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The Implicit Motives of Terrorist Groups: How the Needs for Affiliation and Power Translateinto Death and DestructionAuthor(s): Allison G. SmithSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 55-75

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Political Psychology,

Vol.

29, No. 1, 2008

The Implicit

Motives

of

Terrorist Groups:

How

the

Needs

for

Affiliation

and Power

Translate into

Death

and

Destruction

AllisonG. Smith

This study xplored

thedynamicsof

terrorism

hrough

quantitative

content nalysis of

documents

issued

by

terrorist roups

and nonterrorist omparison

groups.

Thirteen ter

rorist

roups

were matched

with

comparison groups

that hared the

ame

ideologies,

and

their documents

were

coded for

ingroup

affiliation,

utgroup

affiliation,

nd

power

motive

imagery.

s

hypothesized,

ompared

with

nonterrorist

roups,

terrorist

roups

were significantlyigher in ingroup ffiliation

motive

imagery

nd

significantly

ower

in

outgroup affiliation

motive

imagery

n

the

ull sample

of

documents and

in an indicator

sample

that included

only

terrorist

roups'

preterrorism

documents.

Terrorist

groups

were

significantly

igher

than

comparison groups

in

power

motive

imagery

in the

full

sample

and

marginally

significantly

igher

in

power

motive imagery

in the

indicator

sample.

These results

highlight

the

important

ole that

group

dynamics

play

in terrorist

groups.

KEY

WORDS:

terrorism,

motives,

power, affiliation,

social identity theory,

content

analysis

Dear America,

Today the

LORD

has

visited our

land

in

judgment.

An

invading

force

has pierced

the

shores

of

our

country

to

wreck

havoc and

devastation

upon

us,

on our

cities

and

our

people.

Because

the

immutable

character of God

never

changes,

let

us

consider

forwhat

cause

the

Lord has

smitten

us.

Could

it be that

the blood of

over

44,000,000

pre-bom

children has

brought

this

destruction

to our

shores?

("An

open

letter

to

America,"

2001)

55

0162-895X

2008

International

ociety

f Political sychology

Published

y

Blackwell

ublishing.nc.,

50

Main

Street, alden,

MA

02148,USA,

9600

Garsington oad,Oxford,

X4 2DQ,

and

PO

Box

378

Carlton outh,

053Victoria

ustralia







56

Smith

Like most New

Yorkers, I've been consumed with the attacks

on the

World Trade Center.

Unlike

most New

Yorkers,

I

believe

the

attack is

a

direct result of

America's sins against

God.

It iswritten,

"When a man's way please theLord, he maketh

even his

enemies

to

be

at peace

with

him"

(Proverbs

16:7).

Has America

been doing thatwhich pleases God? The answer

is a

resoundingNo " (Milliner,001)

These statements were issued

by

members

of

two

U.S. pro-life

groups

in

reaction to the 9/11 attacks on theUnited States. While the rhetoric of the two

groups is similar, the

nature

of their actions

is quite different.

The first uota

tion is from

a

member

of

Operation

Rescue

(later

renamed

Operation

Save

America), a group that campaigns against

abortion using various

nonviolent

tactics

such as

blocking

access

to

clinics

and

displaying pictures

of dead

fetuses. The second quotation

is from

a

member

of

the

Army of God,

an

orga

nization whose members

have

engaged

in

various terrorist ctivities

to stop

abor

tion, including

clinic

bombings

and the

attempted

murder of at least one

practitioner.

In this

project,

a content

analysis of

the

documents

produced

by groups

such

as

these

was

conducted

in

order

to

explore

the

psychological dynamics

of groups

that

do and

do

not

engage

in

terrorism.

The

goals

of

the study

were

to test

hypotheses derived

from

psychological

theory

and

to

examine whether

content

analysis might provide

indicators

of

a

group's

future

terrorism.

Studies

f

Terrorism

Although arguing

for

a

particular

definition

of

"terrorism"

is

beyond

the

scope

of

this

paper,

it's

important

to

make

explicit

the criteria

thatwere used to

label an activity as "terrorist" in this study.Specifically, I focused on three char

acteristics

of terrorism

on which there

is

a

good

deal

of

consensus

(Wilkinson,

1990).

First,

to be

labeled

as

terrorist

n

act

had

to

be

intended

to create terror

Merari

&

Friedland, 1985;

Schmid, 1988; Wilkinson, 1990). Although

terrorism

might

also be

intended

to

evoke

other emotional reactions-such

as

anger,

confusion,

and

despair-one

of its

primary goals

is

to create extreme

fear

in

a

population by

undermining

its

sense

of

security.

For

this

reason,

I did

not

consider

acts

of

pure

economic

sabotage

or

nonviolent

activities

to

be terrorist.

Second,

terrorism

s intended

to

create

terror n an

audience

beyond

itsvictims

(Bandura, 1990; Crenshaw, 1995; Schmid, 1988). Schmid (1988) discusses the

distinction

between

targets

of violence

(or victims)-who

are

often chosen

to

symbolize

some

larger group-and

the

targets

of

terror

or

audience)-who

iden

tify

ith the victims

or

their

larger group.

Terrorist violence

is

sometimes

instru

mental

(e.g.,

when victims

are

actually

individuals

the

actors want to

punish

or







The Implicit otives ofTerrorist

roups

57

eliminate), but in this study only those acts thatwere also symbolic innature were

considered errorist.

