The Opening of Genesis. Preliminaries V.

The Ancients Advance in the Knowledge of Natural Things(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

I. THAT THE ANCIENTS, IN CONSIDERING THE NATURES OF THINGS, ADVANCED ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

II. COMPARISON OF TEXTS: THE STAGES IN SUM.

III. THE MATERIAL CAUSE IN THE FIRST STAGE: THE PRIMEVAL CHAOS.

IV. CHAOS AND A SPIRIT OF AIR AS THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO THE THEOLOGY OF THE ANCIENTS.

V. ON THE SEPARATION OF THE WATERY PARTS FROM THE EARTHY ONES IN THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS.

VI. THE FIRST STAGE: MATTER (HULE) CONSIDERED AS THE NATURE AND SUBSTANCE OF A THING: THE MATERIAL CAUSE.

VII. CERTAIN VIEWS OF THE ANCIENTS CONCERNING THE INDEFINITENESS OF THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF CREATION.

VIII. THE NEXT ADVANCE IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF NATURE, WHICH DISCOVERS THE NECESSITY OF A FIRST MOVER: THE EFFICIENT OR MOVING CAUSE.

IX. THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ALL THINGS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GENESIS OF THE UNIVERSE.

X. ON FORMLESSNESS IN RELATION TO CHAOS AND CREATION.

XI. ON ACTIVE COMPLETED POTENCIES.

XII. ON THE CONFUSED AS COMING BEFORE THE DISTINCT IN KNOWLEDGE AND IN BIOLOGICAL GENERATION.

I. THAT THE ANCIENTS, IN CONSIDERING THE NATURES OF THINGS, AD-VANCED ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

1. The stages in the advance in knowledge: a summary account:

Cf. Just Thomism. January 18, 2007:

One account of the history of philosophy, partII

St. Thomas divides the history of philosophy into three stages using the principle: The ancients, in considering the natures of things, advanced according to the order of human knowledge.

And then he sets forth the first stage:

Since human knowledge attains knowledge through the senses, the first philosophers were occupied with sensible things, and little by little they attained to intelligible things. Now since accidental forms are sensible in themselves, but substantial forms are not, the first philosophers said that all forms were accidental, and that only matter was a substance. This substance sufficed to cause the accidents that are caused by substance, and so the first philosophers did not posit a cause other than matter; but rather claimed that every thing that came forth among sensible things seemed to be caused by matter. Because of this, they were forced to posit that there was no cause of matter, and they totally denied efficient causality.

St. Thomas then describes a middle stage:

Later philosophers, to some extent, began to consider substantial forms- but they focused their whole inquiry in specific forms, and so they did not get to a knowledge of universals. They did posit some agent causes, like intellect or friendship or strife, but these causes only changed the matter to this form or that one by processes like separating and gathering together- but none of their causes infused existence into things universally. According to their account, therefore, every being does not proceed from the action of an agent cause, rather, the action of the agent presupposes matter.

St. Thomas says that the process was complete when

Later philosophers, like Plato, Aristotle, and those following them, attained to a consider-ation of the very being of things, and these men alone posited a universal cause of all things, by which all other things came forth into being, as Augustine says in The City of God, VIII, chap. 4. (De Potentia, III, 5.)In sum:

1. the first philosophers began with accidental forms (which are sensible in them-selves), supposing all forms to be accidental, neglecting the agent cause

2. later philosophers considered substantial forms, but specific rather than universal ones, and only those agencies which were causes of becoming rather than of being

3. even later philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, attained to a consideration of the very being of things, considering a universal cause of all things

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952), q. 3, art. 5:

Q. III: ARTICLE V

Can There Be Anything That Is Not Created by God?

[Sum. Th. I, Q. xiiv, A. I]

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether there can be anything that is not created by God. Seemingly this is possible.

1. Since the cause is more powerful than its effect, that which is possible to our intellect which takes its knowledge from things would seem yet more possible to nature. Now our intellect can understand a thing apart from understanding that it is from God, because its efficient cause is not part of a things nature, so that the thing can be understood without it. Much more therefore can there be a real thing that is not from God.

2. All things made by God are called his creatures. Now creation terminates at being: for the first of created things is being (De Causis, prop. iv). Since then the quiddity of a thing is in addition to its being, it would seem that the quiddity of a thing is not from God.

3. Every action terminates in an act, even as it proceeds from an act: because every agent acts in so far as it is in act, and every agent produces its like in nature. But primal matter is pure potentiality. Therefore the creative act cannot terminate therein: so that not all things are created by God.

On the contrary it is said (Rom. xi, 36): From him and by him and in him are all things.I answer that the ancients in their investigations of nature proceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. Wherefore as human knowledge reaches the intellect by beginning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on the domain of the senses [lit. sensible things], and thence by degrees reached the realm of the intellect [lit. intelligible things]. And seeing that accidental forms are in themselves objects of sense, whereas substantial forms are not, the early philosophers said that all forms are accidental, and that matter alone is a substance. [e.g. Antiphon; cf. Phys., II. 1 (193a 4-28)] And because substance suffices to cause accidents that result from the substantial elements, the early philosophers held that there is no other cause besides matter, and that matter is the cause of whatever we observe in the sensible world: and consequently they were forced to state that matter itself has no cause, and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause.

The later philosophers, however, began to take some notice of substantial forms: yet they did not attain to the knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the obser-vation of special forms; and so they posited indeed certain active causes, not such as give being to things in their universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form: these causes they called intelligence, attraction and repulsion, which they held responsible for adhesion and separation [e.g. Anaximander and Empedocles, for whom see below]. Wherefore according to them not all beings came from an efficient cause, and matter was in existence before any efficient cause came into action.

Subsequent to these the philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and their disciples, attained to the study of universal being: and hence they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into being, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 4). This is in agreement with the Catholic Faith; and may be proved by the three arguments that follow.

First, if in a number of things we find something that is common to all, we must conclude that this something was the effect of some one cause: for it is not possible that to each one by reason of itself this common something belong, since each one by itself is different from the others: and diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Seeing then that being is found to be common to all things, which are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of necessity that they must come into being not by themselves, but by the action of some cause. Seemingly this is Platos argument, since he required every multitude to be preceded by unity not only as regards number but also in reality.

The second argument is that whenever something is found to be in several things by participation in various degrees, it must be derived by those in which it exists imperfectly from that one in which it exists most perfectly: because where there are positive degrees of a thing so that we ascribe it to this one more and to that one less, this is in reference to one thing to which they approach, one nearer than another: for if each one were of itself competent to have it, there would be no reason why one should have it more than another. Thus fire, which is the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in all things hot. Now there is one being most perfect and most true: which follows from the fact that there is a mover altogether immovable and absolutely perfect, as philosophers have proved. Consequently all other less perfect beings must needs derive being therefrom. This is the argument of the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, I).

The third argument is based on the principle that whatsoever is through another is to be reduced to that which is of itself. Wherefore if there were a per se heat, it would be the cause of all hot things, that have heat by way of participation. Now there is a being that is its own being: and this follows from the fact that there must needs be a being that is pure act and wherein there is no composition. Hence from that one being all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation, must needs proceed. This is the argument of Avicenna (in Metaph. viii, 6; ix, 8). Thus reason proves and faith holds that all things are created by God,

Reply to the First Objection. Although the first cause that is God does not enter into the essence of creatures, yet being which is in creatures cannot be understood except as derived from the divine being: even as a proper effect cannot be understood save as produced by its proper cause.

