFDIregimedidnottakeplaceuntil

2013-14asacrucialpartofRaúl’sreformagenda.Thelegalframework,includingfor

Cuba´sfirstSpecialDevelopmentZone(Mariel)withgeneroustaxexemptionrules,is

prettymuchuptointernationalstandard.Whenmostothersourcesofinternational

financialsupportdriedup,theGovernmentstartedspeakingaboutFDIasahigh

priority,suggestingthatannualFDIamountsof2.5billionUSDwouldbeanecessary

431

minimumrequirementfortheeconomytostartgrowingsustainably.Inreality,onlyone

thirdoronefourthofthisamountseemstohavebeenmobilised,forobviousreasons:

Cubaisnotamemberofanyoftheinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)thatwould

normallyactascreditorandguarantorformajorFDIs.Thescarcefiscalliquidityraises

doubtsaboutCuba´scapacitytohonouritspaymentobligations.Andthebureaucracyis

stillsoopaqueandslowinitsdealingswithforeigninvestorsthatconfidenceisdifficult

tobuild.

ApeculiarsituationinfavouroftheCubanprivatesectorexistswhenitcomestocapital

flows:Duetoaquitemassiveinflowoffamilyremittancesfromthe2millionplusCuban

diaspora,particularlyintheUS,theparadoxisthatnon-statebusinessesprobably

attractatleastasimilaramount—ormostprobablyclosertodouble—ofwhatforeign

investmentrepresentsforstatecompanies.Withoutthissource,wewouldnothaveseen

therelativesuccessofsuchenterprises,sincethestateisdoingitsbesttoholdback

privatecapitalaccumulationandinvestment,andalsoblockingprivatebusinessesfrom

FDIsduetotheirlackoflegalcompanystatus.Cubacouldhavehadtheopportunityto

repeatthesuccessstoriesoftheearlymarkettransitionsinChinaandVietnam,largely

basedondiasporainvestments.Butprivatebusinessesinthosetwocountriesenjoyeda

muchmoreexplicitpoliticalsupportasmajorinstrumentsofgrowthandemployment

generation.InCuba,successfulentrepreneursaresystematicallybannedfrom

expandingtheirbusiness,inspiteofthepotentialtheyrepresenteitherbymeansof

diasporainvestmentsortheirownaccumulatedprofits.

PresidentTrump’srevisedCubapolicyallowstheremittanceinvestmentstocontinueas

longasitdoesnotgotoGovernment-connectedpersons.Investmentsthroughstate

corporations—particularlymilitary-controlled—willbeevenmorerestrictedthan

before.Iftherehadbeenarealwillingnesstogiveprioritytoproductiveinvestments,

however,theCubanGovernmentcouldhavetakenmuchmoreadvantageoftheUS

policyinitiatedbyObama,toallowUSbusinessandtraderelationswithnon-state

companies.ButtheGovernmenthasevidentlygivenmoreprioritytokeepstatecontrol

oftheeconomythantopromoteinvestments,jobcreationandeconomicdevelopment

byallowingarobustprivatesectortoemerge.Apparently,italsoprefersacompletely

dysfunctionalillegalitytocontinueandspreadinthenon-statesector—thusallowing

432

constantclampdowns—ratherthanpromotingawellregulated,rationalandrobust

mixedeconomy.

Theofficialreasoningbehindthishasbeenlinkedtoresistanceagainstgrowingsocio-

economicdifferentiation,asweshallseeunderthenextchallengealsotobeunderstood

asaconfrontationbetweentwopartlyantagonisticgroupswithinthepowerstructure.

Whilethismaybearealmotive,andevenstrongermotivationbehindthereformfoot-

draggingmustprobablybesoughtinfearscausedbythepoliticalimplications.

ThethreemainsourcesofforeigncurrencyfortheCubanstateeconomy,exportof

professionalservices,remittancesandtourism,provideapositivetradebalanceof

goodsandservices,butcannotcopewiththehugebudgetdeficit.Consequently,Cuba

hasverylittleinvestmentcapacity,resultinginacapitalformationratioperhapsonly

halfofwhatisneededforsustainablegrowthandtherebuildingoftheeconomy.Some

signsofapotentialpartnershipbetweenUScapitalandthedominantmilitary-managed

CubanenterprisescouldbeseenduringtheObama-eradétente,inspiteoftheUS

embargo/blockadestillbeinginforce.PresidentTrumphasintroducedaveryexplicit

banoneconomicUSlinkswithsuchenterprises,furtherunderminingtheinvestment

andgrowthexpectations.Aslongasthenon-statesectorissosystematicallyvictimised,

thereareasyetnosignsoftheCubaneconomyrecoveringthroughinvestment,growth

andemploymentcreation.

Theplansformassivetransferofstateemployeestothenon-statesector,requirednot

leastduetotheunavoidablebutstillpostponedmonetaryunification,couldhavegiven

theopportunitytosetinmotionaprocessofwhatSchumpeter(2017)calledcreative

destruction:anecessaryreplacementoftheoldwiththenew,intermsofsectors,

technologyetc.Butthatwouldhaverequiredtheproliferationofmassiveinvestments

andgrowthonthebasisofCuba’scompetitiveadvantages,particularlyitshuman

capital.Nothingofthishappened,quitetothecontrary:professionalswereexcluded

fromself-employedwork,andprivatesectorgrowthwasnotpromoted.Schumpeterian

entrepreneurshavelargelylostouttoillicitandsavagecapitalism.Themechanism

describedbySchumpeterandelaboratedbye.g.AcemogluandRobinson(2012)asa

wayofpreventingnationsfromfailing,wasnotreleased.Themostcriticalcreative

433

destructionurgentlyrequiredinCubaistheeliminationofthedualmonetarystructure.

ThishasbeendelayedthroughouttheyearsstudiedhereandislefthangingasaSword

ofDamoclesovertheheadsofthepost-Castroleaders.

Indicator3.1:FDIsplayinganincreasingroleinCuba´seconomicdevelopment.Inspiteof

anewFDIregime,foreigninvestmentshavefallenfarshortofexpressedrequirements,

mobilizingonlyonethirdoronefourthofwhatwasclaimedtobenecessaryfor

sustainablerecoveryoftheeconomy.

Indicator3.2:Increaseinothersourcesofforeigncurrency.Othersourcesofforeign

currencyhavebeenfoundandgrownsubstantially(exportofmedicalservices,tourism),

buttheyarefarfromsufficienttocompensatethefiscaldeficitandspurtherequired

economicgrowth.

Indicator3.3:Familyremittancesandothersourcesofinvestmentpromotingprivate

sectordevelopment:Familyremittanceshavebeenincreasingquitedramatically,and

possiblyprovidedthenon-statesectorwithasmuchastwicetheamountofinvestment

capitalcomparedtoFDIsgoingtothestatesector.

Indicator3.4:Increasingpartnershipbetweenforeigninvestorsandnationalenterprises?

Partnershipbetweenforeigninvestorsandnationalenterprisesisemerginginsome

sectors,mostlyinthemilitary-controlledtourismsector.DuringtheObama

administration,evenUSinvestorsstartedsearchingforsuchpartnership.Thishas

endedwiththeTrumpadministration.

Indicator3.5:Capitalformationratioimproving?Thecapitalformationratiohasnot

improved:itisstillathalfthelevelofwhatisneededforeconomicrehabilitation.

Indicator3.6:Creativedestructiontakingplace?Theclosingofunprofitablestate

businesseshasstarted,butnottotheextentthatwecantalkaboutcreativedestruction.

Familyremittanceshavebeenincreasingquitedramatically,andpossiblyprovidedthe

non-statesectorwithasmuchastwicetheamountofinvestmentcapitalcomparedto

FDIsgoingtothestatesector.

434

Indicator3.6:Macro-economicoutcomeofthereformera:Reformsareassessedbymost

expertsontheCubaneconomytomoveintherightdirection,butstillfallingfarshortof

whatisrequiredforeconomicrehabilitation.GDPpercapitainCubaisstilla

catastrophiconethirdlowerthaninthemid-1980s,andsoisindustrialproduction.

Growthhasremainedatafractionofwhatisneededforeconomicrecoveryandhas

actuallyturnedtorecessiontowardstheendoftheRaúlCastroera.Budgetbalanceand

tradebalanceingoodsareincreasinglynegative,thelattercompensatedforthrough

services.Alongwiththeverylimitedinvestmentratios,themacro-economicoutlookis

verygloomyasCubaisenteringthepost-Castroera.

Conclusion

TheFDIregimehasbeenthoroughlyreformedwithoutleadingtosignificantinvestments

duetopoliticalandstructuralimpediments;diasporainvestmentstoprivatebusinesses

maybeontwicethelevelofofficialFDIs.Butprivatesectorinvestmentsarestilldis-

incentivizedbyabanonprivatecapitalaccumulationandexpansionandonthelegal

establishmentofprivatecompanies.Obama-eraUSinitiativestoallowinternationallinks

withprivatebusinesseswerestronglyrejected.Givenallstructuralimpedimentsonforeign

investmentandgrowingrestrictionsonsuccessfulprivatebusinesses,themassive

investmentsrequiredforeconomicrehabilitationhavenotmaterialized,andemployment

generationislaggingfarbehindtheneeds,leavingaheavyburdentothenextgeneration

ofleaders.

Amixtureofzeroandalternativehypotheseshavebeenconfirmedinthiscase,but

thecombinationofmissinginvestmentsinpublicsectorandimpedimentstoprivate

sectorgrowthevenifinvestmentcapitalhasbeenavailable,hasresultedin

completelyinsufficientgrowth.

Theaccumulatedoutcomeoftheeconomicchallenges(1-3)isthatnorealeconomic

rehabilitationhasoccurred,andthatthedysfunctionaleconomicstructureand

consequenteconomiccrisiscontinues.

435

Challenge3hasnotbeenmet.

Challenge4:Politicalimplicationsofsocio-economicchanges

H4.0.1:Consistentlyresistingmoreautonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorsthatcould

followlogicallyfromachangingeconomicarena;thusresistingpoliticaltransformations.

H4.0.2:Economicreformsleadingtonewsourcesofacceptanceforpoliticalstatusquo?

H4.1:Acceptingmoreautonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorswithpotentialforpolitical

transformations

Itiswhenwearemovingfromtheeconomictothepoliticalarenathatwefindthelikely

reasonforthereluctancetopermitthedevelopmentofastrongprivatesector:Going

throughtheindicatorsdefinedforchallenge4,thereislittledoubtthatthefirstzero

hypothesis(H4.0.1)ismoreconsistentlyconfirmedforthanformostoftheeconomic

challenges.Thesecondzerohypothesis(H4.0.2),whichwouldimplyaChina/Vietnam

styleoutcome(Route1–economicsonly),isalsolargelydismissed.Soisthealternative

hypothesis:autonomyfornon-stateactorsisstronglyresisted,andattemptsaremadeto

narrowratherthanexpandtheirsphereofoperation,whentheircontributiontosolve

theeconomiccrisisismorecriticallyneededthanever.Horizontalandindependent

interestorganizationisresisted,howeverlogicalitmayseemtobeonthebasisof

changingeconomicstructures.Eventhegrowthofco-operatives—forawhileroaredon

asanidealalternativetoprivatisationoftheeconomy—washaltedwhenthey

threatenedtobecomeatooindependenteconomicforcewithapotentialtopromote

politicaltransformations.Extra-officialandvirtualexpressionsofmorehorizontal

interestorganizationarecarefullyemerging,however,insomecasesobligingthestate

tonegotiateandacceptthattheeconomicpowermonopolyiscrackingup.Insomeof

thestrategicsectorsliketourismandurbantransport,theprivatesectordoesnow

occupyaquitepowerfulpositionthattheStatecannotignore.

Thesignificantsocio-economicchangesthathaveoccurred,inspiteofthelimitedand

increasinglyrestrictiveresponsestochallenges1-3,haveledtogrowinginequalitiesand

are-compositionofthesocio-economicpatternsinCuba,withearlywinnersofthe

436

reformscontrastingwithearlylosers.Theformerconsistsofamixtureofmilitary

corporationmanagersandavirtualmiddleclassreapingthebenefitsofsuccessfulnon-

statebusinesses,particularlyintourist-relatedsectors.Thelargerpartoftheireconomic

activityisruledbyinformalpractices.

Theearlylosersofreform,solidlyrepresentedamongpartyandstaterank-and-file

bureaucrats,haveprobablyimpelledandsupportedthehaltandreversalofreforms.

Akeyquestionhereiswhetherthecarefullyemergingprivatesectoroftheeconomyis

constitutingitselfasaneconomicsocietyinthemeaningframedbyLinz&Stepan:

norms,institutionsandregulationsthatmediatebetweenstateandmarket.Only

marginalelementsofthiscanbeobservedsofar.Thesameisthecasewithastate

bureaucracyservingtheneedsofthenon-statesectoroftheeconomy.Ifthiswereto

happen,itcouldaccordingtoLinzandStepaninthenextinstancebecapableof

producingthe‘independenceandliveliness’ofcivilsociety,inthenextinstancespilling

overtoapoliticalsocietyinliberal-stateterms.Thischainofeventsisclearlynotwanted

bythepresentCubanleadership.

Yet,aswehaveshownparticularlyinthediscussionofChallenges6and8,RaúlCastro

hasmovedCubafromatotalitariantoanauthoritarianregime.Itisacrucialclaimofthis

dissertationthatthepoliticaleliteinthissituationstartedworryingaboutalogical

unfoldingofeventsasprescribedinliberaltransitiontheoryandasdocumentedinthe

caseoftheUSSRandotherEasternEuropeanex-communistregimes,provokinga

reversalofmarketreformsinanintenttohaltafurthererosionofthepoliticalpower

monopoly.ThereisevidentlynoconfidencethattheSino-Vietnamesepathofpromoting

marketreformswithoutgivinguppoliticalpower(ref.H4.0.2)willworkinthecaseof

Cuba.ItseemslikelythattheSovietexperiencehasbeencarefullystudied,sothat

everythingwillbedonetoavoidsomethingsimilarfromhappeninginCuba.

Theremaybevariousreasonsfortheresistancetoallowwhatwehavecalled

SchumpeteriancapitalisminCubaandratherprefertheproliferationofillegal,

speculativeandsavagebusinesspracticesatoddswiththemostbasicethicalprinciples

oftheCubanRevolution.Suchgovernment-inducedpracticesarenowusedasapretext

437

toclampdownonbusinesses,producingaself-fulfillingprophecyofalargelyillicitnon-

statesector.Itmaybeaboutanideologicalrejectionofcapitalism,fearofcompetition

againststateenterprises,andevenconcernaboutdissolutionofthesocialstability.

Socialconditionsaredeteriorating,andsocialdifferencesareexplodingbetweenan

emergingmiddleclassofsuccessfulself-employedononeside,andthosedepending

solelyonmeagrepublicsalariesorbenefitsontheother.

Butattheendoftheday,judgingfromthenever-endingharassmentoftheincreasing

shareoftheworkingpopulationforcedtosurviveatleastpartlyoutsideofthepublic

sector,onlyonerealexplanationseemstohavevalidity:fearforthelossofthepolitical

power.Theassumptionisthatbytryingtokeepamixedeconomyatbay,therewillbe

nopoliticalcontaminationfromamarketeconomythatmaypromoteeconomicactors

challengingthecontrolofthePartyandtheState(whatwehavecalledRoute4:

economicleadingtopoliticaltransformations).Eveneconomicreformsinitiallyheralded

byRaúlCastrohavebeenseriouslysloweddownorevenreversedwhenthelossof

economicandconsequentlypoliticalcontrolappearedonthehorizon.

Thesituationofsymbiotic-parasiticinterdependencebetweenthestateandnon-state

sectorsdescribedunderChallenge2,exposesworkersinbothsectorstoahighdegreeof

vulnerability,andtothewhimsofallkindsofcontrolsbypolice,labourinspectorsand

lawenforceinstitutions,whothemselvesalmostasarulemakeuseofillicitmethods

(bribery)fortheirownsurvivalstrategies.

Indicator4.1:Winnersandlosersofthereformswithconflictingpoliticalinterests:There

hasbeenacleardifferentiationbetweenwinnersandlosersofthereforms,withthe

lattergroupapparentlyusingtheirpositionwithinthePartytochallengeandreverse

theentirereformprocess.

Indicator4.2:Anemergingmiddleclasswithdistinctinterests?Socio-economically,a

smallbutrelativelyprivilegedgrouphasemergedwithseveralmiddleclass

characteristicsandaninterestinacontinuationanddeepeningofthereformsbutsofar

withoutpoliticalmuscletoimposetheirwill.Onequestionforthepost-Castroerais

whetherthemostobviousearlywinners,themanagersofmilitary-controlled

438

corporations,willjoinforceswiththisgroupforthefurtherpromotionofmarket

reforms,possiblyevenwithpoliticalimplications.

Indicator4.3:Evolutionofsocialconditionsandpreviousegalitarianstructures:Social

conditionshavedeterioratedforsignificantsegmentsofthepopulationandsocial

differenceshavereachedquitealarmingproportionsthatchallengetheegalitarian

traditionsoftheCubanrevolution;probablycontributingtothepoliticalresistance

againstreforms.WhereChinaandVietnamthroughtheirmarketreformshaveoffered

thelargerpartofthepopulationfastupwardmobilityandsocialimprovement,thus

providingapragmaticacceptanceforsocialinequalitiesandpoliticalstatusquo,thisis

farfromhappeninginCuba.

Indicator4.4:Privatesectorgainingpotentialpowerposition?Yes,theprivatesectorhas

gainedapotentiallysignificantpowerpositioninstrategicsectorsliketourismand

transportbuthassofarfailedtodeveloppoliticalinfluencedefendingtheirinterest

economicallyandevenlesspolitically.Theirreactionsvarybetweensilentprotestand

carefulnegotiation,andarealconfrontationhassofarnotoccurred.Aninteresting

differenceisemergingbetweenatraditionalstatesectorafraidofbeingoutcompeted,

andamoredynamicsector(principallyintourism)wheretheneedforcomplementary

privateservicesisrecognized.Thisdifferencemaybecomepoliticallyimportant.

Indicator4.5:Ideologicalacceptance/resistancetoprivatepropertyandcapital

accumulation:Thisresistancehasbeenmaintainedandevenincreasedduringthe

reformperiod,makingitdifficultforanentrepreneurialgrouptoconsolidateitselfasa

strategicdevelopmentforce.

Indicator4.6:Moreautonomousinterestorganizationpermitted?No,suchorganisation

hasnotbeenpermittedinanysectoroftheeconomy,butthishasnotstoppedmore

informalorganisationalalternativeswithacertainpoliticalimpacttoemerge.Asthe

state´sdependenceontheprivatesectoroftheeconomyincreases,itwillalsobecome

increasinglydifficulttostophorizontalinterestorganisationbeyondthecontrolofthe

Party.

439

Conclusion

ThefirstzerohypothesishasbeenclearlyconfirmedforChallenge4:Quitefar-

reachingeconomicreformshavechangedthesocio-economicandeventhesocio-political

structureoftheCubansociety.Theprivatesectorhasgainedapotentialpowerpositionin

somestrategicsectorsliketourismandtransport.Thishasbeenmetbyconsistentand

increasingeffortstoturnbacklogicallyfollowingpoliticaltransformations,asexemplified

underthediscussionofotherchallenges.Theclaimofthisdissertationisthatthisreaction

ismotivatedprincipallybytheregime’sworryaboutachainreaction:lossofeconomic

monopolyleadingtolossofpoliticalpowermonopoly.

Challenge4—perhapstheprincipalchallengeofthereformprocess—wasactively

refuted:politicalimplicationsofsocio-economicchangeswereconsistentlyblocked;

autonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorshasbeenconsistentlyresisted,alsoruling

outthelikelihoodofachievingpragmaticacceptanceofpoliticalstatusquo.

Challenge5:Achanginginternationalcontext:ReachinganendtotheUS

embargo/blockade;and/orcompensatingtheembargobythehelpofotherinternational

alliances.

H5.0:TherelationshipofhostilitytotheUScontinues,thusalsomaintainingtheinternal


H5.1:SeekinggradualaccommodationwiththeUSduringthesecondpresidentialtermof

BarrackObamaandintroducingmajoreconomicandpoliticalreformsaspartofthat

process.

Ontheinternationalarena,therehaveindeedbeenquitedramaticforcesofchangeat

playduringtheperiodunderstudy.Firstofall,presidentsObamaandCastrosurprised

theirtwocountriesandtheworldwithanunexpectedbreakthroughinpolitical

relations,there-establishmentofdiplomaticrelations,andmutualdeclarationsabout

rapprochementonallfronts.AlthoughPresidentObamawasunabletoget

440

Congressionalapprovalforhisambitionofliftingtheembargo/blockade,hetookalmost

allpossiblestepswithinhisrealmofauthoritytobefriendCubaandundohistorical

hostility.Cubafailed,however,tofullyrecognizethehistoricalpotentialofthisandtake

advantageoftheeconomicopportunitiesofferedbyObama,veryexplicitlyallowingUS

collaborationwiththeemergingCubanprivatesectorinspiteofthestillexisting

embargo.Thiswaspartofwhathetermedthe“empowermentthroughengagement”

policy.

Instead,thehardlinerswontheupperhandbyspreadingsuspicionthatObama´sstated

objectiveofcontributingtoamoreopenCubansocietywouldunderminetheentire

Revolution.Theyperceivedacounter-revolutionaryconspiracybehindMrObama´s

charmingfaceandreactedwithfullrejectionofthispartoftheUSinvitation.Thismade

iteasierforthenewUSPresidentDonaldJ.Trumptoreturntotheeraofideological

confrontation,therebyjustifyingtheanti-imperialistpositionoftheCubanhardliners

onceagain.InLatinAmerica,whichhadturnedstronglyfavourabletoCubaduringthe

firstdecadeofthenewcentury,anewrightistwavestrippedCubaofmanyofthe

politicalandeconomicopportunitiesonceagain.Venezuela’sincreasingcrisisgavethe

lessonthatCubaoncemorehadtobraceitselfforthelossofaneconomicbenefactor

andguarantor,whiletheLatinAmericanrunner-upforthisrole,Brazil,endedupalmost

equallyincapableofprovidingCubawithexternalsupport.ChinaandRussiaoffered

limitedcompensation,whileEurope,inspiteofnormalisedpoliticalties,couldnot

provideCubawitheconomicrehabilitationaslongaseconomicandpoliticalreformsin

Cubaweresolimited.

OneoftheindicatorstowatchherewashowCubawouldadapttochanging

internationalrealities,andhowthiswouldaffectitseconomicandpolitical

transformations.WhatwemayconcludeisthattheoldhardlinersstilldictatingCuba’s

policy-makingrefusaltoadaptpragmaticallytoachangingworldsituation,failtotake

advantageofsignificantopportunitiestorevitaliseitseconomyoutoffearforlosingthe

absolutepoliticalpowermonopolythatanywaymaybeimpossibletomaintainfortheir

successors.Forinstance,theideologicallybasedrefusaltore-establishanyrelationship

withtheinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)willcontinuetomakeitimpossiblefor

Cubatorealizethestatedobjectiveofattractingsignificantforeigndirectinvestment,

441

theofficiallydeclaredavenuetowardseconomicrehabilitation.Inthisway,Cubais

excludingitselffromtheopportunitiessopragmaticallyandsuccessfullygraspedbyits

fellowsocialistcountriesVietnamandChina.529

Indicator5.1:TrendsinUSCubapolicy:Towardstheendoftheembargo?Adramatic

breakthroughforUS-CubannormalisationtookplaceduringtheObamaadministration,

althoughPresidentObamacouldnotmoveCongresstolifttheembargo.Withthe

electionofPresidentTrump,thebilateralrelationbouncedbacktofullconfrontation.

Indicator5.2:RelaxationofUShostilityleadingtoreduced‘bunkermentality’andaless

authoritarianCubanpolity?TherapprochementbetweenUSandCubainitiallyledto

moreinternalopenness.ButthisprocesswasparadoxicallyreversedafterPresident

Obama’svisit(March2016)andwasfurthererodedwhenPresidentTrumptookover.

Indicator5.3:Increasingdiplomaticrecognition—isolationofUSembargopolicy?Cuba

experiencedincreasingdiplomaticrecognitioninLatinAmericaandglobally,andde

factoanisolationoftheUS,untilPresidentObamastartedtherapprochement.President

Trump’srenewedenmitymayonceagainservetoisolatetheUS’Cubapolicy

(particularlyinLatinAmerica—buteveninrelationtotheEU).Buttheincreasing

numberofright-leaninggovernmentsintheregionhasre-openedtheharshcriticismof

Cuba’sdemocraticdeficit,sotosayopeningthegatesofthecoldwaroftheAmericas

onceagain.

Indicator5.4:Cubabenefitingfromnewinternationalalliances?Venezuela’sgrowing

crisisisgraduallyreducingquitedrasticallyitscomprehensivesolidaritywithCuba.

BrazilastheLatinAmericanrunner-upinCubarelationswasseriouslydamagedbythe

crisisinthatcountryandtheLeft’slossofpower.Noothercountryispreparedtostep

529TheUSmayblocktheentranceofCubatotheIFIs.However,membershipintheprobablymostimportantcreditinstitution,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB)iscloselylinkedtomembershipintheOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS).Cuba’ssuspensionfromtheOAS(since1962)wasliftedbyamajorityvotein2009againsttheprotestoftheUS,atatimewhentheclearmajorityofOASmemberswereclearlysympathetictoCuba.Cubamadeitclear,howeverthatthecountryhasnointentionofreturningtothisregionalbody.Anoptionproposedbyseveraleconomists(ref.VidalandScottBrown2015)isthatCubastartstheapproachtoIFIsbyseekingtechnicaladvice,notablyfromtheIMFfortheunificationoftheCubancurrencies.

442

intoanotherbenefactorrole,althoughChinaandRussiaisprovidingCubawithsome

breathingspace,i.a.aspartofitsgeopoliticalrivalrywiththeUS.

Indicator5.5:Adaptationtonewinternationalrealitiesaffectingeconomicandpolitical

transformations?InitialreactionstothenewUS’policyhintedatmorepragmaticpro-

transformationpolicies.Lateron,areturntotraditionalanti-imperialistrhetoricruled

outsuchadaptation,e.g.bymaintainingtherejectionofinternationalfinancial

institutionsthatmighthavefacilitatedmuchbetteraccesstoFDIsandmadethe

monetaryunificationlesspainful.

Conclusion

RelativetoChallenge5,thealternativehypothesiswashalfwayandunexpectedly

confirmed(gradualaccommodationwiththeUS),even(atleastforawhile)

promptingahistoricalshiftinCuba´sinternationalrolefromananti-imperialist

vanguardtoadiplomaticfacilitator.However,thesuccessfulCubandiplomacyledtoa

domesticlegitimationofthehistoricenemyandapotentialde-legitimationoftheregime

itself.Thisbecamethebarrieragainstthesecondelementofthealternative

hypothesis(introducingmajoreconomicandpoliticalreformsaspartofthe

normalizationprocess),helpingbuildaprosperousCubanfutureinpeacefulandless

confrontationalrelationstotheoldimperialistenemy,stronglysupportedbytherestofthe

world.AftertheObama-Trumpchange,itmaybelongbeforethepoliticalrealitiesofthe

USwillofferasecondopportunityofthiskindtoCuba.

Challenge5wastoalargeextentmetbytheUS-Cubanrapprochement,butthe

opportunitytoliberalizeeconomic-politicalstructuresinthecontextofpeaceful

relationstothehistoricalenemywasmissed.

Challenge6:Emergenceofamorepluralisticcivil,academicandmediasociety


organizationandpublicdebateingeneral.

443

H6.1:Agradualopeningforaconstructivepublicdebate,withorganizationalexpressions



TherewasasignificantchangetowardthemeetingofChallenge6duringthefirstyears

beingstudiedhere,untilapproximately2015-2016.Forseveralyears,aclear

strengtheningofcivilsocietytookplace.Theinformationmonopolywaseffectively

broken,withamyriadofalternativeinformationagentsandsourcespoppingup,evena

relativelyhigh-qualityInternetdaily(althoughitwasblockedfromdomesticaccess).

Academicsandintellectualsekedoutamuchmoreautonomousspaceforcriticaldebate

ofalternativedevelopmentoptions,andtheyalsohadchannelstoconveysuchthoughts

tosysteminsiders.Theproblemwasthelackoffeedbackandactivedialoguewiththe

politicalpower.TheCatholicChurch,ledbytheHavanaCardinal,developedsome

interestingdebateinitiativeswhilealsoplayingaroleintheliberationofpolitical

prisoners,butthisproactiverolegraduallylostmomentum.

TheCubanhistorianRafaelRojasdescribedthisdevelopment,quiteaccuratelyatthe

time,as“civilpluralismandpoliticalauthoritarianisminCuba”.

Sincethe2016Obamavisit,civilsocietyhassufferedaparallelbacklashtothatofother

reformefforts:frequencyandnumberofdetentionsofdissentershaveincreased(but

interestinglydecreasedagainin2017),anumberofindependentjournalists,bloggers

andindependent-mindedacademicshavebeenmarginalizedand/orstigmatized,

dismissedfromstateinstitutionsand/orpersecutedinotherways,evennon-

confrontationalactorspromotingdialogueandinnovativethinkingwithoutquestioning

thehistoriclegacyoftheRevolutionhaveseentheirlegitimatespacesignificantly

reduced.However,thenumberofcyber-basedinformationoutletshasincreasedso

rapidlythattheGovernmentisincapableofpreventingaconstantlossofthe

informationhegemony.

Theword‘changeagent’wasreferredtowithcontemptinRaúlCastro’sspeechatthe7th

PartyCongress.Itistodayverydifficulttoseewhothese‘changeagents’shouldbe,and

whethertheywouldultimatelyemergefromwithinoroutsideofthePartysystem.

444

Agame-changercouldhaveoccurredifthecivilsocietyhadmanagedtoconvergewith

independentassociationsofprivateentrepreneurs,unionizedprivate-sectoremployees,

farmersandpeasants,cooperativesorothernon-stateeconomicactors.Butnoneof

theseinterestgroupshavebeenallowedtoestablishthemselvesbeyondtheverticaland

centralistcontrolofPartyandState,althoughtheStatecannolongercompletelyignore

theirstrategicpositions.Theemergingmiddleclassmayharbourbotheconomicinterest

andperhapsgraduallyevenpoliticalideasofitsown.Onequestionhasbeenwhether

thiscouldreleasehithertodormantforceswhenseeingtheirmarketeconomyand

middleclassambitionsseriouslyfrustrated.Coincidingwithpoliticaldeceptionandthe

USAclosingtheirborders,thusdrasticallyreducingthe‘exit’option,maythisleadto

more‘voice’inCuba?

ThefearofthePartyhardliners,itseems,wasthatthedisappearanceoftheenemy

imageofUSimperialism,togetherwiththeopeningofeconomicrelationsnot

completelycontrolledbythestateandoftheemergenceofnewsocialactorswiththe

characteristicsofamiddleclasswouldendangerthemonolithicpoliticalpower.Itmust

probablybeunderstoodasanattackonthedangersrepresentedbythecausaleffects

discussedinthisdissertation:thepoliticalconsequencesofeconomicreform.

Indicator6.1:Evolutiontowardsamorepluralistcivilsociety?Importantopeningstook

placeduringthefirstyears;latermeetingstrongresistance.

Indicator6.2:Academicsandintellectualspermittedamoreautonomousrole?This

indicatoralsosawconsiderableinitialopenings,latertobepartlyrolledback.

Indicator6.3:Churchesplayinganincreasingpoliticalrole?Thechurcheshavenotplayed

anysignificantpoliticalroleaftertheCardinalhelpedliberatepoliticalprisonersin

2010.OnlyminorCatholicgroupsmaintainanopencriticalattitude.

Indicator6.4:Increasingroleforindependentinformationactors?Yes,therehasbeena

verysignificantchangeinthisregard,amountingtothelossoftheGovernment´s

informationmonopoly.Alsoheretherearelaterreversals,buttheGovernmenthasbeen

445

incapableofretakingtheinformationhegemonyamongtheyoungurbanandeducated

population,nowrelyingpredominantlyoncyber-basedsources

Indicator6.5:Morerespectfordissenters?Yesandno.Dissentershavegainedmorespace

ofmovement—includingtravellinginandoutofcountry—butharassmentmayalso

haveincreasedinlateryears,mostlythroughshort-termarbitrarydetention.