Third,

to be

labeled as

terrorist n act

had

to

be intended to create terror n

a

larger audience

in

order to further nother end (Schmid,

1988; Wilkinson, 1990).

For the purposes of this study, these

ends could

be

political, religious, and/or

social.

I did not

consider

acts

in

which

terrorwas

created as

an

unintentional

consequence to

be

terrorist.

Researchers

from

a

variety of fields have investigated

the

causes

of terrorism,

and

not

surprisingly, they

have

approached

this

task

at

various

levels

of

analysis.

At the structural level, both quantitative

and

qualitative

analyses

have shown the

importance of taking into account variables such as religion, economic circum

stances,

ethnic

relations,

and

government

policies

when

trying

to

explain

the

emergence

of

terrorism

n

a

particular

context

(e.g.,

Crenshaw, 1995; Hafez, 2006;

LaFree,

2006; Palmer, 1995).

At the other end of the

spectrum,

there

has been

considerable

research

at the individual level on

how

personality

and

demographic

characteristics

may

be

associated with

an

individual's

decision

to

engage in

terrorism (e.g., Kellen, 1990; Laqueur, 1999; Post,

1990), although

there is

increasing consensus

that

the

characteristics

of group

members may vary both

across and within terrorist

roups (Horgan, 2003; Kruglanski

&

Fishman, 2006).

While not underestimating the importance of structural or individual-level

variables

in

explaining terrorism,

this

study

focuses

on

psychological character

isticsmeasured at the

group

level for three

reasons.

First, conceptually

and

empiri

cally, groups

are an

important

level of

analysis.

There

already

exists a

wealth of

research that

highlights

the

important

role

that groups

and networks

play

in

fostering

the

move

towards

terrorismwhether

by

providing

the infrastructure

nd

training

to

support terrorist

ctivity,promoting

alternate

value

systems

that

isolate

group

members from the rest of

society, strengthening

the bonds

between indi

vidual members

through

rituals and

practices,

and/or

rewarding

members

for

increasingly violent

activity (e.g.,

della

Porta, 1995; McCauley, 2002; Merari,

1990, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Sprinzak, 1990).

Second,

the

documents issued

by

groups

that

engage

in

terrorism

are one

source of information

that

has been

underused by social scientists.While many

researchers discuss the various

writings

and

communiques

of the

groups they are

studying,

few examine

these

documents

systematically,

or

in

great

depth.

While to

some

degree,

this

may

be due

to

concerns that these documents

are

biased

or

misrepresent

these

groups'

true

goals, examining potential

bias

can

provide insight

into

these groups' perspectives,

and

further, nalyses

of

more

latent

psychological

variables,

such

as

motive

imagery,

may

allay

some

of

the

concerns

about

falling

prey

to

intentional

misrepresentation.

Third,

as

will be discussed

below, psychological

theories and research

have

linked certain

aspects

of

group

dynamics

with

aggression,

and

through

a content

analysis

of the motive

imagery

in

group

documents,

it is

possible

to

explore

whether

these

dynamics

characterize terrorist

roups.







58

Smith

Theories of Group Behavior

Social IdentityTheory (Tajfel

&

Turner, 1986)

is

currently

one

of the

domi

nant

social psychological theories addressing

group

behavior.

At its base, this

theorymakes

a

distinction between personal identities,

which

define individuals

in

relation

to other

individuals, and social identities, which

define

individuals

in terms f theirmembership

in

significant social categories and groups (Brewer &

Brown, 1998).

In

theirwork

on the

cognitive processes

of

self-categorization,

Turner and his

colleagues (Turner, 1979; Turner, Oakes, Haslam,

&

McGarty,

1994)

have

argued

that as

a

significant social identity, e.g., membership

in a

political

or social

group, becomes salient

to

individuals, theyundergo

a

process of

depersonalization-that is, they begin

to

view themselves

as

interchangeable

members of the

group as

opposed

to

unique

individuals.

In

addition, social identity

theoristshighlight

the

effect thatbelonging

to a

group has

on

members'

behaviors

towards

others

inside and

outside

the

group

and, specifically,

the

tendencies

towards favoring members

of

one's own

group (the ingroup; Tajfel, 1970) and

engaging

in outgroup

derogation

or

hostility (Brown, 1984). Research-most

using

the

minimal group

paradigm-has shown

that these

tendencies may

be

most

prevalent

in

people

who

highly identify

with their

groups

(Branscombe

&

Wann,

1994; Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, &

Mitchell, 1994;

Struch &

Schwartz, 1989).

Although

very

different

in

approach and method, early Freudian theory

describes some of the same characteristics of

group

behavior but focuses

on

the

role that instincts,ormotives, play

in

its development. Specifically, inCivilization

and Its Discontents

(1930/1961)

and

Group Psychology

and the

Analysis of

the

Ego

(1921/1959)

Freud argued

that

participating

in a

group

allows

members

to

express the

two

basic

human

instincts: the

Life

Instincts

(which

have

the overall

aim to

binding things together)

and

the

eath Instincts

(which

have the

overall

aim

of

tearing things apart).

He also described thenature of the ties thatbind the

group,

positing thatgroups are formed as theconsequence of two forms of identification.

