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® IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

DATED THIS THE 05th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2013

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR

H.R.R.P.NO.110/2012 C/w

H.R.R.P.NOS. 111/2012 & 112/2012

H.R.R.P.NO. 110/2012 BETWEEN: 1. Sri. Munishamanna,

S/o late R.Nanjappa, Aged about 67 years No. 20, Present No.25, Shankara devara mata lane,

Manavarthapet Bangalore-560 053.

2. Sri. Ranganna, Aged about 65 years s/o late R.Nanjappa

186, near Ambika Primary School Jayamaruthi nagar Nandini layout Bangalore-560 058. ....Petitioners (By Sri.K.Chandranath Ariga, Advocate)

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AND: 1. Smt. Dhanalakshmi, W/o Late Myle Vagan

Aged about 59 years 2. Natarajan S/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 33years

3. Smt. Kathyayini D/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 31 years All are residing at No. 719, 2nd floor,

61st cross, V Block, Rajajinagar Bangalore-560 010.

4. Smt. Chakkubai, Husband’s name not known

To the petitioners Major, 5. Ganesh Father name not known To the petitioners

Major, Respondent No.4 and 5 are resident at No. 25, Shankaradevara Mathada Lane, Manavarthepet, Bangalore-560 053. …Respondents

(By Sri. R.B.Sangamesh, Advocate for R-1 to R-3)

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This HRRP is filed under Section 46(1) Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 against the order dated 25.1.2012 passed on IAS in Ex.No.1552/2011 on the file of the X.

Addl. Judge & MACT 16, Bangalore dismissing the IAS filed under Order 21 Rule 97 and 99 R/w Sec. 151 of CPC., as not maintainable. H.R.R.P.NO. 111/2012 BETWEEN: 1. Sri. Munishamanna,

S/o late R.Nanjappa, Aged about 67 years No. 20, Present No.25,

Shankara devara mata lane, Manavarthapet Bangalore-560 053.

2. Sri. Ranganna, Aged about 65 years

s/o late R.Nanjappa 186, near Ambika Primary School Jayamaruthi nagar Nandini layout Bangalore-560 058. ....Petitioners

(By Sri.K.Chandranath Ariga, Advocate) AND: 1. Smt. Dhanalakshmi, W/o Late Myle Vagan

Aged about 59 years

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2. Natarajan S/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 33years

3. Smt. Kathyayini D/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 31 years All are residing at No. 719, 2nd floor,

61st cross, V Block, Rajajinagar Bangalore-560 010.

4. Smt. Angamma, W/o Late Raja Manikya,

Aged about 61 years R/o No. 32/1, 1st Main Sudhamanagar Bangalore-560 027. 5. Sri. Eshwar

S/o Late Raja Manikya, Aged about 61 years R/o No. 32/1, 1st Main Sudhamanagar Bangalore-560 027. …Respondents

(By Sri. R.B.Sangamesh, Advocate for R-1 to R-3) This HRRP is filed under Section 46(1) Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 against the order dated 25.1.2012 passed on IAS in Ex.No.1553/2011 on the file of the X. Addl. Judge & MACT 16, Bangalore dismissing the IAS

filed under Order 21 Rule 97 and 99 R/w Sec. 151 of CPC., as not maintainable.

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H.R.R.P.NO. 112/2012 BETWEEN: 1. Sri. Munishamanna,

S/o late R.Nanjappa, Aged about 67 years No. 20, Present No.25, Shankara devara mata lane,

Manavarthapet Bangalore-560 053.

2. Sri. Ranganna, Aged about 65 years s/o late R.Nanjappa

186, near Ambika Primary School Jayamaruthi nagar Nandini layout Bangalore-560 058. ....Petitioners (By Sri.K.Chandranath Ariga, Advocate)

AND: 1. Smt. Dhanalakshmi, W/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 59 years

2. Natarajan S/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 33years 3. Smt. Kathyayini

D/o Late Myle Vagan Aged about 31 years

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All are residing at No. 719, 2nd floor, 61st cross, V Block,

Rajajinagar Bangalore-560 010.

4. Smt. Jayalakshmi W/o late Narayanappa Aged about 81 years

5. Sri. N. Radhakrishna S/o late Narayanappa Aged about 62 years 6. Smt. N. Rukmini,

D/o late Narayanappa Aged about 58 years 7. Sri. N. Ramachandra, S/o late Narayanappa Aged about 55 years

8. Smt. N.Varalakshmi D/o late Narayanappa Aged about 53 years 9. Smt. N.Saraswathi

D/o late Narayanappa Aged about 53 years 10. Sri.N.Krishnamurty S/o late Narayanappa Aged about 51 years

11. Sri. N. Manjunath

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S/o late Narayanappa Aged about 47 years Respondent No.4 to 11 are residing at

Bakshi Garden Cotton Pet, Bangalore-560 053. ….Respondents (By Sri. R.B.Sangamesh, Advocate for R-1 to R-3)

These petitions are filed under Section 46(1) Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 against the order dated 25.1.2012 passed on IAS in Ex.No.1551/2011 on the file of the X. Addl. Judge & MACT 16, Bangalore dismissing the IAS filed under Order 21 Rule 97 and 99 R/w Sec. 151 of CPC., as not maintainable.

These petitions having been heard and reserved,

coming on for pronouncement of orders this day, the Court made the following:

ORDER

These revision petitions are directed against the

order passed by the X Addl.Small Causes Judge,

Bangalore in Execution Nos.1551/2011, 1552/2011 &

1553/2011 dismissing the application filed under Order

21 Rule 97 & 99 R/W Section 151 CPC by the revision

petitioners as objectors as not maintainable.