Indicator6.6:Emerging‘agentsofchange’?Norealsuchgrouphasemerged.

Conclusion

Thealternativehypothesiswasforseveralyearsconfirmed:therewasagradual

openingforpublicdebatewithmoretoleranceforindependentacademicandcivil

societyexpressions,forgingaconstructivespacetoemergebetweenofficially

controlledstructuresandirreconcilableregimeopponents.Theofficialinformation

monopolywaseffectivelybrokenbyindependentjournalism,mediaoutletsandbloggers.

Butthen,whenthepartyhardlinersstartedworryingaboutthelossofcontrol,they

reactedwithareturntorestrictions,increasedstigmatisationofopposition

(particularlythepro-dialoguegroups),andanattempttoreturntothezero-

hypothesissituation.Theincreasingrejectionofanyalternativestostatusquo

demonstratedthattheacademiceffortstoopenaconstructivedebatewithpowerinsiders

seemtohavefallenondoughears.

Challenge6wasmettoasignificantextent,beforetheregimehardlinerssucceeded

tostartrollingbackthepluralistopening.


(legislativevs.executive).


roles.


independentlyoftheExecutive.

446

Adifferentiationofstateandpartyfunctionswasannouncedasaclearambitionatthe

2012PartyConference.Divisionofstatepowershasnotbeenexpressedasanexplicit

ambition,butitwouldbealogicalsteptowardsanimprovedgovernanceandruleoflaw

standard.Therealityisthatverylittleofthishashappened.Thedegreeofpower

concentrationinCubaisquiteuniquebymostinternationalcomparisons.Thedominant

powergroupthatwehavetermed‘thetwelveapostles’haveconcentratedtoppositions

bothinstateandpartybodies;inlegislativeaswellasexecutivegovernmentbranches

andintheArmedForces.The7thPartyCongress(2016)confirmedthismonolithic

governingstructure,withoutrelievingtheoctogenariangenerationthathasgoverned

thecountrysincethe1959Revolutionofitsresponsibilitiesandmakingthewayfora

newgenerationofPartyleaders.Intermsofpartyleadership,thistransferwasonce

againpostponed,tothe2021PartyCongress.

ThenewCentralCommitteeofthePartyelectedatthe2016Congressdrawsitsmost

numerousgroupofmembersfromstateandPartyfunctionaries,withoutincluding

anybodywithanalternativevoiceandanindependentsocialbase

(intellectuals/academics,artists,non-stateeconomicactors,civilsocietyrepresentatives

fromoutsidetheparty-controlledmassorganisations).

ThefocostrategysostronglyassociatedwiththeCubanguerrillastruggleand

Revolution,withpowerspreadingfromtheguerrillathroughthere-organisedarmed

forcesandtheLeninistpoliticalpartytoallorgansofthestateandsociety,isstillthe

corepoliticallogicinthecountry.Thearmedforces,probablythebestorganisedCuban

institution,whilestillbeinginfirmcontrolofthetopPartybody(thePolitburo)and

dominantamong‘thetwelveapostles’,hasnotplacedasignificantnumberofyounger

officersintheCentralCommittee.Therearealsofewermilitaryintopgovernment

positions(ref.newCouncilofMinisterstoappearinJuly2018),afteraninitial

strengtheningduringthefirstyearsoftheRaúlCastroera.Aninterestingfactorto

observeisthedifferentiationbetweenofficersinactivemilitaryand

security/intelligenceservice,andthoseoccupyingbusinessmanagerpositions(‘military

inuniformvs.militaryinguayavera’).Thisdifferentiationmaycontaincrucial

differencesininterestandtherebyalsopoliticalcontradictionsintheyearstocome.

447

Thereisstillonlyonelegalpoliticalpartyinthecountry,andwecansofarnotseeany

signsofopenpluralismwithinthatpartyalthoughimportantinternalideological

differencesseemtoexist.WhereasacountrylikeVietnamhasquiteopenleadership

conflictsevenfortheelectiontotopposition(ref.2016PartyCongress),nosuchsigns

arevisibleinCuba.Rather,thereseemstobeheavypressureonthenewgenerationof

leaderstoexpresstotalcommitmenttohard-linepartypositions(ref.Díaz-Canel´s

internal2017statementsoneyearbeforehebecamePresident).

Whatwedoseeisthattheparty,withatopleadershipstillcompletelydominatedbythe

nowoctogenariangenerationthatmaderevolutionalmostsixtyyearsago,stands

furtherandfurtherawayfromtherealityofyoungpeople.Deepconcernsabouttheloss

of‘revolutionaryspirit’amongyoungpeopleareexpressed,butitisdifficulttoseehow

theseleadersmaymaintainculturalandsocialhegemonyinpresent-dayCubansociety.

Thenumberofpartymembersisdecreasing;youngpeopledonomorefeelobligedto

jointheParty´syouthorganisationasaprerequisiteforfuturecareer.Althoughthe

monopolypowerinstrumentisstillformallyintact,ithardlyoffersanarenaforpolitical

participationinpolicy-making,dealingwithCuba’sfuturechallenges.

TheApril2018transitionofpresidentialresponsibilitytoapost-Castrogenerationmay

forawhileleadtoadifferentiationofstateandpartyleadership,withRaúlCastroand

hisoldcomradesremaininginchargeofthePartywhilemostofthemleaveState

leadershippositions.Adualpowersituationmaythereforeemergeforthefirsttime

sincetherevolutionwasinstitutionalisedinthe1960s.Theintentionexpressedby

Castro,however,isthatthecombinedcommandofallstructuresberesumedatthe2021

PartyCongress.TheprospectofrealautonomyforthenewPresidentandhisteamof

Governmentleadersisthereforequitedoubtful.

Thebureaucracyhasnotceasedtobeananti-reformforce,inspiteofRaúl’sdemands

forthattohappen.Noindependentvoicesareheardfromthelegislativeorjudicial

branchesofgovernment.ThenewNationalAssemblythatcametogetherin2018has

foundnoplaceforindependentcandidatesandisexpectedtosupportthePartylinein

thesameunanimousfashionasbefore.

448

Indicator7.1:CommunistPartyshowinganysignofopeningup?Cuba´sCommunistParty

hasnotchangedanycharacteristic–itremainsatypicalLeninistPartyastheepicentre

ofpower.

Indicator7.2:WilltherebeanyvisiblestepsawayfromtheCommunistPartypower

monopoly?

The7thPartyCongresstooknostepawayfromthemonolithicandopaquepower

structure.

Indicator7.3:HowrepresentativearemembersandleadersoftheCommunistParty?The

toppartyleadershipremainedpracticallyunchanged,withsomeadditionalyounger

membersofthePolitburo.However,therewasaquitecomprehensiverenewalofthe

CentralCommittee.Noknownreform-orientedintellectualsorpersonsfromprivate

sectororParty-independentorganisationswereincluded.

Indicator7.4:MoredifferentiationbetweenPartyandStatefunctionsandleaders?There

hasbeenanalmostcompleteoverlapbetweenPartyPolitburo,topGovernment

executivesandtopLegislatureleadership,plusthemilitarycommand.Cubahasbeen

governedbyagroupofadozenpersonswithmultipleroles,whatwehavecalled‘the12

Apostles’,themajorityofwhomaremenintheir70sandabovewitharecordfromthe

originalrevolutionarymovement(26ofJuly).InApril2018,adifferentiationbetween

StateandPartyleadershipwasestablishedbytheelectionofanewHeadofStateand

Government,butthisdifferentiationwasintendedtobetransitoryarrangementonly.

Indicator7.5:AnychangeintheroleoftheMilitary?Themilitarycommandstructureis

alsobasicallyunchanged,butittakescareoftwoverydifferentfunctions:thearmed

forcesplussecurityandintelligenceservices(throughtheMinistryoftheInterior),and

managementofthecountry´smostprominentbusinesscorporations.Difference

betweenthesetwofunctionsmaypotentiallyleadtocontrastingpoliticalinterests.We

havenotedthatmilitarymenarelessdirectlyinvolvedingovernmentfunctionsthan

before,andthatfewyoungerofficersarerecruitedtotopPartypositionsthatsoonwill

bevacatedbytheOldGuard.

449

Indicator7.6:Bureaucracyremainingasbarriertoreforms?Thebureaucracywas

identifiedbyRaúlCastroattheoutsetofhiseraasreformspoilers.Thishascontinuedto

bethecase,andCastroseemstohavelosttheforcetochangeit.

Conclusion

Thezerohypothesishasbeenoverwhelminglyconfirmed:anoverlapofpartyand

statefunctionsandexecutiveandlegislativeroleshascontinued.AdifferentiationofParty

andStateleadershipwasintroducedwiththeelectionofanewPresidentinApril2018,

withRaúlCastroandtheOldGuardremaininginchargeofthePartyuntil2021,butthis

arrangementwasmeanttobetemporaryonly.


Challenge8:Movestowardsalessauthoritarianandmorepluralistpoliticalsystem


H8.1:Significantideologicalrenewalandpoliticalreformsbeingintroduced.

Threeideologicalandvisiondocumentswerepresentedtothe7thPartyCongressand

approvedmorethanayearlater.Byandlarge,theyconfirmallolddogmasand

ideologicalpositions.Nonewideologicaltrends,reflectingtheafterallquite

fundamentalmodificationsunderwayintheCubansociety,arevisibleinthese

documents.TheyoffernoresponsetotheserioussurvivalchallengesfortheCuban

economic,politicalandsocialsystem.

Inthediscussionofthischallenge,wehaveassessedtheRaúlCastroreformera’sscore

onLinzandStepan’sregimetypecriteria.

Intermsofpluralism,thepolitical-institutionalauthoritarianismremaineduntouched

whilecivilianpluralism—aswehaveseen—advancedconsiderablyduringthefirst

450

yearsoftheRaúlera.Attemptstorolleventhelatterbackduringthelatestyearscollide

withthesignificantchangeinsocio-economicstructures,whichinthefirstplaceledto

morecivil-societypluralism.Raul’sinitialemphasisonpragmatismattheexpenseof

ideology,waslaterquestionedbyanti-reformactivistsoftenwithoutanyformal

positions,embarkingonanewideologicalbattleandattacksonthosewhodaredto

questionoldideologicalpositions.Itishighlyquestionable,however,whetherthiswill

impressthemajorityofthepopulationwhohavegotatasteofamoreliberalcultural

andeconomicreality.

Mobilisationhasalsolostimportanceandstrengthduringthereformperiod.Itisvery

hardtobelievethatthemobilisationpotentialwillberehabilitated,unlessUSPresident

Trumpactsinsuchprovocativewaysthathereallystirstheoldanti-imperialist

sentimentsinCuba.

LeadershipisincrisisinCubaasRaúlandtherevolutionarygenerationispreparing

theirretreat,particularlywhenseenagainstthebackdropofthecharismatictradition

representedbyFidelCastro.ThenewPresidentneedstobuildhislegitimacymostfrom

scratch,basedonsocio-economicmeritsandtheincorporationofvaluesrelevanttothe

youth.ItwillbedecisivehowmuchspaceheisofferedbyRaúlCastrotoshapehisown

courseforthefuture.

Althoughtherehasbeenaquitesignificantchangeofsocio-economicstructures,

decision-makingisbasicallyascentralisedandopaqueasbefore.Theexistenceof

internalfactionsisstillmostlyanissueofpurespeculation.Thefactthatexternalgroups

ofintellectuals,journalistsandmembersofthecivilsocietyhavebecomeincreasingly

activeinanewkindofpublicdiscussionaboutalternativepolicies,hasnothadany

visibleeffectontheleadingpartyandgovernmentstructures.Thepro-regimemass

organisationsshownosignoftakingamoreindependentrole,inresponsetoamore

pluralisticsocialcomposition.

WhenRaúlCastroannouncedthataConstitutionalReformwasinthemakingandthatit

wouldbesubjecttoareferendum,andthePartylaterannouncedthatanewelectoral

lawwasunderpreparation,clearexpectationswerecreatedthatthecountrymightbe

451

movingtowardsaslightlymoreopenelectionprocessforNationalAssemblyand

PresidenttotakeseatinApril2018.Thisalsoleddifferentindependentgroupstostart

campaignsforthepresentationofcandidates.However,the2017/2018electoral

processturnedouttofollowthesameoldprocedure.Throughavarietyofmanipulative

ordirectlyrepressivetechniques,allindependentcandidates—withoutexceptionbeing

stigmatizedas‘counter-revolutionaries’—wereoutmanoeuvred.Theelectionofnew

2018leadersthereforecontainednomorepluralisticelements.

Cubahasseriousruleoflaw(r-o-l)problemsandverylittlehaschangedduringthe

reformera.Therehasbeennodifferentiationofstatepowers:theexecutiveand

legislativepowersarecompletelyintertwined,whilethejudiciaryishierarchically

subordinatedtotheLegislature.Lossofmediamonopolyandstrengthenedcivilsociety,

interestingly,impliesacertain“citizenmonitoring”.CorruptioninCubaisamany-

facetedissue.Thereisprobablylimited‘improperinfluence’byeconomicpowergroups,

andlimitedhigh-levelcorruption.Butbriberyoflower-levelofficialsisalmosttherule.

Opengovernmentisanotherr-o-lindicator.Cubacontinuestohaveanextremelyopaque

governmentculture.Neitherhaveweseenmanyimprovementsoffundamentalrights,in

spiteofanearlyintentiontoratifytwobasicinternationalHRtreaties.Orderand

securitygetsanexceptionallygoodscoreinCuba.Regardingregulatoryenforcement,the

phenomenon‘improperinfluence’isnotapparent,whileimplementationofgovernment

decisionsisoftenveryineffective.Propertyrightsarenotfullyguaranteedbythe

socialistsystem,withtheexceptionofthoselinkedtoforeigninvestors.Civiland

criminaljusticeisfairlywellguaranteed,aslongastherearenopoliticalmotives

involvedinthecase.Politicaldissentershavenoguaranteeinthisrespect.

Onbalance,Cubahasseriousr-o-lproblems,butisnotnecessarilymuchworseoffthan

otherLatinAmericancountrieswithformaldemocracies.

Indicator8.1:Newideologicaltrends?Anassessmentoftheideologicalcontentofthe

documentspresentedtothe7thPartyCongressandlateradoptedbytheCentral

Committeeinmid2017,leavesnosignofanyideologicalrenewalcomparedtothe

Marxist-LeninistidentificationoftheCubanRevolutionintheearly1960s.Onthe

452

contrary,thesedocumentsleavetheimpressionofalackofdynamismandcapacityto

meetthechallengesofthepost-Castroera.

Indicator8.2:Moreliberalregimecharacteristics?Duringthefirstyearsofthereform

era,therewereclearsignsofmoreliberalregimecharacteristicsappearing.Attemptsto

rollthisbackmayonlyleadtomoredistancebetweenthePartyandGovernmentonone

handandapopulationincreasinglymakingendsmeetoutsideofstatestructuresonthe

other.Thisisparticularlythecasefortheyouth.

Indicator8.3:LessauthoritariancultureinsidetheCommunistParty?Nosuchmovehas

beenobserved,inspiteofearlyappealsinthisdirectionfromRaúlCastro.

Indicator8.4:Theroleofpro-regimemassorganisationmobilisation.Thepro-regime

massorganisations,whilelosingmuchoftheirmobilisationpotentialwithoutcapacity

toattractyoungerpeople,haveshownnosignoffacilitatingaspacefordialoguewith

therestofcivilsociety.Onthecontrary,theyhaveratherstrengthenedtheirfunctionsof

intelligence,socialcontrolandconfrontation.

Indicator8.5:Anysignofamoreopen/pluralisticelectionprocess?Nosuchsignshave

beenseenduringthe2017/2018electionsofthefirstpost-Castrogovernmentleaders—

contrarytosomeearlyexpectations.Allnon-partycontrolledcandidateswere

successfullyeliminatedfromtheelectionprocess.

Indicator8.6:Improvedruleoflawperformance?Cubahasseriousruleoflawproblems,

andverylittlehaschangedduringthereformera.Theonlyimprovementhasbeen

throughmore‘citizenmonitoring’causedbythelossofinformationmonopolyanda

moreactivecivilsociety.

Conclusion

IngeneralforChallenge8,weseeaperpetuationofstatusquoandthezero

hypothesis,aftersomeearlysignsofamorepluralistpoliticalstructureappearing

onthehorizon.Itisasiftheoldguardoftheregimehasretreatedtotheirautisticbubble

453

forfearoflettingloosethethreateningpluralisticforcesreleasedbyreformsintheearly

phaseofthepost-Fidelera.

Challenge8hasinnowaybeenmet.






builtonperformance.




Underneaththetopechelonofoldguerrillaheroes,RaúlCastrohasmovedsomekey

leadershippieces.Thefewyoungerleadersthathisbrotherhadpromotedascandidates

totakeoverwhentheoldmencouldnomoreexercisepoliticalleadershipwerealmost

allthrownoutbyRaúlforvariousmotives.Raúlhadtorecognizeatthe2011Party

CongressthatthePartyhadfailedcriticallywiththepreparationofhumanresourcesfor

theupcomingunavoidablegenerationalrenewalofthecountry´sleadership.Sincethen,

acrucialstepwastakenwiththe2013appointmentofMiguelDiáz-Canel,bornoneyear

aftertheRevolution,asthecountry’sFirstVicePresident,andfromthenpreparedto

takeoverasHeadofStateinApril2018.The7thPartyCongresswasagreat

disappointmentforthosewhowerewaitingforamorethoroughrenewalofthe

leadership.Theoldguardwaskeptalmostentirelyinplace;85-yearoldRaúlCastrodid

notretireasFirstSecretary;insteadofpromotingDíaz-Caneloranotheryoungcadreto

therunner-uppositionasSecondSecretaryoftheParty,86-yearoldhardlinerMachado

Ventura—apparentlystillveryphysicallyable—wasalsoconfirmedtocontinueintohis

90s.

454

The2016PartyCongressdidrenewthesecondlevelofitsleadership,the142members

strongCentralCommittee,whereaverageageisfallingandthegenderaswellasrace

compositionisnotverydifferentfromthepopulationatlarge.Butnoneofthese

relativelyyoungleaders,Díaz-Canelincluded,arepubliclyexpressinganynewideas.

Theold-timerconservativeslikeMachadoVenturamaintainideologicalandpolitical

hegemonyintheParty,accompaniedbyagroupofyoungerhard-core‘freelance’

communistswithoutformalpositions,inanattempttoreinvigorateoldorthodox

positions.Giventhecriticalsocio-economicsituationandafreezeonreformsthatmight

haveinjectednewconfidenceinthesystemamongyoungerCubans,thenewleaderswill

havenoperform-basedlegitimacyonwhichtobasetheirpositions.

WithDíaz-Canelelectedasthefirstpost-CastroPresident,butthroughaprocessand

withafutureregimeevolutioncompletelydesignedbytheoldguard,itremainstobe

seenwhetherheandtheyoungerpeoplehebringswithhimwillrepresentareal

renewal,oratleastarevivalofthereformprocessthatwasabortedin2016.

AsBrownnotedinthecaseoftheUSSR,Gorbachevneededreform-mindedpeopleone

stepdowninthepartyhierarchyinordertowintheideologicalbattlethatfollowed.He

alsowentontoobserve,however,thatonlychangeattheapexofthepoliticalhierarchy

wouldallowaseriousreformprocesstotakeplace.InCubasofar,theoldguard,

inspiredbyFidelCastro,haskeptitssolidgripofthetoppartyhierarchy,eliminating

criticalthinkingfromgainingground.ItisacommonhypothesisthatevenRaúlCastro

wasunabletochallengethishegemony,perhapsbecausehecouldnotfindsufficient

supportforhisreformagendaneitheratthetopnoronestepdowninthehierarchy.The

loyaltytoFidel’sorthodoxthinking—evenafterhisdeath—hassimplybeentoo

overwhelmingatalllevelsofthePartyforthattohappen.

WithRaúlremainingasPartyleaderanddefactoultimateauthorityoftheArmedForces

until2021,hemightofferthenextgenerationthenecessaryspaceforarevivalofthe

reformshehimselfwasunabletoimplement,inspiteofrealizingtheirnecessity.

455

Sincethe1959Revolution,Cubanshavesystematicallychosenexitratherthanvoice

whentheyhaveanissuewiththeregime.Cubansarenotverydiscretewhenvoicing

theiropinionsinprivate.Inpublic,however,theiragitatedvoiceisnormallysilenced.

Duringtheseyears,between10and15%oftheCubanpopulationhasemigrated,in

differentwaves.WhenmostemigrationrestrictionswereliftedandthegatestotheUS

burstwideopenin2013,anotherwavedominatedbyyoungandwell-educatedCubans

onceagainoptedfortheexitsolution,withatotalofmorethan120,000again

emigratingtotheUS.WiththeUSagainslammingthedoorinearly2017,andPresident

TrumpclampingdownonLatinoimmigrantsingeneral,thissituationhaschanged.

Addingtothistheeconomicandpoliticalreformbacklashfurtherremovingyoung

talentedCubans’hopeforthefuture,questionsareagainraisedwhetherthevoice

option—thatisdemandsforasayandmoreopenprotestandmobilisationforchange—

willbecomemoreattractive.Thatwillbeanotherinterestingissuetowatchduringthe

criticaljuncture,withthenewgenerationofleadersstrugglingtofindnewsourcesof

legitimacy.


renewal?The7thPartyCongressledtonogenerationalrenewaloftopPartypositions.

TheoldrevolutionarygenerationwillstayoninchargeofthePartyuntilthenext

Congressin2021.ThesecondlevelPartyleadership,theCentralCommittee,was

significantlyrejuvenated.

Indicator9.2:HowthoroughrenewalofStateleaders(2013and2018)?Therenewalof

Governmentpositionstakingplacein2018wasmorethorough,withanewHeadof

StateandGovernmentandrejuvenationoftheStateCouncilalthoughsomeofthe

revolutiongenerationstayedon,perhapsasguardiansofthefidelistalegacy.The

questionishowmuchauthoritythenewPresidentandhisteamcanexercisevis-à-vis

theold-timers’continuedcontroloftheParty(until2021).

Indicator9.3:Reformcontinuityorcounter-reform?InspiteofRaúl’searlyassurancethat

therewasnowaytostophisreformagenda,anaffectivecounter-reform—economically

aswellaspolitically—gainedgroundfromearly2016.

456

Indicator9.4:Newsourceoflegitimacyandpragmaticacceptance?Reformshavebeen

reversedduringthelateryears,inthemiddleofaworseningeconomiccrisis.Therefore,

nonewsourceofperformance-basedlegitimacyisinsightforthosetakingover

Governmentresponsibilityin2018.WhileChinaandVietnamhaveenjoyedpragmatic

acceptanceoftheirregimeduetohistoriceconomicgrowthandsocialmobility,nosuch

prospectsexistinCuba—acountrywhereapreviouswelfarestateisincreasingly

underminedbyaneconomyindeepcrisisandimbalance.

Indicator9.5:Voiceorexit?WhenemigrationrestrictionswereliftedduringtheRaúl

Castroreformera(2013),anotherhugewaveofemigrants—mostlyyoungandwell-

educatedCubans—againchosetheexitoptionratherthanvoicingprotestordemands

forchange.Sinceearly2017,itistheUSsidethathasclosedtheexitoption.Withfuture

lifeprospectsincreasinglyfadinginCuba,newhardshipsawaitingandauthorityand

legitimacyofthepost-Castroleadersinseriousjeopardy,thelackofthetraditionalexit

solutioncouldspurmorevoice,meaningmoreprotestandalternativemobilisationfrom

youngCubans,potentiallyprovokingmorerepressionfromtheGovernmentside.

Conclusion

ThezerohypothesisforChallenge9isoverwhelminglyconfirmed:theold

conservativehardlinershavestrengthenedtheirfirmcontrol.Expectedrejuvenation

ofpartyleadership—announcedin2011—wasoncemorepostponedatthe2016Party

Congress,andsowasalongoverduepolitical-ideologicalrenewal.Ratherthanallowing

thenextgenerationtodevelopnewpolicies,theclockhasbeenturnedbackoncemore.

Raúl’sappointmentofarelativelyyoungsuccessorin2013,whoexpressednonewvision

forCuba’sfutureandgainednoprestigeasafutureleaderbeforehetookoverasHeadof

StateinApril2018,mayperhapsputtogetherateamofyoungerleaderswithamandate

toimplementRaúl’sabortedreforms,ifRaúloffershimthenecessarybackstoppingwhile

heisstillinchargeoftheParty(until2021).Thelossoftheclassicalsafetyvalve—exit—

mayinthissituationofexpectedhardshipandbleakprospectsforthefutureobligeDíaz-

Caneltobuildnewalliancesandpursuedifferentpolicies,inresponsetomorevoicefrom

newsocialactorsandgenerations.

457


Overallstatusoftransformations

Wemayconcludethatthezerohypotheseshavebeenmostlyconfirmedregarding

challenges1-3:importanteconomicreformshavebeenintroduced,buttheyhave

stoppedshortofempoweringneweconomicactorsthatmightchallengethesocio-

politicalstructures,therebyrejectingthelogicofchallenge4(politicalimplicationsof

socio-economicchanges).Aprobablyuniqueopportunityintheinternationalarenaof

throwingoverboardtheoldimperialiststranglehold(challenge5)waswastedforthe

samereason:fearofgivinguptheolddomesticorder.Whentheimperialistenemy

imagestarteddisintegratingwiththenewUS–Cubanrapprochementandex-President

Obama’scharmoffensivedirectlyvis-à-vistheCubanpeople,itprobablywasgradually

perceivedasathreatthatcoulddealafatalblowtotheexistingpowerstructureand

therebythejustificationofCuba’slimitstocivic-politicalliberties.ThenPresident

Trumpcamealong,againmakingiteasiertorehabilitatethisjustification.Thesamehas

happenedtochallenge6(astrengthenedandmoreautonomouscivilsocietyand

academiccommunity):reformstowardsthealternativehypothesiswereallowedtoa

certainpoint,whenthelossofabsolutepowerstartedtobecomearealconcern.Other

politicalreforms,liketheunpackingofthetight-knit,homogenousandmassivepower

institutions(challenge7)havebeenrejected.Norealpoliticalparadigmshifthasbeen

permitted,andtheearlysignstowardsalessauthoritariansystemgradually

disappeared(challenge8),coincidingandcontrastingwithratherdeepsocio-political

diversificationsandtheemergenceofsignificantbutwellhiddeninternalideological

contradictions.Theunavoidablegenerationalrenewal—longputonhold—wasfinally

initiatedwiththeelectionofPresidentDíaz-BalartinApril2018.Whilefromtheoutset

preachingcontinuity,itisunclearhowmuchchangehisnewgovernmentteam—with

veryquestionablelegitimacy—willbeabletocarryoutwiththeOldGuardstillincharge

oftheParty(until2021).AsweshallseeinChapter11,bypushingasideinconsistencies

ofpartialreform,counter-hegemonicthreatsmaybeappearingonthehorizon.How

thesewillbehandledisthedecisivequestionforCuba’spoliticalfuture(ref.Chapter11

andtheScenariosdiscussedinChapter12).

458

Letusfinallyreturntothekeyquestionofthisstudy:whetherandtowhatextenta

wideningofeconomicpluralismhasbeentakingplaceinsuchawaythatitmayleadto

increasingpoliticalpluralismandde-concentrationofpower;oralternatively,whether

changesinthepoliticalandpowerstructuremayaccelerateorslowdownthespeedof

economicreforms.

Bygoingthroughninechallengeswitheachtheirzeroandalternativehypotheses,

studiedwiththehelpofatotalof56indicators,wearereadytodrawaconclusion:

Wewillclaimthatthepotentialforcausalrelationshipbetweeneconomicreformand

politicaltransformationhasbeenconfirmedduringtheseyears.Therestructuringofthe

Cubansocialfabric,asaconsequenceofchangingeconomicrealities,haspresentedthe

politicalpowerwithseriouschallengestoallowdecisivepoliticalrestructurationas

well.Itisverylikelythattheresistanceagainstthis,andthefearforlosingpolitical

powerandseeingarepetitionofwhathappenedintheUSSRandtheprevioussocialist

campofEurope,iswhathasconvincedtheold-guardhardlinersoftheCuban

CommunistPartytoreverseeconomicreformsforfearofunderminingthepolitical

statusquo.Wemayonlyspeculatewhetherthishasevenhappenedagainstthewillof

RaúlCastro,butperhapswiththesupportofFidelaslongashewasalive,thusproviding

hisideologicalcomradeswithapoliticaladvantageagainstRaúl’sbestreformintentions

evenafterhisdeath.

Whatwemayconcludeisthatneithereconomicnorpoliticalreformhasgonedeep

enoughtoreallyallowustorespondwithcertaintytotheoverallquestionofthe

dissertation.Wehaveobviouslyseenasignificantgrowthofaprivateeconomicsector

challengingstateeconomicpowermonopoly,withprobableeffectforthegrowthofa

moreautonomouscivilsocietyandalsosignificantinformationpluralism,andperhaps

makingthepoliticalpowermonopolylessrelevantevenwhenitformallypersists.But

theselaterphenomenaarealsoconsequencesofdefactopoliticalreforms,likethe

emigrationreform,therapprochementwiththeUSA(aslongasitlasted),andthe

growingaccesstoInternet.Thelatterhashardlybeenavoidableanyway,dueto

technologicaldevelopment.Oneeconomicreform,thelegalizationofarealestate

459

market,convertingalargenumberofCubanstolandlordsandproprietors,hasalsohad

adeepimpactontheirperceivedinterestsandideologicalconsciousness:theyhave

startedthinkingasprivateeconomicactorsandindividualcitizens,ratherthanaspart

ofaunifiedpeopleandasocialiststate.

Whatweareleftwithisastronglypoliticallymotivatedefforttorejectthelogicalcausal

relationshipbetweeneconomicandpoliticaltransformationsintheshortterm.The

possiblelong-termeffectmaybethattheentireeconomicbasisandpoliticallegitimacy

oftransferringtheCubanRevolutionwithitsideasofsocialjusticeandnational

sovereigntytoapost-revolutionarygenerationmaybecompletelyundermined.

Onemayonlywonderwhetherthefailuretofollowthroughonthismayleadtoa

redefinitionofthecorrelationofpoliticalforces,insuchawaythattheoppositecausal

logicdrawnupinthekeyquestionkicksin:startingwithpoliticaltransformationsthat

ultimatelybringwiththemeconomictransformations;wherethecrisisoflegitimacyor

evenhegemonymayleadtodissolutionofthepowermonopolyandtherebyopenthe

gatestocapitalism.

LetusillustratethisbygoingbacktoFigure2.1,theEconomics–Politicscorrelation

roadmappresentedinChapter2.WehaveseenthatfromCuba’spointofdeparturein

CellcofourMatrix(theexclusivecharacterofbotheconomicandpoliticalinstitutions),

therehavebeenclearmovementsparticularlytowardsCellb(moreeconomic

inclusiveness)butalsotoacertainextenttowardsCelld(morepoliticalinclusiveness).

Thishashoweverledtoseriousconcernsamongconservativeleadersthatsuch

movementsmighthaveimpactstriggeringfurtherslidestowardsCella,whichdefacto

wouldmeanthefullintroductionofamarketeconomyandalossoftheone-party

system.Asaresponsetothis,measureshavebeentakenthroughcounter-reformto

bringthesituationbacktowardsCellconthepoliticalaswellastheeconomic

dimension,whichhoweverseemstobeanunsustainablestateofaffairsbothfroman

economicandapoliticalperspective.WehaveillustratedthisinFigure10.1:

460

Figure10.1:Politics–EconomicsCorrelationRoadmap:

2018outcomeoftheRaúlCastroreformeffortsFigure 5

a

c

b

d

Inclusive

Inclusive

Exclusive

Exclusive

Political Institutions

Economic Institutions

461

Chapter 11: Some principal dilemmas during the critical juncture

(2018-2021)

Thepurposeofthischapteristodrawuponthetheoreticalandempiricalconsiderations

inpreviouschapters,lookingaheadtowardstheunavoidableandcomplicatedchoices

Cubaisconfrontedwith,thatneedtofindasolutionasanalmostcompletegenerational

changeofleadershipwilloccurduringthe2018-2021period(fromtheelectionofthe

firstpost-CastroPresidentinApril2018,tothenextCommunistPartyCongressthree

yearslatersupposedlywiththedepartureofallCastro-generationleaders).Whatare

theprincipalchallenges,andhowcanandwilltheybesolved?