On

the

one

hand, through

identification

with

the

group ideal,

which

can

be

embodied

in

either

a

leader

or an

idea,

group

members' consciences become

one

with that

of

the

group-i.e., the group's goals and standards

are

internalized

as

their own. At the same

time, through

identification

with

other

members of the

group, group

members

satisfy

their

fundamental

need

for

connection

with

others.

Finally,

Freud believed that the existence

of

external enemies facilitates

the

process

of

group formation by

deflecting

members' fundamental aggression

out

wards,

away from each other:

"It

is

always possible

to

bind

together

a

considerable

number of

people

in

love,

so

long

as there are other

people

leftover to receive the

manifestations

of

their

aggressiveness" (Freud, 1930/1961, p. 72).

In

summary, Social

IdentityTheory

and Freud's

theory

of

group

psychology

both describe the

key

role

that identification

plays

in

the formation

of

groups

and

the tendencies

of

groups,

once

formed,

to

privilege

their

wn

members and

express







The Implicit otives

ofTerrorist

roups

59

hostility owards utsiders. his study as designed oexplorewhether hese

dynamics remore evident n therhetoricf

terrorist

roups han onterrorist

comparison groups

as

would

be

expected if,

as

many before have argued, the

terrorist roup plays a

critical role

in

fostering itsmembers' violent activities.

In

this tudy, hese ynamics

ere

assessed throughhese roups'use of implicit

affiliation

and

power motive imagery.

Implicit

Motives

and

Aggression

Unlike explicit, or self-attributed,motives, which can be readily identifiedby

those

who

possess them, implicit

motives

may

be viewed

as

involving goals

that

are not

always fully

conscious

(Winter, 1996;

Winter

&

Barenbaum, 1999).

Mea

sured

using coding systems

that

have

been

developed through systematic analysis

of

the stories

written

by

individuals

in

whom

a

particular

motive has

been

experi

mentally aroused, implicit

motives have

been

shown

to

relate

to

spontaneous

behavioral trends

over timewhile

explicit

motives have been shown

to

relate to

immediate

esponses

o

specific

ituations

McClelland, oestner, Weinberger,

1992).

In

addition,

measures of

implicit

and

explicit

motives

are

not

highly

correlated,

meaning,

for

example,

that

a

group

or

individual's

explicit statement

that itwants a motive-related goal is not necessarily related to the amount of

motive

imagery

it

uses.'

Studying

he

relationship

etween

mplicit

otives nd

aggressive ehavior

has

a

long

history

in

personality psychology.

From

Freud's discussion the Life

Instincts and Death Instincts

to

the large body of empirical work relating political

leaders'

use

ofmotive

imagery

to

various conflict

outcomes,

two

general

classes

of

implicit

motives have been

the

focus

of

investigation:

affiliation and

power

(Winter,996).

Affiliation.

The

affiliation motive

is

broadly concerned

with the need

for

establishing and maintaining friendly relations with others. Individuals high in

affiliationmotive

imagery

tend to

enjoy interacting

with others and

actively

look

for

opportunities

to

do so

(McAdams

&

Constantian, 1983). Further, on the

international

stage,

it

has

been shown

that

leaders

high

in

affiliation motive

imagery

tend

to

prefer cooperative

outcomes:

higher

levels

of

affiliationmotive

imagery

have been related

to

pursuing

more

interdependent foreign policies

(Hermann, 1980)

and

making

concessions in conflict situations

(Langner &

Winter,

001).

1This is the case in the current study inwhich groups' explicit endorsement of friendship values (which

could be

taken

to

reflect

explicit

affiliation

motivation)

was

significantly

but

not

highly

correlated

with

groups'

use

of

implicit

affiliation motive

imagery

(r

=

.16,

p

<

.05).

Similarly,

groups'

explicit

endorsement of dominance and

aggression

values

(which

could be taken

to

reflect

explicit

power

motivation)

was

correlated

but

not

highly

correlated

with

groups'

use

of

implicit

power

motive

imagery

(r

=

.33,

p

<

.001).







60

Smith

While on the surface these findingsmight seem to indicate that a high level

of

affiliation

motive imagery

would

be associated with a preference for

nonviolence-and

thus

would be uncharacteristic of

groups

that

ngage

in

terrorist

violence-it's important

to note that no

empirical studies have distinguished

between

affiliation motive imagery aimed

towards the ingroup versus the out

group, a

distinction

that eems particularly relevant

when

studying

group behavior.

Specifically,

based

on

the theories discussed

above,

one

might

expect

quite

dif

ferent

outcomes

depending

on

whether

the

group's

affiliationmotive

is directed

inward (resulting

in

a

tight-knit roup potentially hostile

to

outsiders)

or

outward

(resulting

in a

looser group that

ismore

willing

to

establish friendly relationships

with outsiders).

In

this

study,

I

hypothesized

that relative

to

their nonterrorist

comparison groups,

terrorist

groups

would express

higher levels of affiliation

motive

imagery

directed

towards their ingroups

and lower levels of affiliation

motive imagery directed towards their outgroups.

Power The power motive

is

concerned with the

need

for having impact,

control,

or

influence

over

others. In

nearly

three decades of

research, Winter

(1980, 1993, 1996, 2007)

has

shown

the

association between

power motive

imagery

and

aggression.

