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Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 187± 204

The Promise and Threat of America inAustralian Politics*

MARK ROLFE

University of New South Wales

From early days the United States has had a curious and very entertaining career

in Australia as a kind of storehouse of ideas to be raided, a powerfully justifying

precedent to be invoked ¼ or a dreadful example with which to shame the

thoughtless. (Cited in Churchward 1979, p. xxv)

Here we have a summation of the role of America as both a promise and a threatin Australian politics. However, there are further layers to this argument complicat-

ing C. Hartley Grattan’ s observation made almost forty years ago. These must be

outlined before examining the use by certain Australians during the 1940s to 1960s

of a tempting vision of America in order to modernise Australian capitalism. In the

name of development, these people introduced Fordism to Australia througheagerly borrowing from America and then adapting these imports to Australian

political conditions.

The ® rst thing is to clear some conceptual confusion surrounding the issue of

America as a threat. The two countries are often compared because they are both

considered `new worlds’ , with Australia following on the same path as America(Frost 1973±74; McLachlan 1977). This comparison leads easily to America being

seen as either the bright promise to emulate or the dreadful nightmare to avoid.

Both sides of this debate have drawn examples from the same well of American

democracy, culture and modernity.

These images of America are entangled with the issues of Americanisation andcultural imperialism, portraying America as the aggressive Other imposing its

culture upon Australia. Some scholars have elaborated this approach with use of

dependency theory, positing an international division of labour into which Australia

has been slotted with great deliberation. For many, World War II and ANZUS saw

America replace Britain as the imperialist to the Australian satellite (McQueen1973, p. 6; Crough & Wheelwright 1982, p. 179; Churchward 1979, p. 165;

Alomes 1988). Momentum of analysis was carefully maintained by presenting

percentages of industries taken over by American multinationals (Churchward

1979, pp. 177±83; McQueen 1978, p. 22; Crough & Wheelwright 1982, ch. 1;

Alomes 1988, p. 177). The authors lashed a comprador or transnationalised class inAustralia accused of aiding and abetting the American imperialism that dominated

the capitalist state in Australia (McQueen 1978, p. 144; Crough & Wheelwright

* The author’ s gratitude goes to Conal Condren, Sharon Chaproniere and the two anonymous reviewers

for their valuable and constructive advice.

1036-1146/97/020187-18 $7.00 Ó 1997 Australasian Political Studies Association

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188 M. ROLFE

1982, pp. 194±5; Alomes 1988, p. 201). The result was American cultural imperi-alism and a plea from the authors for a renaissance of Australia’ s true national

identity and economic nationalism (McQueen 1978, pp. 147±51, 161; Churchward

1979, p. 184; Fox 1981; Crough & Wheelwright 1982, pp. 189±95; Alomes 1988,

pp. 328±30, 336).

Wheelwright has changed little from this approach except to be mindfulof the globalisation of capitalism since 1982. Australia is still subservient to

Anglo-American capital (Wheelwright 1996, pp. 7±9). Graeme Turner warns us

against simply viewing Americanisation through the `lens of cultural imperialism’

(Turner 1994, p. 103). But he seems to be having it both ways as cultural

imperialism is still an important concept due to a `history of, largely, Americancultural domination’ (Turner 1994, p. 117). As with the authors above, it all comes

back to the question of `American economic power’ (Turner 1994, p. 104) and the

threats to Australian national identity (Turner 1994, p. 117). Concern over political

and economic imperialism has automatically led to the conclusion of cultural

imperialism imposed upon Australia from the outside by this aggressive AmericanOther.

Yet cultural imperialism is not necessarily like a military invasion. As

White (1983, p. 120) observed, the process is something more than a re¯ ection

of economic control and it works at several levels. We must be careful not to

overlook the adaptive willingness of Australians to seek out America. To be sure,if we focus on the obvious instances of American importationÐ McDonalds,

television programs, baseball and CokeÐ there seems to be evidence of unaltered

transmission, and of one culture imposing upon or replacing another. From

thisÐ and this is why such phenomena have achieved their symbolic importanceÐ

we can derive a simple political message of a villainous or corrupting Americaneeding to be opposed; from this comes a sense of the Other, which paradoxically

reinforces a sense of Australian identity. Ultimately, however, the debate about

Americanisation has always been stymied by the issue of Australian national

identity.

Yet, if we examine those signi® cant aspects of what are taken to help make upthe Australian way of life, we will see more systematic and adaptive uses of

America. The way in which we have taken from a willing donor is a part of

Australian identity. But this is something not easily packaged into a single political

message. Indeed, in the case of postwar Americanisation on which I shall focus,

one might even go so far as to suggest that it is the super® cialities of culturaltransmission that are called `Americanisation’ , while the more systemic and

important American importations are called `modernisation’ , as some authors have

perceived (Bell & Bell 1993; Kuisel 1993). This verbal difference has played no

small part in confusing larger issues of adaptation and cultural transmission.

Moreover, on a general note, Australian analysts of `Americanisation’ during thepostwar period have overlooked the comparative possibilities provided by overseas

scholars who examined the in¯ uence of America on Europe. The Marshall Plan

modernised Western European capitalism, bringing Fordism (van der Pijl 1984),

through the work of public and private elites who were brought together on state

bodies such as the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) and the Anglo-AmericanCouncil for Productivity (AACP). The continent, however, was only `half-Ameri-

canised’ due to selection and adaptation by the Europeans (Hogan 1985, 1987),

including the French (Kuisel 1993).