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2. I have heard the arguments of Sri K

Chandranath Ariga, learned Advocate appearing for

revision petitioners and Sri Sangamesh R.B., learned

Advocate appearing for respondents-1 to 3 and perused

the order under challenge as also records secured from

the trial Court. Parties are referred to by their rank in

the Executing Court.

3. The Executing Court has dismissed these

applications on the ground that report submitted by the

Court Ameen would indicate that judgment debtors

were in possession of the schedule premises at the time

of executing the decree and contention of the objectors

that they were in possession of the property and

subsequently dispossessed by the Court Ameen forcibly

prima facie holds no water amongst other reasons

assigned by it. It is this order which is under challenge

in these revision petitions.

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CONTENTIONS OF OBJECTORS:

(a) Though objectors have stated in the

application that judgment debtors had

surrendered possession of the petition

schedule premises to them, Executing Court

did not hold an enquiry in to the claim made

by the objectors to ascertain whether

objectors were in possession of schedule

properties;

(b) Though objector caused obstruction to the

execution of the decree, Executing Court did

not determine as to whether objector is

bound by the decree or not and no enquiry

was held;

(c) Executing Court without holding enquiry

under Order XXI Rule 97 to 101 CPC has

erroneously given a finding that

M.R.Manjappa had lost right, title and

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interest over the property, which finding

could not have been arrived at without

enquiry;

(d) When the finding given by the Court of

Small Causes in HRC Nos.593 & 596/2002

that petitioners therein are entitled to be in

possession and enjoyment of schedule

premises “until mortgage is redeemed” it

could not have held that owners (objectors)

have lost right, title and interest over the

property;

(e) Though tenants of the suit schedule

premises had delivered possession to the

objectors and the objectors had caused

obstruction for decree being executed

without holding enquiry, applications could

not have been dismissed;

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(f) All disputes between the decree holder and

any person objecting to it, is to be

adjudicated by the Executing Court to avoid

long drawn procedure of adjudicating a suit;

and

(g) The decree holders are not the owners and

when tenants were inducted by its owners

namely, the predecessor in title of the

objectors, possession delivered to the rightful

owners is legal and proper which was not

erroneously considered by the Executing

Court.

4. In support of his submissions, he relies

upon the following judgments:

(1) AIR 1998 SC 1827-SHREENATH AND ANOTHER

V/S RAJESH AND OTHERS

(2) ILR 1991 KAR 254-M/S PARAMOUND

INDUSTRIES V/S C.M. MALLIGA

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CONTENTIONS OF DECREE HOLDER:

5. Per contra, Sri Sangamesh, learned Advocate

appearing for the decree holders would support the

order of the Executing Court and contends as under:

(a) Objectors were not present at the time of

executing the decree and no material

whatsoever has been placed to establish

their possession;

(b) There is a collusion between obstructors and

judgment debtors to defeat the decree

passed by competent Court;

(c) The primary requirement to maintain an

application under Order XXI Rule 97 & 99 of

CPC is that, objector should be in

possession;

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(d) If objector has no possessory right in

addition to there being no title, the

Executing Court is within its jurisdiction to

dismiss the application as not maintainable;

(e) The memos filed by the tenants in HRC

Nos.592, 593 & 596/2002 stating that they

have surrendered possession to the owners

came to be rejected on 29.06.2011 and said

order having not been challenged, the

obstructors cannot contend that they are in

possession of the schedule premises;

(f) The alleged tax paid receipts accompanying

the application of the objectors would

indicate that they are dated 09.08.2011 i.e.,

subsequent to issuance of delivery warrant

on 08.08.2011; and

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(g) Even on merits, it is contended that from the

date of mortgage deed dated 04.01.1951 the

tenants continued to pay the rents in favour

of the mortgagee i.e., the father of decree

holders - 2 and 3 and as such, the decree

holders were entitled to seek for eviction and

for the consequential relief of possession by

executing the decree passed in their favour.

6. In support of his submissions, he has relied

upon the following judgments:

1) 2001(3) KCCR 2007-SMT. T.S.

PRAMEELA V/S SRI. BALAKRISHNA

AND ANOTHER

2) ILR 2001 KAR 1008- Y UMESH V/S

SMT. SAROJA AND OTHERS

3) AIR 2006 KAR 172- NANJAMMA V/S

R.T. SUBBEGOWDA & ORS.

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7. Having heard the learned Advocates

appearing for the parties and on perusal of the order

under challenge as also the case laws cited at the Bar, I

am of the considered view that following points would

arise for my consideration:

(1) Whether the Executing Court

ought to have held an enquiry by

way of recording evidence and

thereafter it should have

examined the claim? If not, what

is the nature of enquiry

contemplated under Order XXI

Rule 97 CPC?

(2) Whether Executing Court was

justified in dismissing the

application filed under Order XXI

Rule 97 & 99 CPC by the

objectors as not maintainable?

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(3) What order?

8. In order to adjudicate the points formulated

herein above, it would be necessary to notice factual

matrix, analyse the provisions of law governing the said

issue, state the law laid down on this aspect and then

record my findings or arrive at the conclusions thereon.

Hence, in this manner, points formulated herein above

are being adjudicated and answered.

