The Final Settlement Issues - Center for Strategic and International

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War –Palestinian Factions Aligned with Arafat and the PA 1/19/2005 Page i

CSIS_______________________________

Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270

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Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War

Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and

Correction

The Final Settlement Issues: Asymmetric Values and

Asymmetric Warfare

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

Center for Strategic and International Studies

With the Assistance of Jennifer K. Moravitz

January 13, 2005

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution.

mailto:[email protected]

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War –Palestinian Factions Aligned with Arafat and the PA 1/19/2005 Page ii

Introduction

The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of the CSIS.


Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War –Palestinian Factions Aligned with Arafat and the PA 1/19/2005 Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

V. THE FINAL SETTLEMENT ISSUES: ASYMMETRIC VALUES AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE......1

THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA AS A “HAVE NOT” POWER ...........................................................................................3 THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT ISSUES ..............................................4 THE PROBLEM OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN ...............................................................................6 THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMICS ..................................................................................................................................9 THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM.................................................................................................................................11 THE PROBLEM OF WEST BANK SECURITY ...............................................................................................................15 THE PROBLEM OF WATER........................................................................................................................................17


Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War –Palestinian Factions Aligned with Arafat and the PA 1/19/2005 Page 1

IV. The Final Settlement Issues: Asymmetric Values and Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare is almost always the result of fundamentally asymmetric values that

one or both sides come to believe cannot be reconciled through negotiations alone. This is

certainly the case in the Israeli-Palestinian War. The fighting that began in September 2000 was

driven by factors like the continued development of settlements and of terrorism. It was also,

however, driven by a wide range of “final settlement” issues.

The Israelis and Palestinians had deeply asymmetric goals and expectations over key

issues in Jerusalem. The period between the Oslo Accords and the beginning of the Israeli-

Palestinian War is also a history of times when a facade of hopes and good intentions was

substituted for serious negotiations over final settlement issues. Very real progress was made, but

it occurred too slowly and often focused on minor issues while disguising the depth of the failure

to shape a common understanding of just how serious the remaining differences were.

Too many direct and implied promises were made at the start of the negotiations, and too

little was delivered. Israel made major economic progress that was not accompanied by major

benefits for the Palestinians. Arguments over territory were bogged down in details and were too

slow to address fundamental issues. The peoples on both sides were never really educated to

fully understand the other side’s values and the limits to the other side’s ability to make

concessions. The average Israeli and Palestinian never truly came to understand the level of

compromise that would have to be made. Ultimately, the peace process became a race against a

deteriorating political reality in which the negotiations were either going to collapse, or the sheer

momentum of rapid negotiation over fundamental differences had to push both sides to build

sudden bridges across years of delay.

In retrospect, the Israeli-Palestinian War was driven by a “peace process” that moved far

too slowly in dealing with land and settlement issues to meet Palestinian expectations. As

Chapter III shows, it also did far too little to meet Israeli expectations regarding security and

putting an end to Palestinian acts of terrorism. The end result was that the peace process failed to

meet the expectations of both the Palestinians and Israelis in the areas most fundamental to

winning public support, while delaying negotiation on virtually every final settlement issue.



These negotiations on final settlement issues did come, but they came far later than

originally planned. Between July 11 and July 24, 2000, U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian delegations

led by President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak, and Chairman Arafat, gathered at Camp David

in an attempt to reach an agreement on final status issues. According to a report in the New York

Times, Prime Minister Barak offered the Palestinians partial sovereignty over East Jerusalem in

exchange for broadening the geographical boundaries of the city to include a number of Jewish

settlements.

At the end, the Camp David talks failed despite some important progress. The parties

issued a trilateral statement on July 25, 2000. They declared that they were unable to bridge the

gaps, both Israelis and Palestinians subsequently blamed the other party for the failure of the

talks. Barak issued a statement alleging that, “Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions

necessary.”1 Israelis charged that Palestinian inflexibility, “in particular the positions presented

by…Arafat with regard to Jerusalem, prevented the achievement of an agreement.” It also

blamed “the leadership of the Arab world [who] did not provide Arafat with sufficient backing

for a more flexible stance.”2

Statements by Palestinian leaders confirmed that Jerusalem was a key source of

contention, although there had been disagreements over other issues, such as the right of return

for Palestinian refugees. According to Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), “the Palestinian

negotiators are not willing to sign an agreement that does not include Jerusalem or one which

does not preserve [Palestinian] rights in the city as they were in June 1967.” On the refugee

issue, Abu Mazen added, “the Palestinian delegation refused to set a certain number for refugees

that would be allowed to return, even if they offered three million refugees. We told them

(Israelis) that we want them to recognize the principle (the right of return).”3 Other Palestinian

leaders echoed Mazen’s reaction, including Hanan Ashrawi and Nabil Sha’ath, both of whom

said that the Israeli position at the Camp David II talks fell far short of the minimum acceptable

to Palestinians.4

It is important to note, however, that the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did

not bring a halt to the peace process. As is described later in Chapter V, Israel and the

Palestinians held follow-on talks at Taba in 2001 and made substantial further progress in

dealing with even the most sensitive issues dividing the two peoples. One can only speculate



what might have happened if settlement activity had halted, or the Israeli government had shown

the same willingness to compromise a few years prior to when the Barak government did at

Camp David and at Taba. Likewise, the same type of question can be applied to what would

have happened if the Palestinians had done more to crack down on terrorism and had truly

recognized Israel’s right to exist. As the following chapters show, it is impossible to blame either

side for the war that followed but it is all too easy to blame both.

The Palestinian Dilemma as a “Have Not” Power It is scarcely surprising that most of the violence that shaped the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict originated on the Palestinian side. Israel was the “have” power and the occupier. It had

vastly superior conventional military strength and nearly virtually all of the major areas in

dispute. It could take reprisals for attacks on Israelis by using military force, as well as imposing

economic sanctions and limiting Palestinian movement. Israel’s values centered around the

search for security against foreign and domestic enemies, putting an end to terrorism, and

winning Israel lasting security in dealing with both the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab

world.

Israel sought peace, but it also sought to maintain control over all of the urban area of

Jerusalem, acceptance of adjustments to its 1967 boundaries that gave it an improved security

position, a lasting security presence in a demilitarized West Bank and Gaza, the preservation of

many of its settlements, and security guarantees for any settlements that remained in Palestinian

territory. It wanted to preserve the Jewish character of Israel and sharply limit – if not prevent –

any return by Palestinians to Israel proper. These issues did not, however, threaten Israel or give

it reason to turn away from the peace process.