For

example,

in a

study using

the

comparative

case

study approach,

Winter

(2007)

found that documents written

by political

actors

in crises that escalated towar contained higher levels of power motive imagery

than those

written

by political

actors

in

crises that

were

peacefully

resolved.

Other

research has shown that

high

levels

of

power

motive

imagerymeasured

in

presidential inaugural

addresses were

related to the likelihood of that President

engaging

the

country

in

war

(Winter,

1996),

and

similar

results were found

in

leaders

in

southernAfrica,

where those

high

in

the

power

motive were rated

by

a

panel

of

experts

as more

likely

to

support

armed conflict

(Winter, 1980).

Based

on

these

findings

and the fact that terrorism is

a

violent

activity

intended to

have

an

impact

on both its immediate victims and a

larger

audience that iden

tifies with these

victims,

I

would

expect

that

terrorist groups

would

express

higher

levels of

power

motive

imagery

than

their

nonterrorist

comparison

groups.

Methods

The

goal

of

a

structured,

focused

comparison

is

to

"formulate the

idiosyn

cratic

aspects

of the

explanation

for each

case in terms

of

general

variables"

(George, 1979,

p.

46).

In

this

study,

my

cases were

comprised

of

groups

thatdid

and

did

not

engage

in

terrorism,

nd I

attempted

to

formulate the

explanation

for

thedifferences between these groups by examining the levels ofmotive imagery

expressed

in

their

documents.

Again,

for

the

purposes

of

this

study,

I

defined

a

group

as

engaging

in terrorism

f

it

engaged

in

violent

activity

intended

to create

terror

n

an

audience

beyond

its victims

in

order

to

further

social, political,

or

religious

nd.







The

Implicit

otives ofTerrorist roups

61

Choosing ases

I

identified 13

groups that engaged

in

terrorism

in a

specific

context

and period

and

at least

one

comparison group

from each

context and

period

that did

not. Here, it is important

to

emphasize

that some of the

comparison

groups

may

have engaged

in terrorism during periods

not examined

in

this

study,

but I don't

consider

this

to

be

of

great

concern. My goal is

to

examine

the

psychological

dynamics

associated

with

a

group's

choice to

engage

in

ter

rorism

in a particular time

and

place

and

not

to uncover a static psycholo

gical profile

that will

indicate

whether

a group

has or ever

will

engage

in

terrorism.

I

matched each of

these 13 groups that engaged

in

terrorism

with groups

that

inhabited

the same

political

context

during

the same

period

and held

a

similar ideology,

but

did not

engage

in

terrorism.Groups

were considered

to

have similar ideologies

if

they

viewed the

same

groups

or

individuals

as

oppo

nents

and had comparable

political

and/or social goals

vis-a-vis these opponents.

So,

taking

an

example

from

this

study,

the

National Alliance and theOrder

were

both U.S. right-wing

groups

that

supported

a

pro-White agenda

and rejected

the

legitimacy

of

theU.S.

government,

viewing

it

as

incapable

of defending

"tradi

tional" values. Thus, these groups were considered tohave similar ideologies. At

the

same

time,

while

the National

Alliance

promoted

this

ideology through

national

congresses

and

its own

media outlets

in the

mid-1980s, during

this

same

period,

the Order

engaged

in

terrorism-burning

down an Idaho

syna

gogue, bombing

an

X-rated

movie

theater,

and

killing

an antiracist talk

show

host.

As one of my goals

was to examine

the

generalizability

of findings across

different

types

of

groups,

I

purposefully

included

a

diverse set of

groups

in

the

study.

"The desideratum that

guides

selection of

cases in the controlled

compari

son

approach

is not numbers

but

variety,

that is

cases

belonging

to the same class

thatdifferfromeach other" (George, 1979, p. 60, emphasis inoriginal). Specifi

cally,

I

selected

terrorist

nd

comparison

groups

that

inhabited

a

wide range

of

historical periods

and cultural milieus,

ranging

from

first

entury

CE Palestine to

the

twenty-first

entury

transnational

context.

I included

groups

that focused on

achieving

different

types

of ends: ethnic-nationalist

(e.g.,

theLiberation

Tigers

of

Tamil

Eelam

in

Sri Lanka), left,wing (e.g.,

the

Shining

Path

in

Peru) right-wing

(e.g.,

theOrder

in the

United States), religious

(e.g.,

al

Qaeda),

and single-issue

(e.g.,

the

Army

of God

in theUnited

States).

Finally,

I

chose

comparison

groups

thatwere

recognized by

their

political

opponents

or the

international community

as "legitimate" representatives of theircauses and participated inhigh-level gov

ernment

or

international

structures and

negotiations

(e.g.,

the Social Democratic

and Labour

Party

inNorthern

Ireland)

and

comparison

groups

that

pursued

their

goals

outside of

government

or

international

structures

e.g.,

theNational

Alliance

in theUnited

States).







62

Smith

The cases I examined are presented inTable 1. Further informationon the

specific

groups included

in the

study

is available

in a

previously

published paper

(Smith,

004).

Choosing

ocuments

In this

study

I

collected

documents

that

discussed the

goals of

the groups

being examined,

i.e.,

documents that could be considered group

"manifestos" as

opposed

to

personal

letters

or

memoirs

written by individual

members.2

While all

documents were written by individuals, theystood for thegroup and, in this sense,

were

consensual.

