The Future of Naval Aviation November 2014

The Evolving Future for Naval Aviation

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake Second Line of Defense

November 2014 http://www.sldinfo.com

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1 The Evolving Future of Naval Aviation

Second Line of Defense

Table of Contents

LESSONS LEARNED AT FALLON: THE USN TRAINS FOR FORWARD LEANING STRIKE INTEGRATION .......................................................................................................................... 2

REAR ADMIRAL MANAZIR, DIRECTOR OF AIR WARFARE (OPNAV N98) ..................................... 7 THE ROLE OF LIVE VIRTUAL TRAINING ................................................................................................. 8 THE IMPACT OF 5TH GEN ON FIGHTING IN THE EXPANDED BATTLESPACE .................................................. 12 RE-‐THINKING THE SEA BASE ............................................................................................................ 13 THE CARRIER AND JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS: SHAPING INVESTMENTS FOR THE FUTURE ............... 14

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM MORAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, (N1), FORMER DIRECTOR OF AIR WARFARE (OPNAV N98) ............................................................................. 15

THE TRANSITION ............................................................................................................................ 15 SHAPING INNOVATION .................................................................................................................... 16 THE COMING OF THE F-‐35 .............................................................................................................. 17 THE FUTURE OF UAVS .................................................................................................................... 17 THE COMING OF THE USS FORD ....................................................................................................... 18

REAR ADMIRAL SCOTT CONN, COMMANDER, NAVAL STRIKE AND AIR WARFARE CENTER ..... 20 LEARNING LESSONS FROM COMBAT CHALLENGES ................................................................................ 20 TRAINING TO FIGHT IN THE EXTENDED BATTLESPACE: THE ENHANCED ROLE OF VIRTUAL TRAINING ............. 21 ANTICIPATING AND DEALING WITH THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT ............................................................ 22 TRAINING INCLUDES SUPPORTING DEPLOYED CARRIER WINGS .............................................................. 22 TRAINING IS THE CRUCIAL GLUE ....................................................................................................... 23 WHY FALLON? .............................................................................................................................. 24 TRAINING FOR THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................... 24 OPERATING IN AN EXPANDED BATTLESPACE ....................................................................................... 25 KEY OBJECTIVE MOVING FORWARD .................................................................................................. 26

VISITING FALLON NAVAL AIR STATION: INTERVIEWS WITH THE NAVAL STRIKE AND AIR WARFARE CENTER ................................................................................................................. 27

STRIKE INTEGRATION AT FALLON: PREPARING FOR TODAY AND POSITIONING FOR THE FUTURE ................... 27 CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin: Outgoing STRIKE CO ................................................... 27 CDR James “Cruiser” Christie: Incoming STRIKE CO ............................................................... 30

THE USN COMBAT LEARNING CYCLE: PREPARE AN AIR WING FOR DEPLOYMENT WHILE SUPPORTING ONE

DEPLOYED .................................................................................................................................... 35 TRAINING FOR 21ST CENTURY OPERATIONS: SHAPING EFFECTIVE SEA-‐BASED COMBAT OPERATIONS ........... 40 TRAINING FOR FORWARD LEANING INTEGRATION ................................................................................ 43 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING FOR COMBAT PROFICIENCY .................................................................. 45 THE ROTORCRAFT, THE CARRIER AND TRAINING FOR STRIKE INTEGRATION .............................................. 47 TRAINING FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE: SHAPING A COMBINED ARMS APPROACH ..................................... 52



Lessons Learned At Fallon: The USN Trains for Forward Leaning Strike Integration The USN both in its carriers and its amphibious fleet provides a significant expeditionary capability. The USMC-‐USN team has been reshaping amphibious assault forces under the influence of the Osprey, the coming of the F-‐35B, the addition of new ships such as the T-‐AKE and USNS Montford Point, the USS Arlington, and the USS America.

Less visible have been the coming of the USS Ford and the reworking of the strike fleet. The USS Ford is less about operating as a traditional carrier than as a key C2 and strike enabler for an entire sea-‐base force, surface, subsurface, joint and coalition.

As Admiral Moran, then the head of Naval Warfare in the Pentagon noted in an interview which we did with him in 2013:

The Ford will be very flexible and can support force concentration or distribution. And it can operate as a flagship for a distributed force as well and tailored to the mission set. When combined with the potential of the F-‐35, Ford will be able to handle information and communications at a level much greater than the Nimitz class carriers. People will be able to share information across nations, and this is crucial. We call it maritime domain awareness, but now you’ve included the air space that’s part of that maritime domain.

To get an update on how the USN aviation leadership is preparing for the coming of the F-‐35 and other new strike assets as well as for the USS Ford pairing with these strike assets, we have travelled to Fallon Naval Air Station to understand how the USN trains for forward leaning strike integration. And we followed up that visit with a discussion with the current head of Naval Air Warfare, Rear Admiral Manazir.

The two visits function as two parts of the same puzzle:

• How is the Navy preparing for current strike integration as it anticipates the future? • And how is the Navy shaping concepts of operations for the future and providing that

approach to those who are preparing strike integration?

Fallon Naval Air Station is in the desert of Nevada. It is where the Navy trains for the advanced tactics for core air platforms but most importantly shapes its integration of the air wing prior to going to sea for final preparation for combat. Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) is known in the Navy as “strike university.”

Strike U was set up to deal with combat failures of naval aviation, and to shape better tactics, training and concepts of operations to prevail going forward.

As the head of NSAWC, Admiral Scott Conn, told us: “The mission we have here started with TOPGUN, 45 years ago.

TOPGUN was founded out of failures in combat during the Vietnam War.



TOPGUN training led to measurable improvements in Air-‐to-‐Air kill ratios.

Through the years, other communities have mirrored the TOPGUN model including the EA-‐18G HAVOC course, the E-‐2 CAEWWS course, and the H-‐60S/R SEAWOLF course.

These courses target advanced training at the individual level.

Additionally, as a result of failures in combat in Lebanon, STRIKE University, now call simply Strike, was stood up in 1984 to target training at the integrated warfighting level.

We have learned a lot of lessons at Fallon and we have had a lot of time to shape an effective combat learning environment.

Bottom line: My job here is to prepare our forward deployed air wings to fight and win in a wide variety of missions across the globe.”

The first lesson learned from a visit to Fallon is how the Navy is doing strike integration as part of the deployed fleet. That is, it is not a process of integration focused on the past, but it is part of support for the currently deployed air wings.

Training encompasses not simply preparation for integration; but “consulting services” to the deployed fleet.

As Captain Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin: Outgoing STRIKE CO put it: “We support the Combatant Commanders as well as prepare strike integration ashore so to speak. For example, we have had daily contact with the USS BUSH via email, phone calls and VTCs. This is an aspect of connectivity, which folds nicely into reshaping the impact and meaning of the training function.”

Admiral Conn provided us with a concrete example of the approach: “An historical example of how NSAWC provided reach back support to the forward deployed warfighter was in the early stages of Afghanistan operations.

Ground commanders needed aircraft to strafe at night. To do this strafing mission at night, aircrew needed to put an airplane below mountaintops, perhaps in a valley, provide bullets precisely and then pull off target, and not fly into the terrain.

When NSAWC got this request, in a matter of weeks because it wasn’t overnight, a couple weeks, we came up with the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the fleet to execute that mission.

We then folded those Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) into our training for follow on deployers. And the connectivity we have with the fleet through modern communications allows

Photo of Part of the Air Wing at Fallon. Credit: Second Line of Defense



for an ongoing combat learning process between Fallon and the fleet and this flow of information is central to the process of training in the 21st century.”

The second lesson learned is that the Navy is not waiting for an adversary to hone its anti-‐access area-‐denial skills to reduce the capability of the USN-‐USMC team to operate where they need to. The USN is not sailing ashore and surrendering its sword to adversaries claiming capabilities which they may or may not have, and certainly understands the need to prepare now for the evolving future.

As Admiral Conn put the challenge:

“I think it important to emphasize that adversary A2AD capabilities pose a serious threat not only to Navy, but to our entire Joint ability to fight and win.

Again, I think of A2AD as the proliferation of precision for potential adversaries and how this proliferation of precision effects joint forces ability to maneuver where we need to be and when we need to be there. For me, it is about expanding the battlespace and training with regard to how to do this.”

Training for an expanded battlespace means that the extensive ranges at Fallon are not enough to train to prevail in the evolving battlespace. This is why the Navy is spearheading a broad effort to expand the envelope of training to combine live training with what is called Live Virtual Constructive training. What is entailed is folding in red and blue assets to shaping an evolving strike integration training process.

As Captain McLaughlin explained:

“The current Fallon ranges – although large – are too small to train against an advanced threat, which can shoot longer than the ranges. We need to train to a 21st Century Plus type of threat with very long-‐range missiles in the mix.

It is not about succeeding; it is about how are we going to do this with highest probability of success.

We are rolling in Live Virtual Constructive Training to provide the extenders for our operators to work in that threat environment and to reach out to other assets – Navy and joint – which can allow us to fight in an expanded battlespace.”

The third lesson is that NSAWC is focused on the Rumsfeld admonition that you have to fight with the force you have, they are anticipating ways to work more effectively in the expanded battlespace. There is clearly a “red” component to the LVCT effort – folding in new assets and tactics of adversaries – as well as a “blue” component, how to leverage a diversity of USN, joint and coalition assets in expanding the capability of an integrated fleet as new capabilities are added.

For example, CDR Charles "Scotty" Brown, current STRIKE XO, previous TOPGUN Instructor noted that:



“We work closely with VMX-‐9 at China Lake to work with them in connecting their testing efforts with how those efforts might integrate with the strike force. They will come up on a routine basis and support NSAWC where we can take a look at some of the newer systems that they have in developmental or operational testing and see what kind of results you get with using those systems.”

The F-‐35 is a key element of shaping Navy thinking about operating in an expanded battlespace. Aviation leadership is looking forward to the impact of F-‐35 on the evolution of the strike fleet, much as a leaven for change than the sum and substance of that change.

As Admiral Conn put it:

“Looking forward, we need to continue to provide trained and ready aircrew to operate forward.

In looking to the future, in five years we are going to have JSF in the fleet.

In five years we may have UCLASS on our carriers. In five years, the Super Hornet of today is going to be different. In five years the E-‐2D capabilities and our networks will have matured. In five years the threat is going to change and competitors will have more capability.

In working with Naval Aviation Leadership, we are on a journey of discovery of how to best create a training environment that replicates potential adversary’s capabilities.”

The fourth lesson is that the focus on forward leading integrative training means that each element of the strike force needs to train for a particular platform’s proficiency but to do so with an understanding of what is coming with regard to future dynamics of integration.

For example, with regard to rotorcraft training, CDR Herschel “Hashi” Weinstock, current Department Head for SEAWOLF, NSAWC’s Rotary Wing Weapons School noted that:

“The USN as a whole is working through how to best use UAVs in the years ahead.

There are so many missions where they can bring complementary capabilities, or new ones.

We have subject matter experts in my department and others who work on these issues, and we are paying close attention to the opportunities in that arena.

I can clearly see the day when manned assets operating above the water will work closely with UAVs, managing them and sending them forward as needed for coverage.

The UAV’s would greatly expand the battlespace awareness of the strike group, and if necessary, the manned assets could redirect UAVs to areas of greater interest. They could, and probably will, play in other mission sets as well.”

The experimental X-‐47B UCAS-‐D completes a touch and go landing aboard the carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt on 11/14/13. Credit: Navy Media Content Services



The fifth lesson is that augmenting the capability to tap into joint and coalition assets is a key enabler for the naval strike force as well as learning how best to support joint and coalition forces as well.

In the past decade the USN has provided important support for the joint forces. For example, in an interview with CDR Mike “Beaker” Miller, Naval Strike and Warfare Center, Airborne Electronic Weapons School (HAVOC) we learned from his experience how he supported the US Army in Iraq.

“We flew carrier planes – the Prowler – out of a former Soviet base, that was an Army base, as part of an Air Force Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan (one of the most land-‐locked places on earth) in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.

We had not really focused on that mission before Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, but the red side was leveraging commercial technology to create an asymmetric advantage against the ground forces.

We were tasked to disrupt and deny those advantages, by providing supporting non-‐kinetic fires to protected entities (mounted and dismounted troops).

Following my deployments with the Navy to Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to embed directly with the Army as a Brigade EWO with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Air Assault Division in Iraq.

That experience helped me understand the synchronization and employment of non-‐kinetic fires from the supported commander’s perspective.

In effect, our effort became part of a broadened notion of close air support (CAS) or “fires.”

In the four-‐week course, which NSAWC offers as the various elements of the strike, force train to integrate prior to going to sea and their final training before operational deployment, the last week is spent taping into the joint community.

As Captain McLaughlin explained the process:

“We have a number of core training programs for graduate level proficiency of the primary platforms, such as TOPGUN, for example, with regard to fighters.

But that is for training at the individual level.

The next round of training is for what we call ARP or Advanced Readiness Phase, which is primarily focused at the squadron level.