Thediscussionofthesedilemmaswillserveasapreambletotheoutliningand

assessmentofthepossiblescenariosforCuba´sfuture,tostarttakingshapeduringthis

supposedcriticaljunctureinthecountry´shistory.

11.1 What is a critical juncture?

Wewillrefertothepost-CastroerainCuba(startingon19April2018)asacritical

juncture,withagradualbutfullgenerationalchangeofleadershipanddeepuncertainty

aboutthecountry´swayahead.Anotherconcept,beingontheverge,hasbeenappliedso

manytimestoCubaatvariousmomentsduringitsrecenthistorythatwewanttomake

aqualitativedistinction:inOctober1962themissilecrisisputtheentireworldonthe

brinkofnuclearwar;thecollapseofmostoftheSovietblocaround1990ledmanyto

thinkthatthedaysofCastro’sRevolutionwerecounted(ref.Oppenheimer’sinfamous

1992booktitle“Castro’sFinalHour”);whenFidelsuddenlysteppeddownin2006many

observersbelievedthattheRevolution’ssurvivalwasimpossiblewithoutFidel,before

hewasimmediatelyreplacedbyhisbrotherRaúl.Thistimearound,wearespeaking

aboutwhatisverysoonabiologicallyinevitableinter-generationaltransferofpower.

Huntington(1968:14)claimsthattheinter-generationaltransferofpowerisacritical

462

testofthereproductivecapacityofapoliticalorder:

“Solongasanorganizationstillhasitsfirstsetofleaders,solongasaprocedureisstill

performedbythosewhofirstperformedit,itsadaptabilityisstillindoubt[…]Thefounders

oforganizations–whetherparties,governments,orbusinesscorporations–areoftenyoung.

Hencethegapbetweenchronologicalageandgenerationalageisapttobegreaterinthe

earlyhistoryofanorganizationthanlaterinitscareer.Thisgapproducestensionsbetween

thefirstleadersoftheorganizationandthenextgenerationimmediatelybehindthem,which

canlookforwardtoalifetimeintheshadowofthefirstgeneration.Inthemiddleofthe

1960stheChineseCommunistPartywas45yearsold,butinlargepartitwasstillledbyits

firstgenerationofleaders[…]TheshiftfromLenintoStalinwasanintra-generation

succession;theshiftfromStalintoKhrushchevwasaninter-generationsuccession.”

Huntington’s1968considerationsaboutyoungfounderswhohangonandreferredthe

nextgenerationto“alifetimeintheshadow”couldnotbeillustratedbyabettercase

thantheCuban.Comparisonstolaterinter-generationalchangesinChina(whenDeng

XiaopingtookoverafterMao’sdeathin1976byoutmaneuveringMao’schosen

successorHuaGuofeng)andtheUSSR(whenGorbachevtookoverfromChernenkoin

1985),areevenfarmoreillustrativethanHuntingtoncouldknowin1968.Aswehave

discussedinChapter4,theyaremajorreferencecasesforwhatmayhappeninCuba

post-Castro.

ThefirstquestiontoaskasCubaisenteringthiscriticaljunctureisthereforehowdeep

changesthenewgenerationofleadersiscapableandwillingtoundertake.MacGregor

Burns(2003)distinguishesbetweentransactionalandtransformationalleadership.A

transactionalleaderisnotlookingtochangethefuture;herathertriestokeepthingsthe

samebyattemptingtoraisetheefficiencyofestablishedroutinesandprocedures.Such

leadersaremoreconcernedwithfollowingexistingrulesthanwithchangingthe

structureoftheinstitutiontheyaresettolead(beingacompanyoracountry).

Transformationalleadership,ontheotherhand,iscreatingavisionofsomethingnew,

workingwithsubordinatestoidentifytheneededchange,andguidingthechange

throughinspirationandmotivation.

ItmaybedifficulttoseehowMiguelDíaz-Canel,oranybodyelseinthenewleadership

463

generation,canmobilisethepersonalauthoritytoexerttransformativeleadership.

DifferentfromDengandGorbachev,hewillhavetostarthisleadershipcareerwith

manyofthefoundingfathers—notleasttheyoungerCastro—stillmaintainingdecisive

powerpositions.Theformaltransferofthepresidencywasdesigneddowntothe

smallestdetailbytheoutgoingleader,andDíaz-CanelappearedinfrontoftheNational

Assemblylikeagratefulanddutifulheirtothefamilycompany,promisingtocarryiton

likethefatherhadinstructedhimto.Hehadhardlyanyotherchoiceatthatmoment.

StandingatacriticaljunctureliketheoneCubaisexperiencingattheentryofthepost-

Castroera,however,transformationalchangeisdefinitelywhatisrequired.Aswehave

concluded,businessasusualisnooption.Whatthesecond-generationCubanleaders

willdowhendictatedbynewrealities,nobodycantellnow.

Letusstartbybrieflyexplainingtheoriginoftheconcept‘criticaljuncture’andhowwe

understanditinthecaseofpost-CastroCuba.

Thefirstuseofthisconceptincomparativepoliticsandhistoricalanalysisdatesbackto

theclassicalworkofLipsetandRokkan(1967:37–38),tracingtheoriginsofWestern

Europeanpartysystemstothree‘crucialjunctures’inthehistory,settingthestagefora

qualitativelydifferentinstitutionaldevelopment,andfurthergivingrisetowhatthey

term’path-dependentprocesses’.Whatthisimpliesisthatdecisionstaken,andchoices

made,duringthecriticaljuncture,mayhavealastingandlimitingimpactonfuture

options.Ofcourse,thepreviouscriticaljunctureinCubawasthe1959Revolution.

Alaterdefinitionoftheconceptisasfollows:

“Theconceptof‘criticaljuncture’isanessentialbuildingblocofhistoricalinstitutionalism.

Manycausalargumentsinthehistoricalinstitutionalistliteraturepostulateadualmodelof

institutionaldevelopmentcharacterizedbyrelativelylongperiodsofpath-dependent

institutionalstabilityandreproductionthatarepunctuatedoccasionallybybriefphasesof

institutionalflux—referredtoascriticaljunctures—duringwhichmoredramaticchangeis

possible.Thecausallogicbehindsuchargumentsemphasizesthelastingalternativeoptions

andleadtotheestablishmentofinstitutionsthatgenerateself-reinforcingpath-dependent

processes.”(CapocciaandKeleman2007:341).

464

Acriticaljuncturealsoopensupforanotherconcept:agency.Bythisismeantthe

individualcapacityofaleadertoactwithdeterminationinsuchsituationsandtake

strategicdecisionsmoreindependentlyofagivensocialstructure,beyondwhatfollows

automaticallyduringperiodsofinstitutionalstabilityandhistoricalcontinuity.The

literatureoncriticaljunctureoftenfocusesonpoliticalagencyandchoiceas

determinantsforselectingamongtheoptionsavailableatthetimeofthecritical

juncture.InhiscomparativestudyofthepoliticaldevelopmentofCentralAmerica,

Mahoney(2002)definesmoreexplicitlycriticaljuncturesas“choicepoint[s]whena

particularoptionisadoptedamongtwoormorealternatives”givenbyprevious

historicalconditions:

“[I]nmanycases,criticaljuncturesaremomentsofrelativestructuralindeterminismwhen

willfulactorsshapeoutcomesinamorevoluntaristicfashionthannormalcircumstances

permit...thesechoicesdemonstratethepowerofagencybyrevealinghowlong-term

developmentpatternscanhingeondistantactordecisionsofthepast”(Mahoney2002:8).

RaúlCastro´sleadershipduringthereformprocessmayhaveelementsofagency

(capacitytodothingsdifferentlyfromFidel),andwehavebeentestinganumberof

hypothesesinordertodeterminewhetheraprocessoftransformativechangeshasbeen

introducedduringhisleadership.Whatwewanttodiscussinthischapteriswhether

thereweretransformationprocessesinitiatedduringtheRaúlera(2008-2018)that

maybeacceleratedorturnedinotherdirectionsinthepost-Castroera.Therefore,we

willendthedissertationwithadiscussionofdifferentscenariosforCuba’sfuture

development,takingtheexpectedupcomingcriticaljunctureasapointofdeparture.

Itgoeswithoutsayingthattransformativechanges,setinmotionatmomentsofrelative

structuralindeterminismthroughtheexerciseofstrongpoliticalagency,requires

transformationalleadership.Thereisseriousreasontoquestionwhetherthenew

generationofCubanleaders—individuallyorasacollective—possesssuchcapacity.Will

theseriousnessoftheeconomicandlegitimacycrisesobligesuchleadershiptobe

exercised?Thatwillbasicallybedeterminedbythewaythemanydilemmasexpectedto

emergeduringthecriticaljuncturewillbeaddressedbytheyoungerleaders,starting

withthenewPresident.OneadvantageDíaz-Canelmayhaveinthisrespectisthathe

maygobacktoreforminitiativesactuallytakenbyRaúlCastro,butlaterabortedduring

hisera.

465

11.2 Some paradigmatic choices ahead

Theconceptof‘democracy’withthequalifyingadjective‘socialistdemocracy’was

broughtinasoneofeightbasicprinciplesintheprogrammeofprinciplesthatcameout

ofthe7thPartyCongress,whatwaslabelledCubansocialisteconomicandsocial

development.Theconceptisdefinedasamixtureofdirectandrepresentative

democracy,verymuchinaccordancewithArticle3oftheCubanConstitution:

“Socialistdemocracyonthebasisofthesovereignpowerofthepeople,fromwhich

originatesallthepowerofthesocialiststate,exerciseddirectlyorthroughassembliesof

People'sPowerandotherStatebodiesthatderivefromit,inthemannerandaccordingto

thestandardssetbytheConstitutionandlaws“(S/E).

Whendiscussingfactorsthatmaybedecisiveforthefuturedemocraticdevelopmentof

Cuba,itisimportanttoconsiderwhetheranychangeisobservableonanumberofbasic

variablesthatcharacterisethepresentpoliticalcultureandpractice,settingthecountry

onthepathtoanyreasonableunderstandingofafunctioningdemocracy.Butthemore

basicquestioniswhethersuchchangesareatallpossiblewithintheLeninist

democratic-centralismlogicoftheCubansystem,definedbyLeninhimselfas"freedom

ofdiscussion,unityofaction"(Lenin1906).TheLeninistsystemofpower,undoubtedly,

offersverylittleintermsofdecentralisation,horizontalinterestrepresentation,

transparency,accountabilityandpluralism—keyelementsoftheparadigmaticchoices

thatthenewgenerationofCubanleaderswillbeconfrontedwith.

Callsfrommorereform-orientedpartyinsidersformoreparticipationandmore

decentralisationarenotnewinCuba.Theyhavealsotoalargeextentbeenseenas

legitimate‘withintherevolution’.Forinstance,apaperco-writtenbyprevious

colleagues,nowTemas-editorRafaelHernandezandHaroldoDilla(thelatternowin

exileandverycriticaloftheregime)(HernandezandDilla1992),qualifiestheCuban

politicalsystemas‘participatory’,butnotasmuchastheywouldhavelikedittobe,also

callingformoredecentralisationandefficiency.530

530”Asinallcontemporarysocieties,politicalparticipationinCubahasitslimitations”saytheauthors.Namely:“weaknessesinthesubsystemofinformation,bureaucratism,thepersistenceofacertainmarginalizationofsomesocialgroups,excessiveadministrativecentralization,underutilizationof

466

Continuedcentralisationvs.decentralisationofstateandsociety:531

Cubahasanextremelycentralisticdecision-makingstructure.Allcriticaldecisionsare

takenonnationallevel,byasmallpoliticalelitewithoutanysystematicconsultation

mechanismwithdecentralisedbodies(territoriallyspeaking),letalonewith

independentorcountervailinginstitutions.Therehasbeennodistancebetween

executiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernment,eithersubordinatedtothesupreme

poweroftheCommunistPartyinacompleteoverlapofseniorpositionsamongadozen

predominantlyoldmen,mostlydrawnfromtheguerrilla-inspiredmilitary-leninist

structure.Thereisnoprocedurewherebythispoliticaleliteisinrealitymade

accountableforitsdecisionsbyopenpopularconsultation.Thereisevidentlyahuge

challengetodecentralisethispoliticalstructure.ThewayoutgoingPresidentRaúlCastro

laidoutthefutureleadershipstructureuntilhehimselfturns100yearsleaveslittle

hopeforanychangeinthisrespect.GivenDíaz-Canel’sbackgroundfromtheprovincial

leveloftheParty,andtheapparentlystrongpositionofpresentprovincialleaders(ref.

Indicator7.2),however,theremaybeheavypressuresformoredecentralisationinthe

timeahead.

Continuedverticalvs.morehorizontalformsofinterestrepresentation:

Closelylinkedtothedescribedcentralism,thepoliticalsystemisalsovertical,with

decisionstakenonthetopandbeingmoreorlessautomaticallycommunicated

downwards.Military-inspiredexpressionsfromtheFideleralike‘bajarorientaciones’

(‘senddowninstructions’)and‘ComandanteenJefe–ordene’,areindicativeofan

extremelytop-downpoliticalculturewithoutrealparticipatorypractices.Withthe

emergenceofamuchmoreheterogeneousandmorediversifiedsocio-economic

structureinthecountry,onewouldexpectthatthesemorecontradictoryinterestsbe

representedbyhorizontalandmember-controlledinterestrepresentation.Asdiscussed

elsewhere,constanttensionsareemergingaroundthesecontradictions,posinganother

participatorymechanismsasaconsequenceofthetraumaticrejectionofoldstylesof‘politicking,’andsoon.”(HernándezandDilla1992:38)(S/E).TheCEAwasclosedin1966,inacontroversialgovernmentdecision.531Severalofthese’paradigmaticchoices’arecloselyrelatedtotherule-of-lawelementsdiscussedunderIndicator8.6–theremaythereforebesomerepetitionofarguments.

467

challengetotheCubanpoliticalsystem.Alsointhisregard,transferofresponsibilitytoa

non-militaryleaderlikeDíaz-Canelmayharboradifferentmanagementculture.

Continuedgovernmentandbureaucraticopacityvs.moretransparencyanddownward

accountability:

ManagementofgovernmentbusinessinCuba—andevenmoredecision-makingpractice

intheCommunistParty—mustbeconsideredasextremelyopaque,completelyatodds

withtheprinciplesoftransparency.532Cubancitizensarenottreatedasrights-holders

accordingtointernationalprinciplesofhumanrights,withanunquestionableaccessto

relevantinformationaboutdecisionsofrelevancefortheirownlifeandthesocietyto

whichtheybelong.MostCubancitizensaresofamiliarwiththislackoftransparency

thattheydon´tevenbothertorequestthekindofinsightingovernmentaffairsthatis

takenforgrantedinaliberaldemocracy.Thissituationcomestoarealtestwhenforeign

investorsareinvitedin,andtheyarealienatedbysuchbureaucraticpractice,

threateningtounderminethedeclaredobjectiveofattractingamassiveincreaseinFDIs

asanofficiallyrecognisednecessityforthecountry´sdevelopment.Díaz-Canelusedto

speaktojournalistsabouttheneedtoabandonwhathecalledtheexaggerated

“secretiveness”(secretismo)inCubanmedia.Itwillbeinterestingtoseewhetherhe

intendstofollowthatupinpracticeasHeadofGovernment.

Theconceptofrendicióndecuentas,theSpanishsynonymforaccountability,hasalong

traditionintheCubanrevolution.Inprinciple,thosewhoareelectedtoanofficeare

supposedtoprovideinformationandfeedbackabouttheirexerciseofthemandateto

theelectors.Theprincipleistoacertainextentbeingpracticedatthelowestlevel,for

instanceinneighbourhoodconstituencies(ref.principleofcall-backofelected

representatives).Atthatlevel,theremayalsobearealexchangeofviews,withany

neighbourbeingallowedtoquestionthelocalrepresentativeandpresentcomplaints

againsthimorher.Atthetopendoftheverticalstructureofpower,thisprincipleis

532HeadoftheEconomicReformCommission,Murillo,madeaveryfrankadmissionrightafterthe2016PCCCongress:”itisimpossibletoleadacountrywithouttransparency”(remarksatTallerInternacionalsobreauditoriá,controlysupervisión,organizedinHavanainMay2016,quotedbyElíasAmorBravo:“¿Dequétransparenciaestánhablando?”,Cubaeconomía,3.06.16).

468

beingpracticedbytheFirstSecretaryoftheParty,orthePresidentoftheRepublic,

presentingaReport(InformeCentral)tothePartyCongressdelegatesorbyofferinga

formalopeningspeechtotheNationalAssemblyattheendofeachyear.Atthatlevel,

however,thereisnorealdebateorquestioningofhowpowerhasbeenexercised;and

theprincipleofrendicióndecuentasismoretypicallyturnedupsidedownbymid-level

officialsbeingdemandedtoreportupwardsabouttheirexerciseofamandate.Andof

coursethelackofmulti-partyelectionsandalegitimatepoliticaloppositionworking

insidethesystemmeansthatthereisnocriticalquestioningoftheexerciseofpower.

AccountabilityinCubahasthereforeinpracticebeenmoreunderstoodasa

responsibilityofthoseatlowerlevelsofeconomicandpoliticalinstitutionstoreport

upwardstothesupremelevelsofpower.

Gorbachev’sprincipleofglasnost,theemergingprincipleofdemocraticaccountability

andtransparencytowardstheendoftheUSSR,isoftenunderstood—alsoinCuba—as

whatintheendunderminedtheSocialistFatherland.AccordingtoFukuyama

(2011:480),“itisthebalancebetweenastrongstateandastrongsocietythatmakes

democracywork[…]”.Basedonthisunderstanding,thereisseriousreasontoquestion

whethertheCubanconceptof‘socialistdemocracy’hasanyrealmeaninginthewaythe

Cubanpoliticalsystemworkstodayormaybeexpectedtoworkwithoutmore

fundamentalchangesintherelationshipbetweenstateandsociety.

ThesituationintermsoflackingdownwardaccountabilityinCubaisofcoursenotvery

differentfromtheonewemayobserveincountrieslikeChinaandVietnam.Butatleast

inChinatheregimeseemstohavefoundamechanismtohandlesocialprotest,through

thephenomenonwehavereferredtoas‘contentiousauthoritarianism’,meaning

proceduresforroutinebargainingbetweenthegovernmentandprotesters.Vietnamhas

sofarfailedtodevelopanysimilardisputeresolutionmechanism,implyingthatland

disputespresentaseriouschallengetogovernmentalandcommunitylegitimacyin

Vietnam.ThesameisclearlythecaseinCuba.

ChinaandVietnamhavedevelopedwhatseemtobequiterobustpoliticalstructures

withoutdevelopingrealdownwardaccountabilityorrule-of-law,buildingon

millennium-longstatetraditionswherenoneoftheseprinciplesexisted.Thismaybe

469

muchmoredifficultinasocietylikeCuba,withitsEuropean-inspiredcultureandstate

tradition.

Continuedauthoritarianismvs.moreeconomicandpoliticalpluralismwithactivepolitical

participation:

Theproblemsofcentralisation,verticalismandopacityhaslongbeenrecognisedby

Cubanintellectuals,andevenattimesreflectedintheofficialmedia.ThedailyJuventud

Rebeldeinanarticlefrom2011identifiedexcessivecentralisation,verticalism,state

regulationandprohibitionsthatreducedinitiativebystatecompaniesandlocal

authorities,asthemain‘plagues’infrontofthereformprocess.533Thesecharacteristics

maybesaidtorepresentthesourceofthecontinuedauthoritarianismthatdefinesthe

Cubanpoliticalsystem,eveninitspresentpost-totalitarianphase.Thiscontinuesto

workagainstreformsinfavourofasignificantstrengtheningofthenon-statesectorand

notleastmorepoliticalpluralism.Bottom-uppoliticalparticipation,independentof

partyandstatedictate,asinequanonforrealdemocracy,isbeingeffectivelyblockedby

thisomnipresentauthoritarianism.

Continuedmarketillegalityvs.legalandwell-regulatedbusinesspractices:

Thereseemstobeamoreandmoredirectlinkbetween—ononeside—stateeffortsto

limitthemarketeconomysuchasbanningcertaincommercialpractices,withdrawingor

freezingself-employmentlicenses,introducingmaximumprices,oringeneral

presentinganykindofdifficultiesforprivatebusinesses,and—ontheotherside—

continuedmarketillegality.Whenlicenseswerewithdrawnfromcarretilleros(ambulant

streetvendorsofbasicfood)infirst-half2016,theybyandlargecontinuedtheir

businesswithoutstatepermission,butnowbeingpushedunderground,therebyjoining

thelargerpartofstreetcommercealreadybeingexercisedininformalorillegalways.

Theeffectisthereforeafurtherunderminingofthepossibilitytoestablishbetter-

regulatedbusinesspractices,andthede-stimulationofwhatwehavecalled

Schumpeterianordevelopment-orientedcapitalism.Oneisleftwiththeimpressionthat

thestrengtheningofpositiveaspectsofcapitalismormarketeconomyisnotreally 533JuventudRebelde,11.09.11.

470

wanted.ThesituationresembleswhatKornai1992:450;455)observedintheUSSR:

“(A)lthoughoneofthebureaucracy´smentalcompartmentsisawarethatitneedsthe

privatesector,anothercompartmentofthesamemindnursesasmolderingdistasteand

hatredforprivateownershipandindividualactivity.”

Kornaigoesontospeakaboutaviciouscircle:

“[P]rivatesectorunderreformsocialism[…]oftenshows[…]theworst,notthebestsideof

capitalism.Thatheightenstheantipathytowardthem,whichisastimulusandargumentfor

thebureaucracytobeevenmorehostiletowardthem[…]resultinginabittercoexistence.”

Maintainingthegapbetweenlarge-scalestateandjointventuresvs.small-scalesurvival

businesses,ratherthanstimulatingthelattertogrowintomorerobustcompanies:

Thelatterpointalsohastheconsequenceofhamperingtheemergenceofmorerobust

mediumenterprisesthatmightevenhavehadthepotentialofgrowingintolargernon-

stateenterprises.Theprincipleofnotallowingcapitalaccumulation(statedatthe6th

PartyCongressin2011andre-enforcedatthe7thCongressin2016byoutlawing

‘wealth’ingeneral)hasthesameeffect.Asmentionedearlier,thefinalversionofthe

‘EconomicandSocialDevelopmentPlan’approvedinmid-2017representedacertain

flexibilisationofthisposition,asdidtheapprovalinprincipaloftheopportunityto

establishprivatecompanies(ref.Indicator4.5).Butnolegalisationofthisisexpectedin

theimmediatefuture,534thusobligingtheinformalcompaniesthatdefactoexistto

continuetheirlargelyillicitpractices.

Eliteenrichmentandincreasedinequalityvs.entrepreneurial-drivengrowthwithina

regulatoryframeworkgearedtowardsequitabledistributionandsocialsecurity:

Normally,moremarketeconomywouldbeexpectedtoleadtomoreinequality.Weare

alreadyseeingthishappeninginCuba,withthecarefulreformsthathavebeen

implemented.Considerablesocialdifferentiationhasemergedinaformerlyvery

egalitariansociety,althoughwecannotreallysofarspeakabouteliteenrichmentinany 534”Itwillnotbepassedanytimesoon”,accordingtoOmarEverlenyPérez(TheEconomist,30.09.17:”CluelessonCuba´seconomy”).

471

waycomparableforinstancetootherLatinAmericansocieties,ortotheRussiathatwas

builtontheruinsoftheformercommunistUSSR.Adeepeningofeconomicreforms

wouldbeexpectedtoleadtomoreprivateenrichmentandfurtherincreaseinsocial

differences.However,aswehaveshowedunderIndicator9.4,thismaybeavoidedif

organisedwithinastrongregulatoryframeworkliketheonepracticedinScandinavian

countries,orinLatinAmericancountrieslikeCostaRicaandUruguay.Wehavethere

arguedthatimportantaspectsofsuchamodelmightbeviableinCuba,allowingfora

relativelyequitabledistributionofresourcesandmakingitpossibletosavethesocial

securitybuiltbytherevolutionbutnowincreasinglyunderthreatfromadysfunctional

economy(ref.Chapter12,Scenarios).Wehavealsoarguedthatonewaytoobtainthis

mightbewithinanalternativevisionofpoliticisingdemocracy,perhapsbuiltonrecent

experiencesfromsomeLatinAmericancountries,althoughitmaybedifficulttoseehow

suchexperiencesmaybeappliedtoapost-totalitarianregime.

Ontheotherhand,whatwemayenvisageastheconsequenceofanalternativealongthe

lineoftheneo-patrimonialscenario,beitofa‘socialist’or‘oligarchic’variant,is

preciselyadrasticeliteenrichmentanddramaticallyincreasingsocialdifferences.535

Non-curabledemocraticbirthdefects?

Inthetheorychapter,wediscussedvariousfactorsworkingagainsttheintroductionof

democracyinCuba,undertheconcept(borrowedfromFukuyama)of‘democraticbirth

defects’.

WestatedthattheauthoritarianandilliberalcharacterofCubanpoliticalinstitutionsgo

backtothecolonialandpost-colonialslavery-plantationeconomy.Sugar,ofcourse,was

ahindrancefortheintroductionofastrongfamilyfarmstructure,andmuchofthenon-

sugaragriculturewasalsoorientedtowardsexport.Thesugarplantationsoriginally

dependedonslavery.Evenafterslaveryhadbeenlegallyabandoned,theseason-based

workinthesectorcontinuedtosufferfromacontinuationoftheslaveryculture.The

economicelitesdominatingCubansocietyhadalsodefactocontrolofthepolitical

system,carryingoverthecolonialtraditionintothesemi-independentPlattAmendment 535Ref.Bechle(2010),discussingtheuseoftheconceptneo-patrimonialinaLatinAmericancontext.

472

era,witharelativelyweakbutverycentralisedandauthoritarianstate,withoutrealtax-

raisingcapacity(thislatteraspectbeingquitedifferentfromEastAsiancountrieslike

ChinaandVietnam).ThePlattAmendmentinitselfwasofcoursealsoastraightjacketon

internaldemocraticdevelopment,dependentonUShegemony.Itshouldbekeptin

mind,though,thatthe1940Constitutionrepresentedaquitesignificantopeningfor

formalliberal-democraticinstitutionsandprocesses,unfortunatelyabortedbyexcessive

corruptionandpowerabuse.

WiththeendofCuba´ssugareconomyinthepost-Sovietperiod,andintheabsenceof

otherextractivesectorsofgreatsignificancetotheeconomy(apartfromnickel,atleast

aslongasnocommercialoffshoreoilproductionisestablished),Cubaismuchless

export-dependentthanitusedtobe,andlesssothanotherLatinAmericancountries.In

2016,onlyabout30%oftherevenuewasreportedtodependontheexportofbasic

products536.Thismayactuallyimplysomesignificantstructuraldemocraticadvantages

comparedtomostotherLatinAmericancountries.Inthissituation,theopportunityis

reallytheretostimulatesmallandmedium-sizeentrepreneurshipandcooperative

productionstructuresworkingforthedomesticmarket,soastocreatemoreinternal

economiclinkageswithpotentialformoreegalitarianandparticipatorypolitical

processes.Thisopportunity,itseems,isnottakenbythepresentpoliticalleadership—

probablyoutoffearexactlyforthebroaderpoliticalcompetitionandtherebymore

democraticstructuresitcouldhaveledto.Rather,thereseemstobemoreinterestin

strengtheningstatemonopoliesworkingwithforeigninvestorsinthedynamicpartsof

theeconomy,primarilyintourismandperhapslaterinanewefforttoindustrialise

agricultureandonceagainturnittowardsexport(e.g.rehabilitationofthesugar

industryforproductionofbio-energy).Realdemocratisation—economicaswellas

political—itseems,isseenmoreasathreattomonopolypartycontrolthanasan

opportunityforthepeopletobecomemastersoftheirowndestiny—somethingthatat

leastintheorycouldbeseenasacrucialsocialistobjective.

536AfigurecitedbyleadingCubaneconomistJuanTriana,posted11.07.2016:http://oncubamagazine.com/columns/the-situation-and-development-in-cuba/

473

Thetraditionalliberaltransitionparadigms,representedbyLinzandStepan,Fukuyama

andseveralothers,donotrepresentaverylikelyoutlookforCuba,leastofallintoday´s

neo-authoritarianworldofliberalretreat.

Itisimportanttoremember,however,thatfarfromeverythingisnegativewhen

comparingtheprospectsforliberaldemocracyinCubatoothercountries.Thomas

Carothers(2007),aleadingscholarondemocratictransitions,emphasizesstrengthened

statecapacityasakeyelementforsuccessfulpost-authoritariantransition.Amongthe

mostprominentfactorshepointsoutashamperingdemocraticsuccess,fewarereally

presentinCuba(suchashighlyconcentratedextractiveresources,identity-based

divisions—ethnic,religious,tribal—orbelongingtoanon-democraticregionof

neighbouringcountries).

Fukuyama(2013:15)saidthefollowingaboutdemocraticshortcomingsinLatin

America:

“DemocracyhasbecomedeeplyentrenchedinmostofLatinAmericaoverthepast

generation;whatislackingnowincountrieslikeBrazil,ColombiaandMexicoisthecapacity

todeliverbasicpublicgoodslikeeducation,infrastructure,andcitizensecurity.”

Accordingtomostofthesecriteria,Cubaisactuallyinacomparativelygoodposition

whenitcomestothepotentialfordemocraticdevelopment.

11.3: The supposed incoherence of partial reform

ThedemiseoftheUSSRanditsEasternEuropeanclientregimes,seenupagainstthe

survivaloftheChineseandtheVietnameseregimes,areinevitablereferencecasesfor

Cuba.Manyfactorshavebeenbroughtintoexplainthesedifferentoutcomesof

Communistexperiences.Nationalismisonefrequentlycitedcause:inthecaseofChina

itsmillennium-longcultural,economicandevenpoliticalglobalsupremacythatwas

onlybrokenbytheWestduringatrifleof100-oddyears,somethingthatitbecamea

commongoalfortheentirenationtorebuild;inthecaseofVietnam,therevengeofthe

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nationalhumiliationthroughwestern-ledimperialisticwars.Thenationalistandanti-

imperialistsentimentsoftheCubanrevolutionisquitesimilar,andprobablyplayeda

decisiveroleinthewayFidelCastro´scharismaticleadershipsucceededinbringingthe

Cubanregimethroughthehardshipsofthe1990s.

TheUSSRcollapsescenariohasofcoursebeenperceivedasanexistentialthreatbythe

Cubanleadership.TotransfertheSovietexperiencetoCuba,though,ismeaningless;the

veryfactthatCubasurvivedthefallofRussianandEasternEuropeanCommunisminthe

1990ssaysenoughaboutthat.Butsomefactorsmustbemorecarefullywatchednow,

e.g.assummarisedbytheBritishhistorianArchieBrown(2009:586-602):economic

failure,increasedaccesstodiversifiedinformation,theeasingoftravelrestrictions,the

increasinglycriticalattitudeofintellectualsandacademicswithintheparty,thecoming

topowerofanewpartyleader(oranewgenerationofleaders).Regardingthelatter

aspect,BrownemphasiseshowimpossibleitwastoforecasttheevolutionofMr

Gorbachev´sthinkingwhenhewaselectedtothetopposition:“Noonewhothoughtas

Gorbachevdidin1988,nottospeakof1990-91,couldhavebecomegeneralsecretaryin

1985unlesshehadbeenanactorofOscar-winningtalentswhokeptallhisrealopinionsto

himself”(ibid:596).

WhereasMrGorbachev´sreformattemptintheUSSRimpliedbothperestroika,

restructuringoftheeconomy,andglasnost,politicaltransparency,therehassofarbeen

noexplicitmessageaboutglasnostinCuba.ThereisoneparallelinthesensethatRaúl

Castroalsolaunchedaseriouscampaignagainstcorruption.Butthemainproblemwith

thiscampaign,leadingCubanintellectualsargue,ispreciselythatitisnotaccompanied

bypoliciestopromotetransparencyandpublicaccountability;thatthesystem

continuestobe“opaquetoknowledgeandcitizencontrolof(investment)contracts,the

tenderprocessesandtheawardingofcontractsforinvestmentprojects”(Alonsoand

Vidal2013).537Aswehavenoted,therehavebeenclearsignsofincreasingpublicdebate

inCuba.TherehasevidentlybeenatoughbattleinthePartyaboutsomebasicpolitical

issueslikeaccumulationofwealthandtheroleofprivateentrepreneurs.Noneofthe

leaders,includingtheyoungergeneration,havebeenshowingtheircardsinthisdebate.