The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement Issues In contrast, the uncertain evolution of a Palestinian government on the West Bank took

place in a climate where the Palestinians were clearly the “have nots.” The “final settlement”

negotiations over Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank were supposed to begin in 1996, and

lay the groundwork for resolving the issue of Palestinian sovereignty. However, Israel and the

Palestinian Authority made little progress between September 1995 and when the Wye River

Memorandum concluded in November 1998. While limited progress was made in 1999 and

2000, the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000 marked the first truly serious effort to deal

with final settlement negotiations and came four years after the time they should have begun.

This does not mean that progress did not take place towards creating a Palestinian state.

The Palestinian Authority developed a functional chief executive and an elected 82 member

Palestinian Council.5 The Palestinian Authority acquired the power to tax, to zone land, to

control some aspects of communications, to control local radio and TV broadcasts, to regulate

many aspects of commerce, to issue passports, to have foreign currency reserves, to enter into

some types of international agreements, and to set up courts and enforce their judgments over

Palestinians.6

Nevertheless, Israel and the Palestinian Authority never fully resolved the issue as to how

Palestinians could become fully independent, although Camp David and Taba made several

potential breakthroughs. Much of the reason for the delay was the result of Israeli politics, the

assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and the election of Binyamin Netanyahu. The election of Ehud

Barak on May 17, 1999 changed this situation, but did not lead to serious negotiations over the

final settlement issues until Camp David, or even to some form of Palestinian statehood. Barak

was considerably more receptive to negotiations over statehood than his predecessor Binyamin

Netanyahu had been.7 For example, Barak said in an NBC interview on July 18, 1999 that he

generally supported a Palestinian state, but he asked Arafat to delay a declaration until after a

final settlement, and that the creation of such a state was conditional on the success of peace

negotiations.8

This issue remained unresolved as Israel and the Palestinians moved towards full-scale

war. During the prime ministerial election campaign in 2001, Ariel Sharon supported a



Palestinian state, although he kept his views on what such a state should look like deliberately

vague. In an interview with the Israeli daily Maariv published a month after his election, Sharon

conceded that he was willing to recognize a demilitarized Palestinian state in less than half the

size of the West Bank—although this was considerably less than what Ehud Barak had offered at

Camp David. Sharon referred to Barak’s offer to cede to the Palestinians over 90 percent of the

West Bank as a “horrible mistake,” and told the newspaper that he was willing to offer the

Palestinians up to 42 percent of the West Bank as part of a peace deal.9

The issue of statehood also continued to interact with other equally serious problems in

the Greater Jerusalem area, Gaza and the West Bank, where both Israelis and Palestinians had

asymmetric values and different views of security:

• Demographics and population growth.

• Poor economic conditions and high unemployment for Palestinians.

• The threat of major immigration to areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority or government by Palestinian refugees, and the strain such immigration would put on the water supply.

• Control over Jerusalem and adjustments to Israel’s boundaries in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

• The strategic value of the Jordan River area, which makes Israel reluctant to give up control over its security.

• The future of Israeli settlements in Gaza, and how to develop Gaza as a workable economy.

• How to create some form of contiguous Palestinian state.

• How to create economic links with Israel, and the level of freedom of movement for Palestinians in Israel.

• Competition for water, which is compounded by the fact Israelis now use three times more water per capita than Palestinians.

• Resolving the issue of whether there should be any form of confederation with Jordan. Such a confederation now seems extremely unlikely, but the issue remains and would have a major potential impact on the future role of the Jordanian military and Jordan’s role in the peace process.



The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return As discussed in more detail in Chapter III, Palestinian demographics both complicated

the search for peace and helped shaped the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Estimates by

the World Bank indicate that the total population of the West Bank and Gaza doubled between

1980 and 1996, and are projected to double again to 4.8 million by 2015.10 Estimates by the U.S.

Census Bureau indicate that the total Palestinian population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem

will increase to 2.4 million in 2005, and 2.8 million in 2010. Similarly, the total Palestinian

population in Gaza is projected to increase from 0.88 million in 1995 to 1.4 million in 2005, and

1.7 million in 2010.11 According to the United Nations, the total Palestinian population in the

West Bank and Gaza is projected to increase from 3.2 million in 2000 to 4.5 million in 2010, 6

million in 2020, 7.8 million in 2030, 9.5 million in 2040, and 11.1 million in 2050.12

This population growth poses serious potential problems for the political and economic

success of any future peace settlement. It also compounds the problem of giving Palestinians

outside the West Bank and Gaza any right of return. Estimates indicate that there were over 2.5

million people outside the West Bank and Gaza registered as Palestinian refugees who might

claim the right of return in 2003 out of the over 4.1 million total UN registered refugees.

As of December 31, 2003, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) estimated that this total included 394,532 registered

Palestinians refugees in Lebanon (223,956 registered in refugee camps). This total amounted to

approximately 9.4% of the country’s population. There were 413,827 registered Palestinian

refugees in Syria (2.3% of the country’s population and 120,865 in camps), and 1,740,170

people in Jordan (31.9% of the country’s population and 307,785 in camps). There are over

665,246 registered refugees in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (29.7% of the population and

179,541 in camps). There were over 922,674 registered refugees in Gaza (72.4% of the

population and 484,563 in camps).13

This refugee population is growing rapidly. It presents both a critical challenge to any

“right of return” and to the development of Gaza and the West Bank— even if they only have to

deal with the natural growth of their existing population. The total Palestinian population in

Jordan increased from 1.9 million in 1995 to 2.3 million in 2000, and is projected to increase to

2.7 million in 2005, and 3.1 million in 2010. The total Palestinian population in Lebanon grew



from 0.39 million in 1995 to 0.46 million in 2000, and is projected to grow to 0.53 million in

2005, and 0.6 million in 2010. The total Palestinian population in Syria grew from 0.36 million

in 1995 to 0.41 million in 2000, and is projected to grow to 0.46 million in 2005, and 0.51

million in 2010.14

These demographic realities make the problems of agreeing upon some form of

Palestinian “right of return” as an element of a peace agreement extremely serious. Both sides

are still bitterly divided over the extent to which the refugees fled because of Israeli military

action and persecution, because they chose to do so, or because Arab leaders encouraged them. It

is also important to consider that most Palestinian refugees have never seen any part of

“Palestine.” Nearly 80% of the refugees have been born since their parents left Israel, and this

raises questions as to what kinds of refugee status can be inherited.