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THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF AMERICA 189

This article will demonstrate that, at the same time as European capitalismmodernised, Australian capitalism also modernised to Fordism under the guise of

that old ambition in Australian national identity since European settlement to

develop the continent (Horne 1976; Loveday 1977; White 1981). So it is not

surprising that American ideas rippled out from the Plan to Australia with a

resonance that still echoes today, as we shall see. The principal responsibility fortransmission lay not with the US but with Australians from the major political

parties and leading business organisations, companies and trade unions who so

often pointed to America as the model for Australia’ s future. These groups formed

an historic bloc in consensus around a grand development program of industri-

alisation, immigration, housing, public works, full employment, welfare and afacilitative role for the state. This program, this consensus and this bloc coalesced

as a result of Australian political battles, as Fordist theory advises, and formed for

almost three decades the main ensemble of political and social institutions neces-

sary to balance the Fordist virtuous circle of mass production, mass consumption,

productivity and high wages.1

It was these men and their organisations whopromoted American goods and the specialised American knowledge of manage-

ment theory, advertising, selling and distribution, which are of considerable

importance to Fordism (Jessop 1990a, 1990b; Noel 1987) and industrial society

generally (Giddens 1990; Gellner 1965).2

But there was, as well, a blurring of the boundaries between the state and civilsociety. Men from the groups of this bloc manned the state agencies that were most

important to modernisation. Additional Fordist institutions included postwar emerg-

ence of corporations (Aglietta 1979; Butlin et al. 1982, p. 108); a highly regulated

labour market; Taylorism in the factory; increased road building; decentralisation

of industry to the suburbs. But most of all, suburbia was the focal point for thedevelopment program and for these institutions of Fordism. Suburbanisation was

not central to all the countries that experienced Fordism, but it was for America

(Florida & Feldman 1988; Davis 1986, p. 191) and for the `high-consumption’ and

`heavily gadgeted’ Australian homes based on `the American pattern’ (AustralasianManufacturer 1956c, p. 60). Some of the men of the historic bloc came from thesteel, motor vehicle, chemical, oil, food-processing and electrical industries which

were the success stories of the 1950s and 1960s (Boehm 1979, p. 166) feeding this

expanding suburbia. The bungalow in the sprawling suburbs, with all the consumer

treats and a car in the driveway, was the focus for a vast Fordist complex.

World War II left America brimming over as both cornucopia and `arsenal ofdemocracy’ , inaugurating that country’ s greatest period of in¯ uence upon the

world. `The American Way of Life’ was the call to arms for Americans spreading

the apparent lessons of their success through the Marshall Plan of 1948. The Plan

1 For a fuller explanation of Fordism see Noel (1987) or Jessop (1990a, 1990b). These are mere starting

points.2 Carey (1980, 1995) is concerned with the import of American scienti ® c management as the corporate

desire for social control through propaganda. But there is no larger theoretical perspective as I haveoutlined or any awareness of the criticisms of the concept of ideology as articulated by Lichtheim (1965).

Fordist theory can explain the quali® cation that Carey introduces in his argument: ` ¼ I do not mean todeny, I should stress, that many people support such movements in good faith, or even that some good

may come from them’ (1980, p. 85). Carey has little to say about the import to Australia during the timeI am examining (1995, pp. 109±12) and what there is can easily be explained with the Fordist perspective

I have adopted.

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190 M. ROLFE

pursued a strategy of political and economic integration in the reconstruc-tion of Europe (Maier 1977; Hogan 1985, 1987; Kuisel 1993), shifting WesternEuropean economies to reliance on Fordism (van der Pijl 1984). In order to attainthe American `miracle of mass production’ Paul Hoffman, head of the ECA,

demanded that Europeans forget about class con¯ ict and adopt American ideas for`worker and employer teamwork’ and `more ef® cient production’ (Hogan 1985,p. 63). This `politics of productivity’ placed economics over politics, and economicgrowth over class con¯ ict (Maier 1977, p. 613).

Arguably the Plan’ s greatest achievement, says Anthony Carew (1987, p. 3), wasthe development of productivity consciousness among European workers throughproductivity councils, especially the Anglo-American Productivity Council. This

body sent teams from British industries to America. British management mostlydetermined the composition of the teams and the Americans then vetted them forsupposed security risks. The teams toured American companies carefully selectedfrom the northeast where union conditions and industries were more advanced thanin other, non-unionised areas. Sometimes conditions recommended in reports didnot even exist in America. Not surprisingly, this process led to unanimous

conclusions in all the reports, which achieved wide distribution in Britain andacross the world (Carew 1987, pp. 136±44). In Australia, the Associated Chambersof Manufacturers of Australia (ACMA) and the Associated Chambers of Commerceof Australia (ACCA) were instrumental in disseminating the reports, which alsoreceived glowing publicity in trade magazines.3

The result of the teams’ efforts was a politically constructed view of theAmerican worker. Although the teams consisted of specialists in their ® elds, Carew

notes the reports placed greatest emphasis on vague psychological elements ofAmericans, typi® ed in phrases such as `American attitude of mind’ and `Americanproductivity consciousness’ . Such vague rhetoric ignored factors such as thehistorically higher rates of American investment in mechanisation due to the costsof labour, and the bene® ts gained from American economic policy both domesti-cally and internationally during the war. In the 1980s and 1990s Americans were

exhorted to adopt the attitudes of the Japanese. Ironically, this was `Americanisa-tion’ rebounding upon the Americans as the Japanese learnt Quality Control fromthe American Edward Denning after the war.