537Thequoteistakenfromtheintroductorychapterofthebook,reproducedbyEspacioLaical,Havana,July2013.

475

ItremainstobeseenwhetherPresidentDíaz-Canelandhisyoungercolleagueswilldare

tobemoreopen-mindedabouttheirforward-lookingthinkingduringthecritical

juncture.TheirbesthopeisprobablythatRaúlwillpermitagradualopeningwhileheis

stillinchargeoftheParty(until2021),withoutwhichthechallengeofmanaging

internaldebateandfactionsmaybetoomuchfortheyoungerGovernmentleaders.

Oneissuediscussedatlengthinthisdissertationiswhatcomesfirst:economicor

politicaltransformation(ref.thevariousroadmapslaidoutbasedonFigure2.1).While

thecharacteroftheCubanreformprocessupto2016hadmoreemphasisoneconomic

reformsthatcouldbeexpectedtospillovertothepoliticalrealmofsociety,thequestion

iswhethertheCommunistParty´sefforttoturntheclockbackmayundermineitsown

ideologicalrealismandpowerposition,thusreleasingpoliticaltransformationswith

effectontheeconomy—justasKornaiobservedintheUSSRandEasternEurope.

OurhypothesishereisthattheCubanreformprocesshasbeenmostlyaboutsurvival

withoutdevelopment,dictatedbythefearofgivingtheprivatesectorastrategic

economicroleasaplatformforchallengingthemonolithicpoliticalpowerstructure.But

thequestioniswhethertheregime—anditssocialconquests—maysurvivepost-Castro

withoutamorecomprehensivemarketeconomy.AswehaveseenwithKornai’sand

Brown’sanalysisofthelatestyearsoftheUSSR:reformprocessesinaCommunist

systemtendtoreleasepoliticalforces,provokedbytheincoherenceandcontradictions

ofpartialreform,thatintheendbecometoooverwhelmingfortheParty’smonopoly

power,thusunderminingtheentiresystem.So,onthequestionofdeeperandmore

rapidreforms,youaredamnedifyoudoandyouaredamnedifyoudon´t.

InChinaandVietnam,ontheotherhand,therehasbeenextremelysuccessfuleconomic

developmentandsocialimprovementsasresultoffar-reachingmarketreformsthatmay

explainwhythepoliticalregimeshavesurvived(ref.theconceptpragmaticacceptance).

WhathappenedinChinafromMaotoDengisaveryinterestingcaseforcomparison.

DengandtheCommunistPartyunderhisdominancerecognisedthattheirlegitimacy

restedoncontinuingstrongperformance,andtheywere“nottappedbyideologyorpast

practiceinmakingdramaticandrapidcoursecorrections”(Fukuyama,2014:378).So,if

476

FidelCastrointhissensewasCuba´sMaoZedong,RaúlCastromayfromtheoutsetof

thereformshavebeenseenasCuba´sversionofDengXiaoping—aslongashewasable

topursuethereformprocess.WillDíaz-Canelrevivethereformsthatwereaborted

beforeRaúlcouldfullyimplementthem?

InVietnam,DoiMoibecamearesoundingmacro-economicsuccess,bycreatingaprivate

sectorcapableofmassivelyabsorbingthoselaidoffintheshrinkingstatesector.Justas

DengXiaopinghadestablishedthecredo“letsomepeoplegetrichfirst”538,the

VietnameseCPin2006decidedtoremovetheclausethatpartymembers“couldnot

exploit”,i.e.thattheywereallowedtorunprivatebusinessandhireworkersand

practicecapitalaccumulation.Thiswasrightlyseenasaprerequisiteforprivate

investments,andthe2006decisionrepresentedthecrossingofavitalideologicalline.

Butitwasprobablylittlemorethanbringingthepartyinlinewithawell-established

practice.Theseturn-aroundsinChinaandVietnamstandinstarkcontrasttowhatCuba

hasdonesofar.

TheVietnameseCommunistParty,accordingtodeVylderandFforde(1996)actedin

responsetotheincreasingcommercialroleofmilitaryenterprises,andforfearof

massiveurbanunemploymentasnon-viablestateenterpriseshadtoclose,spurringa

potentialforsocialtensionanddisorder.

BoththesefactorsmaybesaidtobepresentinCuba,theformerrepresentedbythe

increasingstrengthofthemilitarycorporationslookingforstrategicalliancesandjoint

ventureswithforeigncapital–anambitionnowseriouslycomplicatedbythenewUS

policyunderPresidentTrump.539Thegrowinggulfinproductivitybetweentheseand

themajorityofunproductivestateenterprisesisquiteremarkable.

Aswehaveshown,thereisnotyetanysignthatthesuccessfulmarketeconomiesare

leadingtopoliticalliberalisationinChinaorinVietnam.Thissignalisobviouslywell

noticedbytheCubanleaders,butthereisstilldeepmistrustaboutthepossibilityof 538"Nanxun"(SouthernTour)of1992.QuotedinTheEconomist(31May2001).Dengiscommonlyquotedassaying«Togetrichisglorious»,butthereisnoproofthatheactuallysaidthis.539Accordingtowell-informedsources,thereseemstobeadebateinCuba(early2018)aboutthetransferoftheleadingmilitarycorporationGAESAtocivilianpoliticalcontrol.Itisnotknownwhichformapossiblere-organizationwouldtake.

477

avoidingregimebreakdownifthesamedegreeofmarketreformsweretobeintroduced

inCuba.ThemainargumenthasbeenCuba´sgeographicalpositionintheclose

neighbourhoodoftheUS.Anotherconcernmaybethathistoricandculturalconditions

inCubawouldnotrepresentthesamevaccineagainstdemandsfortheendtoone-party

ruleasthecollectiveandstate-basedtraditionsofitsEastAsiansocialistfriends.

Saxonberg(2013)observesanevolutionforCubainhisdiscussionofCommunistand

post-Communistregimestypes:totalitarianinthe1960s(alongwiththeentire

communistworld);earlypost-totalitarianwithpatrimonialtendenciesinthe1970s;540a

certainrelaxationofpost-totalitarianisminthe1980swithalimitedopeningforreform

debatewithintheboundsofofficialideology;andfreezingpost-totalitarian(stillwith

patrimonialtendencies)inthe1990s,partlyasareactiontoGorbachev´sreformsand

thefalloftheUSSR:reformdebateswerestopped,peasantmarketsandself-

employmentwerefirstreluctantlyallowedassurvivalmechanismsinfaceofa

desperateeconomicsituation(períodoespecial),butrapidlystrangledwhentheystarted

tochallengetheoldorder.541Saxonbergfailstoconcludeclearlywhetherornotthe

changesorchestratedbyRaúlCastro—withacomebackforsimilarreformsyetthistime

intendedtohaveamorestrategiccharacter—takesCubatohisnextcategory,the

maturingpost-totalitarianstage,astageheclaimstobetypicalforUSSRunder

GorbachevandevenforChinaandVietnamintheculturalandeconomicspheres

startinginthe1990s.Thislatterregimetypecould,accordingtoSaxonberg,leadto

threepossibleoutcomes:anegotiatedchange(asforinstanceinHungaryorPoland),

retentionofpower(asinChina),orasemi-revolution“whenfreezingbeginsagain”(as

intheUSSR).Thelattermaytoacertainextentbesaidtohaveoccurredafter2016

(whatwehavecalled‘counter-reform’),buttherearenosignsofthisleadingtoany

‘semi-revolution’likeUSSRunderGorbachev.Thequestionishowmeaningful

Saxonberg’sdiscussionhereis.

Probablyadecisiveelementhere,asseenveryclearlyinthecaseofVietnam´sversionof

maturingpost-totalitarianism,istheestablishmentofnewbusinessenterpriseswitha 540Saxonbergusestheconcept‘patrimonial’ratherthanLinzandStepan´slessculturallyappropriateconcept‘sultanist’.541RaúlCastroisrecentlyreportedtohaveexpressed,inafrankconversationwithaprominentEuropeanpolitician,thatitwasaseriouserrornottohaveconsolidatedandstrengthenedthesereformsinthe1990sratherthangivingthemup,untiltheywerere-launched15-20yearslater.

478

blurredlinebetweenpublicandprivatepropertyandmanagement,evenamendingthe

constitutionsothatprivateenterprisesobtainthesamelegalrightsasstate-run

enterprises(ref.the‘socialistneo-patrimonialist’or‘authoritarianmarketeconomy’

scenarioinChapter12).Foreigndirectinvestmentwasplayingaprominentroleinthe

industrialdevelopmentpermittedbytheVietnamesemarketresurrection,leadingto

rapideconomicgrowthwithpositiveimpactandsocialimprovements,“encouragingthe

populationtopragmaticallyacceptcontinuedone-partyruleasawaytoguarantee

economicstability”(Saxonberg:96).Aswehavepointedout,thissituationisstillabsent

inCuba.Totheextentitmanifestsitselfintheyearstocome,itwouldbeastrong

drivingforcetowardsmaturingpost-totalitarianismintheeconomic(andperhaps

cultural)sphere.Thebigquestionofthisdissertationiswhetherthiswouldallowpower

toberetainedbythemonopolypartyinanauthoritarianmarketeconomylikeChinaor

VietnamorprovokeanegotiatedchangeasinEasternEuropeandtheUSSR.

AnothersignificantdifferencecomparedtoCuba—typicalformaturingpost-totalitarian

societieslikeVietnamandChina—isthatthereformsbeganfrombelow,“withlocal

agriculturalcollectivesexperimentingwithwaystoimproveproductionthroughgreater

freedomsforpeasantstocultivatetheirownproducts”(Saxonberg:98);experiments

thatwerelaterapprovedbythePartyleadershipleadingtoindustrialrenovationand

economicgrowth.WhileCubaisalsomoving,althoughslowly,towardsmorepeasant

autonomy,thereisreallynotrendthatthisisledfrombelow.Theagricultural

bureaucracymayoftenhavebeenmoreauthoritarianandanti-reformonlocallevels.

MarcFrank(2013:262)claims—basedonin-depthjournalisticstudiesoftheCuban

countrysideduringtwodecades—thatRaúlCastro´sreforms“werebeingsabotagedby

localpowerstructuresbuiltuparoundthestate´sagriculturalmonopoly”,outoffearfor

losingpositions,powerandprivileges(ref.Challenge1).Saxonberg(175-76)observes,

“thereformsinCubahavenotbeenfollowedbythetypeofdecentralisationseenin

China”.Heconcludes,“Cubanpeasantsdonothavethesameincentivestorevoltatthe

locallevel(inthehopeofgainingsupportfromthecentralgovernmentagainstlocal

officials)”.Onthispoint,heissurelyright.

AsimilartrendmightpresentitselfinCubaintheyearstocome,onceagainraisingthe

questionwhethermonolithicpoliticalpowermayberetainedasinthecasesofChina

479

andVietnam.Thebigchallengeforthesetwocountries,whichispresentlymuchmore

acuteforCuba,issummarisedasfollowsbySaxonberg(2013:103):

“Whatwillhappenifthecountryeventuallyfacesasharpeconomicdownturn,andthe

populationseeslittlereasontopragmaticallyacceptaMarxist-Leninistregimethatnolonger

believesinMarxism,andwhichonlykeepsthepartofLeninismthatrelatestoaone-party

dictatorship?”

Saxonbergputstheultimatechoicereferredtoaboveinstarkterms:willthemostlikely

optionthenbetoshootdissentersortoinitiatenegotiationswiththeoppositionover

institutionalchange?

Keepinginmindtheconceptofpragmaticacceptance,wemayconcludethatthefuture

sourceofauthorityorlegitimacywillbedecisiveforthechoicebetweenfreezingand

maturingpost-totalitarianisminCuba.Neo-patrimonialaspectswillarguablydelaythe

maturingprocess.Aworseningorlackofimprovementofsocio-economicconditions

maybeafactorgraduallymovingtheregimeinamaturingdirection,withaself-fulfilling

prophecythatmoremarketwillbenecessarytosavetheeconomy.

Withsocio-economiccrisis,littlepragmaticacceptanceandlittleexpectationforpolitical

reform,thereisofcourseadangerthattheregimetypemaybouncebacktofreezing

post-totalitarianism,wheretheregimemaymeetabeginningpopularrevoltwith

repression,whicheithermaypermittheregimetomaintainpower,negotiatea

transition,orbeobligedtostepdown.

Onefactortobearinmindhereisthatthefirstcarefulstepstowardsliberalisationthat

havebeentakenduringtheRaúlCastroera,mayincreaseexpectationsandpressureon

post-Castroleaderstoliberalizefurther.Theymaythusendupinasituationnotunlike

theoneGorbachevhadtocopewith,tryingtocombineperestroikawithglasnost,rather

thantheperestroikawithoutglasnostformulathatinawaydefinedRaúl’sreform

agenda:economicreformswithoutinstitutionalandpoliticalreforms.

480

Herearesomefurtherquestionsthatmayapplyinthesituationweareforeseeingin

Cubaintheyearstocome:

• Willtheroleofthemilitaryasthearguablystrongestinstitutioninthe

countrytiltCubatowardsamoreinstitutionalmilitary-corporate

patrimonialism?

• Ifnot,willaworseningorlackofimprovementoftheeconomybeafactor

movingtheregimeinamaturingdirection,withaself-fulfillingprophecythat

moremarketwillbenecessarytosavetheeconomy?

• Theroleofintellectualsandprofessionalswillbecrucialinsuchasituation:if

theydaretoengageinamoreopendebateaboutnon-Leninistalternatives,

bringinguptheparadigmaticdilemmasdiscussedabove,andevenmanageto

broadenthesocialspaceforsuchdiscussionsbybringinginthenew

economicactors(peasants,self-employed,smallentrepreneurs):maythis

movethesituationtowardsmaturityandopenupforregime-exceeding

options?

Aremarkfromahigh-levelpublicmedialeaderinmid-2016whenneweconomic

austeritymeasureswereannounced,clearlynotmeantforpublicknowledge,showsthe

degreeofnervousnessaboutthisprospect.Warningagainstarepetitionofthestreet

protestsofthe1994Maleconazo(ref.Indicator6.6),theonlyrealpublicrevoltever

occurringagainsttheCastroregimeinthemidstoftheSpecialPeriod,shewentonto

say:

"Gentlemen,thiscountrycannotstandanother93,another94,ifyoudonotwanttosee

streetprotestsandthereisnoFideltoappearontheMalecónoratleastuntilnowtherehas

beennofigureinthiscountrythatshowspeopletheirfaceinordertocalmtheirtempers"542

(S/E).

542DiariodeCuba,1.07.16,”Lasubdirectorade'Granma'alertadequeenCubasedanlascondicionesparaunestallidosocialenlascalles”(S/E).Theyoungjournalistinaprovincialpartynewspaper(Vanguardia,SantaClara)whopublishedthisspeechonhispersonalblogwasharshlycriticizedandfiredfromhisjob.

481

BothdilemmasoutlinedbyKornai(ideologicalanti-reformresistanceinthe

nomenclature,andtheincoherenceofpartialreform)areveryvisibleinCubatoday,and

theformerwasclearlystrengthenedatthe7thPartyCongress.Raúlhimselfhas

repeatedlycomplainedaboutthebureaucraticresistancetohisreformproposals,

leadinghimtoformulatethereformrecipe“sinprisaperosinpausa”;“withouthurrybut

withoutpause”—whatwehavecalledthewisdomoftheturtle.Afterthe7thCongress,

oneisalmosttemptedtoproposethattherecipewaschangedto“withouthurryand

withpause”.Howandwhenthisideologicalresistance,clearlyembracedbytheparty

intransigentsandatleastinitiallybythefirstpost-Castropresident,willbeovercome,

becomesacrucialquestionduringthecriticaljuncture.OnemayarguethatDíaz-Canel’s

bestopportunitytobuildanewlegitimacyliespreciselyinthebuildingofanalliance

withintellectuals,youthandtheneweconomicactors—whichmayevenenjoythe

supportofthecorporatesectionofthemilitary.

Kornaialsotalksaboutalossofself-confidencebythoseinpower,includingthe

bureaucracy.PerhapsthatisalsowhatwearenowobservinginCubacausedbya

constantlossofsocialhegemonyandsocio-economicstatus.Thisispossiblywhatis

compensatedforby‘bureaucraticarbitrariness’(caprichos),particularlyvis-à-visthe

self-employed.

Theriseoftheprivatesectoris,accordingtoKornai(op.cit)themostimportanttendency

intheeconomicsphereduringtheprocessofreform.Butitisanambivalentprocess,he

argues,accompaniedbyacountertendencytoobstructandrestrict.Manyofthese

trendsmaybeclearlyseeninthecaseofCuba,forinstanceinRaúlCastro’sreferencesto

bureaucraticresistancetoreform,orintheharassmentwehaveseentakingplace

againstself-employed.

JustasLinzandStepanspeaksaboutaninstitutionalizedeconomicsociety,Kornai

pointsoutthatthemarketrequiresaninfrastructureofinstitutionsthatishardtosetup

inreformsocialism,frequentlybeingbiasedbypublicandbureaucraticinstruments,

referringtowholesalers,commodityexchanges,warehousing,estateagents,investment

firmsandabroaddecentralisedfinancialsector.AllthisisakeyprobleminCuba,and

veryparticularlythelackofwholesaleinstitutionsbothforinputsandsales.

482

Kornaiemphasisesthecontradictionbetween“theprivatesectorandtheofficial

ideology”,orprivatepropertyvs.Marxism.TheCubanCommunistPartyhasconsistently

shownacontemptforwhatiscalledunearnedincomeandgettingrichwithoutworking,

particularlyunderFidelandprobablylesssounderRául(althoughthe7thParty

Congressre-enforcedthisresistance).Thereisaninterestingsimilarityheretotheway

Gorbachevexplainedhisperestroika—aconceptwhichsoonaftercametobeso

despisedbyFidelCastro—in1988beforelosingfaithinSoviet-stylesocialism:

“Thusperestrojkaineconomicrelationsiscalledforinordertounearththeopportunities

inherentinoursystem,inthevariousformsofsocialistownership.Butprivateownership,as

iswellknown,isthebasisofexploitationofmanbyman,andourrevolutionwas

accomplishedpreciselyinordertoliquidateit,inordertohandovereverythingto

ownershipofthepeople.Tryingtorestoreprivateownershipmeanstomovebackward,and

isadeeplymistakendecision”(Kornai1992:445).543

So,afterall,theuseofthetermlaactualizacióndelsocialismo,‘updatingofsocialism’in

Cuba,perestroikawithoutglasnost,maynotbesodifferentfromwhatGorbachevhadin

mindwhenhelaunchedhiseconomicreformsintheUSSR,beforetheyranoutof

control.

Thereis,however,stillarejectionofChineseandVietnamesebrandsofcapitalism.Cuba

isindeedaverygoodillustrationofwhatKornai(p.447)saysabout“reformsocialism

(being)incapableofputtingforwardaconsistentsystemofideasofthesubjectsof

privateproperty”.

11.4: Power, hegemony and legitimacy during the critical juncture

WehaveunderChallenge8discussedwhetherthemonopolypoweroftheCommunist

Partyinrealitymaybelooseningupthroughconstantlylosingsymbolicandpractical

relevanceinthe‘reallyexistingCubansociety’.ThelooseningupoftheCommunist

Party´spowermonopolyisoneofKornai´smaincriteriaforamorewide-reachingsocial

transformation.Wehaveshownsomeexamplesofhowthesocialstatusofparty

543KornaiisherequotingfromGorbachev´sspeechtothePresidiumoftheSupremeSovietoftheSovietUnion,reproducedinPravda,26.11.88.

483

membership—andalsothenumberofmembers—isclearlybeingreduced.Oneofthe

claims(e.g.byChaguacedaandGeoffrey,2015)isthatrealpowerisbeingtransferredto

GovernmentbodieslikethelegislativeStateCouncilandtheexecutiveCouncilof

Ministers.AswehaveshownunderChallenge7,however,theoverlapbetweenthetop

structuresofthesebodiesandthePolitburooftheCommunistPartyhasbeenalmost

complete.Morethanacessationofpowerquota,whatistakingplaceaccordingtothis

lineofthinkingisthereforeaconcentrationofpowerinthehandsofthedozentopparty

andgovernmentcadres(wehavereferredtothemas‘thetwelveapostles’)witha

limitednumberofadditionalindividuals,thatconstitutetherealpowerinCuba.What

maybetakingplaceasweenterthecriticaljuncture,however,isacertainreductionin

thisoverlap(ref.Table9.4,waitingtoseethesituationaftertheappointmentofthenew

CouncilofMinistersinJuly2018).

Otherobserverswillofcourseputmoreemphasisonthepowerofthearmedforces.

Again,aqualificationisneeded.Thetopmilitaryhierarchyispartoftheabove-

mentionedtopdozencadres.Butwehavealsoshownthatthemilitarypresenceintop

partyandstatebodiesisbeingreduced,andthatwehavesofarnotseenthattheold

generationofgeneralsinsuchpositionsisbeingsubstitutedbyyoungertopofficers.Itis

veryinterestingvis-à-vistheimminentchangeofguardsthatsofewyoungermilitary

officersarevisible,544whiletheprovincialleadersofthePartyrepresentperhapsthe

mostnumeroussourceofrecruitmentforthepost-CastroPartyleadership.

Furthermore,thereisanotherpartofthemilitaryinstitutionthatmayexertmore

influencethanevenmostoftheoldgeneralshangingonintheParty’sPolitburoandthe

CouncilofMinisters:themanagersofmilitary-controlledcorporations.Alongwiththem,

agroupoflineministersandtheirassociatesinthetopbureaucraticapparatusof

ministriesandotherstateinstitutions,maybeexercisingmorerealpowerintheirday-

to-daymanagementofcomplicatedtechnicalissues—particularlywhentheyconcernan

internationalmarketeconomicrealitywheretheoldguardpossessesverylimited

capabilities.545

544OneexceptionheremayofcoursebeCoronelAlejandroCastroEspín(Raúl’sson).545ThisrepresentsaclearchangefromthewayFidelCastrowasconductinghisleadershiprole,expectinganyministerorhigh-levelstateofficialtostandreadyatanymomenttotakehispersonalorders,followupandimplementhismoreorlesswhimsicalinitiatives.UnderRaúlCastro´smuchmoreinstitutionalized

484

IfweshalldrawonsomeofthehistoricparallelstothedissolutionoftheUSSR,ithas

beenemphasised(ref.Brown,op.cit)thathighlyeducatedandurbanfull-timeofficials

hadadisproportionatelylargepresenceintheparty,withaverystrongreformist

influence.Thevastmajorityofleadingspecialistsinthesocialsciences(academic

lawyers,economists,sociologists,politicalanalysts)werepartymembers,fromwhom

themostinfluentialideasforchange(economicandpolitical)emanated.Itshouldbe

pointedoutthattheregimetransformationintheUSSRwasatypicalcaseoftransition

broughtaboutfromabove,likeinHungary,asopposedtopressurefrombelowasthe

casewasinPoland,partlyinEastGermany.

Cuba,withitsextremelycentralisticandverticalpowerandgovernmentstructures,will

withallprobabilityfollowtheSovietpatterninthissense.Itwillthereforebeofinterest

towatchsomeofthesamesociologicalcharacteristicsoftheemergingpowerholders.

TheelectionofanewCentralCommitteeatthe7thPartyCongressleavesnosignsof

integratingactiveacademicsfromoutsidethepowercirclesofthePartyandinthatway

givethemanextendedroleindecision-makingbodies.EveniftwoofthenewPolitburo

members(bothwomen)weredrawnfromacademicinstitutions,theirbackgroundis

moreadministrative—selectedthroughthePartyvettingsystemdescribedunder

Challenge7—meaningthattheywereprobablynotputinthispositioninorderto

channelcriticalacademicthinkingintotheleadingdecision-makingbody.Asimilarlack

ofopennesstoacademicinstitutionsseemstobecommonatprovinciallevel,withall

provinceshavinguniversitiesthatpotentiallycouldbeactivelyusedforexchangeof

creativeideasandproposalsofapoliticalandeconomicsystemthatreallyhasanurgent

needforrenovation.

ThenewPresidentMiguelDíaz-Canel,bornaftertheRevolution,civilian,willatleastfor

thefirstthreeyearsonlybepresidingovertheStatewhileRaúlandthehistóricosuntil

2021stayatthehelmofthe‘leadingforce’ofthecountry:theCommunistParty.Inthis

situation,onecouldimaginetheemergenceofsomekindof‘dualpower’.Fromthe

outset,however,Díaz-CanelwaspresentedbyhismentorRaúlCastroasapure

transitionalfigure,guaranteeingcontinuityandnotransformationoftheCubanpolity.

systemofgovernment,ministriesandstatebodiesareafterallleftwithcertainindependencewithintheirrespectivetechnicalareasofcompetence.

485

Hewillsoonbereminded,however,thatbusinessasusualisnomoreanoptionforCuba.

Long-delayedeconomicdecisions,startingwiththecurrencyunification,willobligehis

newgovernmentteamtoreviveRaúl´sunfinishedreformagenda.IfRaúlCastrowas

unabletoimplementmaneofhisannouncedmeasureshimself,hemaynowofferhis

successorthenecessarypoliticalbacking—withdefactocontrolofthePartyandthe

ArmedForces–thathehimselfwaslackingasthecountry’stopExecutive.Thatwill

probablybeDíaz-Canel’sonlysolidpowerbase—forlackofproperlegitimacy—during

thecriticaljuncture.Returntotheeconomicreformmodemayalsosetinmotionthe

politicaltransformationsthatwereheldbackduringthetenraulistayearsstudiedhere.

Politicalforceswithhegemonicimplicationsmaythusbereleasedandobligethenew

Presidenttobuildnon-traditionalalliancesbeyondtheCommunistParty,bringingin

newadvisorsthatmaybecomedecisiveonceRaúlandhisgenerationisdefinitelyoutof

thegame.

Brown(2009:594)saidaboutGorbachevthatheneededreform-mindedpeopleonestep

downinthepartyhierarchyinordertowintheideologicalbattlethatfollowed.He

added,however,that“onlychangeattheapexofthepoliticalhierarchycoulddetermine

whetherfreshandcriticalthinkingwouldremainamereintellectualdiversionor

whetheritwouldinfluencetherealworldofpolitics”.BrownclaimsthatGorbachevwas

alreadymuchmoreofareformerwhenhebecamepartyleaderthanthePolitburo

realized,butthathisintentionwastoreformtheexistingsystemandnotmake

transformativechange,untilthesystemstartedtofallapart.546

TheveryreferencetoGorbachevwouldbeapoliticalhara-kiriinCubatoday—heis

consideredtheultimatetraitorthatcausedtheUSSRtocollapse.Butitisinterestingto

notethatmanyfromthegenerationnowenteringthepowerstructuresinCuba,intheir

earlytomid-50s,werestudyingintheUSSR(andotherEastEuropeancountries)

around1990,observingatcloseholdbothperestroika,glasnostandtheentire

transformationstakingplace.Whetherthatwouldmakethemmoreorlesssympathetic

toreforms,andwhatkindofreform,isanybody´sguess.

546LikeDíaz-Canel,GorbachevwasthefirstleaderofhiscountrybornaftertheRevolution,aboutthesameage(mid-fifties)whenhetookoverfromover-agedveterans,deliveringthesamecontinuitydiscoursefromtheoutset.

486

Whatmaybeexpectedisthattheincreasingdiversificationofpoliticalpositions,andthe

quiteheateddebatesthatapparentlyhavetakenplace—andonlywithgreatdifficulties

couldbeconcluded—beforeandafterthe7thPartyCongress,mayeventuallyopenupfor

clearerpoliticalfactionsintheParty,possiblyalsopermittingthedebatestoextendinto

broaderacademiccircles.

Thistakesusrighttothedecisivequestionofhowthepost-Castrogenerationofleaders

willsolvethelegitimacychallengetheyaresoclearlyexposedto.

11.5: Emergence of counter-hegemony and the option of negotiated solutions.

AccordingtoBrown(op.cit.),whenthefreeflowofinformationbecameapoliticalreality

intheUSSRintheformofglasnost,itbecameadecisivefactor,alongwiththeeconomic

failure,inundoingCommunism.

Cubahasneverhadglasnost,buttheinformationmonopolyhasbeendefinitively

broken,mostlyduetotechnologicalfactsontheground.Youngpeople,evenparty

loyalists,havenoproblemtoseekalternativeinformationandviews,abouttheoutside

worldaswelltheirowncountry,includingabouttherootcausesoftheeconomicfailure.

Thiswillnecessarilyhaveconsequencesforthewaythenewgenerationofleaders

needstocommunicatewiththepopulation,andtakepublicopinionintoaccount,ifthey

wanttobuildanewcapitaloflegitimacy.

Inthisregard,weneedtorecapitulatethefactthatthetraditionalsocialcontract

betweentheCubanstateandpolity,anditscitizens,isfallingapartasaconsequenceof

theneweconomicrealitieswediscussedinChapter5.Aconstantlygrowingshareofthe

population,closetoonethird,isemployedoutsideofthestatesector,whilethemajority

formallyremainsaspublicemployees.Butthetwogroupsareincreasinglyintertwined

inanillicitsymbioticinterdependency:thenon-stateemployeesdependongoodsor

favoursobtainedfrompublicemployeesthroughembezzlementorgraft,andpublic

employeescanonlysurvivebyillegallysellingpublicgoodsandservicestotheprivate

sector—ordedicatingsignificantpartoftheirtimetoparallelnon-stateactivities.Either

487

groupistherefore,indifferentways,becominglessandlessdependentonapreviously

omnipresentandomnipotentstateandpartyapparatusfortheirsurvivalandlife

projection,atleastasfarasaformalandlegalrelationshipisconcerned.Particularlythe

youngsegmentsofthepopulationareseekingexit—literallyorvirtually—fromFather

StateandfromtheCommunistPartynomenclatureintheirprojectionofameaningful

future.Thesamehappenswiththenewmiddleclass.Thismayresultinaparadigmatic

changeofsocialcontractwithpotentiallytransformativeconsequencesfortheCuban

powerstructureandsociety.

Acrucialquestionisthereforewhatimpactthisfundamentallychangingsocial

architecturehasonpeople´sloyaltytothestate,andonthestate´spoweroverordinary

citizens,inshortthesocialcontractbetweenthestateanditscitizens.

Althoughthischangingsocialcontractwillleadtopoliticalpowerbeingincreasingly

questionedbythepopulation,thereissofarnosignofcounter-hegemonicforces

developing—asdiscussedinthetheorychapter—withinoroutsideofpartyandstate

structures.Still,weneedtobeontheoutlookforwhetherthelooming‘crisisof

legitimacy’inCubawillhaveanyresemblancewitha‘crisisofhegemony’,orof

‘authority’,inGramscianterms.IfandwhentheCubannomenclature,playingasimilar

roletothatofthebourgeoisieinacapitalistsociety,weretobeobligedtoallowthe

formsofhegemonytochange(typicallyinthewaytheNordicmodelwasconceivedin

the1930s,ref.TörnquistandHarris2016:41-50),theCubanpowerelitemighthaveto

lookforasimilaradaptationofitshegemonicblocinordertomeettheemerging

legitimacycrisis,atsomepointafterApril2018.

Onepossibleadaptationalternativecouldbetopermitalargerlegalspacefor

entrepreneurialactivitiesandthenon-stateeconomy(permittingSMEstoregisteras

legalentities,permittheestablishmentofwholesalemarkets,significantlyexpandthe

spaceandautonomyofthecooperativesector).Allthesemeasureswouldbein

accordancewithdecisionsalreadytakeninprincipleonRaúlCastro’swatch,butnever

implementedduetotheresistancecarryingthedayafterthecounter-reformsetinfrom

2016.Suchmeasurescouldevenbecomesystemicnecessitiesinasituationwhere

economicgrowthcontinuestobemarginalorevennegative,whileFDIstaysattheir

488

presentlowlevels,withaTrumpadministrationintheUSstoppinganyfurther

economicnormalisationorevenbacktrackingonwhateverwasachievedunderthe

Obamaadministration.Thenewrestrictionsonremittancestomilitary,partyandstate

employees(ref.Challenge3.2)couldpotentiallycontributetoafurthermodificationof

thecorrelationofeconomicforcesbetweenthestateandnon-statesectorsinCuba,and

furtheraggravatedifferencesandsolidifycontradictionsbetweenwinnersandlosersof

thereforms.