Israel has not been prepared to absorb more Palestinians into Israel proper for political

and cultural, as well as demographic reasons. Israeli Jews on both sides of the political spectrum

profess that they refuse to agree to a settlement that will allow for the return of large numbers of

Palestinians to Israel proper for fear of being demographically outnumbered by the Arab

population. In a telling example, Yossi Beilin, a Labor Party member generally considered a

political dove, told the Israeli daily Ha’aretz in an interview on June 15, 2001: “I definitely did

not agree, and will not agree, to a permanent settlement that will ultimately worsen the

demographic balance inside sovereign Israel. That is my sharpest red line. On that issue I am

absolutely tough. I am generous geographically but tough demographically. A Jewish majority

within the sovereign [borders of the] state of Israel is the main thing as far as I am concerned.

For me it is the most important thing.”15

Demographic growth rates within Israel are already a problem. Population figures

demonstrate why Israeli Jews are so concerned. According to recent statistical projections

published on the International Christian Zionist Center website, the total population of Israeli

Jews will rise from 4.52 million in 1995 to 5.36 million by 2005 (an 18.5% increase), and to 6.52

million by 2020 (an increase of only 21.7%); whereas the total Israeli Arab population will grow

from just over 1 million in 1995 to 1.36 million by 2005 (an 35.6% increase), and to just under

2.1 million by 2020 (an increase of over 53.5%).16 Furthermore, according to the Israeli Central



Bureau of Statistics, Israeli Muslims’ natural reproduction rate of increase from 2000 to 2003

was 3.6%—doubling the Jewish population’s 1.8% average during this time.17

At the same time, the Palestinians would face massive if not impossible economic

challenges in absorbing large numbers of refugees into Gaza and the West Bank. Both areas are

already under extreme internal demographic pressure and have serious problems in getting the

water, development funds, and infrastructure growth they need to deal with their current native

population. The United Nation’s projections of total population growth for the West Bank and

Gaza suggest that such demographic pressures will gradually worsen over the next fifty years—

even without the additional pressure of refugee influx. According to its estimates, the Palestinian

population will increase by 41% from its 2000 level by 2010, 90% by 2020, 143% by 2030,

197% by 2040, and 248% by 2050.18

It is also far from clear that Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria are prepared to deal with the

political, social, and economic problems of moving the refugees out of the camps and fully

assimilating them as citizens with local or dual nationality. Some experts have proposed

compensation, but meaningful compensation for nearly 3.8 million refugees would also involve

massive costs. Furthermore, there are serious questions as to who should be compensated and

how it would be paid out in a region where corruption is not totally unknown and refugees have

little ability to appeal to governments and the courts.

Nevertheless, the “right of return” is as important to Palestinians as it is to Israelis. It is

an explosive issue in Palestinian politics and failure to find some form of compromise could lead

to the failure of any new peace process or lead to new acts of terrorism if left unresolved.

Groups representing Palestinian refugees have long demanded the right of return and/or

compensation from Israel, as have the registered refugees in the West Bank and Gaza.

Palestinian refugees help fund and support the Palestinian Authority, but they also support

hostile secular Palestinian movements, Hamas, and the PIJ. They sometimes infiltrate into Gaza

and the West Bank as “freedom fighters,” and play a role in secular extremist/terrorist

movements. The Palestinians in Lebanon, in particular, still present the problem that they could

reemerge as a paramilitary force that could attack across the border into Israel proper or infiltrate

into the West Bank, possibly with support from Hizbollah, Syria and/or Iran.



The Problem of Economics Economics was an underlying factor shaping the collapse of the peace process. The

Palestinian population in the West Bank reaped little benefit from the seven years of peace

negotiations following the Oslo Accords, as mentioned earlier. Even measured in purchasing

power parity terms, which tend to inflate incomes at the lower end of the scale, the CIA

estimates that the per capita income of Palestinians in 1996 was $1,100 in Gaza, and $1,800 in

the West Bank, while per capita income of Israelis was $17,500. If per capita income is

measured in more classic terms of a monetary GNP, the World Bank estimates that Palestinian

per capita income was $1,350 in 2001, while the Israeli income was $22,850.19

Some reports indicate that per capita income of Palestinians made little progress in real

terms during the peace process, while the per capita income of Israelis rose sharply. While

Palestinian unemployment statistics are uncertain, it is almost certain that direct and disguised

unemployment among young Palestinian males never dropped below 25% and sometimes surged

to 40% during periods of severe tension between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, when the

flow of labor into Israel and Palestinian trade were severely restricted. While some figures put

Palestinian unemployment as low as 12%, true unemployment and disguised unemployment on

the West Bank varied from around 35% to 40%, depending upon political conditions.20

However, another report released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October

2003 indicates that “the Palestinian economy saw tremendous improvement during the Oslo

period…[even though this evaluation] directly contradicts the long accepted assessment by the

IMF and other economists that the Palestinian economy was stunted in the years following

Oslo.”21 In fact, the data suggests that the average standards of living improved between 1994

and 1999 with an average annual real GDP growth rate of 8.3% (and GNI) growth of 9.2%. This

growth rate is also “more consistent with the general sense of optimism in the West Bank and

Gaza that prevailed during these [after Oslo] years.”22

The current war however, has made this situation far worse. Israeli closures, movement

restrictions and physical damage have drastically reduced the economic activity and living

standards of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. As of late June 2004, the

latest data published by the World Bank Group (WBG) on the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian

War on the Palestinian economy was based on statistics obtained through the third quarter of



2003. According to the WBG, based on a US$2 per day poverty line, 21% of the West Bank and

Gazan Palestinian population was living in poverty as of September 2000. By December 2002,

however, this figure had increased to nearly 60% overall, and above 75% in Gaza alone. After

the first two years of fighting, the number of Palestinian poor tripled from 637,000 to

approximately 2 million.

