The National Government Bureaucracy and Local Government Reform

in the Post-1997 Thailand

AchakornWongpreedeeAssociate Professor

The National Institute of DevelopmentAdministration

Thailand

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The National Government Bureaucracy

and Local Government Reform

in the Post-1997 Thailand

Abstract ThisarticleexplorestheoptionsforaconceptualframeworktoexplainthedynamicsofdecentralizationandlocalgovernmentreforminThailandsincethelate20thcentury.Threetheoreticalframeworkswillbeassessedtodevelopanexplanatorymodelthatelu-cidateswhytheimplementationoflocalgovernmentreforminThailandhasbeenslow,despite favorablepoliticalandsocialconditionsfordecentralization.Theseframeworksare the cultural-psychological, actors’ strategic choice, andhistorical-institutionalistframeworks.An in-depthanalysisof thedecentralizationreformprocesssincethe late20thcenturywillbeconducted,supplementedby in-depth interviewswithseniorgov-ernmentofficialsandacademicsthattookpartintheinitialstageofdecentralizationre-forminThailand.Therearefourfindingsoracademicarguments.First,centralbureau-cratsstillhavestrongbeliefthat localpoliticiansandlocalbureaucratscircumventthelawforcorruption;thereforemanycentralorganizationscraftrulesandregulations,orevenadverseobservations fromthecentralauditors-general tostrictlyregulate localgovernments.Oncethesestricterregulationstakeeffect,manymalpracticesamonglocalgovernmentsareexposedtothepublic,resultinginworsepublictrustratingsamonglo-calgovernmentsvis-à-viscentralgovernmentagencies.Second,nationalpoliticiansstilldominatethenationalcommitteeofdecentralization,which is themostpowerfulbodydealingwithdecentralizationinThailand.Thestructureofthenationalcommitteeofde-centralizationisstillverycentralized.AllThaischolarsandexperts,aswellaslocalpoli-ticiansand localbureaucrats in thecommitteeareappointedbythenationalgovern-ment.This structure isobstacle to freeandneutral suggestions to strengthen fiscaldecentralizationand localautonomy.Third,all localpoliticiansandbureaucrats, inalllevelsof localgovernment,alsohavetheirown interests.Localpoliticiansandbureau-cratsofProvincialAdministrativeOrganizations(PAOs)wanttheretentionofPAOsasthelargestandhighestleveloflocalgovernment,whilethoseofmunicipalitiesdemandforanincreasingamountof intergovernmentalgrantsfromcentralgovernment.ThoseofSub-districtadministrativeorganizations(SAOs)wishtobeupgradedtomunicipalitiesstatus, so that theymaygetbiggeramountof intergovernmentalgrantsandalsobegrantedwithgreaterlocalautonomy.Withthesediverseself-interests,thesituationre-mains instatusquo.Fourth,althoughdecentralization intermsofauthoritiesandper-sonnelhavebeennotablytransferredfromcentraltolocalgovernmentsincetheDecen-tralizationActof1999, fiscaldecentralizationhasnot improved.Localadministrativeorganizationsstillrelyonintergovernmentalgrantsfromcentralgovernmentandhaveverylimitedlocalleviedtaxesallowedbycentralgovernment.Fromthesefourfindings,therefore,IarguethatThailand’sdecentralizationinthePost-2000,comparedwithinthePre-2000,hasbeenremarkablyslowprogressduetoaforementionedreasons.

Keywords:Decentralization,LocalGovernment,Historical Institutionalism,Administra-tiveReform

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Introduction: Problem Statement and Research ObjectiveDecentralizationhasbecomeashibboleth forpolicymakersandacademics in the lasttwodecadesofthetwentiethcentury.Turner(1999)contributestotheglobaltrendto-wardsdecentralizationbasedontwomajorhistoricaldevelopments.First,theHunting-tonianthird waveofglobaldemocraticexpansionledtothedemiseofauthoritarianisminmanydevelopingcountriesbetween1974and1995(Huntington,1991).Thedemocra-tizingforceaccompaniedanunprecedentedgrowthininternationalconcernforhumanrights.Thissentimentresonateswiththeliberaltraditioninpoliticalscience.Inordertoensurethefullprotectionofhumanrights,devolutionofpowertolocalgovernmentsisindispensable(Diamond&Tsalik,1999).Confluenceofthedemocratizingforceandin-creasingawarenessofhuman inalienablerightsprovidesan“impetustodecentraliza-tionthroughtheideathatpeopleshouldparticipateinordeterminethedecisionsthataffect their lives” (Turner,1999,p.2).Theseconddevelopmentthatbuttresseddecen-tralizationeffortswastheemergenceandarticulationoftheNewPublicManagement(NPM),whichepitomizedtheglobalpublicsectorreforminthe1990s.NPMfollowersplacedheavyemphasisontechnicalefficiencyofdecentralization,whileoptimisticallyenvisioningtheuniversalconvergenceofpublicsectorreformmovementsthatrevolvearounddecentralization(OsborneandGaebler,1992).BeyondthecircleofNPMscholars,internationaldonoragenciessuchastheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)alsoemphasizedtheneedfordecentralizationinthedevelopingworldun-derthebannerofbringingthestateclosetothepeople.

WhiletheadvocatesofNPManddemocratizationprognosticatetheglobalconver-genceofpoliticalandadministrativereform,thediversityofexperienceswithdecen-tralizationinthedevelopingworldsuggestsotherwise.Inmanycountries,notonlyhasdecentralizationfailedtodeliveronitspromises, italsounleashedmanyseriouspoliti-co-administrativeconsequencesand,inmanycases,exacerbatedtheexistingethnicani-mosity.Evenmorestrikingistheabilityofcertainregimestoresisttheglobalreformmovementthatattemptedtospreadthegenericpatternofdecentralizedgovernance.Thesedrawbacksofdecentralizationremindusofthedownfallofearliertheoreticalor-thodoxies,whichsimilarlyanticipatedtheglobalconvergenceofpolitico-administrativesystemsmodeledafterWesterndemocraticpluralism(Moore,1963).

Thailandprovidesanexampleofhowdecentralizationappearstohaveachievedtheoppositeof the intendedgoals (Dufhues,Theesfeld,andBuchenrieder,2014).Afteracenturyofheavilycentralizedterritorialadministration,decentralizationinThailandbe-gan inearnestwiththe1992pro-democracymovementthateventually ledtothede-miseofmilitary-dominatedgovernment.In1994,thedemocraticallyelectedparliamentapprovedanewformof localgovernment, theTambon Administrative Organization(TAO).Further,the1997constitutiondevotedanentireprovisiontolocalgovernmentautonomy.Despitetheconstitutionaland legalsanctions, implementationofdecentral-ization-relatedpoliciesbythecentralgovernmentremainsineffectiveandmodest:“Theambitiousdecentralization frameworkdeveloped inthewakeof the1997constitutionhasbeenonlypartlyimplemented”(CamposandHellman,2005,p.7).