IfDíaz-Canelandhisnewregimereturntomoresystematicpro-marketeconomic

reform–probablywiththesupportofRaúlCastrowhowastheoriginalarchitectof

thesemeasures–itcouldlaythefoundationforgradualandperhapsnegotiatedchanges

alsointhecorrelationofpoliticalforces,whichispreciselywhatthePartyhardliners

havebeenworriedabout.Ifitisnotpermitted,socialtensionsmayincrease,witha

possibleneedtoapplymorerepressiontocontrolthesituation.

Whethersuchchangeinthecorrelationofeconomicforcesoccursornot,adeeporganic

crisisislooming,perhapstemptingnewsocialforcestostartbuildingacounter-

hegemonichistoricalbloc,leadingtowhatGramscicalled‘creatingthenew’whichin

Cubawouldbesomekindofpost-communism.

OneobvioussourceofchallengetotheexistinghegemonyoftheCubanpoliticalsystem

wouldcomefromastrengthenedallianceofcivilsocietyandautonomouslyorganised

non-stateeconomicactors.Ifbreakdownoflegitimacyisfollowedbytheorganisationof

counter-hegemony,collectiveprojectsforanalternativefuturemaystartemerging.So,

accordingtoPrzeworskiandbuildingontheGramscianconceptofhegemony,regime

transformationwillonlyentertheagendawhencivilsociety,includingnon-state

economicactors,managetoorganisea‘counter-hegemonicbloc’inasituationoffailing

regimelegitimacy.

Thishasobviouslynotyethappened,norarethereclearsignsthatitwilloccur.But

seriousproblemsoflegitimacyduringthecriticaljuncture—notablystrengthenedbya

deepeconomiccrisis—maybringaboutanewsituationinthissense.Thedetonating

forcemaybetheunavoidablescrappingofdualcurrency,whichmayonlybemitigated

489

throughcomprehensivemarketreformsandyetleadtodramaticsocialconsequences

(ref.Indicator3.6).

Thetraditionalarguments(ref.e.g.BarringtonMoore(1966)orRueschemeyeret.al.

(1992)thattheemergenceofstrongmiddleclasseswillproduceavitalpro-democratic

forcehassofarseemedtohavelittlerelevanceinCuba.However,itisnomore

unthinkablethattheemergentmiddle-classinCubamaydeveloppoliticalinterestsofits

own.Theremaybesomethingbrewinginthatrespect,andthismayactuallybecomea

game-changingprospectiftheabove-discussedchangeofeconomicandpolitical

correlationsoccursaspartofthecriticaljuncture.

LikeinVietnam(deVylderandFforde,op.cit.)thereformdriveinCubahassofarnot

beenexpectedtocomefromindependentinterestsmadeupbysocialclasses,butrather

fromanintra-eliteconflictwithinthestateapparatus.OnequestioninCubaiswhether

increasingpoliticalpluralism,perhapsalsofissureswithintherulingpowerapparatus,

maybeemergingevenwithoutformalreforms,andwhetherthiswillbeprovokinga

politicalcrisisatsomepointduringthecriticaljuncture.

Oneparticularaspecttowatchiswhathappenstothesystemofrepressionifandwhen

thejustificationoflimitedcivil-politicallibertiesbecomesseriouslythreatenedbythe

disappearanceofanexternalenemy(nowmostprobablyexpectedtohappenonlypost-

Trump;i.e.veryunlikelybefore2021).IfweonceagaingobacktotheUSSRsituation,

wesawhowtheendoftheColdWartensionsledtoaweakeningofthemilitary-security

apparatusandtherebyoftheanti-reforminfluenceofconservativeCommunists.The

warmingofrelationswiththeUSAduringtheObamapresidencyhadnosimilareffectin

Cuba:perhapstheSovietlessonhadbeenlearnt.

TheelectionofDonaldJ.TrumpasPresidentoftheUnitedStates,withhisintentionto

reversewhatwasachievedintermsofnormalisation,mightprovideanothershotinthe

armoftheCubananti-reformforcesand—ontheotherside—representadisincentive

forthosewhostillhavebelievedinthepossibilityofchange.PresidentTrumpmayend

uphandinganotheropportunityandlegitimacytothosewhoaretryingtostopreforms

inCuba,byonceagainembodyingtheimperialistghostamongordinaryCubans.

490

So,howcouldanegotiationscenarioemergeinCuba?

Negotiationscenarios

Inthetheorychapter,wepresentedsomeconsiderationsaboutnegotiationscenariosas

partofpost-totalitarianorpro-democracytransformation(LinzandStepan,

Przeworski,Whitehead).

NonegotiationscenarioisforthemomentonthetableinCuba.Forthattohappen,the

combinationofaregimesurvivalcrisis—andperhapstheprospectsofserious

repression—andtheemergenceofacounter-hegemonicalternativewouldberequired.

Onecanonlyspeculatewhetherandunderwhatcircumstancesthatwouldhappen,

particularlygiventhepossibilityofanotherIceAgeinrelationswiththeUS.

Atthispoint,wealsoneedtoreturntothediscussionofwhatcomesfirst:economicor

politicalchange.InCuba,thereisstillreasontobelievethatchangesandthereforealso

negotiationsintheeconomicarenawillcomefirst.Thatiswheretheprincipalregime

crisisistobefound,andwherethemajorityofthepopulationareexpectingreforms.So,

anegotiationscenarioinCubawillprobablyfirstoccurovereconomicissues;withmore

acceleratedeconomicreforms,spillingoverintotheemergenceofamorehorizontally

organisedandmoreinfluentialnon-statesector,whatwehavecalledaneconomic

society.Thisprospectisprobablythemainreasonwhythereissomuchresistance

againstanyideaorproposaltoconstitutehorizontalinterestorganisations.Atthat

point,economicandpoliticalissueswillbeblurred.

Onemayimagine,however,thatresistanceagainsteconomicreforms,andconsequently

anaggravatingeconomicandsocialcrisis,maycontinuetounderminethepolitical

legitimacytosuchanextentthatpoliticalprotestbecomesamajorissue,perhaps

accompaniedbyincreasingrepression.Ifthatweretooccur,wewouldbespeaking

aboutaquitedifferentnegotiationagenda.

491

SomeobservershaveexpressedworriesthataweakeningoftheCommunistPartymight

leadtoamoredisorganizedandchaotictransition:"Themostpredictablescenarioto

avoidchaoswouldbeanauthoritarianbureaucraticgovernment,formed,inthe

immediateterm,byRaúlCastro´strustedmilitarypersonnel"547(S/E).

Summingupthischapter,wehaveshownthatthehistoricallyrootedauthoritarianism

hasbeensquarelyconfirmedandevenstrengthenedwhenthepowerbrokersfelt

threatenedbytheinconsistenciesofpartialreform.Alldilemmasdiscussedremain

unresolved:thesocio-economiccrisisisworsethaneverandwill—withdisappearing

charismaticauthority—continuetounderminethelegitimacyofthepresentpower

structure.Whetherthiswillleadtohegemonicrivalrypromptingnegotiatedsolutionsor

settlementofconflictsbytheuseofmoredirectrepressionisthebigquestionforCuba’s

future.

547CarlosManuelRodríguezArechavaleta,CubanpoliticalscientistoftheUniversidadIberoamericana,Madrid,inadebate”Escenariosposiblesdelfuturocubano”,organizedbyFlacsoatCasadeAmérica,Madrid,June2016(”Cambios,Castro,Reformas:¿“NoCastronoproblem”,otravez?TransiciónenCubanocomenzaráhastamuertedeFidelCastro,segúnexpertosenMadrid”).EFE,Madrid,30.06.16(reprintedinCubaencuentro.com).

492

Chapter 12: Assessment of scenarios

“IhavesaidthatCubadoesnotneedtocopyneithertheChinesenortheVietnamese

model,whichdoesnotmeanthatwecannotlearnfromall:alsotheCostaRican,the

Chilean,theNorwegian,theSwedish,theCanadian,theBrazilian.”

(JuanTriana,Cubaneconomist)548.

WithCubaenteringitscriticaljuncture,afullgenerationalchangeofguardswill

graduallytakeplace—partlyforbiologicalreasons,partlybecauseofnewretirement

rules:

• ElectionofPresidentinApril2018,withoutanypreviouslyannounced

constitutionalandelectionlawreformsthatmighthaveallowedmore

pluralism.

• LargepartoftheCabinetandStateCouncilwillhavetobechangedand

rejuvenatedatthesametime,afterservingtwoterms(10years).

• ¾ofPolitburomemberswillhavetostepdownat2021PartyCongress.

• Thegenerationchangeisnotimmediatelyexpectedtoleadtosignificant

economicand/orpoliticalchange.Theoldhardlinershavebeentightening

thepowerevenharderduringthelasttwoyearsbeforethechangeof

presidents,byimposingtheirno-transformationviewsonthenewleaders.

• NorealsolutiontoCuba´sdeepeconomiccrisisisinsight.

• Cubaisheadingforadeepcrisisoflegitimacy;perhapsevenacrisisofpower

hegemony.

Asweareenteringthepost-Castroera,wefinditrelevanttodiscussdifferentscenarios

forCuba’sfuturedevelopment,againtakingtheexpectedcriticaljunctureasapointof

departure.Theliteratureoncriticaljunctureoftenfocusesonpoliticalagencyandchoice

548JuanTriana:”Cubanotienequecopiarningúnmodelo”:InterviewwithOnCuba,1.06.15.

493

asdeterminantsforselectingamongtheoptionsavailableatthetimeofthecritical

juncture.

Inthefollowing,weshallfirstreviewsomethoughtsaboutfuturescenariospresented

byotherauthors,beforeweconcludewithourown.Whendiscussingscenariosfor

Cuba’sfuturedevelopment,thecriticaljunctureisthepointofdeparture,andthe

tensionsbetweensocialstructureandindividual,morevoluntaristicagencyamongthe

futureleaderswillbeatstake.

12.1. Alternative economic scenarios

12.1.1 Ritter’s scenarios

TheCanadianeconomistandCubaexpertArchibaldRitterhasoutlinedfouralternative

optionsfor“Cuba´smixedeconomy”,mostlyplayingwiththepercentageofthe

workforceemployedindifferentcategoriesoftheeconomy(Ritter,2016).

Thefirstoptionheproposesis“institutionalstatusquo”comparedtothesituationin

2016.Ritter´sestimateoftheworkforcecompositionisreproducedinChapter5.

Hecallshissecondcategorya“mixedeconomywithintensified‘cooperativization’”.It

wouldimplypermittingcooperativesinallareas,includingprofessionalactivities;

openingupthecurrentapprovalprocesses;encouraginggrass-rootsbottom-up

ventures;providingimport&exportrights;andimprovingcreditandwholesaling

systemsforcoops.”HisspeculationisthatacooperativesectorinCubacouldemployas

muchas35%oftheworkforce(1.7millionworkers),vs.4.6%atpresent.Underthis

scenario,publicsectorproductionwouldbeall-buteliminated(reducedfrom33to3%),

publicsectoradministrationwouldfallfrom40to30%oftheworkforce,whileprivate

sector(indigenousplusforeign-owned)wouldrisefrom21to31%.

ThethirdofRitter´sscenariosiscalled“WideOpenForeignInvestmentApproach”,

involvingarapidsell-offofwhathecallsstateoligopolisticenterprisestofinancially

494

strongforeignbuyers(includingtheUSwhentheembargoisover).“Thisisastrong

possibilityifexistingstateoligopolies(e.g.,CIMEXandGaviota)weretobeprivatisedin

bigchunks.Thepolicyrequirementsforthisapproachtooccurwouldberapid

privatisationplusindiscriminatedirectforeigninvestmentandtakeoversbylarge

foreignfirms.”Underthisoption,foreign-ownedandjointventureemploymentwould

riseto28%,mostlyatthecostofpublicsectorproductionthatwouldfallfrom33to5%,

privateindigenoussectorwouldgrowfrom21to32%,whereasthecooperativesector

wouldstayconstant.

Ritterleavesoutavariantofthisoption,whichmaybeperhapsthemostlikelyoneto

occurinapost-Castroandpost-embargosituation:afusionofforeignanddomestic

oligopolies(thelatterrepresentedbymilitary-controlledcorporations).Itwouldseem

thatbothlarge-scaleforeigninvestorsandtheCubancorporationsmightseethatasa

viablesolutionofcommoninterest.

Thefourthoptioniswhathecalls“Pro-indigenousprivatesectorinamixedeconomy”.

“Thiswouldrequirean‘enablingenvironment’formicro,smallandmediumenterprisewith

areasonableandfairtaxregimen;anendtothediscriminationagainstdomesticCuban

enterprise;theestablishmentofunifiedandrealisticmonetaryandexchangeratesystems;

propertylawandcompanylaw;aliberalizationofmicro-,smallandmediumenterprise

wouldalsobenecessarytoreleasethecreativity,energyandintelligenceofCubancitizens.

Thiswouldinvolveopenandautomaticlicensingforprofessionalenterprises;anopeningup

forallareasforenterprise–notonlythe“201”;permissionforfirmstoexpandto50+

employeesinallareas;creationofwholesalemarketsforinputs;openaccesstoforeign

exchangeandimportedinputs;fulllegalizationof‘intermediaries’;andpermissionfor

advertising.”

Underthisoption,indigenousprivatesectoremploymentwouldbedominant,reaching

44%,alsointhiscaseatthecostofpublic-ownedproductiondrasticallyfallingfrom33

to3%,vs.asignificantbutfarfromdominant12%forFDIandjointventures,and7%

forcooperatives(aslightincrease).

Then,Ritteralsopresentshispersonalpreference,“’Indigenous’privatesectorplus

cooperativeapproach”,withalarge“indigenous”privatesector(30%ofemployment),a

495

significantcooperativesector(20%),alargepublicsectorprovidingpublicgoods

(35%),asmallsectorofgovernment-ownedenterprises(5%),andasignificantprivate

foreignandjointventuresector(10%).

IfonecouldthinkofahybridmixturewithmoreinspirationfromtheScandinavian

(particularlyNorwegian)experiences,onecouldstillmaintainasizeablepublic

enterprisesectionpartlyinjointventurewithforeigndirectinvestors,withindigenous

privateandcooperativesectorsmoreorlessonpar.

12.1.2. Feinberg’s three scenarios

Feinberg(2016)outlinesthreeoptions.ThefirstscenariohecallsInertiaandexit,with

thebasiccharacteristicsbeing“authoritarianresilience”,withcontinuedone-party

monopolyandbureaucraticcontrolandthepost-Castrogenerationofleadersbeingtoo

timidanddividedtomakesubstantialreform.Hepredictsthatthiswillleadto

continuedeconomicstagnationandpublicdisenchantment,andconsequentlylittle

enthusiasmamongtheyoungerCubans.

Feinberg’ssecondscenarioiscalledBotchedtransitionanddecay;mayinvolvemore

economicreformthaninthefirstscenariobutwithoutconsolidatinganewcoherent

system.Corruptionandorganisedcrimemayflourish.InternaldivisionsofthePCCmay

createpoliticalinstability.OutmigrationwillaccelerateinapatternreplicatingPuerto

RicoorCentralAmerica.Repressionmaybecomemorewidespread.

TheSoftlanding—sunny2030,needlesstosay,isFeinberg’soptimisticscenario.

AlthoughhenevermakesanyassociationwiththeScandinaviancountries,most

characteristicsofthisscenariobearthistrademark(whathecalls‘marketsocialism’):a

mixedprivate-publiceconomywithanimportantcooperativesectorandsolid

integrationintotheglobalmarket,highgrowthandprogressivetaxationthatsustains

universalandhigh-qualitypublicsocialservices,aprominentinvestmentroleforthe

Cubandiaspora,stronginstitutionswithrobustregulatorypowers.Heisveryopen-

mindedaboutthepoliticalsystemcharacteristics—apartfromgreaterpluralismanda

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moreopencivilsociety,perhapsabitnaivelyclaimingthateverythingfromVietnamto

CostaRicamaybecompatiblewiththesoft-landingscenario.

12.1.3. Monreal’s scenarios

CubaneconomistandsocialscientistPedroMonreal,workingwithUNESCOand

affiliatedwiththeCubaPosiblethink-tank,haspresentedhisscenariosthroughthe

followingfigure:

Figure12.1:TheMonrealscenariosFigure 6

Source:FigurepresentedbyCubaneconomistPedroMonreal(UNESCO),atUniversity

ofAlicante,Spain,”SeminarioNuevosescenariossobreCuba:SociedadyDerecho”,16-17

November2016.

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Monreal´sideaisbasedontwovariables:1.(Xaxis)levelofeconomicgrowthand

whetheritisinclusive(promotingequality)orexclusive;and2.(Yaxis)degreeofstate

prominenceintheregulationoftheeconomy.

Regardinggrowth(Xaxis),heisrepeatingtheconventionalwisdomamongCuban

economists(andindeedthePresidenthimself)thatgiventhedeepcrisisoftheCuban

economy,aGDPgrowthof5-7%willbetheminimumtoputCubaonacoursetoa

sustainableeconomy.Butonlygrowthisnotsufficient,accordingtoMonreal.Social

maldistributionforinstancemeasuredbytheGiniindexisnotofficiallyreportedin

Cuba,butestimates(referredtounderIndicator4.3)indicatedramaticallyincreasing

inequalities.549Sogrowth,inordertobemeaningfulaccordingtoMonreal,must

generatemeaningfuljobswithliveablewages,andalsobeusedtosafeguardthebasic

socialservicesoftheCubanrevolution.

Regardingtheroleofthestate(Yaxis),Monrealspeaksonlyabouttheregulatoryaspect,

notaboutstateproperty.Bothareprobablyimportantinordertomaintainapower

balance.Adrasticstateretreatfromtheeconomywouldevidentlyimplytheriskof

exclusiveratherthaninclusivegrowth.

Thepresentsituation(statusquo)ofverylowgrowth(orrecessionasindependent

economistshaveclaimedfor2016and2017)withincreasingsocialdifferences,hecalls

‘inertia’.Tocontinueinthiscornerofhisfigureistheleastsustainableofallscenarios.

WhathecallsRoute1,achievinginclusivegrowthwiththepresentlevelofstate

regulationbringingthecountrytowards‘prosperoussocialism’,maybepreferableto

thegovernment.ButneitherMonrealnoranyseriouseconomicproposalsIhavecome

acrosssaysanythingabouthowitmaybeachieved.

Route2bringsthecountrytowardshighinclusivegrowththroughapartialstateretreat

(andthusanincreasingmarketeconomy),supposedlyarrivingata‘welfarestate’.This

wouldprobablycorrespondtothesecondofRitter´soptions,orevenhis‘preferred’

549ReferbothestimatesofGiniindexvariations,andalsothedramaticallyincreasedsocio-economicdifferentiationquotedbyMesaLago,underIndicator4.3.

498

hybridsolution“indigenous’privatesectorpluscooperativeapproach”(although

Monrealdoesnotspeaksomuchabouttheroleofcooperatives).

Monreal´sRoute3isnotreallycleartome:itimpliesthemaintenanceofhighinclusive

growth,butre-introducingastrongstateafterfirsthavingexperiencedstateretreat.Itis

difficulttoenvisionhowthiswouldcomeabout,butthenhebringsthecountrybackto

the‘preferredprosperoussocialism’.

12.2. Alternative political scenarios

12.2.1. Saxonberg on Transitions from Communism

Saxonberg(op.cit.)hasspeltoutthreetransitionoptionsforacountryfindingitselfin

whathecalls‘maturingpost-totalitarianism’,whereCubaoftodayfitsclearlyinasa

typicalcase.MakingasomewhatpragmaticinterpretationofSaxonberg,wemayforesee

thefollowingscenariosastheoutcomeofthecriticaljunctureinthecaseofCuba:

• Maturingpost-totalitarianismwithexpectationforpoliticalreformand

willingnesstoopenadialoguebeyondtheCommunistPartyforitsgradual

retreatfrompowermonopoly(includingmorepluralisticelectionsand

increasingrespectforcivic-politicalrights):ThisisnotyetontheagendainCuba.

• Maturingpost-totalitarianismwithoutexpectationforpoliticalreformand

retreattofreezingpost-totalitarianismwithoutpragmaticacceptance,wherea

revolt-and-repressionspiralmayappearasareality.Developmentssince2016

haveobvioussimilaritiestowhathecallsa‘freezing’stage.Ifthiswereto

continuethroughthecriticaljuncture,withnosolutiontothedeeplegitimacy

crisis,wecannotruleoutthatamoreviolentsituationmayemerge.

• Maturingpost-totalitarianismwiththeintroductionofsuccessfulmarket

reforms,normalisationofthesituationwiththeUS,beginningsocio-economic

improvementsbutnoexpectationforpoliticalreform.Thismightamounttoa

variantofwhatwehavecalledsocialistneo-patrimonialism,alternatively

authoritarianmarketeconomy.

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12.2.2. Transformation to liberal democracy

Underthisheading,wehavediscussedthemoretraditionaltransitiontheories,

representedbyLinzandStepan,Fukuyamaandseveralothers.Wehavesofar

concludedthatthisisnotaverylikelyoutlookforCuba,leastofallintoday´sneo-

authoritarianworldofliberalretreat.

Itshouldbekeptinmind,however,thatfarfromeverythingisnegativewhencomparing

theprospectsforliberaldemocracyinCubatoothercountries.ThomasCarothers

(2007),aleadingscholarondemocratictransitions,emphasizesstrengthenedstate

capacityasakeyelementforsuccessfulpost-authoritariantransition.Amongthemost

importantfactorshepointsoutashamperingdemocraticsuccess,fewarereallypresent

inCuba(suchashighlyconcentratedextractiveresources,identity-baseddivisions—

ethnic,religious,tribal—orbelongingtoanon-democraticregionofneighbouring

countries.

Fukuyama(2013:15)saysthefollowingaboutdemocraticshortcomingsinLatin

America:“DemocracyhasbecomedeeplyentrenchedinmostofLatinAmericaoverthe

pastgeneration;whatislackingnowincountrieslikeBrazil,Colombia,andMexicoisthe

capacitytodeliverbasicpublicgoodslikeeducation,infrastructure,andcitizen

security.”Accordingtomostofthesecriteria,Cubaisinacomparativelygoodposition.

12.2.3. A Mexican “PRI-like” scenario?

SomeauthorshavebeenhintingthattheMexican‘InstitutionalizedRevolution’andits

hegemonicpartyPRI,whichheldpoweruninterruptedlyinthecountryfor71years

from1929to2000andcamebackinpowerfrom2012,couldalsobeadesirablemodel

forCubancontinuity.Infact,thescenarioproposedbyMiamiUniversityProfessorJosé

Azel550basicallyfollowsthelogicofonethescenariosproposedlaterinthischapter,

whatweshallcall‘oligarchicneo-patrimonialism’:

550JoséAzel:”El‘PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional’cubano”,PublishedinAsceNewsclippingsNo.683,19.11.2015.

500

“NobelPrizeLaureateMarioVargasLlosacataloguedtheMexicangovernmentunderPRIas

‘theperfectdictatorship’.ACubanversionmightbeonitsway.Inapreviouswork(“Cuba

despuésdelosCastro:elEscenarioProbable”),551IanticipatedmyanalysisofhowtheCuban

communismwouldevolve,leavingitsdeathwaketomilitariesaschangeagents.Idescribed

afraudulenteconomicscenariowherethegeneralswouldtransformthemselvestothenew

‘industrialcaptains’,orchestratingcorruptprivatizationsofstatecompanies,verysimilarto

theprivatizationarrangementsinRussiainthenineties.Thatscenariorequiresthegenerals

tointroducetheillusionofpoliticalchangeinordertogivethenewregimeafacadeof

legitimacyforthebenefitoftheinternationalinvestorcommunity.ThisishowaCuban

systemofhegemonicpartybegins.

Inaregimebasedonahegemonicparty,authoritydoesnotrelyonrevolutionaryhistoryor

personalcharisma-ashasbeenthecaseinCuba-butontheinstitutionalizationofapolitical

partydesignedtomaintainpowerinperpetuity.TheCubanversionwillbeunderthecontrol

ofthemilitary.AhegemonicpartysystemwilldifferfromthecurrentCubanLeninistmodel

inwhichacondimentofopposingpoliticalpartieswouldbetolerated.Theopposition,of

course,wouldhavenochanceofattainingpower,butwouldestablishthefalseimageofa

totalitarianstateintransitiontodemocracy”(S/E).

12.3. Scenarios for an authoritarian market economy

12.3.0. Overview and common denominators

Whatfollowsistheauthor’spresentationofmostlikelyscenariosforaCubamovinginto

thecriticaljuncture:firstaclusterofthreedifferenttransformationoptionstoan

authoritarianmarketeconomy(‘oligarchic’and‘socialist’neo-patrimonialism),followed

byapossiblebutforthetimebeingnotverylikelyalternative:amixedeconomywith

moreparticipatorypolity.

IfwealsotrytofitthesescenariosintoourEconomics-Politicscorrelationroadmap,it

wouldbeasfollows:

551WallStreetJournal,15.06.2015:http://lat.wsj.com/articles/SB12607879463517393677504581048400539083370

501

Scenario1.1:‘Socialist’neo-patrimonialism(or‘authoritarianmarketeconomy’):Thisis

theSino-Vietnameseway,orRoute1.

Scenario1.2:‘Oligarchic’neo-patrimonialism:exampleshereareRussiaandAngola,

wherewehaveseenthecombinationofRoutes2and4withseriousregressionalong

bothroutesbacktowardseconomicandpoliticalexclusion.ParticularlyinAngola,the

A&Rconceptof“extractive”structuresisclearlyofrelevance,althoughthenew

presidentafterAugust2017electionshastakensomequiteunexpectedstepsawayfrom

this.

Scenario2:Transnationalneo-authoritarianism(Cubaasmini-Florida,takenoverbythe

Cuban-AmericanoligarchyandperhapsTrumpthebusinessman):Thismightbethefast-

trackRoute5,perhapswithanendgoalclosetowhatA&Rdescribesasinclusiveness

butwithseriousflawsinwhattheadvocatesofaNordicmodel(=”thewaytoDenmark”)

wouldseeasadesirablegoal.

Scenario3:Transformativedemocraticpolicies:towardsamixedeconomywithmore

participatorypolity:Thisisthecombinationof2and4,our‘waytoDenmark’

ThemostlikelyoutcomeoftheCubantransformationprocessseemstobea

developmenttowardswhatwemaycallanauthoritarianmarketeconomy.Itisvery

hardtoseehowthe‘market’elementofthisoutcomemaybeavoided—althoughthere

arestillstronghard-lineforcesagainstit.

Wemaydistinguishbetweenthreevariantsofthisscenario:

Scenario1.1:“Socialist”neo-patrimonialism(orauthoritarianmarketeconomy);

Scenario1.2:“Oligarchic”neo-patrimonialism;

Scenario2:Transnationalneo-authoritarianism.

(Pleaseseetheendofthechapterwhereallscenariotablesarelisted).

Therearesomanysimilaritiesbetweenthesethreescenariosthatwefirstdiscussthem

togetherbeforewecomebacktothemoredistinctivequalities.

502

AmaincharacteristicoftheVietnameseandChinesemodelsistheblurringoflines

betweenpublicandprivateenterprises,asstateinstitutionsoftenformnewcommercial

companiesbasedonpublic/privatepartnership,allowingprivateentrepreneursto

developaslongastheyworkincloseassociationwithstateandparty(Saxonberg2013).

VerydifferentfromChinaandVietnam,theCubanregimehassofarcontinuedtoblock

thegrowthofamorerobustprivatesectorintheeconomy,apparentlyforfearoflosing

politicalcontrol.Withouttheexistenceofrelativelystrongprivateentrepreneurs,itis

difficulttoseehowabrandofneo-patrimonialismsimilartoChinaandVietnammay

emerge.

Anotheralternativeauthoritarianscenario,RussiaorAngola-styleeliteappropriationof

statepropertyinthehandsofasuper-richgroupofrent-seekingoligarchs,isalso

difficulttoimagineintheabsenceofarealsourceofnaturalresource-based

accumulation.Fortheforeseeablefuture,oilandgaswillnotgivethepredominantly

militarycorporateelitetheopportunityforsuchgiganticprivateappropriationinCuba.

Thetouristindustry,whichalongwiththemonopolytelephonecompanyisthemain

sourceofincomefortheCubanmilitarycorporations(perhapsinthefuturethespecial

developmentzoneandharbourinfrastructureatMarielwillalsobeasource),will

hardlyserveasabasisfortheconspicuousaccumulationofwealthseeninRussiaor

Angola.Oneopportunityforthispotentialclassofstatecapitalistsmayperhapsbe

linkedtofuturemegainvestmentsbytherichestCuban-Americans,forinstancein

agribusinessorinamassivereconstructionoftheCubaninfrastructure.

HistorianRafaelRojashasclearlyvisualizedthepossibilityofneo-patrimonialismtaking

holdinCuba,alsoseeingthisintheperspectiveofre-establishmentofCuban-US

relations:

“There-establishmentofrelationswiththeU.S.willstrengthenthoseelementsofstate

capitalismthatarebeingcreatedinCuba,anditwillconsolidateaneweconomicclasswhich,

asweknow,isverymuchoverlappingwiththemilitarysectors.Ihavenodoubtaboutthis:

thatthemilitary-businesscaste(casta)willstrengthenitselfwiththere-establishmentof

relations.Butthismayalsobeanelementthatincentivizestheemergenceofsmalland

503

mediumprivateenterprisewithnationalcapitalthatisnottotallysubordinatedtothe

militarybusinesscaste”552(S/E).

WhatRojastalksaboutherecomesprettyclosetowhatwehavebeenlabellingsocialist

neo-patrimonialism,althoughperhapsnotofthesamefinancialdimensionaswehave

seeninsomeotherauthoritarianstateswithvastaccesstonaturalresources.Inour

view,however,oneofthedecisivestrugglesinCuba—andalsointheCuban-American

diaspora—intheyearstocomewillbebetweenquasi-monopolyoroligopolystate

capitalismandtheemergingmedium-levelnon-stateenterprises:Theseriousdoubt

aboutthewilloftheformersectortoletthelattergrowintoastrongandsignificantpart

oftheeconomyevidentlyhasimplicationsforthepoliticalfutureofthecountry.

Severalyearsearlier,CubanpoliticalscientistArturoLopez-Levyairedsimilarthoughts:

“OnewellkeptsecretisthatliberalizationisdesiredbyCuba’selites.Inthelasttwenty

years,thedualeconomyhasservedtheinterestsofthepost-revolutionaryelitesinallowing

themtoacquireadvantageouspositionsfromwhichtopromotetheirinterestsand

privilegesthrougheventualmarketization.Withoutformallyrejectingtheiroldideology,

manyrevolutionariesofoldergenerations,andparticularlytheirchildren,theprincesand

princessesofthesystem,haveengagedinconspicuousconsumption.Anewstratumof

entrepreneurs,oftenwithlinkstothegovernmentandpartyelite,isaccumulatingwealthin

thehopethatFidelCastro’sdeathwillalsomarktheendofanti-richsentimentswithin

Cubansociety.Theideaofexpandingrightssuchastherighttoownprivatepropertyand

therighttotravelispartofaself-servingagendaoftheemergingelites.Tothem,the

businessofrevolutionisbusiness”(LopezLevy2011i:383).

AnotherquestioniswhetherCubanstatecapitalistswillhavethemuscletobecome

anythingbutjuniorpartnersintheirpartnershipwithmega-investorsfromtheUS,not

leastfromtherichestpartsoftheCubandiaspora.Theprobabilityisthattheywillhave

totakeabackseatrolewhen,therichestinCuban-Americanfamiliesgetseriously

involvedinCubanbusiness.Ratherthansocialistneo-patrimonialismorapost-socialist

oligarchymodel,Cubamaybecomesomekindofmixedstate-capitalismsubordinatedto

552RafaelRojas(2015),"Elrégimenbuscapara2018unrelevogeneracionalsindemocratización",interviewin14ymedio,11.09.15.Ofcourse,alliancesbetweenUSinvestorsandthemilitarycorporationsaresupposedlyruledoutbyPresidentTrump’sCubapolicy.Itisnotcertainhowlongthispolicywilllast,however.

504

diasporaoligopolydominance,wherethespacefordomesticprivateentrepreneursmay

bemuchmorelimitedthanforinstanceinVietnam.