Turning to the postwar American in¯ uence on Australia, much of the responsi-bility rested with the actions of the state under the Liberal±Country Parties coalitiongovernments led for most of this period by Robert Menzies. Bipartisan continuity

saw his government carry on the postwar development program begun by theChi¯ ey government. However, the Menzies government shifted state policy onhousing to promote home ownership, particularly with the 1956 Commonwealth±State Housing Agreement. The War Service Homes program, the subsidy fromthe Home Savings Grant Scheme and the requirements in 1959 that banks keep50% of their funds for loans for housing further skewed things towards homeownership, which reached 76% in 1961. Regardless of political complexion,

Federal and State governments encouraged a rush to the suburbs (Bunker 1989;Forster 1995).

3 ACMA and ACCA worked in conjunction with the American consulates and the Contact Clearing

House, an ERP body (Manufacturing & Management 1955, p. 58). Various trade journals, includingRetail Trader, Australasian Manufacturer, Federal Accountant and Manufacturing & Management, ran

reviews and/or edited versions of appropriate reports.

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THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF AMERICA 191

Continuity between governments was evident also in the partnership between thestate and certain businessmen and business organisations central to Fordism. A

partnership between the state and manufacturers, ACMA and ACCA, has been

noted before (Glezer 1982; Simms 1982; Bell 1989, 1993; Capling & Galligan

1992). In fact, there was a blurring of the boundaries between the state and civil

society, with origins during the war under the Curtin government (Butlin 1955;Butlin & Schedvin 1977; Hall 1971). After the war, men from leading manufactur-

ing companies, from ACMA, ACCA, primary producer organisations, the ACTU

and sometimes from the Australian Employers Federation were recruited for state

bodies such as the Immigration Planning Council (IPC), Immigration Advisory

Council (IAC), Capital Issues Board (CIB), National Security Resources Board(NSRB), Import Licensing, Ministry of Labour Advisory Council, Reserve Bank

Board and various defence committees.4 Competing sectors were now reconciled

around development, with a place for agriculture secured in Australian Fordism.

Before Marxist conclusions about the state are drawn, it must be known that

representatives of non-class actors the National Council of Women and the RSLwere included on the Import Licensing Committee and the IAC, respectively.

These bodies had `strategic selectivity’ (Jessop 1990b) because of their import-

ance in the distribution and control of capital and labour. The charter of the IPC

was speci® cally geared to agriculture, manufacturing, mining of coal, iron and

copper, housing and the infrastructure for these industries (Australian Archives,MP598/1, Box 2, 9th IPC, 23 October 1951, Attachment 1 to Agendum 55/1951).

Import licensing was instituted by the Menzies government with an inclination

towards the goods of modernisation from America rather than those from Britain

(Australian Archives, A4907/XM1, Minutes of Cabinet Meeting 5±6 March,

Decision No. 328, pp. 3, 5). The double-sided coin of defence and development,with emphasis on industrialisation, guided the CIB5 in its control on investment,

guided the NSRB and the defence committees distributing government money, and

guided the tight control of American dollars.

The evident blurring between state and civil society was further compounded by

organisations such as the Australian Institute of Management and the Australian±American Association (AAA). The latter organisation began in 1936 as the

British±American Cooperation Movement, which overlapped in membership with

the Australia branch of the English Speaking Union (Kent 1980). The latter

organisation arose in 1912 from dedicated supporters in Britain and America of

Anglo-Saxon ideals (van der Pijl 1984, pp. 38±40). In October 1949, the US StateDepartment described AAA of® ceholders as overwhelmingly of coalition member-

ship (Kent 1980, p. 71). Luminaries included Liberal Party members Norman

Myers and George Coles of the eponymous retail chains, stockbroker Ian Potter,

Charles McGrath of Repco, Arthur Warner (electrical appliance manufacturer and

4Also indicative was the close cooperation between the LPA and big companies like BHP, GMH,

AMPOL and CSR in the `Australia Unlimited’ campaign for over a year before the 1958 election (Simms

1982, p. 60). This was American `prestige advertising’ pushing the reputation of a corporation as a goodcorporate citizen, rather than its product. This occurred twenty years prior to the multinational corporation

pushes that both White (1983) and Carey (1995) complained about.5 Australian Archives, Canberra, A571/68, 1956/843 Reinstitution of the Capital Issues Control Policy

1953±58, letter W. C. Balmford to the Secretary, 23 January 1956, attachmentÐ Capital IssuesRegulations 1951±53. Australasian Manufacturer 24 May 1952, p. 20; Commonwealth Parliamentary

Debates, House of Representatives, 14±15 May 1952, p. 359.

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192 M. ROLFE

Melbourne television owner); as well as manufacturers Herbert Gepp of APM andJohn Storey of Repco, Frank Packer, Keith Murdoch, and L. McConnan who led

the banks’ charge against Chi¯ ey’ s bank nationalisation. Many of these men were

also on the original council of the IPA (Vic.). Another AAA member, mining

magnate W. S. Robinson, described the organisation as `an important propaganda

centre, favouring the economic beliefs which made the United States great and,Australians hope, will make their own country equally so’ (Robinson 1970, p. 215).

The Australian Institute of Management (AIM) was formed by leading manufac-

turers and participants in state agencies: John Storey, chair of the IPC; Essington

Lewis of BHP and industrial czar of the war effort; Herbert Gepp; and William

Queale of Kelvinator, the AAA and the IPC (Manufacturing & Management 1952,p. 119). AIM was instrumental in spreading American management theory and

scienti® c management through its courses attended by thousands of Australians

(See also Cochrane 1985; Carey 1980, 1995).