While the Fallon Ranges are used for ARP’s, the primary instructor cadre comes from the weapons schools located at the fleet concentration centers. Again, using the F-‐18 example, the weapons schools at Naval Air Station Oceana and at Naval Air Station Lemoore are primarily responsible for ARP training.



The final strata are at the integrated level, which is what we do here at STRIKE. This involves not only all the squadrons in a given air wing, but external naval and joint assets as well.”

As part of the broadening of the training environment, NSAWS has Aegis weapons officers and others to shape an expanded strike envelope for the training process.

As we learned from our interview with Rear Admiral Manazir and will discuss next: “The initial operational capability of fifth generation fundamentally changes the way that we’re going to fight.”

It is Manazir’s job to sort through how to shape capabilities to do that; it is Fallon’s to deliver combat capability, which embodies those capabilities in the world of real combat.

For as the successor of “Proton,” CDR James “Cruiser” Christie put it succinctly:

“And clearly, you want to train to the high-‐end threat, the most capable potential threat out there — their hardware, their assessed pilot capabilities, their integrated air defense networks. You train against that as best you can, or something generically mimicking a high-‐end threat. Combat is a complex environment that does not suffer fools.”

Rear Admiral Manazir, Director of Air Warfare (OPNAV N98) After our visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station where we focused on the training for the current and evolving integrated strike group, we had a chance to discuss our experience with Rear Admiral Michael Manazir, Director of Air Warfare.

The conversation revolved around the impact of fifth generation capabilities on the evolution of the integrated strike group, to include the impact of the new carrier, the USS Ford, and the overall extended capabilities of the evolving sea base, both amphibious assault and carrier strike.

And in a recent interview, which our colleague Gordon Chang conducted earlier this year with the Admiral, the approach, which the Admiral is pursuing with regard to the joint, and coalition approach to the evolving strike force was evident.

In the tense settings of the future, the partnerships with allied navies will be force multipliers, taking the strain off America’s shrinking defense budgets.”

In the interview Rear Admiral Manazir drew upon his recent carrier command experience to highlight the role of global partnerships in shaping deterrence in depth capabilities.

Rear Admiral Michael Manazir made this point when he told me how in May of last year he stared down Iranian craft that wanted to interfere with the ships he commanded in international water in the Persian Gulf.

Yes, his vessels must have looked impressive to the Iranians, but what was even more fearsome was the multinational task force of which they were a part.



Manazir’s ships were but a few of the 35 vessels participating in the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise, a freedom of navigation drill that last year included 6,500 sailors and representatives from 41 nations.

There is nothing so frightening for the seamen of a rogue state than to see ships from a unified coalition on the high seas backed by history’s mightiest maritime force.

http://www.sldinfo.com/admiral-‐manazir-‐on-‐the-‐impact-‐of-‐global-‐partnerships-‐for-‐deterrence-‐in-‐depth/

Question: During our visit to Fallon, it was clear that the key focus of Naval aviation tactics and training is strike integration to successfully fight with the fleet you have, but at all command levels there was also a very clear understanding of always anticipating the future. You are in charge of looking at that future and how do you view that in relation to the current strike integration focus?

Rear Admiral Manazir: “Fallon is organized for integrated air wing training. They are not focused on whether an airplane is an F (fighter), A (attack) or an E (electronic warfare); they are focused on how does this air wing come together and fight with an F component, an E component and an A component.

The fifth generation is bringing us the opportunity and indeed the imperative to fundamentally alter the way we look at air warfare. The F-‐35 is not an A or an E or an F; it is all of those.

Earlier we had an F-‐14, an A-‐6 and an EA-‐6B and needed all three to do our job; now one airplane blends those capabilities and we can leverage that as we look at the integration of the other capabilities of the air wing we are developing.

Fifth generation is opening up so many possibilities that how we used to think about our capabilities is changing; how do we wring out the full capabilities of the air wing with the fifth generation as a catalyst for change?”

The Role of Live Virtual Training Question: A clear lesson learned from Fallon is the need to alter the training approach to deal with 21st century threats as well as capabilities. To do so, they are focused on Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC) training. How do you view this in regard to shaping the airwing of the future?

Rear Admiral Manazir: “The initial operational capability of fifth generation fundamentally changes the way that we’re going to fight.

F-‐35 C Carrier Trials Aboard the USS Nimitz, November 2014. Credit: USN



Where it used to be platform-‐to-‐platform, we now have inherent in a single weapon system, the capability to fold in all those things that we used to think were single missions, like the fighter mission, like the attack mission, like the electronic warfare mission.

Those missions were given to separate platforms because we didn’t have the way to fold them into a single platform. Now we have that capability to do that. So that fundamentally causes us to look at the way in which we do business in the future.

When we train, we always train to an integrated capability. At Fallon, we assume that the air wing squadrons are already trained to their individual skill sets, they’re already to a level at which they’re ready for integrated training against a very, very high-‐end mission set.

That mission set is modeled against an updated threat presentation that we corroborate across all intelligence sources to understand the threat we’re going to go against. And then we build training scenarios to that point at all security levels.

The current air wing that we have is capable of training inside the Fallon battlespace in a way in which we normally train: you use simulators to practice, and then you get in your airplane and you go against representative threat systems. Most of the representative legacy threat systems are on the Fallon ranges. And they are either physically there or we have a simulation that emulates the threat presentation. And all of that can be contained in that air space.

The threat baseline that we’re looking to fight in the mid-‐2020s and beyond is so much more advanced that we cannot replicate it using live assets. And those advances are in the aircraft capability, the weapon capability, and in the electronic warfare capability of the threat systems. That drives us to thinking about a different way to train.

In order to do that, you have to be able to have a realistic and representative emulation of the threat that is not live. And there are a couple of ways to do that. The first one is you make it completely constructive, and the second way is you make it simulated.

Live, virtual, constructive (LVC) training is a way to put together a representation of the threat baseline where you can train to the very high end using your fifth generation capability. Some of it is live with a kid in the cockpit, some of it is virtual in a simulator, and so “virtual” is actually the simulator environment. And then constructive is a way to use computers to generate a scenario displayed on either or both of the live or simulated cockpit.

You can also combine them to be live-‐constructive, or virtual-‐constructive, and by that I mean there are systems out there right now that you can install in the airplane that will give you a constructive radar picture air-‐to-‐air and surface-‐to-‐air along with the electronics effects right onto your scope.

You’re literally flying your airplane, and through a data link, you can share that information between airplanes, you can share it between dissimilar airplanes.

You could take a set of Navy airplanes, for instance, an E2D and a division of F-‐18s or F-‐35s on the Fallon range. And you could have a constructive scenario that is piped into all five of those



airplanes. It’s the same scenario, has all the same effects. And then the blue players can act according to that constructive scenario, and react to that constructive scenario in the live environment, but there’s nothing real in front of them…the threat is all simulated by computer generation.

Now let’s say that through fiber network, you pipe that constructive picture over to a coalition partner…for example, you do so to the RAAF in Australia…it is piped to a live airplane or a simulator over there, and let’s say there’s two Australian airplane simulators, and they’re seeing the same picture as the Americans are fighting.

And let’s say that there is a network that goes to the Aegis Cruiser, which is off the coast of Florida, and is going to be their Aegis Cruiser for the training. And you can show them the same picture.

Credits: ABDONLINE, Global Aerospace Solutions

And you can transmit through coms across that. You can easily see the training power in this LVC construct.

There are other systems that will allow you to have a live wingman up in the air in Fallon or on another range, his lead in a simulator, and when the simulator lead looks at his or her visual, he can see a virtual representation of his live wingman doing everything he does in the aircraft , and a link sends the aircraft maneuvers down to the simulator.



And when the simulator or the live person looks through their enhanced Joint Helmet Mounted Queuing System, he can see a virtual airplane on his visor.

When the virtual airplane on the helmet system say, dumps a flare or drops ordnance against the target, you actually see it come off the airplane in your visor. And you can actually fight a virtual bogey on your visor, and the guy’s not there. And you fight it with your airplane, just as if it is a real piece of metal. So that’s the live-‐constructive piece.

If you optimize the networks so that you have a live airplane flying somewhere, a simulator that’s exactly what emulates a live airplane, and then a constructive scenario that goes to both you now have the full LVC construct. You can overcome the barriers of geography, if the range is not big enough. You could also overcome the barriers of multilevel security, because if you go up and use all of your weapons system modes up in the air, live, there are surveillance systems that can pick up what you’re doing.

A look at the fusion cockpit of the F-‐35. Credit: Second Line of Defense

In this way, you can protect high end modes with encryption, and then create an architecture where LVC allows you to train to the complete capability of your fifth generation platform integrated into the advanced air wing and connected to AEGIS and the aircraft carrier as well as operations centers ashore. And that’s what we’re looking to do.



We realize that the fifth generation platform has now bumped us up against the limits of our training ranges and that we do not quite have the LVC components built yet, so that is where our current focus lies.”

The Impact of 5th Gen on Fighting in the Expanded Battlespace Question: In this approach, clearly you are looking at the “red” side, but the “blue” side is equally demanding. With fifth generation, you are looking at off-‐boarding capabilities such as the fifth generation acting as forward deployed scouts identifying targets for Navy weapons. How do you view this aspect of the challenge?

Rear Admiral Manazir: “I could absolutely finish your sentence. It is as challenging right now to figure out how to use this fifth generation capability as to deal with the “red” side. We’re thinking about integrating the weapons system capability…not the platform…in reshaping the airwing – that is the challenge.

In the past, any high-‐end capability, like the F-‐117 in Desert Storm, went by itself. The approach was: leave me alone, don’t touch me; I can operate more effectively alone. From this perspective, fifth generation is understood as a high end, leave alone capability: the capability to go downtown with a low probability of intercept, low probability of detection data link and associated weapons systems that allows the platform to operate inside the red battlespace.

We are not simply doing that. We are focused on the ability to connect into the integrated fire control network, pull that fifth generation information into the network. We’re learning a lot of lessons from F-‐22, we’re bringing those lessons on as our corporate knowledge starts to gell so we understand how to do this effectively.

You captured the exact point. We think of integrated capability. If you take this fifth generation airplane that people like to keep by itself, how do you integrate into the strike group? But integration from the blue side is the key challenge and advantage of adding fifth generation to the airwing.”

Question: Another aspect of thinking about the F-‐35 is the impact of a global fleet of F-‐35s. With your ability to operate integrated with your F-‐35Cs with joint or coalition aircraft, the reach of the carrier air wing is extended significantly.

Rear Admiral Manazir: “Reach not range is a key aspect of looking at the carrier airwing and its ability to work with joint and coalition forces. This is clearly enhanced with the F-‐35.

What you can do with a Carrier, given joint and coalition perspectives is the Carrier automatically extends your reach because you can put it anywhere you want. The mobility of the carrier is a key point. You can put it up against the problem set the national command authority or the joint force commander wishes to address; and then you can move it to deal with an evolving target or operational set of challenges, again aligned with the commander’s intent.



You can move the reach of the carrier wing as you redeploy it and connect with joint or coalition assets. The carrier has a core ability to operate organically but its real impact comes from its synergy with the joint and coalition force, which will only go up as the global F-‐35 fleet emerges.

And this will get better with the coming of the USS Ford. What the Ford does is it optimizes the things that we think are the most important.

Some of those capabilities are clear:

• Enhanced sortie generation capabilities or the number of times you can get airplanes into the mix to keep the reach out there.

• The power generation capability, so advanced systems can operate off of the ship. • The ability to take the information that is brought back through the airborne network

into the ship and be able to disseminate it to decision makers is enhanced over the Nimitz class.”

Re-‐Thinking the Sea Base Question: Another key way to consider the carrier, its airwing and the evolution of concepts of operations is to rethink the role of the sea base. It is not just about the USS Ford; it is about the USS America, the USS Arlington, the T-‐AKE ships, the amphibious assault task force and the evolving carrier air wing as a whole. The capability to link US maritime and air assets as well as those of coalition forces creates a whole new set of possibilities.

What is your take on this dynamic?

Rear Admiral Manazir: “I am the son of a Marine. What you are talking about is in my blood. And the Marines are leading the charge on fifth generation capability and bringing it into the fleet.

And when we think back to World War II, the Navy-‐Marine team in the Pacific was the integration of core capabilities, which defeated the Japanese forces. The new ships, the coming of the F-‐35 and reworking our concepts of operations enhance such integration.

And a key element is the capability to evolve our systems over time. It needs to be recognized that the USN shares its investment in F-‐35 combat systems with the USMC, the USAF and coalition partners – we are all using the same combat systems in our aircraft. That is an investment multiplier.

As the F-‐35 and its fifth generation data fusion capabilities continue to advance through the follow-‐on development of the software, processing that information that we’re going to be able to get from the environment through the fifth generation systems into the Carrier, and then to

Artist Rendition of the USS Ford at Sea. Credit: Huntington Ingalls



be able to input that information into a decision loop, and then acting will be a big step forward.”

The Carrier and Joint and Coalition Operations: Shaping Investments for the Future Question: And the flexibility of your evolving carrier air wing to support the kind of 21st century strategic environment is crucial as well. The carrier air wing can lead an effort, support a joint effort, or lead or support a coalition effort. The President spoke of leading from behind, but I would prefer supporting a coalition partner, but one can envisage new possibilities.