A

comprehensive

search

was conducted for each

group, and

every document

that

met

this criterion

and

was

published verbatim,

as opposed

to

paraphrased,

was

included

in

the

study

(n

=

166).

Specifically,

the

following

types of

documents

were

analyzed:

party plat

forms,

proposals

to

mediators

trying

to

explain

the

position

of the

group vis-a-vis

its

opponents,

letters r

interviews given by

official group representatives

aimed

at

explaining

the

group's principles

and

goals,

and sections

of books written by

active

members about

the

purpose

of

an

organization.

The

types and number

of

documents analyzed

in

each

context

are

presented

in Table

1.

The documents included in the studywere found throughopen sources such

as university library

collections,

the

Foreign

Broadcast

Information Service

(FBIS) Daily

Report,

newspapers,

and,

in

some

cases, internet sites

set up by the

groups

themselves.

For

documents

not

originally

issued

in

English,

English

trans

lations

were

analyzed.

In

previous

studies

using

content

analysis, translated

docu

ments

have

been shown to

yield

about the same scores

as

originals

as

long

as the

translations

are

of

high quality

(Hermann, 1980;

Winter, 1973).

Coding

Documents

In linewith standard

coding procedures,

after

all

identifying

information

was

removed

from

documents, they

were

randomized and

coded

by

a

trained

scorer

who demonstrated

a

category

agreement

of

.85

or above on

each

motive with

calibration

materials

prescored

by

experts

(Winter,

1989).

The

scorerwas

blind

to

the

purposes

and hypotheses

of the study.

In

all cases,

the

unit

of

coding

was the

sentence,

and raw scores

were

converted

into

images

per

1000

words,

as

is the

standard

practice

in

studies of

motive

imagery.

In

all but the

four

cases

in which

the

documents were

books,

the entire

document

was

coded

formotive

imagery.

Due

to the

time-consuming

nature

of

the

coding process, only the introductorychapter of each of thebooks was coded.

Descriptions

and

examples

of the

types

of

images

coded

for

the

power

and

affiliation

motives

can

be

found

in

Table 2.

2

A

list

of

the

documents

used in

this

study

is

available

from

the

author.







The

Implicit

Motives of Terrorist

Groups

63

CO00

OC

0)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A0

ci~0

0

00

1

+0

0

S

Qo

C

o -~~~ 0 0 0

~~~~1o

--

0

l

\0 0)~~~~

00 0)0)0) 0

0

0)00 )

"O

C'~~~~~~~~~~~~CO

C

"0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-

C~~~~~~~~~~~o

o

O

u

CO

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CO

"0~~~~~~~~~

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CO 0~~~~~

I.-CO-CO

0) 0

CO

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7

0

0)~~~

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a#

CO C

0C

CO0 O

40

-0

0

0

0 CO"0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Cu~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C

0~~~~~~~~

0~~~~~~~~

00

Hn

-

0 *~~~~ ~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~

00

0

CO

~~~~~~~~;

100

00

0)