However, what foundered the relationship in the late 1940s between the ALP and

business was socialism. The Liberal Party (LPA) pro ® ted by this situation when inopposition, especially in leading ACMA, ACCA, the Institutes of Public Affairs

and various anti-Labor groups against the Chi¯ ey government after 1946 (May

1968). Of great importance was Liberal Party use of America to capture the

standard of modernity while condemning the ALP for its socialism and responsi-

bility for Australia’ s problems. Thus the LPA became identi® ed with the future andaspirations for an American-style consumer society centred on the home and

family, the same locus of Menzies’ appeal in speeches such as the Forgotten People

broadcast of 1942 (Brett 1984). The language of `productivity’ , `growth’ , and `way

of life’ were adopted to change the old Australian banners of full employment and

`rising standards of living’ and modernise Australia along Fordist lines. Thispowerful mix of the familiar and the new aided the Liberal Party in creating an

intellectual and rhetorical space distinct from that of the Australian Labor Party.

Thus we are able to explain further the identi® cation of the Menzies era and its

achievements with the easily ridiculed `suburbia’ and the success of twenty-three

consecutive years of coalition government.A number of people oversaw the birth of the Liberal Party. Herbert Gepp

inspired the Victorian branch of ACMA to form the Institute of Public Affairs,

Victoria (IPA±Vic.), which stands out as the prominent organisation in the birth of

the LPA (Aimer 1973, 1979; Simms 1982). The IPA (Vic.) was an organising point

and fundraiser for anti-socialist forces in the 1940s, as well as a think-tank withpublications such as Looking Forward, Increased Production, Facts and the IPAReview . Depression, war, policies of the Chi¯ ey government, and public expecta-

tions had left the IPA (Vic.) with little alternative but to accept that the capitalist

state had important responsibilities for full employment and social security. In this

new world the authors of Looking ForwardÐ and the IPA generallyÐ distancedthemselves from the prewar economy.

Similarly, Australians later read an article originally from Fortune that American

capitalism was completely different to its prewar counterpart because of the

democratisation of ownership and af¯ uence so that `American capitalism today is

a system in which all Americans have a shareÐ Main Street has replaced WallStreet as the dominating factor’ (Rydges 1952, pp. 163±4). Shares, pro ® ts, jobs,

high wages and social security were bene® ting all such that `distressing poverty’ ,

`serious unemployment’ , `bad working conditions’ were banished (Facts 1953).

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THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF AMERICA 193

Such arguments were considered important to fending off the alternative per-ceivedÐ incorrectly as it turned outÐ in the bountiful production of the Soviet

centrally planned economy. Thus, at the height of the Cold War, the Fortuneeditors borrowed from Marxism to celebrate the `USAÐ Permanent Revolution’ ,

where the `American Way of Life’ was `simply the manifestation of certain

universal laws working on American soil over a certain period’ (Rydges 1952,p. 163). Peter Drucker trumpeted in 1950 that `The world revolution of our time is

ª made in Americaº ¼ The true revolutionary principle is the idea of mass pro-

duction’ (1950, p. xi).

Sections of Looking Forward were adopted at the 1944 conference that inaugu-

rated the LPA (see Thompson et al. 1986, p. 35). However, there was still businesscriticism of Looking Forward, which led the IPA to publish Increased Production(Hay 1982, p. 211). The difference is vital, for the ALP’ s strong suits of full

employment and social security were to be made dependent on `a third great

aim ¼ maximum ef® ciency or maximum productivityÐ and the attention of the

community riveted fairly and squarely upon it’ (Institute of Public Affairs 1945,p. 10). It will be noticed that `production’ and `productivity’ were interchange-

able for writers of the 1940s and 1950s. The notion of standard of livingÐ which

had been considered in terms of wages since the beginning of the centuryÐ was

also made dependent on productivity. Increased Production points throughout to

America but one quotation will suf® ce:

It is not too much to say that we are witnessing a new industrial revolution. The

United States, with wise economic direction, would seem to have within it the

power to win not merely `freedom from want’ but a standard of material comfort

for its people surpassing anything hitherto envisaged. (Institute of Public Affairs

1945, p. 19)

The American utopia was succinctly encapsulated in the phrase `The American

Way of Life’ , which soon minted its Australian cousin. Richard White noted the

vagueness of the notion, yet it was to be defended against communist subversion.

It also accommodated American cultural transmission to Australia and wasidenti® ed with suburbia and the home with the car and consumer goods supplied

by manufacturing (White 1979, 1981). To the IPA the `psychological climate of

America’ was ultimately `the root’ of the `startling productivity of the United

States’ . The IPA proposed `the American Way’ as `the accepted way of life of the

Australian people’ (Institute of Public Affairs 1949b, p. 130) and in 1949 observed:

It is not the much-lauded American industrial `know-how’ that is so important, as

the American attitude of mind ¼ Australia needs a new national outlook and

faith, a new philosophy of industry and politics. It needs leaders who can bring

the nation to a new way of life. (Institute of Public Affairs 1949a, p. 14)

Here is the same resort to vague psychology that Carew criticised in the Marshall

Plan.

In the late 1940s all countries outside the US, including Australia, had to endure

shortages, rationing and dif® cult conditions. Like almost all governments of the

time the Chi¯ ey government was compromised by the complexities of governingin a turbulent world recovering from war while seeking to modernise, usually with

American goods bought with American dollars or even with American investment.