For example, the Aussies are leading an effort in their part of the woods and have made their new Canberra-‐class amphibious ships a flagship of their operation. They fly their potential F-‐35Bs off of those ships. The planes connect directly to your carrier F-‐35s and then your carrier Admiral can provide significant real time support to that Australian effort up to the level desired by the US National command authority. The capabilities of the USS Ford to support such a decision effort are a significant step forward as well.

Rear Admiral Manazir: “They are. But to get full value from the scenario you described the training piece is crucial. Exercises and training will be essential to shape the kind of convergent capability, which the new systems will allow. Training unlocks those kinds of options. It is not just about technology.

And as we re-‐shape our concepts of operations under the influence of fifth generation capabilities, we need to re-‐focus our investments on the missing pieces revealed by re-‐shaping our concepts of operations.

As we think about the threat baseline, as we think about the potential scenarios that we could be in, and as we think about our operational plans, and about our campaign analyses, we will look at our evolving integrated capability, and then figure out where our gaps are.

My job is to buy those capabilities. I need to be able to look at the entire spectrum of the operational level of war, and determine where I invest.

I’m able to balance my investments, taking advantage of fifth generation capability.

I’m thinking about what is my potential with investment, to enhance my capability.

And when I am focused on the evolving impact of integration I am thinking of both the F-‐35 and the USS Ford and what these two platforms together bring to wring out the capabilities of legacy assets and to shape a way ahead for new ones. It is about the impact of the carrier and its airwing on the role of the seabase within the joint and coalition environment.”



Vice Admiral William Moran, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, (N1), former Director of Air Warfare (OPNAV N98) In an April 30, 2013 interview with Rear Admiral Bill Moran, Director of Air Warfare (OPNAV N98), the approach of the US Navy in combining several naval air transitions with the introduction of the USS Ford was the focus of conversation.

In a co-‐authored article, the Admiral had looked at the GERALD R. FORD class carrier as a new naval platform. In this conversation, the focus was on the evolving context and how the FORD class would fit with the fleet and the transition in the air wing aboard the carrier.

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-‐09-‐0/leap-‐ahead-‐21st-‐century-‐navy

Rather than seeing the new carrier as the centerpiece of an island of concentrated force within which the carrier was the centerpiece, Moran emphasized that the FORD class could play this role, but its design and the evolving nature of the air wing and other capabilities will allow it to play a much more flexible or distributed role.

The Transition Question: When we visited San Diego a couple of years ago, the naval aviators we talked to were focused on the across the board transitions which were underway. For example, Captain Whalen, now the Commander of the USS Carl Vinson underscored that the Navy was facing an across the board transition.

http://www.sldinfo.com/managing-‐the-‐transition/

How do you view the transition?

Rear Admiral Moran: “We are the midst of a significant transition in Naval aviation. We are working it hard inside the building and in concert with the fleet and that is one reason why we’ve had our heads down and not as vocal as one might expect.

We largely took a procurement holiday with regard to naval air platforms in the mid 1990s. When one is buying aircraft, typically you are looking at a 20-‐25 year service life. If you are buying in peaks, you are then going to have valleys.

Because of the mid-‐1990s procurement holiday, we are now in the midst of replacing several legacy platforms across the fleet.

We will be done with all our helicopter transitions by 2016. We will be done with the F-‐18 Es, Fs and G’s along with the P-‐8 by the end of the decade. We will be on a steady ramp on E2D because it is not a volume aircraft.

In effect, in the foreseeable future, we will only be buying the F-‐35C as our advanced aircraft system. These are the aircraft that will make up the carrier airwing for the next 20 plus years.

This means that in 20 years we will face a new build cycle to add replacement aircraft or air systems to replace current capability.



This means that the air wing that will go onto the Ford, for example, will provide a key foundation to shape an understanding of what comes next.”

Shaping Innovation Question: Your focus on cycles of innovation can be misunderstood.

When you are talking about where you might wish to be in 2030, some might see this as an unhappiness with the trend lines which you are already have set in place. Could you give us your thoughts on this challenge of presentation of future technologies with current evolutions?

Rear Admiral Moran: “We are looking at a number of evolving technological developments and options to shape the naval air wing after next. Unfortunately, some people misunderstand this approach and think we are looking at future technologies to displace what we are buying now, including the F-‐35 in the near term. In fact it is just the opposite.

We are going to operationally shape our understanding of the evolving air wing, notably as the F-‐35 enters the fleet, and build from that to the air wing after next.

The CNO has highlighted the role of payloads in shaping the kinds of platforms we are buying and likely to develop and buy.

We think that in Naval aviation we are building out in that manner with the new GERALD R. FORD class of carriers (future platform) married with evolving air wing capabilities (payloads).

Another good example is the new P-‐8 Poseidon, which was design built from a commercial airframe. We then put architecture in the airplane to allow growth in terms of what capability will fit into that airplane in the future. This kind of “truck” and “payload” construct buys us time to evolve capability, whether it’s weapons or sensors or communications gear that are more easily integrated into the backbone of that airplane.

http://www.sldinfo.com/tthe-‐us-‐navy-‐in-‐transition-‐the-‐case-‐of-‐the-‐p-‐8-‐as-‐part-‐of-‐the-‐attack-‐and-‐defense-‐enterprise/

http://www.sldinfo.com/indian-‐and-‐american-‐naval-‐cooperation-‐the-‐potential-‐role-‐of-‐the-‐p-‐8/

When we think of strike fighters for the carrier wing after next, shaping a combat truck in effect will play a role. It might be a truck that has a common architecture, a backbone to it that you can plug and play different capability sensors, weapons, comms, and that will drive design and it will drive propulsion.

It will also have the reach and reach back to operate in multiple environments.

A USN P-‐8A assigned to Patrol Squadron 30 flies above aircraft carrier USS Harry s. Truman in the Atlantic Ocean, October 16, 2012. Credit: USN



And will have payloads on it that will enable future weapons that we see that are smarter, more precise, and will be a bit unpredictable for potential adversaries, whoever they might be.”

The Coming of the F-‐35 Question: You will also have the opportunity from the standpoint of 2030 to take advantage of understanding what the impact of the F-‐35 will be on the fleet.

Rear Admiral Moran: “Absolutely. That is a good point.

Joint strike fighter in my view is a revolutionary change to how we’re going to operate.

And we will evolve joint strike fighter once we get it in our hands and we learn to operate with it, and we truly understand its full potential. Once we get it out there and we start operating, we’re going to find out that we’re going to want to evolve this capability.

And the F-‐35 may be its own successor.

Point being, we do not need to make a decision on the future as of yet, because much will depend on the operational experience we gain with the new air wing as well as a close look at the evolution of technologies, such as propulsion.

The mix of aircraft and capability is a key part of our discussion going forward in the future, especially on what the air wing after next might look like.”

The Future of UAVs Question: There are frequent comments to the effect that it is the end of the manned aircraft era and we will see the dominance of the unmanned. But one could note that UAVs really are simply data links in space and are extremely vulnerable in many ways. But clearly robotics is a key part of the evolution of what will shape the future of what is on the carrier deck.

Rear Admiral Moran: “They are called unmanned systems, but clearly they are not today. There is significant support necessary to operate the systems, and the man in the loop is crucial to execute an effective mission. Where you would like to go is to launch a system so it could operate autonomously within the rules of operation and engagement you have pre-‐set.

We clearly are not there yet. What we get for now from so-‐called unmanned systems is persistence. There is a clear value in the persistent capability for the ISR mission of UAVs.

Information security and control is crucial as well.

If I launch it, can I turn it back? Can I prevent it from doing something when the information changes between the time I launch it and the time it arrives?

That’s the judgment piece, that’s the autonomous piece that is crucial to a commander. So I think the man in the loop, whether it’s the truck, the man in the truck that operates that capability, whether it’s the carrier or the airplane is still relevant for a long, long time.”



The Coming of the USS Ford Question: You have been talking about the evolution of the air wing, but you clearly have in mind that the new large deck carrier will be part of the re-‐shaping of what that air wing can be used for. Could you talk about your understanding of the Ford and its capabilities?

Rear Admiral Moran: “Because it’s an “electrified” platform — it’s no longer predominantly steam and hydraulics and all of the things that are traditional parts of the Nimitz class carriers — we’ve replaced a lot of that with electrical capability because of improved power generation coming out of a newly designed nuclear power plant.

It’s a generational leap in capability in terms of generated power.

FORD will generate three times the electrical power of a NIMITZ class carrier. And with that you can electrify the ship and you can automate the ship, add the most powerful and advanced radar system in the Navy and then when you want to put things on the ship, new capabilities in the future that we can’t even think of today, whether it’s a hypersonic capability that’s unmanned, directed energy weapons or whatever it is, we do know is it’s got to be able to plug in. It’s got to fit in somehow. And, it’s going to need power.

Schematic of USS Ford. Credit: Huntington Ingalls

With a ship that is in effect a 21st century infrastructure for 21st century systems, we will be able to do that.

Whatever we invent, whatever we want to put on this truck in the future, it is going to be able to incorporate it in a way that the current configuration cannot.

We have also reduced the crew size and designed the ship for reduced maintenance, thereby reducing operational costs over its lifetime by four billion dollars.

The FORD Class will introduce significant design improvements in flight deck sortie generation capability.



It’s cleaned up significantly. We’ve developed in effect a pit crew concept where there’s enough room when an airplane lands that you can pull it off into the pit and reconfigure it, whether it’s sensors or weapons, and gas it, and put it right back out on the deck and launch it.”

Question: You are describing a carrier, which can operate much more flexibly than a traditional carrier, and one which can become a central piece in a combat spider web, rather than operating at the center of a concentrated force. Could you talk to the con-‐ops piece of this?

Rear Admiral Moran: “The Ford will be very flexible and can support force concentration or distribution. And it can operate as a flagship for a distributed force as well and tailored to the mission set.

When combined with the potential of the F35, FORD will be able to handle information and communications at a level much greater than the Nimitz class carriers.

People will be able to share information across nations, and this is crucial. We call it maritime domain awareness, but now you’ve included the air space that’s part of that maritime domain.

There is another aspect of the FORD, which is important to handling the information systems as part of the evolution of the fleet. We’ve never really talked about the cooling aspects. But if you go down to Newport News and take a tour of the FORD right now, one of the things they really like to brag about is innovations in the cooling system. All of us know the processing power takes its heat.

And so, you’ve got to be able to cool it. FORD more than doubles the cooling system capacity of a NIMTZ class carrier.

But let me close by circling back to the future of the airwing for the next 20 years and the value we see in the F-‐35C.

We are buying all production aircraft currently. We see the coming of the FORD and the coming of the F-‐35 as highly synergistic for the fleet and its operation as a sea base. And with the F-‐35C must come Block 3F capability, which has a fully enabled set to operate the weapons we use at sea, multi-‐ship integration and a host of other very important capabilities important to how we expect to operate in the future. We are not going to accelerate the number of production airplanes until we get to Block 3F which will give us the capability that we need to operate off the carrier.

Once we marry up F35C with key capability investments in the Super Hornet, E2D, Growlers and a mix of unmanned capabilities, we will continue to have an airwing that can dominate in any environment.”



Rear Admiral Scott Conn, Commander, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center As we concluded our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we had a chance to discuss the Center and the way ahead with Rear Admiral Scott Conn, Commander of the Center. Rear Admiral Conn has had a distinguished career as a naval aviator.

His prior command tours include Carrier Air Wing 11 embarked in USS Nimitz (CVN 68), the FA-‐18 series Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 aboard Naval Air Station Oceana, and VFA-‐136 deploying in USS George Washington (CVN 73).

Conn’s sea tours include a division officer tour in Fighter Squadron (VF) 11 deploying twice in USS Forrestal (CV 59), as division officer and department head with VFA-‐15 deploying in USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-‐71) and USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), and as a department head with VFA-‐81 deploying in USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69). He also deployed serving as a battle director at the Combined Air Operations Center in Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.

Ashore, Conn’s flying tours includes serving as an adversary pilot in VF-‐43 flying the A-‐4, F-‐5 and F-‐16 aircraft, and as a department head and instructor pilot in VFA-‐106.

His staff tours include serving as the Staff General Secretary and PACOM event planner at the Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, Virginia, as the Executive Assistant to Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and as the Strike Branch Director in OPNAV N98. Conn is also a graduate of the Naval War College.

He has flown over 100 combat missions in Operations DELIBERATE FORCE, Southern Watch, Deny Flight, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.

He has accumulated over 4,700 flight hours and 1,000 arrested landings. He was the recipient of the 2004 Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Inspirational Leadership award.

Learning Lessons from Combat Challenges The Admiral noted that the “mission we have here started with TOPGUN, 45 years ago.

TOPGUN was founded out of failures in combat during the Vietnam War.

TOPGUN training led to measurable improvements in Air to Air kill ratios.

Through the years, other communities have mirrored the TOPGUN model including the EA-‐18G HAVOC course, the E-‐2 CAEWWS course, and the H-‐60S/R SEAWOLF course.

These courses target advanced training at the individual level.