Themanifestationofanysucheconomicscenarios,however,willbeconfrontedbya

seriouspoliticalchallenge.Howtocompensateforthelossofabsolutepower

instrumentsinasituationwherethehistoriclegitimacyoftheSierraMaestrageneration

disappears?InChinaandVietnam,theauthoritarianmarketeconomyhascoincided

withalongperiodofunprecedentedeconomicgrowthandsocialmobilityforthe

majorityofthepopulation,particularlythosemovingtothecitiesandthusbecoming

potentiallyactivepoliticalcitizens.Aspointedoutelsewhere,thisoptionforpragmatic

acceptancedoesnotexistnowinCuba.

Thereisanincreasingdifferentiationofpoliticalpositionsamongordinaryparty

members.Althoughleadingcadresareextremelycarefulnottoexpressanydiverging

positions,simplybecausethatwouldbethesameascommittingpoliticalhara-kiri,itis

generallyassumedthatthesedifferenceswithinthepowerstructuresofthepartywith

relatedinstitutionswillbecomemorevisiblewhenthenewgenerationnowbeginsto

takeover.

WeperceiveanincreasinglypotentialtensionintheCubansociety:asignificant

percentageoftheCubanworkforce—perhapsasmuchasoneinthree—isnow

independentofstateemploymentbutstillheavilydependentonthediscretionary

powerandabusebystateemployees(refwhatwehavetermed‘thestrangleholdof

symbioticinter-dependence’,seeIndicator2.5).Importantsegmentsofthestateand

partystructurearedoingtheirbesttoreviveanti-imperialism,whiletheoverwhelming

majorityofCubansseemstowelcomenormalisationofrelationswiththeUS.If

significantsectorsoftheCubanpeopleperceivethatitistheCubansidethatareholding

backontheeasingofeconomicopportunities(whatmanyCubanscall‘theinternal

blockade’),inasituationwherethesafetyvalveof‘exit’isnomoresoeasilyavailable,

thegovernmentcouldbemetbymuchstrongerandperhapsopenprotestfromordinary

Cubans.Thatcouldleavethepowerstructurewithtwooptions:increasetherepression

ofoppositionorallowademocraticopening.

505

CubahasnotyetseenaserioussurgeofsocialprotestaswehavereferredtoinChina,

partlyalsoinVietnam.IfsuchsocialprotestweretospreadinCuba,thereisatpresent

norealmechanisminplacetohandlethem,liketheso-calledroutinisedcontentious

bargainingappliedinChina,contributingtotheregime´sresilience(Chen2012).In

otherwords,Cubahasnotshownasimilarcapacitytoallowsocialprotestandmeetit

withthecontentiousauthoritarianmechanismthatseemstobeworkingquiteeffectively

inChina.Cubamightbeobligedtolookforheavy-handedresponsemechanismsif

protestsbecomemorewidespread.

Theneo-patrimonialistoptionisillustratedinFigure12.2.

506

Figure 7

Figure12.2Scenario1:Statusquotowardsneo-patrimonialism

*ThisfiguredoesnotdistinguishbetweenScenario1.1(”Socialistneo-patrimonialism”–ref.Table10.1)andScenario1.2(”Oligarchicneo-patrimonialism–ref.Table10.2).Themaindifferenceisthatinthe”oligarchic”variant,stateincludingmilitarypropertywillrapidlybeappropriatedbythestateandmilitarynomenclature,probablyleadingtoevenfasterandgreatercorruptionandsocio-economicdifferentiation.

Figure 8

507

Scenario 1.1: Transformations towards a socialist neo-patrimonial (or authoritarian market

economic) state?

Cubabelievesinthepossibilitytocombinetheprinciplesofamarketeconomybasedon

supplyanddemand,andstateplanning.InPresidentCastro´sReporttothe7thParty

Congresshestatedthatthiscombinationhadbeen“successfullydemonstratedinthe

‘reformprocess’inChinaandthe‘renovationprocess’inVietnam”(Castro2016).So,to

theextentCubahasanyforeignmodelsforitsown‘updating’,itisaboutthesetwo

countriesandparticularlyVietnam.Thegreateconomicsuccessesofthesetwosocialist

countries,andthegenerallyacceptedprospectsofChinarisingtobecometheleading

worldpower,areofcourseelementsthatmakethemextremelyattractiveasrolemodels

forCuba.

Thequestionis,however,howmuchofthemillennium-longhistoric,culturalandmore

recentstructuralcharacteristicsofthesetwoAsiancountries(ref.Chapters3.9.4and

3.9.5)arerelevantforpost-CastroCuba.Aboveall,howmuchofthelast40years’

economicexperiencesofthetwo‘sistersocialistcountries’isCubapreparedto

implement?Vietnamtookadecisivesteptofullyre-integratewiththeinternational

economicsystemandjointheWorldBankandtheIMFintheearly1990s,

simultaneouslydeepeningthestrategicmarketreform(DoiMoi).Allthiswasmade

possiblebynormalisationwiththeUS,leadingtotheliftingoftheUSeconomicembargo.

Cubaneverachievedthesamewhenasimilarprocesswasinitiatedbyex-President

Obama,butwehavealsoshownthatCubafailedtotakefulladvantageoftheUS

opening,thusperhapsaddingdifficultiestoafullliftingoftheUSembargo.

MarketreformsinCubahavebeenmuchmorecareful,andhaveseenaclearbacklash

afterthefirstyearsofRaúl´sreforms.Thisisthecaseregardingmarketfreedomsand

profit,investmentandexpansionopportunitiesforprivateentrepreneursaswellasfor

farmers/peasants,andmoresurprisinglyalsoforcooperatives.Cubainreality—andin

spiteofmeasurestosanctionillegalities—seemstopreferalargelyblacksurvival

economytoamoreregulatedmarketplaceforSMEs,artisanproducersandfarmers.

Cubahasinprincipleintroducedthesameliberalregimeforforeigndirectinvestment

508

(FDI),butthecountry´sabsencefrominternationalfinancialinstitutions(another

differencefromChina/Vietnam)andseriousdoubtsaboutthecountry´scapacityto

honourfinancialcommitmentsandallowrepatriationofprofitarefactorsthatmakesit

impossibletoattractsignificantFDIs.Vietnamhasbeenlessrestrictivewiththe

permissionfornon-stateeconomicinterestgroupstoorganizehorizontally(towards

whatwehavecalled‘economicsociety’).Limitstopoliticalreformsareaboutthesame,

althoughVietnamispracticingasignificantinternalpartypluralismthatsofarhasbeen

completelymissinginCuba.CubaisnowfinallylikeVietnamandChinaintroducingterm

andagelimitsforitsleaders,eventuallypermittingagenerationalrenovationthathas

gonequitesmoothlyinthetwoothercountrieswhilebeingblockedinCuba.553Cubais

stillanextremelycentralisedsystem,whilethedecentralisedandbottom-upinitiatives

thathavebeencriticaleconomicreformdriversinChinaandVietnamhavebeen

completelymissing.Thesameisthecaseforcomplaintsandco-optationmechanisms

thathaveprovidedeffectiveabsorptioncapacityforsocialprotest(contentious

authoritarianism).WiththelossofyoungCubanséxitoptiontotheUS,andthelackof

conditionsforthepragmaticacceptanceofauthoritarianregimethatstillexistsinChina

andVietnam,Cubaisconfrontedbyalegitimacychallengethatmaybecomeverytough

tocopewithshortofaresorttoquitemassiverepression.ThisissoevenifCubahasso

faravoidedthemassivecorruptionproblemsandeliteenrichmentseeninthetwoother

countries.So,whileCubahasbeenmuchmorerestrictivewiththeintroductionof

marketmechanismsandopeningforprivatesectorgrowthoutoffearforlosingpolitical

control,suchcontrolmayeventuallybelostpreciselybecausetheover-cautionis

leadingtoadeepeningeconomiccrisisthatmakesitmoreandmoreimpossibletokeep

thesocialcontractwiththepopulationandmaintainafunctioningsystem.

ItmaywellbetemptingforCubatocopytheChinese/Vietnamesecombinationofan

authoritarianone-partysystemwithafunctioningmarketeconomy.Sofar,however,the

countryhasbeenunwillingtointroducethenecessarymarketreformstoachievethe

economicsuccessofitstwoAsianfriends.

553Aswehavenotedelsewhere,Chinaisnowgoingtheotherway.

509

ReferringtoPresidentXi´snewpowerconcentrationinChina,inmanywayscomparable

toFidel´spreviouspositioninCuba,itisalsodifficulttoseehowpost-Castroleadersin

Cubamaybuildnewandeffectiveleadershipmodelswiththenecessarylegitimacy.

The‘SocialistNeo-patrimonialistscenario’issummarisedinTable12.1(pleaseseeend

ofchapter).ComparedtoourPolitics–Economicscorrelationmatrix,thisScenario

correspondstoRoute1.

Scenario 1.2: Transformations towards an oligarchic neo-patrimonial state

Themaindifferencebetweenthe‘socialist’andthe‘oligarchic’variantsofneo-

patrimonialismisthatthelatter—likeinRussiaandAngola—ismuchmorebasedon

privatisationoroutrightstealthofpublicpropertybytheformernomenclature,and

therebymassiveprivateenrichment.Thissystemmayhaveamoreformallydemocratic

polity,withtransitionsfrompartymonopolytohegemonicparties.Theremayalsobe

somemorepluralismincivilsocietyandthemedia,butRussiahasseenaclear

narrowingofthisspaceandastrengtheningoftheauthoritarianstructuresduringthe

Putinregime.Inthatway,thetransitionfrompresentsocio-politicalstructuresneednot

besodifficult,evenifsomeformallydemocraticreformsareallowed.Thisresemblesthe

optionprescribedbyAzel(op.cit.),whichhecallsthe‘MexicanPRI’variant.Aclose

Cubanally,theBolivarianRepublicofVenezuelafoundedbyHugoChavez,alsohad

someresemblanceofthismodelbeforeitstartedapproachingcollapseunderMaduro.

Thereisageneralconcernthattheincreasingeconomicpowerofmilitary-controlled

corporationswillgraduallyleadtoenrichmentofthemilitaryleadersofthese

companies,andgenerallyofthepoliticalleadership:

"Themostapparentconcerninthissenseisthattheroleofthemilitaryinkeypointsofthe

economyisenablingthefutureeconomicempowermentofthedominantclansthrougha

virtualpiñata,leadingtotheself-annihilationofthesystembythosewhoareinheritingthe

power."554

554ReinaldoEscobar:”Trump,losmilitaresyladivisióndepoderesenCuba”,14ymedio,20/06/2017.

510

(Seesomepossiblecharacteristicsofthe‘oligarchicneo-patrimonialist’scenarioin

Table12.2(pleaseseeendofchapter)).

Scenario1.2representsacombinationofRoutes2and4inthePolitics–Economics

matrix,withseriousregressionalongbothroutesbacktowardseconomicandpolitical

exclusion.ParticularlyinAngola,theA&Rconceptof‘extractive’structuresisclearlyof

relevance.

Scenario 2: Transformations towards a Transnational neo-authoritarian state

Anotherscenario,notsodifferentfromthetwoformer,isanalliancebetweenthe

militarycorporateeliteandmultinationaloligopolycapital,firstandforemostfromthe

US,andprobablydominatedbybigCuban-Americaninvestors.Thisoptionisofcourse

onlyfullypossibleifandwhentheUSembargo/blockadeislifted.Therewereseveral

signsthatbothsidesweregettingpreparedforsuchpartnershipsduringtheObama

presidency.PresidentTrumphassignalledahardenedrelationtoCubaduringhisterm

andhasspecificallybannedanyrelationswithmilitarycorporations.Butifapost-2020

USPresidentwantstopromotebigbusinessrelationswithCuba,thereisnowhereelse

toturnthantothemilitary-managedcorporations,whichhavealreadybeenactively

wooedinUS-CubannegotiationsbeforeTrump´snewrestrictionswereputinplace.

Onecouldperhapsexpectsuchinvestmentstoleadtoanunfettered,freewheeling

capitalism,wherestateregulationswerecompletelythrownout.Thatisnotnecessarily

thecase.Theanti-CastroelitethatleftCubaaftertherevolution,manyofwhosefamily

descendantswouldbeamongtheinvestmentcandidates,hasinfactatraditionofclose

relationswiththeState,ashighlightedbyValdésandLandau(2012):

“[M]anyofthosesameanti-CastroCuban‘conservatives’showednooppositionwhen

PresidentFulgencioBatistaintroduced‘biggovernment’,orstrongstateinterventioninthe

Cubaneconomy.Indeed,since1934Batistausedthestatetoplayamajorrolein

transformingandregulatingCuba’seconomy.

TheseCubans–conservativeonlyintheiroppositiontorevolution—haveneverbecome

‘libertarians’,norhavetheyfavouredlaissez-fairecapitalism.Someofthemajorfortune

511

makersinpre-revolutionaryCubamadeuseofthathighlyregulatedeconomytoamasstheir

wealth.So-calledsugarkingJulioLoboreapedhisfortunefromathoroughlyregulatedsugar

market.Pre-revolutionaryCuba’sgovernmenthaddividedsugarprofitsamongthelarge,

mediumandsmallgrowers,andassuredeachpartnerofhispropershare.”

Whatisquitelikelyisthatthisscenariowouldreducestatepropertytoaminimum,and

thattherewouldbeaveryheavypressureforthereturnofmostofthenationalisedand

confiscatedproperties.Bygoingthroughthelistofthe550biggestproprietorsinpre-

revolutionaryCuba,therealeconomicoligarchythatfledtoMiami(Jimenez,2008),555

onecaneasilyspotanumberofstillveryrichfamilydescendantsinSouthernFlorida

whowouldhavelittledoubttorushbacktoCubaifconditionspermitit.Thebiggestof

them,theFanjulfamilywithcloselinksbothtoleadingDemocratic(Clinton)and

Republican(Bush)familiesintheUS,wouldprobablybeamongthefirstandforemost.

Jimenez(ibid:207),liststheFanjulfamilyasthethirdbiggestnon-UScapitalgroupin

Cuba(theabove-mentionedLobobeingthefirst),withlandpropertiesof60,000

hectares,ownershipoftensugarfactoriesandthreealcoholdistilleries.Today,the

familygroupproduces6milliontonsofsugareveryyearinFloridaandtheDominican

Republic,threetimesthetotalproductionofCuba.Thisisthebrandoffamilies,thetwo

brothersAlfonso(”Alfy”)andJosé(”Pepe”)stillmaintainingtheirCubancitizenshipthat

wouldprobablybeverykeentoreturnandreconquerdominanceoftheCubaneconomy

iftheywereallowedto.

Whatwemayimagineundersuchscenario(ref.Table12.3atendofchapter),isthatthe

military-corporatepresenceatleastfromthestartwouldstillbequitehigh(but

graduallysubordinatedtobigforeigncapitalandpossiblyprivatisedinthehandsofthe

military-dominatednomenclature),thatsmallandmediumprivateentrepreneurscould

haveaprominentbutnotdominantrole,andthattheagriculturewouldbepre-

dominantlyexport-oriented.Aformalmulti-partysystemwouldprobablybeintroduced,

mostlikelywithahegemonicpartywheremilitaryandforeigncapitalgroupshave

dominanceandwherecivilsocietypluralismwouldhardlybeallowedtochallengethese

555Itisinterestingtonotethatthisimpressivedocumentarywork,publishedinHavana,makesnomentionofthepropertybelongingtoCastrofather,DonÁngel:theManacasfincainBirán,todayamuseuminHolguínprovince,withits10,000hectaresdomain(althoughmostofitwasrentedpermanentlyfromtheUnitedFruitCompany),withsome300familieslivingandworkingontheproperty(Szulc1986:99).TheCastrofamilynodoubtbelongedtothelandedoligarchyinpre-revolutionaryCuba.

512

interests.Thisisnotarecipeforawelfarestate:corruptionwouldbesignificant,

legitimacyratherlimited,andtheneedforrepressionwouldprobablyalsobegreat.One

mayhopethatevensuchamodelwouldnotimplythereturnofthemafiasandBatista-

likeconditions,althoughitcannotberuledout.

ThismightbeRoute5,thefasttrack,inourMatrix,perhapswithanendgoalcloseto

whatA&Rdescribesasinclusiveness,butwithseriousflawsinwhatadvocatesofthe

Nordicmodelwouldseeasadesirablegoal(=”thewaytoDenmark”).

12.4. A scenario for transformative democratic policies

Scenario 3: Transformative democratic policies: towards a mixed economy with more

participatory polity

Inthetheorychapter,weraisedtheissueofwhether‘transformativedemocratic

politics’werepossibleinaCubancase,basedontheStokkeandTörnquist(2013:3)

definition:“[P]oliticalagendas,strategiesandalliancesthatuseformalandminimalist

democracytointroducepoliticsandpoliciesthatmayenhancepeople’sopportunities

forimprovingdemocracyandmakingbetteruseofit.”

Theconcepthasbeendevelopedandstudiedmostlywithreferencetoformal

democracies,oftendescribedas‘nascent’or‘fledgling’regimesbornoutofthe‘third

waveofdemocratization’andstillwithacertainamountofcivilandpoliticallibertiesin

place,butwheregooddemocraticintentionshavesubsequentlygoneastray:

“DemocratizationintheGlobalSouth,inturn,hassufferedfromasimilarparadoxtothatof

developmentwithpoverty.Thedefenceofcivilandpoliticallibertiesandofgenerallyfree

elections,ashashappenedinIndia,andtheintroductionoftheseinothercountries,are

greatlytobewelcomed.Butwhileeffortsatprivatisation,relianceonself-managementby

civilsociety,andelitistandtechnocraticgovernancethathavebeeninspiredbyneoliberal

ideashavesometimescoincidedwithenhancedcivilandpoliticalrightsandforreasonably

freeandfairelectionsinformerlyauthoritariancountries,empiricalevidenceshowsthat

513

theyhavenotyetyieldedsubstantialimprovementswithregardtosoundadministration,the

ruleoflaw,andgenuinepopularrepresentation”(TörnquistandHarris2016:4).

IsitpossibletointroduceasimilardiscussioninacountrylikeCuba,whichhasnotgone

throughasimilarformaldemocratisation,thushavingapre-transitionstate,still

undergoingpost-totalitariantransformations,butwithheavyLeninist,authoritarian,

centralist,verticalist,opaquestructuresremaining?Whenthereformsproposedby

PresidentRaúlCastrohavebeenmeetingsomuchresistanceaswehaveseen

particularlysince2016,wehavearguedthatthisiscausedbytheintransigentparty

hardlinersperceivingthemasunderminingtherevolution´sverypowerstructures,and

thattheythereforeseekrefugebehindthesestructuresinordertosabotagefurther

reform.AlessonworthnotingfromtheUSSR,clearlystudiedcarefullyinCuba,isthat

partialreformrepresentsarealthreattothebreakdownoftheentiresystem(Kornai,

1992;Brown,2009).Butitmightbeworthwhilediscussingwhethersuchaprocess

couldhaveanyrelevanceinaCubanpost-Castroreformprocess,asanalternative

sourceoflegitimacyandanewsocialcontractforthenewgenerationofleaders.

Asamoreconcreteindicationofwhichpoliticalvisionswehaveinmind,wereferredto

theTörnquistandHarrisdefinitionofsocialdemocracy:Democraticpoliticstowardsthe

combinationofeconomicgrowthandsocialequity.Suchexperiencesarederivednotonly

fromthe‘GreatNordicTransformation’ofthe1930s,butalsofrommorerecentLatin

Americancases(CostaRica,Uruguay,Ecuador,BrazilduringtheLulaera).

GrowthandequityareclearofficialcommitmentsforCuba´sCommunistPartyand

government(ref.alsoMonrealabove),buthardlyrealistictoachieveunderpresent

circumstances.Sowewouldhavetoturnthedefinitiononitsheadandask:isthereany

waythatthenewCubanleadershipreplacingtheSierraMaestragenerationcouldsee

moreparticipatoryprocessesasawaytoachievere-distributiveeconomicgrowth

aimingatthere-establishmentofthewelfarestate–orevenacceptmoredemocratic

practicesasanoutcomeofsuchprocesses?

Whatwouldinthatcaseberequired?Törnquist/Harrishavediscussedfourdimensions

thatwouldbeofrelevance:

514

Dimension1:“Broadpopularinterestsandideastranslatingintotheformationand

organisationofdemocraticpoliticalcollectives”.

InCubathereisnotradition(sincetherevolution)forindependentpoliticalaction(by

individualsorgroups).Butthereisnowforthefirsttimeacarefullyemergingeconomic,

civilandpoliticalpluralitytobuildon,meetingwithangryresistancefromtheParty

hardlinersthatseemtohavegainedtheupperhandforfearoflosingthepolitical

control.TheCubapolicyoftheTrumpadministrationisnotatallpromotingsuch

plurality,butwhathappensafterApril2018isstillintheblue.

Dimension2:“effortstobuildstrongdemocraticlinkagesbetweenstateandsociety”.

InCuba,thechallengeistode-coupletheextremelyverticalandtop-downdependency

linkagesbetweenstateandsociety,andsubstitutethemwithmorehorizontal,

independentandparticipatorylinkages:buildingformalisedparticipatorychannelson

localandnationallevels.Thesamepresentsituationapplieshereasundertheprevious

dimension.Cubahasa(too)strongstate,butrequiresmorerationalandeffective

implementationmechanismsandinstitutions.

Dimension3:“struggleonthebasisofcommonpopularinterestsandideasforuniversal

civil,political,andsocialrights,andrelatedwelfarepolicies”.

Cubahasastrongwelfaretradition.Butthishasbeentheresultofbenefitsbeing

endowedfromabove,andalsofinancedbyinternationalallies.Thechallengenowisto

allowcitizensandorganisedcollectivestostrugglefortheserightsfrombelow.The

mostlikelystartingpointforthiswouldbethroughcooperatives,iftheywereallowedto

becomeabackboneofCuba´seconomicdevelopment,andliveuptointernationally

recognisedcooperativeprinciples.Anotherinterestingmovewouldbemore

decentralisedpublicpolicies,strengtheninglocalgovernments,perhapspromoting

somekindofparticipatorybudgeting.Buttherearenotyetanysignalsinthatdirection.

Dimension4:“attemptsatthedevelopmentofgrowthcoalitions(socialpacts)between

sectionsofcapitalandlabourinthewidestsenseoftheterms,aswellasbetweenlabour

andagrarianproducers”.

515

InCuba,neithercapitalnorlabourissofarindependentlyorganised.Butsuchsocial

pactsandgrowthalliancesareinfactcarefullybeingdevelopedbetweenprivate

entrepreneurs,theiremployeesandpubliclyownedcompaniesinsituationswherethe

privatesectorisgainingstrengthandmakingitselfunavoidable—particularlyinpartsof

thetourismsector.Ideasaboutpublic-privatepartnershipintheproductiveuseof

familyremittances(ref.ideaspromotedbyex-economyministerRodríguez)mightalso

beanelementofrelevancetothisdimension.Intheagriculturalsector,therecouldbe

anobviousopportunitytoestablishgrowthcoalitionsbetweenproducersofdifferent

categories,ifthedecisionfromthe6thPartyCongress(2010)ofallowingsecond-degree

cooperativeshadbeenimplemented,sothatproducer-controlledagro-industrial

complexescouldbeestablished.

LatinAmericahasinmanywaysbeenthemainregionalarenaforthephenomenonof

politiciseddemocracyduringthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury,representedby

thecomingtopowerofalargenumberofleft-leaninggovernmentsoriginallybasedon

strongpopularmovements,mostofwhichwithcloselinksofsolidaritywithCuba.It

maybeargued,however,thattheseexperiencesarequitedifferentfromthe‘Nordic

model’thatinmanywaysinspiredtheconceptof‘transformativedemocraticpolitics’.A

fundamentalcharacteristicofthismodelwasasocialmovementledbyradicallabour

organisationsthatacquiredandtransformedstatepowertobecomeatoolforsocietal

transformation,withaninstitutionalisedsystemofmediation.556

Overtheyears,leftistgovernmentsinLatinAmerica,broughttopowerbyinnovative

mobilisationeffortsbycivilsocietyandpopularmovements,havedevelopedworrisome

authoritarianattitudes,alsoexpressedthroughveryapologeticassessmentsofthelack

ofdemocracyinCuba(seee.g.argumentinMainwaringandPérez-Liñán2015).This

situationofmutualapproximationbetweenCubaandleftistgovernmentsduringthis

periodinotherLatinAmericancountries(Venezuela,Bolivia,Ecuador,Nicaragua,toa

certainextentBrazilandArgentina)ledtoaninterestingtrendofCubamovingtowards

somekindofLatinAmericannormalcy(Bye2014).Inthissituation,onemightassume

thatCubacouldfindinspirationinelecteddemocraticandmixedeconomystructuresof

556AgoodsummaryoftheNordicmodel,itshistoryaswellasitspresentandpossiblefuturecharacteristics,istobefoundinarecentstudy:Dølviket.al.2015.

516

otherLatinAmericancountries.Withrecenteconomicandpoliticalbacklashforseveral

oftheseleftistandpro-Cubangovernments(Venezuela,Brazil,Argentina,Chile),this

sourceoftransformativeinspirationhasagainbecomelessrelevant.

Wemayimaginesomestepstowardsa“socialdemocratic”transformationinCuba:

• Thestatemustdistinguishbetweenitsregulatorandemployerroles(andfully

defineitsformofstatecapitalism).

• Privatebusinessmustbeallowedtoorganiseaslegalentities(inprinciple

approvedby7thPCCCongress)andtoorganiseemployerinterestgroups.

• Self-employed,artisansetc.mustbeallowedtoorganiseandnegotiatewiththe

state.

• Cooperativesmustbegivenrealindependence(accordingtointernational

cooperativeprinciples)andproceduresfornegotiationwiththestatemustbe

established–andsecond-degreecooperativesneedtobeauthorisedand

promoted.

• Labourunionsmustbegivenmoreautonomyandaccesstonegotiatewithboth

state,non-statedomesticandforeigninvestmentemployers.

• Agrarianproducersmustalsobeallowedtoorganizehorizontallyandnegotiate

withstateandwithcommercialintermediariesunderstateregulation.Cuban

agricultureisdeeplytransformingfromplantationtodomesticallyoriented

small-scalefamilyfarmingunits,andthiscouldbeagoodbasisfordemocracyto

takehold).

Letuslookathowtheabove-mentioneddimensionsandpossiblestepsrelatetothe

presentideologicalpositionoftheCubanCommunistParty.

Cubansocialismwasdefinedinthestrategydocumentpresentedtothe7thPCC

Congress(April2016)(‘EconomicandsocialmodelforsocialistdevelopmentinCuba’)

andapprovedmorethanayearlater:

517

“ThestrategicobjectiveoftheModelistostimulateandconsolidatetheconstructionofa

prosperousandsustainablesocialistsociety–economically,sociallyandenvironmentally–

committedtothestrengtheningofethical,culturalandpoliticalvaluesforgedbythe

Revolution,inasovereign,independent,socialist,democratic,prosperousandsustainable

country.”(S/E)

Basicprinciplesofthestrategy:

• Thesocialiststateasthebasisforpreservationofallnationalandhumanistic

values:Equalopportunitiesforallwithoutanyformofdiscrimination.

• Statepropertyofthebasicmeansofproduction,socialistplanning,guaranteeing

universalandfreesocialservices—butopeningfornon-stateproperty(national

andforeign).

• ‘Socialistdemocracy’:mixtureofrepresentativeanddirect,butsubjecttothe

leadingroleoftheCommunistPartyofCuba,theuniqueandorganizedvanguard

ofthenation(aprinciplethrownoutbyScandinaviansocialdemocratsinthe

1920sand1930s).

So,hereisthe10,000-dollarquestion:

Isthereacaseforpost-CastroCubabuildinganewlegitimacystructure,buildingonthe

strongandclientelisticstatewithitshistoricalsocialachievements,butgradually

transformingittowardsmoredemocraticparticipationofautonomouslyorganized

citizensandcollectives(cooperatives,self-employed,increasinglyautonomousunionsand

farmerassociations,employersássociations),interactingwithamorede-centralizedand

transparentstate(withstrengthenedlocalgovernment)?Couldthisoccurinparallelto

morepluralisticrepresentationinaLegislaturethatgainsmoreindependencefromthe

Executive(anopportunitythatnowseemstohavebeenpostponedforafter2018)?

WhichexperiencesfromtheestablishmentoftheScandinavianwelfarestates,building

ontheruinsofthedeepsocialcrisisofthe1930s,couldberelevantforCubainthe

comingyears(Lie2012):

518

• CombinationofKeynesianmacro-economicpoliciesandcollectivewage

negotiations/agreementbetweenhorizontallyorganisedunionsandemployers

(state,militarycorporations,privateSMEs,farmers/cooperatives,FDIs).

• Historiccompromisebetweenantagonisticsocialandpoliticalforces.

• Howcanthevarietyofsocio-economicactorsemergewithsufficientstrengthto

enablesuchpolicies:beallowedtoorganizeinterest-andissue-basedhorizontal

organisations,independentofpartyandstatedominance?

• Combinationofrepresentativeandparticipatoryandperhapsdeliberative

democracy(withcorporativeelements).

• Growthpromotingwelfarepoliciesandthere-foundationoftheCubanwelfare

state.

WhileMesaLagoclaimsthategalitarianisminCubahadahighcostwhenitcomesto

productivity557,ProfessorMoeneclaimsconsistentlythatNorwegianegalitarianismmay

havebeenquitepositiveforproductivity(Moene2016).Itwouldbeveryinterestingto

discusswhetherthiscouldbecomearealisticopportunityinCuba.

ThisisourScenario3,illustratedbythefigure12.3below,andsummarisedinTable

12.4(pleaseseeendofchapter).FittingitintoourPolitics–EconomicsMatrix,itwould

beinacombinationofRoutes2and4.

557AtCubaPosibleseminar,NewYork,26.05.16.

519

Figure12.3

Scenario3:Participatorydemocracywithsocio-economicandwelfarestate

rehabilitationFigure 9

MakeuseofUScommercialoptions(asproposedby

Obama)

TheScandinaviantraditionsofplanning,mixedeconomywithastrongstateroleas

regulatoraswellasowner,andwelfarestate,isattractivetoanincreasingnumberof

Cubanintellectualsandacademics,andpossiblyalsotoreform-orientedpartsofthe

nomenclature(thosestillbelievinginre-distributiveandethicalsocialism).

Thewindowofopportunityforsuchalternativepolicieswasnottakencareofduringthe

lasttwoyearsoftheObamaadministration.Itishighlyuncertainifandwhenitreturns.

12.5 The rejection of systematic market reform and the danger of collapse – some

final considerations

Ifwelookatthecriticalvariablesofthevariousscenarios,wewillnotethatthereare

particularlytwothatwillbeatthecentreofattentioninthemonthsandyearsahead

duringthecriticaljuncture.OneisfullyunderthecontroloftheUS;theotherunderthe

fullcontrolofCuba,buttheyarecloselydependentoneachother.

TheUSembargoisstillineffectdespitePresidentObama´seffortstoperforateitas

muchashecould.MrTrumpiscommittedtokeepit,andsoisCongressatleastuntil

aftertheNovember2018elections.Aslongastheembargoisineffect,itisvirtually

impossibleforCubatoaccesstheinternationalfinancialsystem,whichagainmakesit

extremelydifficultforCubatomobilizeFDIofanymagnitude,seenasakeyconditionfor

sparkingthenecessarygrowthofCuba´sGDPtosavetheeconomy.Themainintended

beneficiaryofFDIisthestateeconomicsector,particularlythemilitary-controlled

corporations.

OntheCubanside,thereseemstobeacloserelationshipbetweenthemaintenanceof

theLeninistpoliticalsystemanditsaccompanyingeconomicsystem(centralistand

verticalone-partyandstate-dominatedsystemholdingbackonbotheconomicand

politicalpluralism).UnlikeChinaandVietnam,Cubawouldpossiblyhavetoletgoofits

politicalpowermonopolyifthecountrydecidestoopenuptheeconomicspacefora

strategicnon-statesector(SMEsplusautonomouscooperatives).

521

ThemainconditionfortheUSabolishingtheembargo/blockadeisofcoursethatCuba

abolishesitsLeninistsystem.ButthelastthingtheCubanCommunistPartywoulddois

toacceptthisasaconditionanddoasUncleSamdemands.Onthecontrary:themore

PresidentTrumpdemandsthis,thestrongerwillthepositionofthehardlinersin

Havanabe,andthelesslikelyisitforanysignificantpoliticalopeningtotakeplace.So,

underthepresentcircumstances,neithersidewilltakethenecessaryfirststepto

changestatusquo.