The WBG, estimates that Palestinians, who were already poor prior to the onset of the

war, became much poorer. In fact, in 1998, a poor Palestinian on average consumed the

equivalent US$1.47 per day. As of March 2003, this average had dropped to US$1.32.23

According to other World Bank estimates, the Palestinian GDP per capita shrank by

approximately 10 percent in 2000 compared to 1999, constituting the sharpest drop in real GDP

since the beginning of the peace process. The sharp drop was largely due to the extremely weak

fourth quarter of 2000 that followed the outbreak of the fighting, which pulled down the average

for the year as a whole. In 1999, the Palestinian Gross National Income (GNI) was an estimated

US$5.4 billion. According to the WBG, GNI dropped 12% in 2000 , while remittances vanished

almost entirely in the last quarter of 2000.24 Moreover, by the end of 2002, the GNI “had shrunk

by 36% from its December 2000 level” and overall GNI losses since the start of the conflict had

reached US$5.2 billion. Thus, by this point in time, “the opportunity cost of the crisis was equal

to almost one full year of Palestinian wealth creation.”25

According to a PCBS survey and WBG data, only six months after the outbreak of the

conflict, Palestinian median household income had dropped approximately 50% below its pre-

war level. To cope with the drop in income, many households were forced to sell family jewelry,

postpone paying bills and borrow money. Some households turned toward agricultural

production of basic food products or emigrated. Both strategies did nothing to help future

economic growth.26 In addition, despite increases in Palestinian employment rates, due largely

to the Palestinian population’s high growth rate of approximately 4.3% per anum, jobholders

must use their lower income levels to provide for more people.

In March 2004 the WBG reported that dependency ratios (total population divided by

total number of jobholders) have significantly increased over the course of the war. According

to its findings, in the third quarter of 2000 each Palestinian jobholder in the West Bank was



responsible for supporting 4.3 persons and each Gaza jobholder was supporting 5.9. By the

fourth quarter of 2003 the ratios had increased to 5.4 and 7.7 respectively.27

The onset of war also negatively affected the fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority.

Although there was already a low level of investment in the West Bank and Gaza prior to

September 2000, private investment dropped sharply the as soon as the war began—particularly

in the tourism and export-oriented sectors. Due to this sudden drop in economic activity and

private consumption, the PA’s revenues drastically decreased. Moreover, their domestic tax

collection efforts became less efficient and then eventually almost impossible.28 Soon thereafter,

Israel suspended the transfer of all funds accrued for the PA and began withholding taxes

collected on the PA’s behalf. In late 2000 the PA’s monthly revenue averaged US$91 million;

by the end of 2002 it had fallen to just US$18 million. In fact, from the start of the conflict

through 2002, emergency financial aid from donor countries—which averaged US$42 million

during this time—was the only thing that prevented the PA from totally collapsing. for it made

up “about half of total PA budget outlays over the period.”29

The determination of the Palestinian’s economic situation is also making a Palestinian

“right of return” a steadily greater problem. Even the most favorable projections of economic

development in the region indicate that there is only a moderate chance that the living standards

of Palestinians already in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza can now be improved at a

rate that will reduce the security problems inherent in the gap between their present per capita

income and that of Israelis.30 Any major immigration by Palestinians from outside the West

Bank and Gaza would sharply increase the economic problem, while major immigration to Israel

would also increase the competition over water.31

The Problem of Jerusalem The Israeli-Palestinian War has been fought largely in the West Bank and Gaza, but the

future of Jerusalem is another unresolved final settlement issue that has shaped the conflict. In

spite of some import progress, Camp David and Taba showed that Israel and the Palestinian

Authority still differed fundamentally over control of the greater Jerusalem area and over

adjustments to their pre-1967 boundaries. Furthermore, the Israeli concessions made at these

negotiations scarcely represented a popular consensus. In the spring of 1999, former Israeli

Prime Minister Netanyahu not only insisted on Israeli control of the greater Jerusalem area, he



drafted plans to make a Jewish settler enclave in Hebron, 80% of which had been turned over to

Palestinian rule in 1997, permanent.32 While Prime Minister Barak advanced more generous

proposals at Camp David and Taba, neither side showed that it could define a workable

compromise over control of the Temple Mount, East Jerusalem, or the boundaries of the greater

Jerusalem area.

Jerusalem involves far more than politics, demographics and economics. Religion is a

key problem between Israeli and Palestinian. Tolerance is tentative, and passions can run deep.

This reality became all too clear during the initial fighting in September through November

2000, which rapidly made religion a major issue. In fact, Ariel Sharon’s September 28, 2000

visit to the site of the Temple Mount—upon which the al-Aqsa Mosque, the second holiest place

in Islam, stands—was one of the key events that heralded the onset of widespread fighting. Since

then, there have been several additional clashes sparked by worshippers at the al-Aqsa Mosque

and/or Western Wall and repeated quarrels over shrines like Hebron, Bethlehem/Rachel’s tomb,

and Joseph’s tomb.

The peace process was always a settlements process as far as the “greater Jerusalem” area

was concerned. By the beginning of the conflict in September 2000, there were approximately

200,000 Palestinians with ID cards registered in Jerusalem, while approximately only 86,000

Palestinians actually lived in the city. Approximately 2,400 Jews and 27,000 Palestinians lived in

the old city.33 The Israeli population of the greater Jerusalem area had risen to nearly 433,000,

with two-thirds of the population actually living in Jerusalem.34 Israelis had long been moving

into settlements surrounding East Jerusalem. While such settlement activity did reflect a natural

growth in the Jewish population, the placement of some of the settlements and key roads was

designed to separate the Arabs of Jerusalem from those of the West Bank.

Israel attempted to reduce the number of Palestinians with Jerusalem ID cards between

1995 and 1999 – although it claims to have confiscated only around 2,800 ID cards while

Palestinian sources claim Israel confiscated over 11,000.35 As a result, it is almost impossible for

the IDF to secure the Arab areas in East Jerusalem or the greater Jerusalem area without some

form of urban warfare or the forced evacuation of a large number of Palestinians.

During the peace process, control of Jerusalem also interacted with the issues of

sovereignty, the credibility of a Palestinian state, and Palestinian dignity. Until the Camp David



summit in July 2000, Israel insisted on undivided control over Jerusalem and its Israeli-occupied

suburbs. Former Prime Minister Rabin made it clear that he regarded control of Jerusalem as

non-negotiable in a speech he gave on October 25, 1995, at Israeli’s celebration of the 3,000th

anniversary of King David’s establishment of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. He told an

audience of Israeli lawmakers and leading Jewish figures that, “There is only one Jerusalem. For

us, Jerusalem is not a subject of compromise, and there is no peace without Jerusalem. Jerusalem

...was ours, is ours, and will be ours forever...”36

Former Prime Minister Peres and former Prime Minister Netanyahu endorsed this

position, often with strong US political support. On October 24, 1995, the U.S. Senate voted 93

to 5 to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem by 1999.37 However, President Clinton exercised his

waiver authority under this act on June 18, 1999, saying that the issue of Jerusalem should be

resolved through direct negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, and the U.S. should not

take steps that would prejudice the negotiations or make them harder. President Clinton did

imply, however, that the United States would support moving the capital after the failure of the

Camp David talks in the summer of 2000.38

Since that time, President George W. Bush has resisted taking such action, but has not

directly rejected the Israeli position. On June 11, 2001, for example, he began to sign a series of

six-month waivers postponing relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to

Jerusalem for “reasons of U.S. national security” that have continued through June 15, 2004.