Reply to the Second Objection. From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be but also to be created: since before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creating essence.

Reply to the Third Objection. This argument proves that primal matter is not created per se: but it does not follow that it is not created under a form: for it is thus that it has actual being. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Augustine of Hippo, City of God, VIII. 4 (tr. Marcus Dods):

Chapter 4. Concerning Plato, the Chief Among the Disciples of Socrates,

and His Threefold Division of Philosophy.

For those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles, and who are said to have manifested the greatest acuteness in understanding him, do perhaps entertain such an idea of God as to admit that in Him are to be found the cause of existence, the ultimate reason for the understanding, and the end in reference to which the whole life is to be regulated.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 44, art. 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Article 2. Whether primary matter is created by God?

Objection 1. It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.

Objection 2. Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.

Objection 3. Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyselfviz. angelsthe other nigh unto nothingviz. primary matter.

I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal sub-stance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived trans-mutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [i.e. the zodiac], according to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato.

But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered being under some particular aspect, either as this or as such; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things.

Then others there were who arose to the consideration of being as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as these, or as such, but as beings. Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are such by accidental forms, nor according as they are these by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.

Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of becoming in particularthat is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.

Reply to Objection 2. Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 40).

Reply to Objection 3. The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created. (emphasis added)

In sum, the advance in knowledge proceeded from sensible bodies to substantial form to universal causes:

1. sensible bodies, considering in them

movement

certain accidents

rarefaction and condensation

union and separation

2. substantial form distinguished from matter: such transmutations being attributed to

the oblique circle (i.e. the zodiac)

ideas

3. the consideration of being as being, considering a cause of things as such

being considered as such (according to accidental forms)

being considered as this (according to substantial forms)

being considered as being (and therefore requiring a universal cause)

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952), q. 3, art. 17, c.:

Q. III: ARTICLE XVII

Has the World Always Existed?

[Sum. Th. I, Q. xiix, A. i: C.G. II, xxxiv, xxxvii]

THE seventeenth point of inquiry is whether the world has always existed: and it would seem that it has.

I answer that we must not hesitate to hold that, as the Catholic faith teaches, the world has not always existed. This cannot be disproved by any physical demonstration.

In order to make this clear we must observe that as we have shown in a previous question in Gods works we cannot assign a necessity on the part of the material cause, nor on the part of the active power of the agent, nor on the part of the ultimate end, but only on the part of the form which is the end of the work, since if the form be presupposed it is requisite that things be such as to be fit for such and such a form. Hence we must speak of the production of this or that particular creature otherwise than of the production of the whole universe by God. When we speak of the production of a particular creature, it is possible to gather the reason why it is such and such, from some other creature, or at least from the order of the universe to which every creature is ordained, as a part to the form of the whole. But when we speak of the production of the whole universe, we cannot point to any other creature as being the reason why the universe is such and such. Wherefore since neither on the part of the divine power which is infinite, nor of the divine goodness which stands not in need of creatures, can a reason be assigned for the particular disposition of the universe this reason must be found in the mere will of the Creator: so that if it be asked why the heavens are of such and such a size, no other reason can be given except that their maker willed it so. For this reason too, as Rabbi Moses says, Holy Writ exhorts us to consider the heavenly bodies, since we gather from their disposition how all things are subject to the will and providence of a Creator. For no reason can be given for the distance of this star from that one, or for any other dispositions that we observe in the heavens, save the ordinance of divine wisdom: wherefore it is written (Isa. xl, 26): Lift up your eyes on high and see who hath created these things. Nor does it matter if someone say that the distance in question results from the nature of the heavens or heavenly bodies, even as a certain quantity is appointed to every natural thing, because just as the divine power is not confined to this rather than to that quantity, so is it not confined to a nature that requires one particular quantity rather than to a nature that requires another quantity. Consequently it makes no difference whether it be a question of quantity or of nature: although we grant that the nature of the heavens is not indifferent to any quantity in particular, and that there is no inherent possibility of the heavens having any other quantity than that which they actually have. But this cannot be said of time or the duration of time. For time like place is extraneous to things: wherefore although there is no possibility in the heavens with respect to another quantity or inherent accident, yet is there a possibility with regard to place and position, since the heavens have a local movement; and with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, even as there is succession in movement and ubiety: wherefore it cannot be said that neither time nor ubiety result from the heavens nature, as was the case with quantity.

It is clear then that the appointment of a fixed quantity of duration for the universe depends on the mere will of God, even as the appointment of a fixed quantity of dimension. Consequently we cannot come to a necessary conclusion about the duration of the universe, so as to prove demonstratively that the world has always existed.

Some, however, through failing to observe that the universe was made by God, were unable to avoid erring in this question about the beginning of the world. Thus the earliest physicists recognised no effective cause and maintained that uncreated matter was the cause of all things, and thus they were compelled to hold that matter had always existed. For seeing that nothing brings itself from non-existence into being, that which begins to exist must be caused by something else. These assertedeither that the world was always in continual existence, because they recognised none but natural agents which being confined to one mode of action, of necessity always produced the same effects; or that the world had an interrupted existence; thus Democritus held the world, or rather worlds, to be in a continual state of formation and destruction on account of the chance movements of atoms.

Since, however, it seemed unreasonable that all the congruities and utilities to be found in nature should be due to chance, whereas they obtain either always or in the majority of cases: and seeing that nevertheless this would follow if there were no other cause but matter, and especially that there are some effects which cannot be sufficiently explained by the causality of matter, others like Anaxagoras posited an intellect as active cause, or like Empedocles, attraction and repulsion. Yet they did not hold these to be the active causes of the universe, but likened them to other particular agents whose activity consists in the transformation of matter from one thing into another. Consequently they were compelled to assert that matter is eternal, through not having a cause of its existence: but that the world had a beginning, because every effect of a cause which acts by movement follows its cause in duration, since such effect does not exist before the end of the movement, which end is preceded by the initial movement, co-existent with which is the agent that initiates the movement.

Aristotle (Phys. viii, i), observing that if it be said that the efficient cause of the world acted by movement, it would follow that one would have to proceed to infinity, since every movement must be preceded by another movement, maintained that the world has always existed. He argued not from the position that the world was made by God, but from the position that an agent which begins to act must be moved: thus considering the particular and not the universal cause. Wherefore in order to prove the eternity of the world he based his arguments on movement and the immobility of the prime mover: and hence if we consider them carefully, his arguments seem to be those of one who is arguing against a position, so that at the commencement of Phys. viii, having intro-duced the question of the eternity of movement, he begins by citing the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, his object being to argue against them.

Those who came after Aristotle, however, considering that the whole universe was produced by God through his will and not by movement, endeavoured to prove the eternity of the world from the fact that the will does not wait to do what it intends, except on ac-count of some new occurrence or change, even though we be compelled to imagine it in the succession of time, in that one wills to do this or that now and not sooner.