H ~~~~~~~~~0

,

CO

CO CO

0

,

~~~ CO 0

CO~~~~~~~~

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~"

u

Z~~~~C







64

Smith

Table 2. Outline of Power and Affiliation Motive Scoring inVerbal Material

Imagery ype

Definition

Example)

Power A

concern with

having impact

on

others

or the

world through:

*

Strong, forceful actions.

("They invaded

our

country.")

*

Comparison

or

regulation. ("They monitor

our

every

action.")

*

Attempts

to

influence

or

persuade. ("They convinced us

to

support

them.")

*

Giving help

that is not

explicitly

solicited.

("We

will

fight for

the

oppressed.")

*

Concem with

prestige

or

impressing

the world at

large.

("We

demand respect.")

*

A

strong

emotional reaction

to another's

action. ("Their

indecision enrages

us.')

Affiliation A concern with establishing, maintaining, or restoring friendly relations through:

*

The expression of

positive,

friendly,

or

intimate feelings towards others.

("We

love ur fellow

elievers.")

*

The expression of

negative

feelings

about

separation or the disruption of

a

friendly relationship. ("We

are

tormented

by

our

separation

from

our

families.")

*

Affiliative, companionate

activities. ("We spent hours

sharing

our

views.")

*

Friendly,

nurturant acts.

("We

must

take

care

of

our

people.")

Note.

Adapted

fromWinter

(1989).

This

outline is not

adequate

for

scoring

purposes.

Power

motive

imagery is scored

when an

action expresses a

concern with

having an impact on others. Examples include references to strong, forceful

actions

having

an

impact

on others

or

the

world, comparison

or

regulation,

attempts

to

influence

or

persuade,

and

concern

with

prestige

or

impressing

the

world at

large (Winter, 1989).

All

power

motive

images

are

weighted

equally

such

that a reference to

violently

attacking

another

would receive the

same score as a

reference to

convincing

another to

change

a

position.

Affiliation

motive

imagery

is

scored when an

action

is described in

a

way

that

expresses

a

concern

with

maintaining

or

restoring

friendly

relations

with others.

Examples

include references to

positive, friendly,

or

intimate

feelings

towards

others, negative feelings

about

separation

or

the

disruption

of a

friendly

relation

ship, and companionate activities (Winter, 1989).

In

addition, after the documents had

been

coded,

each

affiliation

image

was

examined.

If

the

image

expressed

a

concern

with

developing,

maintaining,

or

restoring

relations with thosewho were

considered

part

of the

group

or

the

group's

cause, ingroup

affiliation

was coded. If

the

image expressed

a

concern

with

developing, maintaining,

or

restoring

relations with

the

group

considered

oppo

nents, outgroup

affiliation

was coded.

Images

thatdid

not

fall

into

one of these

two

classifications-e.g., images

that related

to an

opponent's

concern

with

develop

ing,maintaining,

or

restoring

relations with

another

group-were

not

included

in

the

following

analyses.

As this

classification of

affiliation motive

imagery

fre

quently required

knowledge

of the

groups

beyond

what

was

present

in

individual

documents,

I

determined

the classification of

the

affiliation

images. Although

this

might

be viewed

as

introducing potential

bias,

the fact

that this

coding

was conducted

on

documents which

were

mixed

together

in

random order and in







The Implicit

otives

of

Terrorist roups

65

which specific groups were not identified resulted in virtual blindness as to

whether

individual

documents were

issued

by terrorist r

comparison

groups.

Plan

of

Analysis

In

order

to

determine

whether

specific

variables

were

associated with

engag

ing in

terrorism,

took

a case

study

approach and

treatedeach

context as a

separate

case

in

which

I

testedmy

hypotheses. When

taking

this

approach,

I

first

used

t-tests

to

determine whether

there

were

differences in

the

means

of

terrorist nd

nonterrorist

groups

within each context in

ingroup affiliation,outgroup affiliation,

and

power

motive

imagery.

Then,

in

order

to

examine

whether any

variables were

significantly

related

to

engaging

in

terrorism

cross

all

of the

separate

comparison

cases

taken

together,

I

used

the

Stouffer method

(Mosteller &

Bush,

1954;

Rosenthal, 1978)

to

combine

the

results of

the separate case

studies.3

In

addition to

examining whether

motive

imagery variables were

associated

with

actively

engaging

in

terrorism,

was

interested

in

uncovering whether

the

levels

of motive

imagery present in

documents

might

indicate that a

group was

moving

towards

terrorist

ctivity.

Specifically,

I

wanted to

explore whether terror

ist

groups were

higher

in

ingroup affiliation and

power motive

imagery

and lower

in outgroup affiliationmotive imagery than theirnonterroristcomparison groups

before the former

engaged

in

any

type

of

terrorism.

n

order to

do

this,

I

created a

sample (the indicator

sample)

that

included

only

those

documents issued

by

terrorist

roups before

theyhad

engaged

in

any

act

of

terrorism.

ny

documents

a

group issued

after it

engaged

in

its first ct

of

terrorismwere not

included in

this

sample.

If

therewere no

preterrorism

documents

for a

particular terrorist

roup,

neither itnor

its

matched

comparison

group

was

included in

the

indicator

sample.

The

question

concerning

which

documents from

terrorist

groups'

matched

comparison

groups

to

include

in

the

indicator

sample

was

dictated

by

sample

size.

While the fact

that

a

terrorist

vent

may

affect

all

groups

in

the

context

in

which

it

occurs

provides a

compelling argument for

comparing only

the

preterrorism

documents

of

both

terrorist

roups

and

their

matched

comparison

groups,

includ

ing only

preterrorism

documents from

all

groups

would

have

left

me with

a

very

small

sample

of

documents

(n

=

36).

Further,

preliminary analyses indicated

that

therewere no

significant differences

in

the

levels of

motive

imagery

variables

present in

the

documents issued

by comparison

groups after versus

before terror

ism

occurred in