Bush has made it clear, however, that his “Administration remains committed to beginning the

process of moving …[the US] embassy to Jerusalem” at some point in the future.39

All of these problems are compounded by the fact that Jerusalem is not easy to define in

either religious or geographic terms. The “old city” involves complex religious issues regarding

the control of Jewish and Muslim holy places. The Jewish and Palestinian population of greater

Jerusalem extends far beyond the former administrative boundaries of Jerusalem and involves

suburbs and settlements beyond the boundaries of several Palestinian cities.

“Jerusalem” has become a large area with very complex demographics and economics.

Metropolitan Jerusalem has a population of nearly half a million, and spreads over more than 100

square kilometers (42 square miles) of hills and valleys of which East Jerusalem comprises

approximately 67 square kilometers.40 The present area of East Jerusalem is about 10 times the



size it was under Jordanian administration in 1967. It extends to Kafr Aqab, about 10 kilometers

to the north of the old boundary, and then about two kilometers west of the old boundary—

almost as far west as Abu Dis. It extends to Umm Tuba and Har Homa in the south, roughly four

kilometers to the south of the old boundary. As a result, modern East Jerusalem is larger in

territory than the entire Jewish-occupied area around Jerusalem was in 1967. East Jerusalem,

however, also now includes about 100,000 Palestinian residents, and isolated Palestinian villages

like Um Tuba and Sur Baher.41

According to CIA estimates, as of July 2004, there are fewer than 177,000 Jewish

residents in East Jerusalem.42 In addition, the Israeli-occupied suburbs in the West Bank now

extend beyond Ramallah and Bethlehem. There are four major Jewish settlement complexes in

the greater Jerusalem metropolitan areas, including Betar-Gush Etzion-Tekoa in the south

(16,713 Israelis), Ma’aleh Adumim-Mishor Adumim in the East (21,348 Israelis), Beit El-

Kochav Ha Shahar in the north (7,573 Israelis) and Givon-Beit Horon in the west (17,644

Israelis). Israeli settlements as far away from the old city as Beit Shemesh in the west, Almog

junction in the east, Ofra in the north, and Tekoa in the south, are still within a 30-minute

commute of modern Jerusalem.43

Even the narrowest Israeli definition of “Jerusalem” is now at least 60% larger than the

Jerusalem of 1967, and Israel controlled area continues to grow. Many Israeli analysts believe it

is likely to include a zone that begins at Gush Etzion in the south and extends north to Givat

Ze’ev, and some Israelis have argued that it should extend to Beit El. This would mean dealing

with municipal areas that mix at least 160,000 Jews and 150,000 Palestinians, and leave at least

64,000 Israelis in settlements in the greater Jerusalem area. 44

Given this background, any Israeli Prime Minister is now likely to insist on either some

form of separation and security barriers or firm “red lines” defining the Greater Jerusalem area in

making any final peace deal with the Palestinians. Israel will likely not withdraw all the way to

its pre-1967 borders, Israeli concessions on Jerusalem will likely remain limited, many Jewish

settlers will remain in West Bank blocs, and it is unlikely that any foreign army will be allowed

west of the Jordan River.45 For instance, although the final revised and approved version of

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement plan does not directly refer to the issue of

Jerusalem, it does state that “in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of



Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and villages, security areas and

other places of special interest to Israel”—a statement which is universally interpreted as

including the Israeli capitol.46 From a Palestinian viewpoint, however, Jerusalem is as

Palestinian as it is Jewish, and “greater Jerusalem” has come at the direct expense of the

Palestinians. This issue is particularly serious for deeply religious Palestinians.

The Problem of West Bank Security

Gaza did not emerge as a critical final settlement issue during the peace process. Gaza is

an area with few resources and a massive Palestinian population, and where public opinion polls

show most Israelis are willing to trade withdrawal for a secure peace or simply to reduce the

security burden on the IDF. For instance, according to an October 2003 survey conducted by the

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 55% of those polled said they were in support of a unilateral

withdrawal “from settlements in Gaza to make defending the border easier.”47 In fact, Prime

Minister Sharon began to advance formal proposals for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza

in late 2003. An Israeli public opinion poll released by Machon Dahaf/Yediot Aharanoth on

May 14, 2004 reported that 71% of responders favored a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in

May 2004—a 9% increase from the previous month.48 Some Israelis have also advocated

trading Israeli territory near Gaza for control over more of the West Bank.

The West Bank, however, has proved far more difficult to negotiate. Israel has long

resisted giving up control of the Jordan River area north of Jericho, positions on the heights on

the West Bank that provide sensor and intelligence coverage of Jordan and the West Bank, and a

substantial strip of the West Bank to the east of its 1967 boundary south of Tulkarm and north of

Ramallah. The Jordan River Valley forms a natural security barrier between Israel and Jordan,

and effectively acts as a giant anti-tank ditch. This defensive line sharply increases the amount of

time Israel has to mobilize and its ability to ensure control over the West Bank in the event of a

war. Former Prime Minister Rabin indicated in his October 5, 1995 speech that Israel would

retain a security border in the Jordan Valley and annex the west bank of the Jordan and the

settlement blocs of Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Zeev, and Gush Etzion around Jerusalem. This

demand would have kept the homes of about 48,000 Jews, or one-third of the current settlers,



under full Israeli sovereignty. It is important to remember that this declaration came early in the

peace process49

Similar statements were made by Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon. Former Prime Minister

Ehud Barak stated that preventing a foreign army from entering territory west of the Jordan

Valley was one of his ”red lines” during the 2001 election campaign. Ariel Sharon and Benjamin

Netanyahu consistently declared their opposition to relinquishing the Jordan Valley throughout

the peace process. The ability to occupy key areas in the West Bank gives the IDF major

military advantages. It explains why Israel occupies the “Green Areas” that run through the

Jordan Valley that are approximately 60 kilometers long from north to south and 10 kilometers

deep. It also explains why Israel created two security corridors from west to east that separate the

Palestinian controlled areas into four parts during the peace process. One corridor runs from the

Ariel settlement to the Shilo settlement to the Jordan Valley and separates the Ramallah and

Nablus-Jenin areas. The other runs from East Jerusalem through the Ma’ale Adumim settlement

to the Jordan and separates Ramallah, Bethlehem-Hebron, and Jericho. These corridors allowed

the IDF to control nearly every key communication route and junction in the vicinity and were

supported by a steadily expanding network of roads, strong points, and barriers that have been

enhanced significantly during the current fighting.