FACTUAL MATRIX:

9. Decree holders have filed Execution Petition

Nos.1551/2011, 1552/2011 & 1553/2011 seeking

execution of the order passed by the Small Causes

Court, Bangalore dated 15.07.2011 in HRC

Nos.593/2002, 596/2002 & 592/2002, whereunder

Small Causes Court had allowed the eviction petitions

filed by the decree holders under Section 27(1)(a) & (r) of

the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and directed the

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respondents therein to quit and deliver their respective

portions of the schedule premises to the petitioners

therein i.e., decree holders. Undisputedly, none of the

tenants-respondents therein have questioned the order

of eviction passed by the trial Court and same has

reached finality. Hence, seeking execution of the said

order, three (3) execution petitions came to be filed by

the decree holders referred to herein above. Delivery

warrant came to be issued by Executing Court on

05.08.2011 and it was returned unexecuted for want of

police help. On 09.08.2011 to break open the lock with

police help was granted and Executing Court ordered for

listing the execution petitions on 08.09.2011. Delivery

warrant issued by the executing Court was duly

executed on 10.08.2011 and possession was handed

over to the decree holder through the bailiff as per the

bailiff report and the mahazar drawn at the spot.

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10. On 10.08.2011 applications under Order

XXI Rule 97 & 99 r/w Section 151 CPC came to be filed

by the objectors. Said applications came to be opposed

by the decree holders by filing statement of objections.

Executing Court as already noticed herein above,

dismissed these applications by common order dated

25.01.2012 and as such, proceedings came to be closed

on 13.02.2012.

PROVISIONS OF LAW:

Section 47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.-

(1) All questions arising between the parties

to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their, representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

(2) xxx , (3) Where a question arises as to whether

any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the

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purposes of this section, be determined by the Court.

[Explanation I: For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit.

Explanation II: (a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a

party to the suit in which the degree is passed; and

(b) All questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such

purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.]

ORDER XXI RULE:

97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the

possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.

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(2) Where any application is made under

sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.]

98. Orders after adjudication.- (1) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2),—

(a) make an order allowing the application

and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or

(b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit.

(2) Where, upon such determination, the

Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of

the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the

judgment debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in

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the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days.

99. Dispossession by decree holder or purchaser.- (1) Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of

a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the

application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.

100. Order to be passed upon application complaining of dispossession.- Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the court shall, in accordance with such determination,—

(a) make an Order allowing the application

and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or

(b) pass such other Order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit.

101. Question to be determined.- All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising

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between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be

determined by the Court dealing with the application, and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions.

103. Orders to be treated as decrees.- Where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100, the Order

made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.”

ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

11. Section 47 mandates all questions arising

between the parties to the suit or their representatives

shall be determined by the Court executing the decree

and not by a separate suit. A third party claiming

independent right over the property which is the subject

matter of execution can object and get his claim

adjudicated when he is sought to be dispossessed by a

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decree holder and he need not wait until he is

dispossessed. In other words, the objector has to

establish the possession over the property from which

he is sought to be dispossessed. He need not wait till he

is being dispossessed and then file a separate suit. Any

person other than the judgment debtor, who is being

evicted by execution proceedings has the right of

hearing before the executing Court. All such disputes

are to be adjudicated by the Executing Court itself

finally under Rule 100 CPC. Thus, possession of the

subject property in the hands of the objector is a

condition precedent for objecting to the execution

proceedings when sought to be dispossessed.

12. Perusal of Rule 99 of Order XXI would

indicate that a person other than judgment debtor when

dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a

decree, has to make an application to the Court

complaining of such dispossession for being put in

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possession of such property. Thus, it would clearly

indicate that objector has to plead, prove and establish

that he was in possession of the property to which he is

or was in possession until dispossessed.

13. Rule 101 of Order XXI mandates all

questions including questions relating to right, title and

interest arising between the parties to a proceeding on

an application filed under Rule 97 or 99 or their

representatives shall be determined by the Court

dealing with such application and not by a separate suit

and on such determination, it can make an order

directing the applicant/objector to be put into

possession of the property or dismiss the application or

pass such other orders in the circumstances a case may

warrant.

14. A conspectus reading of Order XXI Rules 97,

98, 99, 100, 101 & 103 would indicate that executing

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Court is empowered to adjudicate the right, title,

interest claimed in the property arising between the

parties to a proceedings or between the decree holder

and the person claiming independent right, title and

interest and an order is to be made in that behalf by the

executing Court. On such adjudication, it becomes

conclusive between the parties and it shall be construed

as a decree enabling the aggrieved party to pursue the

same in an appeal as if it were decree and such dispute

not to be agitated in a separate suit. Prior to 1976

amendment of CPC, right of suit under Order 21 Rule

103 was available which has since been done away by

the amendment. Thus, the scheme of code appears to

put an end to the protraction of the execution and to

shorten the litigation between the parties or persons

claiming right, title and interest in the immovable

property which is the subject matter of execution.

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CASE LAWS DISCUSSED:

15. As to what powers the Executing Court can

exercise while adjudicating the claim of obstructor,

came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex

Court in the case of NSS NARAYANA SARMA &

OTHERS VS. M/S.GOLD STONE EXPORTS (PVT) LTD

& OTHERS reported in AIR 2000(2) SC 251 and it was

held that executing Court is competent to consider all

questions raised by the obstructor/s offering

obstructions against execution of the decree and pass

appropriate order under Order 21 Rule 103 which is to

be treated as a decree, as under:

“19. From the principles laid down in the decisions noted above, the position is manifest that when any person claiming title

to the property in his possession obstructing the attempt by the decree-holder to dispossess him from the said property the executing Court is competent to consider all questions raised by the persons offering obstruction against execution of the decree

and pass appropriate order which under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 is to be

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treated as a decree. From the averments made in the petition filed by the appellants before the executing Court it is clear that they are claiming independent right to the

property from which they are sought to be evicted in execution of the decree. It is the further case of the appellants that the right in the property had vested in them much prior to filing of the present suit the decree of which is under execution. It is to be kept

in mind that the suit as initially filed was a suit for partition simplicitor. In such a suit the High Court in course of execution proceedings ordered delivery of possession. Whether such a direction given in the suit is valid or not is a separate matter. We need

not say anything more on the question at present. As noted earlier, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench dismissed the petition filed by the appellants as non- maintainable without entering into the merits of the case. The Division Bench

appears to have taken the view that since the appellants are claiming the property through the Paigah Committee or the State Government, who are parties in the suit, they are bound by the decree. The view taken by the Division Bench is

unsustainable and does not at all stand scrutiny under law. It amounts to, if we may put it that way, begging the question raised in the petition filed by the appellants. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated here that the appellants are claiming independent title

to the property as the transferees from the pattadars whose land did not vest in the

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State Government under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Jagirdar Regulation Act, 1958. On a perusal of the orders passed by the single

Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the said orders are based on a complete mis-reading of the case of the appellants and mis-conception of the legal position relevant to the matter. Considering the facts and

circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the matter should be remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the petitions filed by the appellants by a single Judge at the first instance.

16. The incidental question that would arise for

consideration would be whether the enquiry

contemplated would be recording of evidence, marking

of documents and examination of such material in

detail or a summary enquiry would suffice. In this

regard, no straight jacket formula can be prescribed

inasmuch as, it may differ from case to case. In other

words, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of

each case. If in a given case, the material would

primafacie indicate that affording of opportunity to lead

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oral evidence is not called for, the objector cannot be

heard to contend that the enquiry contemplated under

Rule 98 of Order XXI would mean and include granting

of permission to tender oral and documentary evidence

as otherwise, such order is without jurisdiction. Infact,

the Hon’ble Apex Court in RAJIV TRUST’s case reported

in AIR 1998 SC 1754 has held adjudication referred to

under Order XXI Rule 97(2) does not necessarily involve

a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. It has been

held therein as follows:

“13. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process

contemplated in Order 21, Rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor.

Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination if the Court deems it necessary.”

17. The above statutory provisions has been the

subject matter of consideration by this Court as well as

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Hon’ble Apex Court and it has been held that it is open

to a person in possession of an immovable property, not

being a party to the decree for possession or ejectment

or an order of eviction passed under the Rent Act, to

obstruct to the execution either by filing an objection to

the execution before the delivery warrant is issued or to

obstruct the execution of delivery warrant and that the

executing Court has to investigate the claim in terms of

Rules 98 and 101 CPC. Thus, a person being not in

possession of disputed property would not be competent

to offer any resistance or obstruction or objection to the

execution of the decree. The recourse left open to such

person is to file a regular suit and work out his/her

remedy in the said suit. It has been held in the

following judgments that if a person is in possession of

the subject property he is entitled to resist from being

dispossessed by offering obstruction or raise an

objection to the decree and the factum of possession

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would be the foundation for such obstruction or

resistance. The case laws on these aspects can be

summarized as under:

1) AIR 1998 SC 1827 - SHREENATH AND ANOTHER V/S RAJESH AND OTHERS

“13. So far sub-clause (1) of Rule 97 the provision is same but after 1976 amendment all disputes relating to the property made under Rules 97 and 99 is to be adjudicated under Rule 101, while under unamended

provision under sub-clause. (2) of Rule 97, the Executing Court issues summons to any such person obstructing possession over the decretal property. After investigation under Rule 98 the Court puts back decree-holder in possession where the Court finds

obstruction was occasioned without any just cause, while under Rule 99 where obstruction was by a person claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own right, the Court has to dismiss the decree-holder application. Thus even

prior to 1976 right of any person claiming right on his own or as a tenant, not party to the suit such person's right has to be adjudicated under Rule 99 and he need not fall back to file a separate suit. By this, he is saved from a long litigation. So a tenant or

any person claiming a right in the property, on his own, if resists delivery of possession

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to the decree-holder the dispute and his claim has to be decided after 1976 Amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 101 and prior to the amendment under Rule

97 read with Rule 99. However, under the old law, in case order is passed against the person resisting possession under Rule 97 read with Rule 99 then by virtue of Rule 103, as it then was, he has to file a suit to establish his right. But now after the

amendment one need not file suit even in such cases as all disputes are to be settled by the Executing Court itself finally under Rule 101.

14. We find both either under the old law or the present law the right of a tenant or any person claiming right on his own of the property in case he resists, his objection under Order 21, Rule 97, has to be decided by the Executing Court itself. 15. Rule 100 of the old law, as referred in the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is a situation different from what is covered by

Rule 97. Under Rule 100 (old law) and Order 99 the new law covers cases where persons other than judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder, of course, such cases are also covered to be decided by the Executing Court. But this will

not defeat the right of such person to get his objection decided under Rule 97 which is a

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stage prior to his dispossession or a case where he is in possession. In other words, when such person is in possession the adjudication to be under Rule 97 and in case

dispossessed adjudication to be under Rule 100 (old law) and Rule 99 under the new law. Thus a person holding possession of an immovable property on his own right can object in the execution proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97. One has not to wait for

his dispossession to enable him to participate in the execution proceedings. This shows that such person can object and get adjudication when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree-holder. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find the Full

Bench in Smt. Usha Jain (supra) correctly decided in law.”

2) ILR 1991 KAR 254 – -M/S PARAMOUND INDUSTRIES V/S C.M. MALLIGA

17. In view of what has already been stated

by us, it is not possible to agree with the view expressed in Smt. Jairaji's case. No doubt it is true that the executing Court cannot compel a decree holder to move an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the C.P. Code but it cannot also proceed with

the execution when an obstruction is caused by a third party by filing objections claiming to be in possession in his own right and not through the Judgment debtor, without deciding the objections. In Smt. Jairaji's case it is held that it is not required to make an

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enquiry of the nature contemplated by Order 21 Rule 97 of the C.P. Code on the ground that no procedure is prescribed for considering the objections filed by a third

party without an application filed by the decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. It is also further observed that the enquiry will be made only for the satisfaction of the Court whether the person to be dispossessed prima facie belongs to the category given

under Order 21 Rule 95 C.P.C. We have already held that whether or not the decree-holder files an application under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C., the executing Court has to determine the objections filed by a third party who is not a party to the decree.

Therefore, the objections filed by a third party has to be determined in the same manner as a suit. In addition to this, it is also relevant to notice that the decision in Smt. Jairaji's case was rendered prior to the coming into force of Central Act 104/1976.

18. In Ramaiah's case it has been held

that only a decree-holder can make an application under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. complaining of resistance or obstruction which can result in an investigation by the Court. An obstructor who is not a party to the decree cannot approach the Court with

an application to determine and safeguard his right or to obtain an order in his favour under Order 21 Rule 97 of the C.P.C. or any other provision of law. It has also been further held that such an application does

35

not lie and a third party cannot ask for an enquiry in the matter or relief. There is also another proposition of law laid down in this decision that if the decree-holder instead of

fifing an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the C.P.C. for removing the obstruction, only files a counter to the application filed by a third party and takes part in the proceeding, on the determination of the objection filed by the third party, it would

not be open to the decree-holder, if the decision were to go against him, to take a plea that the objection-application filed by a third party was not maintainable and the Court could not have decided the same. The latter proposition is in conformity with the

view expressed by this Court in Maddim Setty's case. As far as the former proposition is concerned, it is not possible to agree with the same in view of what has already been expressed by us.

(3) AIR 1998 SC 1754: (1998) 2 SCR 587: (1998) 3

SCC 723: JT 1998 (3) SC: (1998) S SCALE 550- SILVERLINE FORUM PVT. LTD., V/S RAJIV TRUST AND ANOTHER

“10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the

decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions "arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99" shall be determined by the executing Court, if such questions are

36

"relevant to the adjudication of the application". A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is

warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to

the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising

further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act.

When a decree-holder complains of

resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution Court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication, the Court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding

on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint.

The words "all questions arising

between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the Court is not obliged to

37

determine a question merely because the resistor raised it. The questions which executing Court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts.

First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g. if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not

necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question

regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resistor or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21,

Rule 97(2) of the Code, execution Court can decide whether the question raised by a resistor or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section.

11. In the above context we may refer to Order 21, Rule 35(1) which reads thus:

"Where a decree is for the delivery

of any immovable property, possession thereof shall be

38

delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf,

and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property."

12. It is clear that executing Court

can decide whether the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refused to vacate the property.”

(4) AIR 2002 SC 3083: (2002) 2 SUPPL.SCR 8: (2002) 7SCC 50: JT 2002 (6) SC 472: (2002) 6 SCALE 178-TANZEEM-E-SUFIA V/S BIBI HALIMAN AND OTHERS

“7. A perusal of Order 21, Rule 97 shall facilitate the proper appreciation of the

contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. It reads as follows:

97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable

property.- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any

person obtaining possession of the property, he may make an

39

application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.

(2) Where any application is made

under sub-rule (i), the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained."

8. The above noted provision

entitles the decree holder to bring it to the notice of the execution court the fact that the execution of the decree is being resisted or

obstructed by any person in possession of the property. The executing court would adjudicate upon the application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 in accordance with law.

9. We may also peruse Rule 99, Order 21, which reads as under:

99. Dispossession by decree-

holder or purchaser:- (1) Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed

of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may

make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession.

40

(2) Where any such application is

made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained."

10. The above provision is to be

availed of after a person in possession claiming its independent right is

dispossessed, in that event such the 3rd person can complain of dispossession to the executing court.”

18. If the objections filed by the objector for

decree being executed against him or a person who is

dispossessed from the property put into execution

contending that he is entitled to be put back in

possession by filing objections would primafacie indicate

that it is a bonafide claim or the objections is not

tainted with malafides to protract the proceedings or

such objector is not indulging in the decree being

frustrated on frivolous, vexatious and untenable

grounds, then in such eventuality, executing Court

enjoins the power to direct the parties to tender

41

evidence to substantiate their respective claims. Thus,

discretion requires to be exercised by the Executing

Court keeping in mind the settled principles in this

regard. If the objections filed by the objector on the face

of it being bonafide requiring consideration by the

Executing Court, necessarily trial would be required.

However, on the face of it if it is frivolous, vexatious or

without any merit relief can be refused and objections

can be rejected and in such an event recording of

evidence would not be necessary at all. It has been held

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in KAZI AKEEL AHMED vs

IBRAHIM reported in 1996(3) SLJ 1697 as under:

“He submitted that there is absolutely no merit or any substance in the false and fictitious claim of respondent No. 2 Girraj that he is a tenant in the shop in his own

right independently of respondent No. 1 which is evident from the fact that the suit for injunction and declaration filed by him against the appellant was dismissed on November 2, 1995, a certified true copy of which with English translation has been

placed on record.

42

xxxx These facts clearly go to show that the claim of the respondent No.2 that he is a tenant is

wholly fictitious and without any foundation and it was for this reason that the suit had been dismissed with cost to the tune of Rs.2,000/-. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, we find absolutely no merit in the application of respondent No.2

resisting the execution of the decree validly passed by a competent Court of Law.”

19. Yet another aspect which requires to be

taken note of by the Executing Court while examining

an application filed under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 is :

a person who is not in actual possession would have no

right to agitate in the execution proceedings for

delivering possession to the decree holder, such

applicant or objector offering obstruction to the

execution proceedings need not be countenanced. A co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of AKKATAI @

SUJATHA vs BABURAO SATTAPPA ANGOL reported in

ILR 1995 KAR 1892 has held to the following effect:

43

“12. An application under Order 21 Rule 97 is one to be made by the decree holder for removal of the obstruction that may be caused when possession of the immovable

property is sought to be delivered to him in execution of the decree obtained by him. Order 21 Rule 99 applies to a case where a person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of the immovable property by holder of a decree for possession and such

person can make an application for restoration of possession. Thus it is seen that the only applications that are contemplated by Rules 97 and 99 are by the decree holder for removal of obstruction or by a person dispossessed in execution of the

decree for possession. The question of the decree holder applying for removal of obstruction in a case where the obstruction or objection is not offered by the person in actual possession of the property, but by some person who is not in actual possession

but who claims a right in the property, would not arise as the decree holder can secure possession by dispossessing the person in actual possession. The necessity for a decree holder applying for removal of obstruction would arise when the person in

actual possession causes obstruction to delivery and the decree holder wants that obstruction to be removed and possession to be delivered to him. In such a case the person causing obstruction may be the judgment debtor or someone else on his

instigation or someone who is bound by the decree. The obstruction could also be caused

44

by a person who is in actual possession and who claims interest independent of the judgment-debtor and who is not bound by the decree. The obstruction can only be by a

person in actual possession of the property. That this must be so can be gathered from the fact that if the decree holder without seeking removal of obstruction manages to get possession in execution of the decree a remedy is provided for the person who is

actually dispossessed and who claims interest independently of the judgment-debtor and who is not bound by the decree to seek restoration of possession. A person who is having some interest in the property and who is not bound by the decree, but

who was not in actual possession of the property when the decree holder takes possession in execution of the decree, is not provided any remedy under Order 21 Rule 99. If the provisions of Order 21 Rules 97 to 101 are read together it would be clear that

it is only the obstruction or objection of persons who claim to be in actual possession of the immovable property which can be investigated in the execution proceedings and not the claim of a person who offers to obstruct or object to the execution though he

is not in possession of the property. If it is to be held that even a person who claims some right in the property independent of the judgment-debtor and who is not a party to the proceedings can make an application offering objection or obstruction to the

delivery of possession to the decree holder, even though he is not or does not claim to be

45

in possession of the property, then there would be no end to the travails of a decree holder. The object of these Rules is to protect the interests of persons who are in

possession of the immovable property having a right independent of the judgment-debtor against dispossession in execution of a decree which is not binding on them, as well as to enable the decree holder securing possession of the property removing any

obstruction that may be offered either by the judgment-debtor or by the persons claiming under him and who are bound by the decree. It must be remembered that these proceedings form part of the proceedings in execution of a decree for possession of

immovable property or for possession by a purchaser of an immovable property sold in execution of a decree. Persons who are not in actual possession of the immovable property are not given a right to agitate their rights in proceedings in execution of a decree for

possession under the guise of an application offering obstruction or objection to the execution.

14. While answering the first point which had arisen for consideration in that case this Court has held that it is open to the person in possession of an immovable property, not being a party to the decree for possession or

ejectment or an order of eviction passed under the Act, to obstruct the execution either by filing an objection to the execution before the delivery warrant is issued or to obstruct the execution of the delivery

46

warrant. It is therefore abundantly clear that it is only a person who is in actual possession of the immovable property in respect of which either a decree for

possession or an order for eviction is passed, who can offer his obstruction or objection by filing an application. If a person making such an application is found to be not in actual possession of the property then he or she cannot maintain the application and the

Executing Court would be free to proceed with the execution.

20. A perusal of Rule 99 of Order XXI would

clearly indicate that any person other than the

judgment debtor if dispossessed of immovable property

by the decree holder of a decree can make an

application to the Court complaining of such

dispossession and seek possession of such property and

thereupon the Executing Court is required to adjudicate

upon the application as stipulated under Rule 101. A

division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of

VARKEY JOSEPH POTHANIKATT V/S THE BOARD OF

REVENUE, TEIVANDRUM AND OTHER reported in AIR

47

1978 KERALA 149 has held that obstructor must

establish that such applicant was in possession of

subject property in good faith on his own account or on

account of some one other than the judgment debtor. It

has been held as follows:

“2. The learned Judge after noticing the

facts and discussing the position found that respondents 3 to 8 were squatters on the property and they were claiming in their own right, and therefore, having regard to the provision of Order XXI Rule 99 of the Civil P. C. which provides for delivery of

possession after removal of obstruction, the purchaser was not entitled to get actual possession of the property. Section 41 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act which is the relevant provisions reads:

"Where notwithstanding such

publication, any lawful purchaser of land may be resisted and prevented from obtaining possession of his purchased land,

the Collector, on application and production of the certificate of sale provided for by S. 39, shall cause the proper process to be issued for the purpose of putting such purchaser in possession in

the same manner as if the

48

purchased land had been decreed to the purchaser by a decision of a civil court.

For purposes of this section the Collector

may exercise all the powers of a Civil Court under the Civil P. C. for the time being in force."