their

contexts.4

Thus,

in

order

to

explore whether

levels of

motive

3

The

Stouffer method

involves

adding

the

standard

normal

deviates,

Zs,

associated

with the

ps

obtained

in

each

study

(or

in

this

case

each

context)

and

dividing

this

by

the

square

root

of the

number

of studies (contexts) being combined. One of the strengths of this approach is that it

weights

each case

study

evenly

such

that

contexts in

which

there

are more

documents do

not

overpower

those in

which

there

are

fewer.

4

To

test

this,

I

created

a

sample

that

included

all of

the

documents from

comparison

groups

that

had

issued

documents

both before

and after

terrorism

occurred

in

their

contexts.

I then

conducted

t-tests

within each context to

look for

differences

in the

means on

each

variable

based

on

when

documents







66

Smith

imagery variables might indicate whether a group was moving towards terrorist

activity,

I

compared terrorist roups'

preterrorism

documents with the documents

issued by theirmatched comparison

groups

both before and after the

terrorist

group

engaged

in terrorist

ctivity

(n

=

98).

Results

Ingroup ffiliation

otive Imagery

The differences inmean levels of ingroup affiliationmotive imagery-that is,

affiliation

motive imagery

directed

towards

the

ingroup-expressed

by terrorist

and comparison

groups

in the full and indicator

samples

are

presented

in Table

3.

In

the full sample,

two

terrorist

groups

expressed

significantly higher

levels of

ingroup

affiliation

motive

imagery

than

their

comparison groups (Palestine

1944

48:

difference

in Ms

=3.18, p <.05;

Transnational:

difference in Ms

=2.36,

p

<

.0

1),

and terroristgroups

expressed

a

significantly

higher

level

of

ingroup

affiliation

motive imagery

than

comparison

groups

when

results

were

combined

across

contexts

(Z

=

2.24,

p

<

.05).

In

the indicator sample,

the

same two

groups

expressed

significantly

higher

levels of ingroup affiliation imagery than their comparison groups (Palestine

1944-48:

difference

in

Ms

=

2.10, p

<

.001;

Transnational: difference

in

Ms

=

2.63,

p

<

.05),

and terroristgroups

again

expressed

a

significantly

higher

level of

ingroup

affiliationmotive

imagery

than

comparison groups

when results

were combined

across contexts

(Z

=

1.86, p

<

.05).

Outgroup Affiliation

Motive

Imagery

The differences

in

mean

levels of

outgroup

affiliation motive

imagery

expressed by terrorist nd comparison groups in the full and indicator samples are

also

presented

in

Table 3.

In the

full

sample,

two

terrorist

groups expressed

significantly

lower

levels of

outgroup

affiliationmotive

imagery

than their

com

parison

groups

(Northern

Ireland:

difference

inMs

=

-1.36,

p

<

.05;

Sri

Lanka:

difference

inMs

=

-1.25,

p

<

.01),

and terrorist

roups expressed

a

significantly

lower

level

of

outgroup

affiliation

motive

imagery

than

comparison

groups

when

results

were

combined

across contexts

(Z

=

2.26,

p

<

.05).

In the

indicator

sample,

one

terrorist

group expressed

a

significantly

lower

level of

outgroup affiliation imagery

than

its

comparison

group

(Sri

Lanka:

dif

ference

inMs

=

-1.25, p

<

.01),

and

terrorist

groups expressed

a

significantly

were

issued

(before

or

after

terrorism)

and

used the

Stouffer method

to

explore potential

differences

across

contexts.

There

were no

significant

differences

on

any

variable

within

or

across

contexts

(ingroup

affiliation

motive:

Z=1.23,

p

=

ns,

outgroup

affiliation

motive:

Z-.31,

/?

ns,

power

motive:

Z

=

.46,

p

=

ns).







The

Implicit otives

ofTerrorist

roups

67

CZ

t

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68

Smith

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The Implicit

otives ofTerrorist

roups

69

lower level of outgroup

affiliationmotive

imagery

than

comparison groups when

results were combined

across contexts (Z

=

1.86,

p

<

.05).5

Power Motive Imagery

Finally, the differences

in

mean

levels

of power motive imagery expressed

by

terrorist

nd

comparison

groups

in the full and indicator

samples

are also

presented

in Table 3.

In

the

full sample,

four terrorist roups expressed


levels of

power

motive

imagery than

their

omparison

groups

(Palestine

1944-48:

difference in Ms =5.88, p <.05; Northern Ireland: difference in Ms =4.46,

p

<

.05;

United States

1983-85:

difference

inMs

=

4.84, p

<

.01;

Sri

Lanka:

dif

ference

inMs

=

5.31, p

<

.01),

and

terrorist

roups expressed

a

significantlyhigher

level

of power

motive

imagery

when results

were combined across all

contexts

(Z= 3.62,

p<

.001).

In

the sample

that included only

those documents

terroristgroups issued

before they engaged

in

terrorism,

two

terrorist

groups expressed significantly

higher

levels of power

motive imagery

than their comparison

groups

(Palestine

1944-48:

difference

in

Ms

=

6.87,

p

<

.05;

Sri Lanka: difference

inMs

=

5.44,

p

<

.01),

and terrorist

roups expressed

a

marginally


level

of

power

motive

imagery

when results

were

combined across all contexts

(Z

=

1.55,

p<.10).

Discussion

Affiliation

Motive

Imagery

and

Terrorist

Aggression

As

hypothesized,

therewere differences

in the levels of

ingroup

and

outgroup

affiliation

motive

imagery expressed by

terrorist

groups

and their

comparison

groups across contexts, and these differenceswere in thehypothesized direction.

Specifically,

compared

with

their

nonterrorist

counterparts,

terrorist

groups

expressed significantly

higher

levels

of

ingroup

affiliationmotive

imagery

and

significantly

lower levels

of

outgroup

affiliation

motive

imagery

in both the full

and

indicator samples.

This seems to

indicate

that the affiliation

motive of terrorist

groups is

more

focused

on

creating tighter

onnections

with those considered

"us,"

while the affiliation

motive

of

comparison

groups

ismore

focused

on

creating

new

connections thatblur

the line between "us" and

"them."

To

give

a concrete

example

of

how

the affiliationmotive imagery

differed

in

terrorist and comparison

group documents,

it is interesting

to compare the