Additionally, as a result of failures in combat in Lebanon, STRIKE University, now call simply Strike, was stood up in 1984 to target training at the Integrated warfighting level.

We have learned a lot of lessons at Fallon and we have had a lot of time to shape an effective combat learning environment.”



Bottom line: My job here is to prepare our forward deployed air wings to fight and win in a wide variety of missions across the globe.

Training to Fight in the Extended Battlespace: The Enhanced Role of Virtual Training Question: You have focused on counter-‐insurgency missions a great deal in the past decade, but clearly the next will return you to high end warfare and the challenges of dealing with denser defenses and fighting in contested air space. How are you preparing for those contingencies?

Admiral Conn: “There are clear challenges in terms of fighting the high-‐end fight in the period head.

And if you look at the map in front of us which shows our ranges in Fallon in terms of miles, depth and breadth, it is clear that I am running out of real estate (land and airspace) to train to the entire kill chain of integrated fires.”

Question: We have seen a similar situation with MAWTS at the Yuma Marine Corps Air Station as well and they expanding their operational area by using other ranges such as at Nellis or the Goldwater Range near the Luke AFB.

Admiral Conn: “We work in close coordination with our counterparts in Nellis.

We maximize every opportunity to work together in developing joint solutions to the high end fight of the future.

Through the process we better understand the capabilities the joint force brings to bear, and develop the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to fight jointly.

But this issue of training to the high-‐end fight is not only about real estate; it is also about our desire to not reveal to potential adversaries how we intend to fight.

These considerations are driving us to live, virtual, and constructive training solutions as part of our overall operational training environment game plan.

Let me be clear, as far as I can see there will always be a requirement to conduct training in aircraft.

At Fallon, in addition to developing and practicing those TTPs to fight and win in any scenario, we also provide the opportunity to stress the various systems with end to end live fly validation.

As an example, when a mission is planned that requires the delivery of ordnance, whether that ordnance be bullets, bombs or missiles, Sailors have to build up the weapons, then the weapons are loaded on an aircraft, Sailors then have to check to see that the aircraft can communicate

An F/A-‐18F Super Hornet approaches the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower for an arrested recovery. June 14, 2013. Credit: USN



with the weapon, then aircrew have to preflight the aircraft, take off, fly to the range, conduct airborne system checks, fight their way to the target, arm the aircraft, hit the pickle and in most cases guide the weapon to the target.

This is a brief description of the kill chain that ends up in a kinetic effect, or to state clearly, a bomb going high order on the target, and the right target at the right time.

This live fly validation cannot be done in a simulator.

That said, in a simulated environment, I can have aircrew jump in a device, and I can train them at the integrated level across the entire kill chain for various missions.

I can conduct this high end training very quickly, a lot of reps and sets if you will, at reduced cost.”

Anticipating and Dealing With the Threat Environment Question: How do you develop your evolving anticipated threat environment?

Admiral Conn: “Future threat assessments are developed collaboratively between Office of Naval Intelligence, Fleet and Combatant Commanders, Naval Air Warfare Resource Sponsors, and Naval Air Systems engineers.

This process includes input from NSAWC’s subject matter experts.

While NSAWC participates in this process, our main focus is to be able to fight and win today with today’s equipment.

Additionally, I need to be clear that NSAWC is one part of the Fleet Response Plan.

The training we conduct at Fallon is from the fights on to the knock it off, and is not focused on taking off and landing on an aircraft carrier.

The fact that Naval Forces fight forward from the sea is what makes us unique and provides our Nation with the presence to prevent crisis, and if required, to respond to a crisis quickly and decisively.

The cold hard truth is that launching from a Carrier, or one of our Amphibious Ships for our Marine Corps brethren is inherently dangerous and unforgiving of mistakes or complacency.

This unique maritime operational aspect is addressed through follow on training by Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 and CSG 15 who make recommendations for certification for deployment.”

Training Includes Supporting Deployed Carrier Wings Question: We found it interesting that your strike integration training involves as well regular dialogue with the deployed carriers and apparently you work in support of the deployed fleet as well in shaping TTPs, which they might need in ongoing operations. Could you speak to that process?



Admiral Conn: “NSAWC innovates in peacetime while providing the reach back support to adapt in war.

We are in regular communication with the deployed carriers.

We provide technical and tactical reach back support to address observed shortfalls in combat to existing TTPs.

An historical example of how NSAWC provided reach back support to the forward deployed warfighter was in the early stages of Afghanistan operations.

Ground commanders needed aircraft to strafe at night.

To do this strafing mission at night, aircrew needed to put an airplane below mountaintops, perhaps in a valley, provide bullets precisely and then pull off target, and not fly into the terrain.

When NSAWC got this request, in a matter of weeks because it wasn’t overnight, a couple weeks, we came up with the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the fleet to execute that mission.

We then folded those TTPs into our training for follow on deployers.

And the connectivity we have with the fleet through modern communications allows for an ongoing combat learning process between Fallon and the fleet and this flow of information is central to the process of training in the 21st century.”

Training is the Crucial Glue Question: Clearly, shortfalls in flight hours and training is a crucial concern for you.

How do you view the challenge?

Admiral Scott Conn: “Naval aviation is very interdependent on how we train aircrew and how we resource to those training requirements.

As competing readiness requirements pressurize the flight hour program, pushing training qualifications later on in one’s aviation career creates a bow wave.

Naval aviation is looking at this issue hard, to ensure our future forward deployed leaders will have the requisite knowledge, skills and experience to in fact, lead.

What we will not do, let me repeat, not do, is to lower our training and readiness standards.

In the future, the live, virtual and constructive training is envisioned to relieve some of this stress, particularly as aging aircraft and 5th generation aircraft are more expensive to operate.

Bottom line here is that training is the essential glue for operational success.

In combat, you’re not going to rise to your level of technology or the capabilities of your opponent,; you’re going to fall back to your level of training.



Today and in future, with the proliferation of precision across the globe, the difference between winning and losing is/will be measured in seconds, not minutes.”

Why Fallon? Question: Fallon is a tough place to reach, and our sense is that the warriors who come here are clearly very committed to the mission.

Admiral Scott Conn: “The city of Fallon is a great partner in the execution of our mission.

The reason aircrew come here is because of the mission.

They come here because of the passion for the mission.

And they come here because they want to pass their knowledge onto other aviators.”

Training for the Joint Environment Question: The relationship between the deployed CAGs and your command is not one widely realized outside of the Navy.

And we learned that in your strike integration activities you are building in more joint work as well.

Could you give us a sense of that activity?

Admiral Scott Conn: “We participate in some of the planning for joint exercises.

We participate in those exercises as well.

Our EA-‐18G Growlers are often requested to support exercises in Nellis.

We need to make sure that folks understand the capabilities of the air wing as well as the Carrier Strike Group.

During our Maritime Employment course, a good portion of the attendees come from various U.S Air Force units.

As another example of Joint integration is that Air National Guard F-‐16s from the East Coast will support the next air wing.”

Question: We also learned that you have surface officers, such as Aegis weapons officers, working strike integration as well.

Could you comment on that aspect?

Ed Timperlake with Admiral Conn after the Second Line of Defense Interview.



Admiral Scott Conn: “As we build an Aegis-‐like capability into the training here in Fallon, my subject matter experts will be more effectively working side by side with the surface community subject matter experts, and in the process will learn from each other more effectively as we develop and refine existing CSG TTPs for various missions.”

Operating in an Expanded Battlespace Question: A number of analysts have focused on the Anti-‐Access Area Denial threat as a serious limiting factor for future USN operations.

How do you view that and focus upon how to best train to deal with those threats?

Admiral Scott Conn: “I think it important to emphasize that adversary A2AD capabilities pose a serious threat not only to Navy, but to our entire Joint ability to fight and win.

Again, I think of A2AD as the proliferation of precision for potential adversaries and how this proliferation of precision effects joint forces ability to maneuver where we need to be and when we need to be there.

For me, it is about expanding the battlespace and training with regard to how to do this.

We are developing the means to push out the battle space and our ability to find, fix, track, target and engage the threat.

The F-‐35 will bring enormous capability in this area.

At the same time we are developing means to deny, degrade or delay a potential adversary’s ability to do the same to us.

This is why the EA-‐18G with Next Generation Jammer is so important to the Air Wing of the future, with its ability to provide operating sanctuaries for our forces through exploitation of the EM spectrum.



Fallon training ranges image taken from the NSAWC Command Brief. Credit: NSAWC

That said, the proliferation of precision across the globe compresses engagement timelines, things will happen very fast.

And we have to push those boundaries out to buy freedom of maneuver, decision space and time.

We are adding new capabilities to do so in the period ahead.

With the advent of a live, virtual and constructive training environment we will then integrate those new capabilities to train and fight in this expanded battlespace.

With regard to building out our Virtual Constructive Training, it is a work in progress and one, which is central to future of training here at Fallon.”

Key Objective Moving Forward Question: You have been at the command for six months, when you leave the command what do you hope to have achieved?

Admiral Scott Conn: “First and foremost is to continue to provide trained and ready aircrew to operate forward.

In looking to the future, in five years we are going to have JSF in the fleet.



In five years we may have UCLASS on our carriers. In five years, the Super Hornet of today is going to be different.

In five years the E-‐2D capabilities and our networks will have matured.

In five years the threat is going to change and competitors will have more capability.

In working with Naval Aviation Leadership, we are on a journey of discovery of how to best create a training environment that replicates potential adversary’s capabilities.

Before I leave, I would like to hand my relief a destination to drive to in this regard.”

Visiting Fallon Naval Air Station: Interviews with the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center In this section, the interviews we conducted while visiting senior staff at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare center are provided. The staff was very helpful in explaining how they are working to craft an effective integrated airwing going to the fleet, supporting the currently deployed fleet and preparing for the future. We thank those persons interviewed for providing their time and insights so that that others might learn about their efforts, and be able to appreciate more fully their role and their service to the country.

Strike Integration at Fallon: Preparing for Today and Positioning for the Future We started our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station with the outgoing and incoming commanding officers of Plans, Programs and Tactics, or STRIKE (N5) in the Center.

Plans, Programs and Tactics, or STRIKE (N5) is involved in tactics development and assessment for tactical aircraft and SH-‐60 helicopters, program management and participation, mission planning, and inter/intra service liaison.

They are also the primary trainers for visiting air wings during their “Air Wing det. Fallon” phase of training, prior to deployment.

CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin: Outgoing STRIKE CO Our introduction to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center was provided by CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin, outgoing STRIKE CO, previous TOPGUN CO, and Instructor.

He highlighted a number core dynamics involved in the Center as well as discussing a number of key “work aheads” for Naval Aviation.

Clearly, training must focus on fighting with the force you have, but this force evolves over time and one needs to be prepared to incorporate joint capabilities and new capabilities coming the USN and USMC as well.

“Proton” discussed some of those aspects as well.For an outsider, the presence of TOPGUN would suggest the fundamental meaning of Fallon; but this would be clearly incorrect.



As “Proton” explained: “We have a number of core training programs for graduate level proficiency of the primary platforms, such as TOPGUN, for example, with regard to fighters.

But that is for training at the individual level. The next round of training is for what we call ARP or Advanced Readiness Phase, which is primarily focused at the squadron level.

While the Fallon Ranges are used for ARP’s, the primary instructor cadre comes from the weapons schools located at the fleet concentration centers. Again, using the F-‐18 example, the weapons schools at Naval Air Station Oceana and at Naval Air Station Lemoore are primarily responsible for ARP training.

The final strata are at the integrated level, which is what we do here at STRIKE. This involves not only all the squadrons in a given air wing, but external naval and joint assets as well.”

Question: There is a close interactive process of training between the weapons schools and the wings?

Captain McLaughlin: “There is. For the F-‐18 side of the house, TOPGUN is at the top of the training pyramid and the weapons schools basically work for TOPGUN.

TOPGUN develops the tactics, techniques and standardization procedures for the strike fighter aviation and then those TTP’s are pushed to the fleet via the respective weapons schools in Oceana and Lemoore.”

Question: With regard to the strike integration phase, you both provide the training for integration but are in regular dialogue with the deployed carriers to both support them and to learn from their deployment experiences?

Captain McLaughlin: “That is correct. We support the Combatant Commanders as well as prepare strike integration ashore so to speak.

For example, we have had daily contact with the USS BUSH via email, phone calls and VTCs.

This is an aspect of connectivity, which folds nicely into reshaping the impact and meaning of the training function.”

Question: In other words, at Fallon you are operating in a highly interactive combat learning process rather than doing stove-‐piped training?

Captain McLaughlin: “That is correct.

Captain Kevin "Proton" McLaughlin. Credit: Second Line of Defense



During the month they’re here, the STRIKE team rolls up their sleeves, and we are with them 24/7 shaping and evaluating the integrated training process with them.

It’s kind of a crawl, walk, run process.

It starts at what we refer to MLT, mission level training, such as a 12 to 16 ship integrated strike against a low-‐level threats in both the air-‐to-‐air and surface-‐to-‐air regimes.

The threat capabilities gradually ratchet up and eventually leads to the advanced training phase, which is an A2AD 24-‐30 plane strike in GPS denied environments, Link-‐16 denied environments, et cetera, whatever that A2AD for that specific mission set is.