Scarcities drove the ALP government to be concerned with production and a

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194 M. ROLFE

production campaign (Australian Archives, A462 404/4 Pt. 1), with Chi¯ ey on theradio exhorting the nation to greater effort (Crisp 1961, pp. 343±50). Scarcities

could only be solved by the development program but this needed rare American

dollars. As part of Britain’ s sterling bloc with its shared imperial pool of dollars,

Australia was not in control of a very rationed commodity. Moreover, it was

uncomfortably caught in the rivalry between the sterling and dollar blocs(McFarlane 1984; See Pemberton 1987).

However, the opposition under Menzies simply ignored such complexities. No

attempt was made to gainsay the Chi¯ ey government’ s rhetoric on full employ-

ment. Instead, Menzies castigated the ALP, for `the basic evil of socialism is that

it takes production for granted and devotes its greatest efforts to re-distribution’(Liberal Party of Australia 1949, p. 16). In September 1947 Harold Holt was able

to turn a critique of Britain into an attack on socialism for white-anting the empire.

Only a `few years ago’ Britain was `the saviour of civilisation’ but now it was `a

tragedy’ . This would not have happened `but for the introduction of doctrinaire

socialism. Great Britain is being dragged down today, just as this country is, by theadoption of that vicious policy.’ Holt ignored `all sorts of theories’ about Britain’ s

slip, the loss of `its overseas investments, a great many other things ¼ I do not

regard these statements seriously’ (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates [here-

after CPD] 1947, p. 237). Even talk of the dollar shortage was merely `mumbo-

jumbo’ (CPD 1949, p. 365).The opposition simply equated Britain’ s situation and Australia’ s problems with

socialism. This was unfavourably compared to an equation comparing America

with capitalism and the coalition. It was an effective use of the maxim `Keep it

simple, stupid’ that political parties easily indulge in to make electoral choice more

stark and obvious. The coalition was offering a clear path to heaven and glorieseverafter of American-style capitalismÐ but only if the devil of socialism was put

to the hindmost. While the Empire was ravaged by disputatious socialists, Harold

Holt could point across the seas to America `the home of individualism’ :

The United States of America is not torn by con¯ ict on the issue whether the

country is to become socialist ¼ The people of the United States of America have

made up their minds about the country’ s basic policy, and they have a chance of

getting somewhere because they know where they want to go. (CPD 1948,

p. 2061)

Gaining of® ce did not give Menzies and his government any magic solutions to theproblems Chi¯ ey faced. Furthermore, the dilemma deepened in 1950 with the

Korean War. Australian defence requirements now competed with the development

program. Booming wool exports for the war drove in¯ ation higher. There were

problems within the most strike-prone industries. Under-investment in the mining

and stevedoring industries, especially in housing, caused worker disgruntlement.Moreover, in a meeting with the minister for National Development, Richard

Casey, the Joint Coal Board complained about the `reluctant to recalcitrant’ attitude

of the management and owners of coal mines (Casey, MS6150, Series 4, Box 26,

vol. 13, 13 April 1950). But it became easier to blame communists in Australia

under the direction and pay of Moscow to foment strife and thus bring aboutrevolution through the disruption of production. A 1948 LPA document noted that

raising the ordinary unionists’ standard of living was `a secondary consideration’

of Australian union leaders. Their attitudes stood in `direct contrast’ to the

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THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF AMERICA 195

`American union leader’ whose `primary objective’ , it said, `is to give security tothe worker’ , not through restriction but `through the expansion of production’

(Liberal Party of Australia 1948, p. 1). Here was the idealised view of American

labour that Carew criticised.

Rising in¯ ation in 1950, however, dented the government’ s popularity. As an

antidote the party’ s strategic Public Relations Committee decided upon `Propa-ganda ¼ to rally general support for the Government’ and `direct the public mind

to the evidence of the worldwide Communist conspiracy to sabotage production

and defence preparations in the Democracies’ (Liberal Party of Australia 1951,

p. 6). This was the Liberal strategy in the April 1951 election, which came one

month after the High Court disallowed the Menzies’ bill banning the CommunistParty. The actual reasons for dissolving parliament were forgotten during the

election campaign with the opportunity to kick the communist can. US secretaries

Dean Acheson and George Marshall did not want to see the return of a Labor

government (United States Department of State 1951, p. 183), especially one

headed by ALP leader Herbert `Doc’ Evatt. With the hurried compliance of theTruman administration Menzies was able to parade a draft of the ANZUS Treaty

for the voters only one week before the election.

Like its predecessor, the coalition government sought a `double insurance’

foreign policy involving Britain and America for both development and security

(Pemberton 1987). The realities, though, saw a gradually greater reliance on the USthrough ANZUS and international events of the 1950s; the American-led and

® nanced International Refugee Organisation and its successors which sent migrants

to Australia as part of the strategy for reconstructing Europe; seven World Bank

loans for development; and the International Wheat Agreements and International

Materials Conference, which were American-led cartels. This situation was evidentat the annual Coral Sea Week commemorations organised by the Australian±

American Association in every capital city and many lesser ones. From 1950 until

the late 1960s ample newspaper coverage across these cities portrayed a uniform

sentiment of gratitude for our American saviour in the Battle of the Coral Sea of

1942 and the hope that a similar blessing would turn back any future danger. Theeditor of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce journal The Record evoked best

the tensions between nostalgia for sentimental ties and the needs of the future:

Ef® ciency is their watchword, in war and peace ¼ we know that the American

Navy, and the Fifth American Air Force saved Australia from invasion and

occupation [a reference to the Coral Sea battle; MR] ¼ In the productive arts of

peace, the Americans lead the free world. The truth is that the American product

is superior to the British product in many instances, and in very many cases is

superior to the Australian product ¼ It wasn’ t always so; we do not underestimate

the tremendous cultural and commercial debt we owe to Britain, and we do not

forget our British heritage; nor do we think for a moment that we are in the

slightest degree anti-British, because we are pro-American. In any case, American

civilisation is to a very large extent based on British civilisation ¼ Ef® ciency,

that bright jewel in a half-darkened, half-socialised world, shines on as the

guiding star in the United States, based on, and nurtured by, free, really free,

individual, competitive enterprise. (The Record 1954, p. 7)

Anglo-Saxondom provided the key conceptual link to language which embraced

Australians, Britons and Americans and harked back to the turn of the century. In

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the 1950s it made the Americans acceptable as torch-bearers of Anglo-Saxondom,accommodating Australia’ s changing relationships. When in Washington in 1950 to

get the ® rst of the seven US loans for the development program, Menzies compared

the pioneering efforts of America in the nineteenth century with that of Australia

in the twentieth and noted:

The power and signi® cance of the United States are not the creation of a few

modern years. They are a growth of centuries. The spirit of America was not

breathed into you the day before yesterday. Some of it goes back, I am proud to

say, to the Shakespeares and the Raleighs and the Drakes and a common heritage.

(Current Notes on International Affairs 1950, p. 574)

Employing Empire and America in tandem, the rhetoric of Anglo-Saxondom acted

as a thread of continuity from the security of an imagined antiquity into the adventof an expected prosperity during the rapid metamorphosis into a Fordist society and

the most frigid times of the Cold War. ANZUS completed the link between

defence, development, anti-communism and American-style Fordism. For over 20

years American Fordism provided the path for our society to a vista of `Australia

Unlimited’ . Only America could protect our society through ANZUS and only thecoalition government could assure our safe and secure development along that path.

From now until the 1980s the coalition continually berated the ALP as threats to

the alliance.

Such a secure situation accompanied profound changes in the leading industries

feeding suburbia. In the 1940s and 1950s there was a `great trek’ of business peopleof all ® elds to America (Australian Institute of Political Science 1957, p. 178),

evident in most editions of Manufacturing & Management and AustralasianManufacturer. These listed the men and some women who travelled to Britain and

the Continent (which were also modernising with help from the US) but more often

to America, seeking experts, designs and techniques. By 1956, 696 US companieswere connected to Australian companies, mostly through licensing agreements

(Australasian Manufacturer 1956b, p. 41). An American technical mission arrived

in Australia in 1957 and its report reveals the debt of Australian vehicle, engineer-

ing, white-goods, television and appliance industries at the centre of the growing

Fordist web:

There is an extensive and ever increasing tie-in between American and Australian

manufacturers. Throughout the Australian industry, appreciation was expressed to

American industry for making available technical information on products and

production techniques toward which the Australians lean heavily. (Australian

Archives, A1209/23, 1957/5480, Pt. 3, Memo P. E. Ruestow to Assistant

Secretary of Defence [ISA], p. 2)

One may amplify the report to ® nd the same reliance with chemical companies6 and

other white-goods companies.7

Mass production needed mass consumption mediated by mass advertising and

mass distribution involving supermarkets and shopping centres. Advertising

6 Australian Manufacturing 14 January 1956, p. 24, 11 February 1956, p. 69, 30 June 1956, p. 72, 21

July 1956, p. 81, 16 April 1956, p. 343A.7 Australian Manufacturing 19 January 1957, p. 69, 21 July 1956, p. 42, 5 May 1956, p. 80, 15 March

1956, p. 308.

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agencies sent their people to America to learn the latest techniques.8

During the

1940s and 1950s there was a `ceaseless ¯ ow of Coles and Woolworths men’ to the

US bringing back `the gospel’ on supermarkets (Nation 1960, p. 12). The ® rst

shopping centre was opened in Brisbane in 1957, designed by a young architect

who trained in America. But the major shopping centre developer of the 1960s was

the Myers retailing group, which brought out a Los Angeles specialist agency to

design their ® rst in Chadstone, Melbourne (Marshall 1962, pp. 228±30; see also

Rolfe 1992a, 1992b). The primary design feature of supermarkets and shopping

centres was the parking area, a repository for the cars sitting in the driveways of

suburban homes. These cars took families along freeways designed by American

transport consultants for Sydney, Melbourne (Sandercock 1977, pp. 156, 192±3),

Canberra, Adelaide and many other Australian cities. American theories dominated

Australian transport studies in the 1960s (Black 1974, p. 78).

Returning to productivity we ® nd no simple transference but its adaptation to

Australian conditions via little of® cial encouragement in its promotion. Top

businessmen, business groups, unions and even Richard Casey urged the Menzies

government to initiate a productivity drive along the lines of the AACP (Casey,

MS6150, Series 4, Box 26, vol. 13, 9 June, 5 July and 23 November 1950; vol. 14,

18 January 1951; Australian Archives, A694 B155 Pt. 3 general folio nos 240, 242,

334). But no such agency eventuated. There was no enthusiasm from Menzies, nor

from the top mandarins who believed in getting the capital and labour ® rst and

using them more ef® ciently later. Nothing was to upset the cooperation between

government, business and labour thought to be fundamental to the development

program (Australian Archives, A694/1 B155 Pt. 1 folio nos 31,42). The Australian

Productivity Council (APC) was formed in 1959 along the lines of the British

Productivity Council (the successor to the AACP) but without involvement by the

Menzies government. The subsequent creation in 1961 of councils in the NSW and

federal spheres for coordinating the efforts of the Department of Labour and

National Service, industry productivity groups and the APC (Pahlow 1962, pp. 54±

6) were only advisory and proved fragmented.