It would be noticed that the deeming,--so to

say--of the proceedings to be a decree by decision of a civil court is only for the purpose of issuing process for putting the purchaser in possession. It is for this

purpose that the Collector has to exercise all the powers of a civil court under the Civil P. C. We shall assume, without finally deciding, that this provision is sufficient to attract Order XXI Rules 97 and 99 of the Civil P. C. Even then we find it difficult to

sustain the order of the learned Judge. Order XXI Rule 97 allows a right for the removal of obstruction or resistance against any person in order to obtain possession of the property. Rule 98 deals with the applications against persons who offer

resistance or obstruction on behalf of the judgment-debtor or acting at his instigation. We may leave out this provision which has no application. We then come to Rule 99 which reads:

"99. Resistance or obstruction by

bona fide claimant.--Where the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by any person (other

49

than those mentioned in R. 98) claiming in the good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of

some person other than the judgment-debtor, the Court shall make an order dismissing the application." It is of the essence of this provision that the resistance or obstruction must

have been occasioned by a person other than the judgment-debtor and that such persons should claim in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of

someone other than the judgment-debtor. With these ingredients or requirements of the rule, we should couple the absence of any finding in Ext. P-7, of a claim in good faith on the

part of respondents 3 to 8. Indeed we find it difficult to posit good faith on their behalf especially in view of the facts noticed in Exts. P-6 and P-7 orders. In Ext. P-6 order it is stated:

"It is therefore clear that the

property was in the effective management and

possession of Government all these years without any occupants on the site. It was put to sale while it was

50

under sirkar management. Hence the auction was made of a property free of any occupation."

This finding of the Tahsildar was not in any

way interfered with or set aside or differed from in Ext. P-7 order of the Board of Revenue. Having regard to 'the accepted fact

that the property was under Government management and possession, it would be a sad reflection on the said management, to lightly presume that the Government permitted, or connived at encroachers roaming over the property. Without any

material and data we would not be justified in coming to such conclusion. We are therefore of the opinion that the Board of Revenue was wrong in passing Ext. P-7 order without adverting to these relevant and material aspects of the provisions that we have noticed.

4. Counsel for respondents 3 to 8 raised the contention that the Tahsildar who passed

Ext. P-6 order had no jurisdiction to pass the same, and that he had not been empowered by the Government to perform the functions of the Collector either by name or by virtue of his office. The objection in regard to the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar

was not raised at any stage. The Tahsildar's order was carried up in revision to the Board of Revenue. There was no occasion for respondents, perhaps, to raise or press the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Tahsildar

51

as they succeeded in the revision on the merits. Before the learned single Judge again who heard the writ petition against Ext. P-7 order, there was, presumably, no ground to

urge the plea of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Tahsildar, as the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition on the merits. Before us the plea was urged. The learned Government Pleader stated that he could not positively state whether the Tahsildar had

jurisdiction; but that, he gathered that there is no specific empowerment of the Tahsildar. Even assuming, without deciding, that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction we do not think on this ground we should decline to interfere with Ext. P-7 order of the Board of

Revenue. We think the interests of justice would be advanced by quashing Ext. P-7 order to enable the purchaser to realise the fruits of his purchase rather than maintain the order and continue the illegal occupation of the Respondents.

We allow the appeal and set aside the

judgment of the learned Judge. In the result we allow O. P. No. 4716 of 1972 and direct that Ext. P-7 order of the Board of Revenue

will stand quashed. There will be no order as to costs.

20. Similar view has been taken by Calcutta

High Court in the case of SHYAMAPADA

BHATTACHARYYA V/S AJIT KUMAR BASU MALLICK

52

AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1973 CALCUTTA 336

namely, a claimant or objector must be in possession of

the subject property under some independent right or

title of his own to obstruct from decree being executed.

It came to be held in the said judgment as under:

“21. This is the scope of the application before me and unless Mr. Sarkar’s client can show that he has been in possession of the property under some independent right or title of his own, the purchaser of the property which is sold in execution of the

decree can claim that the resistance is made by the judgment-debtor or some person at his instigation and such resistance is not made in good faith under any bona fide title. Opportunity was given to Mr. Sarkar’s client to give evidence before me to prove that he

has any independent right or title, but Mr. Sarkar’s client did not do so. Mr. Sarkar did not bring his client in the witness box nor tender any evidence to show that his client has any bona fide right or title.”

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:

21. It requires to be noticed that in the instant

case applications have been filed by the revision

53

petitioners before the Executing Court under Order XXI

Rule 97 & 99 CPC read with Section 151 CPC. Rule 97

of Order XXI enables the decree holder to seek for the

resistance or obstruction being removed who is a holder

of a decree for the possession of immovable property or

purchaser of such property. The words “any person”

occurring in Order XXI Rule 97 offering resistance for

delivery of possession in execution of decree of

ejectment and the manner in which such application

should be dealt with has been clearly explained by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of SRINATH &

ANOTHER VS RAJESH & OTHERS reported in AIR 1998

SC 1827 wherein it has been held that a third party in

possession claiming independent right as a tenant can

object and get his claim adjudicated when sought to be

dispossessed by a decree holder and he need not wait

till he is dispossessed.

54

22. In this background, when the application

filed by the revision petitioner/objector is perused, it

would clearly indicate that objectors father had

executed a registered mortgage deed dated 04.01.1951.