And in that phase we are also working with the USAF, and other non-‐organic assets because, in the real world, we would be working together against that sort of threat.”

Question: Training to A2AD is a major challenge given range limitations and the need to tap a variety of non-‐carrier resources in conducting that fight.

How are you training to that environment?

Captain McLaughlin: “The current Fallon ranges – although large – are too small to train against an advanced threat, which can shoot longer than the ranges.

We need to train to a 21st Century Plus type of threat with very long-‐range missiles in the mix.

It is not about succeeding; it is about how are we going to do this with highest probability of success.

We are rolling in Live Virtual Constructive training to provide the extenders for our operators to work in that threat environment and to reach out to other assets – Navy and joint – which can allow us to fight in an expanded battlespace.”

Question: And this approach allows you to fold in over time new blue force assets as well, for example with the Navy the F-‐35C or the UCAS?

Captain McLaughlin: “It does but F-‐35C will be much easier to integrate than UCAS as we have a very defined capability set with the JSF but are still unclear about UCAS.

Correspondingly, we have been preparing for the introduction of the F-‐35C for some time, and have many involved in preparing for its introduction into the fleet.”

FCSG-‐9 strike personnel working with Fallon in providing Tomahawk strike support. Credit: USN



Question: Certainly, the fight against ISIL has reminded the nation once again of the flexibility of the sea base and how that flexibility really compliments other air power capabilities, which can be brought to the fight?

What is your take on the role of the sea-‐base in the expanded battlespace?

Captain McLaughlin: “A key advantage of the carrier and sea-‐basing more generally is the ability to move to the fight with logistics support onboard.

We do not need long lead times and delicate diplomatic negotiations to move to the fight; we just sail to the fight, and given forward presence, we are probably not too far away in any case.

Moreover, as we add new capabilities like the F-‐35, and enhance our ability to leverage joint and coalition assets we are going to be more effective in the expanded battlespace with the sea base a central element, if not the central C2 capability for the joint or coalition force.”

CDR James “Cruiser” Christie: Incoming STRIKE CO We then had an opportunity to continue the conversation about the strike integration process and challenges with “Proton’s” successor, CDR James “Cruiser” Christie, incoming STRIKE CO, and previous TOPGUN CO

Question: How do you view the function of the STRIKE Command, which you are about to lead?

CDR Christie: “The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center really is an umbrella organization that brings together several schools of excellence with regard to core combat capabilities, TOPGUN for fighters, CAEWWS (Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School), HAVOC (Airborne Electronics Attack Weapons School), JCAS (Joint Close Air Support), and the rotary wing training school or RWWS.

At STRIKE we focus on the integration of these various core competencies into an integrated strike force, which will operate off of the carrier.”

Question: Clearly, a key aspect of integration is that it is not fixed but is reworked as new assets come into the fleet.

As we understand it, the latest assets might go to the fleet and then after initial deployments come to Fallon for the learning curve into the integration effort?

CDR Christie: “That certainly can happen, but isn’t ideal.

For example, our first air wing with E2-‐D, the new Hawkeye, is coming here in a couple of weeks.

CDR James "Cruiser" Christie. Credit: Second Line of Defense



We have been working with them over the past year in various parts of their workup because the rollout of the E-‐2D platform has been accelerated.

We’ve sent TOPGUN instructors, and CAEWWS instructors, and STRIKE instructors down to work with CVW-‐1 and VAW-‐125 supportive of that effort.

Typically, the Fleet won’t get a platform or capability until it has been thoroughly tested and validated by our test pilot community.

At Fallon, we focus the bulk of our work on Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTPs) for the fleet.

We’re chartered to create the tactics of the future, and to be able to do that we need to know where revolutionary advances are happening, and to understand those new capabilities thoroughly.

So with regard to the new Hawkeye, we sent staff members with either an E-‐2D or fighter integration background to meet with the squadron and air wing team during their workups to help them work through optimal tactical implementation of their new assets.”

Question: Another key aspect is building an evolving understanding of the threat from more advanced adversaries as well.

How do you do that?

CDR Christie: “We have threat specific subject matter experts who maintain close connections with various intelligence agencies, and with our allies, to better understand the evolving threat environment.

Our subject matter experts convey that knowledge to tactics instructor students in class.

And clearly, you want to train to the high-‐end threat, the most capable potential threat out there — their hardware, their assessed pilot capabilities, their integrated air defense networks.

You train against that as best you can, or something generically mimicking a high-‐end threat.

Combat is a complex environment that does not suffer fools.”

Question: The upgraded Hawkeye is a new asset and presumably you are preparing for the F-‐35 becoming an integral part of the strike package.

How are you preparing for the introduction of the F-‐35 into your strike integration thinking?

CDR Christie: “We are preparing for sure.

TOPGUN has a team of instructors working with MAWTS and Nellis to shape common TTPs.

A new E-‐2 D starts up its engine at Patuxent River on July 16, 2013. Credit: USN



And we have been doing that for three years.

We have already written the initial employment documents with how to integrate the F-‐35 into the fight.

And to be clear, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are all working together on this.

We’re not simply waiting for the plane to come to Fallon, and of course, we have our Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) training and instructing at Eglin AFB.

We maintain a close working relationship with Nellis.

We have an Air Force exchange pilot on staff at TOPGUN and STRIKE, and a former TOPGUN instructor pilot is assigned to Nellis.

Most recently, the Air Force exchange officer at TOPGUN was an F-‐16 pilot.

We see this as an important trade space for intellectual ideas on how to succeed in 21st century air combat.

In order to conduct a truly joint operation with symbiosis, it is important for both weapons schools to send their best tacticians and aviators to each other’s facilities.

This is how you realize fully integrated capabilities operating in the joint realm. And this exchange has been going on for more than a decade.”

Question: What you are describing is shaping a cadre of tacticians and operators who can actually think about convergent operations?

CDR Christie: “That is a good way to put it.

To operate jointly, you cannot do it from a book or simply be handed directives.

You need to understand how the other service operates, how it is different and where commonalities can actually yield capabilities.”

Biography of CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin

A native of Newport Beach, CA. CDR Kevin McLaughlin enlisted in the Navy in 1989 and was named Navy League Outstanding Recruit for his graduating cadre. Following ET ‘A’ School and Navy Nuclear Power School in Orlando, FL., the then ET3 McLaughlin transferred to Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Upon completion of prototype, he was en route to the USS Helena (SSN 725) when he was accepted into the Naval Aviation Cadet program.

CDR McLaughlin graduated from Aviation Officer Candidate School as the class Distinguished Naval Graduate and proceeded to Primary flight training in Corpus Christi, TX. Upon completion of primary flight training he received a jet slot and subsequent training in Kingsville, TX. Following Intermediate and advanced jet training, and newly commissioned, CDR McLaughlin



received orders to the F/A-‐18 Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) at MCAS El Toro, CA. During his FRS tour he was awarded the 1993 David McCampbell Award as the top Air Combat Maneuvering student pilot in the Navy. Following completion of the FRS, CDR McLaughlin was assigned to NAS Lemoore, CA. and VFA-‐146.CDR McLaughlin served in VFA-‐146 from December 1994 to December 1997 and had various duties including Line Division Officer, Quality Assurance Officer, Schedules Officer, Communications Officer, Landing Signals Officer, and Air-‐to-‐ Air Weapons Training Officer. During his tenure he made two deployments on board the USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) in the Arabian Gulf. He was named as the Charles H. Bryant Leadership Award winner for 1997.

Upon completion of CDR McLaughlin’s tour in VFA-‐146, he was assigned to NAS Fallon, NV. as an instructor at Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) where he taught graduate level tactics to both F/A-‐18 and F-‐14 combat aircrew. While assigned, CDR McLaughlin served as the Maintenance Officer and the Fleet Training Officer.

Completing his TOPGUN tour in February 2001, CDR McLaughlin transferred back to NAS Lemoore for duty as the Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor and Training Officer aboard VFA-‐151. During this tour, he made another six-‐month deployment in support of OSW onboard the USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) and was named the VFA-‐151 Junior Officer of the year for 2001. In 2002, CDR McLaughlin was selected as a Washington DC Intern Fellow where he received a Masters in Organizational Management from George Washington University while interning on both the Navy and Joint Staffs.

Upon completion of his tour in Washington, CDR McLaughlin returned to Lemoore for his Department Head tour assigned to VFA-‐94. During his two-‐year tour he made another six-‐month deployment, this time in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM aboard USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) and served as the Safety, Maintenance, and Operations Officer.

In November of 2006 he was assigned as the Organizational Policy Officer to the J-‐5 Plans and Policy directorate of the United States Northern Command in Colorado Springs. He was selected for Operational Command in 2008 and completed training in the FA-‐18E Super Hornet, for eventual assumption of duties as Executive Officer of VFA-‐14 in 2010. CDR McLaughlin then assumed the duties as Commanding Officer of VFA-‐14 in July 2011 and led the squadron through a combat deployment in support of Operations NEW DAWN and ENDURING FREEDOM aboard the USS JOHN C STENNIS (CVN 74). While in Command, VFA-‐14 was selected as the 2012 RADM Wade McClusky recipient for outstanding Attack Squadron in the US Navy. Upon completion of his Command tour, CDR McLaughlin was assigned to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center to assume duties first as TOPGUN and then STRIKE Department Head.

He has over 3500 hours and 850 carrier landings aboard eight different carriers. Personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Strike-‐Flight Air Medal (3), Navy Commendation Medal (3), Joint Staff Achievement Medal, Navy Achievement Medal (4), Good Conduct Medal, and various other unit awards.

Biography of Commander James D. “Cruiser” Christie



Commander James Christie graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994 with a degree in Mechanical Engineering and then commissioned an Ensign. Winged a Naval Aviator in Kingsville, TX in 1997, he received orders to the “Sharpshooters” of VMFAT-‐101 to commence training in the FA-‐18 Hornet. He subsequently reported to the VFA-‐137 “Kestrels” in May 1998 at NAS Lemoore and deployed twice in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH aboard USS Constellation (CV 64).

In 2001, Commander Christie reported to the VFA-‐122 Flying Eagles at NAS Lemoore, CA as an FA-‐18E/F Super Hornet flight instructor and Landing Signals Officer. After one year at VFA-‐122, he attended Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) with follow on orders to Strike Fighter Weapons School Pacific as a Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor (SFTI) specialized in FA-‐18 Combat Systems. Commander Christie was next assigned to the VFA-‐2 “Bounty Hunters” in 2004 as the Pilot Training Officer and completed a deployment in support of Operation Unified Assistance to provide tsunami relief for Indonesia.

In 2005 he joined the VFA-‐22 “Redcocks” as a department head and completed a combat deployment aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and Pacific Command’s inaugural Valiant Shield Exercise, shortly followed by a surge deployment in support of 7th Fleet operations.

In January 2009, Commander Christie graduated from the Naval War College in Newport, RI with a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies. He then completed an Individual Augmentee assignment to the Force Strategic Engagement Cell, Multi-‐National Force Iraq (MNF-‐I) in Baghdad as the lead strategist for Shia insurgent reconciliation.

In January 2011, Commander Christie reported to the Black Knights of VFA-‐154 as Executive Officer. He immediately deployed for CVW-‐14’s sunset eight-‐month deployment in support of Operations TOMODACHI, NEW DAWN and ENDURING FREEDOM aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76).

Upon return and decommissioning of CVW-‐14, the Black Knights transferred to CVW-‐11. Commander Christie took command of VFA-‐154 in May 2012 to lead the Black Knights through work-‐ups and another deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM aboard the USS Nimitz (CVN 68).

In September 2013, Commander Christie reported to Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) as TOPGUN’s Commanding Officer. In October 2014, he transferred from TOPGUN to STRIKE within NSAWC. He has logged 3000 flight hours in the F-‐18A-‐F and has accumulated more than 800 arrested landings.

His awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (2 awards), Strike Flight Air Medals (3 awards), Navy Commendation Medals (2 awards), Navy Achievement Medals (2 awards) and numerous other campaign and unit awards.



The USN Combat Learning Cycle: Prepare An Air Wing for Deployment While Supporting One Deployed Training is crucial to combat success.

As Admiral Nimitz confronted the last century’s challenges he concluded a core lesson for this century’s Pacific warriors:

“Having confronted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: ‘training, TRAINING and M-‐O-‐R-‐E T-‐R-‐A-‐I-‐N-‐I-‐N-‐G.’ as quoted in Neptunes’s Inferno, The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal (James D. Hornfischer)”

The budgetary pressures on training will only impede combat success and put warriors at needless risk.

It is hard enough to fight and win; it is even more difficult when training gets cut to the bone and threatens to take away a core combat advantage which a well trained force has compared to opponents who are not as well trained.

It is also the case that the pilots and maintainers of today’s and tomorrow’s force are flying more complex aircraft, and in the case of the Navy Super Hornets and then F-‐35Cs.

This requires significant proficiencies, which go beyond simply being a competent “flyer” of an airplane; pilots are becoming key C2, ISR and strike assets all in one.

Clearly, training is crucial to dealing with the growth in complexity.

As General Hostage, the Commander of ACC, put it into a recent interview with us:

What we’re asking a young lieutenant to do in her first two or three years as a fighter pilot is so far beyond what they asked me to do in my first two to three years, it’s almost embarrassing.

The things we require of her, the things she has to be able to do, the complexity of the system that she operates are so much more taxing, and yet, they make it look easy. They’re really, really good.

Training, training, training comes to mind as a requirement for dealing with today’s and the coming air systems which are managed by the fighter combat managers in their cockpits.

http://www.sldinfo.com/training-‐for-‐air-‐combat-‐general-‐hostage-‐focuses-‐on-‐the-‐challenge-‐of-‐training-‐for-‐the-‐21st-‐century-‐fight/

It is also the case that politicians are requiring the execution of stringent Rules of Engagement for pilots in combat; this can only demand more training, not less.

The importance of training and its role in preparing a carrier strike package for see was highlighted in a recent interview with CDR (S) Jayson “Plato” Eurick, current Air Wing Training Officer, at Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon Naval Air Station.



During our visit to Fallon, it became very clear that the term training confuses more than clarifies.

Training sounds a bit like a nice to have preparatory drill, rather than what it is for the air power community – the shaping of core instincts for competent execution of missions.

Plato put it well: “Training can be conveyed in a couple different ways, depending how you look at it. The way we try to teach training is we work to the end state. What is the end state right now?

For example, we have an air wing that’s coming through Air Wing Fallon here starting Monday. They’re coming here for their four-‐week exercise. In our training, we will convey to the air wing the importance of training, and that is not just daily routine training, I’m doing this, I’m doing that.

You are doing that training for a certain reason. In this case look at what the USS Bush is doing.

That is what we will convey, the overall end state of what the training is going to eventually lead to.”

And the mention of the USS Bush is not by accident.

What we learned from Plato was that the CAG on the USS Bush is in daily contact with Fallon to both provide input with regard to operations and their impact on preparing the next air wing out as well as to get help when needed with regard to altering tactics and training WHILE on deployment.

Training is about getting ready for deployment and supporting deployment, which is certainly a broad concept of training.

Plato clarified the point: “We ensure that they (the air wing) get up to speed on all of the information that is currently taking place in theater.

We don’t train Air Wing Fallon for a specific theater or country, we give them a broad brushed training, but we ensure that they get the information that is coming directly back from the guys overseas, in this case, the USS Bush.

And then we train them.”

Question: You have described the CAG talking regularly with Fallon. Is this largely a one-‐way transmission?

CDR "Plato" Eurick. Credit: Second Line of Defense



Plato: “It is highly interactive. It is daily. And we provide inputs when asked to improve tactics and training for ongoing operations.”

What Plato highlighted was that his team worked at the end of the workup cycle where the various elements of the air wing come together and prepare to execute the complex ballet at sea which is what a carrier air wing has to do to be successful. After a four week training period, the air wing then goes to its at sea pre deployment exercise and then on to deployment.”

So Plato and his team are at the end of the preparatory cycle, so the ability to input the latest operational information is central to mission success.

A key element of the discussion with CDR Eurick was about the central importance of the training officer aboard a carrier.

According to Plato: “Pilots are coming in throughout the period of deployment and the training officer is focused on the integration of the pilots cycling through into an integrated airwing.

The various components of the air wing train to the ARP (Advanced Readiness Program) prior to coming to work with Plato and his team.

The entire air wing comes to Fallon for what’s known as Air Wing Fallon Detachment.

That’s four weeks long, and that’s the program that I run and coordinate.

When they come here to Air Wing Fallon, this is the last real opportunity for the air wing to prepare for their sea deployment.

And this is both the first opportunity, and the last opportunity for the air wing to integrate and work together without the other strike group assets.

Up until this point, they’ve been working as five or six different units of excellence with regard to their respective platforms.”

Question: How do you structure the four-‐week cycle?

Plato: “We start out week 1 and 2 which is kind of like the first quarter, second quarter, we’re getting the flow, feeling the other team out, and what we’re going to do.

We train the air wing on basic integration.

We teach these nine squadrons how to operate together as an air wing.

And it’s a learning process.

And now as we head into our week 3 and 4, basically, second half, we incorporate all of those lessons learned that have come back from overseas and theater.

For example, we incorporate lessons learned from the air wing deployed on the USS Bush and what they are telling us they are seeing over there, what they are doing.



We also seek feedback on what they were deficient in, and what they were very good at.”

Current Integrative Training Tasks: NSAWC Command Brief

Question: When the four weeks are over, you then provide your evaluation to the CAG?

Plato: “We do. After every phase, what I referred to as the first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, I as the air wing training officer, we get in a room with CAG, DCAG, NSAWC admiral, the deputy commanders here, the skipper here, Proton (CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin, outgoing STRIKE CO, previous TOPGUN), all squadron COs and XOs, and I give them a phase debrief at the end of each one of their phases.

We tell them, here’s the areas where you’re good, but more importantly, here’s where you’re deficient.

This is where you need to focus further attention.

And then at the very end of the detachment, we’ll do a final debrief, and we’ll tell CAG, here’s where you guys are solid in the air wing, keep it up.

But here’s where you’re deficient, and this is what’s going on in theater, if you’re deficient in some of these areas, you need to focus your training on your integrated exercises, during COMPTUEX, focus in these areas because these are going to be your critical areas of concern when you go out on deployment in three months.

We will provide CAG with evaluation data throughout the Air Wing Fallon process.

Here are the targets you had assigned, and how many targets you actually destroyed.

These are the weapons you employed.

This is why you didn’t hit the target.



So we give CAG the information, and just tell him the areas NSAWC thinks that they’re deficient and need to work on, and then we let CAG make his own decision on how they did during Air Wing Fallon.”

Question: Obviously training as we are discussing it here – the end state of going into preparation for combat – is crucial to mission success.

How do shortfalls like reduced flight hours affect the process?

Plato: “The guy who has been on combat deployment for nine months is comfortable because he’s been doing carrier operations.

The guy that has very little flight hours or flight time over the last six months during the first month or two of deployment, he’s not very comfortable doing carrier operations.

And it definitely raises the hair on the back of your neck.

And the longer you go, from being away from the ship, whether that’s due to reduced flight hours, shore duty, whatever, it takes a lot more time and money to get the pilot back up to speed where he is comfortable to get on or off the Carrier.

We need to be strike fighter pilots, fighter pilots, weapons officers, whatever it is.

You have to be very good at operating your sensors, the integration in the cockpit, the weapons that are onboard your aircraft.

But you can’t focus on that part of your training or your job until you are very good at the basics of flying the airplane.

You have to be comfortable flying the airplane, and operating all your button pushing, your takeoffs, your landings, all of that has to be second nature.

You have to be able to do that in your sleep because you need to be able to focus on the more advanced and complex systems in the airplane.

And when you don’t fly that airplane on a regular basis, even though a simulator can account for some of that time, but you got to be able to get into the air, and experience the effects of the airspeed, the Gs, you know, just the ground rush that’s associated with the airplane.

When you get to that point where you’re comfortable, and you’re doing that on a daily basis because you have flight hours, all of that basic stuff is second nature.

Now you can focus on more advanced and complex systems associated with the airplane.”

Question: As you train to deploy, clearly the joint aspect is important as well. How do you factor that in?

Plato: “Once the Carrier goes out on deployment, yes, it is self-‐sustained, it is a global force wherever you want it, when you want it.



However, if you look at what’s going on, everything’s becoming joint integrated, e.g. Joint strike fighter.

Everything is going towards joint operations.

Air Wing Fallon training is now opened up to joint integration.

So when the air wing is here in Fallon, they do three weeks of strictly Navy air wing training.

And then the last week, we bring in joint assets to participate with the air wing during large force strikes.

So the Navy gets a look at how the Air Force does business.

The Air Force gets to look at how the Navy does business. I think communities are going to continue to evolve the more we interact and integrate with each other.”

Training for 21st Century Operations: Shaping Effective Sea-‐based Combat Operations During our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we had a chance to discuss with the new CO of TOPGUN his approach coming into the job.

CDR Edward “Stevie” Smith is the current TOPGUN CO, and a previous TOPGUN Instructor is a key leader in the NSAWC enterprise.

Question: You have just taken over as the CO of TOPGUN.

How do you see your basic challenge?

CDR Smith: “If we do get that opportunity to come back, we understand our primary job is to support the Admiral’s vision and execute the mission of NSAWC, as a whole, keeping this the center of excellence.

We also realize that it’s important to protect the integrity of the organizations that we’re charged with helping lead.

And maintain all those core missions and core value, and allowing evolution to change, to occur, but making sure they keep it in line with maintaining the fundamentals of those organizations.”

Question: We were discussing earlier with regard to rotorcraft training the important role of the ranges for testing integrated EW and other types of training.

How do the instrumented ranges work for today’s Navy?

CDR Smith: ”In the past we were geographically confined to the instrumented ranges that relied upon ground based receivers to track and record aircraft data.

Now everything is GPS based combined with more modern tracking technology which great expands our ability to train.”



Question: We have discussed with others at NSAWC the growing role of virtual training in preparing to fight in an extended battlespace.

How do you look at this development?

CDR Smith: “It is an important one.

As we fight in an extended battlespace, we need to tap into various USN or joint assets for the fight.

We clearly cannot bring Aegis ships, or Patriot or THAAD batteries, but in the fight we need to tap into those assets.

We can do that as we build out our capabilities for virtual training.”

Question: In your professional judgment, the type of simulation or the threat presentation is pretty good?

CDR Smith: “It has the potential for getting better.

Replicating rapidly changing threat capabilities is expensive and in this day of constrained budgets we have to prioritize where we spend our limited resources.”

Question: The Carrier and its support assets provide for significant organic punch, but clearly going forward to ability to either support or to lead joint airpower and other assets will be of increasing importance.

How do you look at this evolution?

CDR Smith: “I think of it as interactive circles.

Like the USMC we are an expeditionary force when it comes to the carrier.

We bring the fight to our adversary’s coast all over the world.

And we cannot always count on our Air Force and Army brother being there for a particular operation.

That forms the first operational circle.

But clearly the ability to work with joint partners, the USMC and the US Air Force, in an expeditionary operation forms the second interactive circle, and where extended land operations are entailed, the US Army as well.

The third interactive circle, which can overlap the second, is the ability to support or to draw upon allied capabilities and assets.

FCDR Edward "Stevie" Smith. Credit: Second Line of Defense



The ability to train to operate in all three environments will be increasingly important over the next twenty years as we deal with the evolving threat environment.”

CDR Smith Biography

CDR Edward Smith, a native of Houston, Texas, graduated from Texas A&M University, earning a Bachelor of Science in Industrial Distribution. Upon commissioning he attended flight school in Pensacola, Florida, Meridian, Mississippi, and Kingsville, Texas, where he earned his Wings of Gold in 1997.

Upon being selected to fly the F/A-‐18C, Commander Smith reported to the “Gladiators” of VFA 106 in Jacksonville, Florida, where he qualified as a fleet replacement pilot prior to his assignment to the “Knighthawks” of VFA 136.

During his first sea tour he deployed aboard USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74) on her maiden deployment in 1998 and again aboard USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) for her 2000 cruise. In June of 2001, Commander Smith was selected to attend the Navy Fighter Weapons School, TOPGUN, where he remained as an instructor upon graduation.

While at TOPGUN he served as both instructor, Standardization Officer and the Navy’s Subject Matter Expert for Global Positioning System (GPS) Weapons during both Operation ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM.

In June of 2004, Commander Smith reported to the “Bulls” of VFA 37 as the Training Officer and deployed aboard USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75) for her 2004-‐2005 combat deployment. Upon completion of this tour, he then reported to the “Valions” of VFA 15 as a department head serving as both the Maintenance and Operations Officer for the squadron as they prepared for their 2008 to 2009 deployment aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71).

In August of 2008, Commander Smith reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve in the J-‐34 Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense. During his tour on the Joint Staff, he was responsible for all aspects of DOD Antiterrorism Training and led the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Level IV Antiterrorism Executive Seminar.

In October of 2009, Commander Smith volunteered as an Individual Augmentee, where he served in Kabul, Afghanistan, from December 2009 to May 2010, as the Liaison for a Joint Special Operations Task Force to the Commander of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).

While assigned to the Joint Staff, Commander Smith earned his Masters in Business Administration from The Pennsylvania State University and also attended the Joint Forces Staff College for Level II Joint Professional Military Education.

After refresher training in the F/A18C at VFA 106, Commander Smith reported as the Executive Officer of VFA 34 just months before their eight month combat deployment aboard USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) in support of Commander, Fifth Fleet and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.



Upon return to Virginia Beach, Commander Smith assumed command of VFA 34 in December of 2012 and has led his squadron as they have achieved the Commander Naval Air Forces Battle Efficiency Award, CNO Safety Award and Captain Michael J. Estocin Award for operational excellence.

CDR Smith has been awarded the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Commendation Medal, Strike Flight Air Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation Medal (two awards), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (two awards), and numerous campaign and unit citations.

He has accumulated 600 arrested landings and over 3400 flight hours.

Training for Forward Leaning Integration During our visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we had a chance to discuss the approach to strike integration being pursued in the training process at the Center with CDR Charles “Scotty” Brown, current STRIKE XO, previous TOPGUN Instructor. Brown is the N-‐5 assistant to the department head at Fallon.

“We have an unusual N-‐5 structure here — we are not about plans and policies.

We are the department charged with strike training and some other miscellaneous pieces as well.

I have been in the Navy for about 21years now and grew up as an F-‐14 Top Gun pilot.

After doing that for a decade I made the transition to the Super Hornet. And here I am now flying the F-‐16 as well in the aggressor role.”

“Scotty” explained that many pilots at Fallon are F-‐16 qualified pilots as well as Super Hornet pilots.

He explained that they do not have full time aggressor pilots and members of NSAWC play that role on a case-‐by-‐case basis. He emphasized that the focus of “Air Wing Fallon is upon integration.

“It is about taking all the point nosed squadrons as well as the E-‐2, the rotary wing, everyone in the air wing, as well as representatives from the air defense commanders from the surface fleet.

Having his OS controllers join us allows us to see a wider range of capability to shape the integration process.

So it is about 28 planes working together to put ordinance on target.

CDR Charles "Scotty: Brown



At the same time, we seek every opportunity to build in joint assets, such as AWACS, and JSTARS, whether non organic or organic and work to fuse those assets into an integrated operational whole.”

He underscored as well that the Fallon model was being replicated elsewhere in the Navy notably with regard to the surface fleet, and as that happens training among the various Navy communities would be facilitated as well.

“We are following a stair-‐step approach.

For example, initially it’s us being able in-‐house at this location to try and simulate or tie in the surface side to command-‐and-‐control UAS type aircraft or platforms.

But down the road we will be able to tie in potentially with a ship that’s pier-‐side down in San Diego with the same group that’s up here, and then fuse a picture that allows us to train to a problem set that you we would not be able to otherwise.”

He expressed concern about the need to have realistic adversary training and has the threat goes up, “we need to be sure that we can realistically prepare for the threat environment we will face in the years to come.”

“I don’t think flying F-‐5s will be enough to replicate what an adversary stealth aircraft is going to pose as a challenge.”

Along with others in the command, “Scotty” highlighted the importance of live virtual constructive training in terms of better understanding both the threat as well as the blue assets, which need to be integrated in the fight.

And he argued that as other parts of the Navy established their own live virtual construct centers, tying these centers together would facilitate the kind of integrated training, which was necessary for 21st century operations.

He highlighted as well the importance of folding in innovations coming to the fleet as part of shaping the training process.

“For example, we work closely with VMX-‐9 at China Lake to work with them in connecting their testing efforts with how those efforts might integrate with the strike force.

They will come up on a routine basis and support NSAWC where we can take a look at some of the newer systems that they have in developmental or operational testing and see what kind of results you get with using those systems.”

He noted that in contrast to his last tour at Top Gun, the Center was doing a better job of getting fleet representative aircraft in the flying inventory.

“When I was stationed over at the Top Gun side when I was last here, we did not have fleet representative airplanes here.



We did not have the same type of software, and same capability as the planes in the fleet.

And this gap is important to close for realistic training for strike fleet integration.”

We will close with a bit of history from “Scotty’s” past.

“Two of the most famous F-‐14 headline making events occurred during the Reagan Presidency. On 8/18/81, early in President Reagan’s 1st term, two F-‐14s from the VF-‐41 Black Aces flying off the USS Nimitz (CVN-‐68) shot down two Libyan Su-‐22 “Fitters” over the Gulf of Sidra.

The second event had a similar outcome. In the final days of the Reagan administration, two F-‐14s from the VF-‐32 Swordsmen shot down two Libyan MiG-‐23 “Floggers” on 1/4/89. To honor these events in the Reagan Presidency, the Reagan Presidential Library obtained an F-‐14 for display on the library grounds.

Unfortunately, the actual aircraft involved in the shoot downs were not available so the F-‐14 obtained by the Library was painted to represent BuNo 160403 flown by the late CDR Hank Kleeman and LT David Venlet in the 1981 event.

The actual Tomcat displayed at the Library is BuNo 162592.

The delivery Crew that brought the aircraft to the museum on October 17, 2003 was from MSAWC, with LCDR Charles Scotty Brown and RIO Lt Natalie JJ Good.”

http://f-‐14association.com/images/display/display-‐162592.htm

The Importance of Training for Combat Proficiency During our visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center in October 2014, we had a chance to discuss the importance of training and the way ahead with CDR Charles “Chunks” Smith.

Question: You are currently at Top Gun but what is your background in Naval Aviation?

CDR Smith: “My background is primarily as a weapons school instructor, which I have done for about half of my career.

I have had two tours at Top Gun and most recently as an exchange officer with Nellis in the F-‐16 division of the Air Force Weapons School.

I was at Nellis for two and half years and have come back to Top Gun and can bring back that experience to the Top Gun program.”

Question: We have discussed with other members of NSAWC the role of virtual training in preparing to operate in the extended battlespace. What is your perspective on this trend?

CDR Charles "Chunks" Smith. Credit: Second Line of Defense



CDR Smith: “There are two important aspects.

One is cost, where virtual training is designed to drive down the cost of actual flight hours.

But it is important to remember how important flight hours really are to basic proficiencies.

The second is as you say about shaping capability to operate in the battlespace.

If you want to train to concepts like Aegis is my wingman, you are going to do that in a virtual training space.

I can take that pilot in the cockpit and broaden the threats and extend his capability to draw upon blue assets through virtual training.”

Question: How would you contrast Top Gun with Nellis?

CDR Smith: “At Top Gun we fly the F-‐18 so our focus is on proficiency in flying that aircraft.

At Nellis you have a variety of airplanes and the focus is first of all on proficiencies and advanced tactics for that airplane and then with the integration of those aircraft across the air wing.

A key part of Nellis training is clearly upon airpower integration.

Our focus after Top Gun within NSAWC is upon integration of the carrier strike group, which is our functional equivalent of Nellis doing its integration processes.”

Question: How do you view the role of training –notably advanced weapons school training – in terms of preparing for combat?

CDR Smith: “We are demanding significant effectiveness and complexity out of our carrier air wings in today’s environment.

But I cannot run a Peyton Manning style offense if I don’t know how to block and operate downfield effectively.

I have to train those basic competencies to then operate effectively in a complex system.

That is what we do in the advanced weapons schools.

You need to ensure that the basic air service mechanics are solid; otherwise integration is really ineffective.

I would argue that training is the essential piece, which is necessary to drive combat competence and the ability to get full value out of our platforms.

I’m not a famous admiral in the Pacific, but if you want the Chunk sound bite, I’ll tell you that it is a waste of taxpayer money if you buy a capability that has not been trained to by its aircrew, it’s a waste of tax payers money.”



Question: As a new platform, like the F-‐35, is introduced into the fleet and then the TTPs shaped for the aircraft and then integrated into the air wing, what are the challenges?

CDR Smith: “A key challenge can be to simply apply the older thinking to the newer platform.

The danger, in my own opinion, is the fleet developing TTPs for a new platform based on the tactics for which they’re familiar from their own legacy platform.

For example, the USAF flew the F-‐22 as if was an F-‐15; when they finally shifted the tactics to the new platform’s capabilities, change really took hold.”

Question: We have lived through this before when the air to air and air to ground communities in the Navy were confronted with the challenge of coalescing their two cultures into the F-‐18.

The F-‐4 and A7 communities are now confronted with the need to blend their culture.

And that kind of transition will occur as the F-‐35 enters the fleet.

CDR Smith: “That makes sense and we can draw upon historical analogies in other ways as well.

For example, for me the F-‐35 SEAD mission is quite similar to how the Wild Weasels used their F-‐16s.

There are distinct parallels to the F-‐16 SEAD mission.

And the way I would look forward to F-‐35s working with Growlers is that the two aircraft have different missions and provided a combined arms type of approach to dealing with spectrum warfare.”

The Rotorcraft, the Carrier and Training for Strike Integration During our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we were able to discuss the role of rotorcraft on the carriers and the training to that role at NSAWC with CDR Herschel “Hashi” Weinstock, current Department Head for SEAWOLF, NSAWC’s Rotary Wing Weapons School.

CDR Weinstock is a native Virginian with an undergraduate degree from the University of Virginia and a Master of Science degree from the University of San Diego.

Designated a Naval Aviator in 1996, his early flying tours include service with the HS-‐15 Red Lions in Jacksonville, Florida; the HS-‐10 Warhawks and HS Weapons and Tactics Unit in San Diego, California; and the HS-‐14 Chargers in Atusgi, Japan.

He commanded the HSC Fleet Replacement Squadron in San Diego, HSC-‐3.

CDR Herschel "Hashi" Weinstock. Credit: Second Line of Defense



His staff tours include duty with Carrier Air Wing Five, the Pacific Command Joint Interagency Coordination Group, and in the Pentagon.

He has served as a Weapons and Tactics Instructor pilot for over fourteen years, in addition to roles as a Safety Officer, Operations Officer, and others; and has accumulated over 3400 flight hours in fleet aircraft.

In 2013, he reported to Naval Strike Air Warfare Center aboard NAS Fallon, NV as the N8 Department Head, leading the Rotary Wing Weapon School, model manager for the Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor course and the Navy Mountain Flying course.

His personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and others.

Question: What is the mission of rotorcraft aboard the strike carrier?

CDR Weinstock: “Historically, the helicopter focused primarily on search-‐and-‐rescue missions and, especially during the Cold War, anti-‐submarine warfare.

Currently, we fly two types of helicopters, which continue to play those roles but have an expanded mission set.

Among other missions, they play a major role in the defense of the carrier battle group, dealing with various surface threats, including small boats.

Both helicopter variants, the Sikorsky-‐built MH-‐60R and MH-‐60S, are vital to the overall air wing mission.

The Romeo is especially important in providing radar coverage, both for situational awareness and more explicitly, forward deployed threat detection and target acquisition.

It is focused on sea control.

From off the coast, they can provide outstanding coverage of the sea-‐base and also look inland; they can see EW signals as well as plot contacts on radar; and push all of that information through a link back to the ship so that the decision-‐makers on the ship have the latest, most detailed information possible to make well-‐informed, timely decisions.

The Romeo provides a lot of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), that decision-‐making feed I spoke of.

The Sierras can provide some of that as well, but don’t have a radar.

A Sea Hawk embarked aboard the USS John C. Stennis during an Underwater Sea Warfare Exercise. 2/10/19. Credit: USN



Both the Romeo and the Sierra have a MTS, a Multi-‐Spectral Targeting System, which is essentially a FLIR on steroids.

It’s a good system, providing a lot of detail day or night, much better detail than you can get with your eyes at certain ranges.

Working together, one helicopter’s radar tells the battle group where the contacts are that need to be investigated, and the MTS on both helicopter types allow the aircraft to get the definition necessary to know if those contacts are threats or not.

Both assets provide a protective safety net, cooperating with other assets to provide the anti-‐surface picture, making sure that all the ships remain safe.

The two helicopter types have complementary systems.

The Romeo, with its radar and associated EW (Electronic Warfare) systems, offers situational awareness outside the visual range.

The Sierra lacks a radar, but has a more diverse weapon suite and a very robust self-‐defense capability.

So I would say that the Romeo is a better battlefield manager, and the Sierra’s going to have more options in dealing with any given threat environment.”

Question: Clearly, the ASW threat is a key one, and with the addition of very capable diesel submarines in the global threat environment, the demand signal must be going up?

CDR Weinstock: “It is. The Romeo is the only organic ASW (Anti-‐submarine Warfare) asset in the battlegroup, and is extremely capable.

It has to be; nuclear submarines are becoming more proliferate and the new diesels out there now are definitely not a low-‐end threat.”

Question: The Army has been doing interesting work on linking up RPAs with their helos. The Navy must be working the same challenge and opportunity as well?

CDR Weinstock: “We are. Primarily, the rotary wing UAV, the MQ-‐8 Firescout, supports missions for NSW (Naval Special Warfare) forces, but has potential functionality in a lot of other mission sets that we are exploring.

The USN as a whole is working through how to best use UAVs in the years ahead.

There are so many missions where they can bring complementary capabilities, or new ones.

We have subject matter experts in my department and others who work on these issues, and we are paying close attention to the opportunities in that arena.

I can clearly see the day when manned assets operating above the water will work closely with UAVs, managing them and sending them forward as needed for coverage.



The UAV’s would greatly expand the battlespace awareness of the strike group, and if necessary, the manned assets could redirect UAVs to areas of greater interest. They could, and probably will, play in other mission sets as well.

Question: Clearly the rotorcraft are not operating alone, so integration with the air wing is a crucial aspect of your operational envelope. What is your approach?

CDR Weinstock: “When the air wings come out to NAS Fallon to train with NSAWC, they need to be able to fight as an integrated, cohesive team.

So the fixed wing assets, both jet and prop, work with the helicopters to accomplish various missions.

For instance, the Romeos work with the Growlers (EA-‐18G) to locate EW targets and help assess them.

Usually the Romeo is going to be primarily an over-‐water platform, but it can easily supply information about inland EW systems and threats.

Another example would be CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue), where the Sierras are the primary rescue vehicles for a downed aviator and the air wing assets form a protective umbrella overhead, with strike fighters defending against threats on the ground or in the air, Growlers suppressing missile threats and degrading enemy communications and radar, and the E-‐2 overhead managing the airspace and providing early warning.

All these different assets are necessary to get the job done, and they all have to train together to be able to accomplish the mission seamlessly when the day comes.

The fixed wing assets and rotary wing assets from the air wings work and train together at other times during a workup cycle, and in other locations, but this is the only place where they can come together to train on an instrumented Navy range.

They brief together, they fly together, they debrief together, and then they do it all again the next day.

Each mission, they get feedback from the various experts here at NSAWC on where to improve.

We have the instrumentation and tools to recreate the missions accurately for highly effective debriefs.

That instrumentation and professional feedback is something that only NSAWC and places like it can provide.”

Question: You have instrumented ranges where you can really train to the capabilities, which your “teamed” assets can provide?

CDR Weinstock: Absolutely.



We can create a threat representative environment where F/A-‐18s, Growlers, E-‐2’s, and Romeos and Sierras work together in a coordinated manner against a variety of threats.

NSAWC’s range can simulate threat environments ranging from low-‐end to very high-‐end.

And by training and operating in these environments, we can practice the tactics we would use in any given theater of operations.

Question: Clearly, the small boat threats are a significant one, notably in operating in high maritime traffic areas. How do you deal with that?

CDR Weinstock: “What we are doing right now is training to the specific skill sets needed, all of which apply to that particular mission.

Romeo crews need to be good at battlefield management with their radar and link network, and all of the rotary wing assets need to be proficient at employing ordnance and with their defensive systems and tactics. Defense of the battlegroup against a small boat threat is a mission set where Sierras and Romeos must work together seamlessly.

Here at NSAWC, we can recreate the threat with a collection of vehicles approaching a simulated high-‐value unit, and the helicopters have to track the targets and practice suppressing the threat.

We often bring F/A-‐18s and other assets into the problem.

During overwater training, we try and bring P-‐3s or P-‐8s into the problem as well by introducing a simultaneous ASW threat.

When we train to a standard where crews can manage multiple threats in a complex battlefield environment, we better ensure we are ready for whatever might happen in theater.

The key point is that we train to integrate the platforms to provide multiple solution sets, complementary sensor and weapon systems, to deal either with an ASW or small boat threat.

It’s incredibly important that we develop those relationships now, as well as the coordination plans, so that we integrate seamlessly on deployment.

Air wing events here at NSAWC are the best opportunity where the crews have the chance to all sit down and brief together, fly together, and debrief together, working out all the kinks and ensuring they are ready for the missions.

Romeos and Sierras are only one part of the overall air wing combat power, but the capabilities they bring are essential to the overall mission.

CDR "Beaker" Miller. Credit: USN



Battlefield awareness, search and rescue, logistics, anti-‐surface and submarine warfare, combat search and rescue, and others…

All are important to the overall effort, and all need to be practiced and trained to for proficiency and readiness.

One of the best parts about duty at NSAWC is the chance to work with the other communities – the strike fighters, Growlers, the E-‐2’s – day in and day out.

No matter what community you’re from, you’re all working towards that same goal, to provide the fleet with the best training in the world.

It makes for a great sense of team spirit, and makes it easy to go to work every day excited about what you’re doing.”

Training for Electronic Warfare: Shaping a Combined Arms Approach During our visit to Fallon, we had a chance to discuss the role of Airborne Electronic Attack with CDR Mike “Beaker” Miller, Naval Strike and Warfare Center, Airborne Electronic Weapons School (HAVOC).

CDR Miller has an extensive background in electronic warfare and has worked with the US Air Force, US Army, the USMC as well with USN forces in providing electronic warfare support.

He was the commander of the first carrier-‐based EA-‐18G Growler squadron and has done two deployments on Growlers operating in the Med, the Arabian Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Western Pacific.

And as will become clear in the interview his time working with the US Army on the ground and in air in both Iraq and Afghanistan was an important part of his combat learning process as well in understanding the nature of fighting electronic warfare with a reactive enemy.

Question: What is the key function of electronic warfare capability?

CDR Miller: “It really should be understood as spectrum warfare, or what the Navy is labeling as Electronic Maneuver Warfare (EMW).

EMW is essentially all about creating warfighting advantages in and through the electromagnetic spectrum by disrupting the adversary’s kill chain while optimizing our own.

The goal of Blue Electronic Warfare is to create tactical advantage for Blue forces and Blue kill chains by delaying, degrading, denying, or deceiving the Red kill chain.

The target for Blue EW is the Red kill chain – always has been.

Both the USN and USAF provided EW support to the US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan and continue to do so. Credit: USN



In the real world, every kill chain is different, even those with similar equipment, doctrine, and training, which is why EW mission success is heavily dependent upon mission planning.Upon identification/nomination of the applicable Red kill chain, Growler aviators, intelligence officers, and cryptologists perform EW targeteering to identify vulnerabilities in that kill chain – vulnerabilities to screening, saturation, deception, stimulation, or destruction.

We then do weapon-‐to-‐target pairing, matching the best EW weapon available against each of those high payoff vulnerabilities.

Those weapons can be jammers, receivers (for warning/localization/avoidance), anti-‐radiation missiles, decoys, or other tools in the EW/SEAD toolbox.

Using AEA-‐specific weaponeering tools, we then determine the weapon delivery parameters required to achieve the desired effects for each of those weapons.

These weapon (and sometimes sensor) employment parameters drive Growler positioning and maneuvers in the battlespace.

We then employ EA-‐18G survivability tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve the Growler combat survivability required to achieve valid EW employment parameters with a high degree of probability.”

Question: This means that the role of the squadron in doing non-‐kinetic strike is significant?”

CDR Miller: “That is true, because in effect no one else is trained and experienced to perform the EW targeteering function in the Navy. At the AEA Weapons School here at NSAWC, we run a Growler Intelligence Officer course in parallel with our Growler Tactics Instructor (aircrew) course to provide the Fleet with a select group of Naval Intelligence Officers that have a graduate-‐level understanding of tactical non-‐kinetic mission planning and employment.

We absolutely need these individuals to help tighten the bonds between EA-‐18G operators and the Navy’s Information Dominance Corps.

I would add that EW is an undervalued capability until you actually fight.

Nobody really cares about electronic warfare until the shooting starts; and then you cannot get enough of it.

Question: How important was your time working with the US Army?

CDR Miller: “It was very significant.

We flew carrier planes – the Prowler – out of a former Soviet base, that was an Army base, as part of an Air Force Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan (one of the most land-‐locked places on earth) in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.



We had not really focused on that mission before Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, but the red side was leveraging commercial technology to create an asymmetric advantage against the ground forces.

We were tasked to disrupt and deny those advantages, by providing supporting non-‐kinetic fires to protected entities (mounted and dismounted troops).Following my deployments with the Navy to Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to embed directly with the Army as a Brigade EWO with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Air Assault Division in Iraq.

That experience helped me understand the synchronization and employment of non-‐kinetic fires from the supported commander’s perspective.

In effect, our effort became part of a broadened notion of close air support (CAS) or “fires.”

If one thinks of what we have done as part of refined CAS so to speak one can understand better what we were about.

The Army, after experiencing what we could do to support the ground scheme of maneuver began to reconsider investments in this area.

And for future operations in a permissive environment, both the Army and the Marines are building out vehicle based and UAV based systems to provide the non-‐kinetic fires capabilities that Prowlers, Growlers, Compass Call, and other EW platforms supported them with in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Question: You did this in communication with a ground based JTAC.

But could we not do this from the air in support of an ally without one, if we are looking to deliver a broad based attack such against ISIL?

CDR Miller: “I would prefer to not to it that way although it could be done.

By having someone on the ground, you can get a better outcome.

It enhances your ability to provide the effect which most closely meets the supported ground commander’s intent.

It is important to de-‐conflict non-‐kinetic first in the same manner as kinetic fires.

The doctrinal definition of CAS is integration of fires when in close proximity to friendlies which means that detailed integration is required for the proper effect.”

Question: How do you view the Growler in the scheme of joint EW or what one might call Tron Warfare?

A Growler aboard the USS Harry S Truman. 8/15/13. Credit: USN



CDR Miller: “It provides an important capability.

I take a combined arms approach to capabilities in this area.

By having a variety of capabilities you take away the red side’s ability to achieve mission success by targeting a single platform type or blue capability.

History indicates that “silver bullet” solutions or gameplans devised in peacetime often do not have the adaptability, resiliency, or redundancy required to be successful in combat.

For example: mobile targets present a major challenge for EW and the ability to disrupt and exploit the red kill chain. And target mobility includes their agility in the spectrum, not just the physical location of the threat sensor, weapon, or network.

Tactics and training predicated on “exquisite” knowledge of enemy locations, signatures, and reactions leave us vulnerable to surprise in the fog and friction that will likely dominate the opening hours of the next fight.

We operate our Growlers on a mission expecting to need to shift among various types of targets and to calibrate our weapon against a diversity of targets.

We train our Growler Tactics Instructors “how” to think tactically and not just “what” to think tactically.

The tactics of today will someday be countered – not if, but when.

The human element of warfare, and electronic warfare is warfare, is as important as it has ever been.

The men and women that employ the amazing capabilities of the EA-‐18G remain our “asymmetric advantage” in today’s and tomorrow’s fight.”

Question: So what you are saying is that the blue side needs enough diversity of toolsets that the enemy cannot overly commit to one identified strength or vulnerability for that matter?

CDR Miller: “That is correct.

Commander Miller’s Biography

Commander Miller grew up overseas and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1994.

He earned his Wings of Gold as a Naval Flight Officer in March 1996 and was selected to fly the EA-‐6B Prowler.

Commander Miller’s operational assignments include the “Gauntlets” of VAQ-‐136 deploying aboard USS Independence (CV 62) and USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63),file:///Users/robbinflaird/Desktop/Beaker.jpg Carrier Air Wing NINE (CVW-‐9) staff deploying aboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), and the “Garudas” of VAQ-‐134 deploying twice to Bagram Air



Field, Afghanistan.Commander Miller also deployed to Baghdad, Iraq as the Electronic Warfare Officer for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (the “Rakkasans”) as an element of Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE (JCCS-‐1).

He reported to the “Shadowhawks” of VAQ-‐141 in May 2010 as Executive Officer following transition training in the EA-‐18G, deploying in May 2011 aboard USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) for the first carrier deployment of the Growler. Commander Miller took command of VAQ-‐141 in July 2011.

He led VAQ-‐141 through the first two carrier deployments of the EA-‐18G Growler, operating in 2nd, 6th, 5th, and 7th Fleets as a component of Carrier Air Wing EIGHT (CVW-‐8) and Carrier Air Wing FIVE (CVW-‐5). Commander Miller relinquished command in February 2013.

Ashore, Commander Miller instructed at VAQ-‐129, the EA-‐6B Fleet Replacement Squadron and pursued post-‐graduate education at the USAF Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, AL. He reported to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon, NV in March 2013.

Commander Miller’s personal decorations include seven Air Medals (Strike/Flight) and Commendation Medals from the Navy, Army and Air Force.

He’s been NATOPS-‐qualified in the EA-‐6B, S-‐3B and EA-‐18G, accumulating 3,500 flight hours, 217 operational missions, and 800 carrier arrested landings.

Also see the following:

http://www.sldinfo.com/visiting-‐a-‐usmc-‐unmanned-‐aerial-‐vehicle-‐squadron-‐the-‐vmu-‐2-‐discusses-‐the-‐future/

A final issue, which we discussed with a Prowler pilot in the room, was the whole challenge of transitioning the Prowler experience into the UAV squadron and the F-‐35B squadron.

Clearly with the migration of electronic warfare to what Ed Timperlake has called “Tron Warfare” change is under way.

The USMC clearly understands this.

As Col. Orr, then the CO of VMX-‐22 put it in a presentation to the Air Force Association Mitchell Aerospace Institute:

Col. Orr also discussed the USMC effort to merge the complementary capabilities of two traditionally separate, very separate communities.

We have signals intelligence professionals, primarily ground-‐based radio battalions who report back up through Title 50 authorities.

And then we have a separate group that does electronic warfare, notably the EA-‐6B Prowler conducting tactical electronic warfare.



Those two communities traditionally haven’t really talked much.

We are bringing them together in the same facility called the Cyber/Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (CEWCC).

That Cyber/Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell provides the MAGTF commander the ability to deconflict and conduct operations within the electromagnetic spectrum at a tactical level.

At a tactical level, the CEWCC allows us to be able to combine cyber and electronic warfare effects and have the commander make decisions ranging from listening to deception to jamming.

Prowler experience as well as infrastructure needs to be folded into the way ahead, a subject, which we hope to pursue in the near future.

As Lieutenant Colonel Faught put it: “We need to find ways to exploit the analytical infrastructure which has supported Prowler and take that forward into the 21st century approaches we are now shaping.

Documents

The Future of Naval Aviation November 2014