Yet these fell into the same error as those mentioned before. For they considered the first agent as being like an agent which exercises its activity in time and yet acts through its will. Such an agent is not the cause of time but presupposes it: whereas God is cause even of time, since time is included in the universality of the things made by God: and therefore seeing that we are considering the production of all being by God, the fact that he made it then and not sooner does not enter the question. For this considers time as though it preceded the making instead of being conditional on the making. But if we consider the making of the universality of creatures among which time itself is included, we must consider why such and such a measure was affixed to time, and not why the making was at such and such a time. The fixing of the measure to time depends on the mere will of God, who willed that the world should not have always been, but should have a beginning, even as he willed the heavens to be neither greater nor smaller than they are. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book II: Creation I. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James E. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), c. 37. pp. 109-111:

Chapter 37SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE POINT OF

VIEW OF THE MAKING OF THINGS

[1] Lastly, we must show that no argument drawn from the standpoint of the making of things can necessitate that same conclusion.1[2] The common opinion of the philosophers, on which the first argument was based, namely, that from nothing comes nothing, is true as regards that particular making which they had in mind. Since our knowledge originates in sense perception, which is concerned with singular things, the progress of human thought has been from particular to universal considerations. That is why those who sought the principle of things considered only particular makings of things, inquiring how this particular fire or stone comes to be. And so those who came first, considering the making of things in a more extrinsic fashion than they needed to, claimed that a thing is made only as concerns certain accidental dis-positions, such as rarity, density, and the like, and consequently they said that to be made was nothing else than to be altered; and this they held because it was their under-standing that each and every thing was made from a being actually existing.

But later thinkers, considering the making of things from a more intrinsic point of view, advanced to the problem of the making of things in terms of their substance; and they maintained that from an actually existing being a thing need be made only in an acci-dental respect, but that from a being potentially existent it is made in essential fashion. But this making, namely, of a being from any being whatever, is that of a particular beingone that is made inasmuch as it is this being, a man or a fire, for example, but not inasmuch as it is, uni-

1. See above, ch. 34. [109-110]

versally,2 because there was previously existent being that is transformed into this being.3

Entering more deeply into the problem of the origin of things, philosophers came at last to consider the procession of all created being from one first cause: a truth made evident by arguments previously proposed.4 Now, in this procession of all being from God it is impossible for anything to be made from some other preexisting thing; otherwise, this procession would not consist in the making of all created being.[3] Now, the first philosophers of nature, who shared the commonly received opinion that nothing is made from nothing, did not attain to the idea of such a making as this. Or, if any of them conceived of it, they did not consider it making properly speaking, since the word making implies motion or change, whereas in the origination of all being from one first being, the transmutation of one being into another is, as we have shown, inconceivable.5 And on this account it is the business not of the philosopher of nature to consider that origination, but of the metaphysician, who considers universal being and things existing apart from motion. Nevertheless, in virtue of a certain likeness we transfer the word making even to that origination of things, saying that anything at all whose essence or nature originates from something else is made.6[4] From this we see that the second argument, based on the concept of motion, is also inconclusive. For creation can be called a change only in a metaphorical sense, that is, only so far as the created thing is thought of as having being after not being, even as with things not mutually transformed we say that one comes to be from another simply because one succeeds the other; for instance, that day comes from night.7 Now, since that which in no way exists is not in any particular

2. See above, ch. 21.

3. See above, ch. 17.

4. See, for example, ch. 16 above, with St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 44, 2.

5. See above, ch. 17.

6. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 45, 2, ad 2.

7. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 45, 1, ad 3. [110-111]

state, the idea of motion used in the argument does not warrant the conclusion that, when a thing begins to be, it is in another state now than it was before.[5] Whence it is also clear that, contrary to the third argument, no passive potentiality need precede the existence of all created being. Such a necessity obtains in the case of things that come into being by way of motion, for motion is the act of a thing existing potentially.8 But before a created thing existed, its existence was possible, in virtue of the power of its agent, by which also it began to be. Or that thing was possible on account of the relationship between the terms involved, wherein no incompatibility is found; and this is possibility according to no potentiality, as Aristotle states in Metaphysics V [12].9 For the predicate, act of being, is not incompatible with the subject, world or man, as commensurable is incompatible with diameter. It therefore follows that the existence of the world or of man is not impossible, and, consequently, that before they actually existed their existence was possible, even in the absence of all potentiality. On the other hand, things produced by way of motion must be previously possible by virtue of a passive potentiality; and when Aristotle uses this argument in Metaphysics VII [7] it is to these things that he refers.[6] Moreover, from what has been said it is clear that the fourth argument likewise misses the mark. For, in things made by way of motion, to be made and to be are not simultaneous, because the production of such things involves succession. But in things that are not made by way of motion, the making does not precede the being.[7] In the light of all this, then, it is clear that nothing stands in the way of ones holding that the world has not always existeda truth which the Catholic faith affirms: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. 1:1); and in the Book of Proverbs (8:22) it is said of God: Before He made anything from the beginning, etc.

8. Aristotle, Physics, III, 1 (201a 10).

9. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 12 (1019b 12).

10. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 7 (1032a 12). (emphasis added)

Cf. idem., II, ch.17, n. 14:

[14] This truth refutes the error of the ancient philosophers who asserted that matter has no cause whatsoever, for they perceived that in the actions of particular agents there is always an antecedent subject underlying the action; and from this observation they assumed the opinion common to all, that from nothing, comes nothing. Now, indeed, this is true of particular agents. But the ancient philosophers had not yet attained to the knowledge of the universal agent which is productive of the total being, and for His action necessarily presupposes nothing whatever. (emphasis added)Since, then, nothing comes from nothing, if one begins from particular agents, which always require an antecedent subject, matter must have always existed, and so is uncaused.

The stages according to SCG, II, 37 in sum:

That a thing is made only as concerns certain accidental dispositions.

That the making of things is considered only in terms of their substance.

That all created being proceeded from one first cause.

Supplement: On the congruities and utilities of nature as pointing to a divine cause:

Cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, I. xvi (tr. C. D. Yonge, The Nature of the Gods and Divination, Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1997, original edition H. G. Bohn, 1853), Book II, sec. VII:

VII. But where did we find that which excels all these things I mean reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding, thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be the most excellent. Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that agreeable, uniform, and continued agreement of things in the universe? Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers, at another be covered with snow? Or, if such a number of things regulated their own changes, could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the increase or wane of the moon? Could the differ-ent courses of the stars be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these things subsist, I say, in such a harmony of all the parts of the universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit? (emphasis added)

For the Judeo-Christian alternative, cf. An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith by St John Damascene. Translated by E.W. Watson and L. Pullan. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 9. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, 1899), Book I, Chapter III:

CHAPTER III

Proof that there is a God.