From a Palestinian viewpoint, however, control of the West Bank should be returned to

its 1967 boundaries, or as close to them as possible, and with full Palestinian sovereignty. The

Palestinians have every incentive to seek to create a contiguous state on the West Bank, and

obtain the return of as much territory as possible. It is oftentimes said that the Palestinians want

peace with dignity and sovereignty while Israel wants peace with security and separation.

The problem throughout the peace process was that both sets of demands may have been

just in theory, but were not achievable in practice in regards to the Jerusalem area or the West

Bank. From an Israeli viewpoint, each sacrifice of control over the routes up to the heights above

the West Bank, and down to Israel’s pre-1967 territories, reduced both Israeli control over the

West Bank, and the ease with which the IDF could deploy, as well as increased the potential

risk that a Jordanian, Palestinian, or Syrian force could deploy into the heights. Control of

access of the heights above the Jordan River Valley provides Israel with a major military

advantage in terms of sensor coverage, warning, artillery operations, and armored warfare.



At the same time, securing the West Bank was costly to Israel during the peace process,

and these costs have risen steadily during the Israeli-Palestinian War. Control over the West

Bank has meant dealing with complex and overlapping enclaves of both Palestinians and Israeli

settlers. The Palestinians may be relatively easy to isolate in much of the West Bank, but this

takes money and manpower and Israel is extremely sensitive to casualties. Securing any strong

point or settlement can leave the IDF and settlers isolated in any given battle. The current

fighting has shown that Palestinian resistance can force the IDF to disperse into a wide range of

areas. This situation has reinforced each side’s incentive to adopt asymmetric tactics and

methods of warfare rather than has pushed them towards peace.

If war continues, the end result is likely to be more security positions, barriers, roads, and

possibly settlements. If peace negotiations do resume, it seems likely that Israel will seek to

occupy part of the West Bank along the upper part of the Jordan River, and keep the Jordan

River Valley as its security border. Even though the Camp David talks showed that Israel might

be willing to make some concessions in this regard, Israel is nearly certain to demand an

agreement that will limit the growth of Palestinian paramilitary capabilities to levels only slightly

higher than those allowed in the 1995 accords. Israel is likely to demand that no regular

Palestinian or Jordanian military forces be permitted in the West Bank area, or deployed closer to

Israel than Jordanian forces are today. Israel will also almost certainly demand that there be fixed

force limitations, force deployment and disengagement agreements, limits on the nature and size

of military exercises, and warning and pre-notification agreements.

At the same time, the West Bank’s history of war and occupation means that a Palestinian

entity or state is likely to resist such concessions and to seek to limit or avoid any compromise

that does not go back to the 1967 border. The intermingling of Israeli and Palestinian also means

that even a successful compromise could be highly unstable for years, and that extremists on

both sides are likely to try to undermine a peace with terrorism and violence.50

The Problem of Water A final critical issue that helped cause the present war, and which must shape any peace,

is the issue of water. The present fighting has focused predominantly on other issues, but both

sides know that control of the West Bank, and Gaza’s lack of resources, involve serious water

issues that can easily affect any future fighting or move towards peace. Israel has long



maintained control over most of the flow of water to the West Bank and Gaza, and the division

and control of water between Israelis and Palestinians is particularly contentious in the West

Bank area.

While various reports differ significantly over the amounts of water involved, a large

system of mountain aquifers supplies both the West Bank and Israel’s pre-1967 territory. This

system of aquifers can supply about 970 million cubic meters of renewable water per year. It

currently provides about 40% of the water Israel uses for agriculture and 50% of its drinking

water – much of it for Tel Aviv and its suburbs. Although the West Bank has over 600 million

cubic meters (21 billion cubic feet) of this water, much of it drains into Israel’s pre-1967

boundaries and is easier to collect from there. Nearly all of this water collected within Israel’s

pre-1967 boundaries goes to Israelis.

On average, throughout the 1990s, Israel used about 470-480 of the 600 million cubic

meters worth of water available from the mountain aquifers on the West Bank per annum—

approximately 80-83%. About 50 million cubic meters of the 600 million cubic meters was given

solely to Jewish settlers on the West Bank. In contrast, the entire Palestinian population was

allotted 120-130 million cubic meters (4.2 billion cubic feet)—16% to 20% per year. This

allocation forced many Palestinian villages on the West Bank to severely ration water, and 37%

of the Palestinian villages were entirely without running water.51 Moreover, the average per

capita water use in Israel was 339.2 cubic meters, compared to 93.20 cubic meters in the West

Bank and Gaza.52 Thus, Israelis used at least three times more water per capita than Palestinians

during this time.

The allocation of West Bank water to the Palestinians increased as part of the Oslo II

accords. However, the new allocation scarcely met Palestinian demands and the issue was left

for the final status negotiations that have yet to be reached. Hence, control of water remained a

major security issue for both sides. The onset of the current Israeli-Palestinian war in September

2000 has further exasperated the division of water resources contention, with the Palestinians

bearing much of the additional hardship.

According to the Center for Economic and Social Rights, the amount of available West

Bank groundwater resources that Israel uses has increased to approximately 85% per annum in

2003 since the start of the current conflict.53 The Palestinian Hydrology Group reports that as of



January 2004, the average per capita water use in Israel was 580 cubic meters per year, compared

to 140 cubic meters in the West Bank and Gaza. These statistics show that whereas the Israelis’

annual per capita water usage has increased, 71% from the 1990s average, the Palestinians’ has

increased only 50% (a 21% discrepancy in rate)—and furthermore, that on average Israelis now

use at least four times more water than Palestinians.54 In fact, according to Harald D.