Theonlywayisforeithersidetostarttakingmutuallyreinforcingstepsthatmaysoften

thepositionontheotherside.ThatwasassuminglywhatPresidentsObamaandCastro

attempted,buttheUSsteps–toproposedealingwiththeCubannon-stateeconomy—

werenotmetbyreciprocalresponse:Cubapermittingthistohappenbyopeninga

largerspaceforitsentrepreneursandcooperatives.

Beingconfrontedbyafartoughernegotiator,whoiskeentocourttheCastrobrothers´

bitterestenemiesinMiami,thefirststepthistimearoundmayhavetocomefrom

Havana.Byseeingthattheblockadewillremain,alsoblockingtheentryofFDIofany

significancewhiletheeconomyisindeepercrisisthanever,thepost-Castrogovernment

takingofficein2018wouldhavetocalloffthereform‘pausa’andgetinto‘prisa’(hurry)

moodandfinallystartimplementingallthemeasuresthatwereonthetablewhenRaúl‘s

reformpolicywaslaunched.Thatwouldimply:

1. Legalisingprivateenterpriseandofferthemappropriateconditionstogrow,re-

investandgenerateliveablejobs;

2. Givingpeasantsandfarmerscontroloftheentireproduction-marketingcycle,by

favouringsmallandmedium-scalefamilyfarmingforthepurposeofnational

foodsecurityandimportsubstitution;

3. Promotingautonomouscooperativesasastrategicsectorbothinagricultureand

inurbanbranchesoftheeconomy,includingsecond-degreecooperativesthat

mayputinplacecontinuousmarketingchannelsandagro-industry;

522

4. Allowingnon-statewholesalechains;

5. Fullylegalisingremittancesandothermedium-sizeFDIintheprivatesector;

6. Thetoughestofall,butprobablyunavoidable,wouldbetomatchtheincreasing

economicpluralismwithmorepoliticalpluralism:morespaceforcivilsociety,

allowhorizontalinterestorganisationwithnegotiationoptions,anevenallow

morecompetitiveelections(notnecessarilymulti-partyasafirststep)–thefirst

opportunitywithoutconstitutionalinterruptionwouldonlybein2022.

IfmostofthesestepsaretakenontheCubanside,itwouldbeveryhardfortheUSto

avoidliftingtheembargo/blockade,particularlyiftheRepublican/Democratic

correlationofforcesischangedafterCongressionalelectionsin2018orthenext

presidentialelectionsin2020.ThatcouldtakeCubaalongwaytowardsourscenario3:

mixedeconomywithparticipatorydemocracy,withgoodprospectsofre-buildingthe

welfarestate.

IfallsuchreformscontinuetoberejectedandtheUSstandsfirmoreventakesmore

stepsbackonitsside,iftheoldCubanrevolutionarygenerationkeepsdoinglikethe

Ostrichburyingtheirheadsinthesandtilltheirbitterend,theworstofallscenarios

cannotberuledout:thefullcollapseofthesystem;statefailure.Infact,allfour

scenariosdiscussedabovearebasedontheintroductionoffarmoreextensivemarket

reformsandhightomediumforeigndirectinvestments,whichistodaynotviable

withoutsomemajorconcessionsintheeconomicpolicy.Thereistodaynoprospectof

significantalternativesourcesfortheeconomicgrowthsodesperatelyneededinthe

Cubaneconomy.IfthesituationinVenezuelaendswithacompletedisaster,whichnow

mayseemunavoidable,themostimportantpresentsourceofforeigncurrency,inthe

formofoildeliveriespayingformedicalandotherCubanprofessionalserviceswillalso

vanish.Thiscouldproducehardshipscomparabletothe‘SpecialPeriod’ofthe1990s.

TherewouldsimplybenopoliticallegitimacytocopewithsuchasituationinCubapost-

Fidelandpost-Raúl.Intheworstofcases,therefore,partialorfullstatefailurecannotbe

ruledout,althoughwearestillfarfromthatsituation.

523

Table12.1

Scenario1.1:“Socialist”neo-patrimonialism(orauthoritarianmarketeconomy)

Table 16

Economicvariables Politicalvariables Socialvariables

Stateproperty:H Stateregulation:H Socialdistribution:L-M

Militarycorporate

dominance:H

Monopolisticpoliticalparty Corruption:H(-M)

Nomenclatureproperty:M Ideologicalpluralism:L(-

M)

Welfarestate:L-M

Autonomouscooperatives:

L-M

Civilsocietypluralism:L(-

M)

Legitimacy:L(-M)

SMEs/private

entrepreneurs:M-L

Interestorganization:

vertical

Repression:M-H

Diasporainvestments:M-L Democraticpolitical

participation:L

DesiredFDI:H Socio-politicaldialogue:L-

M

IFIrole:H De-centralization:L-M

Tradedependence:H Ruleoflaw:L-M

Agriculture:export-

oriented(withhigh

militarydominance)

Growth:M

Table 17

524

Table12.2

Scenario1.2:“Oligarchic”neo-patrimonialism

Table 18

Economicvariables Politicalvariables SocialvariablesStateproperty:L Stateregulation:L-M Socialdistribution:MMilitarycorporatedominance:H-M

Hegemonicpoliticalparty Corruption:H-M

Nomenclatureproperty:M Ideologicalpluralism:M Welfarestate:L-MAutonomouscooperatives:L

Civilsocietypluralism:M Legitimacy:L-M

SMEs/privateentrepreneurs:M-L

Interestorganization:vertical/horizontal

Repression:M

Diasporainvestments:M-L Democraticpoliticalparticipation:M

DesiredFDI:H+ Socio-politicaldialogue:L-M

IFIrole:H De-centralization:M-H Tradedependence:H Ruleoflaw:M Agriculture:export-oriented(withhighFDIdominance)

Growth:M

525

Table12.3

Scenario2:Transnationalneo-authoritarianism

Table 19


Nomenclatureproperty:H Stateregulation:M Socialdistribution:L

Militarycorporate

dominance:H

Monopolisticorhegemonic

politicalparty

Corruption:H


L

Ideologicalpluralism:L-M Welfarestate:L

SMEs/private

entrepreneurs:L-M

Civilsocietypluralism:L-M Legitimacy:L

Diasporainvestments:M-L Interestorganization:

vertical

Repression:M-H

DesiredFDI:H Democraticpolitical

participation:L

IFIrole:H Socio-politicaldialogue:L(-

M)

Tradedependence:H De-centralization:L

Agriculture:export-

oriented(withcombined

FDI/mil.corp.dominance)

Ruleoflaw:L-M

Growth:M

526

Table12.4

Scenario3:Mixedeconomywithparticipatorydemocracy

Table 20


Stateproperty:H Stateregulation:H Socialdistribution:H

(“inclusivegrowth”)

Militarycorporate

dominance:M-L

Fromhegemonictowards

pluralisticpartysystem

Corruption:M-L

Nomenclatureproperty:L Ideologicalpluralism:H-M Welfarestate:H


H

Civilsocietypluralism:H Legitimacy:H

SMEs/private

entrepreneurs:H

Interestorganization:

horizontal

Repression:L

Diasporainvestments:H Democraticpolitical

participation:H

DesiredFDI:H-M Socio-politicaldialogue:H

IFIrole:H De-centralization:H

Tradedependence:H Ruleoflaw:M

Agriculture:familyfarming

withcooperatives

Growth:M

L=Low

M=Medium

H=High

527

Chapter13:Conclusions

Weshallheresummarisetheentirediscussionofthisdissertation:therelationship

betweeneconomicreformswithinanewinternationalreality,andtheprospectsfor

politicaltransformationsinCuba.

MostobserversagreethatthereformssetinmotionbyRaúlCastroduringhistenyears

asPresident,particularlythoseapprovedbythe6thPartyCongressin2011,werethe

mostcomprehensiveandthedeepestreformscarriedoutduringtheentirerevolution,

withtheintentiontosavethecountry´seconomyinviewofallaccumulatedproblems

inheritedsince1959.

Thekeyquestionwehavestudiedinthisdissertationisthis:whetherandtowhatextent

awideningofeconomicpluralismhasbeentakingplaceinsuchawaythatitmayleadto

increasingpoliticalpluralismandde-concentrationofpower;oralternatively,whether

changesinthepoliticalandpowerstructuremayaccelerateorslowdownthespeedof

economicreforms.

Wehavetriedtoillustratetheseoptionsbydrawingsomealternativeroutesona

roadmap,bymeansofpossiblemovementswithinapoliticsvs.economicscorrelation

matrix(Figure2.1,reproducedbelow):

528

Twoprincipalroutesarediscussed:Route2,withmovementfromcellctocellbanda

possiblefurthermovetowardscella,implyingchangesfromexclusivetomoreinclusive

economicinstitutionsoreconomicsleadingtopoliticalchange;vs.Route4fromcellcto

celldandalsointhatcaseapossiblefurthermovetowardscella,implyingchangesfrom

exclusivetomoreinclusivepoliticalinstitutionsorpoliticsleadingtoeconomicchange.

Theserouteshavebeenassessedinrelationtoninechallenges,studiedwiththehelpof

atotalof56indicators(ref.Annex1).

RaúlCastrohasbeenbreakingonceforbiddenideologicalbarriersduringtheseten

years.HispreferenceseemstohavebeenwhatwehavecalledRoute1,economicsonly,

theChineseandVietnameseway,wherepoliticalinstitutionsremainbasicallyexclusive.

Willinglyornot,however,thereformshavealsoimpliedcertainmovementsalongboth

Route2andRoute4.Ithasturnedouttobeimpossibletoavoidtheaffectingthe

politicalarenacompletely.

Thecontradictorycharacterofhisrhetoricaswellashisactsmaybeunderstoodasan

attempttobalanceconflictingforceswithintheCubanpowercircles.Mostobservers

wouldagreethatReformsweremovingtooslowly,beforeavirtualcounter-reform

gainedprominenceduringthelatest2-3yearsofRaúl´sera.Theresultofthishasbeen

paralysisratherthanrenewal.

Wehaveinthisdissertationdiscussedvariousalternativetransformationmodalities

(ref.Whitehead2009):

• TheSpanishpost-Franco‘modeltransition’;

• Thedoubleortripletransitionfromcommunismandastate-runeconomy(and

evenanoppositemilitaryalliance)towhatseemstobebouncingbackto‘illiberal

democracy’incountrieslikePolandandHungary;

• The‘miracletransition’inSouthAfricapromotingco-existencebetween

apparentlyirreconcilableenemies–butperhapseventheresomeofthemiracle

isgone;andthentheSino-Vietnameseeconomictransformationwithoutthe

changeofpoliticalregime.

529

• Themostfailedofallmodalitiesisclearlydemocracyimposedfromoutside,with

US-attemptedregimechange–thepubliclyannouncedUSpolicytowardsCuba

untilObama.Sofar,noteventheTrumpadministrationhasreturnedtothis

policyinspiteofkeyadvisors(likeNationalSecurityAdvisorBolton)inprinciple

arguingstronglyforit.ItremainstobeseenwhethertheTrumpadministration

succeedswithanewversionofregimechangeinthecaseofNorthKorea.

Wehavediscussedsuchmodalitiesinrelationtoavarietyofarenas,partlyfollowingthe

logicofLinzandStepan(1996).Havetheeconomicreformsapproachedanythinglikean

institutionalizedeconomicsociety,withthestatebureaucracyfacilitatingan‘enabling’

setofmarketrules?Hasthisgivenrisetoafreerandliveliercivilsociety?Maythispush

openamoreautonomouspoliticalsociety,withstrengthenedruleoflaw?

AccordingtoFukuyama(2014),“itisthebalancebetweenastrongstateandastrong

societythatmakesdemocracywork”,withthesocietyimposingaccountabilityonthe

state.Cubaisinthequiteenviablepositionofhavingastrongandunifiedstate,sothe

missinglinkhereisastrongercivilsocietycapableofchallengingthatstate.Wehave

triedtostudytowhatextentthathasemerged.

Post-authoritarianism,sayLinzandStepan,canbebroughtaboutbychoice(deliberate

policiesoftherulers),bydecay(throughinternalideologicalerosion),orbysocial

conquest(citizenmobilization).

Przeworski(1991)hasarguedthatthereisalinefromthebreakdownofregime

legitimacytotheestablishmentofcounter-hegemony,butthat“analternativefuture”

willonlyemergewhenverticalcontrolissubstitutedbyhorizontalorganizationwhich

managestopresentnewcollectivealternatives.

Onewayofachievingthisisbybuildingalliancesaroundbroadpopularinterests,

promotingcollectiveactionthroughtransformativedemocraticpolitics,buildingnew

socialpactssubstitutingtheLeninistsystem.This,accordingtoTörnquistet.al(2016),

wouldrepresentamorepoliticisedandparticipatorydemocracy,asanalternativetoa

liberaltransitionthatintherealworldof2018hasendedupwithoverwhelming

530

democraticfatigue.Isthispossibleinapre-transitionregimelikeCuba?Ratherthan

jumpingtoaWestminsterdemocracymodel,mayalsoelementsofdeliberativeor

consensusdemocracybeapplicable?

Buildingonthesetheoreticalandempiricalobservations,wemaythenaddressthekey

questionofthisstudy:

Themacro-economicoutcomeattheendoftheRaúlCastroreformerawasquite

depressive,resultingfrompoliticalhesitanceandresistanceagainststructurally

necessarymarketreforms.Investmentsandgrowthhavestayedfarbelowwhatis

requiredtorehabilitatetheeconomy;fiscaldeficitisreachingdangerousdimensions;

GDPisstillonethirdlowerthanthepre-crisislevelofthemid-1980s.Hopesforalife-

savinginjectionthroughforeigninvestments(FDIs)havenotmaterialised.

Paradoxically,familyremittancesmayhaveboostedthenon-statesectorwithtwiceas

muchinvestmentcapitalcomparedtoFDIsgoingtothestatesector,despiteofficial

policyrulingoutforeigninvestmentinthenon-statesector.

RaúlCastro—ratherthanhandingoveracountryonarecoverypathasintendedbyhis

reformprogramme—isendingtwogenerationsofruleinitiatedbythe1959Revolution

withtheworsteconomicandsocialcrisissincethe1990s.Twoofthemainreformaims

wereneverachieved:Therehasbeennoimprovementinfoodself-sufficiencyor

reductionofcurrencydemandingimports,andchronicfoodshortagesarecontinuing.

Aninefficientstatesectorstillhastocopewithalargelyredundantpublicworkforce

receivingsalariesthatcontinuefallingfarshortofsubsistenceneeds,thusforcingmost

publicemployeestoseekadditionalinformalandillegalsurvivaloptions.

Theideologicalresistancetoprivatepropertyandprofit-makingasabasisforbusiness

expansion,hasneverbeengivenup.Mostaccumulatednon-statecapitalthereforestays

unproductive.Alargepartofstatecompaniescontinuesrunningatheavylosses.The

privatesectorhasnotbeenallowedtodevelopinsuchawaythatitmaycompensatefor

redundantpublicjobs.Thissituationwillbecomeevenmoreunsustainablewhenthe

long-postponedabolitionofthedualcurrencysystem–acornerstoneoftheoriginal

reformplan–cannolongerbeputoff.Therearedisastrousestimatesthathalfofall

531

remainingpublicemployeesmayhavetobelaidoffduetotheinflationeffectwhen

monetaryunificationfinallytakesplace.Thisheadache,likesomanyothers,issimply

passedontothepost-Castroleaders.

Privateentrepreneurs,afterallnowoccupyinganincreasingroleintheCubaneconomy,

aresimilarlyandsystematicallyforcedtocommitillegalitiesinordertooperate,i.a.due

tocontinuedbanonwholesalestructuresandarbitrarytaxpolicies.60%oftheprivate

economyhasbeenpushedundergroundtoaninformalandlargelyillicitexistence,thus

escapingthestateregulatorycapacities.

Together,stateemployeesandself-employedformasocio-economicpuzzleofillicit

symbioticinterdependencethatobligesthemajorityoftheCubanpopulationtoexchange

ill-gottengoodsandgains,withthemaintenanceofstateemploymentoftenaslittlemore

thananecessarypartoftheCubanparasiticsurvivalstrategy:publicemployees

embezzlingstateassets,andtheself-employedusingthesestolenassetsorfavours

obtainedthroughbribesintheirbusinesses,and/orstayinginformalandthusunder-

reportingheavilyontheirtaxobligations.Themajorityoftheself-employedareleftto

micro-sizesurvivaland‘savagecapitalism’,constantlyexposedtoharassmentbystate

inspectorsthatplaytheirpartintheparasiticrelationships.Fearof‘kulakization’ofthe

peasants,andofpromotingamiddleclassofentrepreneursfavouringdeepereconomic

andevenpoliticalreforms,hasapparentlybeenattherootofeffortstobackpedalon

marketreforms,nomatterthenegativeeffectoneconomicrehabilitation.

Thereisamoredynamicandsustainablepartofthestatesector,dominatedbymilitary-

managedcorporations.Aninterestingdifferenceisemergingbetweenthissectorwhere

theneedforcomplementaryprivateservicesisrecognizedandpublic-private

partnershipispromoted,andontheothersidethehighlyinefficientrestofthestate

sectorafraidofbeingoutcompeted.Itisnoteworthythatthisrelativelysuccessfulpart

ofthestatesectorisoftenworkingquitecloselywiththemoreentrepreneurialand

professionalpartoftheprivateeconomy.Bothareconcentratedinthemostdynamic

partofthedomesticeconomy:tourism.

ThesocialeffectsofthepeculiartwistsandturnsoftheCubaneconomyarenoless

532

devastating.Tobepoorinitselfishard;tobefallingfromarelativelyacceptablesocio-

economicstatusinacountrywithsmallsocialdifferences,allbroughtaboutbythe

Revolution,toasituationwhereyousimplycannotmakeendsmeetandthesocial

securitynomoreexists,isfarworse.Thisisnotatallcompatiblewiththeideaofsocial

justice,theverybedrockoftheCubanRevolution.Povertyisnowaffectingincreasing

segmentsoftheCubanpopulation.Thisiswhatmarksthegreatdifferencewiththerole

modelsChinaandVietnam,undergoingfardeepermarketreformswithspectacular

growthandupwardsocialmobilityforthelargemajorities.Theseregimesaretherefore

enjoyingahighdegreeofpragmaticacceptance,amissingelementintoday’sCuba.The

informalcharacterofthenon-stateeconomyisalsoblockingtheintroductionofa

rationaltaxsystem,deprivingthestateofsignificantincomeopportunitiesandofan

essentialmeasuretocombattherapidlyincreasingsocialinequalities.

Thereformsstoppedshortofempoweringneweconomicactorsthatmighthave

challengedthepoliticalstructures.Everythinghasbeendonetocounterthelogical

causalimpactofwhatwehavediscussedaschallenge4:politicalimplicationsofsocio-

economicchanges.Therehasbeenacleardifferentiationbetweenearlywinnersandearly

losersofthereforms,withthelattergroupapparentlysupportingthoseforceswithinthe

Partythatwishedtoreversetheentirereformprocess.Thoseturningthereformclock

backbasedonideologicalanti-capitalistresistancemayprobablydosowiththesupport

ofrank-and-fileStateandPartyfunctionariesandthehumblestsectionsofsocietywho

areamongtheearlylosers.Manyofthemareoldpeoplewhoalwayshavebeenthe

staunchestsupportersoftheRevolution.

Auniqueopportunityemergingintheinternationalarenaofthrowingoverboardtheold

imperialistdominance(challenge5)waswastedforthesamereason:fearofgivingup

theolddomesticorder.Whentheimperialistenemyimagestarteddisintegratingwith

thenewUS-Cubanrapprochementandex-PresidentObama’scharmoffensivedirectly

vis-à-vistheCubanpeople,itseemstohavebeenperceivedasathreatthatcoulddeala

fatalblowtotheentirepowermonopolywithitsjustificationofthelimitstocivic-

politicalliberties.ThenPresidentTrumpcamealong,againmakingiteasiertodustoff

thesameenemyimage.Asaconsequence,thetypicalCuban‘UsversusThem’syndrome

ofpastingtheimperialistCIAstamponeverybodywhodarestoexpressanindependent

533

voicewasrevived.Reformstowardsastrengthenedandmoreautonomousciviland

academiccommunity(challenge6)werereversed,andinternalstigmatisation

particularlyofthepro-dialoguepartsofthiscommunitywasintensified.Thebunker

mentalitywasonceagainstrengthened.Theincreasingrejectionofanyalternativesto

statusquodemonstratedthateffortsbyagroupofacademicsandintellectualstoopena

constructivedialoguewithpowerinsidersseemtohavefallenondoughears,confirming

theimpressionofacollectiveautismsyndromeparalysingthepowerelite.Ratherthan

takingnecessarymeasuresintime,thepowerholdersactedliketheostrich:burying

theirheadsinthesand.

AnillusionseemstobelingeringoninHavanathatitisstillpossible,in2018,toruna

countrybyanti-capitalistprinciples,withoutafunctioningmarketeconomy.Itisnow

soon30yearssincetheCouncilforMutualEconomicAssistance(COMECONorCMEA–

towhichCubabelonged)wasdissolved,itismorethan30yearssinceVietnamlaunched

itspro-capitalistDoiMoireforms,anditismorethan40yearssinceDengXiaoping

startedpromotingcapitalisminChina.NorthKorea,theonlyself-declaredsocialist

countryalongwithCubathatuntilnowmaybecharacterizedasanti-capitalist,seemsto

beseriouslyconsideringtheoptionoftradingitsnucleararsenalforcapitalist

developmentandfollowtheexamplesofChinaandVietnam.Thereisincreasingconcern

intheworld–200yearsafterthebirthofKarlMarx–abouttheevilaspectsofglobal

capitalism.ButhardlyanyMarxisteconomistwouldtodayarguethatacountrycan

prosperwithoutoneformofamarketeconomyortheother.Nomatterwhich

transformationmodelbecomesreality–theeconomymustbefixedbyamuchdeeper

marketreform.ThereisnowaytheyoungerCubanleadersmaysquarethecircletoavoid

this.

Stayingpracticallyaloneoutsideofallinternationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs)558,Cuba

iseffectivelycutofffrominternationalsystemsforcreditsandguaranteesthatare

requiredinordertoattractFDIsortorestorethemacro-economicbalance.Theanti-

imperialistcontemptforglobalcapitalistinstitutionsisofcoursepartlyexplainedbythe

558 According to the World Bank website, only Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco, in addition to North Korea and Cuba, are not members of the World Bank Group (comprising 189 nations)

534

USembargo,whichalsoimpliesablockadeagainstCubajoiningtheIFIs.Butevenwhen

theOASin2009votedtowelcomeCubaback,adecisivestepforre-joiningtheInter-

AmericanBank,ideologicalrhetorictookpreferenceoverpragmaticneeds.Cubais

offeringgenerousincentivesandactivelycourtingforeigninvestorsforthesalvationof

theeconomy,whiledomesticcapitalaccumulationisstillillegal,andnon-stateCuban

companiesarelegallyruledoutandsystematicallyvictimized.Thefearoflosingpolitical

controlisparadoxicallydrivingthemarketeconomyunderground,undermining

equalityvaluestoanextremedegree,andeffectivelyundercuttingthepolitical

legitimacy.

RaúlCastro’shistoricalshiftinCuba´sinternationalrolefromananti-imperialist

vanguardtoadiplomaticfacilitatorwasalsoapparentlypushedaside,andtheoldanti-

imperialistrhetoricwasresumed.

Otherpoliticalreforms,liketheunpackingofthetight-knitandhomogenouspower

institutions(challenge7)havebeenavoided.Thealmostcompleteoverlapbetween

PartyPolitburo,topGovernmentexecutivesandtopLegislatureleadershipplusthe

militarycommandwasmaintained.Whatwehavecalled‘the12Apostles’,themajority

ofwhomaremenintheir70sand80switharecordfromtheoriginalrevolutionary

movement(26ofJuly)haverefusedtoleavethestage.Allhopesforamoreopenand

pluralisticpollingprocessduringthe2017/18electionsofthefirstpost-Castro

LegislativeandExecutiveleaderscametonothing:throughasystematicsmear

campaign,allcandidatesnotvettedbytheCommunistPartywereaccusedofbeing

counter-revolutionaryandeffectivelyeliminatedascandidates.

Norealpoliticalparadigmshifthasbeenpermitted,andearlysignstowardsaless

authoritarianpoliticalsystemgraduallyevaporated(challenge8).Theunavoidable

generationalandpolicyrenewalkeptbeingpostponedalmostuntiltheold-guardpower

elitereachedthebiologicalend-station.Thenewgenerationwhoarecarefullypermitted

totakeoverGovernmentleadershipalmostbydefaultin2018istherebybeingridof

anylikelysourceoflegitimacy(challenge9).

535

InasocietywhereanomnipotentStateduringalmosttwogenerationshasbeentaking

theresponsibilitytoguaranteeitscitizensgoodeducationandhealthstandards,with

accesstoameaningfuljobandlifecareer,relativelydecentincomesandsocialsecurity,

whathasbeenexpectedinreturnisatotalloyaltybythecitizenstotheGovernment.

Nowthatneitherofthesefundamentalhumanconditionsmayanymorebefulfilled,the

all-inclusivesocio-economic-cultural-politicalpactisdisintegrating.Themajorityisstill

stayingawayfromadirectconfrontationwiththoseinpower.Morethananything,this

maybeaconsequenceoftheirfearthatalltheiraccumulatedillegalities—wellknownby

theState’spervasivesecurityapparatus—representaSwordofDamoclesthatmayhit

themiftheyopenlyactindefianceoftheloyaltypact.Perhapsthatisalsoareasonwhy

theGovernmentpreferstomaintainasavagepetty-capitalistsystemratherthan

attemptingtoregulatemarketrelationswithinamorefunctionalmixedeconomy.Seen

fromthecitizens,whetherformallybeingstate-employedorself-employed,theyknow

thatthepactwiththestatewasalwaysbasedonapaternalisticgoodwillofFidelandhis

revolutionarygeneration.Itwasnevercodifiedascitizens’rights,andthelossofthe

historicalguaranteesisthereforenotsubjecttoclaimordefencethroughanykindof

legalprocessorpoliticalmobilisation.

Bysummarisingthediscussionoftheninechallengeswitheachtheirhypotheses,wedraw

thefollowingconclusionofthisstudy:

Wewillclaimthatthepotentialforacausalrelationshipbetweeneconomicreformand

politicaltransformationhasbeenconfirmedduringtheseyears.Therestructuringofthe

Cubansocialfabric,broughtaboutbychangingeconomicrealities,haspresentedthe

politicalpowerwithseriouschallengestoallowdecisivepoliticalrestructurationas

well.Thefearforlosingthepoliticalpowermonopolyandseeingarepetitionofwhat

happenedintheUSSRandtheprevioussocialistcampofEurope,isprobablywhathas

convincedtheold-guardconservativesoftheCubanCommunistPartytoreverse

economicreformsthatmightunderminethepoliticalstatusquo.Thismayevenpossibly

havehappenedagainstthewillofPresidentRaúlCastro,butperhapswiththesupportof

Fidelaslongashewasalive,thusprovidingtheconservativeswithapoliticalclout

againstRaúl’sbestreformintentions.

536

Whatwemayconcludeisthatneithereconomicnorpoliticalreformhasgonedeep

enoughtoreallyallowustorespondtotheoverallquestionofthedissertation.Wehave

seenasignificantgrowthofasmall-scaleprivateeconomicsectorchallengingthestate

economicpowermonopoly,withpotentialeffectforthegrowthofamoreautonomous

civilsociety.Significantinformationpluralismhasemerged,perhapsmakingthe

politicalpowermonopolylessrelevantevenwhenitformallypersists.Buttheselater

phenomenaarealsoconsequencesofpoliticalopenings,liketheemigrationreform,the

conversionofsignificantgroupsofurbancitizenstorealestateproprietorsandrural

citizenstoindividuallandtenants,andthegrowingaccesstoInternet.Thelatterhas

hardlybeenavoidable,duetotechnologicaldevelopment.Aswecansee,therearecausal

linksgoingeitherway:alongRoute2aswellasRoute4ofourRoadmap.

Whatweareleftwithisastrongpoliticallymotivatedefforttorejectthelogicalcausal

relationshipbetweeneconomicandpoliticaltransformations.Thiscausedthecounter-

reformthatdominatedthelatest2-3yearsofRaúl’sregime.

AsweillustratedinFigure10.1(reproducedbelow),theclearmovementstowardscellb

(moreeconomicinclusiveness)aswellascelld(morepoliticalinclusiveness)have

causedalarmthatsuchchangemighttriggerfurtherslidestowardscella.Thiswouldde

factomeanthefullintroductionofmarketeconomyandapluri-partysystem,rejected

bothforideologicalreasonsandduetothepowerlogicofaLeninistpoliticalsystem.

Thisiswhathasproducedthecounter-reform,forgingareturntowardscellconthe

economicaswellasthepoliticaldimension:

537

Theoverallresponsetothequestionwesetouttodiscussinthisdissertationistherefore

thatCubaduringduringthefirst7-8yearsoftheRaúlCastrodecadewasmovingtowards

moreeconomicpluralismwithacertaineffectalsoonpoliticalpluralism.Therewasalsoa

certainliberalizationthepoliticalpowerstructureleadingtoacceleratedeconomic

reforms.Duringthelatest2-3yearsoftheRaúlCastroera,however,economicaswellas

politicalreformshavebeenreversed,inanapparentefforttoavoidfurtherslidestowards

marketeconomyandalessauthoritarianpoliticalsystem.

Cubahasanewnon-CastroPresidentfromApril2018:MiguelDíaz-Canel,acivilianfrom

thepost-RevolutiongenerationwhoisnotyetleaderoftheParty,thushavingamuch

narrowerpowerbasethanhispredecessors.Fromtheoutset,hewaspresentedbyhis

mentorRaúlCastroasanheirwhowassystematicallybroughtuptostepinwiththe

purposeofguaranteeingcontinuityandnotransformationoftheCubanpolity.We

assumethatnationalindependenceandsocialjustice–therebuildingofthewelfare

state–remainasoverarchingvaluesandgoalsoftherejuvenatedCubanregime.Wealso

takeitforgrantedthatthereisanaimtobasethisonthehighestpossibledegreeof

politicallegitimacy.Howcanthatbeachieved?

Inthissituationofdesperateneedfornewideasaboutthecountry´sfuture,theParty

givestheimpressionofapparentmonolithicunityaboutnothingbut“continuity”,where

nobodydarestoshowtheircardsorexpressdoubtsaboutthestateofaffairs.Anew

HeadofStateistakingoverfromtheoctogenarianrevolutionarygeneration,without

presentingaprogramoravisionforthefuture,apparentlywithnoclueaboutWhatIs

TobeDone559.Thelackofopendebate,consultationwithdomesticexpertsor

internationalagencies,letalonewiththepopulationatlarge,isleadingtoanopen

questionofhowandwhereanewleadershipmaylookforqualifiedandcomprehensive

newpolicies.

ThebigquestiononDíaz-Canel’swatchwillbewhattodowiththelong-delayed

unavoidableeconomicdecisions,startingwiththecurrencyunification.Thismaysoon

obligehisgovernmentteamtoreviveRaúl´sunfinishedreformagenda:givepeasants

559 Ref. the political pamphlet written by Lenin in 1901

538

andfarmersmoreautonomy,expandtheprivatesectorandthemarketeconomy,

legalizeprivatecompanies,offercooperativesmoreautonomyandastrategicroleinthe

economy.Suchmeasuresmaynowbemoreunavoidablethanever,inordertoprovide

peoplewithfoodonthetable,liveablejobsandahopeforthefutureinalegally

regulatedandlaw-abidingsociety.RaúlCastromaynowsupporthisownoriginalreform

stepsfrombehind,perhapsprovidinghischosensuccessorwithamoresolidpolitical

backingthanwhathehadhimself.Returntotheeconomicreformmodemayalsosetin

motionthepoliticaltransformationsthatwereheldbackduringthetenraulistayears

studiedhere:aRoute2movementaccordingtoourroadmap,theeconomicsleadingto

politicsroute.