It is also undisputed that mortgaged property was

leased by mortgagor in favour of the judgment debtors

and the records would also indicate the decree holders

are the legal heirs of the original mortgagee and they

had undisputedly collected rents from judgment debtors

and there was relationship of landlord and tenant

between them. Infact, this Court in the earlier round of

litigation between the decree holders and the judgment

debtors herein in HRRP 620/2004 c/w 622/2004 &

624/2004 disposed of on 25.01.2008 has held that

there exists jural relationship of landlord and tenant

between the parties. Said order has reached finality

and now the present objectors are claiming to have

taken possession of subject property through the

55

judgment debtors. In the original proceedings namely,

HRC 596/2002 (HRRP No.111/2012) and HRC

593/2002 (HRRP No. 110/2012) memos came to be

filed by the respondents therein stating that they have

vacated the petition schedule premises and they have

handed over possession of the petition schedule

premises to the original owner Sri N Ranganna, s/o late

M.R.Nanjappa. Said memos came to be opposed by the

petitioners and they came to be dismissed by the trial

Court by a common order dated 29.06.2011 on the

ground that respondents therein had not come out with

a specific contention as to who is the original owner of

the premises. Undisputedly, the said order has reached

finality and there is no challenge to the same. The

affidavit supporting the applications in question do not

disclose as to when possession was delivered and it is

silent on this aspect. The said memos (filed in HRC

No.596/2002 & 593/2002) had been rejected by the

56

Court below vide order dated 29.06.2011 and as such

the objectors now having claimed to have stepped into

the shoes of judgment debtors cannot traverse beyond

the order dated 29.06.2011 whereunder said memos

had been rejected.

23. It is to be further noticed that the objectors

have claimed that they were in possession of the

petition schedule premises as on the date of decree of

ejectment being executed through the process of Court.

If so, nothing prevented them to either affix their

signatures to the mahazar drawn by the Court bailiff or

offer obstruction to said decree being executed and their

claim being adjudicated. Same has been done. The

report of the bailiff would indicate that possession has

been taken by the decree holder on 10.08.2011 from

judgment debtors. Apart from these aspects the

judgment debtors have not been able to demonstrate

before the Executing Court or before this Court about

57

their possession as on the date the decree holders

executed the decree. The property tax register extract

and the tax paid receipts have come in to existence

subsequent to possession being delivered. Even the

electricity bills produced for the month of August, 2011

do not indicate about electricity having been supplied to

the petition schedule premises and same having been

consumed. What has been reflected in the said bill

would indicate that a sum of Rs.20/- has been collected

as minimum charges by the Electricity Department. In

that view of the matter also, contention of the objectors

about they being in possession of petition schedule

premises or having been dispossessed by the decree

holders cannot be accepted and said contention is

contrary to records. Hence, it stands rejected.

24. Insofar as HRC No.592/2002 is concerned,

there was no such memo filed which relates to HRRP

112/2002. As such, question of executing Court

58

considering the claim of the objector in this background

did not arise at all. Hence, the claim of objector having

come into possession of the suit schedule property by

virtue of judgment debtor handing over the same is not

only bereft of truth but it is utter falsehood. In fact,

objector in their affidavit supporting the application filed

under Order 21 Rule 97 do not state as to how they

entered into possession of the schedule premises.

Infact, at paragraph 6 of their affidavit they contend

possession of the schedule premises was handed over to

them by the children of late Raja Manikyam without

disclosing as to their names, the date on which

possession was delivered or from whom. On the short

ground that the objectors have failed to disclose these

details itself was sufficient for the executing Court to

reject the claim of the objectors. Dehors the same,

executing Court has proceeded to enquire into the

59

merits of the claim and found it to be hallow to reject

their prayer and rightly so.

25. Undisputedly, objectors were not in

possession of the petition schedule premises either at

the time of decree was being executed or prior to that.

On the other hand, decree holders are undisputedly

mortgagee in possession and the deed of mortgage dated

04.01.1951 would evidence that petition schedule

property was mortgaged by Sri M.R.Nanjappa and his

children in favour of Sri Mylevagan and it is his legal

heirs (mortgagees) who filed eviction petition and

obtained an order of eviction in HRC No.592, 593 &

596/2002 on 30.06.2004 and sought for execution. The

mortgage deed executed in favour of Sri Mylevagan is

not redeemed by the mortgagors or his successors in

interest. Thus, the objectors have not established to

demonstrate their independent title over the subject

property. The alleged possession claimed by them is

60

also not proved and particularly when the memo filed by

the tenants stating that they have handed over

possession to the objectors i.e., in HRC NO.596 &

593/2002 (HRRP 111 & 112/2012) having been rejected

by the trial Court by order dated 29.06.2011 and same

having reached finality, there was no other material

available before the trial Court other than the report of

the Court bailiff to arrive at a conclusion that the

judgment debtors were in possession and not the

obstructors. It is because of this precise reason,

Executing Court has examined the report of the Court

Ameen which primafacie indicated that judgment

debtors were in possession of petition schedule

properties at the time of executing the decree and as

such rejected the claim of the objectors. In view of the

fact that objectors were not in possession and the report

of the Court Ameen not disclosing that the objectors

were dispossessed of the property in question, objectors

61

claim cannot be construed as one falling under Rule 99

of Order XXI to arrive at a conclusion that Executing

Court ought to have determined the claim of the

objectors under Rule 101 CPC. In that view of the

matter, I am of the view that no infirmity whatsoever

can be found in the order passed by executing Court

rejecting the applications filed by the objectors.

26. For the reasons aforestated, following order

is passed:

1) Revision petitions are hereby dismissed.

2) Order passed by the Executing Court

in Ex.Nos.1551, 1552 & 1553/2011

dated 25.01.2012 are hereby affirmed.

3) No order as to costs.

Sd/- JUDGE *sp