All things that exist are either created or uncreated. If, then, things are created, it follows that they are also wholly mutable. For things, whose existence originated in change, must also be subject to change, whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will[5]. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable. For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence, that is to say, must have opposite properties: who, then, will refuse to grant that all existing things, not only such as come within the province of the senses, but even the very angels, are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world, I mean angels and spirits and demons, are subject to changes of will, whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness, whether a struggle or a surrender; while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction, of increase and decrease, of quality and of movement in space. Things then that are mutable are also wholly created. But things that are created must be the work of some maker, and the maker cannot have been created. For if he had been created, he also must surely have been created by some one, and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. The Creator, then, being uncreated, is also wholly immutable. And what could this be other than Deity? And even the very continuity of the creation, and its preser-vation and government, teach us that there does exist a Deity, who supports and maintains and preserves and ever provides for this universe. For how[6] could opposite natures, such as fire and water, air and earth, have combined with each other so as to form one complete world, and continue to abide in indissoluble union, were there not some omnipotent power which bound them together and always is preserving them from dissolution? What is it that gave order to things of heaven and things of earth, and all those things that move in the air and in the water, or rather to what was in existence before these, viz., to heaven and earth and air and the elements of fire and water? What[7] was it that mingled and distributed these? What was it that set these in motion and keeps them in their unceasing and unhindered course[8]? Was it not the Artificer of these things, and He Who hath implanted in everything the law whereby the universe is carried on and directed? Who then is the Artificer of these things? Is it not He Who created them and brought them into existence. For we shall not attribute such a power to the spontaneous[9]. For, supposing their coming into existence was due to the spontaneous; what of the power that put all in order[10]? And let us grant this, if you please. What of that which has preserved and kept them in harmony with the original laws of their existence[11]? Clearly it is something quite distinct from the spontaneous[12]. And what could this be other than Deity[13]? (emphasis added)

5. Reading ; a variant is .

6. Athan., Cont. Gent.

7. Various reading, Who.

8. Greg. Naz., Orat. 34.

9. The Greek is , to the automatic; perhaps = to the accidental, or, to chance.

10. Or, Whose was the disposing of them in order?

11. Or, Whose are the preserving of them, and the keeping of them in accordance with the principles under which they were first placed?

12. ; or, quite other than the spontaneous, or, than chance.

13. Athan., De Incarn. Verbi, near the beginning. Greg. Naz., Orat. 34. (emphasis added)

2. That nothing comes from nothing and the relation of this dictum to the positing of something existing in act as first principle:

On the principle ex nihilo nihil fit, consider the following excerpt from John of St. Thomas: cf. De Principiis Naturae by Thomas Aquinas. Translated as The Principles of Nature to Brother Sylvester by R. A. Kocourek (html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.):

John of St. Thomas, Natural philosophy

Now that there is indeed an entity [primary matter] of such a potential and unformed character Aristotle deduced from two principles: first, from substantial generation itself, secondly from the fact that naturally nothing comes from nothing. And this second point is deduced from the first because if from nothing something would come to be, so that the whole substance of a thing would come from nothing, by this very fact there would not be generation but creation, and corruption would be annihilation. Hence determinate dispos-itions would not be required for determinate generations, but it would be possible for a stone or a horse or any other thing to come to be in the same way, because if it comes from nothing there is no point to the dispositions which make it determined more to one thing rather than another. However, if it comes to be from something and what comes to be is a substance, from the fact that the generation is substantial, it necessarily presupposes some subject capable of a new substantial existence and losing the existence which it had before because it is corrupted. Neither of these therefore it has of itself and consequently it is in potency to both of them.

On the need for a determinate nature for things, cf. The Way Things Are: The De Rerum Natura of Titus Lucretius Carus by Rolfe Humphries (Bloomington, 1968), I.156-192:

Now, if things come from nothing, all things could

Produce all kinds of things; nothing would need

Seed of its own. Men would burst out of the sea,

And fish and birds from earth, and, wild or tame,

All kinds of beasts, of dubious origin,

Inhabit deserts and the greener fields,

Nor would the same trees bear, in constancy,

The same fruit always, but, as like as not,

Oranges would appear on apple-boughs.

If things were not produced after their kind,

Each from his own determined particles,

How could we trace the substance to the source?

But now since all created things have come

From their own definite kinds of seed, they move

From their beginnings toward the shores of light

Out of their primal motes. Impossible

That all things issue from everywhence; each kind

Of substance has its own inherent power,

Its own capacity. Does not the rose

Blossom in spring, the wheat come ripe in summer,

The grape burst forth at autumns urge? There must be

A proper meeting of their seeds in time

For us to see them at maturity

Grown by their seasons favor, living earth,

Bringing them safely to the shores of light.

But if they came from nothing, they might spring

To birth at any unpropitious time,

Who could predict?since there would be no seeds

Whose character rules out untimely union.

Thirdly, if things could come from nothing, time

Would not be of the essence, for their growth,

Their ripening to full maturity.

Babies would be young men, in the blink of an eye,

and full-grown forests come leaping out from the ground.

Ridiculous! We know that all things grow

Little by little, as indeed they must

From their essential nature.

3. For St. Thomas understanding of this principle, cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book XII, Lect. 6, nn. 2500-2509:

LESSON 6Eternal Motion Requires An Eternal Mover

Chapter 7

And since this is a possible account of the matter, and if this is not so all things will come from Night (1060) or all things were together (1060) or something comes from non-being (1034), these difficulties are solved. And there is something which is always being moved with an unceasing motion, and this is circular motion. This is evident not only in theory but in fact; and for this reason the first heaven will be eternal.

1066. Therefore there is also something which causes it to move. And since that which is moved and causes motion is intermediate, there must be something which causes motion and is unmoved, which is eternal and both a substance and an actuality.COMMENTARY

2500. He raises a question about a point already dealt with. The question is whether actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality so that the first principle of things can be held to be one whose substance is actuality. In regard to this he does three things. First (1059:C 2500), he gives an argument to show what is false, namely, that potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality. Second (1060:C 2501), he argues on the other side of the question (But if this is so). Third (1062:C 2506), he answers the question (Now to think).

He accordingly says, first (1059), that it has been pointed out that an eternal substance is an actuality, although there is a difficulty regarding this. For potentiality seems to be prior to actuality, since one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed (465:C 950) [read: 521] Now potentiality seems to be related to actuality in this way, because everything which is acting seems to be able to act, but not everything which is able to act is acting; and so it seems that potentiality is prior to actuality.

2501. But if this is so (1060). Then he argues on the opposite side of the question, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives an argument reducing the counter-position to absurdity.

He says that, if potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality, it follows that at some time nothing may exist; for the contingent is what can come to be but has not yet done so. Hence, if the first beings are potential, it follows that they do not exist actually; and so no other being will exist.2502. This can be taken in two ways. First, according to the opinion of certain of the ancients, who were called the theological poets, such as Orpheus and certain others, who claimed that the world is generated from Night, i.e., from a simple pre-existent privation. Second, according to the later physicists, i.e., philosophers of nature and their followers, who, when they saw that nothing comes from nothing in the natural world, claimed that all things were together in a kind of mixture, which they called Chaos. (Anaxagoras, for example, held this view.) Thus they held that all things exist potentially and not actually.

2503. But whether this position is stated in the former or in the latter way the same impossible conclusion follows, provided that potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality. For those things which are in potentiality only, or which come entirely under privation, or belong to some confused mass, cannot be moved so as to be brought to actuality unless there is some moving cause which is existing actually. For in things made by art the matter does not move itself, but an agent moves it, i.e., technical knowledge, or art. Neither does the menstrual blood, which is the matter from which an animal is generated, move itself, but semen, i.e., the sperm of the animal, moves it. Nor does earth, which is the material from which plants are generated, move itself, but the seed, i.e., the seeds of plants, move it.

