The Expansion of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the 1950s

Great Powers in the Middle EastGalen JacksonApril 15, 2014

Agenda

• Background• Ike’s “New Look” in the Middle East• The Baghdad Pact and Tensions with the Arabs• The Road to the Suez Crisis and Its Aftermath • Eisenhower Doctrine• Israel, the Bomb, and the United States (to be

continued April 22)

The Setting

• 1949 Armistice Agreements—“no peace, no war”

• An uneasy status quo

• Instability in the Arab world

• Rise of Nasser/Pan-Arab Nationalism

Britain and France in Decline

The “New Look” and the Middle East

The Eisenhower/Dulles Strategy

• Containment—Middle East of major geopolitical significance (oil for W. Europe)

• Israel and the colonial powers: American liabilities

• Resolve conflict/move closer to Arabs to strengthen regional position

• Focus on anticommunism/USSR ignores regional forces/intra-Arab divisions

Nasser’s Egypt

U.S. Dilemmas in the Arab World

• Split in the American government—Egypt vs. Iraq

• Importance of a Middle East NATO: Baghdad Pact

• Polarization of Arab World/Egyptian-Czech Arms Deal

The Soviet Union in the Middle East

• First country to extend de jure recognition to Israel—socialist ideology attractive

• Quick policy reversal—Israel’s condemnation of North Korea, acceptance of American aid, anti-Semitism

• Opportunity to outflank NATO and the “northern tier” and undercut Baghdad Pact

A Second Try with Nasser

“A Complete Stumbling Block”

• Nasser’s refusal of the initial offer

• Johnston/Anderson Missions

• Dangerous “neutralism”—Nasser joins NAM

• American domestic politics

• Nasser’s recognition of Communist China

Nasser’s Stunning Riposte

The American Response

• Focus shifts to containment of Nasser

• But will not sanction an Anglo-French military response

• Diplomatic efforts become a charade

Anglo-French-Israeli Collusion

Tripartite War Aims

Ike’s Furious Reaction

• Resentful of timing—election and Hungary

• Blatantly imperialist/opens door to USSR

• Kept in the dark

• Potential superpower confrontation

• Totally inappropriate/UN considerations

A Case of Successful Coercion

• Economic pressure on Britain and France

• Public condemnation of the attack

• Linkage of American public/private aid to Israel

• Delay in emergency oil shipments

• Soviet threats

The American-Israeli Standoff

Significance of the Suez Crisis• Ironically, a more stable status quo (UNEF)

• 1957 American aide-mémoire (critical in 1967)

• Destruction of British and French influence in the Middle East/blow to the Western alliance

• Nasser the big winner; USSR also benefits

• Lesson for Israel: no withdrawal without concessions

• Lesson for Arabs: the U.S. will take care of it

A New Policy

The Eisenhower Doctrine

• Power vacuum created—still want to contain Nasser

• Exclusive focus on Communist/USSR threat

• Repeated errors of Baghdad Pact—again bogged down in intra-Arab squabbling/anti-Nasser result

• Lebanon Intervention and Iraq Coup (1958)

Summing Up the 1950s• Decline of European great powers

• Cold War comes to the Middle East

• Eisenhower consistent, focused, anti-communist, and impartial, but undermined by simplicity/misunderstanding of Arab world

• American impartiality on the Arab-Israeli conflict proved ineffective because the United States faced a divided Arab world and due to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism— could not be organized into an anti-Soviet bloc even with U.S. overtures to the Arabs

• Rise of Arab nationalism (e.g. UAR, 1958-1961)

A Missing Piece of the Puzzle: The Beginnings of Israel’s Nuclear Program

Israel’s Quest for the Ultimate Insurance Policy

Israel’s French Connection

• “A passionate love affair”

• Dimona

• Ike’s approach to proliferation/discovery of the site/Israel as a special case

• Ben-Gurion’s acknowledgement (Dec. 1960)

A New Administration

Kennedy’s Nuclear Policy

• Must be understood in a global context

• Initially unconcerned—Waldorf-Astoria meeting (May 30, 1961), inspections regime

• By 1963 there is a marked shift—Ben Gurion’s resignation

• Heading toward confrontation when JFK assassinated; Eshkol’s acceptance of inspections

Moving toward Acceptance (to be continued April 22)

• American conventional arms for Israel—perhaps linked to nuclear issue; non-introduction pledge

• LBJ less concerned with nonproliferation and not willing to have a confrontation; China angle

• Arabs unconcerned until 1965-1966

• Result: Israel gets the bomb/amimut

• Possible factor in May/June 1967 (operational/target)

On Thursday

• Kennedy and LBJ

• Causes and Consequences of the June 1967 Six-Day War

• United Nations Resolution 242

Questions?

Thank You!