There was no speci® c measure of productivity at this time in Australia.

Objective, statistical certainty seemed to arrive with the invention in 1938 of gross

national product (GNP) by American Professor Simon Kuznets, later an adviser to

a European statistical bureau founded by the Marshall Plan. But Australia did not

have a comparable feat until N. G. Butlin’ s Australian Domestic Product, Invest-

ment and Foreign Borrowing 1861± 1938/39. Nevertheless, analysing productivity

has always been a complex task because of the range of variables involved. These

are not simply encapsulated by quoting productivity per worker, let alone assuming

attitude as an explanation. Productivity is an abstract term and its measurement,

said one bureaucrat in words that have resonance today:

¼ is a very dif ® cult matter. Its dif ® culty lies in the absence of adequate data and

in the usual problems of de® nition and interpretation, but most of all from the fact

that the concept of productivity itself is an imperfect one. In relation to a

8 See Broadcasting & Television 18 October 1957, p. 31, 13 December 1957, p. 32, 21 February 1958,

p. 35, 16 May 1958, p. 30, 30 May 1958, p. 34, 19 September 1958, p. 31, 17 October 1958, p. 16. Seealso Newspaper News 1 November 1955, p. 23, 1 February 1956, p. 12, 3 April 1956, p. 12, 1 June 1956,

p. 12.

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particular process productivity can be a fairly precise idea ¼ Where there are a

variety of products, the idea is necessarily less precise; and when the idea is

related to the whole national economy it becomes extremely imprecise. This is

essentially because changes in the nature and quality of what is produced cannot

really be quantitatively measured; and the idea therefore of a quantitatively

measurable thing called productivity only has meaning for the real world in cases

where qualitative differences are negligible. (Australian Archives, A694 B155 Pt.

3 folio 210, Note On Productivity Amended copy p. 5)

The problems with measuring such an abstraction have been easily overlooked

during the contentious uses of productivity in political rhetoric. It is used to makeinternational comparisons, often with associations of decline and future effort to be

pursued. This began during the Cold War when GNP measure was used to create

a ladder of nations. By such a number we could quantify the economic threat of

the Soviet Union to America and the West, at a time when the centrally planned

communist economy was perceived as a viable alternative to capitalism. But alsoGNP demonstrated how much exertion awaited each nation to catch up to the US,

the model for modernisation. Such a snakes and ladders game of international

comparisons still dominates us today.

Drawing on such international comparisons, productivity became a weapon in

the trench warfare of partisan politics. There was a widespread belief in the late1940s that productivity had fallen considerably since before the war, and the LPA

played on this to attack the Chi¯ ey government. But a Liberal research document

of 1950 conceded: `There is some dif® culty in ® nding exact evidence of this

decline’ (Liberal Party of Australia 1950, p. 1). While addressing leading business-

men in May 1952, Casey put most of the blame `for our low productivity’ onLabour’ s advocacy of `class war’ , which stood in stark contrast to America which

had no such political party (Casey, MS6150, Box 27, Series 4, vol. 14, 12 May

1952).

The rhetoric of American-style productivity had been around since the 1940s, as

we have seen. However, Smyth sees the events of 1956 as seminal in ending theuse of Keynesian intervention for the greater good of social policy and instead

using it for economic growth in the af¯ uent society (Smyth 1990, p. 190). It has

been the responsibility of all Australians ever since to `make the cake bigger’ ,

rather than worry about its division. The Menzies’ government called an election

for December 1955 because it expected a recession in 1956 (Liberal Party ofAustralia 1956, p. 1). Nevertheless, a crisis arose for the government in February

1956 with a surprising public statement by eight leading economists on the `acute

economic crisis’ (The Age 1956). A snowball of publicity followed in the newspa-

pers. The IPA and the tripartite Ministry of Labour Advisory Council called for

higher productivity and productivity consciousness among Australians (Austra-lasian Manufacturer 1956a, p. 82). Menzies had to deliver a mini-budget in March

and addressed the nation in language that shifted responsibility away from the

government and on to the rest of the nation, `the real key’ said a Liberal

backbencher (Hulme 1956):

The attack on the productivity problem is a matter for urgent attention ¼ We

have not yet understood that rapidly increasing population, industrial expansion,

adequate national defence, high and stable unemployment, just social services,

and rising real standards for the individualÐ to all of which we are as a nation

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dedicatedÐ cannot be simultaneously achieved without increasing skill, organis-

ation and effort. To put it quite clearly, we cannot have increased development

and increasing individual consumption without increased production, savings and

investment. (The Age 1956, p. 5)

However, we also ® nd the ALP adopting the same priorities. The AustralianInstitute of Political Science convened a conference on productivity in the wake of

the economic problems. One of the ALP’ s favourite sons, Frank Crean, placed

productivity after full employment but before socialism (Australian Institute of

Political Science 1957, p. 5). Arthur Calwell joined Menzies in proclaiming

productivity `one of the greatest tasks facing the nation’ (The Age 1961). Calwelllater told President Kennedy that nation building was proceeding very rapidly in

Australia, faster than that achieved by the US during its greatest period (The Age1963). This echoed the analogies of the nineteenth century as well as the broadcast

in 1938 of a previous Labor leader, Billy Hughes: `What we are, you were; and

what you are, we hope to be’ .Such patterns of rhetoric are still extant. In the 1996 election, John Howard

spoke like his Liberal forebear of the `forgotten people’ overlooked by Labor, the

`battlers’ `of mainstream Australia’ and their `great Australian dream of employ-

ment and home ownership’ (Howard 1996a). Productivity was still a national

endeavour and the barrier across the yellow brick road was still in the labourmarket. But it was not in place due to communist action. In the 1990s productivity

in public rhetoric is understood in terms of `genuine microeconomic reform’

(Howard 1996a). Central to this goal is reform of the industrial relations system to

allow workplace agreements that will deliver more jobs and boost income (Howard

1996b; Robb 1996f). Such reform is the main concern of the ProductivityCommission (Howard 1996a). The snakes and ladder game continues with un-

favourable comparisons made to OECD averages of GDP per worker (Howard

1996a) and to the success of the American labour market in solving unemployment.