If,ontheotherhand,theyoungerleadersfailtorevivethereformagendaandinject

somenewhopeinastagnatingsociety,theyriskprovokingaredefinitionofthe

correlationofpoliticalforces,insuchawaythattheoppositecausallogickicksin:may

thecrisisoflegitimacyorevenhegemonyleadtodissolutionofthepowermonopolyand

therebyopenthegatestoamorecomprehensivemarketeconomy?Alessonlearned

fromtheUSSRdissolutionisthatbyattemptingtopushasideinconsistenciesofpartial

reform,counter-hegemonicthreatsmaybeappearingonthehorizon,causinga

completepoliticalparadigmshift.Inrelationtoourroadmap,thiswouldimplyaRoute4

movementthatwehavecalledthepoliticsfirstleadingtoeconomicslogic.

Despitetheexpectedcontinuity,thenewgenerationofleadersmaybeobligedbyfacts

onthegroundtodefineanewwayforCuba.Acriticaljunctureliketheoneexpectedfor

the2018-2021periodimpliesthatthestagemaybesetforaqualitativelydifferent

institutionaldevelopment,whichmaygiverisetocompletelynew’path-dependent

processes’:decisionstaken,andchoicesmade,duringthecriticaljuncturemayhavea

lastingandlimitingimpactonfutureoptions.ThepreviouscriticaljunctureinCubawas

the1959Revolution.Arewenowawaitinganotherqualitativetransformationofsimilar

dimensions?Aretheresomanystringsattachedtotheselectednewleadershipthattheir

rolewillbepurelytransactional,waitingforotheractorstotakethelead?

Insuchasituation,thepowerofagencyexercisedbynewleadersmaybecomedecisive,

withaspaceformorepragmaticandvoluntaristdecision-makingthatsofarhasbeen

539

blockedbythehistoricalleaders.Whomaybetheagentsofchangeinsuchasituation?

Willtheycomefromyoungerpartycadres,forinstanceprovincialleaders?Istherea

post-revolutionmilitarygenerationreadytostepinwhenRaúlastheguarantorofthe

militaryinstitutionalparty-loyaldisciplinedisappearsalongwithhisgenerationof

generals?Asituationtowatchisalsothedifferenceofinterestandperspectivebetween

‘officersinuniform’and‘officersinguayavera’(i.e.thecorporateleaders).Maynew

actorsoutsideofthepowercirclesfinallygainmoreautonomyandinfluence,for

instancedrawnfromnewalliancesofindependentlyorganizedentrepreneurs,

peasants/farmers,intellectuals,artists,informationworkers,andaboveallan

increasinglyimpatientyouthgeneration?

ThereisstillsomuchuncertaintyabouteventsasCubaismovingfromcastroismto

post-castroism,thatitisworthwhilediscussingalternativescenarios(Chapter12).We

havearguedthattheheavytrendsdiscussedinthisdissertationpointinthedirectionof

a‘socialist’or‘oligarchic’formofneo-patrimonialismasthemostlikelyoutcome,witha

mixtureofRussianandSino-Vietnameseregimerolemodels.Analternativescenario

maybesomeformoftransnationalneo-authoritarianismwiththeUSreturningtoplaya

dominantrole,althoughthismayhavebeenputonholdbytheTrumpadministration.If

MrTrumpsucceedstobringacountrylikeNorthKoreaintothecapitalistworld,may

Cubabethenextonhislist?Will‘thenewdeal’hehasbeenspeakingaboutbeanything

differentfromamini-Florida?Willthatunderanycircumstancesbeaccepted,in

completedisregardofeverythingtheCubanRevolutionhasrepresented?

Wehavealsoarguedthataverydifferentalternativeisperceivable:aparticipatory

democracywithsocio-economicrehabilitationandtherevivalofthewelfarestate.But

thelatteroptionwillrequireaseriesoftransformativedecisionsimplyingpolitical

paradigmshiftslikethosediscussedinChapter11,duringthe2018-2021critical

juncture.Thiswillonlyoccurwithrealignmentsofthepresentpoliticalcorrelationof

forcesinCuba,andprobablyonlyifaseriouscrisisofhegemonyweretoemerge.Short

ofthis,theabolitionoftheLeniniststatestructureishighlyunlikelytooccur.

Wecannotruleoutaworst-casescenario—unfortunatelynotcompletelyimprobableif

deeperreformscontinuetoberejected:theremaybearealdangerofcollapseandstate

540

failure.Raúl’swordsfrom2010maybecomereality:“Eitherwerectify,orthetimeisup

forcontinuingtobalanceontheborderoftheabyss;wesink,andwewillsinktheefforts

ofentiregenerations.”

DuringthelastcoupleofRaúl’spresidencyyears,afterbeginningcarefullytoletthe

spiritofadifferentsocietyoutofthebottle,theold-timersofCuba’sCommunistParty

havebeenstrugglingtoputitbackin.ForthenewPresidenttocontinuethatstruggle

insteadofrespondingtothetemptationsthatyoungCubanshadbeguntogetatasteof,

willnotgodownwell.Mostyouthwouldratherexpecthimtodolikethelumberjack’s

sonintheGrimmBrother’sfairytale:toletthedemonoutofthebottleagainandthus

givingthemahopeforamoreprosperousfuture.

Nowthattheoldpactbetweencitizensandthestateseemtobefallingapartwhilethe

generationthatmadetheRevolutionisreachingtheendoftheroad,anythingmayof

coursehappen.Cubanshavehistoricallysoughttheexitoptionratherthanvoicing

demandorprotest,includingduringtheRaúlCastroera.TheUSsidehasrecently

decidedtoshutthedooronnewCubanimmigrants,whileyoungpeoplefindtheirlife

careersgettingincreasinglygloomyathome.Newleadershavelittletoofferintermsof

anewmerit-basedlegitimacy.ThequestionisthenwhetherCubanyouthwillfinally

raisetheirvoiceanddemandsomekindoftransformative—ratherthanpure

transitional—change.

WhenRaúlCastrosteppeddownasHeadofstateandgovernmentinApril2018,atleast

formallyendinga58-yearlongCastroregime,hehadspenttwoformalperiodsinthese

positions.IfhefoundhisRevolutionontheborderoftheabyssbackin2010,hisreform

erahasfailedtocomeupwiththelife-savingparachute.Thatformidabletaskisnowleft

tohissuccessors.

Endingthisresearchprojectattheentrypointofthecriticaljuncture,makesiteasyto

proposewhatfollow-upresearchcouldconsistof:continuestudyingthecorrelation

betweeneconomicandpoliticalprocessesinthefollowingyears.Perhapsthatmight

provideuswithabetterresponsetothequestionsweraisedfortheRaúlCastroera.

541

Appendix 1:

List of challenges

Challenge1:Significantretreatofthestateintheagriculturalsector,asameasure

tomeetthemassiveneedforincreasedfoodproduction.


fooddistribution.




Indicator1.1:Movementfromstatetonon-statelandtenure?

Indicator1.2:Generalautonomyandsovereigntyforpeasants/farmers?

Indicator1.3:Fromstate-regulatedtomarket-basedcommercialisation?

Indicator1.4:De-bureaucratizationofagriculture?

Indicator1.5:Strengtheningoffamilyfarming?

Indicator1.6:Sufficientfoodsupplytourbanareas,ataffordableprices?

Indicator1.7:Reducedimportdependency?

Challenge2:Looseningofstatecontrolanddominanceoftheeconomy–growthof

non-stateeconomy–aimingatsustainedeconomicgrowthandemployment

generation.

H2.0:statusquo:acontinuationofstatepropertyhegemony,combinedwithanincreasing




economy.

542


Indicator2.1:Explicitpoliticalwilltode-monopolisethestateeconomy?

Indicator2.2:Increasingde-regulationofstatecompanies?

Indicator2.3:Continueddominanceofmilitarycorporations?

Indicator2.4:Transferofworkforcefromthepublicsectortoself-employment?

Indicator2.5:Privateworkforcegainingmoreindependencefromthestate?

Indicator2.6:Growingweightofthenon-statesectorintheCubaneconomy?

Indicator2.7:Growthofanautonomouscooperativesector?

Indicator2.8:Incentives/dis-incentivesforotherpotentialnon-stategrowthinitiatives?

Challenge3:Massiveneedforproductiveinvestmentstospureconomicgrowthand


H3.0.1:statusquo:disincentivesfornon-stateinvestments


corporations;spurringsignificantstatesectorgrowthandemploymentcreationand

macro-economicgrowth

H3.1:Allow/promotediasporainvestmentsaswellasdomesticentrepreneuraccumulation

andinvestment;spurringnon-stategrowthandemploymentcreationandmacro-economic

growth

Indicatorstowatch:

Indicator3.1:FDIsplayinganincreasingroleinCuba´seconomicdevelopment?

Indicator3.2:Familyremittancesandothersourcesofinvestmentpromotingprivate

sectordevelopment?

Indicator3.3:Increaseinothersourcesofforeigncurrency?

Indicator3.4:Increasingpartnershipbetweenforeigninvestorsandnationalenterprises?

Indicator3.5:Capitalformationratioimproving?

Indicator3.6:Creativedestructiontakingplace?

Indicator3.7:Macro-economicoutcomeofthereformera

543

Challenge4:Politicalimplicationsofsocio-economicchanges.

H4.0.1:Consistentlyresistingmoreautonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorsthatcould

followlogicallyfromachangingeconomicarena;thusresistingpoliticaltransformations.

H4.1.1:Economicreformsleadingtonewsourcesofacceptanceforpoliticalstatusquo?

H4.1.2:Acceptingmoreautonomyfornon-stateeconomicactorswithpotentialforpolitical

transformations

Indicatorstowatch:

Indicator4.1:Winnersandlosersofthereformswithconflictingpoliticalinterests

Indicator4.2:Anemergingmiddleclasswithdistinctinterests?

Indicator4.3:Evolutionofsocialconditionsandpreviousegalitarianstructures

Indicator4.4:Privatesectorgainingpotentialpowerposition?

Indicator4.5:Ideologicalacceptance/resistancetoprivatepropertyandenrichment

Indicator4.6:Moreautonomousinterestorganisationpermitted?

Challenge5:Achanginginternationalcontext:HowtoinfluencetheUStoabandon

theembargo/blockade;and/orcompensatetheembargobyhelpofother

internationalalliances.

H5.0:TherelationshipofhostilitytotheUScontinues,thusalsomaintainingthe


H5.1:TherewillbeagradualaccommodationofCuban-USrelationsduringthesecond

presidentialtermofBarrackObama,allowingtheintroductionofmajoreconomicand

politicalreformsaspartofthatprocess.

544

Indicatorstowatch:

Indicator5.1:Cubasearchingforanewinternationalrole

Indicator5.2:US-Cubarelations:TowardstheendoftheembargoandtheCuban“bunker

mentality”justifyinglackofcivicfreedoms?

Indicator5.3:StrengthenedtiestoLatinAmerica—isolationofUSembargopolicy?

Indicator5.4:Improvedrelationstotherestoftheworld?

Indicator5.5:WhatinternationalZeitgeistisframingCubaattheendoftheCastroera?

Challenge6:Emergenceofamorepluralistcivil,academicandmediasociety.


organisationandpublicdebateingeneral.

H6.1:Agradualopeningforaconstructivepublicdebate,withorganisationalexpressions



Indicatorstowatch:

Indicator6.1:Increasingcivilsocietypluralism

Indicator6.2:Moreautonomousroleforacademicsandintellectuals?

Indicator6.3:Churchesplayinganincreasingpoliticalrole?

Indicator6.4:Increasingroleforindependentinformationactors?

Indicator6.5:Morerespectfordissenters?

Indicator6.6:Emerging“agentsofchange”?


(legislativevs.executive)?


roles

545


independentlyoftheExecutive

Indicatorstowatch:

Indicator7.1:CommunistPartyshowinganysignofopeningup?

Indicator7.2:WilltherebeanyvisiblestepsawayfromtheCommunistPartypower

monopoly?

Indicator7.3:HowrepresentativearemembersandleadersoftheCommunistParty?

Indicator7.4:MoredifferentiationbetweenPartyandStatefunctionsandleaders?

Indicator7.5:AnychangeintheroleoftheMilitary?

Indicator7.6:Bureaucracyremainingasbarriertoreforms?

Challenge8:Movestowardsalessauthoritarianandmorepluralistpolitical

system?


H8.1:Significantpoliticalreformsbeingintroduced.

Indicatorstowatch:

Indicator8.1:Newideologicaltrends?

Indicator8.2:Apoliticalevolutiontowardsmoreliberalregimecharacteristics?

Indicator8.3:LessauthoritariancultureinsidetheCommunistParty?

Indicator8.4:Theroleofpro-regimemassorganisationmobilisation.

Indicator8.5:Anysignofamoreopen/pluralisticelectionprocess?

Indicator8.6:Improvedruleoflawperformance?




546



builtonperformance.




Indicatorstowatch:


renewal?

Indicator9.2:HowthoroughrenewalofStateleaders(2013and2018)?

Indicator9.3:Reformcontinuityorcounter-reform?

Indicator9.4:Newsourceoflegitimacyemerging?

Indicator9.5:VoiceorExit?

547

Appendix 2:

Note on sources

ThisdissertationistheproductofalongjourneythroughtheCubanpoliticallandscape,

actuallygoingallthewaybacktomyfirststayinCubainthelate1970s.Mostofthe

material,however,isobviouslycollectedduringthetenyearsdealtwith—2008-2018.

Duringtheseyears,theauthorhasvisitedCubaonnumerousoccasionseveryyear,

discussedrelevantissueswithalargenumberofCubansfromallwalksoflife,

participatedinseminarsandworkshops,workedmoredirectlywithCubanandnon-

Cubancolleagues,readdraftsandfinalarticles,hadaccesstoinformaldiscussions

amongCubanscholarsthattheynormallywouldbequitecarefultoletforeignerslisten

to.Thelevelofconfidencethusshowntomecannotbeabused.

Forthisreason,therearerelativelyfewformalinterviews,recordedandusedthrough

directquotes.Inmanycases,Icannotrevealtheexactidentityofsources,forobvious

reasonsgiventhecharacteristicsoftheCubanpoliticalsystem.

Inthefollowing,thereisalistofpersonswithwhomIhavehadrelevantacademic

conversations,inmanycasesonseveraloccasions,inmanycasesbothoralandbye-

mail.IhavenotmadeformalinterviewswithCubanofficials,simplybecauseIhavenot

hadanacademicvisagivingmeaccesstosuchinterviews,butalsobecausesuch

interviewsinCubaarenormallyoflimitedvalue.Thereareofcoursealonglistof

quotationsfrompublicspeechesandinterviews,appropriatelyreferredtointhetext.

ListofCubanconversationpartners:

CarlosAlzugaray,ex-Ambassador,co-PresidentofCubachapterofLASA(LatinAmerica

StudiesAssociation).

DomingoAmuchastegui,ex-intelligenceanalyst,CubanMinistryofForeignAffairs,now

residinginMiamiandstillwritingextensivelyaboutCubancurrentaffairs.

548

LuísBérrizPérez,President,Cubasolar(NGOworkingforrenewableenergy).

HaroldCárdenas,Politicalscientist,DirectoroftheJóvenCubaassociation,nowPhD

scholaratColumbiaUniversity,NewYork.

ArmandoChaguaceda,Politicalscientist,UniversityofGuanajuato/Mexico.

IlianaDíazFernandez,Economist,CEEC.

ElaineDíazRodríguez,Director,PeriodismodeBarrio.

LaritzaDiversent,LawyerandDirectorofCubalexLegalAdviceCentre,since2017forced

toleaveCubaandsetuptheCentreinexileintheUS.

ReinaldoEscobar,Journalist14ymedio,Havana.

OscarEspinozaChepe,lateCubaneconomistandpoliticalprisoner.

KarinaGálves,economistandleaderofCentrodeEstudiosConvivencia,in2017

sentencedtothreeyearsinprison.

NoraGámezTorres,JournalistMiamiHerald/ElNuevoHerald,PhDinMusic

AnthropologyCityUniversityofLondon.

AniciaGarcíaÁlvarez,economist,ProfessorUniversityofHavana,ex-DirectorCEEC.

OsielGouneo,BalletDancerwhomigratedtoNorway,nowperformingattheOsloOpera.

LenierGonzalez,Sub-DirectorGeneralofCubaPosible.

RafaelHernandez,EditorofRevistaTemas(publishedbytheMinistryofCulture).

549

EduardoLamora,filmdirectorlivinginParis(Norwegian-Cubancitizen).

MiriámLeiva,freelancejournalist,co-founderofDamasenBlanco,widowoflateCuban

economistOscarEspinozaChepe.

MaxLesnick,journalistlivinginMiami,closefriendofFidelCastro,AlfredoGuevara,José

RamónMachadoVenturaandotherCubanleaders,relationsgoingbacktocommon

studentstrugglesagainstBatista.

ArturoLópez-Levy,Politicalscientist,nowteachingatUniversityofTexas,US.

IdaelMárquezArtiaga,self-employedentrepreneur,PinardelRio.

PedroMonreal,economist,ex-CEEC,DirectorAcadémicoCubaPosible,officialatUnesco

(Paris).

EmilioMorales,ex-officialCIMEX,nowDirectorofHavanaConsultingGroup,Miami.

YailenisMulet,economist,previouslyresearcheratCEEC.

ArmandoNova,agriculturaleconomist,CIEIandex-CEEC,bothoftheUniversityof

Havana.

LilianaNúñezVelis,President,FundaciónAntonioNúñezJiménez(environmentalNGO)

LeonardoPadura,Cubannovelist.

JaimeOrtega,Cardinalandex-ArchbishopofHavana.

YaimaPardo,blogger.

OmarEverlenyPérez,economistex-CEEC(alsopreviouslyCEECDirector),in2016

suspendedfromhisresearcherpositionthere.

550

YasminPortales,blogger,ObservatorioCríticodeCuba.

EmmaProenzaSuárez,ownerofBed&Breakfastbusiness.

RobertoRobaina,ex-MinisterofForeignAffairs,removedfromthispositionin1999and

latermadealivingasaprivaterestaurantowner.

AlejandroRodríguezRodríguez,independentjournalistandblogger.

NorgesRodríguez,blogger(nowlivingintheUS).

PabloRodríguez,anthropologist,Professor,AnthropologyInstitute,MinistryofScience,

TechnologyandEnvironment.

LeydisRosaenz,lawyer,PartnerandCubarepresentativeofQR-legal(Germanlawfirm).

CarlosSaladrigas,Cuban-AmericanbusinessmaninMiami,supportingentrepreneurial

trainingthroughCatholicChurchandactivelylobbyingfordiasporainvestments.

YoaniSánchez,journalistandDirectorof14ymedio,Havana.

RicardoTorres,economist,CEEC.

TaylorTorres,blogger(nowlivingintheUS).

JuanTrianaCordoví,economist(andEx-Director),CEEC.

RobertoVeiga,DirectorGeneralofCubaPosible.

PavelVidalAlejandro,economistex-CEEC,professorPontificiaUniversidadJaveriana,

Cali,Colombia.

ReinaldoVivasZerquera,restaurantowner,Trinidad.

551

PlusalargenumberofCubanswhoremainanonymous.

Listofnon-Cubanconversationpartners:

ClaesBrundenius,Economist,ProfessorEmeritus,UniversityofLund.

JoséChofreSirvent,DirectorAcadémico,DepartamentodeEstrudiosJurídicosdel

Estado,UniversityofAlicante(Spain)(responsibleforalong-termcollaborationwith

Cubanuniversities).

GuyCristophe,FirstSecretary,EmbassyofFranceinHavana.

SamuelFarber,PoliticalScientistofCubanorigin,ProfessorEmeritus,BrooklynCollege

oftheCityUniversityofNewYork.

RichardFeinberg,LatinAmericaInitiativeatBrookingsInstitution,WashingtonDC(ex-

SpecialAssistanttoPresidentBillClinton).

MarcFrank,ThomsonReuterscorrespondentinHavana,livingtheresincethe1990s.

FabioGoebel,HeadofBusinessDevelopment,Odebrecht,Cuba.

BerntHagtvet,PoliticalScientist,ProfessorEmeritusUniversityofOslo.

TedHenken,Sociologist,Professor,BaruchCollege,CityUniversityofNewYork.

EricHershberg,Politicalscientist,ProfessorofAmericanUniversity(WashingtonDC).

BertHoffmann,Politicalscientist,GermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudies(GIGA),

Hamburg.

552

JanToreHolvik,ex-NorwegianAmbassadorinHavana.

JonasLovén,SwedishAmbassadorinHavana.

AndrewMacDonald,BritishInvestorinrenewableenergysector.

JavierMerinoCondado,Counsellor,EmbassyofSpaininCuba.

IngridMollestad,NorwegianAmbassadorHavana.

DagNagoda,ex-FirstSecretary,NorwegianEmbassy,Havana.

JohnPetterOpdahl,ex-NorwegianAmbassador,Havana.

ManuelOrozco,Inter-AmericanDialogue,WashingtonDC.

PhilipPeters,Ex-CubaadvisorUSStateDepartment,PartneratD17Strategies

(WashingtonDC).

MatthewPickles,HavanarepresentativeofErnstandYoung.

FernandoRavsberg,Uruguayanjournalist,basedinCubasincemanyyearsago,ex-

correspondentofBBC,regularlypublishingopinionarticlesthroughhisblog

http://cartasdesdecuba.com

ArchibaldRitter,economist,ProfessorCarletonUniversity,Canada(ref.hisCubablog:

https://thecubaneconomy.com).

OlleTörnquist,Politicalscientist,ProfessoratUniversityofOslo.

JoséMaríaViñals,Lawyer,PartnerandRepofDespachodeLupicinioAbogados(Spanish

lawfirminHavana,representingseveralmajorforeigninvestors).

553

LaurenceWhitehead,Politicalscientist,Professor,Dept.ofPolitics,NuffieldCollege,

OxfordUniversity.

StåleWig,Socialanthropologist,UniversityofOslo,PhDcandidate.

Writtenpublicationsquoted:

14ymedio,digitaldaily,editedinHavana,mostoftennotaccessibleonthepublicCuban

Internet(www.14ymedio.com).

ASCENews,newsclippingserviceprovidedbyASCE(AssociationfortheStudyofthe

CubaEconomy),editedinMiamiandsentforfreebye-mailtoallsubscribers

AssociatedPress,US-basednewsagencywithpermanentrepresentationinHavana

BBCNews(website,oftenbasedonreportsfromBBCHavanaCorrespondent)

Bohemia.

CaféFuerte,newsandinformationsite(http://cafefuerte.com)editedbyCuban

journalistsresidingintheUS,offeringitsspacetoindependentCubanjournalistsliving

andworkinginCuba.

CartasdesdeCuba,blogpublishedbyUruguayanjournalistFernandoRavsberg(seenon-

Cubanconversationpartners)(http://cartasdesdecuba.com).

ConvivenciaCetrodeEstudios,oppositionthink-tank;itsnewofficeinPinardelRío

boughtinthenameofKarinaGálvezin2017wasconsideredasillegallyacquired,Mrs

Gálvezsentencedtothreeyearsinprison(http://convivenciacuba.es).

CubaContemporánea,Cubanculturalreviewwithrootsbackto1913.

554

Cuba-economía,ablogpublishedbytheCubaneconomistEliásAmorBravo,residingin

Madrid(http://cuba-economia.blogspot.no).

Cubadebate,aCubanwebsite(www.cubadebate.cu)mostlycontainingofficial

informationandopinionsheldbyPCChardliners.

Cubaencuentro,describingitsmissionas“analysisandreflectiononthetransnational

Cubancommunity”(https://www.cubaencuentro.com).

Cubainsidetheworld,English-languageofficialCubanwebsite

(https://cubainsidetheworld.wordpress.com).

CubaPosible,websiteeditedbyThinkTankofthesamename(www.cubaposible.com).

Cubaprofunda,(https://cubaprofunda.wordpress.com),websitewithcloselinksto

MinistryofCulture

CubaStandard,Miami-baseddigitalnewsserviceonCubaneconomy

(https://www.cubastandard.com).

Cubanálisis,aMiami-basedthinktankmanagedbytheexiledCubaneconomistEugenio

Yáñez(http://www.cubanalisis.com).

CubaNet,digitalnewsserviceeditedinMiami(www.cubanet.org),

frequentlyusedaspublicationchannelforindependentCubanjournalists

DiariodeCuba(DDC),informationwebsiteeditedinMiami(www.diariodecuba.com).560

DiariolasAméricas,DailynewspaperspecialisingonLatinAmerica,publishedinMiami

(https://www.diariolasamericas.com).

560AccesstoDCCinCubawasblockedin2017,butawayaroundthismeasurewaslaterannouncedthroughthedownloadingofaspecialsoftware(ref.DDC12.01.18).

555

TheDiplomatMagazine,internationalaffairsmagazinespecialisingontheAsia-Pacific

region.

EconomicTrendReport,quarterlypublicationbyCubaStandardEconomicReports,co-

authoredbytheColombia-basedCubaneconomistPavelVidalandthebusiness

journalistJohannesWerner,publishingitsowneconomicactivityindexasa

compensationforheavylimitationsanddelaysinthepublicationofpublicstatisticsin

Cuba.

EcuRed,pseudo-academicwebsitewithaneditoriallineclosetotheofficialpartyline,

alsohostingthevirtualjournalCubaContemporánea(www.ecured.cu).

EFE,SpanishinternationalnewsagencywithpermanentpresenceinHavana

ElEstadocomotal,privateblogbyeconomistPedroMonreal

(https://elestadocomotal.com/).

ElNuevoHeraldo,dailyeditedandpublishedinMiami(inSpanish)withwidecoverage

onCuba(www.elnuevoherald.com)(ref.English-languagedailyMiamiHerald).

ElPaís,Spanishdaily,previouslywithfrequentcoveragebyfull-timecorrespondentin

Havana,whowasexpelledfromHavanain2011andhasneverbeenreplaced.

EngageCuba,aUScoalitionofprivatecompanies,organisations,andlocalleaders

lobbyingfortheliftingofUSembargoagainstCuba:(www.engagecuba.org/).

EspacioLaical,Catholicculturalmagazine(http://espaciolaical.net).

GacetaOficial,CubanGovernment´sofficialannouncementsite(www.gacetaoficial.cu).

GlobalPost,anonlineUSdigitaljournalismcompany,(http://www.globalpost.com/).

Granma,officialorganoftheCubanCommunistParty(www.granma.cu).

556

TheGuardian(London).

HavanaTimes,independentCubanblogandmagazineeditedinNicaragua

(https://www.havanatimes.org).

Inter-PressService(IPS),ThirdWorldnewsagency,HavanaBureau

(http://www.ipscuba.net).

MartíNoticias,webservice(www.martinoticias.com)editedinMiami(ref.alsoRadio

andTVMartí),financedbytheUSGovernment.

MiamiHerald,dailyeditedandpublishedinMiamiwithwidecoverageonCuba

(www.miamiherald.com)(ref.Spanish-languagedailyElNuevoHerald).

TheNewYorkTimes(NewYork).

ObservatoryonEconomicFlexibility,toolforcountryeconomicanalysis

(https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/cub/).

OnCubaMagazineandOnCubawebsite(www.oncubamagazine.com),publishedbya

Cuban-AmericanmediagroupbasedinNevada(managedbyHugoCancio),with

permanentanddulyaccreditedcorrespondentofficeinHavana.Themagazineis

availablefreeofchargeonmostflightsfromtheUStoCuba.Cubanjournalistsand

scholarsarefrequentlycontributingtoOnCuba.561

PalabraNueva,JournaloftheArchbishop’sofficeinHavana(http://palabranueva.org).

Postdata,amultidisciplinaryteamofbloggers“whichwishestotellstoriesfromCuba

basedontheinterpretationofavarietyofsources”(http://www.postdata.club/).

ProgresoSemanal,“anindependentpublicationofaprogressivecharacter”,published

561InaninternalspeechinFebruary2017,thenFirstVicePresidentDíazCanelattackedthemagazineandsaiditwasgoingtobeclosed.Thisneverhappened.

557

onlineinMiamiwithfrequentarticlesbyprominentCubaneconomists

(http://progresosemanal.us).

ThomsonReuter,HavanaBureau(i.a.withtheseniorforeigncorrespondentinHavana,

MarcFrank)(ref.alsoReutersBusinessNews).

USAToday(Virginia,USA).

WashingtonPost(WashingtonDC).

558

559

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Appendix 4:

List of acronyms

ACHN: Asociación Cubana de Hombres de Negocios

ALBA : Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América

ANAP: Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos (National Association of Small

Agriculturalists)

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASCE: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy

BNDES: Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento (Brazil’s state development bank)

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CABEI: Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE in Spanish)

CAF: Corporación Andina de Fomento

CBO: Community Based Organisation

CCS: Cooperative of Credit and Services

CDR: Comité de Defensa de la Revolución (Neighbourhood Committees)

CEEC: Centre for the Study of the Cuban Economy

CELAC: Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

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CEPAL: Comisión Económica (de la ONU) para América Latina y el Caribe (English:

ECLAC)

CIEI: Centro de Investigación sobre la Economía Internacional

CIEM: Centro de Investigación de la Economía Mundial

CIMEX: Cuban Import-Export Corporation (military-controlled conglomerate)

CENISEX- Centro Nacional de Educación Sexual de Cuba

CNA: Cooperativas No-Agrícolas (Non-Agricultural Cooperatives)

COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Aid (English acronym: CMEA) – the previous

Soviet-bloc economic cooperation community

CPA: Cooperativa de Producción Agropecuaria (Agricultural Production Cooperative)

CPI: Corruption Perception Index

CTC: Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (Cuba´s Trade Union Confederation)

CUPET: Unión Cuba-Petroleo (Cuba’s State Oil Company)

DGI: Dirección General de Inteligencia (Cuba’s main state intelligence agency, under the

Ministry of the Interior – MININT)

ECLAC: UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Spanish: CEPAL)

EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit

ETECSA: Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (Cuba’s state monopoly

telecommunication service provider)

584

FAR: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Cuba’s Armed Forces)

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FEU: Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios

FLACSO: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales

FMC: Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (Cuba’s Women Federation)

GA: General Assembly

GAESA: Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (main business conglomerate of Cuba’s

Armed Forces)

GARE: Gabinete de Redimensionamento Empresarial (Angola)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GDR: (former) German Democratic Republic

GESPI: Government Employee with Significant Private Income

GPCL: General Principles of Civil Law (China)

HDI: Human Development Indicator

IADB: Inter-American Development Bank (also often known as IDB)

ICA: International Cooperative Alliance

ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESC: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

585

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDB: Inter-American Development Bank (Spanish: BID)

IFI: International Financial Institution

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IMTC: International Money Transfer Conferences

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization

KGB: the former USSR Intelligence and Security Police

MINAG: Ministerio de Agricultura

MINCIN: Ministerio de Comercio Interior

MINEM: Ministerio de Energía y Minas

MINFAR: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Ministry of Defence)

MININT: Ministry of the Interior

MINT: México, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding

MSME: Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

NEP: New Economic Policy (USSR under Lenin)

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

586

NUPI: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs

OAS: Organization of American States (Spanish: OEA)

OEC: Observatory of Economic Complexity

OEE: Organizaciones Económicas Estatales

ONEI: Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (Cuba’s Buro of Statistics)

OSDE: Organización Superior de Dirección Empresarial

PCC: Partido Comunista de Cuba

PURC: Cuba’s Communist Party in the 1940s

REDFE: Red de Facilitadores Electorales

SEF: Programa de Saneamiento Económico y Financiero (Angola)

SEZ: Special Economic Zone

SME: Small and Medium Enterprise

SNTHT: Tourism and Hotel Workers Union (affiliated to CTC)

SPE: Sistema de Perfeccionamiento Empresarial

SUIN: Cuban national ID system

SUM: Centre for Development and the Environment (affiliated to the University of Oslo)

TCP: Trabajador por Cuenta Propia (Cuban Self-Employed Worker, with a special license)

587

TI: Transparency International

UBPC: Unidad Básica de Producción Cooperativa (a “collective” largely state-controlled

cooperative)

UJC: Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (Cuba’s Communist Youth League)

UNA: Unión Nacional de Acopio (the Centros de Acopio is the state system of purchase and

distribution of agricultural products)

UNASUR: Union of South American Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Program (Spanish: PNUD)

UNESCO: United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization

UPEC: Unión de Periodistas de Cuba (Cuba‘s Journalist Union)

UPR: Universal Periodic Review (country-by-country human rights assessment mechanism

under the UN Human Rights Council)

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics = ex-Soviet Union

VCCI: Vietnam’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry

WB: World Bank

WFP: World Food Programme (Spanish: PMA)

ZEDM: Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel