The radical dawa in transition The rise of Islamic ... · 1.4.8 The radical dawa’s claim of representation 24 1.4.9 Answering the competition: intolerant isolationism and anti-democratic

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The radical dawa in transition

The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands

20071542 Broch DAWA Eng.indd 1 08-10-2007 15:39:17

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Table of contents

Foreword 7

Introduction 9

1 TheriseofIslamicneoradicalismintheNetherlands 15

1.1 ThreephasesinthedevelopmentofDutchIslamicradicalism 15

1.2 Firstphase:IslamicradicalismtakesrootintheNetherlands

underforeigndirection 16

1.3 Secondphase:theriseofautonomousdomesticradicalism 17

1.3.1 Foreigncontroldeclinesinfavourofautonomy 17

1.3.2 Fragmentation,lackoforganisationandamateurism 17

1.3.3 Theinternet:akeycatalystinthefragmentedsecondphase 18

1.3.4 Theradicaldawadecideswhereitstandsonjihad 19

1.3.5 TheautonomisationoftheradicaldawaintheNetherlandsand

therestofEurope 20

1.4 Thirdphase:theriseofIslamicneoradicalism 20

1.4.1 Aneworientation,notyetanewmovement 20

1.4.2 Towardsmorestructureandmorecoherentstrategicand

tacticalthinking 21

1.4.3 Anewvisionoftherankandfile 21

1.4.4 Declineoftheinternetinthethirdphase? 22

1.4.5 Theuseofviolenceisinopportune 22

1.4.6 Theriseofnon-radicalmovements 22

1.4.7 Theriseofnon-activistultra-orthodoxmovements 24

1.4.8 Theradicaldawa’sclaimofrepresentation 24

1.4.9 Answeringthecompetition:intolerantisolationismand

anti-democraticactivism 25

1.4.10 Undemocraticandanti-democratictactics 26

1.4.11 ThepowersbehindIslamicneoradicalismintheNetherlands

andelsewhereinEurope 27

1.4.12 ThegrowthpotentialofIslamicneoradicalism 28

1.5 Thethreephases:threeformsofIslamicradicalism 28

2 DawaSalafismintheNetherlands:thedrivingforcebehind

theriseofIslamicneoradicalism 33

2.1 Introduction 33


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2.2 Firstphase:creationofaSalafifaithcommunityintheNetherlands 33

2.3 Secondphase:asecondgenerationofSalafisandautonomisation

ofthedawa 34

2.4 Thirdphase:theriseofIslamicneoradicalismwithinSalafismin

theNetherlands 35

2.4.1 IncreasingprofessionalismandfocusupontheDutchsituation 35

2.4.2 ProfessionalisationofSalafidawaonthelecturecircuit 36

2.4.3 ThepoliticisationofSalafidawa 38

2.5 PoliticaldawaSalafism:anemergingradicalmassmovement? 38

2.5.1 GrowingsupportthroughtheSalafilecturecircuit 38

2.5.2 Asocialappealtoresentment 40

2.5.3 Acommonnewidentityastheanswertothecrisisofidentity 40

2.5.4 Thepoliticaldiscourseembracesaprocessofsocialisation 41

2.6 Theradicaldawa:intolerantisolationismand

anti-democraticactivism 42

2.6.1 Theanti-integrationtheologyofSalafism 42

2.6.2 Thestruggleagainstidolatry(‘shirk’)andinnovation(‘bidah’) 42

2.6.3 Intolerantisolationism 43

2.6.4 Rejectionofdemocracyandastatebaseduponsecularlaw 45

3 OtherradicaldawamovementsinEuropeandtheriseof

Islamicneoradicalism 47

3.1 Introduction 47

3.2 TheradicaldawainEurope:threephases 47

3.3 TheactivismofradicaldawamovementsinEurope 48

3.3.1 ThegrowthoftheradicaldawainEurope 48

3.3.2 TheMuslimBrotherhood:foundersofmodernradical

Islamicactivism 49

3.3.3 TablighiJamaat:Islamicreligiousactivisminthefirstphase 53

3.3.4 Hizbut-Tahrir:polarisingIslamicradicalism 54

3.4 ThegrowthofIslamicneoradicalisminEurope 56

4 SecurityrisksfromIslamicneoradicalism 59

4.1 Whendoesradicalismendangerthedemocraticlegalorder? 59

4.1.1 Thedefinitionofradicalismwithsecurityconsequences 59

4.1.2 Thedemocraticlegalorder:apoliticalsystemandawayofliving 59

4.1.3 Abroadviewofsecurity 61

4.1.4 Assessingriskstothedemocraticlegalorder 61


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4.2 Theradicaldawa:therisksnowandinthelongerterm 62

4.2.1 Thecurrentrisks:partialdysfunctionofthedemocraticlegalorder 62

4.2.2 Factorscontributingtothefurthergrowthoftheradicaldawa 68

4.2.3 Possiblelong-termrisks 70

5 StrategiestocounterIslamicneoradicalism 73

5.1 Governmentcountermeasuresandthedemocraticparadox 73

5.2 Betweenpreventionandrepression:strategiestocounter

radicalisation 75

5.3 CounteringbothIslamicradicalismitselfandinaccurate

perceptionsofit 76

5.3.1 Relativistandabsolutistperceptions 76

5.3.2 Preconditionsforthedevelopmentofeffectivestrategies 77

Summary 81

Appendix 85

HistoricalsketchofmodernSalafism 85


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Foreword

ItiswithgreatpleasurethatIpresenttheTheRadical Dawa in Transition,areport

bytheGeneralIntelligenceandSecurityServiceoftheNetherlands(Algemene

Inlichtingen-enVeiligheidsdienst,AIVD).Thisisthelatestinaseriesofpublications

andalertsaboutradicalIslamfromtheAIVD.

BasedupontheAIVD’sownoperationalinvestigations,aswellasknowledgesharedby

otherEuropeansecurityservices,thisreportprovidesadetailedfactualoverviewofthe

natureandextentoftheproblemofthepropagationofanintolerantradicalideology

andtheactualrisksthatitposestoourdemocraticorder.

TheAIVDhasestablishedthatthenon-violentversionofradicalIslamisbeing

evangelisedonaneverincreasingscaleintheNetherlandsandelsewhereinEurope,

andthatthatactivityisbecomingmoreandmoreorganised.Despiteitsnon-violent

form,thisideologyisstilldisruptingtherelationshipswithinandbetweenethnic

groups.Thiscanresultinradicalisation,polarisationandsocialisolation.

Myhopeisthatthesubtledistinctionsandrealisticriskassessmentsdescribedby

myserviceinTheRadical Dawa in Transition willbereflectedintheresponsestothis

report.Aone-sidedevaluationoftheissuecaneasilyleadtoexaggeratedresponses,

andtheymaywellsimplyreinforcetheexistingmistrustbetweencertainsectionsof

thepopulation.Onlyacarefulandqualifiedapproachtothesubjectdoesjusticetoits

complexity.

Director-GeneraloftheGeneralIntelligenceandSecurityServiceoftheNetherlands

S.J.vanHulst


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Introduction

Inrecentyears,andcertainlysincethemurderofTheovanGoghinNovember2004,

muchofthepublicdebateonradicalIslamintheNetherlandshasbeendominated

bytheviolentjihad.ThiscurrentwithinradicalIslamencouragestheuseofviolence

againstwhatitperceivesas‘theenemiesofIslam’inordertoinstigatesocialand

politicalchangesinlinewiththereligiousconvictionsofthejihadis.Thathasprompted

discussionaboutavarietyofquestionsinDutchpolitics,mediaandsocietyatlarge.

Forexample:towhatextentcanthisformofterrorismunderminethedemocratic

legalorder?Whatlegalmeasurescanbetakentopreventit?Whatpoliticalorsocial

developmentsmighthavegeneratedthisjihad?AndhowcanyoungMuslimsbe

preventedfromresortingtoviolenceoutofdissatisfactionwiththeirpositioninsociety?

Thedebateontheseissuesisongoingand,influencedbyinternationaldevelopmentsas

muchasdomesticones,ismostunlikelytoloseanyofitsvehemenceanytimesoon.

Thejihadimessageofmobilisationhassofarfoundhardlyanysupportwithin

theDutchMuslimcommunity.Asaresult,therealstrengthofthoseactiveinthe

Netherlandsremainslimited–althoughanyactualterroristattackwouldcertainly

provehighlydisruptive.TheAIVDthereforeremainsasattentiveasevertotheviolent

jihadinallitsforms.

ContemporaryradicalIslamdoesnotexpressitselfonlythroughviolence,however,

althoughthatissometimesverymuchtheimpressiononemightgain.Inthe

Netherlands,asinseveralneighbouringEuropeancountries,therecurrentlyexistsa

varietyofmovementsactivelyseekingtheimpositionofstrictIslamiclawandtenets.

Andthey,forallsortsofreasons,areexperiencinggrowth.Thesemovementshave

theiroriginsintheIslamicworld,operateaccordingtoastronglyreligiousagenda,are

outspokenlyhostiletothevaluesofWesterndemocracyinawholerangeofrespects

andrejecttheideaofintegrationintoasocietybuiltuponthosevalues.Innoway,

however,dotheypropoundtheuseofviolenceinordertoachievetheirobjectives.

TheirmessagedoesverymuchseemtostrikeachordwithgroupsofyoungMuslims

intheNetherlandsandotherpartsofWesternEurope,whoarecurrentlystruggling

withissuesofidentity.Consequently,atrainhasbeensetinmotionwhich–giventhe

growththesemovementscurrentlyareenjoying–mighteventuallyleadtoagrowing

sectionoftheDutchorEuropeanMuslimcommunitiesturningaway,physicallyas

wellasmentally,fromtheirsurroundingsocieties.Thereisnothreatofviolencehere,

norofanimminentassaultupontheDutchorWesterndemocraticorder,butthisisa

slowprocesswhichcouldgraduallyharmsocialcohesionandsolidarityandundermine


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certainfundamentalhumanrights.Inthisrespect,onecouldrefertosuchphenomena

asatendencytowardsextremeisolationismcoupledwithrigidintolerancetowards

otherbeliefsandopinions,anti-democraticbehaviourandinsomecasesevenadesire

toimposeaseparateformofjustice,withultra-orthodoxIslamiclawstakingprecedence

overDutchorWesternlaw.

TheGeneralIntelligenceandSecurityServiceoftheNetherlandshasbeen

investigatingthesedevelopments,basedupontherealisationthattherearevarious

kindsofradicalisationandthateachpresentsitsownthreatsandrisks.Togetherwith

radicalisationwiththepotentialtoresultinterroristviolence,formsofnonviolent

radicalisationwhichcouldseverelydisruptsocietyhavebeenstudiedaswell.These

includestrivingtowardsthecreationofparallelcommunitystructureswithformsof

self-definedjusticeandthepropagationofanti-democraticbehaviourwhichcould

resultinpolarisation,inter-ethnicandinter-religioustensionsandserioussocialunrest.

ThisreflectsthebroaddefinitionofradicalismasadoptedbytheAIVD:theactive

pursuitofand/orsupportforfar-reachingchangesinsocietywhichmayconstitute

adangertothecontinuityofthedemocraticlegalorder(aim),possiblybyusing

undemocraticmethods(means)whichmayharmthefunctioningofthatorder(effect).

Byextension,then,radicalisationistheprocessofincreasingreadinesstopursuesuch

changes–possiblybyundemocraticmeans–and/ortoencourageotherstodoso.1

Bydemocraticlegalorder,theAIVDisreferringtothespecificwayinwhich

relationshipswithindemocraticsocietiesareorganised.Theseincludeboth‘vertical’

relationships,betweencitizensandgovernment,and‘horizontal’onesbetween

citizensthemselves.Thusthedemocraticlegalorderhastwodimensions:verticaland

horizontal.Theformeristheorderedpoliticalsystemwhichregulatestherelationships

betweencitizensandgovernment,thedemocratic constitutional statemadeupofall

theprinciples,proceduresandinstitutionswhichformthepoliticalsystemofthe

WesternWorldandguaranteethebasichumanandsocialrightsofthosewithinit.The

horizontaldimensionistheordered,democraticwayinwhichcitizensinteractwithone

another:the open society.

1 ThisdefinitionofradicalismandradicalisationislinkedtowhattheAIVDdescribesasthe‘broadapproachtoterrorismandradicalisation’.Seetheservice’sAnnualReport2006,p.11,foradefinitionofthat‘broadapproach’.


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ThisreportfollowsonfromanumberofpreviousAIVDpublications,beginningwith

the2002reportSaudi-Arabian-Arabian influences in the Netherlands – links between the

Salafist mission, radicalisation processes and Islamic terrorism.Thatreportfocusedonthe

activitiesofSaudi-Arabian-ArabianmissionaryorganisationsintheNetherlandsand

theirpossibleinfluenceinradicalisingDutchMuslims.Thedirectpredecessortothis

report,however,isthepublicationentitledFrom dawa to jihad.Publishedattheend

of2004,From dawa to jihaddescribesthewide-rangingthreatposedbyradicalIslam

tothedemocraticlegalorder.Specifically,itcoverstwoseparatetendencieswhich

togetherformcontemporaryMuslimradicalism:theviolentjihadandtheradicaldawa,

withtheformerreadytomakeitscontributiontothearmedstruggleagainsttheWest

andothersupposed‘enemiesofIslam’.Formoreinformationabouttheviolentjihad

intheNetherlandsseethe2006AIVDpublication,The violent jihad in the Netherlands,

current trends in the Islamic terrorist threat.

ThisreportisaboutthedawacomponentofMuslimradicalism.Thetermdawa–the

‘calltoIslam’–primarilyreferstoeffortstomakeasmanyMuslimsaspossibleactive

practitionersofthefaith,inapeacefulmanner.Inthecaseofnon-practisingMuslims,

thatmeansreturningthemtoavowal.Thisgoalinitselfisgenerallyacceptedas

commendablebyMuslims,andisnotthethemeofthisreport.

Rather,thisreportfocusesupontheradical dawa.Thistermreferstotheactivitiesof

Islamicmissionaryorganisations,mosquesandpreachersimpartingaradical,ultra-

orthodoxmessage.Thesemovementsaredescribedasultra-orthodoxbecausethey

arehighlyrigidintheirtheologicalinterpretationsandresistallformsofreligious

modernityorcontemporarymodificationsoftheirdoctrine.Theirradicalismliesinthe

factthattheywanttofundamentallyreformsociety,andindoingsorejecttheWestern

democraticlegalorder.Theyalsohaveahighlyactivistaspect,whichisoneofthekey

pointsonwhichtheydifferfrommoretraditionalultra-orthodoxcurrents.Moreover,

theradicaldawaemploysreligiousargumentstorejectparticipationinthenon-Islamic

societysurroundingitandencouragesfar-reachingintoleranceofandisolationfromall

whodonotshareitsviews,betheyotherMuslimsornon-Muslims.Finally,itcallsfor

anti-democraticaction.Butitdoesallthiswithoutresortingto,appealingfor,glorifying

orsupportingviolence.

TheAIVDhasobservedthatradicaldawamovementshavebeengainingstrengthin

theNetherlandsandseveralneighbouringcountriesinrecentyears.Theyandtheir

preachershaveenjoyedmoreandmoresuccessinreachingspecificgroupsthrough

messagestailoredspecificallytothem.Theywereoriginallyverymuchdirectedfrom


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abroad–ideologically,financiallyandlogistically–butnow,afterabriefphaseof

fragmentationcausedinpartbythedomesticandinternationalresponsetotheviolent

jihad,theyareundergoingaprocessofautonomisationandprofessionalisation.The

AIVDcallsthisprocesstheriseofIslamicneoradicalismanddescribesitinChapter1

ofthisreport.

IntheNetherlands,thisisaphenomenonexpressedprimarilywithinSalafism2.

ThisisarguablythemostradicalcurrentinthespectrumofSunniIslam,andthe

violentbranchofitisasourceofinspirationforjihadisaroundtheworld.Thenon-

violentvariantofSalafismisatpresentparticularlyactiveintheNetherlands,asit

isinBelgiumandFrance.Chapter2describesSalafisminitspresentforminthe

Netherlands.3SalafismisclearlygainingstrengthintheNetherlands,afactprimarily

reflectedinasignificantincreaseinthenumberofSalafireadingsbeingheld

throughoutthecountry.IndescribingthisprocesstheAIVDwillhighlightboththe

messageandthemethodstheSalafipreachersareemployingwhilemobilisingyoung

Muslimsbothreligiouslyandpolitically,sinceitisthey–ratherthantheso-called

first-generationimmigrants–whoseemmostreceptivetoradicalisationaspartofa

complexsearchforidentity.

InChapter3theattentionisturnedtoanumberofradicaldawamovementswhichare

activeintheNetherlandsbuthavemanagedtosecuregreaterinfluenceinotherparts

ofEurope.TheyincludetheMuslimBrotherhood,TablighiJamaatandHizbut-Tahrir,

whichoperateinsuchcountriesasDenmark,France,GermanyandtheUnited

Kingdom.ThesemovementssharesomeimportantfeatureswiththeSalafigroupsin

theNetherlands,buthavetheirownhistories,differideologicallyandhaveadopted

divergentstrategicpaths.Butthepotentialimpactofallthesemovementsuponthe

democraticlegalorderisverymuchthesameinwhatevercountrytheyareexpanding.

Chapter4revealshowradicalismingeneralcanposeathreattothedemocraticlegal

orderandlistssomeofthesecurityrisks,bothshortandlong-term,associatedwith

theriseoftheradicaldawaintheNetherlands.WithintheIslamiccommunities

intheNetherlands,theAIVDisalreadyobserving,althoughstillonalimited

2 ThetermSalafismisderivedfromal-salafal-salih,therighteousforefathers.ThisisareferencetotheprophetMuhammad,hiscompanionsandimmediatesuccessorsaccordingtotradition,thosewhosettheperfectexampleforallwhofollowed.ContemporarySalafismbuildsverymuchupontheHanbalischooloflegalthought,whichisregardedasthemostconservativeschooloflegalthoughtwithinSunniIslam.

3 Thisreportincludesa‘HistoricalsketchofmodernSalafism’initsappendix.


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scale,theerosionofsomeaspectsofthedemocraticlegalorder.Itisquitepossible

thattheradicaldawamighteventuallyheightenethnicandreligioustensionsin

theNetherlands,withincreasingpolarisationasaresultofitsintolerantmessage

concerningthosewhodonotshareitsviews.Tensionswithinthehorizontaldimension

ofthedemocraticorder(theopensociety)aretherefore,inthefuture,quiteforeseeable.

However,theAIVDdoesnotforeseeanylastingdisruptionordamagetothevertical

dimensionofthedemocraticlegalorder(thedemocraticorderasapoliticalsystem),

noteveninthelongterm.

Chapter5providessuggestionsforthedevelopmentofstrategieswhichmightabate

thecurrentvigourofIslamicneoradicalism.Indoingthis,itisparticularlyimportant

torememberthat,howeverconfrontationaltheymaybe,theactivitiesandopinionsof

Islamicneoradicalsareinlinewiththefreedomorreligionandfreedomofexpression

asguaranteedbyDutchlaw,andassuchcannotbecounteredusingconventionallegal

means.Thischapteralsopointsoutthateitherdownsizingorenlarging(theso-called

relativisticversustheabsolutisticapproach)theproblemofMuslimradicalisationinits

currentmanifestationcanbeharmfulforactuallyfindingsolutions.Inasense,itcan

bestatedthatthesecurityissuesassociatedwiththatradicalisationareincreasinglya

productnotofthephenomenonitself,butoftheformationofinaccurateimagesofit.

ThepurposeofthisreportistoputthedebateconcerningradicalIslam–or,more

specifically,theradicaldawa–intheNetherlandsintotheproperperspective.When

addressingthissubject,theimpressionissometimesgiventhatthisisapowerful

movementsettooverturntheDutchpoliticalsystemfromwithin,andinthenot-

too-distantfuture.Thatismostcertainlynotthecase.Evenso,theradicaldawais

notsimplyamarginalphenomenoninvolvingafewpeoplefrustratedbyevents

elsewhere.Rather,itisamovementwhichisgeneratingitsowndynamic,which

operatesfrominnerconvictionandwhichhasmanagedtoachieveareasonablywide

reachbydeliveringaclearmessage.Nevertheless,themajorityofDutchMuslims

feelnoideologicalaffinitywithit.Infact,manyofthemregarditsultra-orthodoxyas

intimidating.YetthesemoderateMuslimsoftenhavedifficultyparryingitsmessage.

Andtherelativisticand/orabsolutisticimageswhicharewidelyheldinsocietyonthe

issueofradicalIslamatlargeonlyservetofurtherhinderthatresponse.Aneffective

curbingoftheproblemsassociatedwiththeradicaldawawillcomefromcallingitwhat

itis:asmallgroupofradicaldawaactivistswhoareunderminingthemulticultural

solidaritywhichcharacterisesDutchsociety.


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1 The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands

1.1 Three phases in the development of Dutch Islamic radicalism

AsintherestoftheWesternworld,IslamicradicalismintheNetherlandshasbeen

changingrapidlyforanumberofyears.Thatprocessislinkedtodevelopmentswithin

theradicalmovementitself,butisalsoaresultofchangesintheDutchandother

WesternMuslimcommunitiesandinsocietyasawhole.

TheprocessfirstbecamenoticeableintheNetherlandsduringthefinalyearsofthe

twentiethcentury,andsteppedupafter11September2001.Thechangeaccelerated

furtherfollowingthemurderoffilm-makerTheovanGoghinAmsterdamon2

November2004,andstillseemstobegaininginintensity.Asimilarprocesshas

beenwitnessedinotherWesterncountries,inthewakeoftheattacksinNewYorkon

the11thofSeptember2001andaftertheMadridbombingsof2004andtheLondon

attacksin2005.

Thisreportdemonstratesthatanewphaseintheprocessofchangeisnowemerging.

AfterafirstphaseinwhichradicalIslamicmovementsintheNetherlandsexpanded

underforeigndirection,andthenasecondoneofautonomousradicalismfocused

specificallyupontheNetherlands,anewthirdphaseisalreadypartiallyunderway.

IntheNetherlands,itiscurrentlymanifestingitselfprimarilywithintheradicaldawa

movement.Whiledevelopmentsduringthefirsttwophasesranroughlyinparallel

withinboththeradicaldawaandthejihadimovement,thetwoarenowgrowingapart.

Itremainsunclear,therefore,whetherthislatestphaseisalsoaffectingjihad-oriented

Islamicradicalism.

Theprincipalchangesinthisthirdphaseconcernthecontrol,organisation,ideological

orientationandstrategicandtacticalthinking–includingopinionsregardingthe

possibleuseofviolence–insignificantsectionsofDutchIslamicradicalism.Andit

seemsasifthisnewformofdoctrineisgoingtobecometheguidingparadigmfor

manyradicals,althoughthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatitstwoearlierversionsare

goingtoloseallsupport.Thelatestparadigmisusheringintheriseofanewtypeof

Islamicradicalism,onewhichcanbedefinedasIslamic neoradicalism.


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BeforedescribingthesignificanceoftheriseofIslamicneoradicalismingreaterdetail,

firstthetwopreviousphasesintheprocesswillbedescribed.

1.2 First phase: Islamic radicalism takes root in the Netherlands under foreign direction

IslamicradicalismfirstreachedtheNetherlandsduringthemid-1980s.Itwasduring

thisperiod,thefirstphaseinthedevelopmentofDutchIslamicradicalism,that

jihadistnetworksaswellasradicaldawaorganisationsofforeignoriginbegantogain

groundhere,managingtorecruitasmallbuthighlycommittedgroupofadherents.

Mostofthemwerefirst-generationimmigrants,mainlyfromMorocco.Closetieswere

maintainedwiththe‘parent’networksandorganisationsabroad,intermsofdirection,

development,ideologicalorientation,financialsupportandstrategicandtactical

choices.

Atthistime,mostofthejihadistnetworkscommittedtoarmedstruggleinconflict

zonesintheMuslimworldwereeitherinfluencedorleddirectlybyatleastoneveteran

ofthewarinAfghanistanorBosnia-Herzegovina.Andinmanycasestheyhadatleast

anideologicallinkwiththeAl-Qaedanetwork.

TheradicaldawaintheNetherlandsalsodevelopedduringthisperiod,underthedirect

controlofandwithfinancialandlogisticalsupportfromnon-governmentalmissionary

organisationsoperatingfromcertainIslamiccountrieswhichviewthemselvesas

guidingnations,onaspirituallevel,forMuslimsworldwide.Theprimarygoalofthose

organisationswastospreadtheirownreligiousideologyamongstDutchMuslims.

TheradicaldawaintheNetherlandsmanifesteditselfprimarilywithinSalafism.From

1980onwards,Saudi-Arabian-Arabiannon-governmentalmissionaryorganisations

likeAl-HaramainandAl-Waqfal-Islamiwereinvolvedintheestablishmentofseveral

Salafimosques.BelongingtothepoliticalcurrentwithinSalafismandledbya

numberofimamswithcloseideologicalandinstitutionaltiestoSaudi-ArabianArabia,

thesemosqueshavedominatedtheultra-orthodoxdebatewithintheDutchIslamic

communitysincethemid-1990s.

Inthefirstphase,theideologicallinksbetweentheradicaldawaandjihadism–one

canbeabreedinggroundfortheother–werereasonablyclose,eventhoughthetwo

movementsarenotidentical.Theyoperatedfromdifferentstrategicperspectives,but


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werepreparedtosupportoneanotherwhentheneedarose.Thesameappliedduring

thesecondphase,describedbelow.

1.3 Second phase: the rise of autonomous domestic radicalism

1.3.1 Foreign control declines in favour of autonomy

ThesecondphaseinthedevelopmentofIslamicradicalismintheNetherlandsbegan

aftertheattacksof11September2001.Autonomousjihadistandradicaldawanetworks

nowcameintoascendancy.Theywereinterestedprimarilyinthelocalsituationin

theNetherlandsand,byextension,elsewhereinEurope.Theywereabletoemerge

becauseanumberofforeign‘parent’organisationsandnetworksweresuccessfully

dismantled,andhencelosttheirpowerandabilitytoorganise,intheinternationalfight

againstterrorism.Asfarasjihadismisconcerned,groupslikeAl-Qaedawereseverely

dismantled;inthecaseoftheradicaldawa,internationallyactiveradicalmissionary

organisationslikeAl-Haramainwereaffected.Al-Haramain,forinstance,featuredona

UNlistofgroupsproscribedbecauseoflinkswithIslamicterrorism.

TheriseofautonomousIslamicradicalismwithadomesticorientationwasalsoa

productofthefactthatDutch-basedsupportersofthearmedjihadandtheradical

dawawereincreasinglybreakingawayfromtheiroriginalsourcesofinspirationasthey

becamemoreandmoreconvincedthatIslamwasalso‘oppressedandthreatened’in

theNetherlands.

1.3.2 Fragmentation, lack of organisation and amateurism

InthesecondphaseofIslamicradicalismsupportforIslamicradicalismgrewin

theNetherlandsbecausetherewerenowautonomousnetworksfocusinguponthe

domesticsituation.Butthisalsoresultedinfragmentation,alackoforganisationand

amateurism4whenitcametoideological,strategicandtacticalthinking,inturngiving

risetoanumberofnewphenomenawithinbothjihadistmilitancyandtheradical

dawa.

4 Theuse of the term ‘amateurism’ doesnotmean that these groupswere never able toachievetheobjectivestheysetthemselves.


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Foranumberofyoungpeople,jihadistradicalisationbecameaveryindividualised

process.Theirmilitancydevelopedveryquickly,entirelyindependentlyandwith

absolutelynoformofexternalcontrol,althoughtheprocesswasusuallyinfluencedby

theinternet.Thisgrouphasbeenreferredtoasthe‘self-igniters’.5

Meanwhile,anumberofsmalljihadistgroupswithhighlysectariancharacteristics

alsoappeared.Theyformulatedveryextremeideological,strategicandtacticalviewsin

completeisolation,theresultofakindofhome-made,‘cut-and-paste’jihadistdoctrine

baseduponselectivequotationfromIslamicsources.Thisiswhathappenedwith

theneo-Takfiri6,forexample,amongstwhomweretheso-calledHofstadGroupand

MohammedBouyeri,themurdererofTheovanGogh.

Inothercasesthefragmentation,lackoforganisationandamateurismledtothe

emergenceofa‘radicalIslamiclifestyle’.Thisistypicallyexpressedthroughtheuseof

specificformsofrhetoric(‘jihadtalk’)andtheadoptionofhighlyritualisticpatternsof

behaviour–forexample,wearinga‘strict’Islamicdress,usingcertainbodylanguage

andobservingtheseparationofthesexes.Thegroupwhichhastakenupthislifestyleis

muchlargerthanhardcoreof‘true’Islamicradicals,thereasonbeingthattheyfindita

‘cool’wayoflifewithouthavinganydeep-seatedconvictions.

Finally,thereare‘peripheral’groupswhichtrytousetheirsupposedIslamicradicalism

tojustifywhatsimplycouldbecharacterisedasescapism,nihilism,hooliganism,

vandalismorcriminality.

1.3.3 The internet: a key catalyst in the fragmented second phase

Therapidgrowthoftheinternetaroundtheworldduringthefirstfewyearsofthis

centurydidnotpassradicalIslamby.Hundredsofwebsites,bothviolentandnon-

violentinnature,appearedandcaughttheattentionofyoungMuslimsduringthe

secondphase.7TheyincludeseveraldozenSalafi-orientedsitesinDutch,propagating

5 Rather than ‘individualised’, this phenomenon is perhaps better referred to as ‘solitary’radicalisationbecausethoseconcernedverymuchwentthroughtheprocessalone.

6 Theterm‘takfir’comesfrom‘kufr’,theArabicwordforunbeliever.Takfiricallforthekillingof those they regardasnon-believingMuslims–bywhomthey reallymeananyMuslimwhodoesnotsharetheirownradicalinterpretationofIslam.Neo-TakfirishaveadaptedthisconcepttoaspecificallyWesterncontext,extendingittoincludethekillingofnon-Muslimcriticsofthefaith.SeealsotheAIVDpublicationThe violent jihad in the Netherlands,p.32.

7 Atpresenttherearearound4.500radicalwebsitesworldwide.


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moreorlessmilitantversionsoftheideology.ManyyoungMuslimsconductheated

discussionsonthesewebsitesand,protectedbytheirrelativeanonymity,donot

shyawayfrommakingverymilitantstatements.Thisformofexpressiondoesnot

necessarilyindicateatrulyextremistattitudetolife,butithascertainlycontributedto

thegrowthofIslamicradicalism.Alotofyoungpeopleseemtofinditdifficulttoplace

theradicalmessagesintherightperspective,andsotoresistthem.Duringthesecond

phase,theinternetalsobegantoactasakindofideologicalencyclopaedia:within

arelativelyshorttime,radically-mindedMuslimyouthscanvisitahostofIslamic

websitesandgatheracollectionofextremistquotesandcitationstailoredexactly

totheirpersonalpointofview.Thankstotheinternet,the‘cut-and-paste’ideology

mentionedearlierflourishedduringthesecondphase,contributingsignificantlytotwo

ofitskeyfeatures:fragmentationandamateurism.

1.3.4 The radical dawa decides where it stands on jihad

ThepublicdebatesparkedintheNetherlandsby11September2001andthemurder

ofTheovanGoghforcedtheradicaldawainthesecondphasetodefinewhereitstood

withrespecttotheviolentjihad.PartlyunderpressurefromtheDutchpublicand

politicians,itsrepresentativesopenlydeclaredtheiroppositiontotheuseofviolencein

theWest.Asanextensionofthat,theyalsoconcludedprivatelyandindependentlythat

supportforjihadinthatformcouldunderminetheirownmission.Theradicaldawa

wouldbenefitmorefromgradualbutlastingprogresswhichdidnotattractnegative,

growth-restrictingattentionfromtheauthoritiesorsocietyatlarge.Moreover,there

issometimesagenuineabhorrenceofviolence.Theresultofallthiswasthatthe

jihadisandtheradicaldawa,whichhadhithertoformedtheradicalIslamicmovement

together,slowlybegantogrowapartandcouldnolongerberegardedasasingle

force.Jihadisbegantoaccusetheradicaldawaofmakingtoomanyconcessionstothe

‘infidels’,whilsttheradicaldawacondemnedjihadismfordamagingthegrowthand

reputationofIslamthroughrecklessactsunsanctionedbytheclericsitrecognised.As

forsupportforfellowMuslimsinconflictzones,amoreambivalentattitudecouldbe

observed.TakinguparmsagainstthosewhoattackIslamisclearlyauthorisedunder

Islamiclaw,andsometimesevenregardedasnecessary,buttheradicaldawainthe

Netherlandsnolongercallsopenlyforthisformofjihad–althoughitcertainlydoes

notcondemnit,either.


20

1.3.5 The autonomisation of the radical dawa in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe

Asmentionedbefore,theradicaldawahasinrecentyearsbeenundergoingaprocess

ofautonomisationintheNetherlandsandvariousotherEuropeancountries.Whatthis

meansinpracticeisthatlessandlesscontrolisbeingexercisedovermosquesinthe

NetherlandsfromtheIslamicworld,thatthereisgreaterideologicalfragmentation,

thatthemessagebeingdeliveredistailoredmoretothelocalsituationandthatanever

clearerdivideisappearingbetweenjihadismandtheradicaldawa.

Moreover,anewgenerationofradicaldawapreachershasappeared.Whereasthe

firstgenerationwasheavilydependentupontheso-calledIslamic‘guidenations’for

support,bothideologicalandinstitutional,thenewpreachersseemtohavewrested

themselvesawayfromit,atleastinpart.Theymaystillsharetheirdoctrinewiththe

religiousestablishmentinthepreviouslymentionedIslamiccounties,buttheyare

increasinglysucceedinginpresentingthatfreefromdirectcontrolandinaform

adaptedtothelocalsituation.Theresultisamoreprofessionalmessageandahigher

standardoforganisationwithintheradicaldawa,andalsoanopportunityforits

proponentstojoinforces.Consequently,themovementintheNetherlandsandsome

neighbouringcountriesisnowonthethresholdofathirdphaseinitsdevelopment:the

riseofIslamicneoradicalism.

1.4 Third phase: the rise of Islamic neoradicalism

1.4.1 A new orientation, not yet a new movement

AllthesignsindicatethatIslamicradicalismintheNetherlandsisatthebeginning

ofathirdphase,whichinvolvessignificantsectionsofthemovementundergoing

substantialchangestothewaytheyaredirectedandorganised,aswellastotheir

ideological,strategicandtacticalthinking.Changessofundamentalthattheresult

ofitcanbedescribedasIslamicneoradicalism.Theuseofsuchatermdoesnot

imply,however,thatthereisyetoneclearlydefined,homogeneousmovementwith

adherentswhohaveconvertedconsciouslytoit.Rather,itrepresentsaneworientation

withinestablishedIslamicradicalism–oneattemptingtoovercometheproblemsof

fragmentation,lackoforganisationandamateurism.


21

1.4.2 Towards more structure and more coherent strategic and tactical thinking

TheriseofthisIslamicneoradicalismcoincideswiththatofanewgenerationof

Islamicradicals.Theycountenancenocompromiseswhatsoeverintheiridealofa

politicalandsocialorderbaseduponultra-orthodoxinterpretationsofIslam,both

withintheMuslimworldandbeyondit.However,theydoverymuchquestiontheway

inwhichthepreviousgenerationattemptedtobringaboutaradicalIslamicworld.

Theneoradicalsarehighlycriticalofthephenomenawhichhaveappearedintheir

circlessinceSeptember2001.Theyincludefar-reachingindividualisationintheform

ofso-called‘self-ignition’,thesectarianprocesseswhichhaveaffectedsomeradical

groupsandtheselectivequotationofIslamicsources.Intheirview,radicalIslam

hasfortoolongovervaluedemotionsandresentmentattheexpenseofrationaland

pragmaticthinking.

Accordingtothisnewgeneration,Islamicradicalshaveforyearslackedanyclear

strategicandtacticalvisionconcerninghowIslamcanbecomearealforceintheWest.

TheybelievethatradicalismintheNetherlandsmustbetransformedintoamass

movementcapableofbecomingapowerfulfactorinsocietythankstowidespread

grassrootssupport.Andforthatitisnecessarytojoinforcesandtoorganisethe

movementmoreprofessionally.Theyalsorealisethattheirgoalrequiresclearstrategic

andtacticalvision,aswellasaconcretepoliticalprogrammewhichgoesfurtherthan

merelyformulatingutopianideals.Onlyinthatwaycantheycontinuetoappealto

largesectionsoftheirpotentialrankandfileandtogainlong-termcommitmentfrom

theiradherents.Itisalsoimportantthattheirmessagetranscendethnicitytoreachall

MuslimsintheNetherlands.

1.4.3 A new vision of the rank and file

TheIslamicneoradicalsarewellawarethattheMuslimcommunitiesinthe

Netherlandsdonotconsistsolelyoffrustratedanddisaffectedindividuals.Theyalso

realisethatnewgroupsareappearingwithinthecommunity,suchashighly-educated

Muslims.Groupswhichtheybelievecanplayanimportantroleinestablishingabroad-

basedradicalmovement.Suchamovement,afterall,canneverbedrivenbyfrustration

andresentmentalone.Andreachingeachofthegroupsneededtoformamass

movementmeansputtingacrossspecificmessagestailoredtoeachofthem.


22

1.4.4 Decline of the internet in the third phase?

Inthethirdphaseofitsdevelopment,theradicaldawaclearlywantstoattractand

retainwidespreadsupport.Anditisquestionablewhethertheinternet,whichwassuch

aprominentfactorinthesecondphase,isthemostsuitablemediumfordoingthat.

Internetusers,radicalorotherwise,areinapositiontoexploreallithastoofferwith

anindependencewhichmakesitdifficultforamovement’scadrestoretaincontrol

oftheirrankandfile’sideologicaleducation.Afterall,therearecountlessalternative

viewscirculatingonline.Theradicaldawawantstocontrolhowitsmessageisreceived,

totheexclusionofotherpointsofview.Italsoreliesheavilyuponthecharismaofits

preachers,withtheirabilitytomanipulategroupprocesses.Andthatrequiresclose

and,whennecessary,frequentpersonalcontactwiththetargetaudience.Although

effortstoharmoniseonlineactivitieswithintheradicaldawahavebeenobserved,there

isnosignasyetofoneunitedandco-ordinatedvirtualdawamessage.Ontheinternet,

atleast,thefragmentationwhichsocharacterisedthesecondphaseisstillwidespread.

1.4.5 The use of violence is inopportune

Asalreadydescribed,adividehasopenedupbetweenjihadismandtheradicaldawa,

asnowrepresented–inthethirdphase–bythegroupofIslamicneoradicals.Oneof

thekeyconsiderationsintheirreticenceaboutcallingfortheuseofterroristviolence

intheNetherlandsorelsewhereintheWesternworldistheirdesiretogainbroad

support.Theuseofsuchextremeviolencecandeterpotentialadherentsandcompel

thegovernmenttotakerepressivemeasures,andthatcouldsubstantiallydamage

theneoradicals’long-termmission:toslowlybuildwiderbackingforradicalIslam

andtostartdevelopingamassmovement.However,theydonotruleouttheuseof

certainformsofviolence–forexample,streetprotestswithnolossoflife–andpublic

disturbancesaslongasthesedonotendangerthelong-termstrategy.

1.4.6 The rise of non-radical movements

ThesupportersofIslamicneoradicalismarewellawareofthesocialdynamicswithin

theunfrustratedandunalienatedsectionsoftheMuslimcommunities.Andthey

realisethattherapidgrowthofnon-radicalmovementscouldrepresentformidable

competitionfortheirideology.Both,afterall,areattemptingtodrawfromthesame

wellofpotentialsupport.Andtheyaredoingsoatacriticaltime,justasthattarget

group–second-generationMuslimsintheNetherlandsandEurope–isembarking


23

uponacomplexsearchforitsownidentity.Asearchwhichbynomeanshastoendata

radicaldestination.

Forexample,amovementwhichwantstocombineanorthodoxIslamiclifestylewith

participationinWesternsocietyiscurrentlygainingground.Whilstnotyetwidespread

intheNetherlands,thisthinkingisalreadywellestablishedelsewhereinEuropeand

intheMiddleEast.OneofitsexponentsistheEgyptian‘televangelist’AmrKhaled,

whocombinesaconservativevisionofIslamwithpositivethinkingaboutthepersonal

growthoftheindividualasaparticipantinmodernsociety.Khaledrejectstherigidityof

currentslikeSalafism,whilstinnowaycallingintodoubtthesupremacyofIslam.8

TheinfluenceofdevelopmentselsewhereinEuropecanalsobeenseenwithinthe

DutchMuslimcommunities.Onereflectionofthatisacombativebutnon-radical

socialactivism,campaigningfortherighttofullyexpressMuslimidentitywithin

anopenandpluralisticsociety.Operatinginparallelwiththatisanemancipationist

civicactivismwhichseekstomaketheIslamicvoicemoreclearlyheardonthewider

politicalstage.AnexpressionofthistrendintheNetherlandswastheparticipationof

severallocalMuslimpartiesinthe2006generalelection.Attheinternationallevel,

theSwissphilosopherTariqRamadanisaprominentproponentofsuchnon-radical,

identity-basedactivism–and,byextension,itsemancipatorypoliticalcounterpart.His

viewshavebeengaininganincreasinglysympatheticreceptionintheNetherlands.

OtherpotentialcompetitorsforIslamicneoradicalismaresecularcurrentswithin

theMuslimcommunities.Afterall,notallthepoliticalandsocialmovementsinthe

Islamicworldareinspiredbyreligiousmotives.Currentsrootedatleastpartiallyin

Westernenlightenmentthinkingalsohavetheirspokespeopleandsupportersthere.

ThestrictseparationofstateandreligionwhichcharacterisethemodernTurkishand

Tunisianconstitutionalsystemsareobviousexamplesofthis,buttherearealsoseveral

theologians,philosophersandpoliticalthinkers–suchasSadikal-Azm,NasrAbu

Zeïd,Abdullahian-NaimandKhaledAbual-Fadl–whoplacehumanrationalitybefore

religiousdogmatism.9Thesemovementsandindividualsdonotenjoywidespread

supportwithintheIslamicdiasporaintheWest,buttheycouldstillhinderthegrowth

ofIslamicneoradicalismbyofferingmembersoftheMuslimcommunitiesalternative

perspectivesandopinions.

8 Seealso:P.Haenni.L’islamdumarché.Paris,2005.9 ThesethinkersareofArabdescent,butareprimarilylivingintheWesternworld.


24

TheIslamicneoradicalsregardtherecentappearanceofmovementsofso-called

‘ex-Muslims’inseveralEuropeancountries,theNetherlandsincluded,asparticularly

threatening.TheyareafraidthatMuslimswhoturntheirbackonthefaithforgood–

andinsodoingchallengeitssupremacyandtheinfallibilityofitsdivinemessage–can

underminethegrowthofradicalIslamfromwithin.

1.4.7 The rise of non-activist ultra-orthodox movements

Aswellasthenon-radicalmovementsjustdescribed,thereisalsoanothercurrent

discernibleinWesternIslam:ultra-orthodoxgroupswhichcallforcompleteseparation

fromsocietywithoutcombiningthatwithactivism.Whilstseekingtoliveinultimate

pietythemselves,theyhavenomissiontoreformtheWesternsocietyaroundthem.

Theirmessageisthuspurelyreligious,withnopoliticalovertones.Suchgroupsinclude

theso-calledapoliticalSalafis.Theologically,however,thismovementisjustasultra-

orthodoxastheradicaldawaandsocouldpotentiallycompetewithitforadherents.

Inthiscase,currentswiththesamereligiousvaluesbutatotallydifferentattitudeto

politicalquestionsformathreattotheIslamicneoradicals,anditisnotuncommon

forthesegroupstocomeintoconflictwiththeradicaldawaoverthequestionwhichof

themtrulyrepresentstheMuslimcommunityintheWesternworld.Notleastbecause

oftheconvictionwithwhichitoperates,however,theradicaldawaseemstohavewon

thatargumentforthetimebeing.

1.4.8 The radical dawa’s claim of representation

AsithasgrowninstrengthintheNetherlandsandsomeofourneighbouring

countries,sotherepresentativesoftheradicaldawahavebecomemoreinsistentin

theirclaimsthattheyrepresentandspeakonbehalfoftheIslamiccommunitiesinthe

West.Intheircontactswiththegovernment,mainstreamorganisationsandothers,

theyarguethattheyrepresentpureIslam.Andsometimeseventhattheyspeakfor

alltheMuslimsinthecountry.10Asaresultofthiseffectivepublicprofiling,Islamic

interestgroupsinwhichproponentsoftheradicaldawaareprominentarenow

regularlyconsultedonissuesordisputesinvolvingIslamiccommunitiesintheWest.

10AtameetingwithTilburgCityCouncilon16April2007,localsalafistimamAhmedSalamclaimedtospeakforallMuslimsintheNetherlands.HisstatementwaspromptedbyaremarkfromtheleaderoftheLabour(PvdA)groupthattheimamrepresentedonlyaminorityview.


25

ThisisthecaseinseveralEuropeancountries11,theNetherlandsincluded.Inthisway,

theradicaldawahasbeenaffordedalegitimacywhichfaroutstripstheoftenlimited

extentofitssupport.DuetothispublicprofilingthewiderIslamiccommunityinthe

Westsometimesfindsitselfforciblyassociatedwithaparticularreligiousprofile.This

despitethefactthatthemajorityofWesternEuropeanMuslimswanttobepartofa

pluralisticdemocracyandarenotseekingtobuildasocietybasedonanultra-orthodox

model.ManymoderateorsecularMuslims,however,areunwillingtochallenge

theseself-appointedleadersopenly,forfearofbeingbrandedinfidelsand‘enemies

oftheIslamiccommunity’.ThatfearcouldhelpencouragethegrowthofIslamic

neoradicalism.

1.4.9 Answering the competition: intolerant isolationism and anti-democratic activism

Asalludedtoinsection1.4.6,thereiscompetitionforthesupportoftheDutchMuslim

communities.Theneoradicals’strategyinthisbattleistwofold,combiningwhat

theAIVDreferstoas‘intolerantisolationism’and‘anti-democraticactivism’.These

twotacticsoperateinparallel,butdifferintheiremphasis.Bothhavethesamegoal,

though:toincreasethepowerofIslamicradicalismintheNetherlands.Andbothdraw

uponmethodswhichruncountertothespiritofthedemocraticorder,ifnottheletter

ofitslaws.

‘Intolerantisolationism’attemptstocreateaseparatespacealongsidethepublic

domain,onegovernedbyrulesdifferentfromthoseapplicableunderthedemocratic

legalorder.Theaimistoestablishseparate,Islamisedenclaveswithinsociety,

placeswithnoroomforthosewhothinkdifferentlyorwhopractiseotherfaiths

(exclusivism)andwhereIslamicrulesandregulationstakeprecedenceoverDutchlaw

(parallelism).TheseenclavesareintendedaspowerbasesforradicalIslamandtoserve

asbridgeheadsforitsfurtherexpansion.Theymaybephysicalareas,atthelocalor

nationallevel,butcanalsobevirtualenclavesinthemedia,ontheinternet,inpublic

lifeorineducation.

Meanwhile,‘anti-democraticactivism’intendstotransformthepublicdomainintoa

spaceinwhichthedemocraticlegalorderisreplacedbyotherstandards.Exceptasa

11 FortheroleplayedinthisbyradicaldawamovementsinforinstancetheUnitedKingdom,seeMelaniePhilips,Londonistan,London,2006;EdHusein,TheIslamist,London,2007andHardline takeover of British mosques,TheTimes,London,7september2007.


26

distantideal,theaimisnottoIslamisethepublicdomainassuch,butrathertohinder

anddisruptthe‘obscene’democraticorderasapoliticalsystemanditsopen,multiform

societyasaplacetolive.Thetacticsusedareprovocation,deliberatepolarisationand

thefosteringofhostilitytowardsthesupposedlyanti-Islamicoutsideworld.Becauseof

thisconfrontationalapproach,anti-democraticactivismisanattractivealternativefor

thoseradicalswhofeelthatachievingisolationismwilltaketoolongandwhosethirst

foractionmakesthemprefer‘quickwins’,butforwhomviolenceandterrorismgotoo

far.

1.4.10 Undemocratic and anti-democratic tactics

Ashasalreadybeensaid,theIslamicneoradicalsrejectterroristviolence.Butthey

havebeenexploringnon-violenttactics,bothopenandclandestine,asanalternative.

AlthoughsofarusedononlyalimitedscaleintheNetherlands,theseundemocratic

andanti-democraticmethodshaveforsometimebeenpartoftheradicalarsenalinthe

Islamicworld.BelowisasummaryofwhattheymightinvolveintheDutchcontext,

classifiedintothosewhichhavealreadybeenusedhereonasmallscaleandthose

knowntobeunderconsiderationorconceivable.

a.TacticswhichalreadyhavebeenusedonasmallscaleintheNetherlands

• Forcingpeopleintheimmediatevicinity,neighbourhoodorwiderIslamic

communitytoconformtoone’sownstrictstandardsofbehaviour.Women,

homosexuals,themoreliberallymindedandsuspectednon-believersaremostlikely

beconfrontedbythistactic.

• Forcingpeopleintheimmediatevicinity,neighbourhoodorwiderIslamic

communitytodisplayloyaltytotheirownfaithgroupalone,andsometimestotheir

ownethnicfaithgroupalone.

• Attemptingtoconvinceorintimidatepeopleintheimmediatevicinity,

neighbourhoodorwiderIslamiccommunitynottoparticipateinsomeorallofthe

institutionsofthedemocraticlegalorder.Forexample,usingthreatsorpersuasionto

preventthemvoting.

• Attemptingtoconvinceorintimidatepeopleintheimmediatevicinity,

neighbourhoodorwiderIslamiccommunitynottoworkfororprovideservicestothe

institutionsofthedemocraticlegalorder.Forexample,tryingtopreventthemtaking

upagovernmentjob.

• Deliberatelyattemptingtodisrupttherelationshipsbetweenreligiousorethnic

communities,ortocreateotherformsofsocialtension.Forexample,discouraging


27

contactwiththosewhoholddifferentviewsandcultivatinghostilethinking.This

attitudeissometimespromptedbythefeelingthatthereexistsagenuinethreatto

theIslamiccommunity.

• Attemptingtoencouragepeopleintheimmediatevicinity,neighbourhoodorwider

Islamiccommunityintocertainformsofcivildisobedience.Forexample,notpaying

taxes,removingchildrenfromschool,providingincorrectdetailswhenapplyingfora

studentgrantorloanandwithholdinginformationfromthepolice.

b.Tacticswhicharebeingconsidered

• Attemptingtogaininfluenceinsidepoliticalparties,thejudicialsystemandother

socialorganisationssuchastradeunions,professionalassociations,studentbodies

andconsultativeorgans,includingbymeansofclandestineentryism.

• Deliberatelyattemptingtodisruptsocialharmonyortocreatetensionsby,for

example,spreadingfalserumoursorconspiracytheories.

• UsingpersuasionorintimidationtoimplementaSharia-basedlegalsystemwithina

particularcommunityorneighbourhood.

• Attemptingtogaininfluencewithinpoliticalpartiesorothersocialorganisations

withaviewtotakingthemoverinthelongterm.

• Attemptingtoinfluencepoliticalofficeholdersthroughintimidation,briberyor,

iftheyareMuslimorigin,brandingthemastraitorstothefaithandtheirown

community.

1.4.11 The powers behind Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands

and elsewhere in Europe

TheradicaldawaintheNetherlandsandseveralneighbouringcountrieslikeBelgium

andFranceisshapedprimarilybypoliticalSalafism,whichisalsothemostimportant

sourceofIslamicneoradicalisminthesecountries.Althoughotherradicaldawa

movementsarealsoactiveinthesecountriesandotherEuropeancountries.Their

objectivesaremoreorlessthesameasthoseofthepoliticalSalafis,buttheyemploy

differentstrategiesandtactics.However,theytooareencouragingtheriseofIslamic

neoradicalism.ThesemovementsincludeHizbut-Tahrir,TablighiJamaatandthe

MuslimBrotherhood(seeChapter3).


28

1.4.12 The growth potential of Islamic neoradicalism

ThethreatultimatelyposedbyIslamicneoradicalismislargelydependentuponits

potentialforgrowth.EstimatesbytheAIVDandsecurityservicesinanumberof

neighbouringcountriesappeartoindicatethatapproximately5percentofthereligious

MuslimpopulationintheWesternworld12istosomeextentreceptivetoradicalisation.

Ofthat5percent,about10percentwillactuallyradicaliseintheend.Insodoing,they

maychooseeitherjihadismortheradicaldawa.Theradicaldawamainlytargetsthe

5percentofreligiousMuslimspotentiallyreceptivetoradicalisation–afairlylarge

group.Itmustbeemphasisedthatthesefiguresareestimatesonly;nohardstatistics

arecurrentlyavailable.

ThecurrentgrowthoftheradicaldawaintheNetherlandsismostapparentfromthe

expansionnowbeingenjoyedbySalafism.Moreandmorepreachersarebeingsent

outfromtheSalafimosquestogivereadingsalloverthecountry,andhencetheyare

reachingincreasingnumbersofyoungMuslims.Since2005,thenumberofreadings,

thenumberofpreachersandtheaudienceseemstohaveatleastdoubled(seefurther

2.5.1).

1.5 The three phases: three forms of Islamic radicalism

ThebeginningofathirdphaseofIslamicradicalismdoesnotmeanthatthefirsttwo

areentirelyoveryet.Itiscertainlynotthecasethatanentirelynewformofradicalism

hassuddenlyreplaceditspredecessors.Atthepresenttime,allthreeareflourishing

alongsideoneanother.

Thetableonthenextpagecomparesthecharacteristicsofthosethreeforms:

12 ThisrepresentsonlyonesectionofthetotalMuslimpopulation(whichaddsuptoapproximatelyonemillionintheNetherlands).WhatproportionofMuslimscountas‘religious’isdifficulttoestimate,butonecouldcautiouslysaythatitisperhapsabouthalfofthem.


29


30

Manifestation Direction/control Ideologicalbasis

Phase1:

1985-present

Individualsandsmallgroupswith

strongorientationtowardscountry

oforigin.

Parentorganisations

abroad.

Ideological,logistical

andfinancialsupport

fromabroad.

Derivedfromforeign

scholars(ulema).

Phase2:

2001-present.

Variousmanifestations:

• Individualradicalisation‘self-

ignition’;

• Autonomousgroupsand

networksfocusinguponthe

Dutchsituation;

• Sectarianismamongstsome

smallgroups;

• Superficial‘lifestyleIslamic

radicalism’;

• LimitednumberofSalafi

mosques,butwithstrong

appealtonascentIslamic

radicals;

• Salafisdiscovertheyoungasa

targetgroup;

• Autonomouspreachersinthe

alternativereligiouscircuit,

notlinkedtoinstitutionalised

mosques;

• Widespreaduseoftheinternet.

Autonomisation

resultingfromlossof

controlfromabroad

andincreasingdesire

forindependence.

Fragmentation.

Lackoforganisation.

Amateurism.

Autonomisation:

• LocalSalafiandother

preachersaswellas

foreignscholars;

• ‘Cut-and-paste’ideology,

withstrongfocusupon

theinternet;

• Utopianorapocalyptic

outlook.

Phase3(Islamic

neoradicalism):

2005-present

Rapidgrowthoftheradicaldawa;

riseofpoliticaldawaSalafism.

Professionalisation:

centralleadership,

regionalcadreand

localmilitantsableto

mobilisealargerank

andfile.

Attempttobelessutopian;

translationtospecific

situationintheNetherlands.

Politicisation:response

topoliticalandsocial

developments,tryingto

influencethemwhilstat

thesametimerejectingthe

democraticlegalorder.


31

Basicstrategy Targetgroup(s) Approachtogovernment

andsociety

RetainMuslimcommunitiesin‘pure’Islambyimmersingthem

inultra-orthodoxpreaching.

WesternMuslimcommunitiesareregardedaspotentialsources

oflogisticalandothersupportinconflictsinMuslimregionsand

abroad.

First-generation

immigrantswith

strongorientation

towardscountry

oforiginandthe

worldwideMuslim

community

(umma).

Littlecontact.Orientation

towardscountryoforigin

andtheumma.

• Theradicaldawaispreachedalongsideviolentjihad,butthe

twograduallygrowapart;

• WinyoungMuslimsovertotheradicaldawamessageof

‘pure’Islam;

• Encourageintolerantisolationism;

• EncourageactivismdesignedtoconfrontWesternsociety;

• Useofviolence,includingterrorism,intendedtoraise

tensionsbetweenMuslimsennon-Muslims.

Relativelydeprived,

particularly

frustratedand

alienatedsecond-

generationMuslim

youth.

Resistanttointegration.

Avoidancebehaviour.

Encouragementof

intolerantisolationism

amongstownrankand

file.

Jihadismandtheradicaldawahavebecometwoverydifferent

strategicoptions:

• UseofviolenceintheWestisusuallyconsideredinopportune

atthepresenttime;

• Focusupongradualgrowth;

• Encourageformationofclandestineandinformalenclaves

withtendencytowardsself-government;

• Encourageopenorclandestineanti-democraticactivism;

• Useofclandestinetacticstomobilisepotentialrankandfile,

frustrateopponentsanddisruptdemocraticprocesses;

• Exertclandestineinfluenceoverpolicy;

• Entryism,initiallyintomainstreamsocialorganisations.

Various,from

secondandthird-

generationMuslim

youth.

Notonlythe

frustratedand

alienated,butalso

thereligiously

inspired,socially

concernedand

highlyeducated.

Encouragementof

intolerantisolationism

andanti-democratic

activisminown

community.

Also‘front’politics,

clandestineattemptsto

exertinfluenceoverpolicy

andentryism,particularly

intomainstreamsocial

organisations.


32


33

2 Dawa Salafism in the Netherlands: the driving force behind the rise of Islamic neoradicalism

2.1 Introduction

TheNetherlandshashadasteadilygrowingMuslimcommunitysincethelate1960s.

Nowcomprisingsome8percentofthepopulation,thiscommunityoriginally

consistedprimarilyofmigrantworkersfromTurkeyandMorocco.Butithasbecome

morediversesincethemid-1990s,mainlyduetothearrivalofasylumseekersfroma

varietyofIslamiccountries.Nevertheless,TurkishandMoroccanmigrantsandtheir

descendantsstillmakeupthecountry’stwobiggestMuslimcommunities.BothTurkey

andMoroccopractiseamoderateformofIslam;traditionally,ultra-orthodoxversionsof

thefaithhavenotbeenwidespreadthere.Despitethis,though,anincreasingnumber

ofyoungDutchMuslims–mostlyofMoroccanorigin,butalsosomeofTurkish

descent–havebeenturningtoSalafism.

TheirreceptivenesstothisstrandofIslamappearstohaveitsoriginsinnew

recruitmentandpersuasionstrategiesadoptedbytheradicaldawa,andinthisspecific

casebySalafimosquesandpreachers.Thisgrowthisassociatedwiththeprocessof

autonomisationandprofessionalisationdescribedinthepreviouschapter.Thethree

phasesinthedevelopmentofIslamicradicalismintheNetherlandssincethe1980sare

outlinedbelow,astheyapplyspecificallytoSalafism.

2.2 First phase: creation of a Salafi faith community in the Netherlands

ASalafifaithcommunityfirstappearedintheNetherlandstowardstheendofthe

1980s.WithhelpfromtheSaudi-Arabianmissionaryorganisationsmentionedin1.2,

theAl-TawheedmosquewasestablishedinAmsterdamandtheAl-Fourkaanmosque

inEindhoven.Afewyearslater,thistimewithanindirectformofSaudi-Arabian-

Arabiancontrol,theAs-SoennahmosqueinTheHagueandtheIslamicFoundationfor

EducationandPropagationofKnowledgeinTilburgwereestablished.Sincethemid-

1990s,thesemosqueshavebeenundertheideologicaldirectionofArabic-speaking

preachersoriginallyfromcountrieslikeEgypt,SyriaandSudan,buteducatedinSaudi-

ArabianArabiaoratleastfamiliarwithSaudi-Arabian-Arabianreligiousdogmas.Their


34

originaltargetforevangelisationwasthefirstgenerationofMoroccanimmigrants,

buttheywerenotparticularlysuccessfulinthat;theultra-orthodoxmessagedidnot

resonatewellwiththatgroup’sownreligiousbackground.Butthesamecannotbesaid

ofMuslimmigrantsfromtheMiddleEastandtheHornofAfrica:theywerealready

morefamiliarwiththesedogmas,sotheincreaseintheirnumbersintheNetherlands

fromthemid-1990sconsiderablystrengthenedtheSalafimosques.

Thefourmosquesmentionedaboveallhaverhetoricallygiftedpreachers,are

exceptionallywell-organisedandattractmulti-ethniccongregations.Together,theyare

attendedbyabout3,000peopleatFridayprayers.13Therearealsothreeorfoursmaller

Moroccanmosqueswithideologicalorinstitutionallinkstothem.

2.3 Second phase: a second generation of Salafis and autonomisation of the dawa

ItwasaroundtheturnofthecenturythattheSalafimosques‘discovered’anew

generationofrapidlymaturingMuslimyouth–adiscoverycloselyrelatedtotherecent

historyofimmigrationintotheNetherlands.Thiswasaperiodwhenarelativelylarge

numberofthechildrenoffirst-generationimmigrantswerereachingadulthood.And

asyoungadults,forvariousreasons–notleasttheirIslamicbackgroundinanon-

Islamiccountry–theywerestartingtolookfortheirownMuslimidentitywithin

Westernsociety.ThatwasaquestonlyacceleratedbythegeneralDutchresponseto

the11thofSeptember2001andthemurderofTheovanGogh.Atthesametime,the

firstgenerationofSalafipreachers–whohadarrivedintheNetherlandssomeyears

before2001–wasabletoputacrosstheirmessageatseveralSalafimosques.Having

developedtheirownorganisations,thesemosquesnowbegantopayincreasing

attentiontothedawa.Meanwhile,anewgenerationofSalafipreacherswasemerging;

menwhounlikethefirstgeerationofSalafipreachers,althoughusuallyratherolder

thantheyoungpeopletheyweretargeting,likethemactuallycamefromthesecond

generationofMuslimimmigrantsandsosharedtheirsocialandculturalbackground.

13 TheSalafimosquesprimarilytrytoattractadults,buttheydoalsoprovidereligiouseducationforchildren.TheAs-SoennahmosqueinTheHague,forexample,setsasidesignificantamountsoftimeforthatactivity.


35

Since2005,thesepreachersseemtohavebecomeincreasinglygoodat‘connecting’

withthewaythissecondgenerationofMuslimyouthviewstheworld.Becauseofthat,

theyhavebeenspecificallychargedwithspreadingthewordamongsttheyoung–so

muchsothattheycaneasilybeclassifiedseparatelyas‘youthpreachers’.Theseyouth

preachersclaimtohavedefinitiveanswerstoallthemanyquestionsyoungMuslims

haveabouttheirplaceinDutchsociety,theirreligiousbackgroundandrecentpolitical

andsocialdevelopments.Andthoseanswers,theysay,aretobefoundonlyinpure

IslamandnotineitherDutchsocietyortheirowncountryoforigin.Thesepreachers

mainlyreachtheiryoungtargetaudiencethroughmeetingsarrangedspecificallyfor

them,whichareheldwithgreatregularityalloverthecountry.

2.4 Third phase: the rise of Islamic neoradicalism within Salafism in the Netherlands

2.4.1 Increasing professionalism and focus upon the Dutch situation

AsignificantsectionofDutchSalafismisnowgraduallyenteringathirdphasein

itsdevelopment.Thisischaracterisedprimarilybyeffortsonthepartofthesecond

generationofpreacherstomaketheirmissionintheNetherlandsmoreprofessional

andtodeviseastrategyandtacticstailoredmoretothesituationhere.

Thesepreachersareconvincedthat,beforeanythingelse,thecurrentfragmentation

ofDutchSalafismmustbestopped.TheyarealsoconsciousofthefactthattheSalafi

messageisnotgoingtohithomewiththeirtargetgroup,youngDutchMuslims,ofits

ownaccord.ManyoftheseyoungMuslimsdonotautomaticallyviewareturntopure

Islamasthesolutiontotheproblemstheyarelabouringunder.Theyarealsodeterred

bySalafism’sinsistenceupontheobservanceofstrict,puritanicalcodesofbehaviour.

Thepreachersthereforerealisethattheyneedtounderstandthetargetgroupbetter.

ButthegrowingdiversityofMuslimyouthmeansthattheyarenolongeronegroup,

butawholehostofdifferentsubgroupseachrequiringitsowntacticalapproachifthey

aretobewonovertoSalafism.Forexample,thosewithdifferentlevelsofeducation

needtobeaddressedindifferentways.

Thepreachersalsounderstandthat,toachievetheirobjectives,theyneedtounderstand

andbeabletoexertinfluenceoverthewidersocio-politicalcontextintheNetherlands.

Whereasthefirstgenerationofpreacherswasfarmoreinterestedinpoliticalandsocial

developmentsintheMiddleEastandtheMuslimworldingeneral,theirsuccessors


36

areconcentratingmuchmorespecificallyupontheDutchsituation.Theyrealisethat

theycanattractandmobiliseadherentsbyrepeatedlyinsistingthatMuslimsinthe

NetherlandsarebeingsystematicallypreventedfrompractisingpureIslam.Inso

doing,theyemphasisethatthis‘suppression’istheworkoftheDutchgovernment,of

thenon-MuslimDutchpopulationandofcertainspecificpeoplewithintheMuslim

communitywhofollowwhattheSalafisclaimisan‘un-Islamic’wayoflife.Theyare

alsoaware,however,thatincreasingthepoliticalandsocialinfluenceofSalafism

requiresnotonlythatitgainmoresupport,butalsothatitadoptdifferenttactics.

Moreandmorefrequently,therefore,theyareturningtheirattentiontothe–often

clandestine–exertionofstrategicinfluenceovergovernment,interestgroups,

consultativebodies,fundingorganisations,socialinstitutionsandsoon(seefurther

4.2.1,underi).

2.4.2 Professionalisation of Salafi dawa on the lecture circuit

ThenewgenerationofSalafievangelistsisdominatedbycharismatic,eloquent

youthpreachers.ForsomeyearsnowtheyhavebeenleavingthefourmainSalafi

centresintheNetherlandseveryweektovisitanumberofnon-Salafimosqueswith

predominantlyMoroccancongregations,andalsoIslamicyouthcentres,wherethey

givereligiouslectures.Theprimarytargetaudienceisan‘undercurrent’ofyounger

membersofthemosque.Thesemeetingsusuallytakeplacewithouttheknowledge

ofthemosquecommittee,whichhardlyeverhasSalafisympathies,butevenifitdoes

hearofsuchameetingitoftenlackstheexecutiveauthorityneededtopreventit.

Unlikethefirstgenerationofpreachers,thesecondconsistsofyoungmen–almost

allofMoroccanorigin–whowerebornintheNetherlands,oratleastgrewuphere.

Partlybecauseofthis,theyarewellawareofdevelopmentsinDutchsociety.Intheir

lectures,theyprimarilyaddressyoungermembersofthesecond-generationMoroccan

communityand,albeittoalesserextent,immigrantsfromotherbackgrounds.That

overwhelminglymeansyoungpeoplefromthewiderArabicculturalcommunity,under

whichSomalisarealsoincludedinthiscase.Theyarealsoreachingagrowingnumber

ofDutchconvertstoIslam.ThelecturesareusuallygiveninDutch.

Traditionally,theTurkishcommunityintheNetherlandshasfeltnoaffinitywith

Salafism.ItsAraborigins,itsideologicallinkstoaschoolofIslamiclawwithno


37

influenceinTurkey14anditscallforpan-ArabIslamicbrotherhood–expressed

throughtheglorificationoftheArabiclanguage,amongstotherthings–areallreasons

forthat.Moreover,anddespiteitslargelyruralorigins,theTurkishcommunityin

theNetherlandsisheavilyinfluencedbyKemalism.KemalAtatürk,thefounderof

modernTurkey,introducedcleardistinctionsbetweenchurchandstateandbetween

traditionandmodernity.Thisphilosophy,knownasKemalism,remainswidely

respectedamongsttheDutchTurkishcommunity.Also,Turkey’sofficialDepartment

ofReligiousAffairs,Diyanet,exercisesideologicalcontroloveraboutthree-quartersof

theTurkishmosquesintheNetherlands,withtheresultthattheyareoverwhelmingly

moderateinnature.Recently,however,Salafismhasbeengaininginpopularity

amongstastillsmallgroupofyoungerTurks–althoughitalsoseemsthattheir

radicalisationhasisolatedthemfromthewiderTurkishcommunityandinsteadled

themtojoinmulti-ethnicnetworks.SoanyradicalisationofTurkishyouthisforthe

mostpartoccurringoutsidetheirowncommunity,which–unliketheMoroccan–is

highlyresistanttothiskindofmovement.

OtheryoungMuslimimmigrantswhoarenotpartoftheArabculturalcommunity,

suchasAfghans,alsoappeartobeshowinglittleornoaffinitywithSalafismatthe

presenttime.

IthasrecentlybeenobservedthattheSalafipreachersappeartobeseekinganewand

largertargetgroup.Sincetheendof2006,theyhavebeenorganisinglecturesinthe

TamazightlanguageoftheBerbers,whichisthemothertongueofmostMoroccansin

theNetherlands.ThismovehassignificantlyincreasedtheSalafis’potentialaudience.

LectureshavealsobeengiveninTurkish.

Ifwomenarepresent,themeetingsarestrictlygender-segregated.Therearealso

speciallecturesforwomenonly,deliveredbyfemalespeakers.Theydonothavethe

samestatusasthemalepreachers,however.

Well-educatedyoungMuslimsareanothernewtargetgroupfortheSalafipreachers.

They,afterall,havethepotentialtoenterimportantpositionsinDutchsocietyandto

gaininfluencewithintheirowncommunities.Theseeducatedyoungpeople,together

withothersdeemedtoshowpromise,aremorelikelytobeadmittedtoexclusive

14 SalafismisrootedintheHanbalischooloflegalthought(‘madhhab’)withinSunniIslam,whereasTurkeyfollowsthemoreliberalHanafischool.


38

teachinggroups,tobeinvolvedinstrategicconsultations,tobegivenresponsibilities

and,ifpossible,tobeaskedtopreachthewordthemselves.Bytargetingthisgroup,

thehopeistocreateaMuslimintellectualclasswhichcanactasareligiousliberation

movement–astrategyinspiredbyEgypt’sMuslimBrotherhood.15

2.4.3 The politicisation of Salafi dawa

DuringthecurrentthirdphaseofSalafism’sdevelopment,mostofitsadherentsseem

bechoosingthenon-violent,politicalformofIslam.Thatappliesequallytovirtually

everySalafimosqueintheNetherlandsandtothesecondgenerationofpreachers.

ThisvariantofSalafismischaracterisedbytheadoptionofaclearposition,grounded

inreligiousmotives,onrelevantsocialandpoliticaldevelopmentsandbyeffortsto

influencethemthroughactivism.

PoliticalSalafismfirstemergedinSaudi-ArabianArabiaduringtheearly1990sas

areactiontothesupposedlylimitedpoliticalawarenessoftheofficialSaudi-Arabian

clergy,alsoreferredtoasapoliticalSalafism.

OnsuchissuesasviolentjihadintheWest,bothpoliticalandapoliticalSalafismare

diametricallyopposedtothevariantwhichpreachesglobalarmedreligiouswar:jihadist

Salafism.16

2.5 Political dawa Salafism: an emerging radical mass movement?

2.5.1 Growing support through the Salafi lecture circuit

PoliticalSalafismhasbeenbothgrowingandprofessionalisinginrecentyears.The

questionnowiswhetherthatgrowthmightleadtotheemergenceofaradicalmass

movement.Itisstilltooearlytoprovideadefinitiveanswer,butthatdoesnotdetract

fromthefactthatthenumberofSalafimeetingsintheNetherlandshasincreased

substantiallysince2005.Speakersfromthefourmainmosquesnowlecture,with

varyingfrequency,atthirtyormoredifferentlocations.Thatnumberhasatleast

doubledinthepasttwoyears.

15 SeeChapter3formoreinformationabouttheMuslimBrotherhood.16Seealsotheappendixtothisreport,‘HistoricalsketchofmodernSalafism’.


39

Thelecturesaregivenbyaboutfifteenexperiencedpreachers,whoareaffiliatedtothe

fourmainSalafimosquesinvariousways.Therearealsoapproximatelyten‘trainee’

preachersatpresent,wholectureonlysporadically.Supervisedandguidedbytheir

moreexperiencedcolleagues,mosthaveassociationswithIslamicyouthcentres.There

appearstobeanactivesystemofrecruitment:talentedyoungpeopleare‘spotted’and

thengraduallyguidedtowardspreachingwork.Thenumberofactivepreachershas

atleastdoubledbetween2005and2007.ItistheexpectationoftheAIVDthatthe

numberoflecturesgivenwillprobablycontinuetoincrease,notleastbecausetheSalafi

mosquesareprioritisingthisactivity.

MostlecturesaregivenatMoroccanmosquesorIslamicyouthcentres.Thereare

approximately550mosquesintheNetherlands,ofwhichabout40percentcanbe

characterisedas‘Moroccan’.TheSalafisarecurrentlyreachingsomethirtyofthese,

representingjustunder15percentofthetotal.Itisnotunusualforahundredorso

youngDutchMoroccanstoattendsuchalecture,butisunclearhowmanyareactually

convincedbytheSalafimessage;thatisdifficulttogaugebecauseitisverymuchan

‘inner’process.Asalreadypointedout,thenumberofMuslimsintheNetherlands

whohaveactuallyradicalisedtowardseitherthejihadorintolerantisolationismand

anti-democraticactivismremainssmallinpercentageterms.Butitisstillnotclear

whetheraSalafimessagetailoredtoaspecificgroupandsometimesrepeatedwith

greatfrequencymightwinovermoreyoungMuslims.Therapidgrowthinthenumber

oflecturesandpreachers,andtheincreasinginterestinSalafismamongstyoung

Moroccans,indicatethatitcould.Moreover,asortof‘dominoeffect’nowappearstobe

settingin:morepeoplearegivingmoreSalafilecturesatmorevenues.See2.6.1fora

detailedanalysisoftheircontent.

Thiswholeprocessisstillbeingmanagedcentrallyatthemoment,butthereis

expectedtobesomedecentralisationovertimeasanewgenerationofpreachers

becomessofamiliarwiththemessagethatitcanspreaditwithoutguidancefrom

above.

Noneofthisnecessarilymeansthattheexponentialgrowthwillactuallycontinueat

itscurrentrate.Atpresent,itisdifficulttoascertainwhetherinterestinSalafismis

increasingoutofdissatisfactionwiththeestablishedorderoroutofatruedevotion

toultra-orthodoxdoctrine.Eitherway,though,itisveryimportantthatDutchsociety

remainsalerttothisgrowth.Particularlybecause,certainlyinitssocialaspects,the

messagebeingpropagatedbythesepreachersmakesapowerfulappealtothesenseof

deprivationandtheneedtoseekanidentityfeltbycertaingroupsofyoungMuslims.


40

Thoselisteningtothatmessagemightbeencouragedintoaprocessofreligious

socialisationwithapoliticaldimensionwhicheventuallyresultsintheadoptionofan

intolerantandisolationistattitudetowardsmainstreamDutchsociety,andarejectionof

thedemocraticlegalorder.

2.5.2 A social appeal to resentment

Throughitscurrentsocialmessage,politicalSalafism’sradicaldawaisseekingto

attractwidespreadsupportamongstyoungMuslimsintheNetherlands,particularly

thoseofMoroccanorigin.Anotinsignificantproportionofthisgroupisstruggling

withproblemslikedroppingoutofschool,unemployment,above-averagecontact

withthejudicialsystemandadifficultsearchforanidentity.TheSalafipreachersare

expertsinplayingontheirsenseofdeprivationandmarginalisation.Theyclaimthat

theweaksocialpositioninwhichmanyyoungMoroccans–andtheirparents–find

themselvesisnotoftheirmaking.Rather,itistheanti-IslamicsentimentsoftheDutch

whichhaveaffordedtheircommunitysecond-classstatus.TheypresentDutchsociety

asthesolecauseoftheproblemsaffectingyoungMoroccanshere.

Thisplayingonasenseofdeprivationseemstobeanimportantfactorinradicalisation.

Indeed,similarcallsforresentmentarealsomadetootherMuslimethnicgroups.If

theaudiencedoesnotappeartosharethatfeelingspontaneously,thenthepreachers

claimsystematicallythatMuslimsintheNetherlandswillalwaysremainsecond-class

citizensandneverbegiventherightstheyareduebecauseoftheirfaith.Inthatway

theycaneventuallysummonupthedesiredresentmentand,overtime,initiatethe

processofradicalisation.

2.5.3 A common new identity as the answer to the crisis of identity

ItisclearthatactiveattemptsarebeingmadetoweanyoungMoroccans,andother

Muslimswherepossible,awayfromnationalreligioustraditionswhicharesupposedly

inspiredbysuperstition.Thepreacherspresent‘pureIslam’asadivinerevelation

whichmustbeseparatedfromthattradition,confrontingtheiraudienceswith

interpretationsoftheKoranfoundedintheworksofSalafireligiousscholars,mostof

themfromSaudi-ArabianArabia.Thesepresentopinionstotallydifferentfromthe

moremoderateinterpretationswhicharecommoncurrencyincountrieslikeMorocco.

Consequently,listenerstothesesermonsareinasensebeingdrawnintotheMiddle

Easternculturalsphereandsobeinggivenadestinationintheirquesttofindtheirown

identity.TheyaretoldthatintheNetherlandstheyhaveneitheraDutchidentitynor


41

aMoroccanone,butareMuslimsfirstandforemost.Theyarethusofferedaneutral,

all-embracingMuslimpersonawithwhich,sotheyaretold,theyareguaranteedastable

lifeandcanembracepureIslam.Inreality,however,whattheyarebeinggivenisa

Saudi-ArabianinterpretationofIslamwiththeaccompanyingSaudi-Arabianformsof

expressionandSaudi-Arabianoutwardcharacteristics.ThisisaversionofIslamwhich

sitsveryuneasilywithDutchsociety,butalsowiththetraditionalMoroccanreligious

identity.And,asalreadynotedin2.4.2,itisaninterpretationwhichfindsverylittle

resonanceatallwithintheTurkishcommunity–inthisrespect,thatgroupseemsto

possessamoredeep-seatedsenseofitsownidentity.

2.5.4 The political discourse embraces a process of socialisation

Throughtheirlecturecircuit,theSalafipreachersareactivelyseekingtocreateagroup

identity.NowthattheyarereadytoembracepureIslam,theaudiencesaretold,theyare

abouttoenteranewgroupwhichiswellorganisedandwillprovidethemwithwarm

friendships:aneffectivemeansofbondingyoungMuslimsinsearchoftheirown

identity.JoiningthebandoftrueMuslimswillgivethemnotjustspiritualpeacebut

alsoasolidsocialfoundationwithwhichtheycancompletetheirquestfortheirown

identity.Moreover,theywillbecomepartofadistinctivegroupwhichstandsoutclearly

fromthedecadentsocietyallaroundit.Theindividualispushedintothebackground;

theyaregoingtobepartofanIslamiccollective.Theyoungadherents–predominantly

men,butalsowomen–arespecificallycommandedtopresentthemselvesoutwardly

asMuslimstosetthemapartfromthe‘unbelieving’and‘sinful’outsideworld.Their

dresscodebothconfirmstheirMuslimidentityandexpressestheirrejectionof

mainstreamsociety.Theyoungmenmustgrowtheirbeardsandwear‘Islamic’dress

–includingtrousersabovetheankleandaprayercap–whilstwomenshouldbefully

covered,preferablyincludingafaceveil.Allthismakesitextremelydifficulttoleavethe

grouplater,andonlycontributestothegrowthandpowerofSalafism.

Withinthelecturecircuit,therearealsoactiveeffortstoidentifyparticularlycapable

youngparticipantsatanearlystagesothat,oncetheirloyaltyhasbeenestablished,they

canreceivefurtherreligiousinstructioninexclusivegroupsandthenbegroomedto

propagatetheradicaldawaoftheirownaccord.Thegroupprocessisthuscharacterised

byahighlevelofopennessandpressuretoconvertontheonehand,butalsobya

certainamountofexclusivityontheother.TheSalafimessageisforeveryone,but

responsibilitywithinthemovementisreservedforachosenfew.


42

2.6 The radical dawa: intolerant isolationism and anti-democratic activism

2.6.1 The anti-integration theology of Salafism17

Asexplainedbefore,thecurrentgenerationofSalafipreachersisspreadinga

polarising,antiintegrationmessageinordertorecruitasmanyadherentsaspossible

andsobuildamassmovement.However,thistenetisalsofirmlygroundedinthe

religioustextsattheheartofthedoctrine.Outofasincerereligiousconviction,Salafis

arestrivingtomakeallhumanthoughtsandactionssubservienttotheultimate,

compellingsupremacyofGod.

Theythereforeregardthepurificationofthefaithandhenceofthesocietyaround

themasoneoftheirmostimportanttasks.Tothisend,theyhaveestablishedahighly

organisedinternalsystemforthetransferofknowledge.Thisconsistsmainlyof

lecturesandone-dayorlongerIslamicconferences(‘dawrahs’)atwhichtheypresentan

ultra-orthodoxmessagedesignedtoheightensocialawareness,butalsotodeepenthe

innerreligiousbeing.

Thelecturesaddressabstracttheologicalthemesofanultra-orthodoxnature,like

‘preparingfordeath’,‘thesoul–friendorfoe?’and‘resolveintimesoftemptation’.

Throughthesetopics,anattemptismadetoconnectwiththespiritualandmoralquest

beingundertakenbyyoungMuslims.Thepreachersalsotrytocreatefertileground

foraSalafiapproachtoIslam.Forexample,theybringupsuchissuesasthestruggle

againstidolatryandinnovation.

2.6.2 The struggle against idolatry (‘shirk’) and innovation (‘bidah’)

ThemessagebeingpropagatedbypoliticaldawaSalafismintheNetherlandsis

supportedbyanultra-orthodoxtheologicalreasoning.Ingeneral,thisisdoneaccording

tothesamegeneralprinciplesasusedbyothervariantsofSalafism.Whatisspecific

topoliticaldawaSalafismisthewayinwhichtheseprinciplesaretranslatedintothe

contemporarypoliticalandsocialcontext.

17 TheAIVD’sobservationsonthissubjectcorrespondcloselywiththedescriptionsofSalafism’stheologicaldoctrineinQuintanWiktorowicz,‘AnatomyoftheSalafimovement’,inStudiesinConflict&Terrorism,pp.207-235,NewYork,2006;andHamidAlgar,Wahhabism:acriticalessay,pp.1-70,NewYork,2002.


43

Attheheartoftheunderlyingtheologyistheprincipleof‘tawhid’,theunityofGod.

MuslimsmustacknowledgeGodasoneuniqueentity,deservingofallpraiseasruler

oftheuniverse.Itisthedutyofbelieversnotonlytoacceptthisasabasictenetoffaith,

butalsotopractisetheiracknowledgementofit.Thatmeansstrictobservanceofthe

lawsrevealedbyGodintheKoranandfurtherexplainedintheHadith,orteachingsof

theprophet,aswellaspreventingandcombatingidolatry(‘shirk’)–whichrefersnot

onlytotheworshipofothergods,butalsotoallhumanactionswhichdonotconsider

andsubmittothecommandmentsofGod.AndinSalafismtheyincludehonouring

andrespectingdemocraticinstitutions,acountry,aflagandsoon.Music,dance,film,

sportandotherformsofrelaxationcanalsocountas‘shirk’.Idolatrycomesfromwhat

theSalafiviewasthedeludedideathatpeoplecanarrangetheirownpersonaland

publiclivesindependently,withoutfollowingtheinstructionsprovidedbyGod.People

whothinkthattheycanexistandactoftheirownfreewill–inotherwords,thosewho

believethatmanisanautonomousforceintheuniverse–arecommitting‘shirk’.

AccordingtoSalafism,preventingandcombatingidolatrybeginwiththeacceptance

that,throughtheKoran,Godhasfullyrevealedhowpeoplemustleadtheirpersonal

andpubliclives.Fromthiscomethestrictcodesofbehavioursocharacteristicof

themovement.Anythingwhichdeviatesfromaliteralreadingoftherevelationisa

‘bidah’,orinnovationintroducedbyman,andthatcanleadto‘shirk’.Everyinnovation

affectingthetraditionalinterpretationoftheIslamictextsisathreattothefaith,even

wheninspiredbythenoblestofmotives.

2.6.3 Intolerant isolationism

TheirdesiretoenforcepureIslamleadstheSalafistowantnopartofanon-Salafi

society.WhenpiousMuslimscomeintocontactwithotherculturesandpeople

withdifferentideas,thereisadangerofthoughtsbeingexchangedandreligious

cross-pollinationoccurring.Andthatcanresultin‘bidah’,whichimperilsthefaith.

ItispartlybecauseofthisthatSalafismcanbecharacterisedasananti-integration

movementonreligiousgrounds.Integrationintoanyothersocietythreatensthepurity

ofthedoctrine.

ManySalafisregardtheIslamicconceptofaworlddividedintoaHouseofIslam(‘Dar

al-Islam’)–wherepeaceandjusticeprevail–andaHouseofWar(‘Daral-Harb’)–also

HouseofInfidels(‘Daral-Kufr’)–inaperpetualstateofdarknessandinjusticeas

compelling.TheythereforebelievethatthepiousmustdistinguishbetweenMuslims

andnon-Muslims,andthatthetwogroupscanneverco-existonequalterms.This


44

meansthattheyarealsoaversetotheconceptoffreedomofreligion.That,afterall,

assumesthatallreligionsshouldbetreatedequallyandthateveryreligiousexpression

deservesrespectandmustbeallowedfreelyandwithoutrestriction.ForSalafis,thereis

onlyonetruefaith:Islamastheyobserveit.Theythereforealsodescribethemselvesas

the‘SavedSect’(‘al-firqaal-najiya’)

ItisbaseduponthisconvictionthatSalafiscriticiseotherreligiouscurrents.For

example,theyparticularlyabhorJewsandShi’ites.Thelatterareregardedasapostates

andenemiesofSunniIslam.TheJews,meanwhile,arethemortalfoesoftheprophet

MuhammadandhenceofIslamasawhole.AlthoughtheKoranstatesthatJewsand

Christiansdeserverespect,inSalaficirclesthatinjunctionisconsideredobsoletesince

thecurrentgenerationofJewsandChristiansnolongerhaveanythingincommonwith

thosereferredtointheKoran.

Salafismalsoharboursastrongbeliefinanti-Islamicconspiracies,basedinpartupon

severalversesfromtheKoranwhichassertthatJewsandChristiansareill-disposed

towardsMuslims.18Thispreconceivedmistrustleadstohostilitybeingperceivedin

everyquarter,andinsomecasestoaself-perpetuatingvictimcomplex.Thesupposed

hostilityistotallyatoddswiththeDutchgovernment’sattemptstoinitiateadialogue;

Salafishereviewsuchadialoqueasatextbookexampleofdeliberatethreats.Anyone

enteringintoadialoguewithunbelievers,makingconcessionstoDutchsocietyand

showingwillingnesstoassistintegrationisendangeringhisownfaith.Contactwiththe

supposed‘enemiesofIslam’ispermittedoutofself-defence,butthetruepurposeof

andthinkingbehinditmustneverberevealedtotheinfidels.Thisdefencemechanism

buildsuponwhatwasoriginallyaShi’itedogma,‘takiyya’,whichallowsbelieversto

adoptadifferentreligiousorideologicalidentitytodefendoneselforthefaithwhen

itisunderthreat.OnepracticalrepercussionofthisisthatSalafimosquesinthe

Netherlandspresentafaçadeofrespectabilityintheircontactswiththeoutsideworld:

asandwhennecessary,theydeliveramessageofmoderationandintegration.But

thatisclearlyverydifferentfromthewordtheyarespreadingwithintheirowntrusted

circles.

18 Theyincludeverse3:118.SeealsoWiktorowicz,p.218.


45

2.6.4 Rejection of democracy and a state based upon secular law

Salafisrejecttheideaofaconstitutionalstatebaseduponsecularlaw.Thisisbecause

itinvolvespeopledevelopingtheirownlegislationandrules,andthenputtingthem

beforethelawsofGod.Theultimatelawhasalreadybeenrevealedtomanintheform

oftheSharia.Andthosewhocomplywiththatarefulfillingtheirdutytocontribute

towardsperpetuatingthepowerofGod.Salafismseeksthefullimplementationofthe

Sharia,sinceonlythatwillcreateatemporalstatewhichcomplieswiththewillofGod.

ThisisalsowhytheyrejecttheWesternnotionoftheseparationofchurchand

state.SuchaconceptisanaffronttoGod,sinceitimpliesthatspiritualityshouldbe

excludedfromthepoliticaldomainandhencefromtheorganisationofsociety.And

thatrepresentsadirectthreattoIslam,accordingtotheSalafis,preciselybecauseit

isthetaskofspiritualitytoguidesocietytowardstheobservanceofIslamiccodesof

behaviour.

Salafismalsoutterlyrejectstheideaofdemocracyasthebasisofagovernmental

system.Democracyisoneoftheultimateformsofidolatry,becauseitinvolvespeople

decidingamongstthemselves–totheexclusionofGod–howtheywanttoorganisethe

societytheylivein.Inademocracy,primacylieswithmanandnotwithGod.Thebasic

principleunderlyingthelegitimacyofcontemporarydemocraticstates,thesovereignty

ofthepeople,istotallyatoddswiththefundamentaltenettowhichtheSalafisadhere,

thesovereigntyofGod.

TheseconsiderationsmakeanyintegrationintoorassimilationwithDutchsocietya

threattothefaith.Thefactthattheyviewthatsocietyasadriftandcorruptgoeswithout

saying.Soparticipationinthedemocraticprocess,oranyformofco-operationor

compromisewiththe‘infidelregime’,isrejected.Salafipreachersregularlypostulate

theirbeliefthatIslamiclawsandcustomstakeprecedenceoverandaresuperiorto

thoseoftheNetherlands.


46


47

3 Other radical dawa movements in Europe and the rise of Islamic neoradicalism

3.1 Introduction

Sofar,adescriptionhasbeengivenabouttheriseofIslamicneoradicalisminthe

Netherlandsandithasbeenshownthatthisisreflectedprimarilyinthegrowthof

politicalSalafism.Thisisalargelyautonomousradicaldawamovement,whichhas

managedtoreachaspecificaudiencewithitsnon-violentmissionarymessage.The

AIVDhasalsoobservedsimilardevelopmentsglobally.Throughoutalmosttheentire

Islamicworld,andinparticulartheArabpartofit,Islamicradicalisminallitsforms,

includingSalafism,hasbeenenjoyingarevival.Morerecently,thesametrendhas

beenseeninseveralWesternEuropeancountrieswithMuslimcommunities.Various

radicaldawamovementsareactiveinthisregion,becomingincreasinglyautonomous

andlessreliantupondirectcontrolfromthepreviouslymentionedIslamic‘guide

nations’.Here,too,Islamicneoradicalismseemstobeontherise.Soitsgrowthinthe

Netherlandsisnotanisolatedphenomenonbutpartofawiderglobaltendency.

3.2 The radical dawa in Europe: three phases

RadicaldawamovementshavebeenactiveinWesternEuropesincethe1960s,

primarilyinGermany,FranceandtheUnitedKingdom.Theywereoriginallymarginal

groupswhichfoundlittleresponsefromfirst-generationimmigrants,formuchthe

samereasonsasintheNetherlands:theideologytheywerepropagatingsimplydid

notappeal.Theseevangelicalmovementswereusuallyheadedbyactivistswhointurn

werereceivingideologicalguidanceandlogisticalbackingfromMuslimguidenations

orforeignmissionaryorganisations.Butthingshavechangedsincetheturnofthe

century.Withtheriseofanewandyoungercadre,theultra-orthodoxmovementshave

becomemoreindependent.Althoughnotbrokenentirely,thetieswiththeguidenation

orparentorganisationhavebeenpushedintothebackground.

Byadaptingtheirreligiousmessagetothelocalsituationanddisseminatingitin

amoreprofessionalway,thesemovementshavenowsucceededinestablishinga

lastingrelationshipwithyoungMuslimimmigrantsinWesternEurope.Justasinthe

Netherlands,theradicaldawainavarietyofmanifestations–includingSalafism–now


48

appearstohaveenteredatleastitssecondphase,butmoreoftenthethird,inawhole

numberofcountriesintheregion.

3.3 The activism of radical dawa movements in Europe

3.3.1 The growth of the radical dawa in Europe

AsdescribedinChapter2,politicalSalafismisthemostimportantradicaldawa

movementintheNetherlands.InseveralotherWesternEuropeancountries,too,Salafi

mosqueshavesucceededinmobilisingincreasingnumbersofyoungMuslims.They

havegrowingadherenceinBelgium,GermanyandFrance,forexample,wherethat

phenomenonhasalsobeenaccompaniedbytheappearanceofanewgenerationof

Salafipreachers.

AsintheNetherlands,thosepreachersmaintainrelationshipswithknownSalafi

mosquesbutmainlypropagatetheirmessageinahighlyautonomousway,tailored

tothelocalsituation.AndtheydosoinFlemish,GermanorFrench,notArabic.

InGermanythereareseveralactiveconvertswho,liketheircounterpartsinthe

Netherlands,spreadthewordthroughanationwidelecturecircuit.Andanumber

ofBelgianyouthpreachersmaintaincloserelationshipswithlike-mindedDutch

colleagues.Thereiscertainlysomecross-borderco-operation,anditisbecomingmore

andmoreprofessional.Forexample,DutchyouthpreachersregularlyaddressBelgian

audiences.

InthecountriessurroundingtheNetherlands,otherradicaldawamovementslikethe

MuslimBrotherhood,TablighiJamaatandHizbut-Tahrirarealsoactive.Thelatter

two,inparticular,operatefromalocalperspective,makinggreateruseofprofessional

methodsandincreasinglytargetingyoungMuslimimmigrants.Thesegroupsdohave

somesupportintheNetherlands,butarenoticeablylesssuccessfulherethanthe

Salafis.Intheirnature,overallobjectivesandmethods,allthesemovementsdisplay

closesimilaritieswithSalafism,buttheyhavedifferenthistories,disagreeoncertain

ideologicalandtheologicalinterpretationsandhaveadoptedgenerallydivergent

strategicpaths.

TherearevariousreasonswhySalafismhastakenrootintheNetherlandswhereas

othermovementshaveelsewhere.Here,forexample,theactivitiesofSaudi-Arabian

missionaryorganisationstogetherwiththearrivalintheNetherlandsofcharismatic,


49

rhetoricallygiftedSalafipreachersandtheestablishmentofviablemosques

sympathetictotheirmessage,helpedtopavethewayforthosepreacherstofinda

groupof(young)peoplereceptivetotheirmessage.Socialdevelopmentshavealso

contributed.Thanksinparttoitshighleveloforganisation,Salafismisthecurrent

whichhasmanagedtopropagatetheradicaldawawiththegreatestsuccessinthe

Netherlandsandsohastendedtooverwhelmrivalmissionarymovements.Therehave

beensimilarprocessesinotherEuropeancountries,butwithdifferentgroupstaking

thelead.Forexample,theMuslimBrotherhoodwasalreadyestablishedinGermany

beforetheSalafiscameontothesceneandbeforeinternationalpoliticaldevelopments

addedimpetustoanewgenerationofMuslimyouth’ssearchforitsownidentity.The

sameappliestoHizbut-TahririntheUnitedKingdom.

BelowsomeinformationisprovidedaboutthemuslimBrotherhood,TablighiJamaat

andHizbut-Tahrir,becausetheyarealsoactiveintheNetherlands,albeitonasmaller

scalethantheSalafi.

3.3.2 The Muslim Brotherhood: founders of modern radical Islamic activism

TheMuslimBrotherhood(‘Hizbal-Ikhwanal-Muslimun’)wasfoundedinEgypt

in1928,byHassanal-Banna.Itsestablishmentwaslinkedtoeffortstorevivethe

IslamicidentityoftheArabworld,whichwasbelievedtohavebeenunderminedby

colonialism.Themovement’saimistoactasabulwarkagainstadvancingWestern

culturalandideologicalhegemony.Itwasoriginallypreparedtouseviolencetothis

end,butsincethelate1960stheBrotherhoodhasgraduallyevolvedintoanon-violent

grassrootsmovement.Itisattemptingto‘re-Islamise’societyinaccordancewithan

ultra-orthodoxdoctrine.Toachievethat,itseekstocreateasocialvanguardwhichwill

eventuallysparkamassmovementfortheradicaltransformationofsociety.Withthis

inmind,theBrotherhoodplaysanactivepartinsocietyanddoesnotshunpolitical

participation.Itisonthislatterpointthatthemovementdiffersmostfundamentally

fromotherultra-orthodoxtendencies.

InEgypt,theMuslimBrotherhoodhastakenituponitselftoprovidemanypublic

servicesunavailablethroughthedeficientlyfunctioninggovernment.Itcollects

refuse,operatesambulances,distributesfoodandemergencyaid,andsoon.Inthis

wayithascreatedalmostastatewithinastateinsomepoorerurbandistricts.These

activitiesalsogeneratebroadpublicsupportandenablethemovementtoexposethe

supposedlyinefficientnatureofthecurrentpoliticalsystem.Theresultisthatpeople

aremoreinclinedtoseekrefugeinIslamandsoprovidetheBrotherhoodwithapower


50

base.AsubstantialsectionoftheEgyptianmiddleclassisalsosympathetic,outof

dissatisfactionwiththecountry’sperceivedpoliticalandeconomicstagnation.Although

officiallybanned,inpracticetheBrotherhoodistoleratedinEgyptandinfactformsthe

onlyseriouspoliticaloppositionthere.

Theterroristmovementsal-Gama’aal-Islamiyya(theIslamicGroup)andEgyptian

IslamicJihadbothhavetheirrootsintheEgyptianMuslimBrotherhood.Theywere

foundedinthemid-1970sbyelementsdissatisfiedwiththeorganisation’sdisapproval

ofviolence.19

TheMuslimBrotherhoodhasanimportantoffshootinSyria.Duringthe1970s

andearly1980s,theSyrianMuslimBrotherhoodwasinvolvedinnumerousviolent

confrontationswiththeauthorities.In1982thisculminatedinafiercebattlefor

theBrotherhood’sstronghold,thetownofHama,inwhichsome20,000people

werekilled.20Sincethen,theorganisationhasbeenpreventedfromplayinganypart

whatsoeverinpubliclife.Mostofitsmembersareinprisonorinexile,someofthem

inSaudi-ArabianArabia.TheMuslimBrotherhoodinSyrianolongerurgestheviolent

overthrowoftheDamascusregime,withitspartymanifestonowsubscribingto

democraticparticipation.

TheMuslimBrotherhoodanditssplintergroupsenjoywidespreadsupportinmost

Arabcountries.Forexample,boththePalestinianHamasmovementandtheIslamic

ActionFrontinJordanhavetheiroriginsintheorganisation.21IslamicAction

Frontmembersdominatethestudentmovement,tradeunionsandprofessional

organisationsinJordan;however,theboundariesofthecountry’selectoraldistricts

havebeendrawninsuchawaythattheyarelimitedintheirabilitytostandinlocaland

generalelections.22SeveralotherArabcountrieshavebannedtheMuslimBrotherhood

altogether.

19Seealso:GillesKepel, Jihad, thetrialofpolitical Islam,pp.276-299,Harvard,2002,andInternationalCrisisGroup,IslamisminNorthAfricaII–Egypt’sopportunity,Brussels,20April2004.

20RaymondHinnebusch.Syria:Revolutionfromabove,pp.92-103,London,2001.21 See also:Mohammed Abu-Rumman, ‘Political liberalization in Jordan’ and ‘The role ofEuropewithregardtoIslamicmovements’,inIslamicActivismandDemocratizationintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,pp.25-29and55-59,apublicationofForumandtheScientificCouncilforGovernmentPolicy(WRR),TheHague,2007.

22Seealso:InternationalCrisisGroup,Thechallengeofpoliticalreform.Jordaniandemocratisationandregionalinstability,pp.16-24,Brussels,8October2003.


51

ThemovementbegantomakeinroadsintoEuropeintheearly1960s.23Itsbridgehead

wasestablishedinGermany,whereSaïdRamadan–formerpersonalsecretaryto

Hassanal-BannaandfatheroftheSwissacademicandtheologianTariqRamadan–

hadsettled.Fromthere,heandothersbuiltupanetworkwhichnowhasbranchesin

virtuallyeveryEuropeancountrywithaMuslimcommunity.

NotallMuslimBrothersortheirsympathisersarerecognisableassuch.Theydo

notalwaysrevealtheirreligiousloyaltiesandultra-orthodoxagendatooutsiders.

Apparentlyco-operativeandmoderateintheirattitudetoWesternsociety,theycertainly

havenoviolentintent.Buttheyaretryingtopavethewayforultra-orthodoxIslamto

playagreaterroleintheWesternworldbyexercisingreligiousinfluenceoverMuslim

immigrantcommunitiesandbyforginggoodrelationswithrelevantopinionleaders:

politicians,civilservants,mainstreamsocialorganisations,non-Islamicclerics,

academics,journalistsandsoon.Thispolicyofengagementhasbeenmorenoticeable

inrecentyears,andmightpossiblyheraldacertainliberalisationofthemovement’s

ideas.Itpresentsitselfasawidelysupportedadvocateandlegitimaterepresentative

oftheIslamiccommunity.Buttheultimateaim–althoughneverstatedopenly–is

tocreate,thenimplantandexpand,anultra-orthodoxMuslimblocinsideWestern

Europe.

TheMuslimBrotherhoodisactuallystillinthefirstphaseofIslamicradicalism’s

development.ThemovementmaybeactiveinvariousEuropeancountries,andenjoy

considerableinfluenceinsomeofthem–Germanyincluded24–butitscadrestill

consistsmainlyoffirst-generationimmigrantswhoareusuallywell-schooledinultra-

orthodoxdoctrineandmethods.TheBrotherhoodhasfailedtobringdowntheageof

thatcoregroup,however.Norhasitreallysucceededinreachingayoungergeneration

ofMuslimswhooftencomefromtotallydifferentculturalbackgrounds.Inthiseffort,

itisencounteringstrongcompetitionfromtheSalafis.WhilsttheBrotherhoodmade

someprogressinattractingyoungsterstotheirpolitico-religiousmessageduringthe

1990s,itisnowpoliticalSalafismwhichismakingtherunningwiththataudience.As

aresult,theMuslimBrotherhoodislessprominentinEuropenowthanitwasafew

yearsago.Anditswillingnesstoengageinthepoliticalprocesshasprobablybeenits

undoing.YoungMuslimradicalsarenotpreparedtomakesuchconcessions,sothey

23 LorenzoVidino,‘TheMuslimBrotherhood’sConquestofEurope’,inMiddleEastQuarterly,winter2005.

24See,forexample:UtaRasche,‘SpinneimNetzderMuslimeinDeutschland’(‘SpidersinthewebofGermany’sMuslims’),FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung,11May2007.


52

feelmoreattractedtotheSalafisandotherultra-orthodoxmovements.Nevertheless,

theEuropeanMuslimBrothersstillhaveconsiderableinfluence.Forinstance,they

playedanimportantroleintherecentcontroversysurroundingtheDanishcartoonsof

theprophetMuhammad.Andtheydidnotshyawayfromtheuseofprovocativetactics

duringthat.

OperatingfromDohainQatar,theEgyptianMuslimbrotherYusufal-Qaradawi

–whopreachesonal-JazeeratelevisionandchairstheDublin-basedEuropean

CouncilforFatwaandResearch(ECFR)–playsapartinthatstrategy.Heregularly

presentshimselfasthereligiousleaderofEurope’sMuslimsandissuesreligious

edicts(‘fatwas’)providingpracticalinterpretationsoforthodoxIslamiclawforuse

inthediaspora.Forexample,theECFR–whichhasnoformaltieswiththeMuslim

Brotherhood–hasruledthatEuropeanMuslimsmayuseinterest-payingWestern

bankingserviceswherenoIslamicalternativeisavailable.This‘fatwa’typifiesthe

blendofideologyandpragmatismnowdisplayedbytheMuslimBrotherhood.Inthe

Europeancontext,itispreparedtomakeconcessionsandtobelessdogmaticthan

otherradicaldawamovements,butatthesametimeitstillholdsfirmtothesupremacy

ofIslamandthecompellingneedforobservance.

PoliticalSalafisminWesternEuropehasverymuchborrowedtheBrotherhood’s

methodology:achievingtheIslamisationofasocietythroughstrongorganisationand

thegradual,clandestineestablishmentofastrictlyreligiousMuslimsocialsystem.In

thisrespect,Salafiradicalsandotherultra-orthodoxmovementsviewtheBrotherhood

astheirexample.Buttheyutterlyrejectitswillingnesstoparticipatepoliticallyandto

acceptcompromises.

SomeSalafiimamsnowactiveinEurope,theNetherlandsincluded,areformer

membersoftheEgyptianorSyrianMuslimBrotherhood.Afterbeingforcedoutof

theirhomecountries,theyusuallyreceivedfurtherschoolinginSalafidoctrinein

Saudi-ArabianArabiabeforelatermakingtheirwaytoEuropefromthere.

TheMuslimBrotherhoodcertainlyhassomesupportintheNetherlands.Forexample,

themanagementcommitteeofthees-Salaammosquecurrentlyunderconstruction

inRotterdam–andsettobethelargestinthecountryonceitisfinished–includes

severalmemberswithknownlinkstotheorganisation.


53

3.3.3 Tablighi Jamaat: Islamic religious activism in the first phase

TablighiJamaat–literally‘movementofthemessage’–wasfoundedinthe1920sby

anIndianclericaffiliatedtotheDeobandimovement,whichhasitsrootsintheHanafi

schoolofreligiouslaw.Aclassicmissionarymovement,TablighiJamaatseeksto

reintroduceMuslimstothemessageofIslam.Itsmembersdevoteseveralhoursaday

toreligiousstudiesandmissionarywork,andtrytoeducateasmanyfellowMuslimsas

possibleabouttheirfaith.25

Themovement’sapproachisoneofactiveevangelism.Forexample,byapproaching

Muslimsonthestreet–anactivitytheSalafisconsiderimproperlyinnovative.

Nevertheless,TablighiJamaatinterpretstheIslamictextsinanultra-orthodoxway.

Theologically,itsviewsarevirtuallyidenticaltothoseoftheapoliticalSalafis:Muslims

shouldlive,andevensleep,exactlyastheprophetdid.However,themovementshuns

bothpoliticsandviolence.

Forthisreason,TablighiJamaatisnotregardedasadirectthreattotheconstitutional

orderofWesterndemocracies.Nevertheless,theideologyitpropagatesistotallyat

oddswithcertainfundamentalWesternvalues.Attheveryleast,forexample,itcan

becharacterisedasstronglyopposedtointegration.Italsoadherestothetraditional

doctrineof‘purdah’,whichrequiresthatwomenbetotallyexcludedfrompubliclife

andpreferablynotevenleavethehome.

TablighiJamaatalsorejectsWesternconceptslikedemocracy,secularlegislationand

individualself-determination.AndsomeyoungMuslimshaveradicalisedunderthe

movement’sinfluence:becauseofitsstrongemphasisuponanultra-orthodoxversion

ofIslam,itlaysfertilegroundformoreextremeinterpretations.

Forexample,BritishterroristRichardReid–theso-called‘shoebomber’who

attemptedtoblowupanintercontinentalflightfromEuropetotheUnitedStates–

wasfirstintroducedtotheradicaldawabyTablighiJamaatbeforefurtherradicalising

outsidethemovement.OtheryoungWesternerswhohavefollowedasimilarpath

includeJohnWalkerLindhandJoséPadilla.Lindh,‘theAmericanTaliban’,fought

againstUSforcesinAfghanistanin2001andPadillaplannedtoexplodeaso-called

25 ‘Da’awatil-God’:theinvitationtoreturntoGodthroughcharity,prayerandtheWord.


54

‘dirtybomb’aboardanaircraft.Allthreearenowservinglongprisonsentencesinthe

UnitedStates.

In2006ayoungBelgianconvertcalledMichaBellendisappeared,leavingbehind

jihadistliteratureinhisroom.HeeventuallyreappearedinPakistan,wherehehad

establishedcontactwiththeTablighiJamaatheadquartersintheprovinceofPunjab.26

TablighiJamaathasbeenreasonablysuccessfulinseveralEuropeancountries.Unlike

thepoliticalSalafis,itsadherentsshyawayfromconfrontationandprefertooperatein

anonymity.IntheNetherlands,themovementmainlytargetsMoroccanMuslimsand

isactiveinnumerousmosques–althoughhardlyeverattheinstitutionallevel.Italso

hasafollowingwithintheDutchPakistanicommunity.

BecauseofthecontrollingrolestillplayedbyitsheadquartersinPakistanandthe

coursesEuropeanfollowersareofferedthere,TablighiJamaatisstillinthefirstphase

ofdevelopmentinWesternEurope.Buttherearealreadysignsthatitisbecoming

increasinglyprofessional,focusingmoreandmoreuponyoungpeopleandexpanding

itscadre.Allthingsconsidered,theindicationsnowarethatthemovementisslowly

movingintothethirdphase.ThelinkswithPakistanarenotgoingtobebroken,

however.AndTablighiJamaat’shighleveloforganisationmeansthatitisgoingtoskip

thesecondphase,fragmentation,altogether.

3.3.4 Hizb ut-Tahrir: polarising Islamic radicalism

Hizbut-Tahrir,thePartyofLiberation,wasfoundedinJerusalemin1952,byTaqiuddin

al-Nabhani(1909-1979).Ideologically,thismovementisstronglyinfluencedbySaudi-

ArabianWahhabism(Salafism).Organisationally,itoriginallyseemstohavebeen

modelledonboththeMuslimBrotherhoodandMarxistmovements;intheearlydays

itattractedmanymemberswhohadlefttheBrotherhoodbecausetheyfoundittoo

moderateandobjectedtoitscontactwithsecularauthorities.27

26DeMorgen,‘DeonzichtbaredreigingvandeislamitischeJehova’s’(‘TheinvisiblemenaceoftheIslamicJehovah’sWitnesses’),Brussels,2September2006.

27Seealso:ZeynoBaranetal,TheChallengeofHizbut-Tahrir:DecipheringandCombatingRadicalIslamistIdeology–ConferenceReport,2004,andHizbut-Tahrir–Islam’sPoliticalInsurgency,NixonInstitute,Washington,2004.


55

Hizbut-Tahrircanbecharacterisedasapoliticalparty,butnotoneintheconventional

senseoftheterm.Itoperatesingreatsecrecyandisorganisedintocellswithanalmost

militaryhierarchy.Doctrinally,themovementisdominatedbyvirulentanti-Zionism,

anintensehatredofseculargovernmentsandideologies,thecompleteavoidanceof

thoseholdingdifferentopinionsandtheadvocacyofaconfrontationalandpolarising

message.

TheultimateaimofHizbut-TahriristoestablishtheIslamicCaliphatewithina

reasonablyshortterm.Itispreparedtouseviolencetoachievethatwhenreally

necessary,butconsidersthatinopportuneatthepresenttime.Beforeitcandoso,

themovementmustfirstbuildupitsownstrength.Oneofitsactivestrategiestothat

endisclandestineentryism:Hizbut-Tahririsendeavouringtosecretlyplaceasmany

membersaspossibleinstrategicpositionsinsociety.WhenthetimecomesforIslam

toseizepower,theseactivistswillrevealthemselvesandhelpthemovementtoachieve

itsobjectivesfromwithin.Itispartlyforthisreasonthatthemovement’smaintarget

isthewell-educated.IntheUnitedKingdom28itisactiveinuniversitiesandsimilar

institutions;studentswhoselevelofeducationhassomewhatalienatedthemfrom

theirowncommunities,andsofeelculturallyuprooted,canbeeasilysusceptibletoits

approaches.

Hizbut-TahriralsoattractsarelativelylargenumberofconvertstoIslam.InEuropean

countrieslikeDenmark,GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom,butalsoinAustralia,it

hasbeenrelativelysuccessfulandismanagingtoreacheverlargergroupsofyoung

Muslimsbyappealingtotheirfeelingsofinferiority,deprivationandalienationfrom

theirhostsociety,providinganultra-orthodoxreligiouscontextfortheirfrustration,

apparentlybleakfutureprospects,searchforidentityandfeelingofculturalvoid.

SeveralterroristorganisationswiththeiroriginsinHizbut-Tahrirareactiveinthe

UnitedKingdom.TheyincludeTheSavedSectandAl-Muhajiroun.Italsooperatesin

theformerSovietrepublicsofcentralAsia;forexample,ithasbeenlinkeddirectlyto

theIslamicMovementofUzbekistan(IMU),aterroristgroupaffiliatedtoAl-Qaeda.

Hizbut-TahririnEuropeishighlyautonomousandprofessionallyorganised,witha

youngandwell-educatedcadre.Ithasclearlyidentifieditstargetgroupsforrecruitment

28TheUnitedKingdomconsideredbanningHizbut-Tahririn2006,buteventuallydecidednotto.TheorganisationisproscribedinGermany,ongroundsofanti-Semitism.


56

andoffersthemmessagestailoredtothelocalsituationandusuallydeliveredinthe

locallanguage.Whilstbasedupontheideologicalandmethodologicaldoctrinesofthe

centralleadership,thefactthatthesemessagescanbeadaptedasnecessarybyactivists

indicatethatHizbut-TahririsinthirdaphaseofdevelopmentinEurope.Itsnational

organisationsapparentlyoperateentirelyindependentlyofthecentre,canfunction

withoutitsleadershipandsohavebecomeautonomous.

WhereveritisactiveinEurope,Hizbut-TahrirtendstotargetthelargestMuslimethnic

group.IntheNetherlands,thatistheTurkishcommunity.Butwhilstitdoeshavesome

supportthere,whichisevengrowing,membershipremainssmallinnumericalterms.

Themovementdoestaketothepublicstagehereonoccasions,asitdidduringthe

Danishcartooncrisisattheendof2005andthebeginningof2006.Italsoorganises

conferencesintheNetherlands.

3.4 The growth of Islamic neoradicalism in Europe

AllthemovementsdescribedaboveareactiveinWesternEurope.IntheNetherlands,it

isthepoliticalSalafistswhoareinascendancy;thatalsoappliesinBelgium,Germany

andFrance.IncountrieslikeDenmarkandtheUnitedKingdom,ontheotherhand,

Hizbut-Tahririsgainingmoreandmoreinfluence.Andthatmovementisalsoactive

inGermany.Behindthescenes,meanwhile,TablighiJamaatand–toalesserextent

–theMuslimBrotherhoodaregraduallyestablishingasolidbaseinsideMuslim

immigrantcommunitiesinallthesecountries.

Insomecases,mostlyattheindividualleveloronasmallscale,thesemovementsare

workingtogetherandsomaybeinfluencingoneanotherideologically.Institutionally,

however,thereisseriousrivalrybetweenthem.Thathasitsprimaryoriginin

ideologicaldifferencesofopinionarisingoutoftheologicalissuesordisagreements

aboutdoctrinalstrategy.TheSalafis,forexample,utterlydisapproveofthepersonal

evangelisationtacticsusedbyTablighiJamaatbecausetheyregardthemasadangerous

formofinnovation.AndHizbut-Tahrirdespisesotherradicaldawamovements

becauseitdoesnotconsiderthemconfrontationalenough.Thereisalsopersonal

rivalryatthehighestlevelbetweenspiritualleaders,sometimesrootedincompeting

desirestobeconsideredtheundisputedleaderoftheMuslimcommunity,whichin

somecasesspillsoverintoopenhostility.Allofwhichcertainlytapsthestrengthof

ultra-orthodoxy.


57

Thesegroupsareincreasinglyseekingtorecruitbetter-educatedyoungpeople,through

whomtheyhopetogainstrategicinfluenceinEuropeinthelongterm.Hizbut-Tahrir

isparticularlyfondofthistactic,asareseveralinfluentialmembersoftheMuslim

Brotherhood.Theyarenotconfiningtheireffortstodisaffectedethnic-minorityyouth,

then,butitiscertainlynotagrouptheyhaveforgotten.They,afterall,arethepotential

footsoldiersofthefuture.Thepeoplewhocantransformtheradicaldawaintoamass

movementforfundamentalchangeinEuropeansociety.Moreover,theseultra-orthodox

movementsalsoseemtoappealtocertainEuropeanconvertstoIslam.

GiventhesizeoftheMuslimcommunityinWesternEurope,theradicaldawa’starget

groupintheregionishuge.Itisnotimpossible,then,thatthesemovementswill

managetogaingreaterinfluencewithinboththatcommunityandEuropeansocietyas

awhole.Especiallyiftheyenterthethirdphaseofdevelopmentandsobeginoperating

entirelyundertheirpower,freeofforeigncontrol.Oncethathappens,theyeffectively

becomepartoftheregion’sownreligioustapestry.Andthatcouldeventuallycreate

tensionswithintheEuropeandemocraticorder.Afterall,thebasicideologyofall

theseultra-orthodoxmovementisfundamentallyatoddswiththevaluesofWestern

democracy.

IneveryEuropeancountry,thereseemstobeonespecificgroupofMuslimimmigrants

whichismostsusceptibletoincreasinglyultra-orthodoxviews.IntheNetherlandsthis

istheyoungsecondgenerationofMoroccanmigrants,whereasintheUnitedKingdom

andDenmarkitisthesecondgenerationwithrootsintheIndiansubcontinent.And

elsewhereitattractsothergroups,suchasBosnianMuslims.Whichitisdepends

partlyupontheparticularnatureofacountry’sintakeofMuslimimmigrants.Whilst

theNetherlandshasarelativelylargeMoroccanimmigrantpopulation,mostBritish

MuslimshailoriginallyfromPakistanorBangladeshandinGermanytheyare

predominantlyTurkish.Asubstantialproportionofthenewadherentsoftheradical

dawaarewell-educated,too,whichimpliesthat–howeverimportanttheymaybe–

localandnationalfactorsarenottheonlyonescontributingtoIslamicradicalism.

Othersarealsoatplay.Itwouldappear,forinstance,thatMuslimimmigrantshave

astronglatentreligiousidentitywhichcanpotentiallymakethemreceptivetoultra-

orthodoxideas.Moreover,Islamisseentobespreadinginternationally,thereisa

widelyheldsenseofvictimhoodandastrengtheningofpan-Islamicsolidarity.Inthat

light,localsituationsandnationalbordersarenotabarrier.

Incombatingradicalisationatthepolicylevel,then,itisimportantnottoregardlocal

factorsaloneasitsdrivingforce.Radicalisationmustbeseeninawidercontext,and


58

theradicaldawashouldbeacknowledgedasaself-sustainingforcewithinternational

appeal.Aforcewhichhasitsoriginsnotonlyinthefactorsmentionedabove,but

alsointheuncompromisingandintimidatingwayinwhichitsmessageispresented.

Andthatmessageseemstobesoundingmorecompellingthanevernowthatjust

aboutalloftheprominentradicaldawamovementshavereachedtheirthirdphaseof

developmentandIslamicneoradicalismhasestablishedafirmfootholdinEurope.


59

4 Security risks from Islamic neoradicalism

4.1 When does radicalism endanger the democratic legal order?

4.1.1 The definition of radicalism with security consequences

Inearlierreports,theAIVDhasalreadydefinedwhenradicalismingeneralcanposea

securitythreattothedemocraticlegalorder.29Suchathreatexistswhenthereis:

the active pursuit of and/or support for far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a

danger to the continuity of the democratic legal order (aim). Possibly by using undemocratic

or methods (means) which may harm the functioning of that order (effect).30

Amoreprecisedefinitionofradicalismwithsecurityconsequencesis:

the readiness, based upon ideals inspired by politics, ethnicity or religion, to develop activities

which, by virtue of the ends being pursued and/or the means used, does (or may) pose a threat

to national security, and in particular to the continuity of the domestic democratic legal order

or the international rule of law, or could seriously hinder the functioning of either.

4.1.2 The democratic legal order: a political system and a way of living

Thisdefinitionofradicalismwithsecurityconsequencesisfoundeduponabroad

conceptionofwhatthegovernmentandsocietyunderstandbythedemocraticlegal

order.31Thiscentresonthenotionthatthatorderisaspecificwayofregulatingthe

29Inparticular,seeFromdawatojihad,2004.30Asanextensionofthis,radicalisationcanbedefinedastheprocessofbecomingradicalandtheinternalisationofthatprocess.Todispelanypossiblemisunderstanding,itshouldbestressedherethatthisdescriptionrefersonlytoradicalisationwhichposesathreattothesecurityofthedemocraticlegalorder.Clearly,radicalisminitselfdoesnotrepresentsuchathreat.Indeed,historyteachesusthatradicalismingeneral,inthesenseofstrivingforthefundamentalreformandacceptingthefar-reachingpersonalandpublicconsequencesofthoseefforts,canbebeneficial–andevenessential–tothedynamismofasociety.

31 SeeFromdawatojihad,pp.13-17.SeealsotheDutchgovernmentpaperGrondrechtenineenpluriformesamenleving(‘Basicrightsinapluralsociety’),Kamerstukken(ProceedingsoftheSecondChamberoftheStates-General)II2003/04,29624.


60

relationshipswithinsociety:bothverticallybetweencitizensandtheirgovernmentand

horizontallybetweenindividuals.32

Thedemocraticlegalorderthushastwodimensions:verticalandhorizontal.The

formeristheorderedpoliticalsystemwhichregulatestherelationshipsbetween

citizensandgovernment,thedemocratic constitutional state.Thelatteristheordered,

democraticwayinwhichcitizensinteractwithoneanother:the open society.

Thedemocraticconstitutionalstateisbasedprimarily–althoughnotentirely–upon

principles,proceduresandinstitutionsfoundedinlaw.Theyincludetheseparationof

powers,basicrightssuchasequality,freedomofexpressionandfreedomofreligion,

governmentcautioninencroachingintopeople’sprivatelives,universalsuffrage,

thefreedomtopursuepoliticalpower,thedemocraticcontrolandreviewofdecision-

making,opengovernment,theprinciplethatdecisionsaretakenbythemajoritybut

withrespectfortheminority,andsoon.

Theopensociety,meanwhile,isthewholebodyofconditionsforademocraticlegal

orderwhicharenot enshrined in written legislation.Suchanorderrequiresmore

thansimplythatcitizensformallyacknowledgeandcomplywiththeprinciplesand

proceduresofthedemocraticconstitutionalstate;itceasestofunctionproperlywhen

particularconditions(whicharedifficultorimpossibletoformulateasspecificrules)

arenotmet.Inotherwords,ademocraticlegalorderrequiresacertaindegreeof

confidence,socialcohesion,solidarity,activecitizenshipandloyalty.Attheheartofthis

areanumberofstandardsandvalues:respectfortheopennatureofsociety,respectfor

itspluriformityanddiversity,mutualrespectamongstitscitizens,respectfordivergent

interestsandagenuinewillingnesstoreconcilethemasmuchaspossible,respectfor

theprivatelivesofothers,respectforothermoralandreligiousviews,andsoon.First

andforemost,thecitizensthemselvesareresponsibleforachievingandmaintaining

thesevalues;thegovernmentcanonlyimposethemfromabovetoalimitedextent,and

itisquestionablehowdesirablethatis.

32 Everysocietyhasitsownwayofregulatingthehorizontalandverticalrelationshipswithinit.Thisisdescribedasits‘legalorder’.Thisthereforeembracesmorethenthesystemofjustice(‘thelaw’).Thisisonlypartofthelegalorder.Alegalordercanbedescribedasdemocraticifthecitizensmakingupthesocietyconcernedareinvolvedinshapingandevaluatingit,inanorganisedwayandwithequalpoliticalrights.Thismeansthatdemocraticlegalordercanneverbestatic;bydefinition,itwillbedynamicasitisconstantlyre-evaluatedandreshapedbyitspeoplewithinit.


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4.1.3 A broad view of security

Abroadconceptionofthedemocraticlegalordergoestogetherwithabroadviewof

security.Thesecurityofasocietyisaboutmuchmorethantheensuringthephysical

safetyofallthosewithinit,protectingprivatepropertyandsafeguardingbasicpublic

services.TheDutchgovernmentbelievesinafarwiderdefinition,whichalsoincludes

aprominentroleforsecurityinthesenseofsocialandpoliticalstability.33Thisisthe

kindofsecuritymadepossiblebythedemocraticlegalorder;citizensmustfeelsecure

intheirdealingswithgovernmentandamongstthemselves.Theyalsoneedasense

oflong-termsecurity.Toputitanotherway,therehastobe‘socialtrust’:aprevailing

climateinwhichpeopleareabletoassumethattheycanlivetogetherpeacefully,now

andinthefuture,regardlessoftheirreligious,ethnicorpoliticaldifferences.This

confidenceisbasedupontherealisationbythemajorityofthepopulationthatthe

rightsandfreedomsenshrinedintheConstitution,aswellasdemocraticprocesses

andinstitutionsderivedfromit,applytoall.Moreover,itisalsofirmlygroundedinthe

standardsandvaluesautomaticallyassociatedwithanopensociety,suchasrespectfor

pluriformityandfortheprivatelivesofindividualcitizens.34

4.1.4 Assessing risks to the democratic legal order

Withthisinmind,whenassessingriskstothedemocraticlegalorderthenatureand

extentoftherisktheyposetothebothitshorizontaldimensionanditsverticalneedsto

beexamined.

Inestablishingthenatureofriskstothatorder,therearetwoquestionsemerge:

• Whataretheriskstotheproper functioningofthedemocraticlegalorder?The

questionhereisnotwhetherthecontinuingexistenceofthatorderisactually

threatened,butwhetherthereisanydangerthatitwillnolongerbeabletooffer

all citizenswhatitwasestablishedtoprovidethemwith:therightsandfreedoms

enshrinedintheConstitution,equaltreatmentbytheprocessesandinstitutionsof

thedemocraticsociety,freedomofreligion,therighttoaprivatelifeandsoon.In

otherwords,thisquestionaddressestheriskofdamagetodemocraticlegalorder

whichmightcauseittodysfunction to a greater or lesser extent.Notsofundamentally

33 StrategieNationaleVeiligheid(‘NationalSecurityStrategy’).KamerstukkenII,2006-2007,30821,no.3.

34Sinceitislargelyuninstitutionalised,thehorizontaldimensionofthedemocraticlegalorderisobviouslyfarmorevulnerabletorisksthantheverticaldimension.


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thattheentireorderisindangeroffailing,butenoughtostopitworkingforsome

people.Or,tobelessabsolute,forasignificantsectionofthepopulationsuchasa

particularreligiousorethniccommunity.

• Whataretheriskstocontinuityofthedemocraticlegalorderintheshortorlong

term?Weareconcernedherewithapotentially permanent disruption or underminingof

thatorderasasystem,ineitheritsverticalorhorizontaldimension,orboth,tosuch

anextentthatitsveryexistenceislikelytobethreatenedsoonerorlater.Answering

thisquestionrequiresanassessmentofthelikelihoodthatoneormoreserious

blowswillbestrucktothedemocraticorder,withthepossibleresultthatitwillbe

irreparablydamagedorcollapsealtogether.

Likewise,therearetwoquestionstobeaskedwhenassessingtheextentofriskstothe


• Whatisthetrue‘strength’oftheradicalmovementwhichhaspromptedtherisk

analysis?Specifically,weneedtoaskourselveswhetherthatmovementpossesses

theresources–human,financialorother–neededtoactuallyachievethoseofits

objectiveswhicharecountertothedemocraticlegalorderandwhetheritisableto

deploythemtothatend.

• Whatoppositiondoesthatmovementfaceinachievingitsobjectives?Inotherwords,

howmuchresistanceisbeingorwillbeofferedbyspecificsectionsofthepopulation

–forexamplebythecommunityofwhichthemovementitselfisapart–societyas

wholeorthegovernment.

Answeringallthesefourquestionsallowsustounderstandthetruenatureofthereal

riskswefacenowandinthenearfutureandinthelongerterm.Inthelattercase,of

course,forecastsneedtobemadeconcerningthepossiblefuturedevelopmentofthe

radicalmovementinquestion,inrespectofitsownstrengthandtheoppositionitis

likelytoface.

4.2 The radical dawa: the risks now and in the longer term

4.2.1 The current risks: partial dysfunction of the democratic legal order

Itwouldbegoingmuchtoofartosuggestthattheradicaldawaiscapableof

permanentlydisruptingourentiredemocraticorder.Butitistruetosaythatthe

movementdoesposeathreatnowintermsofcausingthepartialdysfunctionofthat

orderforasectionofthepopulation.Incertaincases,itisalreadycapableofrendering


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partsofthedemocraticlegalorderinoperativeforsomepeople,particularlythose

withinitsownsphereofinfluence.Forexample,MuslimswhoarenotSalafis,donot

practisetheirreligion,holdsecularviewsorotherwisefailtoconformtoSalafism’s

strictcodeofbehaviour.Thistosomeextentendangersboththehorizontaldimension

ofthedemocraticlegalorder,asitapplieswithintheDutchMuslimcommunities,

andalsotheverticaldimensionintermsoftherelationshipbetweensectionsofthose

communitiesandthegovernment.Therisksinvolvedaresummarisedbelow:

a.The radical dawa undermines support for the democratic legal order

Toalimitedextent,thepropagationofananti-democraticmessagebytheradical

dawaisalreadycontributingtoareductioningeneralsupportforthedemocratic

legalorderamongstcertainsectionsoftheMuslimpopulation.Underitsinfluence,

thenumberof–mainlyyoung–Muslimswhoarerejectingallaspectsofdemocracy

isincreasing.Attheveryleast,thisthreatensthehorizontaldimensionofthe

democraticlegalorder,althoughthoseimbuedwithanti-democraticsentiments

haveyettoactivelyresistitsverticaldimensionbyopenlychallengingdemocratic

institutionsandprocesses.

b.The radical dawa contributes to the polarisation of society

Themessageofintolerantisolationismdeliveredbytheradicaldawaiscontributing

tothepolarisationofsociety.Themovementisuncompromisinginthehatredits

expressestowardshomosexuals,Jews,Shi’ites,non-practisingMuslimsandallthe

othersupposed‘enemiesofIslam’–agroupwhich,intheDutchcontext,meansa

hugeswatheofitshostsociety.Thismessageservestoreinforcethemutualhostility

feltinsomesectionsofthatsociety,bybothMuslimsandnon-Muslims.Again,this

representsathreattothehorizontaldimensionofthedemocraticlegalorder.

c.The radical dawa prevents ‘non-conforming’ Muslims from exercising their basic rights

Althoughnotexplicitlythreateningviolence,theradicaldawaisexertingheavy

pressureuponMuslims–bothwithinitsimmediatesphereofinfluenceand

beyondit–toconformtoitsownextremeinterpretationofIslam.Thiseffectively

meansthatitispreventingMuslimswhodothinkandbelieveinthewayitdoes

fromexercisingtheirbasicrights.Whilsttheradicaldawaisopposedtopersonal

‘takfir’–independentlycharacterisingotherMuslimsasapostatesandthen

‘excommunicating’themandperhapsevenadvocatingtheirdeath–virulent

abuseofsupposednon-believersandenemiesofIslamarenotuncommon.This

iscouchedintermslike‘arch-enemyofGod’,‘dog’and‘tumour’.Althoughthose

whofailtoconformtothemovement’srulesandthinkingarenotliterallydescribed


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as‘unbelievers’and‘apostates’,thatistheaccusationimplicitintheotherformsof

abuseemployed.35OtherMuslimscanexperiencethatashighlythreatening,since

traditionaldoctrineregardsapostasyasasinpunishablebydeath.Consequently,

individualMuslimsreallyarebeingpreventedfromexercisingtheirbasicrights.

d.The radical dawa prevents non-Muslims from exercising their basic rights

Non-Muslimswhowanttocriticisecertainaspectsofthefaithinthemedia,

academicdiscourse,artorsatiremayalsofeelrestrictedbytheintimidating,even

threateningtonesometimesadoptedbytheradicaldawatowardssuchsupposed

‘hostility’toIslam.Thisunderminesfreedebateandpublicconfidenceinthe


e. The radical dawa prevents women from exercising their basic rights

Anotherwayinwhichtheradicaldawapreventstheexerciseofbasicrights

isthroughtherestrictionsitseekstoimposeupon(Muslim)womeninthe

Netherlands.This,itclaims,istocurbtheirexposuretowhatitseesasthesexual

excessessotypicaloftheWestandthustoprotect,evensave,women’shonour.

Adherentsoftheradicaldawapreach,andintheirowncirclespractice,thedoctrine

thatwomenshouldatmostbehighlyrestrictedintheirstudies,mustnotwork,must

notplaysports,mustnotjoinclubs,mustnotassociatefreelywithmen,mustnot

shakemen’shands,mustnotbetreatedbymaledoctorsorotherhealthprofessionals

andmayonlyleavethehousewiththeexpresspermissionorinthecompanyofa

malerelative.Itisalsoapparentthatgirlsarebeingrequiredtocomplywithstrict

codesofdressandbehaviourfromaveryearlyage–muchearlierthaniscustomary

intheIslamicworld.

35 Anumberofpublicstatementsby ImamFawazJneidof theAs-Soennahmosque inTheHagueperfectlytypifythisapproach.AtFridayprayershehassaid,amongstotherthings,thatthenMPAyaanHirsiAliisthearch-enemyofGod,thatAhmedAboutaleb–atthetimeDeputyMayorofAmsterdam–shouldchangehisnametoSharon,thatlocalAmsterdamLabour(PvdA)politicianFatimaElatikisa‘dog’,thattheLiberalParty(VVD)andtelevisionnews programmeNova have declaredwar on Islam and that the Socialist Party (SP) isconductingawitchhuntagainstMuslims.AllattackspromptedbysupposedcriticismofIslamorrefusaltocondemntheDanishcartoons.JneidalsofiercelycursedTheovanGoghinalengthyprayerofsupplicationonlyafewweeksbeforethefilmmaker’sviolentdeath.Overtheweekendof23June2007,anarticleappearedontheAs-SoennahwebsiteinwhichEhsanJami,founderofagroupforex-Muslims,wasaccusedofbeingan‘incestuousweasel’whoisangrywithIslambecauseitdoesnotallowhimtoperformsexualactswithhismotherandsisters.ThenewspapercolumnistAfshinEllianwasalsodescribedinsimilarterms.


65

f. The radical dawa prevents homosexuals from exercising their basic rights

Theradicaldawaalsocondemnshomosexualitytoanextentwhichinfringesupon

basicrights.Homosexualityisregardedasasinfuldeviance,publicorsemi-public

displaysofwhichcanresultinsocialrepudiationandevenchargesofheresy.Asa

result,manygayandlesbianMuslimsareafraidtorevealtheirsexualityandsoare

preventedfromexercisingtheirbasicrights.

g. The radical dawa imposes its own religious legal system in an informal and clandestine way

Inherentintheintolerantisolationismpropagatedbytheradicaldawaisstrong

resistancetointegrationintoDutchsociety.Butinternally–althoughonlyvery

rarelyinpublic–themovementgoesmuchfurther.Whatitactuallypreachesis

thatMuslimsshouldretreatintotheirownclosedcommunitieswhere,asmuchas

possible,IslamicreligiouslawprevailsoverthatoftheDutchstate.Inseveralcases

onalimitedscaleandatthelocallevel,informalandclandestinemovesinthis

directionhavealreadybeenobserved.

Onedirectionthisapproachmighttake,forexample,iseffortstoapplytheShariato

MuslimsintheNetherlandsinthedomainofpersonalandfamilylaw.SomeSalafi

mosquesalreadyconductIslamicmarriageswhich,forideologicalreasons,arenot

registeredwiththecivicauthorities.TheyarethereforeinvalidunderDutchlaw,but

legitimateasfarasthemosqueisconcerned.Intheeventofsubsequentdivorceand

childcustodyissues,theIslamicrulesarefollowed.Andunderthem,womendonot

havethesamerightsasmen.Thisisasituationirreconcilablewiththeprincipleof

equalityapplicableinthedemocraticlegalorder.TherearealsoSalafimosqueswhich

arepreparedto‘marry’menwhoarealreadyhavewives,andsoarelegitimisingbigamy

andpolygamy.

h. The radical dawa is exploring ways of clandestinely opposing and disrupting the democratic

legal order

Clandestinetacticsdesignedtoactivelyopposeanddisrupttheprocessesof

thedemocraticlegalorder–suchaschampioningpolarisationandfomenting

unrest–havealreadybeentriedoutonalimitedscaleatthelocallevel.Thisis

notoneoftheradicaldawa’sprimaryapproachesintheNetherlandsatpresent,

buta‘reconnaissance’ofthepossibilitiessuchtacticsmightofferisunderway.

Forexample,severalofthemovement’srepresentativesstatedthat–bywayofa

highlyirregular‘exceptiontotherules’–Muslimswouldbeallowedtovoteinthe

2006generalelectioninordertothwarttheomnipresent‘enemiesofIslam’.This

declarationwasaccompaniedbyavotingrecommendationwhichwasessentially


66

negativeanddefensiveinnature:Muslimswere‘permitted’tovotefortheleaderof

centrepartyD66becausehe–ratherthanhispartyasawhole–wasthepolitician

leasthostiletoIslam.Avoteforanyoneelsewasdeemed‘indecent’,andpartieslike

theChristianDemocrats(CDA),Liberals(VVD),Labour(PvdA)andSocialists(SP)

wereallcondemnedasanti-Islamic.

i. The radical dawa is clandestinely seeking to influence government policy and, through

entryism, mainstream social organisations

Theradicaldawahasbegunactiveclandestineeffortstogainstrategicinfluence36

overnationalandlocalgovernmentpolicy-makingandtosecretlyentermainstream

socialorganisations.Theclandestineaspectofthisderivesfromthefactthatthe

peopleconcernedrefrainfrommentioningtheirreligiousopinionsandloyalties.For

example,theradicaldawahasbecomeactivelyinvolvedinadvisinglocalauthorities

oncrimefighting,prematureschool-leavingbyethnic-minorityyouthandservices

forimmigrantwomen.OrganisationssecretlyaffiliatedtoSalafimosqueshave

obtainedgovernmentgrantsforprojectstorehabilitatejuveniledelinquentsand

schooldrop-outsfromtheethnicminorities.Awayfromthepurviewofthefunding

body,theseyoungpeoplearethenpresentedwiththemessageoftheradicaldawa.

ThisparticularlyseemstohithomewithyounghabitualcriminalsfromMuslim

backgrounds,sinceitloadstheirlatentsenseofguiltwithreligiousbaggage.

Radicaldawaactivistsarealsoinvolvedinhomeworkclubsforethnic-minority

schoolchildren.Rarely,however,cantheyortheiractivitiesbeassociateddirectly

withamosque.Thefundingbodiesusuallyachievetheiraim–areductionincrime,

areturntostudy,betterschoolresultsorwhateveritmaybe–butintheprocessa

numberoftheyoungbeneficiariesmaketheanti-democraticSalafiideologytheir

own.

Intheircontactswiththegovernment,radicaldawaactivistsoftenrepresentthemselves

asspokespersonsfortheMuslimcommunity.And,thankstotheirhighlevelof

36OneactionofthiskindwasorchestratedbytheSalafimosqueinTilburg,mentionedin2.1.Leadingfigurestherewerethedrivingforcebehindtheradicalisationandpublic‘comingout’ofa femaleUtrechtschoolteacher,whowas thendismissed in theautumnof2006afterinformingtheschool’smanagementthatshewouldnolongershakehandswithmen.The case generated considerable media coverage, a complaint to the Equal TreatmentCommission(CommissieGelijkeBehandeling,CGB)–whichruledinfavouroftheteacher–andacourtcasewonbytheschool.TheTilburgmosqueprovidedtheteacherwithmaterialassistancethroughouttheaffair,regardingitasanimportantsteptowardstheintroductionofultra-orthodoxbehaviouralcodesintheNetherlands.


67

organisationandoutwardlyhonourablemotives,theyareregularlyacceptedassuch.In

reality,though,theycertainlydonotspeakforthecommunityasawhole.Thisisarole

theytakeuponthemselveswithahiddenagenda:togainasmuchcontrolastheycan

overcontactsbetweentheauthoritiesandMuslimcommunitiesintheNetherlands.

j. The radical dawa is a breeding ground for violent activism

TheradicaldawarejectstheuseofviolenceintheWestpartlyonideologicalgrounds

andpartlyforpragmaticreasons.However,thismovementcannevertotallybe

separatedfromtheviolentjihadandcertainlynotattheleveloftheindividual

recipientsofitsmessage.Thepossiblerelationshipbetweenthetwohasanumberof

manifestations:

• Theintolerantisolationism,anti-democraticactivismandanti-Westernmessageof

theradicaldawacanforsomeindividualsactasasteppingstonetowardsfurther

radicalisationalongtheroadtoviolence.YoungMuslimswhoadvocateamore

confrontationalapproacharecertainlyreceptivetothispath.Anumberofthe

convictedterroristsoftheHofstadGroup,amongstthemthemurdererofTheovan

Gogh,regularlyattendedeithertheSalafiAl-TawheedmosqueinAmsterdamorthe

As-SoennahmosqueinTheHague–orboth–beforecontinuingtheirprocessof

radicalisationoutsidethoseinstitutions.TwoconvictedHofstadmembersalsoclaim

tohavebeenmarriedaccordingtoIslamicritesattheAs-Soennahmosque.Atthe

veryleast,thisimpliesthattheseterroristscameintocontactwithandpossiblywere

influencedbythosemosques’doctrinesatsomestageintheirlives.

• TheradicaldawarepeatedlyinsiststhatIslamandMuslimsarebeingdeliberately

attackedbytheWesternworld.Bythisitisreferringprimarilytothesupposedly

critical,evenhostile,mannerinwhichIslamisportrayedintheWestandtotheway

inwhichMuslimsaretreatedhere.Fromtimetotime,andespeciallybythefirst

generationofpreachers,thisallegedassaultispaintedinbroadertermstoinclude

the‘unjustified’WesternmilitaryoperationsinplaceslikeAfghanistanandIraq.A

twofoldmessagewhichcouldeasilycreateanatmosphereinwhichcallsforviolent

jihadatleastfindahearing.Themessageoftheradicaldawacanthusinsidiously–

andperhapsevenunconsciously–createaplatformforviolence.

• TheradicaldawaunequivocallyrejectsviolentjihadintheWestatthepresenttime,

butthereremainsaquestionmarkoverthestanceitmightadoptwhenunforeseen

circumstancesleadtoseriouslyraisedattacksbytheindigenouspopulationtensions

intheWesternworld.Whatwouldhappen,forexample,iftherewereattacksby

theindigenouspopulationagainstMuslimsorajihadistterroristattackinthe


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Netherlands?Becausetheradicaldawaacceptstheuseofviolenceinself-defence,no

definitiveanswertothatquestioncancurrentlybeoffered.

• Inthecaseofanumberofradicaldawamovements,itisuncleartowhatextent

theircurrentdisavowalofviolenceismorethansimplypragmatic.Itisnotentirely

inconceivablethatoffshootsof,say,theMuslimBrotherhoodorHizbut-Tahrir

mightconsidertakinguparmsiftheyfelttheywerestrongenough.Experiencefrom

avarietyofIslamiccountriesshowsthatsplintergroupsfromtheseorganisations

havebeenpreparedtouseviolenceinpursuitoftheirobjectives.Thequestion,then,

isunderwhatphysicalandoperationalconditionstheymightconsideritopportune

toresorttoforce.Forthemoment,inthecurrentEuropeancontext,thereisnoclear

answer.

4.2.2 Factors contributing to the further growth of the radical dawa

Asthisreporthasalreadynoted,theradicaldawamovementintheNetherlands

andelsewhereinEuropeiscurrentlyundergoingagrowthcoupledtothe

professionalisationofitsorganisationandstrategicandtacticalthinking.Andthis

growthisalreadycausingatleastpartialdysfunctionofthedemocraticlegalorder.Any

assessmentofthelonger-termrisksinthatrespectmustthereforeseriouslyconsider

theextenttowhichthemovement’sgrowthislikelytobesustained.Continuinggrowth

requiresthatanumberofcriteriabemet,whichinturnaredependentuponthe

followingfactors:

a. Whether or not the radical dawa continues to professionalise

Asjustreiterated,theradicaldawaiscurrentlyprofessionalising.Thequestion

iswhetherthatprocesswillcontinueandwhetheritwillleadtolastingresults.

Althoughhighlydynamicandambitiousnow,anddrawinguponastrongideology,it

isquiteconceivablethatthemovementcouldfallpreytointernalconflictsresulting

from,say,ideological,ethnicorpersonaldifferencesofopinion.Theresometimes

seemstoberatherlessunitywithintheranksoftheradicaldawathanthemovement

wouldliketopresenttotheoutsideworld.Whatismostimportantinthisrespect

iswhoemergeasitsfutureleaders,whatstatustheyenjoyamongsttheMuslim

communitiesandhowmuchcharismaandpowertounitetheypossess.

b. The level of resilience to the radical dawa within the Muslim communities

ThereisclearresiliencewithintheMuslimcommunitiestotherigidandintolerant

natureofcurrentslikeSalafism,butmanymoderateMuslimshavedifficulty

expressingit.Indeed,sometimestheyaredownrightscaredto.Yetitisnot


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conceivablethattheresiliencewillgrow.Fromyoungpeople,forexample,whoare

deterredbytheemphasisuponapuritanicalwayoflifewhichtheyfeelrequirestoo

manysacrificesontheirpartandismorelikelytoworsenthanimprovetheirposition

insociety.Thepersonallifestylesofsomeradicaldawapreachers,whicharenot

entirelyconsistentwiththemessagetheyaredelivering,couldalsofuelopposition.

Preciselybecausetheyaresupposedtosetanexample,thesepreacherscouldjust

aseasilyfallfromtheirpedestals.Moreover,acriticalpublicdebategroundedin

facts,ratherthaneitheroverstatingorunderstatingtheproblemoftheradicaldawa,

mightencouragemoremoderateMuslimstoexpresstheirowncriticismsfreelyand

withoutfear.Thatwouldalsoheightenresilience.

c. The extent to which radical dawa doctrine is internalised and ‘lived’ by adherents

Withinmanyreligiousmovements,thereisoftenadiscrepancybetweendoctrinal

theoryand‘real-life’practice:betweenthemessageactuallybeingpreachedby

theclericaleliteandthewaythemassoftheirfollowersinterpretit.Itistherefore

conceivablethat,overtheyears,thedawamovementwilldevelopinsuchaway

thatthedoctrinalinternalisationbyalargegroupofitsadherentsproveslessthan

totallyfaithfultothecoremessage.Thiscouldresultinagapemergingbetweenthe

‘pure’radicaldoctrineandafarlessextremepracticalobservance.Thatgapdoesnot

seemtobeverywideatthemoment,butthatisprobablybecausetheradicaldawa

iscurrentlyinaphaseofcleargrowthanditisinthefirststagesoftheirnew-found

devotionthatconvertstendtobemoststrictintheiradherence.

d. The availability of non-radical alternatives within the Muslim communities

Chapter1describedthedevelopmentofseveralnon-radicalmovementswithinthe

Muslimcommunities.Whilstthesestillonlyenjoyrelativelymodestsupport,they

couldintimecometorepresentseriouscompetitionfortheradicaldawa.Thefact

thattheNetherlandsisanopenandpluralsocietyalsomeansthattheyhaveallthe

freedomtheyneedtopresentthemselvesandtorecruitadherents.

e. The extent to which Muslim and non-Muslim communities polarise

TheextenttowhichMuslimcommunitieshaveaccesstonon-radicalalternatives

totheradicaldawaisininverseproportiontothedegreeofpolarisationbetween

Muslimsandnon-Muslimsinsociety.Inapolarisedsociety,eachsectionofthe

populationtendstocloseranksagainsttheothers.Theemphasisisplacedupon

internalsolidarityandtheconflictwiththeothergroups.Toomuchinternaldiversity

isregardedascounterproductivetothecollectiveinterestofthegrouponebelongsto.


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Topreventthis,therighttonemustbechoseninthedebateaboutradicalIslamand

theapproachadoptedtoitmustbeproportionaltotheriskitposes.

f. The development of the radical dawa community

Theextentoftheradicaldawa’sfuturegrowthiscloselylinkedtotheissueofhowthe

currentlyexpandinggroupofyoungultra-orthodoxMuslimsapproachesadulthood.

Doestheirembraceofradicalideasrepresentapassingphase,orhavetheytruly

adoptedthedoctrineforlifetopassdowntothenextgeneration.Willafully-fledged

radicaldawacommunitystarttoappear?Ifitdoes,thenthecomparativelynear

futurewillseeagrowinggenerationofchildrenbeingintroducedtothedoctrineby

theirparentsfromanearlyage.Andwiththatcomestheriskthatthoseyoungsters

willbeill-preparedforparticipationinDutchsociety,andperhapsevenwithheld

fromit.Thiscouldenhancethepermanencyoftheradicaldawamovement,since

religiousmessagescanhaveaparticularlylastingandpowerfulimpactwhen

impartedatanearlyage.

4.2.3 Possible long-term risks

Theradicaldawaisalreadydamagingthedemocraticlegalorder,butonlytoalimited

extent.ItisprimarilythosewithintheMuslimcommunitieswhodonotsharethe

movement’sideasandbeliefswhoarehavingtofaceitsimplacablemessageand

activistattitude.Andbecauseoftheintimidatingeffectthathas,thesepeoplearenot

alwaysabletofullyexercisetheirbasicrights.Intheshortterm,then,theimpactof

theradicaldawawillbefeltmostclearlywithintheMuslimcommunities.Whilst

thatdisturbsthedemocraticorder,itinnowayentailsanyfull-scaledisruption.The

questionhere,though,iswhetherandtowhatextentthisstilllimitedriskmightgrow

inthelongtermandcometoaffectnon-Muslimsaswell.

Indeterminingthelong-termriskstothedemocraticlegalorder,itisimportant

todifferentiatebetweentheriskstothatorderasapoliticalsystem–itsvertical

dimension–andtothehorizontaldimension,theopensocietyandtherelationships

betweenpeoplewithinit:

a. Possible long-term risks to the vertical dimension

Iftheradicaldawacontinuestogrowatarapidrate,itisquiteconceivablethatits

anti-democraticmessagewillleadtotheformationofanexpandingcommunity

ofMuslimswhonolongeraccepttheauthorityoftheDutchstate.Andthatwill

inevitablyleadtotensionswhenitcomestomaintainingpublicorder,enforcing


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legislation,interactionwiththegovernment,theimpositionoftaxesand

administrationofthedemocraticprocess.Thisinturnposesarisktothevertical

dimensionofthedemocraticlegalorder,inparticularwhenitcomestorelations

betweenthegovernmentandagrowingsectionoftheMuslimpopulation.Ifthese

processescannotbeheldincheck,itisalsopossiblethatsectionsofthenon-

Muslimpopulationwillbegintoharbouranincreasingmistrustoftheauthorities

–anadditionalrisktotheverticaldimension.Wereboththeradicaldawaandthis

‘indigenousreaction’toassumesubstantialproportions,thatdimensionwouldcome

underconsiderablepressure.

