The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview | Small Arms Survey

8/9/2019 The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview | Small Arms Survey

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The Lords Resistance Army inSudan: A History and Overview

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Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8 Schomerus The Lords Resistance Army in Sudan

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Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute o International Studies, Geneva 2007

First published in September 2007

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

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The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Grad-

uate Institute o International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the

principal source o public inormation on all aspects o small arms and as a

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The Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a three-year research

project (200508) administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been devel-

oped in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry o Foreign Aairs, the UN

Mission in Sudan, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array o inter-

national and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and

dissemination o timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reorm

(SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security.

The HSBA is being carried out by a multidisciplinary team o regional, security,

and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution o armed vio-

lence throughout Sudan and oers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.

HSBA Working Papers are timely and user-riendly reports on current researchactivities in English and Arabic. Future papers will ocus on a variety o issues,

including victimization and perceptions o security, armed groups, and local

security arrangements. The project also generates a series o Issue Bries.

The HSBA project is supported by Canada, the UK Government Global Con-

fict Prevention Pool, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida),

and the Norwegian Ministry o Foreign Aairs.

For more inormation contact:

Claire Mc Evoy

HSBA Project Coordinator

Small Arms Survey, 47 Avenue Blanc

1202 Geneva, Switzerland

E-mail: [email protected]

Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan

HSBA Working Paper series editor: Emile LeBrun

Contents

Acronyms and abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................. 6

About the author ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 10

II. The Lords Resistance Army/Movement ............................................................................................. 12

III. The LRA in Eastern Equatoria ............................................................................................................................ 18

The LRA and civilians ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19

Areas o control ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 20

LRA command structures .......................................................................................................................................................... 22

IV. Allies and enemies ................................................................................................................................................................... 24

The Government o Sudan ....................................................................................................................................................... 24

The SPLM/A ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 28

The UPDF in Sudan ............................................................................................................................................................................. 28

Other armed groups ............................................................................................................................................................................ 32

V. The Juba Peace Talks .............................................................................................................................................................. 34

VI. Access to weapons ................................................................................................................................................................... 41

Types, stockpiles, and command o arms ........................................................................................................ 41

Arms transers .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 43

VII. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 45

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 48

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 51


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Acronyms and abbreviations

CAR Central Arican Republic

CoH Cessation o Hostilities

CHMT Cessation o Hostilities Monitoring Team

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

DRC Democratic Republic o the Congo

EDF Equatorian Deence Force

GPMG General Purpose Machine Gun

GoS Government o Sudan

GoSS Government o South Sudan

ICC International Criminal Court

LRA/M Lords Resistance Army/Movement

MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic o the Congo

SAF Sudan Armed Forces

SPLM/A Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army

SSDF South Sudan Deence Forces

SSIM South Sudan Independence Movement

UN United Nations

UPDF Uganda Peoples Deence Force

About the author

Mareike Schomerus is a doctoral candidate at the Development Studies Insti-

tute (DESTIN) at the London School o Economics. Her research on northern

Uganda and southern Sudan has included reports or UNICEF, USAID, and

the Minority Rights Group International. During the ongoing peace talks

between the Government o Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army, she is

advising local peace building teams in Western and Eastern Equatoria under

the auspices o Pact Sudan.

Having trained as a journalist at Columbia Universitys Graduate School o

Journalism, Schomerus spent 15 years working or major international broad-

casters in Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. She is a direc-

tor and producer o documentaries screened on the FrenchGerman channel

ARTE and the German channel ARD.


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Abstract

The ongoing peace talks between the Government o Uganda and the Lords

Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) in Juba, the capital o South Sudan,

have created renewed international interest in the confict in northern Uganda.

While the negotiations have proved extremely dicult, they have opened up

new channels o communication with the LRA. The talks have also allowed

the aected population o Eastern and Western Equatoria, South Sudan, to

voice their grievances against the LRA and raise questions about the conduct

o the Uganda Peoples Deence Force (UPDF) in Sudan. This study examines

the military history o the LRA in Sudan, the current prospects or ending the

confict, and the main challenges acing the peace talks.


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10 Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 8 Schomerus The Lords Resistance Army in Sudan 11

obstacle to a peace process in Uganda. This is certainly the view taken by the

LRA, which argues that the ICC is biased and politically motivated in its

pursuit just o the LRA and not o both parties, when many, in act, see the

war as a planned intervention by the Museveni government (Otunnu, 2006).

Currently, the question is whether the aected communitys quest or account-

ability is served better through local justice proceduresboth traditional and

ormalor through an international justice system (Aako, 2006). Both options

come with signicant challenges. Local traditional justice procedures have

not traditionally provided accountability or large-scale atrocities and their

suitability or this purpose remains contested (Allen, 2006). At the same time,

negotiating a peace deal under the threat o international arrest has proved

problematic or the LRA leadership and has divided the international com-

munity in its support or a peaceul solution.

It is extremely dicult to obtain actual inormation about the LRA. Much

o the existing voluminous research rom northern Uganda is agenda-driven

or ails to account or the overlap between LRA and civilian grievances and

perspectives. Because research in northern Uganda and, to some extent, south-

ern Sudan requires the cooperation o the Uganda Peoples Deence Force

(UPDF), inormation is oten coloured by the UPDFs own perspective.

This report is based on ocused eldwork in northern Uganda and southern

Sudan in 200507. The author conducted ace-to-ace interviews with a range

o Ugandan and Sudanese civilians and community leaders. The military

was not present on these occasions and the interviewees were assured o ano-

nymity. Members o the military rom both countries, Sudanese politicians,

and LRA representatives, including the LRA high commandspecically

Joseph Kony and Vincent Ottiwere also interviewed.

In describing the history o the LRA/MUPDF confict in Sudan and Uganda,

this report seeks a balance that has been sorely absent in previous media and

academic accounts. That the LRA/M can be seen as having arisen in pursuit

o legitimate grievanceswhich at times have been shared by many commu-

nities in northern and eastern Ugandashould in no way be interpreted as a

deence o the groups methods and tactics. Part o the story o the confict,

however, hinges on the use o propaganda and access to inormation; accord-

ingly, this report attempts to separate act rom ction.

I. Introduction

The arrival o the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Sudan in 199394 marked

the beginning o more than a decade o ghting involving Ugandans on Suda-

nese soil. This development had an impact on both the Sudanese civil war and

the war in Uganda, isolating large parts o Sudans Eastern Equatoria state

rom outside help and causing thousands to fee. The LRA had ventured into

Sudan in the early 1990s to seek reuge rom the ghting in Uganda. By 1993,

the Sudanese government o Omar al-Bashir had turned the LRA into a signi-

cant actor in Khartoums eorts to crush the southern rebellion. Moving into

the Democratic Republic o the Congo (DRC) in 2005, the LRA became a genuine

threat to regional security.

The LRA is one o the most notorious rebel armies in the world. Under the

command o Joseph Kony and his second-in-command Vincent Otti, the group

has been an armed opponent o the Government o Uganda and President

Yoweri Museveni since 1987. Breathtaking brutality, political manoeuvring,

and propaganda have marked the confict on all sides. The LRA has ought

this war with ruthless attacks and abductions, and the Government o Uganda

has responded with structural violence on a grand scale against the people o

northern Uganda.1 Northern and parts o eastern Uganda have been system-

atically marginalized. Warare tactics on the government side consisted o

orcing the entire population in these areas into so-called protected villages,

which are in reality displacement camps with inhumane conditions. This move

has destroyed traditional structures and interrupted development (Finnstrom,

2003). Furthermore, there are numerous reports o violence by the Ugandan

army against civilians in the region (Otunnu, 2006).