51 also conducted

analyses

to

look for differences

between terrorist

groups

and

comparison

groups

in

overall affiliation motive

imagery.

In both the full and

indicator

samples,

there

were

no

significant

differences

across

contexts

(full

sample:

Z=

.25,

p

=

ns,

indicator

sample:

Z=

.44,

p

=

ns).









The

Implicit otives of

Terrorist roups

71

nation-wideampaign f agitation: hroughtubbornnd determined

mass struggles to

defeat the economic and political policies of the

Nationalist overnment:y repulsingheir

nslaughtsn the iving tan

dards and liberties of the

people. (Mandela, 1956/1977)

This short excerpt is replete with power motive

imagery, e.g., references

to

winning emands,

aunching

struggle,

gitating,efeatingolicies,

nd

repuls

ing

onslaughts. Clearly this group wanted

to

have an impact

in

South Africa and

viewed the struggle

in

which

it

was

engaged

in

power-related

terms.

That being

said, thisgroup did not choose to engage in terrorismduring theperiod investi

gated in this

study.7

This

underlines the fact that groups that desire

to

have

an

impact

on

their

political

and social

contexts can

do

so

in

a

variety

of

different

ways.

As it could be

argued

that ll of the

groups

in

this

sample

desired

to have an

impact

on

theworlds

they

inhabited in that

they

all

were

advocating ideologies

thatcalled for

changing

the status quo, it becomes less

surprising

that the

expression of

power motive

imagerylonedid not

distinguish

errorist

roups rom heir onterrorist

ompari

son

groups

in the indicator

sample.

Rather, itmay be thatwhen

examining group behavior, it is

only

in

combi

nation with the type of dynamics that both Social IdentityTheory and Freud's

theoryof group

psychology

describe that

a

high

need for

power leads

to

violence

against

the

outgroup.

The

following excerpt

from the

eclaration of

War

issued

by

theOrder (1984)

seems to

offer

a

prime

example

of how

such

group dynamics may

pave

the

way

to

terrorist

ggression,

how

the fusion of

affiliation and

power

can

lead to

death and destruction:

To these

[slain]

kinsmen we

say,

"Rise,

rise

from

your graves,

white

brothers Rise and

join

us We

go

to

avenge your

deaths.

The Aryan

yeomanry

is

awakening.

A

long forgotten

wind is

starting

toblow. Do

you

hear the

approaching

thunder? It is that of the

awakened Saxon.

War is

upon

the land."

(p.

3)

Conclusions

nd

Limitations

At the

most

basic

level,

this

study

has shown that

the

group dynamics

described

by

Social

Identity

theorists

and Freud

seem to

characterize terrorist

groups. Further, it has demonstrated that it

is

possible to

distinguish between the

documents of

groups

that do and do

not

engage

in

terrorism

through

a

content

analysis of motive imagery. Finally, its findings underline the importance of

7

During

this

period,

theANC did

engage

in

economic

sabotage,

which did not meet

the criteria for

terrorism used in this

study.







72

Smith

examining the objects of affiliationmotive imagery (ingroup and outgroup) when

looking for indicators of group

behavior.

At the same

time, it is important

to

acknowledge

the

limitations of the

approach

I've

taken

in

this study.

A

key

criticism relates

to

my reliance on

matching groups that do and do

not engage in

terrorism

and the

fact that the

validity of this

approach

rests

on

the selection of

appropriate comparison groups

(Breslow &

Day,

1980; Campbell

& Stanley, 1963). Further,

even if

groups can be

found

that

share

similar

goals and opponents, it

is

open

to

question

whether

two

groups ever

really inhabit the

same

context:

i.e., groups that

share the

same

locations in time and space may have very different relationships with the gov

ernment, economic prospects,

etc. It could

be

argued that these

other

contextual

factors-as opposed

to

group dynamics

as

revealed

through

motive

imagery

determine whether a

group

chooses to

engage

in

terrorism.

While

I

view the above

points

as

valid

criticisms,

in

this

study

I

was par

ticularly

interested in

exploring whether results

relating motive

imagery

to

engaging

in

terrorism

generalized

across

contexts, and

to

do this

matching

was

the

only

viable alternative.

To

some

degree,

the

impossibility

of

finding

groups

that

perfectly

matched is the cost

of

conducting applied

research.

In

a

study

I am

currently

conducting,

I

am

attempting

to

overcome some

of

this

limitation

by

focusing inmore depth on a few groups thathave (and have not) engaged in

terrorism

during

particular periods

of their

history

and

exploring

whether the

psychological

variables coded in their

documents-and other

contextual

factors-are related to their decisions

to

engage

in

or desist from

terrorist

activity.

As forwhether variables other than

motives influencewhether

groups engage

in

terrorism,

would

argue

that

they

most

certainly

do. A behavior as

complex

as

engaging

in

terrorist

ctivity

is no doubt

multiply

determined.

Still, regardless

of

whether

they cause,

are

caused

by,

or are

independent

from other

variables that

may

lead a

group

to

adopt

terrorism

as a

tactic,

a

group's ingroup

and

outgroup

affiliationmotive

imagery and,

to a

lesser

degree,

its

power

motive

imagery

may

serve as one set

of indicators that

a

group

is

moving

in

that direction.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This

paper

is

based

on a

doctoral dissertation.

Funding

for this

project

was

provided by

the

Psychology Department,

the

Horace H. Rackham

Graduate

School,

and

the

International Institute

at

the

University

of

Michigan.

I

would like

to thank

David

Winter, Abigail

Stewart,

Rowell

Huesmann,

Christopher

Peterson,

and Clark McCauley for their dvice on conceptual andmethodological aspects of

this

project

and Carrie Paben for

her work

coding

documents.

Correspondence

concerning

this article should

be addressed

to

Allison

G.

Smith,

3726 Connecticut

Avenue, NW,

Apt. 316, Washington,

DC 20008. E-mail:

allison.g.smith@

gmail.com







The Implicit

otives ofTerrorist roups

73

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