Frederiksen, former head of the World Bank’s Water Resources Unit, as of January 2004,

Israel’s annual per capita water consumption was the highest of any state in the Middle East

region whereas the Palestinians was the lowest—so low, in fact, that it still fails to meet the

minimum standard set by the World Health organization (150 cubic meters).55

While that may be the case, Israel already uses far more water than it can produce. Israeli

farmers’ mounting efforts to cultivate arid regions is a leading cause of this production and

consumption gap. In fact, agriculture now encompasses over two-thirds of Israel’s water per

annum. In order to meet the increasing demand for irrigation supply, Israel has been forced to

pump more water from aquifers than can naturally be replenished. For instance, in the summer

of 2003, the Sea of Galilee fell to its lowest levels in recorded history, almost exposing Israeli

water pumps. According to Uri Sagie, Chairman of the Israeli National Water Company,

because of this process of depletion without deficit replenishment, Israel has been left with “no

choice except to create additional sources to close the gap.” For example, in early January 2004,

Israel agreed to an arms-for-water deal with Turkey, which calls for Turkey to ship millions of

tons of water in giant tankers to Israel in return for shipments of hi-tech weapons.56

Furthermore, the fact that a large proportion of Israel’s current water supply is pumped

from the aquifers underlying the West Bank is an impediment to ending the current fighting.

Israelis are deeply concerned that, as a part of any workable resolution, they will be forced to

relinquish control of the land where the aquifers are to the Palestinians and in doing so will loose

all access to this vital water source. Israel must thus decide if it can rely on Palestinian altruism

to safe guard one of its most important water supply sources.57

Despite the weight of Israel’s water dilemmas, the Palestinians have endured even more

severe water shortage problems since the outbreak of fighting in September 2000. Israeli

incursions and security fence construction have drastically reduced the Palestinians’ potable

water supply during the present fighting—particularly in the Gaza Strip. According to an April



2003 report by the Palestinian Agricultural Ministry, from September 28, 2000 to February 28,

2003, Israeli actions destroyed 213 Palestinian water wells (including 203 in the Gaza Strip),

12,249,000 square meters of Palestinian water networks (including 11,392 square meters in

Gaza), 792 Palestinian water tanks and concentration pools (789 in Gaza), and 343, 995 cubic

meters of Palestinian water (341, 095 in Gaza).58

In another study released in early 2004, the Palestinian Agricultural Ministry contends

that construction of the Israeli security fence has significantly damaged their water supply in the

West Bank. It reports that the route of the fence has left approximately 30 groundwater wells,

with a total discharge of 4 million cubic meters per annum, on the Israeli side of the fence,

separated from the Palestinian villages that depend on them.59

Pollution of local groundwater resources compounds the Palestinians’ water shortage

problem. Many Jewish settlements and Palestinian villages dump their raw sewage directly into

local streams and/or the ground and this waste inevitably feeds into the Palestinians’ aquifers. In

addition, the drilling of hundreds of illegal backyard wells in the PA controlled areas of the Gaza

Strip has led the Gaza Aquifer to become contaminated with seawater. Consequently, official

Palestinian surveys reported that, in the summer of 2003, 85 percent of Gaza’s wells produced

water with a salt content of 1,000 milligrams per liter—an undrinkable level—due to the

infiltration of seawater and sewage into the wells.60

In addition to these various factors, population growth will steadily reduce the amount of

water per capita for both Israelis and Palestinians in the coming years. Even if there is no

significant outside immigration, World Bank studies indicate that current population growth

levels in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank will restrict renewable water use for human

consumption and light industrial needs by 2010. In addition, as previously mentioned, there are

nearly 1.5 million people who claim Palestinian refugee status who could, upon returning to

Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, sharply increase the water shortage problem.

Some experts feel that shifting water use away from agriculture, making better use of

recycled water, and creating major new desalination plants, could solve many of the water

concerns cited above. Other experts have claimed such shifts are costly and impractical for

Israel, and that they could take nearly a decade to accomplish and involve an investment in

excess of US $10 billion. The one thing that seems certain is that water problems will continue to



combine with other security problems for both Israelis and Palestinians, which is likely to

present major strategic complications well into the future.



1 “Statement by Prime Minister Barak at a Press Conference upon the Conclusion of the Camp David Summit,” July 25, 2000, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hnn0/ 2 “The Conclusion of the Camp David Summit: Key Points,” Press Release by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2000, available online at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hnm0/ 3 Abu Mazen, “No Peace Agreement with Israel without Jerusalem,” July 29, 2000, PLO Negotiations Affairs Department Website, available at http://www.nad-plo.org/speeches/abumazen3.html/ 4 See, for example, “Palestinian Official Ashrawi says Talks Failure Better than ‘Unfair Agreement,” Voice of Palestine Radio, Ramallah, July 26, 2000, quoted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 2000. See also address by Nabil Sha’ath to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy on June 21, 2000. 5 Summary text of peace accords, US State Department; Israeli government Internet data base, accessed October 1995; information sheets provided by the Palestinian Authority; Washington Post, September 27, 1995, p. A-27. 6 Summary text of peace accords, US State Department; Israeli government Internet data base, accessed October 1995; information sheets provided by the Palestinian Authority; Washington Post, September 27, 1995, p. A-27; Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 1995, p. 19. 7 Assad, Samar. “PLO Statehood Meeting Delayed” Associated Press, June 21, 1999. 8 Stamas, Vicky, “Barak sets 15-month goal for peace breakthrough,” Reuters, July 18, 1999, 1142. 9 “Sharon would Accept Small, Limited Palestinian State,” Houston Chronicle, April 14, 2001, p. 2110 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003, Washington, World Bank, p. 40. 11 U.S. Census Bureau, IDB Summary Demographic Data for Gaza Strip and West Bank, updated July 17, 2003. Accessed March 2004. 12 Based on UN population data base for 2002, accessed March 2004. 13 Palestinian refugee information obtained from: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UNRA in Figures, December 31, 2003. Availible from: http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/uif-dec03.pdf. Accessed on March 29, 2004. Country/territory population data used in determining what percentage of the country/territory’s population is Palestinian was obtained from: CIA, The World Factbook, 2003. 14 Gazit, Shlomo, The Palestinian Refugee Problem, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians, Study No. 2, Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 36; Judy Dempsy, “Palestinian’s Right of Return Turns on Israel’s Moral Responsibility,” Financial Times, October 13, 1999, p. 10. 15 “Interview with Yossi Beilin: Sharon is a Post-Zionist,” Ha’aretz, June 15, 2001, translated by the Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI), available on http://www.memri.org/ 16 The International Christian Zionist Center, “Population Figures,” Israel Today. Available from: http://www.israelmybeloved.com/today/population_figures/ . Accessed on March 29, 2004. 17 Jewish Virtual Library, “Israeli Muslim Birth Rate is Double that of Jews,” The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, February 2003. Available from: http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/muslimpop.htm. Accessed on April 8, 2004. 18 Based on UN population data base for 2002, accessed March 2004. 19 The CIA figures are taken from the World Factbook, 1998, and the World Bank figures from World Development Indicaters, 2003, Table 2.1. 20 These estimates are made on the basis on converstations with experts in the CIA and World Bank. They must be regarded as rough guesstimates. 21 Steve Spiegel and Gilead Light, “Reassuring the Economic of the Intifada,” Israel Policy Forum, October 2, 2003, www.israelpolicyforum.com. 22 Steve Spiegel and Gilead Light, “Reassuring the Economic of the Intifada,” Israel Policy Forum, October 2, 2003, www.israelpolicyforum.com. 23 World Bank, “Two Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment,” March 5, 2003, p. 3. 24 World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Update, June 2001, p. 5 25 World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Update, June 1, 2003, pp. 1-2. 26 World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Update, June 2001, p. 6 27 World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Update, March 1, 2004, p. 24.