2504. This is the reason (1061).

Second, he shows how some of the philosophers of nature agreed with this argument. He says that this is the reason why some philosophersLeucippus, the companion of Democritus, and Platoclaimed that something actual always exists. For they said that motion had always existed even before the world; Leucippus attributed motion to the atoms, which are mobile of themselves, from which he supposed the world to be composed; and Plato attributed it to the elements, which he said were moved by disorderly motions before the formation of the world, and afterwards were brought into order by God.

2505. Now they seem to be right in claiming that motion has always existed. But they were wrong in failing to point out which kind of motion has always existed; nor did they give the cause of motion, either by stating this in an absolute sense or by giving the reason for their own position. Yet nothing is moved by chance, i.e., without some fixed cause, but there must always be something existing which is the cause of motion. For example, we now see that some things are moved in this way by nature or by force or by mind or by some other agent. Hence they should also have stated what the first cause of motion is, whether nature or force or mind; for it makes a great deal of difference which of these is held to be the cause of motion.Plato cannot be excused on the ground that he held the principle of motion to be something that moves itself, which he asserted to be a soul, since the soul did not exist of itself before the formation of the world, but only existed after the disorderly state of motion. For according to him the soul was created at the same time as the heavens, which he claimed to be animated; and thus it could not be the principle of that disorderly motion.

2506. Now to think (1062).

Then he answers the question which was raised, and concerning this he does two things. First, he returns to the points established in Book IX regarding the relationship of potentiality to actuality. He says that the opinion that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not. The sense in which it is right has been explained in Book IX (778-80:C 1844-49); for it was stated there that actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality. But in one and the same subject which is being moved from potentiality to actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time, although actuality is prior both in nature and in perfection.2507. That actuality is prior (1063).

Second, he strengthens his answer by giving the opinions of some of the philosophers. He says that the absolute priority of actuality is asserted by Anaxagoras, because he claimed that the first principle of motion is an intellect; for intellect is a kind of actuality. The same thing is also asserted by Empedocles, who claimed that love and strife are the causes of motion; and also by Leucippus and Plato, who claimed that motion has always existed.

2508. Hence Chaos or Night (1064).

Then he uses the answer to the question given above to clarify a point previously established, and in regard to this he does three things. First (1064:C 25o8), in the light of the things established above he concludes that generation must be eternal. Second (1065:C 2510), on the ground that generation is eternal he concludes that the motion of the heavens must be eternal (Therefore, if something). Third (1066:C 2517), on the ground that the motion of the heavens is eternal he concludes that the first unmoved mover must be eternal (Therefore there is).

He accordingly says, first (1064), that, if actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality, it follows that it is false to hold, with the ancient philosophers of nature, who thought potentiality to be prior absolutely to actuality, that all things pre-existed potentially for an infinite time in a kind of confused mass, which they called Chaos. And false also is the opinion of the theological poets, who claimed for the same reason that the simple privation of things had existed for an infinite time before things began to be actually. Some called this privation of things Night, and perhaps the reason for their doing so is that among qualities and simple forms light is found to be more common and prior (since they thought that nothing exists except sensible things), and night is the privation of light. Both opinions are false, then, if actuality is prior to potentiality.

2509. But since we see that things which are generated and destroyed pass from potentiality to actuality, it will be necessary to say that the same things which begin to be actually after being potentially have always existed in some way. Either the very things which begin to be actually after being potentially have always existed according to circular generation, inasmuch as they claimed that things which are generated were formerly the same specifically but not numerically, and this is what occurs in circular generation. For from the moist earth vapors are derived, and these turn into rain, by which the earth is again made moist. Similarly sperm comes from a man, and from sperm a man again comes to be. Thus things which come to be are brought back the same in species by reason of circular generation. Or again those things which come to be actually after being potentially have always been the same things in a different way, as Anaxagoras claimed that they had actual prior existence in the things from which they are generated. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles Physics. Book VIII translated by Richard J. Blackwell et. al (New Haven, 1963), lect. 2, nn. 971-975:

Lecture 2

Arguments for the eternity of motion

971. After raising the problem of the eternity of motion, the Philosopher now intends to show that motion is eternal. His treatment is divided into two parts:

In the first he explains his proposition;

In the second he solves objections contrary to his proposition, (L.4).

About the first he does two things:

First he presents arguments to show the eternity of motion;

Secondly, he answers opinions to the contrary, (L. 3).

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that motion always has been;

Secondly, that it always will be, at 895.

About the first he does two things:

First he explains his proposition with an argument from motion;

Secondly, with an argument from time, at 979.

About the first he does three things:

First he premisses something needed for his proposition;

Secondly, he presents a proof that manifests his proposition, at 976;

Thirdly, he shows that his argument proceeds necessarily, 977,

972. He says first (753) therefore, that in order to demonstrate the proposition we must begin with things determined at the very beginning of the Physics and use them as principles. By this he gives us to understand that the preceding books, in which he determined about motion in general and which for this reason are given the general title About Natural Things, are set off from this Book VIII, in which he begins to apply motion to things.

He assumes, therefore, what was said in Physics III, namely, that motion is the act of a mobile precisely as such. From this it appears that in order for motion to exist there must exist things which can be moved with some sort of motion, because an act cannot exist without the thing of which it is the act. Accordingly, from the definition of motion it is evident that there must be a subject of motion, if there is to be motion at all.

But even without the definition of motion that fact is per se evident from the general consent of all, for everyone admits as a necessary fact that nothing is moved except what can be movedand this with reference to any and all motion; for example, nothing can be altered except what is alterable, or be moved with respect to place unless it be changeable with respect to place.

And because the subject is by nature prior to what is in the subject, we can conclude that in individual changesboth from the viewpoint of the mobile and of the moverthe combustible subject is prior to its being set afire, and the subject capable of setting it afire is prior to its setting afire, prior, I say, not always in time but in nature.

973. From this argument of Aristotle, Averroes took occasion to speak against what is held by faith about creation. For if coming-to-be is a kind of change and every change requires a subject, as Aristotle here proves, it is necessary that whatever comes to be does so from a subject, therefore, it is not possible for something to come to be from nothing.

He confirms this with another argument: When it is said that the black comes to be from the white, this is not to speak per se, in the sense that the white itself is converted into the black, but it is to speak per accidens, in the sense that upon the departure of the white, the black succeeds it. Now whatever is per accidens is reduced to what is per se. But that from which something comes to be per se, is the subject, which enters into the substance of what comes to be. Therefore, whatever is said to come to be from its opposite comes to be from it per accidens, but per se it comes to be from the subject. Accordingly, it is not possible for being to come to be from non-being absolutely.

In further support of his position Averroes adduces the common opinion of the early philosophers that nothing comes to be from nothing. He also gives two reasons from which he considers that the position arose that something should come to be from nothing. The first is that ordinary people do not consider as existing anything but what is comprehensible by sight; therefore, because they see something visible come to be which previously was not visible, they think that it is possible for something to come to be from nothing.

The second reason is that among the common people it could be thought to be a weakening of the virtue of the agent that it should need matter in order to act, which condition, however, does not derive from the impotency of the agent, but from the very nature of motion. Therefore, because the first agent does not have a power which is in any way deficient, it follows that it should act without a subject.