However, there is little other understanding of productivity. There are juxtaposi-

tionsÐ and that is allÐ of productivity with `savings’ and `innovation’ in the policylaunch (Howard 1996a), but no place for productivity in the superannuation policy

(Robb 1996e). There is no aim to enhance productivity through science and

technology, especially research in universities (Robb 1996a, b). Productivity only

occurs elsewhere with privatisation and reduced costs of government services

(Robb 1996c, d). In other words, we have an understanding of productivity in termsof post-Fordism and its tenets of ¯ exible labour organisation and privatisation, in

contrast to the 1950s when it was perceived through the tripartite consensus of

Fordism. Productivity is ¯ aunted as a `wonder weapon’ curing all of Australia’ s

economic ills, including trade. But Ian McFarlane, the current governor of the

Reserve Bank, is sceptical of Liberal claims that industrial relations reform willsolve unemployment, and his predecessor, Bernie Fraser, has slammed such claims

of `solving unemployment and sundry other ills’ (Henderson 1996, p. 1).

In 1997 Howard returned to Australia full of admiration for the United States and

its success in curing unemployment through high labour mobility and a low

minimum wage. This came after much public criticism of his government’ s failureto reduce high unemployment at home. But some critics pointed to the failure of

Bangladesh or Britain, with an actual unemployment rate of 7.5% (Toohey 1997),

to live up to Howard’ s argument for a lower minimum wage. Howard’ s `glib

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embrace’ of the situation was far more complex. Creation of jobs in America wasultimately due to that country having the highest productivity rate in the world. One

possible cause of low manufacturing productivity in Australia was the use of more

labour in place of capital due to low real wages. By comparison to other countries

Australia has a low level of capital per person employed (Walsh 1997). Moreover,

a complication for the idea of labour mobility is that Americans have always beena people of great geographical mobility (Monkkonen 1988, pp. 27, 194±202). This

suggests one of their differences from Australians which is rooted in history,

regardless of economic principles of ¯ exibility of the factors of production.

Ultimately, we still have in `productivity’ a complex term reduced to simplicities.

Far from productivity being a mere `economic’ term, it is also a broad andconstantly changing term of political debate.

We still have a complex term reduced to simplicities. Far from productivity

being a mere `economic’ term, it is a broad and constantly changing term of

political debate.

Each wave of Americanisation throughout Australia’ s history has also fed abackwash of feeling against such a tide. Stereotypes of America have been intrinsic

to the debates on what this in¯ uence has meant for Australia, particularly the

negative image of America as a threat which has gained most prominence

in the cultural imperialism argument. Ironically, such stereotypes of threat have

been grist to the mill of de® nition of Australian national identity. Ultimately,however, such depictions exhibit little sense of the complexity of `negotiation’ of

Americana: how they arrive and what is done with them once they are here (Bell

& Bell 1993, p. 201). Like the French (Kuisel 1993, p. 232), Australians selected

and adapted from American Fordism. There was even some second-hand acqui-

sition through Britain. This whole process, however, proceeded according to thepolitics of Australian modernisation and the associated line-up of political and

economic forces that held America aloft as the model to follow. Complicating and

cross-cutting this theme of transmission was use of America in political debate for

partisan advantage, despite the lack of substantial difference between the parties

over development, production and relations with America.Since World War II, suburbia has been at the centre of debate on Australian

national identity (White 1981; Gilbert 1988). We can actually see how `American-

isation’ has played an intrinsic part in Australian suburbia and so in our national

identity. By 1964 Donald Horne celebrated Australia’ s world-historic progressive-

ness as the ® rst suburban nation and `one of the ® rst nations to ® nd part of themeaning of life in the purchase of consumer goods’ (1984, pp. 25±9). J. D. Pringle

believed Australia was `certainly one of the most democratic and egalitarian

countries the world has ever seen’ . Class strains had always been conquered by

`the growing wealth of the country [which has] even strengthened democracy.

The Australian worker, well paid, can afford almost everything he wants’(1958, pp. 96, 111). The `Australian Way of Life’ celebrated by the IPA in 1964

involved:

the democratisation of the motor car with its side effects of road congestion,

numerous immaculate petrol stations and modern-architectured motels

¼ multiplication of modern, attractively designed factories ¼ houses comprehen-

sively equipped with the labour-saving and entertainment-giving `gadgets’ .

(Institute of Public Affairs 1964, pp. 9±10)

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No notice was given by these authors to the American contribution but still they

celebrated Australian achievements. Suburbia was a British invention for the upper

class but once imported here decades of Australian alacrity shaped it to become a

dream for all. It has been identi® ed with the Menzies’ years and his paean tosuburbia the `Forgotten People’ , because suburbia was the focus for a car, housing,

electrical appliance and steel complex that stood at the centre of Fordism in

Australia. The Australians involved with this development were the lock keepers of

a wave of modernisation and their work still imbues our existence today.

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