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28 World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Update, June 2001, pp. 10-11 29 World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Update, June 1, 2003, p. 2. 30 See World Bank, Integrated Development of the Jordan Rift Valley, Washington, World Bank, October, 1994; World Bank, Emergency Assistance Program for the Occupied Territories, Washington, World Bank, October, 1994; World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment for Peace, Washington, World Bank, October, 1994; World Bank, Peace and the Jordanian Economy, Washington, World Bank, October, 1994. 31 Statistics based on UNRWA data obtained by telephone. For a discussion of the options from an Israeli perspective, see Gazit, Shlomo, The Palestinian Refugee Problem, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians, Study No. 2, Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995. 32 Reuters, October 6, 1998. 33 Institute for Public Affairs In These Times, “Will the Peace Process Lead to Apartheid?, “Oct. 17, 1999, p. 3. 34 Reuters, Jerusalem Mayor Urges Boost to Jewish Population, September 14, 1999. 35 The Jerusalem Monitor, “Poll Reveals Palestinian Opinion on Jerusalem,” Sept/Oct. 1999, p. 7. 36 White House Statement on Jerusalem Embassy Act Waiver, June 18, 1999. 37 Washington Times, October 26, 1995, p. A-17; Washington Post, October 25, 1995, p. A-22; New York Times, July 6, 1995, p. A-3; Executive News Service, December 3, 1995, 1433. 38 White House Statement on Jerusalem Embassy Act Waiver, June 18, 1999. 39 “Bush Delays Move of U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem,” Washington Post, June 12, 2001, p. 7; George W. Bush, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Suspension of Limitations Under the Jerusalem Embassy Act,” Presidential Determination No. 2004-36, June 15, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040615-13.html, accessed June 22, 2004. 40 CIA, Atlas of the Middle East, Washington, GPO, January, 1993, pp. 52-53, 62-63. 41 Middle East Insight, “Defining Jerusalem,“ Jan-Feb. 1999, pp. 27-52. 42 CIA, “West Bank,” World Factbook 2004, last updated May 11, 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/we.html, accessed June 22, 2004. 43 Dore Gold , Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 7. 44 There are many demographic and historical studies of Jerusalem, and a number of studies of options for peace that are referenced in the bibliography. A number of Palestinian studies have been done on this issue, including draft work by Walid Khalidi, a report by Hisham Sharabi, ed. “Settlements and Peace: The Problem of Jewish Colonization in Palestine” Washington, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, July, 1995, and Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Jerusalem, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Washington, February, 1994. There are a number of excellent Israeli studies as well. Two of the best recent studies are Dore Gold , Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995, and Hirsch, Moshe, Deborah Housen-Couriel, and Ruth Lapidoth, Whither Jerusalem?, London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995. 45 Stamas, Vicky, “Barak sets 15-month goal for peace breakthrough,” Reuters, July 18, 1999, 1142. 46 Office of the Israeli Prime Minister, “The Government Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan,” June 6, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm, accessed June 22, 2004. 47 Asher Arian, “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Memorandum No. 67, October 2003, p. 29. 48 Machon Dahaf/Yediot Aharanoth, “Polls on Unilateral Measures,” May 14, 2004, available online at: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/unilateral.html, accessed July 19, 2004. 49 Executive News Service, October 18, 1995, 1430; Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, Volume 5, Number 6, November, 1995, p. 3. There are a number of Israeli studies of “adjustments” to the 1967 borders, but they rarely are supported by exact borders and significant demographic details. Discussions with Israeli officials indicate that negotiations are not likely to be based on the assumptions in most such studies, particularly the Allon Plan, and that most such studies will need to be revised as a result of the September, 1995 peace accords. For an excellent Israeli study of the options involved, see Joseph Alpher, Settlements and Borders, Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994. There are also a number of good Palestinian studies, including Hisham Sharabi, “Settlements and Peace: The Problem of Jewish Colonization in Palestine” Washington, The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, July, 1995. Even the most recent of these studies, however, are now dated because of the September, 1995 peace accords.


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50 Prime Minister Rabin made these points several times before his assassination. They were repeated afterwards by Shimon Peres, and his new Foreign Minister Ehud Barak and Yossi Belin, a normally “dovish” minister in Peres’s office. See Executive News Service, November 28, 1995, 0419. 51 Executive News, July 17, 1995, 0705; Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 1995, p. 6; Baltimore Sun, August 25, 1995, p., 6A; Washington Post, July 24, 1995, p. A-14, September 10, 1995, p. C-2; Washington Times, August 8, 1995, p. A-12. For a discussion of the water issue from a Palestinian perspective, see Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, The Water Issue and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, Information Paper No. 2, Washington, Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, September, 1993. 52 Associated Press, March 4, 1999. 53 Center for Economic and Social Rights, The Right to Water in Palestine: A Background, Fact Sheet No. 1, 2003. 54 Khaled Abu Toameh, Trickling onto the Conflict, The Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2004. 55 Harald D. Frederiksen, “Water: Israeli strategy, implications for peace and the viability of Palestine,” Middle East Policy vol. 10, no. 4, December 22, 2003. 56 Chris McGreal, “Deadly Thirst,” The Guardian, January 13, 2004. 57 Chris McGreal, “Deadly Thirst,” The Guardian, January 13, 2004. 58 International Press Center, Water Resources of Gaza Strip is in Jeopardy due to Israeli Practices, Palestinian National Authority State Information Service, April 13, 2003. 59 Toameh, Trickling onto the Conflict.60 Saud Abu Ramadan, “The Intifada of thirsty Palestinians,” United Press International, August 13, 2003.