The confict is also setting precedents in the international justice system. In

2005 the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) issued its rst

warrants, selecting Kony, Otti, and three other LRA commanders.2 This height-

ened international debate about the role o international criminal justice in

peace building eorts. Opponents o the ICC see its intervention as the major


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the insurgent armys political prole because o the atrocities committed by

its troops against civilians, and because o the widely-publicized orceul re-

cruitment o children into the army. Political maniestos (see Box 1), although

published at irregular intervals, were largely ignored because o the political

climate in Uganda, which had successully portrayed the LRA/M as a group

o irrational maniacs, driven in its political agenda by an out-o-touch and

disconnected diaspora. According to the ocial Ugandan assessment o LRA

maniestos, many were written in the diaspora and were thereore inauthen-

ticdespite the act that the war had global connections and signicance,

and that the issues raised in the maniestos were clearly relevant to northern

Uganda (Finnstrom, 2003). The LRA says that its own inormation dispatches

were inevitably blocked by the UPDF. According to Kony, during Operation

Iron First in 2002 (see Box 2), one journalist who tried to see what was hap-

pening in southern Sudan was stopped by Museveni in Paratanga.5 Over the

years, government propaganda and media coverage has eectively depoliti-

cized the war. Its disregard or the existence o LRA political maniestos has

largely obscured the underlying political causes o the insurgency,6 which are

II. The Lords Resistance Army/Movement

The LRA has been something o an unknown entity or many years, attracting

wild speculation about its motives and the strength o its ghting orces. Chair-

man Kony himsel has been described in misleading terms either as insane or

as a muddled messiah because o his spiritual teachings, spirit communication,

and his supposed strong adherence to idiosyncratic biblical values. Certainly,

Kony is a powerul spiritual and military gurehead who has managed to

command the LRA and imbue it with an extremely strong, and at times vio-

lent, sense o community. But explaining the LRA solely in terms o its leader

misses the underlying reasons or the war. Active LRA ghters have said that

they do not ght the war or the chairman. They see themselves as ghters

or their people, the Acholi, whom they believe to be marginalized, abused,

and excluded rom Ugandas development by an oppressive regime.3

Very little is known about the military history o the LRAUPDF confict.

Most battles went unreported except or cases where the army celebrated a

spectacular victory. Reports about ghting have been almost exclusively dis-

seminated by the Ugandan government and its inormation policy has always

been to play down the strength o the LRA. Estimates o LRA ghting orces

at the height o military action vary widely. Even since the beginning o the

Juba Peace Talks in July 2006, numbers given have ranged rom a ew hun-

dred to at least 10,000, depending on the source.4 Reliable estimates o LRA

orces at other points during the war simply do not exist. Survey-driven esti-

mates are fawed because at dierent times and in dierent contexts it has

been either advantageous or disadvantageous or civilians to admit their ali-

ation. In addition, LRA membership has oten been fuid, with people joining,

leaving, and rejoining (Allen and Schomerus, 2006). Active combatants have

been less than vocal about their political agenda and have shrouded them-

selves in spiritual mystery.

The Lords Resistance Movement (LRM)the political arm o the LRA, main-

tained as an intricate network in the diaspora communitywas unable to raise

LRA Chairman Joseph Kony (L) with LRA Deputy Commander

Okot Odhiambo, Ri-Kwangba, June 00 M. Schomerus


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ound to be widely supported by the aected population in northern Uganda,

even though the accompanying violence is never condoned (Finnstrom, 2003).

The people o northern Uganda share a sense o marginalization with those

in the east. Ater 20 years o war the statistics are appalling: in 2006, 60 per

cent o schools in the north were non-unctioning, leaving 250,000 children

without any education; 95 per cent o people in the north were living in abso-

lute poverty compared with the national average o 37 per cent (CSOPNU,

2006). Other parts o Uganda have beneted rom signicant economic growthduring this period, but northern Uganda has only experienced growth in the

(oten inecient) humanitarian and development industries. Perhaps para-

doxically, the prolieration o aid is seen by many as one o the main dr ivers

o continued warare. Political representation o northern and eastern Uganda

at the national level remains minimal.

The LRA/M maniestos, collected by Swedish researcher Sverker Finn-

strom over several years, present the issues that are at the heart o the confict

in Acholiland: the lack o political representation rom the region; repeated

human rights violations at the hands o the military; nationwide socio-

economic underdevelopment; and government corruption (see Box 1).

Although these maniestos have been available to the public in northern

Uganda and, once posted on the Internet, globally, their authenticity has

always been questioned by the Ugandan authoritiesmaking them politi-

cally ineectual (Finnstrom, 2003). Those who publicly contradicted the

ocial Ugandan line were oten detained and, in some cases, died in custody.

Joseph Kony explained in 2006 that, We have done our maniesto. . . Our

political agenda, our maniesto is open. Even i we did not explain to the

world, it is already there in Uganda. Asked why the LRA/M had ailed to

publicize its political aims more widely, Kony replied, People are ghting

with propaganda. But or me as a guerrilla, I have not yet reached. . . All thing

[all inormation comes] rom Musevenis side or rom some other people,

because I do not have proper propaganda machineries.7 The inability o the

LRA/M to pursue a convincing inormation strategy, coupled with strong

propaganda rom the Ugandan governmentbeneting rom a good inter-

national reputation, and a plethora o aid agencies willing to accept the ocial

linehas certainly contributed to the spiral o violence.

There is no doubt that the LRA has used horric methods, both in Uganda

and in Sudan, in pursuit o its aims. In July 2006, the leadership publicly

acknowledged and even apologized or its tactics, at least to representatives

o southern Sudanese communities.8Kony himsel has stated that, I cannot

say that we are ghting clean war [or that] Museveni is ghting dirty war, that

one is dicult to say. Because a clean war is known by God only.9

Misleading inormation, however, oten based solely on government sources,

has led to an oversimplied, one-sided view o the confict and o the LRA

itsel. The media, too, has given a one-sided portrayal o the war. Government

inormation policy has driven public opinion. As a result, it is commonly

believed that the LRA is an army o child soldiers and the sole perpetrator o

war crimes, even though the UPDF has also been ound guilty by the Interna-

tional Court o Justice o training and sending children o to ght.10 One inter-

national security expert, summing up the general government inormation

policy on the LRA, conrmed that, Most people still think the LRA is a bunch

o children and old guys due to 20 years o propaganda.11

Box 1 The LRA manifestos

The LRA/M has published political maniestos at regular intervals over the course o the

war. While this is well-known in northern Uganda, where rustration is oten expressed

over the successul silencing o the LRA/M as a political movement, the war has been

continuously presented in the global media as having no political agenda. Much o the

LRA/Ms political energy has thereore been spent trying to counter the view that they are

solely a religiously-motivated terrorist group. For example, a 1 maniesto signed by

Joseph Kony stated that while many members o the LRA are practising Christians, they

did not intend to become undamentalist Christians (Finnstrom, 00).In addition to countering the ofcial discourse on the LRA, which represented the

movement as driven by a desire or a rule o law based on the Ten Commandments, the

maniestos over the years have called or the restoration o multi-party politics and the

introduction o constitutional ederalism. They have also called or support or human

rights, and the need to develop a nationwide socio-economic balance while promoting

peace and security and ending corruption. The maniestos routinely call or ree and air

elections, the separation o the judiciary and executive rom the military, and a reorm o

parliament to tackle those issues. Oten, the political practices o Museveni are questioned

and analysed in detail, especially the concentration o military, legislative, and executive

power in his hands. Other maniestos have outlined LRA/M programmes on health, agri-

culture, education, inrastructure, and even deence (Finnstrom, 00).


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While the emphasis on child abductions accurately captures the brutality

o the war, it glosses over the act that the LRA is a well-trained armed group

answering to a very strong, centralized command. Many members o the

LRA are well beyond childhood and remain with the LRA out o conviction,

a sense o adventure, or a belie in the cause (Allen and Schomerus, 2006).

Studies have revealed an array o reasons or people joining and staying with

the LRA: or many, lie at home oers little while the group provides a sense

o power and loyalty; or others, the ear o reprisal makes them araid toleave. While thousands o children were abducted by the LRA, the ghting

orces usually comprise men and women in their late teens or early twenties.

A large number would have been with the LRA or many years, but only

started ghting when they reached their teens and were no longer considered

children in the Acholi community. Youth in Acholi society are generally de-

ned as people o 13 to 30 years o ageor those who are not yet married

(Annan and Blattmann, 2006). Thus the most active members o the LRA are

more likely to be considered as youth than as children by the local commu-

nity. Furthermore, patterns o abduction show that the LRA does not usually

abduct very young children and that many abductees are released ater hav-

ing done duty as porters (Allen and Schomerus, 2006). Those who are orced

to stay with the rebels are oten teenagers or young men and women who are

physically strong or well-educated: these are the ones capable o receiving

military training and coping with the harsh living conditions o the bush. For

these reasons, dening the LRA as an army o abducted children inantilizes

the movement, suggesting a lack o accountability and making it appear a

less than viable partner in peace negotiations. This has been a problem during

the Juba peace talks.

With the start o the Juba negotiations in 2006, the LRA/M nally estab-

lished a continuous inormation policy, denying responsibility or attacks in

Uganda and Sudan and blaming government troops posing as LRA ghters

or the horric deeds committed against civilians. It is true that both the

Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and the UPDF have attacked and

looted civilians, and other actors have used the LRA to cover up their own

attacks. But in many individual cases identiying the true perpetrators o

attacks is very dicult.12 One complication is the lack o law enorcement,

transport, and communication inrastructure to prosecute eectively aggres-

sors in Sudan. Explaining the general tendency to assign blame to only one

group, a local leader in Juba stated, [the] LRA has become the name or every-

body who has done wrong. Bad people here, they say they are LRA. It will be

a lengthy process to investigate each incident and make an accurate account-

ing o responsibility, but the need or this was reiterated in the signed Agreement

on Accountability and Reconciliation, in which both parties acknowledged the

necessity o truth-seeking and truth-telling processes (Government o Ugandaand Lords Resistance Army/Movement,2007d).

Inter-tribal clashes, small militias, and roving bandits add to a conusing

environment. In Eastern Equatoria alone, civilians have been caught in con-

ficts between the orces o the LRA, the UPDF, the SPLA, the Sudanese Armed

Forces (SAF), the Equatorian Deence Force (EDF), and the South Sudan Inde-

pendence Movement (SSIM). Armed groups supported by the Government

o Sudan (GoS) are still generating instability in the region with the goal o

disrupting the implementation o the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

and destabilizing the South. As one LRA ghter described the situation in 2006,

The truth is, the war between the SPLA and Khartoum is ar rom over.


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III. The LRA in Eastern Equatoria

The earliest sightings o the LRA in Eastern Equatoria date rom 1991 but it

was not until 1994 that the group located its base o operations there and

made its presence elt. Locals recall the rst killings o civilians occurring thesame year, along with the rst abductions. One chie remembers that in the

early days, people did not make the connection between the armed ghters

who appeared in their region and the LRA: people started to recognize the LRA

only when the ghters employed tactics amiliar rom Uganda and when they

began abducting people.13 The locals say that even ater they had identied

the group they still did not know why they were ghting in Sudan.

The LRAs arrival in Sudan was oten explained by the Ugandan govern-

ment as a reaction to UPDF military pressure, but the move over the border

was in act more politically driven. The LRA has stated that it was invited to

become one o Sudans pro-government armed groups. When the SPLA split

in 1991, the action led by Riek Machar (known as SPLM/A-United) moved

into Eastern Equatoria. In 1992, SPLM/A-United signed a cooperative agree-

ment with the GoS. Machar subsequently broke rom SPLM/A-United to orm

the SSIM in 1994. The SSIM then aligned with the EDF and later with the LRA.

The EDF included members rom various backgrounds, including Acholi,

Madi, Lokoya, Lolubo, Iyire, and Lotuko. Many members o the EDF had

taken reuge in northern Uganda and hence spoke Acholi. The EDF and SPLA-

United commander William Nyuon Bany, who was then working with Machar,

acilitated the rst contact between the LRA and the GoS (Johnson, 2003).

A partnership between Khartoum and the LRA was established that would

benet both: Khartoum ran a proxy war through the LRA against both the

SPLA and the UPDF, while the LRA obtained supplies and assistance in its

attempt to overthrow Museveni. Some claim the LRA actually signed an accord

to that eect with Khartoum in 1994, but Second-in-Command Vincent Otti

categorically denied that.14 However, both Kony and Otti were regular visitors

to Khartoum rom the beginning o 1994 and the LRA quickly set up ocial

residence in Juba, then a government stronghold. The LRA soldiers also re-

ceived military training, which mirrored British tactics rom the 1960s and

early 1970s, with an emphasis on anti-ambush drills and jungle ghting.15

The LRA and civiliansIn the muddled military environment o Sudan in the 1990s, the lines between

armed groups and civilians were murky. The LRA, while much eared by thecivilian population, also played host to local actions that had allen out with

Sudanese rebel groups. Since the early days o the second civil war in Sudan

(19832005), many Sudanese Acholi and other Equatorians were opposed to

the SPLA. They regarded the rebels as a Dinka movement with no regard or

Equatorian concerns (Branch and Mampilly, 2005). While a ew Equatorians

joined the SPLA during the 1990s, others stayed with the EDF or the LRA. When

there was ghting against the SPLA or the UPDF, even locals who were not

ethnic Acholi, such as the Didinga, reportedly ought side by side with the

LRA. This oten happened out o disappointment with the SPLA: locals elt

that it had ailed to bring enough orces into the area to protect civilians andthat it mistreated Equatorians. The Acholi in Eastern Equatoria may bear a

grudge against the LRA because people had it very rough rom [them], but

they also have an undeniable connection with the group, whom they regard as

brothers.16 According to one UPDF ocer in Eastern Equatoria, Locals have

a certain level o contact with the LRA, the people here are very anti-SPLA.17

Eastern Equatorians report ongoing business relationships and intermarriage

arrangements between themselves and LRA members.18

The SPLA accused the locals o ailing to report the LRA when they appeared

and thereby collaborating with them, but the locals argued that, it is hard to

report [them] i somebody comes at gunpoint.19 To a certain degree, allying with

the LRA has also been a protection mechanism. One security ocer, comment-

ing on the inability o NGOs to help civilians in Magwi County or the best part

o the war, explained that the community was let to its own devices and thus

chose to avoid conrontation. Because the area was declared o-limits by aid

agencies or such a long time, the locals had to accommodate themselves with

the soldiers. The community could not aord to be hostile to the LRA, he said.20


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Eastern Equatoria has a long history o hosting groups opposed to the

Museveni government. In the 1980s, the orces o Musevenis predecessor

and adversary, Tito Okello, and o Alice Lakwenas Holy Spirit Movement

both stayed in the area. Alice Lakwenas movement is generally seen as the

spiritual and military precursor o the LRA.21 Involvement in Ugandan poli-

tics and the violence connected with it has thus been part o lie or the people

o Magwi County throughout the war.

Once the LRA moved into Eastern Equatoria, ambushes and attacks on vil-lages there became an everyday reality. The LRA was an ecient ghting

orce. However, when asked or their assessment o the groups behaviour,

people in Sudan viewed it very dierently rom those in Uganda. In Uganda,

the grievances o the community are specically directed towards the LRA

and the UPDF, oten down to the personal level o one particular commander.

In Sudan, the LRA was just one o many aces o war. In the highly militarized

environment created by the SPLA, the EDF, the SAF, the UPDF, and the LRA,

all armed groups and their methods merged into one single threat to every-

day stabilitythe soldier. As one man explained, With soldiers, you cannot

trust them. They will always misbehave.22 In Uganda, it was the brutality o

the attacks on civilians that angered the community most, whereas in Sudan

such attacks blended into the high level o ongoing, widespread violence.

Using atrocities or a show o ruthless orce was eective in Uganda (Vinci,

2005). In Sudan, the LRA moved in a very dierent context with many other

ruthless players. One Sudanese politician said that she elt the LRA changed

its behaviour ater moving to Sudan, partly because they were encouraged

by Khartoum to commit atrocities, but also because the already brutal envi-

ronment increased the spiral o violence. She said, They [the LRA] kill people

and hang them up, so when local people come, they dont touch anything. I

think the LRA learned these things rom southern Sudan.23

Areas of controlIn the mid-1990s, Eastern Equatoria was at the rontline o the Sudanese civil

war. The SAF controlled the areas o Magwi, Parajok, Torit, and Owiny-Kibul

with the help o their aligned militias. The LRA became a constant threat

to the SPLA in Eastern Equatoria

because o the groups unpredict-

able movements. Sometimes ghters

would not be seen or several

months, only to then invade a village

and remain in the vicinity or sev-

eral days.24 Road ambushes were

requent, especially along the Parajok

Palataka route. Even Eastern Equa-

torians who had fed the area did not

always manage to escape: two attacks

in the Sudanese Achol-Pii reugee

camp in Uganda, one in 1996 and

one in 2002, let hundreds o Suda-

nese Acholi dead.25 To this day this

remains a bitter memory or the peo-

ple o Magwi.

The LRA established a presence in

the Imatong hills and gained control

over Magwi and parts o Eastern

Equatoria, even renaming an area

New Gulu. It set up its main head-

quarters near Aru Junction, an area

that the UPDF called Kony Village.

The camp at Aru Junction was sizable, usually hosting 3,0004,000 ghters. It

was the training centre and base or several battalions. Kony would stay there

with his wives and Otti was also oten based there. According to the SPLA,and not disputed by the LRA, the SPLA overran this stronghold in 1997. Kony

and Otti reportedly fed to Juba, which then became the groups administra-

tive headquarters. Sudanese orces provided visible protection or Konys

residence, and the LRA established a new camp near Juba in Rubangateka,

which became the base or Ottis command orce. The LRA also had camps in

the areas o Gambera and Illyria.

LRA Second-in-Command Vincent Otti, Ri-Kwangba,

September 00 M. Schomerus


12/30


LRA command structuresThe internal hierarchy o the LRA puzzles its opponents. One SPLA ocer

based in Eastern Equatoria remembers, Nobody ever spoke to Kony. We did

not know who they were. We did not know their commanders or their struc-

tures.26 It is known that there are our main brigades (named Gilva, Sinia,

Stockree, and Trinkle) answering to the high command (Control Altar). Fur-

ther structures are less clear.

A command structure in which the headquarters directs LRA orces un-

doubtedly does exist, but eld commanders have operated with a certain

degree o independence. With troops on the move and spread out in both

Sudan and Uganda, tracking each group o ghters is a challenge. In mid-

2007, the LRA high command also acknowledged or the rst time that there

might be ormer LRA groups that no longer answer to it. 27 When the LRA

engaged the SPLA in combat, LRA ghters typically attacked rst, ollowed

by a second attack by SAF troops. Most battles ought between the SPLA and

the LRA involved the SAF. I the SAF were involved, they oten employed

tanks and sometimes Antonov planes.

The locals in Magwi grew to recognize the more prominent LRA com-

manders (during the assembly o the LRA in Owiny-Kibul in late 2006, locals

easily identied the major commanders), but the UPDF continued to nd it

dicult to understand the group. One said, We heard o Stockree [one o the

LRA brigades], but to us, we dont know who is who. 28 For UPDF ocers,

who are mostly not northern Ugandans, distinguishing the various Acholi

militias who speak the same language was dicult. A UPDF ocer explained

that it took the UPDF many years to understand the dynamics in Sudan and

to distinguish LRA members rom EDF members. Not until 2002, when UPDF

intelligence gathering grew stronger in Sudan, did it clearly establish that theEDF was more active around the Torit area, which is ar rom Aru Junction

where the UPDF was engaged in ghting the LRA.29

Box Operation Iron Fist

In 00 Khartoum and Kampala signed an agreement that authorized the UPDF to pursue

and attack Konys orces in Aru Junction. The UPDFs oray into Sudan was dubbed Opera-

tion Iron Fist and it was one o the bloodiest periods o the war. The campaign was marked

by regular helicopter gunship attacks on the LRA and by retaliatory LRA ground attacks.

Many LRA and UPDF soldiers were killed and the civilian population in Eastern Equatoria

suered tremendously.

Despite the UPDFs eorts to rout the LRA rom Eastern Equatoria, the group wouldremain there or our more years. From mid-00, when the LRA began to prepare or the

peace process that was to become the Juba talks, its fghters and high command moved

towards the border o the DRC in Western Equatoria. On their way west, some o the

fercest fghting with the SPLA occurred in areas that had previously been untouched by

the LRA, such as the road between Yei and Juba (BBC News, 00). However, the LRA

has denied that these attacks were carried out by their troops (Lords Resistance Army/

Movement, 00).


13/30


IV. Allies and enemies

The Government of SudanIn the years beore the signing o the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA), which ended the second Sudanese civil war, it was an obvious advan-tage or Khartoum to ally itsel with the LRA. This was a perect set-up or

carrying out a proxy war (Prunier, 2004). Otti described the logistics o the

mutual agreement by saying, We had a very good relationship with Khar-

toum and the chairman [Kony] went there. Even me, I went several times.30

A Ugandan ocial explained that Kony had an ocial residence in Juba town,

he had an oce, he was a respected military ocer like any o the Sudanese

military ocers.31 Khartoums divide and rule tactics worked to keep the

war in the South alive without relying too heavily on its own troops (Martin,

2002). At the same time, Khartoums support had a politicizing eect on the

LRA that went largely unnoticed by the general public: by obtaining ocialsponsorship rom another state, the groups plans to overthrow the Ugandan

government were urther legitimized.

Khartoum used the split in the SPLA and the subsequent ounding o the

SSIM by Riek Machar to destabilize Eastern Equatoria. Machar ailed to con-

vince the international community o his cause. Ater the massacre o Bor

Dinka in Jonglei in August 1991, when Machars troops killed an estimated

2,000 people and displaced hundreds more, he was let with no outside sup-

port. With nowhere to turn, he allied with Khartoum in his quest to gain

southern independence, and turned against his ormer SPLA comrades. In

return, the GoS agreed to allow a reerendum on southern independencebeore 2009.32

The LRA was an obvious partner or the SSIM. It claims that it was invited

to come to Sudan by the SSIM through representatives o the EDF. Although

both Machar and Kony spent a considerable amount o time in their resi-

dence in Juba, they did not meet directly during day-to-day interactions

between the two groups. They did, however, come ace to ace at least once in

1997.33 Their subsequent meeting was not until the preparations o the peace

talks in 2006, at which point Machar, then vice-president o the Government

o South Sudan (GoSS), acted as mediator between the LRA and the Govern-

ment o Uganda.

The LRAKhartoum relationship peaked in 1996, around the time o the

abduction o the Aboke girls, one o the most inamous incidents o the Sudan

Uganda cross-border war (de Temmermann, 2001).34 By this time, according

to a emale ormer member o the LRA, The Arabs were bringing ood andweapons by car and giving them to us at Aru Junctionsometimes ten car-

loads. They came every three or our months. The Arab soldiers always stay

and chat. Most deliveries were brought by land, though some ormer LRA

members say that ammunition was usually airdropped. Ater 1996, the rela-

tionship slowly waned. The LRA had a bittersweet relationship with Arabs,

remembered a local rom Eastern Equatoria, recalling that the LRA at times

sent messages to the SPLA oering to take over Juba on their behal.35

While civilian and military interviewees say that Khartoum supplied equip-

ment to the Ugandan rebels well into 2006, the LRA says that such supplies

ceased long beore then.36

Others have reported that supplies stopped inNovember 2005, when the LRA crossed into Garamba National Park in DRC.

Khartoum apparently tried to re-establish contact in March 2006, but the gen-

eral consensus is that the relationship was by then overthe LRA today is

adamant that they no longer have any connection with the GoS. It is clear that

Khartoum was still supplying weapons ater the1999agreement (Human Rights

Watch, 2006), but the exact end date o the relationship is hard to establish. It

seems certain, though, that rom the time the LRA made its rst overtures to

the GoSS in early 2006, the LRA was completely disengaged rom the GoS.

Nevertheless, reports persist that airdrops continued in the region ormerly

controlled by the LRA long ater the group had let. In June 2006, there wereapparently airdrops along the Torit road. In October, locals reported airdrops

and at least three low-fying Antonov planes, also near Torit. The area is an

SAF stronghold and locals think that the supplies were either or the SAF or

or the so-called EDF 2, a group o disgruntled ormer EDF ghters still sup-

ported by the GoS with the aim o sabotaging the CPA. Among southern

Sudanese it is common knowledge that the GoS continues to undermine the


14/30


the newly established GoSS, now a semi-autonomous regional government

under the terms o the CPA, did not authorize the renewal o the protocol

when it expired in February 2006. The UPDF now has no legal right to stay in

Sudan. Machar stated in June 2006 that he elt uncomortable under a oreign

invasion, but he has made only minimal eorts to orce the UPDF out.41 The

reason may be that the GoSS must maintain a good relationship with the

Ugandan government, which initially did not look avourably on Sudanese

attempts to bring about peace talks.The UPDFs ongoing presence in Sudan and its military actions against the

LRA have been a major sticking point during the Juba talks. Representatives

o the Ugandan government in Kampala have hinted that there are other

reasons besides the LRA presence or why the UPDF is staying in Sudan.42

For example, according to some Eastern Equatorians, the GoSS is using the

UPDF to protect the SPLA against GoS orces.43 Meanwhile, there is suspicion

that Khartoum is still behind the insecurity in southern Sudan, supporting

whoever is carrying out attacks there. According to a politician rom Nimule,

We cannot rule out that some people, some militias on the ground, were not

absorbed into the military. The area is littered with weapons. But it is the hopeo people that this is not the LRA.44 Implementing the Juba Declaration, which

ormally merged militias such as the South Sudan Deence Forces (SSDF) with

the SPLA, has been challenging (Young, 2006). Given the suspicions and evi-

dence that Khartoum still supports various militias as proxy orcesjust as it

did at the height o the warthe only hope or bringing peace to the region

is a comprehensive restructuring o the security sector.

In addition to attacks by militias on GoSS military targets, road ambushes

have occurred with more economic objectives. Since the signing o the CPA,

trade between Uganda and Juba has exploded, undercutting many traders

with connections to Khartoum. Some road ambushes have been traced back tomerchants attempting to cut o supply routes to Uganda in order to monopo-

lize the markets in Juba with their Khartoum goods. A local politician explained,

People in the South believe that the North has not come out sincerely in this

peace. Especially northern traders. Having these roads [JubaNimule and

JubaTorit] operational makes it fooded with goods rom East Arica. Khar-

toum goods remain on shelves because the market is not there.45

CPA by supporting armed groups. In his speech on the second anniversary o

the signing o the CPA, Salva Kiir Mayardit, GoSS president and rst vice-

president o Sudan, made it clear that continued military support rom Khar-

toum or the LRA and other militias was one reason or the probable ailure

o the CPA (Kiir Mayardit, 2007). This claim has wide currency, although Kiirs

statement also conveniently diverted attention rom GoSS shortcomings.

There are various theories about why the relationship between the GoS

and the LRA deteriorated. One o the most recurring stories, spread in bothUganda and Sudan, is that some LRA ghters were sent or training to Khar-

toum and never returned. It is strongly suspected that this group was integrated

into the orces that became the janjawidthe largely Arab proxy orce used

by the GoS to terrorize Darurians.37 The UPDF spread the story that in 1997

about 300 LRA ghters were taken to ght in Darur. When Kony requested

their return, President Bashir declined. Other security sources estimated the

number o ghters taken to Darur to be only 37 as o late 2005.38 When Otti

was asked about rumours indicating that LRA members were ghting in

Darur, and whether this ended the relationship with Khartoum, he replied:

That is a big no. No.39

An element o distrust had, in any case, been introduced into the relation-

ship in late 1999 when Sudan and Uganda signed the Nairobi Agreement.

Brokered by the US-based Carter Center, the agreement established that

neither party would support the others rebels (Governments o Sudan and

Uganda, 1999). Pressure on Sudan had increased when they were ocially

declared sponsors o terrorism by the US administration o Bill Clinton. The

Nairobi Agreement was an attempt to bring peace to the region, but it ex-

cluded the LRAthereby guaranteeing that it would ail to achieve either

peace or stability. According to one LRA member, The Carter Center did not

talk to the right people.40 While support or the LRA ocially stopped, the valid-ity o the agreement was doubted rom the moment it was signed (Hasunira

and Solomon, 1999).

Khartoum went one step urther in 2002 and issued a military protocol to

allow UPDF operations on Sudanese soil (see Box 2). Operation Iron Fist re-

sulted in increased ghting on both sides o the border. Rather than ending

the war it brought a whole new set o problems to Sudan. As a consequence,


15/30


The SPLM/AThe SPLA in Eastern Equatoria has always ought multiple enemies. While

engaging in erce battles with GoS orces, its various actions were also busy

ghting between themselves, with one side bringing in the LRA to ght with

the GoS. The SPLA aced erce opposition rom local Equatorians; on top o

this, it recognized that it could not deal properly with the LRA.46 Accounts o

military engagement between the LRA and the SPLA dier and are oten con-

tradictory, depending on the source. The LRA generally says that the SPLAwas a weak orce and did not want to ght them; the SPLA in turn argues that

the LRA never attacked military targets, only civilian ones, which meant that

engaging with them involved too many civilian casualties.47 Overall, military

contact seems to have been limited to a ew clashes and major battles, some

as recently as 2005. The SPLA calls its battles against the LRA mostly victori-

ous, although both sides claim to have had the upper hand. The LRA says

that it managed to acquire many weapons as a result o these clashes. The

confict between the two armed groups was also ought using the civilian

population as proxy ghters. The SPLA did not declare war on the LRA, but

they gave arms to villagers to deend themselves.48In late 2005 the newly established GoSS, in which the SPLM holds the major-

ity, changed its approach to the LRA. Ater Otti announced on the radio in the

autumn o 2005 that the LRA wanted peace, the GoSS attempted to establish

contact. Peace delegates o the LRA had already made the link with Nairobi-

based Acholi elders who consulted with local Sudanese politicians and con-

sequently linked them to Machar. Machar, who had become vice-president o

the GoSS ater the death o John Garang, oered to negotiate. In February 2006,

a viable contact was established. The rst meeting between Otti and Machar

took place in April 2006 and eventually led to the rst meeting with Kony the

ollowing month. The Juba Peace Talks ocially began on 14 July 2006.

The UPDF in SudanWith the signing o the agreement to launch Operation Iron Fist, the UPDF

was ocially allowed to establish a presence in southern Sudan. Connections

between the Governments o South Sudan and Uganda, however, go back

urther. One international observer said, It is an intricate relationship between

GoSS and Uganda. It is hard to dismiss the UPDF in all o this.49 The UPDF

has supported the SPLA in both war and peace, providing supplies and stra-

tegic advice. UPDF activity on Sudanese soil is hence not uncommon. While

the UPDF only ocially started ghting the LRA in Sudan in 2002, there is

credible evidence that it has been in Eastern Equatoria since 1997. UPDF sol-

diers have conrmed that they had been in the area much earlier than ocially

sanctioned.50

Local civilians and politicians say that the presence o a oreignarmy did much to exacerbate the Sudanese civil war and had a detrimental

eect on the already war-stricken population. One local rom Eastern Equa-

toria says that while the community members never dared to ght the LRA,

they would keep weapons to be prepared or the UPDF. When they [the

UPDF] meet you in the bush, they cannot identiy i you are a rebel or a civilian.