974, But if one considers rightly, he was deceived by a cause similar to the cause by which he claimed we are deceived, namely, by considering particular things. For it is clear that a particular active power presupposes the matter which a more universal agent pro-duces, just as an artisan uses the matter which nature makes. From the fact therefore, that every particular agent presupposes matter which it does not produce, one should not suppose that the first universal agentwhich is active with respect to all beingshould presuppose something not caused by it.Nor, moreover, is this in keeping with the intention of Aristotle who in Metaphysics II proves that the supremely true and the supreme being is the cause of being for all existents. Hence the being which prime matter hasi.e., a being in potencyis derived from the first principle of being which is in a supreme way a being. Therefore, it is not necessary to presuppose for its action anything not produced by it.

And because every motion needs a subjectas Aristotle proves here, and as is the truth of the matterit follows that the universal production of being by God is neither motion nor change, but a certain simple coming forth. Consequently, to be made and to make are used in an equivocal sense when applied to this universal production of being and to other productions.

Therefore, just as, if we should understand the production of things to be from God ab aeternoas Aristotle supposed, and a number of the Platonistsit is not necessary, indeed, it is impossible, that there have been a pre-existing but unproduced subject of this universal production, so also, in accord with the tenets of our faith, if we posit that he did not produce things ab aeterno but produced them after they had not existed, it is not necessary to posit a subject for this universal production. It is evident, therefore, that what Aristotle proves here, namely, that every motion requires a mobile subject, is not against a tenet of our faithfor it has already been said that the universal production of things, whether ab aeterno or not, is neither a motion nor a change. For in order that there be motion or change, it is required that something be other now than previously, and thus there would be something previously existing, and consequently this would not be the universal production of things about which we are now speaking.

975. Similarly, Averroes statement that something is said to come to be from its opposite per accidens and from a subject per se is true in particular productions according to which this or that being comes to be, e.g., a man or a dog, but is not true in the universal production of being.

This is clear from what the Philosopher said in Physics I. For he said there that if this animal comes to be inasmuch as it is this animal, it ought not come to be from non-animal but from non-this-animalfor example, if a man comes to be from non-man or a horse from non-horse. But if animal is produced precisely as animal, it must come to be from non-animal. Accordingly, if some particular being comes to be, it does not come to be from absolute non-being; but if the whole being comes to be, i.e., if being precisely as being comes to be, it must be made from absolute non-beingif, indeed, this process should be called being made, for it is an equivocal way of speaking, as has been said.

What Averroes introduces about the early philosophers has no value, for they were unable to arrive at the first cause of all being but considered the causes of particular changes.

The first of these philosophers considered the causes solely of accidental changes, and posited all being made to be alteration. Those who succeeded them arrived at a knowledge of substantial changes, but those who came still later, such as Plato and Aristotle, arrived at a knowledge of the principle of all existence.

Consequently, it is clear that we are not moved to assert that something comes to be from nothing because we suppose only visible things to be beings; rather it is because we do not content ourselves with considering merely the particular productions of par-ticular causes, but go on to consider the universal production of all being from the first principle of being. Nor do we assert that to need matter in order to act is due to a diminished power, in the sense of such a powers lacking its natural energy, rather, what we say is that this is proper to a particular power, which does not extend to all being but makes a particular being.Hence one can say that it is characteristic of a diminished power to make something from something in the sense that we would say that a particular power is less than the universal power. (emphasis added)Cf. Commentary on Aristotles Generation and Corruption by Thomas Aquinas, tr. by Pierre Conway & R. F. Larcher (Columbus, 1964), Bk. I, lect. 6-7 complete:

Lecture 6

Does simple generation exist? Problem and solution.

42. After determining about generation and alteration according to the opinions of others, the Philosopher here begins to inquire about them according to his own opinion.

First, he asks whether there is any simple generation, according to which something is said to be generated absolutely;

Secondly, the difference between alteration and simple generation (L. 10).

With respect to the first he does two things.

First he states his intention [42] and says that after having determined the foregoing, the first point in the inquiry into the truth is to see whether something is generated and corrupted absolutely, or whether properly, i.e., absolutely or principally, nothing is generated or corrupted, but that always something is generated from something and into somethingwhich seems to pertain to generation and corruption in a qualified sense. And he gives as an example the case when, from something laboring, i.e., ill, something healthy comes to be. In this case absolute being is not produced, because it already existed, but something, namely, to be healthy, is, since previously healthy was not, but laboring, i.e., ill. And the same holds when something is made ill from healthy, or the small from the large, or conversely, and so on for all changes stated in this mannerfor such generation in a qualified sense is found in every class of mobile being, as is plain in Physics VIII.

43. Secondly, [43], he carries out his proposal:

First, he states a doubt;

Secondly, he resolves it, at 48;

Thirdly, he objects to the solution, at 49.

Regarding the first he does two things:

First, he states the doubt;

Secondly, he rejects one answer, at 46.

As to the first he does three things:

First he proposes a certain consequence [43] saying that, if absolute generation should occur, it would follow that something would be generated from absolute non-being.

44. Secondly [44] he shows that the consequent is impossible. For that from which something is generated can be called it; for example, if from wood a cabinet is generated, it can be said that the cabinet is wood. If, therefore, from absolute non-being being is generated, it will be true to say that nonbeing exists, i.e., that it is beingwhich is to have contradictories true at the same time. Consequently the antecedent is seen to be impossible, namely, that something be generated absolutely from non-being. Now this inadmissibility follows if something should be said to be produced from non-being absolutely, as from a permanent subject; it does not follow, however, if it is pointed out that something is produced from non-being absolutely according to order alone, i.e., that after non-being is produced being. But Aristotle is objecting here in a disputative manner.

45. Thirdly [45], he shows the necessity of the first consequence. For just as some particular generation is related to some particular non-being, so absolute generation is related to absolute non-being. But a certain generation, i.e., a generation according to which something is said to be generated in a qualified sense is from a certain non-being, for example, from non-white, when something becomes white, or from non-good, when something becomes good. Therefore, absolute generation, according to which something is said to be generated absolutely, is from absolute now-being.

46. Then [46] he excludes a certain solution that could be given by distinguishing absolute being. Hence he first presents the distinction and says that absolute being may be understood in two ways: in one way as meaning that which is the first among the predicaments of being, namely, substance; in another way as meaning universal being, which includes all the predicaments. According to these distinctions, absolute non-being may be said either of what is not substance, or of what is in no way being.

47. Secondly [47], he shows that according to both senses something inadmissible follows. For if absolute being is taken to mean the first being, which is substance, then absolute non-being will be non-substance. If, therefore, absolute generation requires that there be absolute being from absolute nonbeing, it will follow that there will be substance from non-substance. But when it is assumed that neither substance exists nor a this (which implies an individual substance), then it is plain that none of the other predicaments will remain, i.e., neither quality, nor quantity, nor wherebecause otherwise it would follow that passions, i.e., accidents, would exist separated from substances, which is impossible.

But if it should be said that that from which something is generated absolutely is uni-versal non-being, in the sense that absolute being is taken to mean common being, it will follow that the expression, non-being, means the negation of all beings. Hence it will follow that what would be generated absolutely would be generated from abso-lutely nothing. But this is against the notion of natural generation, and against the doctrines of all the natural philosophers, who discussed natural generation.