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Duetoavastbodyofcentralbureaucraticregulationsdictating localgovernmentoperations,decentralization inThailand is“deconcentrationrather thandevolutionofcentralauthority”toalocallevel(Arghiros,2001,p.224).Withlimiteddiscretionaryde-cision-makingpower,locallyelectedofficialsfrequentlyfindthemselvescaughtupinle-galandadministrativehurdlesindeliveringontheirelectoralmandates(Sudhipongpra-cha, 2014;Wongpreedee& Sudhipongpracha, 2014). For example, local budgetappropriations,developmentplans,andprocurementcontractsmustbeapprovedbytheinteriorministry’sregionalrepresentatives(e.g.,provincialgovernors,chiefdistrictofficers)andnotrecognizedasastrategicchartingordecisionmakingatthelowerlev-el.

Theobjectiveofthisresearchistoexplainwhyimplementationofthedecentraliza-tionreforminThailandhasbeenslow,despitefavorablesocialandpoliticalconditionsinthe1990s.PastempiricalworksintheThai literatureoffertwoexplanatoryframe-works,eachofwhichhasdifferentpolicyimplications.Thefirstframeworkemphasizeslackofautonomousmentalityandassertivetraditionofself-governance―particularlyamongtheruralThais―asamajorimpedimenttothedevolutionreformefforts.Thiscultural-psychologicalargumentsuggests thatmoregovernmentresourcesshouldbeinvestedincapacity-buildingandattitudeadjustmentprograms,therebyenlargingtherolesofcentralbureaucraticagencieschargedwithimplementingtheseprograms(Sud-hipongpracha,2013).Thesecondexplanatoryframeworkembracesmicroeconomicrea-soningwithspecificfocusonthestrategicinteractionsbetweennationalandlocalpoliti-ciansinformulatingdecentralization-relatedlegislation.Asanimplicitpolicyimplicationbasedonthisstrategicchoiceargument, thenumberand influenceofnationalpoliti-ciansoughttobekepttoaminimumatthetimeofdecentralizationpolicyformulation.

Inanattempttoprovideanalternativeexplanation, thisresearchproceedsas fol-lows.First,anextensiveliteraturereviewwillbeconductedtoexaminethetypologicalmodelstypicallyusedinseveralsocialscientificdisciplinestounderstanddecentraliza-tion.Second,anin-depthhistoricalanalysisofThailand’slocalgovernmentreformwillofferan insight intohowdecentralizationanddemocratizationemergedattheendofthe20thcentury.Thissecondpartof theresearchwillemphasize theeffectsof thetwinprocessesonthedynamicsof localpoliticsandadministration inThailand.Asacaseinpointtoconstructatheoreticalmodelforlocalgovernmentstudiesinthedevel-opingworld, this secondpartwill also assess two competing theoretical frame-works―thecultural-psychological andactors’ strategic choice frameworks.Subse-quently,thethirdpartofthisresearchwillexploreanalternativetheoreticalframeworkbasedonhistoricalinstitutionalism,whicharguesthatallpoliticalactorswhosechoicesarerestrainedbycertainpoliticalandinstitutionalcontextsarealsocapableofshapingthecontextualconstraintstoimprovetheirchancesofsuccessandtoreconstitutetheirchoices(Immergut,1988;Thelen,1999).

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Ⅰ. Literature ReviewA. Typology of DecentralizationLikemanyconceptsinpoliticalscience,decentralizationrequiresdefinitionalclarityandconceptualprecision.Economistsrefertodecentralizationasthetransferofservicede-liveryresponsibilitiestolocalgovernmentswhoareassumedtobemoreaccountabletocitizensthanthecentralgovernmentduetotheirproximitytocitizens(Tiebout,1956;Oates,1972).Intheeconomicperspective,decentralizationhelpstobalanceintergovern-mentalrelationsbymaking localagenciesresponsible fortheprovisionof localpublicgoodsandentrustingthetaskofprovidingnationalpublicgoodstothecentralgovern-ment (Oates, 1972).Bydoing so, decentralization enhances technical efficiencybymatchingthepatternsofexpenditureandrevenueateachgovernmentlevel.

Whereaseconomistsseekaparsimoniousunderstandingofdecentralization,politicalscientistsofferadiversityofdefinitions.Thosewithdeepinterestindemocracyarein-clinedto framedecentralization in termsofpoliticalrepresentationat the local level,whilethepublicadministrationexpertsexpectadministrativeefficiencyfromdecentral-ization.However,decentralizationthroughoutThailand’smodernhistorymeansmorethantransformationofcentral-localrelations.Decentralizationalsoreferstodisaggrega-tionofthepublicsector’sdominanceoverfirmsandcitizens.Thedisaggregationeffortsweremadeexplicit in the1997constitution thatempowered localcommunitiesandtheircitizenstodeterminecoursesofactionsthatdirectlyaffectthem(Connors,2002).

Despitethemulti-dimensionalityofdecentralization,existingconceptualframeworkstounderstanditarenotsophisticatedenoughtocapturethedynamicsofdecentraliza-tioninthedevelopingworld(Cohen&Peterson,1999).Basedonthehistoryoffourma-jorcivilizations,historiansdividedecentralizationpatternsintothetraditional,English,French,andRussianmodels.Anotherframeworktakesintoaccountwherepublicgoodsandservicesareproducedanddeliveredandrevealsfourdistinctformsofdecentraliza-tion: local-levelgovernmentalsystem,partnershipsystem,dualsystem,andthe inte-gratedadministrativesystem.Bothframeworksareinadequatetodealwiththeincreas-ingcomplexityofstructuralandfunctionaldesignsthatmarkedthepastthreedecadesofdecentralizationinthedevelopingworld(Cohen&Peterson,1999).Thetwoscholarsproposeanalternativetypologicalframeworkthatclassifiesdecentralizationintothefol-lowingdimensions:

▪　Political decentralizationdenotesthetransferofdecision-makingpowertociti-zensortheir localelectedrepresentatives.Thisdimensionofdecentralizationisattainablethroughfreeandopenlocalelectionsthatallowcitizenstopartici-pateinlocalpublicpolicymaking;

▪　Fiscal decentralization equipslocalgovernmentagencieswithanabilitytode-terminetheirownexpendituresandwithadequateresourcestoprovideessen-tialpublicservices;and

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▪　Administrative decentralization denotesdevolutionofadministrativefunctions,including intra-organizationalmanagementandpublicserviceresponsibilities,tolocalgovernmentunits.

Thesethreedimensionsofdecentralizationare intertwinedandall togetherdeter-minetheoverallqualityofadecentralizedgovernancesystem.Politicaldecentralizationmeasures,suchasdirectelectionoflocalgovernmentexecutives,wouldbefutileforad-vancinggrassrootsdemocracyifademocraticallyelectedlocalgovernmentlacksreve-nue-generatingauthorityandadministrativediscretion.Politicaldecentralizationwith-outconcurrentfiscalandadministrativedecentralizationwouldonlycomplicatereformeffortstoempowerlocalcommunitiesandrearrangetheirrelationshipwiththecentralgovernment.

B. Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding DecentralizationThereareseveraltheoreticalframeworksintheThailiteraturethatcanbeusedtoex-plainthedynamicsofdecentralizationreforminThailand.Inthisanalysis,twocompet-ing theoreticalmodelsarediscussed: thecultural-psychologicalandactors’ strategicchoicemodels.TheformeridentifiesThailand’ssocialstructureandcentralizedbureau-craticcultureasmajorimpedimentstodecentralizationreformefforts.Thelatterroot-edinmicroeconomicsplacesemphasisonstrategicdecisionsmadebynationalandlocalpoliticiansduringthetimeofdecentralizationpolicyformulation.

▪　Cultural-psychological Framework. Thecultural-psychologicalmodelstress-estheimportanceoftraditionalcultureandcentralizedbureaucraticvaluesinshapingthedecentralizationprocess.Basedonthe“loosesocialstructure”con-cept,Embree (1950)observesthatdespitetheir individualistic tendency,Thaipeopledonothavethecorrectiveself-disciplinethatcharacterizestheAmeri-canandJapanesesocieties.Thailand’slooselystructuredsocialsystemleadstoitspeople’s lackofcollectivedecision-makingandrespect fortheruleof law(Neher,1979).Hence,acentralizedadministrativesystembecomesanecessarymechanismforstabilizingthecountryandformobilizingresourcestoprovidepublicgoodsandservices(Diamond&Lipset,1990;Nelson,1998;Wongsekiart-tirat,1999).

Onempiricalgrounds,thesecultural-psychologicalargumentsoverlookculturalandpolitical transformationsunderpinningThailand’ssocial fabricover thepasttwodecades.The1990spro-democracymobilizationshavegivenrisetoabroadcoalitionofnon-governmentalorganizations (NGOs)and localactiviststhatwasincorporatedintothenationalpoliticalarenaviathe1997constitution.However,there iscurrentlycontradictingevidenceabouttherelationshipbe-tweenthegrowthofcivilsocietyanditscontributionstodemocraticconsolida-tioninThailand(Kuhonta,2008;Kitirianglarp&Hewison,2009).Yet,theongo-ing political struggles have also widened opportunities for ordinarycitizens―particularlythepoorandthoseinruralareas―tochallengeprevail-

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ingpoliticalandsocialestablishmentsthroughconventionalpoliticalchannels(e.g.,politicalprotests,votingingeneralelections)andnewparticipatorymeth-ods(e.g.,everydayinterpersonalinteractions)(Walker,2008;Laverack&Sopon,2009;Laverack&Thangphet,2009;Sudhipongpracha,2013a;Elinoff,2014).

Instead, it is thebureaucraticagencies’ resistance tochange thathasham-peredcitizenengagementinlocalpoliticsandadministration.Inacomparativeanalysisofcommunity-basedwatermanagement inGermanyandThailand,Neef(2008)demonstratesthatitisthecentralbureaucraticresistance―notlo-calresidents’passivementality―thathindersasweepingoverhaulofwaterresourcegovernance.Similarly,CharuvichaipongandSajor(2006)observethatthecentralgovernment’s influenceoverdecentralizationhasresulted in localofficials’adoptionofhierarchicalandbureaucraticcultureinmanagingmunici-palwaste.Tokenisticparticipationandexclusionofgrassrootspeoplearepar-ticularlyevidentinmunicipalwastemanagementinmetropolitanareas.Basedontheseempiricalworks,an importantquestion leftunansweredbythecul-tural-psychologicalmodel iswhythecentralbureaucraticagencieshavebeenable tosubvertdevolutionandwithstand localpopulardemands forpoliticalparticipation.

▪　 Actors’ Strategic Choice Framework. In this framework,decentralizationoutcomeshingeuponwhoinitiatesthereformsandinwhatorderthereformsareintroduced(Falleti,2010).Rootedinthemicroeconomicanalysisofindividu-alself-interestmaximization,Falleti(2005)identifiestwogroupsofpoliticalac-torswhosestrategicinterestsdominatethepoliticsofdecentralizationreform:thenationalpoliticiansandlocallyelectedofficials.Inthisgame-theorysetting,thenationalpoliticians’interestistodivertpublicexpenditurestolowerlevelsofgovernment.Thus, ifthenational interestprevails,politicalbargainingwillendupwiththedevolutionofadministrativeresponsibilitiesto localgovern-mententities. In theresultingdecentralizedadministrativesystem,nationalgovernmentagenciesareexpectedtohavemoredecision-makingpowerthanthe localauthorities.Onthecontrary, ifdecentralization is initiatedby localpoliticians,directelectionsoflocalgovernmentexecutiveswilloccur.Withanelectoralmandate, local leaderscanmakeautonomousdecisions to improvetheircommunitiesandconstituents’ livelihood.Asaresult, thedecentralizedgovernance landscapewillconsistofnationaland localpoliticianswithequalpowerandprestige(Falleti,2005).

Despite itsparsimony, thestrategicchoicemodelhas twomainweaknesses.First,themodelistoosimplisticinitsassumptionthatonlytwogroupsofac-torsdominate thedecentralizationreform (Sudhipongpracha,2013b). In fact,lurkingbehindthepoliticsofpublicpolicymaking isthecentralgovernmentbureaucracywho isresponsible for implementingthedecentralizationreformpolicy.By leavingout this importantactor, thestrategicchoicemodelover-

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looks thenationalbureaucrats’ability to influenceorevenshape thepolicymakingprocesstoadvancetheiragencies’interests(Allison&Halperin,1972;Allison&Zelikow,1979;Meier,1993).Second, theway inwhichdecentraliza-tionreformisinitiateddoesnotalwaysdeterminethedegreeoflocalgovern-mentautonomy.Asacaseinpoint,decentralizationinThailandbeganwithdi-rectelectionsoflocalgovernmentexecutivesandtheconstitutionalprincipleoflocalself-governingautonomy.However,aspreviouslydiscussed,Thai locali-ties’decisionmakingdiscretionremains limited.Thecentralgovernmentbu-reaucracy,especiallytheinteriorministry,continuestoimposedraconianrulesandregulationsoverlocalgovernments.

▪　Historical-institutionalist Framework. Thedecentralizationreformscur-rentlyundertakenbymanydevelopingcountriesarereflectiveofaprotractedstrugglebetweencentralandlocalelitesduringthetimeofmodernstatefor-mationbetweenthe late19thandearly20thcenturies (Manor,1999;Hutch-croft,2000;2001;Melo&Rezende,2004;Selee,2004).Thus,thedynamicsandcomplexityofdecentralizationprocesscanbebestunderstoodbyexaminingthemodernstate,whichmustbeanalyzedwithrespecttoitshistoricaldevel-opment (Pierson,1996).Studiesofdecentralizationreformswouldalsobenefitfromahistoricalinstitutionalistperspectivethatscrutinizes“politicalandeco-nomicdevelopment inhistoricalcontextand intermsofprocessesunfoldingovertimeandinrelationtoeachother,withinabroadercontextinwhichde-velopmentsinonerealmimpingeonandshapedevelopmentsinothers(Thel-en,1999,p.390).”

Widelyusedincomparativepoliticsandpublicpolicy,historicalinstitutionalismoffersananalyticlensthroughwhichsocialandpoliticalphenomenacanbeun-derstoodasdynamicinteractionsamonginstitutionsthatvaryovertime(Pier-son&Skocpol,2002). Inthisanalyticalapproach, institutionsarebroadlyde-finedas“theformalor informalprocedures,routines,norms,andconventionsembedded in theorganizationalstructureof thepolityorpoliticaleconomy”(Hall&Taylor,1996,p.938).Tounderstandtheinter-temporaldynamicsofaninstitution,historicalinstitutionalismreliesontheconceptsofpathdependencyandcritical junctures (Peters,1999;Davies,2004).Thepathdependencycon-ceptposits“thepolicychoicesmadewhenaninstitutionisbeingformed….willhaveacontinuingorconstraining influenceover thepolicy into the future”(Marriott, 2010,p. 37).Themomentsatwhichpolicychoicesaremadeandtranslated intoactionsarereferred toas “critical junctures,”whichunleashfeedbackmechanisms that “reinforce therecurrenceofaparticularpatternintothefuture”(Pierson&Skocpol,2002,p.699).

Nevertheless, insteadofadeterministicoutcome,historical institutionalistsas-sumearangeofpotentialdirectionsforan institutionthatemergeduringitscriticaljunctures(Peters,1999).Pathdependencyinthehistoricalinstitutional-

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istperspectivedoesnotassume linear trajectoriesof institutional life andchange.Throughthelong-termdynamicprocessesofinstitutionalchange,mul-tiplecritical juncturesshapeandreshapepolitics, society,andpublicpolicymaking(Collier&Collier,1991;Mahoney,2000).Thismacro-historicalapproachhasbeenpreviouslyusedtoanalyzevariousaspectsofthemodernstate,rang-ingfromindustrializationandeconomicdevelopment(e.g.,Gerschenkron,1962;Rueschemeyer,Huber,&Stephens,1992;Evans,1995;Acemoglu&Robinson,2002)toauthoritarianismanddemocratictransition(e.g.,Haggard&Kaufman,1995;Diamond,1999;Slater,2003).Thoughnotexplicitlystated,historicalinsti-tutionalismhasmadesubstantialcontributions totheunderstandingofmanyissuesinpublicadministration,suchasgovernmentbudgeting(e.g.,Kettl,1992;Kahn,1997)andlocalpublicservicedelivery(e.g.,Svara,2009;Wollman&Mar-cou,2010).

Decentralizationhasnumerouscritical juncturescharacterizedbythedynamic in-teractionsamongdivergentstakeholderswho“collaboratesometimesandcompeteatothertimesinordertoaddresscommonissuesinlocalities”(Saito,2008,p.1).Asmecha-nismofrearrangingthedistributionofpowers, resources,andresponsibilitiesamongdifferentlevelsofgovernment,decentralizationinevitablycomesundertheinfluenceofpriorstrugglesamongdiverseactorsduringtheyearsleadinguptothefoundingofthemodernstate (Takahashi,2012).Bythe late19thandearly20thcenturies,developingnationsinEastandSoutheastAsiaexperiencedturbulenttransitionsfromfeudalismtomodernity.Inthisperiod,theprocessofmodernstateformationinThailandgaverisetothecentralgovernmentbureaucracyattheexpenseofdemocraticinstitutions,suchasalegislativeassemblywithpopularlyelectedrepresentatives.InitiallyadoptedastheSiameseroyalcourt’sapparatus tosolidify territorialcontrol, thecentralbureaucracygraduallybecame independentoftheroyalcourtandseveraldecadesafter its forma-tion,wasabletojointhearmyinoverthrowingtheabsolutistregime.

Thissequenceof institutionalemergencehasanimportantbearingontheongoingdecentralizationreforminThailand (Sudhipongpracha,2013a).Becausethecentralbu-reaucracycameintoexistencebeforedemocraticinstitutions,itsadministrativeactionsremaineduncheckedbycitizensandcontrolover thecentral-local relationsunchal-lengedbylocalstakeholders.Yet,basedonthenon-deterministictraditionofhistoricalinstitutionalism,criticaljuncturesoverthepastfewdecadeshavetriggeredchangesinthepatternofcentral-localrelationsdominatedbythecentralbureaucracy.Althoughthesechangeswerenotpotentenoughtodrastically transformThailand’s territorialgovernancesystem,anewlegal-institutionalarrangementhasemergedtogoverntherelationshipbetween localcommunitiesandthecentralgovernmentbureaucracy (e.g.,theMinistryof Interior).Thecommand-and-controlmechanismswere replacedbymanysophisticatedregulatoryframeworks for localadministrativefunctionsandalsobythe intergovernmental fiscal transfersthatsuppress local initiatives (Wongpreedee&Sudhipongpracha,2014).

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Ⅱ. Research MethodsResearchmethodsforthisresearchcanbedividedintotwoparts.First,in-depthinter-viewswithseniorgovernmentofficialsandacademicswereconductedtogaininsightsintohowdecentralizationreformcameaboutattheendofthe20thcentury.Thesein-tervieweesincludedseniorofficialsfromtheMinistryofInteriorandtheNationalDe-centralizationCommittee.Several localpoliticiansand localgovernmentofficialswerealsointerviewedtohelpunderstandthedynamicsoflocalgovernmentreformfromthelocalperspectives.

Second,officialgovernmentdocuments,decentralization-relatedlegislation,andnewsstoriespertainingtolocalgovernmentauthoritiesfrom1997topresentwerethoroughlyexamined.To facilitateahistoricalanalysis, theongoingdecentralizationreform inThailandaredividedintofourperiods:

▪　The late 20th-century pro-democracy movement (1992-1997). Themove-mentculminated in theratificationof the1997constitution thatcontainedaprovisiononlocalgovernmentautonomyforthefirsttimeinThailand’smod-ernhistory.Also,between1992and1997,anewtypeoflocaladministrativeor-ganization―theSub-districtAdministrativeOrganization(SAO)―wascreat-edbytheParliament(Wongpreedee:2004).TheseSAOsarenowthesmallestunitsoflocalself-governmentinThailand.

▪　The 1997 constitution era (1998-2001). Despitetheprogressive1997consti-tution,thedecentralizationreformprocesswasstilldominatedbynationalgov-ernmentofficials,includingnationalparliamentariansandtheinteriorministry.Between1998and2001, theParliamentapprovedanumberofdecentraliza-tion-relatedlawsthatnowhaveanimportantbearingonlocalcommunityde-velopmentandlocalgovernmentreform.

▪　The “Thaksin” Era (2001-2006). In2001,ThaksinShinnawatra—thebusi-ness-tycoon-cum-politician—rose to theprimeminister’sposition after thecountry’sgreatestelectorallandslidesince1932.However,Thaksin’sleadershipstylewashighlycentralized.Large-scalebureaucraticandbudgetaryreformswereadopted in order to sustainhispersonalpoweras “chief executive”(Marsh,2006).OneofThaksin’sadministrativestrategieswasthe“IntegratedProvincialAdministrativeSystem(IPAS)”commonlyknownasthe“CEOGov-ernor”policy.Beforethispolicywasintroduced,provincialgovernorswerere-sponsibleforcoordinatingandsupervisingtheimplementationofprogramsde-terminedbygovernmentministriesinBangkok(Chardchawarn,2010)withthispolicy inplace,notonlydidthesegovernorsrepresent the interiorministry,theyassumedtheroleoftheprimeminister’sassistantsintheirprovinces.Allministriesanddepartmentswere instructedtodevolve functions,budgetre-sources,anddecision-makingpowerstotheCEOGovernorswhoweredirectly

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accountable toThaksin’scabinetandhispoliticalclique (Painter,2006).Withthis IPASpowerarrangement,citizensand localgovernmentwereexcludedfromtheirprovinces’budgetaryandplanningprocesses(Chardchawarn,2010).Thedecentralizationeffortswereretarded,ifnothaltedaltogether(Asawimal-kit,2007).Asaresult,acomplicateddecentralizedgovernancesystememergedinThailand; thecountrywas “recentralizing,whiledecentralizing” (Mutebi,2004).

▪　The “Political Turmoil” Era (2006-Present). Thailandhasbeentrappedinapoliticalcrisissincethe2006militarycoupd’état.Whileavastbodyofre-searchesaddressestheeffectsofthisdecade-longcrisisonthecountry’spoliti-calandeconomicdevelopment,littleisknownaboutitsimpactonlocalgovern-ment,localpolitics,andtheongoingdecentralizationreform.Inthissection,thethreetheoreticalframeworkspreviouslyidentifiedwillbeusedtoshedlightonhowthedynamicsof localpoliticsandgovernmenthaveunfoldedover thepasttenyears.

Wongpreedee (2006;2007)’spreviousdecentralizationstudies inThailandcoveredtheperiod,1992–2006.Theseexaminetheformulationandimplementationofdecentral-izationplans,andtheeffectonthestructureofpoliticalpowerattheprovincial level.Themethodologiesused includedocumentanalysis, fieldresearchand in-depth inter-views.Therewerefourmajorfindings:

First,since1992,decentralizationhasgainedenormousmomentum.TheSub-districtCouncilandSub-districtAdministrationActof1994werebornoutofthepoliticalcir-cumstancesfollowingthecrisisofMay1992.Reformersinitiallyproposedtomaketheprovincialgovernor,acentrallyappointedbureaucrat, intoanelectivepost.However,theMinistryof Interiorbureaucratsmountedastrongopposition,andexploiteddis-agreementsamongpoliticalpartiesinthegoverningcoalition,successfullydivertingthereformstowards introductionofelectivecouncilsattheSub-district level.Forthebu-reaucrats,however, thiswasamixedvictory.TheSub-districtAdministrationActof1994openedupaPandora’sbox, fromwhichhavesprung furtherdecentralizationsmeasureswhichhaveprovedunstoppable.

Second,thedecentralizationmeasuresimplementedtodatehaveseveralremainingproblems.Localgovernmentorganizations (LGOs)haveachievedconsiderableautono-mythroughthe1994TambonAdministrativeOrganization (TAO) law,severalprovi-sions intheConstitutionof1997,andtheDecentralizationActof1999.However, twomainproblemsremain.Centralgovernmentcontinuestoresistthetransferofauthority,personnelandbudgettotheLGOs;thetargetofallocating35percentofnationalreve-nuetoLGOsby2006wasmissedbyalargemargin.ThecurrentstructureofLGOsishighly imbalanced.ProvincialAdministrativeOrganizations (PAOs)havesignificantlylargerbudgetsandsmallerworkloadsthanmunicipalitiesorSub-districtAdministrativeOrganizations(SAOs);jurisdictionsoverlap;localpoliticiansoutnumberlocalofficials.

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Third,undertheThaksingovernment(2001–2006),therewasanattempttocounterthe trend of decentralization through the “CEO-governor” scheme implementedthroughoutThailandin2003.ThegovernmentandsupportiveofficialsfromtheInteriorMinistryportrayedtheschemeasafurtherdevolutionofadministrativepower.Howev-er inreality,theschemegavemorepowertotheappointedgovernor,andforcedtheelectivemembersandheadsofLGOstodefertothegovernorinordertogainvariousbenefits.

Fourth,thefamily-basedpoliticalcliques,whohadbecomethedominantfeatureofthestructureofprovincialpowerinthepre-decentralizationera,weregenerallyabletoretaintheirinfluencebyexploitingnewopportunitiescreatedbydecentralization.Theabilityofthesefamiliestoretainpowerwastheresultofhavingample“warchests”ofmoneyandotherresourcesat theirdisposalaswellas thepoliticalcapital fromnet-worksof supporters, cliques, subordinates, community leadersandvotecanvassers.However,thesefamilieshavehadtoinvestincontrollingtheLGOs,asthesehavebe-comekeyinstitutionsinthestructureofprovincialpower.

Insummary,thesestudiesarguedthateventhoughdecentralizationover1992–2006causedchangesinthelegalandorganizationalstructure,ithadverylittleeffectonthepowerstructureintheprovinces.TheMPsofthepre-decentralizationerahave,ifany-thing, increasedtheirpowerandfurtherentrenchedthemselvesmainlythroughtheirforemostabilitytowinalargeportionofthevote. (Wongpreedee,2006;Wongpreedee,2007)

Afewyearslater,Wongpreedee,2010foundthateventhoughthepowerstructureinaprovinceafterthedecentralizationeradidnotchangesignificantly,thebehavioroflocalpoliticianshadsignificantorbigchange.Anin-depthcasestudyinaprovinceofPhitsanulok,foundthatthelocalpoliticianstendtogivemanykindsoffavorfortheirpeople in theirconstituencies,althoughthepowerstructureremainedthesameasapre-decentralizingera.The localelection itselfhassignificantlygrantedpowertothepeople,whichresultedinadjustmentsinthelocalpoliticians’electionbehavior(Wong-preedee,2010:63-67).

AsThailandembarksonitsimportanttransitiontoadecentralizedgovernancesys-tem,anumberofproblemsconfronting theThai localadministrativeorganizations(LAOs)begintoemerge.Whilefiscalandpoliticalissuesaretwosalientproblemswithwhichthemajorityoflocalgovernmentofficialsareconcerned,personnelmanagementposesanotheradministrativechallengefortheThaiLAOs.Confusionover linesofac-countability,unclearpromotionalcriteria,unfairfringebenefits,andthepublicdistrustof localpublicofficialsaretheprimaryproblemsfoundinthecurrentpersonnelman-agementsystem intheThaiLAOs. In2011,effortshavebeenmadeto formaunionthat representsallThai localgovernmentofficials in improving the localpersonnelmanagementsystem.Therebeenanarticle toprovideapreliminaryanalysisof“thewindowsofopportunity” fortheemergenceofthe localgovernmentofficials’union in

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Thailand.Basedonthe in-depth interviewswithseveral localgovernmentadministra-torsinThailand’scentralregion,thefindingsindicatethateventhoughtherighttocre-ateaunionisguaranteedbythe2007constitution,theThailocalgovernmentofficialsstillneedtodevelopalternativefinancingmechanismsfortheirfutureunion,otherthantheannualmembership fees.Multiple sourcesof incomewill strengthen the futureunion,sothatitwillnothavetorelyonthenationalgovernmentsubsidies.Equallyim-portant is theThai localofficials’acknowledgementof theunion’sroles inpromotingboth themembership’seconomicgainsand the local community’s interests. (Wong-preedeeandSudhipongpracha,2013)

In thisarticle, theauthordivides thedecentralizationprocess inThailand from1976-2015intothreemajorperiodsasfollows:

1. 1976-1992.Decentralizationpoliciesstartedwithadministrativedecentralizationinalmostallgovernmentdomains,althoughthesepolicieswereconsideredmoreasdeconcentrationratherthandevolution.

2. 1992-2004.Thepeakof thedecentralizationprocess inThailand.Tambon (orsub-district)administrativeorganizations(TAO)wereofficiallycreatedin1997.

　First,TheTAOlawwastheresultofdemandsfortheelectionofprovincialgovernors; initially,thosedemandshadbeenmadebyThaischolarsandsomepoliticiansforthepurposeofmaximizingtheirinterests.

　Second,owingtodomesticpoliticalcircumstancesfollowingthepoliticalcrisisthatculminatedinviolenceinMay1992,thosewhohadpreviouslyresistedtheideaofelectedprovincialgovernorscouldno longerreject thedemandscom-pletely.Therefore,duringthecampaign leadingupto thegeneralelectiononSeptember13,1992,severalpoliticalpartiesadoptedtheelectionofprovincialgovernorsasapartoftheirpolicyplatforms.

　Third,theinsincerityandhesitationofvariouspoliticalpartiesledtoconflictsamongthemselves.ThoseconflictsprovidedtheMinistryof InteriorwiththeopportunitytomanipulatetheprocessofdraftingwhatwouldbecometheTAOlaw.SeniorMOIbureaucratssuccessfullyallied themselveswith the InteriorMinisterandexofficioSenators.MOIsucceededinconvincingthegovernment,ineffect,todeflectthecallforradicalreform,asdemandedbythescholarsandpoliticians,bydraftingabillthatcouldbeacceptedasmoderateandcouldulti-matelybesafelyenactedastheTAOlaw.

　Althoughthelawatfirstwasthoughttocontributelittletodecentralization,itwasaPandora’sbox.Onceopened,noonecouldstopthewaveofdecentral-izationthatensued,andcontinuedtogainforceuptothe1997ThaiConstitutionandthe1999DecentralizationAct,whichleadtoanelectionofalloflocalexecu-tivesand localcouncilors inevery levelof localself-governments’organizationin2003-2004.

3.2004-2015.Nationalpoliticsfacemanyproblemsthathadanimpactonthetrust

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inthenationalandlocalpoliticians.Decentralizationpolicyhasnotslightlypro-gressedanddrawnbackintothebureaucratsatthecentralgovernment.Manyministriessetuptheirownofficesattheprovincialanddistrictlevelsinsteadoftransferringtheauthorities to the localauthorities.Moreover,centralgovern-mentagencies,i.e.theauditor-general,theInteriorMinistry’sdepartmentoflo-caladministration,thenationalofficeofthedecentralizationcommissionetc.setupmorestricterrules,regulations,ordersandan intergovernmentalsubsidies’formulaforallofthelocalgovernmentorganizations.Localautonomy,therefore,hasbeenverylimited.

Belowarechronologicalincidentsduring2001-2015,whichaffectedthedevelopmentoftheThailocalgovernmentandthedecentralizationpolicyinThailand,bothpositiveandnegativeones.

2001(B.E.2544)–2002AbolitionofthetransferofpublichealthtotheSub-districtAdministrativeOrganization.

2003(B.E.2546)–2004LimitsomeauthoritiesoftheProvincialAdministrativeOrga-nization(orPAO).

2004(B.E.2547)

　▪　“CEO(provincial)governor”policywasinitiatedbyThaksin’sgovernmenttorecentralizeatleastattheprovinciallevel.1

　▪　Thaksinalsolaunchedthebureaucraticmodernizationpolicyin2002.Centraladministrationwasrestructured;thenumberofcentralgovernmentagencieswasincreasedfrom14ministriesand126departmentsto20ministriesand143departments.2

　▪　2004-2006Startingofthetransferofeducationalauthoritiesfromthecentralgovernmenttolocalgovernments.

2005(B.E.2548)  Inthe2005Generalelection,TRTwonalandslidevictorytaking377outof500seatsinanunprecedentedparliamentarymajority.Also,Thaksinbecamethefirstelectedprimeminister inThaihistory toseehisadministrationcompletea full,four-yearterm.  Slowdownofpersonneltransfersfromcentraltolocalgovernments.2005-2006Abolitionofthe35%targetingoflocalrevenueguaranteedbythedecen-tralizationlawsince1999.The1999decentralizationlawwasamended.

2006(B.E.2549)September2006,Thaksinwasoverthrowninamilitarycoup.

2007(B.E.2550)2007-2008Adjustingaportionofgeneralgrantstobehigherthanspecificgrants.

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2007-2013Centralgovernment’ssloweddown intransferringeducationalauthori-tiesfromcentralgovernmenttothelocalgovernment.

2008(B.E.2551)Appointedgovernmentwaspassivetowardsdecentralization;itspo-litical leadership’sconcernonthe issuewasveryweak,and itsdevolutionofau-thorities,budgets,andpersonnel fromcentral to localgovernmentwasnotsuffi-cient.

2008-2014Drawingbackportionsofspecificgrants,whichwerehigherthangener-algrants.

2009 (B.E.2552)LAOsformallyexpressedtheirnoticestoreturnsometransferredauthorities,whichwerewithoutareasonablebudgetbacktothecentralgovern-ment(i.e.roadmaintenance).Thisaction,later,wasviewedbycentralgovernmentasaprotestfromthelocalgovernments.

2010 (B.E.2553)Manycentralgovernmentalagencies (i.e.Auditor-GeneralOffice,MinistryofInteriors,MinistryofEducation,MinistryofPublicHealthetc.)seemedtohavewithdrawntheauthoritiesgivento localgovernmentsbyprovidingrulesandregulationsthatstifledlocalgovernments.

2011 (B.E.2554)PrimeMinisterYingluckShinawatra’sPheuaThaiPartywonthe2011election.Theypromisedsomeproposalsfor“aself-governingprovince”.

2013 (B.E.2556)TheamnestybillofYingluck’sgovernment introducedtoparlia-ment in lateOctober2013resulted in themobilizationof large-scaleanti-govern-mentprotestsinNovemberandDecember2013.

2014(B.E.2557)Amilitarycoup.TheNationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO)enactedanordinanceappointingall localcouncilorsandallLAOclerksasactingLAOchief,especiallyforLAOswhosetermshaveended.3(Electionsatbothnation-alandlocalgovernmentsarenotallowedduetothebanonallformsofpoliticalac-tivitiesthroughoutThailand)  Some30BangkokcouncilorsattachedtoBMA(BangkokMetropolitanAdminis-tration),whichisoneoftwospecialformsofLAOsapartfromPattayaCity,wereappointedasCitycouncilors,especiallywhentheirtermhasended.4

2015(B.E.2558).People’swaitfortheexpectedconstitutionalreformandlocalgov-ernmentreformfromthetwomilitary-appointedcommittees.

Fromtheabovethreeperiods, thedecentralizationpolicy inThailandhasslightlyprogressedinthelastperiod,eventhoughthefirsttwoperiodssawradicaltransforma-tion.Theslowprogressonthelastperiodwasduetothecentralgovernment’seffortindrawingtheirauthoritiesandbudgetbackfromthelocalgovernmentsduringaperiod

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ofpolitical turmoil,which finallyendedupwithtwomilitarycoups.Especially, in the2014militarycoup,theNationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO)eventuallyprohib-itedelectionsofbothnationaland localadministrativebodies.Bangkok’scitycouncilwasreplacedwithanappointedbodyunderretiredcityclerk.Tosomeextent, thismovehasdisruptedthe learningcurveanddevelopmentof localdemocracyunavoid-ably.

Fourobservationscanbedrawnontheslowprogressofdecentralization inThai-landbetween2004and2015.

A. Local government officials as corrupt and incompetent in the eye of central government

Centralbureaucratsstillhavestrongbelief that localpoliticiansand localbureau-cratsarecorrupt, thereforemanycentralgovernmentagencieshaveenacteda largenumberofrulesandregulationsthatcurb localgovernment’sdiscretionaryauthority.Oncethesestricterregulationstookeffect,anumberofmalpracticesamonglocalgov-ernmentofficialshavebeenexposedtothepublic,worseningthepublictrust in localgovernment.

Thecasesbelowillustratehowstringentcentralregulationshaveinadvertentlypor-trayedlocalgovernmentsas“thebadguys”:

Case1:Disputeoverlocalgovernmenttaxes ThePublicFinanceAuditingagencyinstructedtheRayongmunicipalitytoreturnthemoneythatthemunicipalityusedtobuyforsomesouveniritemsasincentivestolocaltaxpayers,toincreaselocaltaxcollection.5

Case2:LAOs’scholarshipscheme ThreeemploymentincentiveprogramsinitiatedbytheMinistryofInteriorandtheNationalCommissiononLocalGovernmentPersonnelandStandards.ThefirstprogramrequiresalllocaladministrativeorganizationsinThailandtoprovidebaccalaureateandpost-baccalaureatescholarshipsfortheirofficials.Inthe secondprogram,localadminis-trativeorganizationshavebeenmandatedbytheNationalCommissiononLocalGov-ernmentPersonnelandStandardstosubsidizeallsocialsecuritycontributionsoftheiremployees.Thethird employmentincentiveprogramisthelocalofficials’annualbonusprogramfundedbyeachlocalgovernment’sbudgetsurplus.Withthesethreeincentiveinstrumentssanctionedbynationalgovernmentagencies,theLAOshasbeenabletoat-tractindividualswithhighacademicandprofessionalcalibertofillupmanyadministra-tivepositions.However,whenrepresentatives fromthecentralauditorgeneralofficecametotheLAOsforanannual financialaudit, itwasdiscoveredthatthethreepro-gramsviolatetheinteriorministry’sMinisterialRulesandRegulationsoftheBudgetaryProceduresinLocalAdministrativeOrganizations(B.E.2541)byillegallycreatingnewexpenditurecategories.InthePFACfinancialauditreport,theMadDogSAOwasre-quiredtoretrieveall themoneygivento its localgovernmentofficialsthroughthese

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programs.

Inshort, in2004, theMinistryof Interior’sdepartmentof localadministration inamemorandum,allowedalloftheLAOstoprovidescholarshiptolocalpoliticiansandlo-calbureaucratstostudyatanyeducational level.6However, in2011, thecentralaudi-tor-generalofficedisallowedsuchandaskedallLAOstoreturnthemoneybacktothe(central)government sinceboth theMOI’sdepartment of local administrationandLAOsdonothavemandatetoprovideanyscholarshiptoLAOs,asprovidedbylaw.7

B. The centralized structure of the National Committee of Decentralization ThestructureoftheNationalCommitteeofDecentralizationisverycentralized.AllThaischolarsandexperts in thecommitteeareappointedbythenationalpoliticiansandbureaucrats.Moreoverthelocalpoliticiansandlocalbureaucratsinthecommitteearealsoappointedbycentralgovernment.Thisstructurehasrefrainedfromfreeandneutralsuggestionstostrengthenfiscaldecentralizationandlocalautonomy.

C. Self-interests of all decentralization policy stakeholders Alllocalpoliticiansandbureaucrats,inallformsoflocalgovernment,alsohavetheirowninterests.LocalpoliticiansandbureaucratsofProvincialAdministrativeOrganiza-tions (PAOs) ask for retaining thePAOsasanupper-level localgovernment.TheSub-districtadministrativeorganizations (SAOs)ask forupgradingtheirstatustobe-comemunicipalitiesinordertoreceivelargeramountofintergovernmentalgrantsandgainhigherleveloflocalautonomy.BelowareexamplesforeachformofLAOs’ownin-terests,whichpreventthemfrompushingformoredecentralization,

1.PAOs,asanuppertierofLAOsinThailand,arelikelytobeabolishedbecausetheir jurisdictionalboundaries coincidewith thoseof themunicipalitiesandSAOs.

2.MunicipalitieshavethestrongestprofessionalassociationamongLAOs,namely,theMunicipalLeagueofThailand.However,almostalloftheannualmeetingsoftheNationalMunicipalLeagueofThailand (NMT)alwaysendupwithaskingforincreaseinintergovernmentalgrantsfromthecentralgovernment.Actually,theNMTshoulddemandfortheotherkindsoflocalleviedtaxes,thebetterra-tioof localbudgettocentralbudget,and increasingaratioofsharedtaxesorsurchargedtaxesfromthecentralgovernment.

3.AlmostallofSAOsarelocatedinruralareaswherelocalleviedtaxesandothersourcesofrevenuearealways insufficient toprovidethestandardservices intheirarea.Theirsharedtaxes fromthecentralgovernmentareonlyminimal.Therefore,almostofSAOsalwaysask forthe intergovernmentalgrants.Asaresult,centralgovernmentalwaysemphasizesthatThailocalgovernmentorga-nizationsarenotreadyformoredevolvedfunctions.

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  AlthoughtheSAOs’professionalorganizations,e.g.,theSAOs’ChiefAssociation,alsosetupitsassociationatregionalorprovinciallevel,theylackcoalitionalcap-ital tostrengthentheirprofessionalorganization.There isneitherthecodeofprofessionalconductnorattempttorallyformoreadministrativeautonomy.

D. Poor fiscal decentralization AccordingtoCheema(2013:6-7),therearefourdimensionstofiscaldecentralization.The first involvestheadequacyof localgovernments’resources inproportionto thescopeoftheirresponsibilities.Thisisimportantbecauseitallowslocalgovernmentstodeliverservicestocitizensandthusgaintheirtrustandconfidence.Theseconddimen-sionisthepercentageof localgovernmentexpenditurethatemanatesfromlocalgov-ernments’ownresources.Where localgovernmentsare toodependentuponcentralgovernment’stiedgrants,theirautonomyisnegativelyaffected.Thethirdisefficiencyofrevenuecollectionandrevenuesharingarrangementsthatpromotepartnershipsbe-tweenthecentraland localgovernments.Theadequacyof financing forcurrentandcapitalexpenditures isakeydeterminantofbothsupplyandquality.Finally,theeffi-cientmanagement of expenditures is equally important tomaximize returns andachievelong-termfiscalbalance.

IncaseofThailand,althoughdecentralizationintermsofauthoritiesandpersonnelhavebeennotablytransferredfromcentraltolocalgovernmentsincetheDecentraliza-tionActof1999,fiscaldecentralizationhasnotimproved.AccordingtoPumkaew(2015),localadministrativeorganizationsstill relyon intergovernmentalgrants fromcentralgovernmentbecauseofavery limitedsourceof local leviedtaxesallowedbycentralgovernment.

Thedecentralizationbecamevisibletwoyearslaterafterthe1999NationalDecen-tralizationActcameintoeffect.Thelawlaiddownplansonrevenueallocationforthelocalgovernmentorganizationofnotlessthan20percentofthetotalgovernmentreve-nuein2001,andtoberaisedtonotlessthan35percentin2006.Followingthe1999lawwastheDeterminingPlansandProcessofDecentralizationtotheLocalGovernmentOrganizationAct,version2,B.E.2549 (2006). Itspecifiedthat, from2007onwards,thelocalgovernmentorganizationshouldachievetherevenueataminimumof25percentofthegovernment’snetrevenueandaminimumof35percentaspreviouslybeenset.Nonetheless,therevenueoflocalorganizationsremainedlowinthepastdecade(seeta-ble1.1).Anddespitearisein2013,theirrevenuestayedat27.27percentwhilethetotalrevenuewas572,670millionbahtandthegovernment’stotalrevenuewas2,100,000mil-lionbaht(OfficetheDecentralizationtotheLocalGovernmentOrganizationCommittee,2013).

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Table 1.1:PercentageofLocalGovernmentOrganization’sRevenuetotheTotalGovernmentRevenuein1998-2013

Fiscal Year The percentage of local government revenue tothe total government revenue (percent)

1998 13.1

1999 13.79

2000 13.39

2001 20.68

2002 21.88

2003 22.31

2004 22.5

2005 23.5

2006 24.1

2007 25.17

2008 25.2

2009 25.25

2010 24.3

2011 26.14

2012 26.77

2013 27.27

Source:BureauoftheBudget(2013)

Source:TheNationalMunicipalLeagueofThailand(2013)

Figure 1.1:ComparisonoftheLocalGovernmentOrganization'sRevenuein1999-2013unit:millionbaht

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Ⅲ. Intergovernmental Grant:Intergovernmentalgrantallocationtolocalgovernmentbodiesbeganin1999.Since2001,thegrantshavebecometheirmajorsourceofrevenue(over40%oftotallo-calgovernmentrevenue).Anincreaseofgrantsbeganannuallyfrom1999,andupto6.3timesin2013.

Twotypesof intergovernmentalgrantallocatedtothe localgovernmentorganiza-tionarethegeneralgrantandthespecificgrant.Theformerallowstheorganizationanautonomousdecisionto implementthegrantunderexisting lawsandregulations.Asforthelatter,itisallocatedtomeettheobjectivesassetbythegovernmentanddisal-lowsthediscretionbytheorganization.Thecentralgovernment,therefore,hasacon-troloverhowthemoneyshouldbeused.Furthermore,inspiteofincreasinggrants,thespecificgrantoutnumberedthegeneralone.Table1.2demonstrates that, from2011,halfofthegrants,or50percent,werethespecificgrant.Thisgrantin2013jumpedto114,594.89millionbahtor52percentofthetotalgrant,ora6-timeincreasewithinsixyearsfrom2007.

Table 1.2:ProportionofGeneralGrantandSpecificGrantin2006-2013Millionbaht

Fiscal Year General Grant % Specific Grant % Total Grant

2006 98,657.00 89.5 11,556.00 10.48 110,213.00

2007 114,293.00 92.48 9,281.00 7.51 123,574.00

2008 109,997.00 83.91 21,077.00 16.08 131,074.00

2009 104,099.00 77.34 30,484.00 22.65 134,583.00

2010 74,271.00 59.24 51091.3 39.24 125,363.04

2011 80,029.00 50.53 78,346.43 49.46 158,375.43

2012 85,695.00 41.76 119,497.08 58.23 205,192.08

2013 104,444.85 47.68 114,594.89 52.31 219,039.74

Source:TheNationalMunicipalLeagueofThailand(2013)

AccordingtotheDeterminingPlansandProcessofDecentralizationtoLocalGov-ernmentOrganizationActB.E.2542(1999),Section12authorizestheNationalCommit-teeofDecentralizationtomakedecisionontheregulationofgrantallocationtothelocalgovernmentorganization.Theallocationcarries threeobjectives: 1) tosupport localgovernmentorganizationsforthenationwideprovisionofpublicserviceswithaccept-ablestandards;2)toreducefiscalgapsamonglocalgovernmentorganizations;and3)toenablesome localgovernmentorganizationstosolveproblemsbeyondtheir fiscalca-pacity(theNationalCommitteeofDecentralization,2011).

Therefore,intergovernmentalgrantallocationinThailandismeanttodiminishfiscalgapsamonglocalgovernmentorganizationssothatpeoplealloverthecountrywillbe

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ensuredstandardizedpublicservices.Fromallaforementioned, it iscritical to investi-gatehowandhowmuchsuchobjectivescanbereachedbythegrant,withspecialat-tentiontothereductioninfiscalgapsandthedeterminationifthegrantisakeymech-anismtowardssuccessfuldecentralizationtothelocalgovernmentorganization.

Althoughthecentralgovernmenthas itsshareofsignificantnumberofviolationandcorruptionvis-a-visthelocalgovernment,thecases(onviolationandcorruption)atthelocalgovernmenthavebeenexposedtothepubliceasierthanthoseatthecentralgovernment.8

Fromthese four findings, I, therefore,arguethatThailand’sdecentralizationprog-ress inthePost-2000erahasbeenremarkablyslowduetoaninadequatesubstantivelocalautonomyprovidedbythecentralgovernment.

Notes 1 Mutebi,AlexM.2004. “RecentralizingwhileDecentralizing:Central-LocalRelationsand

“CEO”GovernorsinThailand”inTheAsiaPacificJournalofPublicAdministration26(1). 2 Painter,Martin2006.“ThaksinisationorManagerialism?:ReformingtheThaiBureaucracy”

inJournalofContemporaryAsia36(1)andOckey,James2004.“State,Bureaucracyandpoli-tyinModernThaiPolitics”inJournalofContemporaryAsia,34(2).

 3 OrdinanceofNationalCouncil forPeaceandOrder(NCPO)no.1/B.E.2557(2014)December25,2014.

 4 All30BangkokCouncilorsin2014isthecurrentBangkokCouncilorswhoallhavebeenap-pointedonSeptember15,2014byWibunSa-nguanpong,anInteriorsMinistry’sPermanentSecretary,accordingtoanordernumber86/2557datedJuly10,2014oftheNationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO).

 5 InterviewwithRayongMunicipality’sdeputymunicipalchiefonAugust27,2015. 6 ThescholarshipsschemestartedonSeptember2004accordingtoMOI’scirculatingformal

letterno.0808.2/c3137datedonSeptember172004retrievedfromhttp://www.dla.go.th/work/e_book/eb2/law3/pdf2/bt039.pdfonJuly23,2015.

 7 TheofficeofauditorgeneralaskedLAOstoreturnthemoneybacktothegovernmentonFebruary2011.

 8 Moung-On,PratuengandWongpreedee,Achakorn (2014)“Anti-Corruption and Corruption Resolutions in Local Self- Government: A Case Study of Sub district Administrative Organi-zation (SAOs) in the Northeastern Region of Thailand”inThaiJournalofPublicAdministra-tion.Vol. 12(1)pp.153-181.

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