They kill you, he said.51

A common saying among Eastern Equatorians, as quoted by an interna-

tional security expert, is: Why is the UPDF in Sudan? To make sure the LRA

is not destroyed.52 The LRA has made the UPDF powerul because military

unding in Uganda has been based on government arguments that strongerdeence is needed against the rebels. With the spread and continuation o the

war, the army has also become a signicant economic player through its

plundering activities and corruption.53 The crimes committed by government

actors, however, is oten overlooked (Galletti and Rone, 2005). The resentment

o people is that these people [the UPDF] were never deending them, said a

local politician in Nimule. They did not have very eective encounters with

the LRA although their mission was to ght them. . . they resorted to destruc-

tion o the area and cutting trees in our orest. People really resent them. He

also pointed out that the UPDF no longer has a mandate to patrol Magwi

County, which includes Nimule.54

Local leaders rom Eastern Equatorian counties presented their grievances

about both the LRA and the UPDF to the LRA leadership in July 2006. While

the accusations o killings and abuses against the UPDF do not match those

o the LRA, the local leaders statement reads: The UPDF did not ull their

mission to South Sudan. For example, instead o ollowing and attacking the

LRA, they turned their guns on the civil population, shooting, looting, raping,


16/30


and burning their huts in pretext o chasing the LRA (The People o Acholi

Madi, Southern Bari, Lotuho, Lokoya, Lulubo, 2006). Uganda and its army

have been ound guilty o similar behaviour in the DRC by the International

Court o Justice, including killing, torture and other orms o inhumane treat-

ment o the civilian population while inciting ethnic confict and ailing to

take measures to put an end to such confict (International Court o Justice,

2005). The courts assessment o the UPDF is oten cited by both locals in

Eastern Equatoria and the LRA/M, who draw attention to similar behaviourin South Sudan.

From an economic perspective, keeping the war alive has become part o a

lucrative economy or the army. Locals regularly reported that the UPDF cuts

down teak trees to take them into Uganda: The UPDF are business-minded

soldiers, they are logging timber in the Acholi area. Who gives them permis-

sion?55 A UN panel o experts presented evidence o Ugandas similar exploi-

tation o natural resources during their military exploits in the DRC in 1998. In

this case, members o the UPDF were ound guilty o exercising a monopoly over

the areas principal natural resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues, or

the purpose o enriching high-ranking members o the military and other leaders.The UPDF established physical control over areas containing coltan (columbite-

tantalite, a metallic ore), diamonds, timber, and gold (United Nations, 2002).

Even during the withdrawal o the UPDF rom the areas around Owiny-

Kibul under the terms o the Cessation o Hostilities Agreement (CoH) (see

Chapter V), locals reported that the UPDF cut down around 200 trees just out-

side Palataka and carried them across the border beore it could be reported

to the authorities. In response, a UPDF ocer argued, Our duties are to look

or rebels in southern Sudan, to maintain law and order along the road. How

can we look or timber?56

The UN panel also ound that, in the DRC, the UPDF was guilty o creatingthe conditions that require the presence o troops and that UPDF military

operations have contributed to the arming o large numbers (United Nations,

2002). To local communities, ghting the actual enemy did not seem to be the

main drive o either the LRA or the UPDF in Eastern Equatoria. As a local

leader says, Since the UPDF came to Sudan, they never had a ace-to-ace

conrontation with the LRA. It is like the LRA has been given sae passage.

People wonder why the UPDF is here. I their presence in Sudan can still

aggravate tension with the LRA, why can they not move behind re lines?

The UPDF should be asked politely to leave. Their presence is not very wise

to reach a tangible peace with the LRA.57

The animosity towards the UPDF in Eastern Equatoria is striking. Locals

and international security observers alike accuse them o having orchestrated

attacks made to look like LRA actions, an explanation that has also been used

by the LRA to clear themselves o blame. Oten, however, even the locals havetrouble telling one armed group rom another. Others point out that the UPDF

started sponsoring EDF 2, a successor o the EDF, to maintain insecurity in

Eastern Equatoria and to clear the LRA rom the area. Witnesses describe how

South Sudanese and ormer LRA ghters were recruited into the 105th bat-

talion o the UPDF to enter Sudan and ght the LRA with its own people. The

105th is also said to be one o the more successul UPDF battalions in engag-

ing the LRA militarily. Locals say that it was used to set up attacks made to

look like LRA activity and that its soldiers were still very active in the area in

the spring o 2007. While it remains almost impossible to substantiate such

claims, they underline the murky and lawless environment. While there islittle doubt that individual soldiers or units have abused their military power,

it is hard to establish the institutional motivation.

All such accusations, both by locals and by the LRA, are dismissed by the

UPDF. One UPDF ocial said, The LRA are looking or all reasons to justiy

what has happened. According to the UPDF, the LRA never engaged in ght-

ing the army but used cowardly tactics, engaging only the smallest groups o

UPDF on patrol and usually choosing to attack civilians in trading centres.58

Responding to accusations o choosing sot civilian targets, Joseph Kony coun-

tered that when the LRA ought the UPDF, the UPDF were supported and

hence accompanied by civilians: So when we shoot, the close re will killcivilians also. He added that the UPDF always made a point o being close to

civilians when they attacked the LRA: That is the tactic, which Museveni now

have [sic] started in Uganda. They mix soldier with civilians so that when we

ght them, we kill civilian.59

As noted earlier, the continued UPDF presence became a major sticking point

in the Juba talks. While some locals claim that a complete UPDF withdrawal


17/30


would leave them with no protection rom armed groups, the majority o the

people in Eastern Equatoria seem tired o its presence. An assembly in Eastern

Equatoria proved unworkable in late 2006 amid accusations that the UPDF as

well as the LRA continued to commit atrocities.

Other armed groups

The abundance o armed groups remains a problem in southern Sudan. TheCPA laid the ramework or ending the presence o Other Armed Groups

(OAGs) through their integration into the SAF and the SPLA. This was ollowed

by the Juba Declaration, which merged the SSDF with the SPLA (Sudan Peoples

Liberation Army and South Sudan Deence Forces, 2006). Despite these devel-

opments, the LRA is one o many armed groups that persist. Some o the

others are GoS proxy orces, others rogue SPLA units who, deprived o pay,

have turned to wreaking havoc. Still others work with traders and bandits

sabotaging transportation routes to control the price o market goods, or attack

locals or their subsistence.

Assigning responsibility or each individual attack to a clearly identiablegroup is oten impossible. Alliances change quickly and so do methods o ght-

ing. For a long time, people identied the LRA by their dreadlocks andpanga

(machete) attacksin act, the LRA is oten reerred to as tong-tong (chop-

chop). But other groups also use pangas, and the LRA sometimes attacked

with guns, complicating the identication o perpetrators.

Despite tensions, the LRA and the EDF have cooperated closely, oten ght-

ing side by side and sharing members and allegiances. In a amous siege in

October 2002, Sudanese government orces recaptured Torit rom the SPLA

with what or years was believed to be LRA assistance. Only recently has it

become clear that the assistance actually came rom the EDF: the LRA was notinvolved in this particular operation.60

One commonly cited OAG is the so-called LRA Sudan (Izama, 2006). This

is most likely an Acholi militia recently supported by Khartoum and not under

Konys command. As one chie explains, LRA Sudan, they are there. They

are those who speak the language o Kony. They start by the inception o the

peace talks. They are being given money to ght. These are Acholi ghting

or Khartoum.61 Observers say that the group identied as LRA Sudan might

actually be, or at least work closely with, EDF 2.

Despite attempts to integrate OAGs, the culture o militias in southern

Sudan remains unbroken. A lot o individuals in militias are unscrupulous,

said one UN ocial. They have had many years o a sense o being paid or

their service and that is hard to overcome.62


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V. The Juba Peace Talks

The rst inklings o a promising and comprehensive attempt to end the war

in Uganda and to solve the problem o the LRA presence in Sudan began in

2006. Both sides had made overtures. In 200506, the LRA made contact withinternational organizations to gather support or peace talks, expressing a

willingness to cooperate with the GoSS. The GoSS, ater repeated unsuccess-

ul attempts to establish contact with the high command, oered the LRA

three options: withdraw rom Sudan, declare war on the SPLA, or engage in

negotiations. This led to the rst meeting between Kony and Machar near the

Congolese border on 3 May 2006, which was acilitated by the Dutch organi-

zation Pax Christi.

The peace talks did not get o to a promising start. International support

was weak. The parties showed little trust or Machar, whom they perceived

as using his mediation role to tighten his own grip on power in the GoSS. TheLRA had no credibility as a negotiating partner, and because the International

Criminal Court (ICC) had issued warrants, states signatories o the Rome

Statute63 could not ocially support a negotiated solution without trials in

The Hague rst. Most o the international attention on the talks was ocused

on questioning the legitimacy, capacity, and knowledge o the LRA/M peace

delegation, which was composed mostly o diaspora members (International

Crisis Group, 2006). It was oten overlooked that the delegation had been o-

cially selected and appointed by Joseph Kony.

While the LRA/M delegation has struggled with capacity issues and in-

ghting, the international questioning o its legitimacy perpetuated the viewthat the LRA is not a political orce, making an already dicult negotiating

environment even worse. The LRA/M repeatedly stated that the peace process

was unsae and biased against it. Progress in the rst six months o the peace

talks was thereore very slow. The GoSS, as the acilitator, has struggled to

create a neutral space or debate, not only because o the immense complex-

ity o interests involved, but also because it is a young government operating

in a precarious security environment. The Government o Uganda, while

showing commitment to the talks, displayed little fexibility on any o the early

LRA demands. On the other side, the LRAs poor organization and some un-

realistic demands did not help its struggle or respect.

Beore the talks even began, however, they were undermined by the dete-

riorating relationship between the mediator and the LRA. Machar was aced

with immense international pressure because he had reached out to the LRA

and committed to provide them with ood to achieve a peaceul environmentor the negotiations. Ater being lmed handing over a cash git o USD 20,000

to Joseph Kony, he was subjected to massive international criticism. It was elt

that the money would enable the LRA to purchase new weaponsdespite

the act that the LRA was not in need o weapons and the amount o money

would have purchased very ew.64 To gain both nancial and political sup-

port, Machar had to prove that these peace talks were workable and that the

LRA/M could be trusted as a negotiating partner. In July 2006, Machar put

pressure on Otti to leave Garamba National Park and join his peace delega-

tion in Juba. Otti declined because o his ear o arrest under his ICC warrant.

Machar then abandoned the LRA/M peace delegation in the bush near theCongolese border, a move that all but destroyed the condence that the LRA

delegation had in him. The peace talks suered rom this lack o trust in their

chie mediator rom July through to December 2006.

Ater the Cessation o Hostilities (CoH) Agreement was nally signed on

26 August 2006, LRA ghters assembled or the rst time at two designated

meeting points in southern Sudan, having been assured sae passage (Govern-

ment o Uganda and Lords Resistance Army/Movement, 2006). The assembly,

however, lasted only a short time and the LRA dispersed when they came

under military threat rom the UPDFthrough its intimidating presence, re

exchanges, and later a helicopter gunship attack. In a renewed agreement, theUPDF committed to withdrawing rom the areas o assembly, but the LRA and

the UPDF continued to clash well into 2007. Beore an addendum was signed

in 2007 allowing it sae passage across the Nile, the LRA was seen moving in

areas ar rom the assembly zones, a violation o the CoH. At the same time,

the UPDF moved its troops and attacked the LRA with helicopter gunships

on at least one occasion. This incident has been ocially conrmed by the


19/30


Cessation o Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT), which is made up o mem-

bers o the UPDF, the SPLA, and the LRA, as well as the UN. However, in

ocial press statements UPDF spokespeople continued to deny the attacks.

Reports o LRA activity on Sudanese soil, specically in Eastern Equatoria,

in 200607 are contradictory. In late 2006, some locals were adamant that the

LRA had stopped attacking and was no longer supplied by Khartoum. Others

remain just as convinced that the LRA was still attacking and ambushing, even

with the help o the SAF. The LRA repeatedly stated that it has not launchedany attacks since it entered peace talks. Several o the attacks that the LRA

was accused o in late 2006 and early 2007 have been investigated by SPLA

and UN monitors, who established that they were not committed by the LRA.

However, the stop-and-go nature o the Juba talks in early 2007 meant that

the situation in Eastern Equatoria deteriorated signicantly because o aggres-

sion on all sides, including conrmed military action by the LRA, the UPDF,

and the SAF. In early 2007, locals rom Eastern Equatoria also renewed their

complaints about abusive behaviourin particular harassment and looting

by SPLA orces stationed in the area. Tensions between ethnic groups are also

running high and oten result in violence.65

The LRA, unsure about the direction o the peace talks ater its reusal to

return to the negotiating table in January 2007 (see below), ended a period o

relative calm when it carried out attacks on civilians. That month, a United

Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) peacekeeper was killed in an attack in

Eastern Equatoria. The ambush was blamed on the LRA, who denied respon-

sibility and claimed that GoS-aligned militias were responsible. Locals in

Eastern Equatoria have expressed disappointment and anger with the LRA

or turning on them once again, even ater the local community had agreed to

host them during the assembly. The deterioration in the security situation also

stalled relie and development programmes that had been a side eect o theJuba talks, leaving the citizens o Magwi County in a desperate situation ater

a brie period o hope.

Because the situation was clearly unworkable, and an assembly o the LRA

in Owiny-Kibul had become impossible, a new addendum to the CoH Agree-

ment allowed all LRA ghters to cross the Nile to gather in Nabanga, Western

Equatoria, within six weeks o the addendums signing on 14 April 2007

(Government o Uganda and Lords Resistance Army/Movement 2007b).

The recommendation or a single assembly point was made by the CHMT in

late January. But inormation about LRA attacks in Western Equatoria and the

groups crossing into the Central Arican Republic (CAR) remained conusing

and oten contradictory. The unresolved issue o the location o the peace talks

in early 2007 led the LRA high command to withdraw rom its designated

assembly area in Western Equatoria, while news reports stated that LRA

ghters were moving towards the border o CAR. This has not been inde-pendently veried but became a persistent rumour. Either way, any urther

spread o the confict would be a worrying development.

For international security personnel, the inormation situation underscores

the need to reinvestigate any attacks that have been blamed on the LRA,

since other groups appear to be taking advantage o the lack o monitoring.

According to one international security expert, the LRA record is so bad that

it will be dicult not to assume that they are always the perpetrators: The

credibility o the LRA is based on the likelihood o the LRA attacking.66 While

some attacks, especially since January 2007, can clearly be traced back to the

LRA, others remain unsolved. They were either carried out by the LRA, whoare still active despite their assurances, or by orces posing as LRA members,

using the commonly known uniorm and ambush methods.

The LRA/M reused to continue peace talks in Juba in January 2007, citing

security concerns, heavy-handed mediation, and unair treatment as their main

concerns. In a detailed statement, the LRA/M also complained that their del-

egations credibility, authenticity, and negotiation strength was permanently

contested by the mediator (Lords Resistance Army/Movement, 2007). This

position led to a stalemate rom January to April. At rst, the LRA/Ms reusal

to return to the table in Juba was seen as proo o their lack o commitment to

the peace talks, but the LRA/Ms subsequent detailed explanation has modi-ed these views. While some o the LRA/Ms concerns are still regarded as

exaggerated, international observers agreed that certain claims needed to be

taken seriously and that the dynamics o the mediation team have at times

worked against the LRA.67 All parties to the peace talks, however, have proven

their ongoing commitment by continuing to attend meetings, by maintaining

open communications, and by participating in extensive consultations with


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stakeholders. While the talks were ocially hibernating in early 2007, the

newly appointed UN special envoy on the LRA confict, ormer President o

Mozambique Joaquim Chissano, held several meetings with the LRA leader-

ship in Garamba National Park. Eorts to reignite the talks in Juba proved

successul when the two parties agreed to return there ater a ace-to-ace meet-

ing between the Ugandan government delegation and the LRA high command

in Ri-Kwangba on 1314April2007 (Government o Uganda and Lords Resist-

ance Army/Movement, 2007a). The LRA agreed to return only i certain con-ditions concerning their security and their position at the peace talks were

met. They also called or observers rom various Arican countries. Peace talks

resumed on 26April 2007 and led to the signing o the Agreement on Compre-

hensive Solutions (see below). Representatives o the governments o Tanzania,

South Arica, Kenya, and Mozambique were among the signatories and, in

addition, several AU monitors have since strengthened the CHMT. This was

the rst time that the LRA had been a contactable group engaging in ongoing

dialogue with the Ugandan government, with international actors, and with

representatives o the communities in Sudan and Uganda.

Since the negotiations rst began in 2006, northern Ugandans have enjoyedde acto peace, which has enabled many to plan or their return home to their

villages rom government displacement camps. The peace process has allowed

traditional leaders to voice their concerns and their grievances about the plight

o the Acholi and other communities in northern and eastern Uganda. In Sudans

Eastern and Western Equatoria, the peace process has also enabled some devel-

opment as aid agencies have moved in to support both the local community

and the peace process. However, due to insecurities in early 2007, progress

came to a halt, much to the disadvantage o the local people who have ex-

pressed bitter disappointment both with the LRA or its continued attacks and

with agencies or not keeping their promises. The security situation or localsgrew much worse in early 2007 (Gordon et al., 2007).

While a peaceul solution is being pursued, military options have also been

explored by outside parties, supported by those who avour executing the ICC

arrest warrants. The ICC strategy has aimed to separate the leadership o the

LRA rom the rank and le in order to drive a wedge between them and enable

a military intervention to execute the warrants, possibly using international

special orces. A military solution would mean a comprehensive attack on the

LRA camp, and would cost the lives o many soldiers in order to arrest a ew

leaders. But despite existing tensions within the LRA/M delegation and be-

tween delegation members and the high command, the LRA/M has resisted

external attempts to create division between the command, the rank and le,

and the peace delegation.

It has become clear, however, that a comprehensive peace deal can only be

signed i there is a solution to the problem o the ICC warrantsone that satis-es all parties to the peace talks as well as the ICC. In May 2007, ollowing

in-depth consultations, a ramework was drawn up to deal with accountabil-

ity issues and to address the outstanding warrants. A much ought-over

Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions was signed on 2 May 2007, using an

unaltered drat that had been presented to both parties in December 2006

(Government o Uganda and Lords Resistance Army/Movement 2May,2007c).

While the signing was hailed as major progress in a peace process that, in many

eyes, had so ar produced ew tangible successes, the document in act leaves

many issues unaddressed. Specically, it does not outline implementation

modalities, leaving many o the agreed articles vague. It should be seen as anexpression o goodwill on both sides, not as an actual protocol o the nal

peace agreement. It has already become clear that many points in the agree-

ment will need to be revisited, and this will constitute the content o the peace

talks in the coming months. As has been seen with the dicult CoH, signed

agreements do not necessarily lead to a clarication o issues. The CoH was at

various times treated as an expression o goodwill and as a ceasere declara-

tion that required monitoring. This led to a conusing situation which was

exacerbated by severe logistical capacity problems in the CHMT.

The Juba talks also remain marred by a poor organizational ramework, an

oten slow or ambiguous international response, and a general lack o trust inits validityas well as the continuing propaganda war ought by the LRA

and the Government o Uganda. Military threats have become part o the

peace process. The governments o Uganda and the DRC, and both the GoS

and the GoSS, have made unambiguous statements about their readiness to

ght the LRA i peace talks ail. The LRA has also oten emphasized its read-

iness to take up arms again.68


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Peace in Uganda will depend on the ability o the parties and the mediators

to drat agreements that give both sides tangible gains. It must also deal with

the questions o justice and accountability in a way that is conducive to com-

munity building without disregarding the existence o the international justice

system. To ensure widest participation, ongoing consultations on northern

Uganda should include as many local leaders, civilians, and stakeholders as

possible to ensure a wide acceptance o the eventual implementation modali-

ties. Peace in southern Sudan depends rst and oremost on successul imple-mentation o the CPA. Yet comprehensive disarmament o OAGs and civilians,

and a peace agreement between the two Ugandan parties, are urgently needed

to stabilize the entire region.

VI. Access to weapons

Types, stockpiles, and command of armsSouthern Sudan is awash with small arms. Several actors contribute to this.

Numerous insurgencies in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn o Arica haveensured a steady stream o weapons, and other anti-government insurgent

groups in Uganda have supplied the LRA with arms. When Idi Amin and

Tito Okello were overthrown (1979 and 1986, respectively), many o those

involved in the ghting looted guns and ammunition and cached them in

northern Uganda. Some o these stocks were very old. Vast numbers o civil-

ians also own and use weapons. Assault rifes are the weapon o choice and

the most readily traded.69 The LRA has also ought with more sophisticated

equipment, although Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifes remain ubiquitous.

In addition, other armed groups have stocks in Sudan and soldiers switch

sides between the various militias or armies, taking their weapons with them.The LRA has weapons and ammunition cached all over northern Uganda

and southern Sudan (Small Arms Survey, 2006). During the years in which

supplies rom Khartoum were constant, the UPDF oten ell behind in the

quality o their equipment. As one ocer recalls, They [the LRA] had all the

small arms that you can think o, but also other support weapons, given by

Arabs. In act they had the anti-aircrat weapons, the twin barrel, which they

could easily carry, and they had the B10, which they used to hit at our armoured

vehicles and tanks. They were well equipped and in act beore the UPDF

acquired a grenade launcher, they were the rst people to acquire them. I

remember one time they attacked a very good group o UPDF ghters usinggrenade launchers and we were wondering what sort o gun they were using.

When one o our people picked up the cartridge and we examined it, that is

when we got to know that they were ar more advanced than us. The UPDF

then asked other countries or help to equip themselves with similar weaponry.70

The LRA was never seriously involved in arms tracking. In the early days,

access to weapons was easy because many LRA ghters were either ormer


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Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) ghters or had close connections

to ormer members o the military who had been ghting Museveni, such as

members o the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA). In act, locals re-

count how, ater the overthrow o Tito Okello in 1986, a wave o weapons was

brought to northern Uganda and southern Sudan. When Khartoum pledged

its support or the LRA ten years later, access to modern weapons greatly

improved. One local leader said, I you wanted 500 tanks, as long as you prom-

ised that you would use them to kill their [Khartoums] enemies, which tothem meant any black-skinned person. . . and o course they were using blacks

to kill blacks. To them arms is not a very big problem.71

Some o the larger or more modern LRA weapons were acquired in battles,

mostly with the UPDF or the SPLA, but also with UN orces. In January 2006,

the LRA and orces o the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Repub-

lic o the Congo (MONUC) clashed in Garamba National Park ater MONUC

was given accurate inormation about the whereabouts o the LRAs high

command. Eight Guatemalan MONUC peacekeepers were killed. Although the

ocial version o eventsrom both the LRA and MONUCis that the LRA

was responsible or the deaths, international military ocials interviewed con-rm they were killed by riendly re in a botched operation in which the LRA

had the upper hand because o their knowledge o the territory. In addition,

the ocials argued that stories circulating about the mutilation o the bodies

o the Guatemalan peacekeepers were untrue.72 The LRA has said that many o

its ghters were killed in the operation, but it was able to make o with some

modern weapons including an M60 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).

At various stages in the confict, the LRA used assault rifes, machine guns,

landminesusually o Russian originand rocket-propelled grenades. They

reportedly also used SA-7 man-portable air deence systems, although it is not

clear whether this was ac

Documents

The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview | Small Arms Survey