48. Then at [48] he resolves this doubt. And he says that this matter has been more fully discussed, i.e., discussed at greater length, also in other books, namely, in Physics I, with the difficulties presented and the determinations made. Therefore now it is enough to state more briefly that something is absolutely generated in a way from non-being, and in a way from being - for that which pre-exists to the generation must be being in potency but non-being in act. Consequently, what is said on both sides is true, namely, that absolute generation is from being, and from non-being.

49. Then [49] he objects against this solution. Concerning this he does three things:

First, he presents the objection;

Secondly, he uses this as an occasion for asking another question and answering it (L. 7);

Thirdly, he answers the doubt under discussion (L. 8).

In regard to the first he does three things:

First, he states his intention [49] and says that because the foregoing determination begets a wondrous question, it will be necessary once more to investigate how absolute generation takes place, i.e., whether from being in potency, or in some other way.

50. Secondly [50], he raises a certain question: Is simple generation only of substance and of this, i.e., the individual in the genus of substance, and not of quantity or quality or where or the other predicaments, which are not beings absolutely? And the same question can be put with regard to corruption. And it is to be supposed as a certainty that simple generation and corruption are of substance alone.

51. Thirdly [51], he continues with the problem. And he says that if the only thing generated absolutely is the what, i.e., something existing in the genus of substance, and if that from which something is generated is being in potency, as was said above, and not in act, it follows that that from which substance is generated, as well as that into which it is changed when corrupted, is substance in potency and not in act. Therefore it remains to inquire whether it is any of the other predicaments in act, such as quantity or quality or where or any of the other predicaments, while at the same time being potentially this being, i.e., substance, which is being absolutely, although not existing absolutely, i.e., in act, as this, i.e., as substance or being.

Whichever part of this difficulty is conceded, something inadmissible follows. For if it is none of the others in act, but is all of the genera of the predicaments in potency, it follows first of all than non-being is separated, i.e., that matter, which is being in potency, is existing under privation, which is non-being, but without any form. Secondly, there follows what the first philosophers most feared, namely, that something be generated from no pre-existing thing: for what is not being in act, is nothing.

But if it is supposed that that from which substance is generated is not a this something, i.e., an individual in the genus of substance, nor substance in act, but is one of the other predicaments in act, there follows the inadmissible consequence we adduced before, namely, that passions, i.e., accidents, exist isolated from substanceswhich is plainly impossible.

Consequently, it seems that absolute generation cannot occur in this way, namely, that a substance be generated from what is non-being in act and being in potency, as the foregoing solution suggested.

Lecture 7

The cause on the part of matter in generation never fails.

52. After presenting an objection against the aforesaid solution, the Philosopher here introduces another question, the answer to which resolves the previous objection. About this he does two things:

First, he introduces the question and resolves it;

Secondly, he uses this solution to resolve the main question (L. 8).

With respect to the first he does three things:

First, he presents the question;

Secondly, he tackles the question, at 54;

Thirdly, he resolves it, at 57.

Regarding the first he does two things:

First he introduces the question [52] and says that these, namely, the previous objection should be handled to the extent that the proposition requires, and that, in order to get a better understanding, we should inquire into the reason why generation always exists, i.e., both absolute generation and generation with respect to a part, i.e., generation in a qualified sense. Now those who posit that the world and motion are perpetual must also posit perpetual generation. What the force of Aristotles arguments is with regard to the perpetuity of motion and the eternity of the world we have explained in Physics VIII and in On the Heavens I.

53. Secondly [53], he explains the question he has introduced and says that one cause that may be assigned of the eternity of generation is that which is called whence the principle [beginning] of motion comes, i.e., the moving or efficient cause; another cause may be assigned, which is matter. And this is the one to be assigned now, namely, the materialfor the moving cause has been discussed in the tract on motion, i.e., in Physics VIII, where it was said that there exists a certain immobile mover for all time, namely, the mover of the heavens, and a mover which is always moved, namely, the heavens.

To determine concerning one of these, namely, the first mover, pertains to another part of philosophy, the part which is first among all the parts; hence in Metaphysics XII the Philosopher determined concerning the cause of the perpetuity of motion and of generation. But regarding the other mover, namely, the mover which causes perpetual generation because it is itself continually being moved, it will later be assigned, at the end of the present book, how this is the cause of each of the aforesaid, i.e., of the perpetuity of generation absolutely speaking and in the qualified sense.

But now we must assign the cause why in perpetuity, generation and corruption do not desert nature, and which is the cause classed under the head of matter, namely, the material cause. And lest this seem to be foreign to the proposition, he [Aristotle] adds that perhaps it will at the same time be shown both what must be said about this question and what must be said of absolute generation and corruption.

54. Then [54] he pursues the question brought up.

First, he presents an objection that would deny perpetuity of generation;

Secondly, he rejects some answers to this objection, at 55.

He says therefore first [54] that there seems to be sufficient reason to inquire as to the cause why generation is folded around, i.e., eternally revolves in nature, if that which is corrupted absolutely falls into non-being. For just as what is generated absolutely comes to be from non-being absolutely, so what is corrupted absolutely would seem to fall into non-being absolutely, in the sense that this non-being would be absolutely nothing. For that into which it falls cannot be a something, i.e., a substance, for since absolute corruption is of substance, what is corrupted absolutely must fall into non-substance. Consequently, neither can the non-being at which corruption ends be quality, or quantity, or where, or any of the other predicaments, since accidents cannot exist without substance.

If, therefore, generation and corruption go on forever, it seems that some being will always be falling into non-being. Consequently, there is always being subtracted some one or other of the things having natures. Now, it is plain that whatever is finite will be consumed if something is continually removed from it. Hence, if the whole universe, from which each and every being is generated, is finite, and if generation is ab aeterno, then all being should have been exhausted long ago, so that nothing should be left now but emptiness, i.e., the void.

55. Then [55] he excludes two answers. The first was that of the ancient natural philosophers who, in order to account for the perpetuity of generation, attributed infinity to the principles. For all who posited one principle, such as fire or air or water or something in-between, endowed that principle with infinity. Democritus however assumed infinite empty space, as well as an infinitude of indivisible bodies. Likewise, Anaxagoras posited an infinitude of similar parts as principles.

All these tenets are rejected by the Philosopher, who says that it cannot be that the reason why generation does not cease is because that is infinite from which something is generated, whether there be one principle or many principles. For such a thing is impossible, since, as was proved in Physics III and in On the Heavens I, there is in nature no infinite in act.

56. A second answer is now presented and refuted [56]. For someone could say that, although there is not present in nature any infinite in act, there is nevertheless an infinite in potency, as is evident in the division of a continuum. Consequently, someone could say that, just as, even though it is not infinite in act, something can be taken ad infinitum by division from a continuum without its being consumed, so too, from natural body, out of which all things are generated, even though it is not infinite, something can be taken which, by corruption, falls away to non-being, yet without its ever being totally consumed. But this is excluded. For if, from a finite continuum, as is said in Physics III, the same quantity is always removed, it will, no matter how large, be finally consumedfor example, if one should continue to remove a palms breadth from the diameter of the heaven. But a continuum is divided ad infinitum if subtraction is always made according to the same proportionfor example, if a continuum be divided in half, and the half into half, and so on infinitely. The same holds for any other ratio. Such a division having been made, it is plain that what is taken after the half will always be less than what was taken beforefor the half of the half is always less than the half of the whole. Hence Aristotle concludes that, if this is the way that generation and corruption are to endure forever, i.e., in the way that a continuum is forever divided, then whatever is generated later will always have to be smaller in quantity, so that, by virtue of what is subtracted from natural body being always less, the original quantity will not be totally consumed. But we do not see this happen, namely, what is generated being always less. Consequently, the way generation and corruption endure ad infinitum cannot be similar to the division of a magnitude ad infinitum.

57. Then [57] having rejected the false solutions, he concludes to the true one, namely, that the reason why the transmutation of generation and corruption must be unfailing, or unceasing, i.e., unceasing, is that the corruption of this is the generation of something else, and vice versa. For generation per se is indeed from a being in potency, i.e., from matter, which is as the subject of natural thingsit is accidental to the matter out of which something is generated that it be the subject of another form, with respect to which it is being in act, and at the same time of the privation of the form to be induced, with respect to which it is non-being in act. On this account Aristotle in Physics I says that generation is per accidens from a being in act, but per se from a being in potency.

Similarly, a thing is per se corrupted into a being in potency, which indeed is now subject to another form, according to which it is a being in act, and to the privation of the previous form, with respect to which it is now non-being in act. Consequently it does not follow that what is corrupted departs completely from the whole nature of things, for although that which is corrupted becomes non-being, yet something else remains, namely, that which has been generated. Accordingly matter cannot remain without being subjected to some form. That is why, upon the corruption of one thing, another is generated, and upon the generation of one thing another is corrupted. Consequently, there is in generation and corruption a certain cycle which gives it the aptitude to last forever.

Finally he concludes with the summary that the aforesaid cause should be considered sufficient as to why there should be absolute generation and corruption with respect to each and every thing in perpetuity. This is true on the supposition that the world and motion are eternalwhich, however, the Catholic faith does not suppose, as has been said elsewhere. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 90, art. 1, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improba-bility. For, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 77, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence,acquires its knowledge somehow from things,and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act,receives nothing from any other,and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (Q. 3, AA. 1, 7; Q. 9, A. 1).

This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i. 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body.

Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of some-thing incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii. 6 [the words as quoted are to be found iv. 31]). So some supposed mans soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. 3, AA. 1, 8; and Q. 75, A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. (emphasis added)

In sum:

1. that nothing but bodies existed

2. that something incorporeal existed, not apart from the body, but the form of the body, leading to the view that God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book I: God. Translated, with an Intro-duction and Notes by Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame, 1975), cap, 20, nn. 34-35:

[34] [Having shown that God is not a body, [t]hereby is destroyed the error of the early natural philosophers, who posited only material causes, such as fire or water or the like, and who thus said that the first principles of things were bodies and called them gods. Among them there were some who further posited friendship and strife as moving causes. (They, too, were refuted through the above arguments.) For since, according to them, strife and friendship are in bodies, it will follow that the first moving principles are bodily powers. They also held that God is composed of the four elements and friendship, which would give us to understand that for them God was a heavenly body. Among the early thinkers, Anaxagoras alone approached the truth by positing that an intellect moved all things.[35] By this truth, too, are refuted the Gentiles, who, taking their beginning in the errors of the philosophers we have listed, posited that the elements of the world and the powers in them are gods; for example, the sun, the moon, the earth, water, and the like. (emphasis added)Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 115, art. 3, obj. 2, ad 2 (tr. English Domini-can Fathers):Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in Bodies Here Below?

Obj. 2. Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agentsheat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the princi-ples of which the early natural philosophers held to be the rare and the dense, there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the in-ferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem [sufficient]. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false. Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii. 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the produc-tion of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Physic. ii. 2) that man and the sun generate man. (emphasis added)Supplement. Why the material principles posited in the first stage are insufficient:

Cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book XII, lect. 5, n. 2494:

LESSON 5An Eternal Immovable Substance Must Exist

Commentary

2494. And even if (1057).

Second, he shows that, in order for motion to be eternal it is necessary not only that an eternal substance exist, which is a mover or agent, but also that its essence be an actuality. Hence he says that the eternity of motion is not adequately accounted for even if it is supposed that an eternal substance does act yet is potential in essence. For example, it would not be sufficient to hold that the first principles are fire or water, as the ancient natural philosophers did, because then motion could not be eternal. For if a mover is such that its essence contains potentiality, it can possibly not be, because whatever is in potentiality may possibly not be. Hence it would be possible for motion not to be, and so it would not be necessary and eternal. Therefore it follows that there must be a first principle of motion of the sort whose essence is not in potentiality but is only an actuality. (emphasis added)

II. COMPARISON OF TEXTS: THE STAGES IN SUM.

1. De Potentia, III. 5

I answer that the ancients in their investigations of nature proceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. Wherefore as human knowledge reaches the intellect by begin-ning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on the domain of the senses [i.e. sensible things], and thence by degrees reached the realm of the intellect [i.e. intelligible things].

First Stage: All forms are accidental and matter is the substance of things

And seeing that accidental forms are in themselves objects of sense, whereas substantial forms are not, the early philosophers said that all forms are accidental, and that matter alone is a substance. [cf. Phys., II. 1 (193a 4-28)] And because substance suffices to cause accidents that result from the substantial elements, the early philosophers held that there is no other cause besides matter, and that matter is the cause of whatever we observe in the sensible world: and consequently they were forced to state that matter itself has no cause, and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause.

Second Stage: Efficient causes are causes of becoming only

The later philosophers, however, began to take some notice of substantial forms: yet they did not attain to the knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the observation of special forms; and so they posited indeed certain active causes, not such as give being to things in their universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form: these causes they called intelligence, attraction and repulsion, which they held responsible for adhesion and separation. Wherefore according to them not all beings came from an efficient cause, and matter was in existence before any efficient cause came into action.

Third Stage: There is a universal cause of all things

Subsequent to these the philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and their disciples, attained to the study of universal being: and hence they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into being, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 4).2. De Potentia, III. 17Some, however, through failing to observe that the universe was made by God, were unable to avoid erring in this question about the beginning of the world.

First Stage: Matter is uncreated and the cause of all things

Thus the earliest physicists recognised no effective cause and maintained that uncreated matter was the cause of all things, and thus they were compelled to hold that matter had always existed. For seeing that nothing brings itself from non-existence into being, that which begins to exist must be caused by something else. These assertedeither that the world was always in continual existence, because they recognised none but natural agents which being confined to one mode of action, of necessity always produced the same effects; or that the world had an interrupted existence; thus Democritus held the world, or rather worlds, to be in a continual state of formation and destruction on account of the chance movements of atoms.

Second Stage: There are active or efficient causes (like the Mind of Anaxagoras)

Since, however, it seemed unreasonable that all the congruities and utilities to be found in nature should be due to chance, whereas they obtain either always or in the majority of cases: and seeing that nevertheless this would [not] follow if there were no other cause but matter, and especially that there are some effects which cannot be sufficiently explained by the causality of matter, others like Anaxagoras posited an intellect as active cause, or like Empedocles, attraction and repulsion. Yet they did not hold these to be the active causes of the universe, but likened them to other particular agents whose activity consists in the transformation of matter from one thin