Itisinconceivable,however,thattheradicaldawacouldundercurrentcircumstances

evolveintoamovementsopowerfulandwidespreadthatittrulywouldendangerthe

verticaldimensionofthedemocraticlegalorder.Theinstitutionsmakingupthatorder

arewidelysupportedintheNetherlandsanddisplaysufficientresilienceandelasticity

tosuccessfullyresistanyattemptbytheradicaldawatounderminethem.

b. Possible long-term risks to the horizontal dimension

Continuinggrowthoftheradicaldawawithoutsufficientresiliencefromsocietyat

largecouldconceivablyresultinthemovement’smessageeventuallycreatingserious

socialtensionsandpolarisation.Inparticular,itstoneandactivities–andpotential

reactiontothemfromothersectionsofsociety–couldleadtolastingethnicand

religiousproblems.Andthiswillcertainlyhappenifgroupswithineithertheradical

dawaorthenon-Muslimcommunitytrytostirupemotionsinadeliberateattemptto

sourrelations.BothMuslimsandnon-Muslimswouldthenbehinderedinhowthey

think,actandrelatetoeachother.Crumblingsocialcohesion,decliningcollective

solidarity,increasingresistancetointegrationandintensifiedgroupthinkingon

allsidescouldenhancethemutualmistrustbetweendifferentsectionsofthe

population.Inthatkindofclimate,discrimination,racism,Islamophobiaandthe

formationofenclavescanflourish.Theycouldevenresultinviolentclashesbetween

Muslimsandnon-Muslims.Quitepossibly,then,thereisagenuinethreattothe

horizontaldimensionofthedemocraticlegalorder,inthesensethattheopensociety

closesupduetoseriouspolarisationofgroupswithinit.37

37When such polarisation exists, so-called ‘trigger events’ like international conflicts orterroristattacksathomeorabroadcouldeasilysparkoffoutburstsofethnicorreligiousviolenceinsociety.


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5 Strategies to counter Islamic neoradicalism

5.1 Government countermeasures and the democratic paradox

Theradicaldawaisnotatpresentcallingfortheuseofviolenceoradvocatingsupport

forviolentgroupsorindividuals.Aslongasthislinecontinuesandthemovementalso

refrainsfromexplicitsedition,incitementtohatredordiscrimination,itsutterances

willbeprotectedbyfreedomofreligionandexpression.Thequestion,then,iswhether

thegovernmentcanactagainstit.

Butinthelightofthedemocraticparadox–whetheritispermissibletousedemocratic

institutionstodestroyorunderminedemocracy–theanswermustbeaffirmative.

Thatparadoxisinsolubleifoneadoptsaminimalisticattitudetothedemocraticlegal

orderbyreducingitmerelytotheprincipleofmajoritygovernance.Infact,though,the

democraticlegalorderismuchmorethanthat.Italsoembracesinalienablerights,38

forexample,aswellastherightsofpoliticalminoritiesandthedutyofgovernmentto

exercisecautionininterferingwithpeople’spersonallives.Fromthisbroaderpointof

view,thereisveryclearlyathreatifdemocraticmeansareusedinattemptstodestroy

orunderminedemocracy.Anditiscertainlypermissibletoactagainstthatthreat,

oratleasttodevelopofficialpolicytocounterit.Whencertainanti-democraticgoals

areactivelypursued,then,evenifonlydemocraticmeansareusedinthatquest,the

governmentisentitledtointervene.

Inthisrespect,a2003rulingbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsisrelevant.39

Thatestablisheddefinitivelythatagovernmentmaytakeactionagainstgroupsseeking

toemploydemocraticmeanstosubvertorundermineademocraticstate.TheCourt

stressed,however,thatthethreatmustbeacuteinthesensethattheorganisation

orgroupconcernedpossessesthemeanstoeffectuateitintheshorttermandthat

thereexistsinsufficientpublicresistancetocounteriteffectively.Thegovernment’s

38 Freedomofexpression,freedomofassociation,andsoon.39Ajudgementmadeon13February2003bytheGrandChamberoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,confirminganearlierjudgementof13July2001bytheThirdSectionofCourt.Byamajorityofjustfourtothree,thejudgesruledthatthedissolutionoftheRefah(Welfare)PartybyTurkey’sConstitutionalCourtwasnotinbreachofArticle11oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR).IntheCourt’sopinion,leadingRefahmembershadpubliclyadoptedpositionswhichmightrepresentathreattothefundamentalguaranteesofdemocracy,ofrightsandoffreedomsprotectedbytheECHR.


74

interventionmustalsoremainwithintheboundsacceptableforademocratically

constitutedstate.Thisjudgementmustthereforebeplacedwithinthecontextofthe

specificpoliticalandsocialsituationofthecountryconcerned;thatdetermineswhen

exactlytheauthoritiesarejustifiedinbanningapoliticalgroupseekingtoestablisha

regimebaseduponprinciplesotherthanthoseofthedemocraticlegalorder.

IntheNetherlands,traditionalpoliticalandadministrativeconsiderationsmeanthat

judicialactionagainstmembersofintolerantlyisolationistandanti-democraticbutnon-

violentmovementsremainsameasureoflastresort.Thatalsoappliestototalbanson

suchorganisations.Non-judicialcountermeasuresareoftenregardedasmoreeffective

aswellasmoredemocratic.

Governmentand–aboveall–judicialinterventionareofcoursenecessaryifand

assoonasradicalsuseundemocraticmeanssuchasterroristviolence.Toacertain

extent,however,someformsofradicalismarepermissiblewithintheboundariesof

thedemocraticlegalorder.Isolationalism,forexample,posesnothreattothatorder

assuch.Inademocraticsociety,citizensretainthefreedom–albeitwithincertain

limits–topursuetheirownlifestyleandtodecideforthemselveshowtheyconduct

theirrelationshipswitheachotherandwiththegovernment.Butiftheirwithdrawal

fromsocietystartstoendangerbasicrightsandfreedomsofothers,thentheyhave

oversteppedthemarkandaredamagingthedemocraticlegalorder.

Inthislight,certainformsofintolerantisolationismdorepresentaparticularthreat:

exclusivisminrespectofone’sowngroupandparallelism.Exclusivismisexpressed

throughdiscrimination,incitementandsowinghatred.Parallelismdoesnotrecognise

theauthorityofgovernment,seekstoimposereligiouslawsbeforesecularonesand

triestocreateenclavesinwhichthatsystemratherthangovernmentauthorityprevails.

Undercertainconditions,judicialinterventionagainsttheseformsofisolationismis

possibleandthegovernmentcanimposeproscriptions.When,forinstance,exclusivist

isolationismleadstoactualdiscrimination,incitementandexpressionsofhatred.

Orwhenparallelismactuallyresultsintheimpositionofanalternativesystemof

justice.Theproblem,though,isthattheexclusivismandparallelismoftheradical

dawaarebeingspreadstealthilyandsecretly.Themovement’spreacherstakecarenot

tobeassociatedopenlywithsuchtendencies.Instead,theydisseminateanimplicit

messageofexclusivismandparallelismcouchedintheirpreachingwithregardtothe

undesirabilityandimpossibilityofintegration,Westerndemocracy’sirreconcilability

withIslam,God’swrathwithunbelieversandsoon.Andpreachingalongthoselinesis


75

stillpermissibleinaccordancewithconstitutionalrights.Otherwaysofcounteringthe

spreadofthismessagemustthereforebefound.

5.2 Between prevention and repression: strategies to counter radicalisation

Inrecentyears,bothnationalgovernmentandlocalauthoritieshavetriedtodevelop

effectivenon-judicialpolicyagainstthoseformsofIslamicradicalismwhicharenot

illegalbecausetheyarenon-violentbutcertainlyposesecurityrisks–bothshortand

long-term–duetotheirintolerantisolationismandanti-democraticorientation.In

thenearfuture,thereisadangerthatthebasicrightsofthoseclosetothemovement

andofotherMuslimswhoholddifferentviewswillbecompromised,thatdifferences

betweensectionsofthepopulationwillbeemphasisedandthatthegroundworkwillbe

laidforsomeindividualstofurtherradicaliseinaviolentdirection.Thelong-termrisk

isthatanintolerantlyisolationistandanti-democraticmassmovementwillemerge,

whichcouldcauseseriousethnicandreligioustensionswithinDutchsociety.

Since2004,atwo-prongedapproachhasbeenadoptedinbothnationalandlocal

policy:preventionontheonehandandnon-judicialrepressionontheother.The

purposeofthepreventivepolicyistoenhancetheabilitytoresistradicalisation.

TheseeffortsareaimedatparticularMuslimcommunities,atsocietyasawhole

andatvariousbranchesofnationalandlocalgovernment.Non-judicialrepression,

meanwhile,usesadministrativemeanstoactivelyhinderthefurthergrowthofradical

dawaorganisationsintheNetherlands.Theseincludefiscal,immigrationandfunding-

relatedmeasures.

Thereisbroadagreementatalllevelsthatsuchadministrativerepressionwillonly

beeffectiveifitusedsparinglyandtargetedprecisely.Notonlydoesitoftenprove

unworkableinpracticeorcomeupagainstconstitutionalobjectionsrelatedtothe

misappropriationofpowers,butitsoverlygeneraliseduse–targetingamosque’s

entirecongregation,forexample,ratherthanjustthemanagementboard–caneasily

provokefeelingsofinjusticeandsoactuallyencourageradicalisation.Itisbecoming

increasinglyclearthatthereisalottobegainedfromhoningthepreventiveaspectsof

policyaswellasfurtherdevelopingfocusedadministrativerepression.


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5.3 Countering both Islamic radicalism itself and inaccurate perceptions of it

5.3.1 Relativist and absolutist perceptions

Toacertainextent,thecurrentsecurityproblemposedbyIslamicradicalismisas

muchaproductofinaccurateperceptionsofthephenomenonasitisoftheradicalism

itself.Bothoveroptimisticandoverpessimisticassessmentsofthethreatitposesoften

standinthewayofMuslimcommunities,societyasawholeandthegovernment

developinganeffectiveabilitytoresistit.Untilrecentlyoptimistic,relativistperceptions

prevailed,doingmuchtoensurethatradicalisationwasjustabriefpassingphasein

theprocessofDutchMuslimemancipationwhichwouldnevergiverisetoanyserious

threattoourdemocraticlegalorder.Thattendencymadeitdifficulttospecifically

describethepotentialthreatentailedbyradicalisation.

Thingshavenowmovedalongwaytowardstheotherextreme,withpessimistic,

absolutistviewscomingtothefore.Thesehavetendedtooverestimatethetruethreat

fromIslamicradicalisminrecentyears.Suchperceptionsarenotonlyaproductof

thepropagandastrategiesandpsychologicalwarfaretacticsadoptedbysomeradical

Muslimorganisations,butarealsoshapedbycertainpoliticalandsocialforceswithin

the‘‘indigenous’populationsoftheWesternworld.Theypaintasituationsoclear-cut

thatitbringswithitarealriskofdeepeningthedivisionsbetweendifferentsectionsof

thepopulation,particularlybetweenMuslimsandnon-Muslims.Andtheyengender

mistrustoftheauthoritiesinbothcamps:intheeyesofthe‘indigenous’populations,

thegovernmentisnotdoingenoughtosuppressIslamicradicals;fromtheperspective

ofethnic-minorityMuslims,itisnotdoingenoughtocounteranti-Islamic‘white’

voices.

BothIslamicradicalsandtheir‘indigenous’oppositenumbersarespreadingabsolute

hostilityanddoomscenariosamongsttheirrespectivecommunities.Thisdespitethe

factthatgenuineradicalisation,whilstcertainlyseriousandacauseforconcern,has

affectedonlyasmallproportionoftheMuslimpopulation.Itisthereforeessentialthat

Islamicradicalismbeputintoitsproperperspective.Inordertodevelopeffectivepolicy

againstpolarisationandradicalisation,itseemsthatboththedoomscenariosand

excessiverelativismmustbedispelledandcountered.


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5.3.2 Preconditions for the development of effective strategies

Outlinedbelowareanumberofperspectiveswhichcouldhelpguideactiontocounter

Islamicneoradicalism.Thesearenotspecificmeasures,butratherpreconditionsfor

thedevelopmentofeffectivestrategies.Theytakeintoaccountboththenatureofthe

phenomenonitselfandtheincorrectorincompleteperceptionsaboutit.40

a.Consider proportionality and subsidiarity when developing strategies

Islamicradicalismisattractingalotofattentionatthemoment.Butitremains

importantalwaystoconsidertheprinciplesofproportionalityandsubsidiaritywhen

addressingtheissue.Thefundamentalvaluesofthedemocraticsystemmustnever

takesecondplacetotheeffectivenessofaction.

b.Remember that the Muslim community is very diverse

TheMuslimcommunityintheNetherlandsisfarfromhomogeneous,either

ethnically,linguistically,religiouslyorideologically.Policyshouldthereforetakeinto

accountthefollowingfactors,amongstothers:

• ViewMuslimsfirstandforemostasindividualsandasfullmembersinsocietyin

theirownright,notnecessarilyjustasmembersofareligiouscommunity.

• ShowthatthereareotheractivemovementswithintheMuslimcommunities,

notonlytheultra-orthodoxones.BeawareofthewealthofdiversitywithinIslam.

ThereisnoonesingleMuslimview,andtheradicalultra-orthodoxpositionisvery

muchaminorityone.Moreover,itisonewhichhasnoideologicalaffinitywiththe

backgroundsfromwhichmostoftheMuslimsintheNetherlandscome.

• BeawarethatitisestimatedthatbetweenathirdandahalfoftheMuslimsin

theNetherlandsdonotbasetheirconductonareligiousagenda;theyareeither

moderateintheirreligiousobservanceornon-practising.

c.Avoid polarisation when developing government policy

Certainforcesinsociety,includingIslamicradicalsandtheir‘indigenous’opposite

numbers,areonlytoohappytoexploitstatementswhichportrayasharperviewof

realitythanthetruesituation.Whendevelopingpolicy,then,thefollowingshouldbe

borneinmind:

40Thisapproachisinlinewithnationalgovernmentpolicyonradicalisation.Inparticular,seeActieplanpolarisatieenradicalisering2007-2011(‘Polarisationandradicalisation:planofaction,2007-2011’),NetherlandsMinistryoftheInterior,2007.SeealsoFromdawatojihad,pp.48etseq.


78

• Donottarallradicalswiththesamebrush.Whendevisingstrategies,drawa

distinctionbetweenthe‘hardcore’andthe‘fellowtravellers’.

• Avoidtheuseofdoomscenariosinpolicycommunicationsrelatedtothegrowthand

capabilitiesofIslamicradicalism.Boththeradicalsthemselvesandotherpolitical

andsocialforcessystematicallyoverstateradicalism’sabilitiesandgrowthinorderto

attractsupport.

• Donotconfirmthemovement’sownclaimsthatitisunderattack,whichisone

ofitsdrivingforcesandisusedtomobiliseadherents.Employdirectlyrepressive

administrativemeasuresonlyverysparingly,andonlyspecificallyagainstthe‘hard

core’ofthegroupinquestion.Rememberthatradicalscouldcitesuchopposition

asanargumenttobecomeevenmoreextremeandtomotivateexistingorpotential

supporters.

• Forceswhichwanttowidenthedivisionsbetweendifferentsectionsofthe

populationandincreasemistrustofthegovernmentputpressureonsociety.Donot

giveintothatpressurebytakingexcessiveaction.Rather,trytoemployapragmatic

policywhichdoesnotalwaysattractattention.

• Asfaraspossible,trytopuncturepolarisingsloganeeringandsingle-issue

approaches.(Inflammatorystatementslike:‘Allourproblemsaredowntothe

suppressionofIslam’or‘IftheMuslimtidalwaveisnotstemmednow,intwenty

yearstimeEuropewillgovernedbySharialaw.’)

d.Try to avoid accommodating radical dawa groups

Intheircontactswithlocalandnationalgovernments,radicaldawamovementsoften

presentthemselvesasspeakingfortheMuslimcommunityasawhole.And,for

fearofalienatingthatcommunity,thegovernmentbodiesconcernedaretherefore

sometimesquiteaccommodatingtowardsthem.Instead,however,theyshould

consideradoptingthefollowingapproach:

• Asagovernment,rememberthatthevastmajorityofMuslims–farfrombeing

radicals–aremoderateMuslims.Andthatthosepeopleareeffectivelybeing

hinderedintheirownpersonalfreedomifradicaldawaclericsareacceptedas

legitimaterepresentativesorleadersoftheentireMuslimcommunity.

• Asagovernment,beextremelyreticentinconsultingradicaldawaclericsonsocialor

religiousmatters.

• Trytopreventanyoneindividualorgroupclaimingthesolerighttointeractwith

governmentonbehalfofacommunity–throughconsultativebodies,forexample.

Instead,seekasmuchdiversityofrepresentationaspossible.Neveracceptthatany

groupcanexerciseavetooverrepresentativesfromothercurrents,betheymore


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liberalormoreorthodox,incontactswiththegovernment.Andrememberthatsome

religiousrepresentativesmayhaveahiddenagenda.

• Asagovernment,beextremelyreticentinprovidingfinancialorothersupportfor

projectswhicharebasedupon,ormightevenencourage,gendersegregationand

otherdiscriminatoryprinciples.

• Asagovernment,donotsupportinitiativesorprojectslikelytoencouragethe

propagationofaparticularideologicallineamongstawidergroup.Likewise,

withholdsupportwhenitisclearthataproject’sorganisersintendtoexcludeother

groups.

e.Enter into dialogue with as many Muslim groups as possible

AdialoguewiththehardcoreofIslamicradicalsisunlikelytoproduceconstructive

orlastingresults.ButitisimportanttointeractwithotherplayersintheMuslim

community.Whendoingso,bearinmindthefollowing:

• DonotinvolveonlyoneIslamictendency,eitherliberalororthodox,inthepublic

debateaboutactivitiesrelatedtostandardsandvaluesinsociety.Forexample,do

includeorthodoxMuslimsininitiativestocountercrimeandpublicnuisanceby

problemyoungsterswithMuslimbackgrounds.

• InvolveorthodoxaswellasliberalMuslimsinthepublicdebateaboutdemocracyin

anopenandpluralsociety.

• Beawareofthefrontpoliticsregularlyusedbyradicaldawamovements.Donot

supportprojectswhichcanbetracedbacktoradicaldawamosquesandcommunity

centres.

f.Try to reinforce trust in the democratic legal order

TheriseofIslamicneoradicalismhassosharpenedthepublicdebateonanumber

ofissuesthatasectionoftheDutchpopulationseemstobelievethatthedemocratic

legalorderitselfwillbeunabletostanduptothephenomenon.Tocounterthis

thinking,considerthefollowing.

• SupportforinitiativeswithinMuslimcommunitieswhicharedesignedtooffera

moderatecounterpointtoradicalism.Forexample,developingthecommunity’sown

abilitytopurgeitselfofradicalinfluence,supportingderadicalisationprojectsorthe

aidingtheadvanceofamoderatecounterideology.

• Attempttorenewpublicconfidenceintheresilienceofthedemocraticsystemand

theopensocietybyencouragingpositivevisionsofthefuture.


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81

Summary

Thisreportdescribesamovementintransition:DutchandEuropeanIslamic

radicalism.ThismovementfirstreachedtheNetherlandsinthemid-1980s,originally

establishedbymissionarygroupsseekingtospreadanultra-orthodoxreligious

ideology.Fromtheoutset,Salafism–oneofthemostradicalofallcurrentswithin

Islam–playedaprominentrolewithintheDutchIslamicradicalmovement.Elsewhere

inEurope,however,otherorganisationstookthelead.TheyincludedtheMuslim

Brotherhood,TablighiJamaatandHizbut-Tahrir.Allaredescribedasultra-orthodox

becausetheyareveryrigidintheirtheologicalinterpretations,areabsolutelyconvinced

oftheirownrighteousnessandabhorallformsofreligiousmodernity.Theyalsoare

consideredradical,becausetheyactivelywanttoforcesocietytoreformalongstrict

IslamiclinesandtheyrejecttheWesterndemocraticlegalorder.

TheAIVDhasidentifiedanumberofphasesinthedevelopmentofIslamicradicalism

intheNetherlandsandEurope.Duringeachofthese,themovementhasmanifested

itselfdifferently,withanewformofradicalismemerging.Thethirdofthesephases

hasrecentlybegun,althoughthisdoesnotmeanthatthelatesttypeofradicalismhas

supplantedtheothertwotypesfromearlierphases;infact,allthreecontinuetoexistin

parallel.

Inthefirstphase,whichbeganinthemid-1980sandpersiststothisday,asmall

numberofultra-orthodoxmosquesandpreacherswiththeiroriginsintheMiddle

Eastreceivedirectideological,logisticalandfinancialsupportfromcertainIslamic

countrieswhichviewthemselvesasguidingnations,onaspirituallevel,forMuslims,

theso-calledIslamic‘guidenations’.Theirmessageisthatofthe‘radicaldawa’.‘Dawa’

literallymeans‘calltoIslam’;the‘radical’designationreferstoevangelicalactivities

bymissionarygroupswithanextremeandultra-orthodoxmessage.Forthemostpart,

theirtargetsforconversionarefellowMuslims.Aswellaspreachersofradicaldawa,

thisphasealsosawanumberofjihadiveteransofthewarsinAfghanistanandBosnia-

HerzegovinabasingthemselvesintheNetherlandsandelsewhereinWestern-Europe.

Theiractivitiesinhereservedviolentendsandtheydisplayed,attheveryleast,strong

ideologicalassociationswiththeAl-Qaedanetwork.Duringthisphase,theradicaldawa

andjihadismmaintainedcloserelationshipsandsometimeseveninstitutionallinks.

Together,thesetwocurrentsmakeupIslamicradicalism.Foranumberofreasons,

theirgrowthhasbeenlimitedduringthisphase.


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Thesecondphasebeganaftertheattacksof11September2001andwasaccelerated

byanumberofotherrelevantevents:the2003Madridbombings,the2004murder

offilmmakerTheovanGoghinAmsterdamandthe2005Londonattacks.Duein

parttothedismantlingofinternationalterroristnetworksafter2001,theguidingrole

playedbycertainIslamicstatesgraduallydeclinedduringthisphase.Instead,there

wasaprocessofautonomisation,withthefocusincreasinglyshiftingtoWestern‘host

nations’.IslamicradicalsnowsoughttodefendtheirfaithintheWestagainstthose

perceivedasits‘enemies’here.Feelingsofresentmentbecameastrongmotivating

factor.Thisphaseisalsocharacterisedbyfragmentation,amateurismandtherapid

growthofso-called‘cut-and-paste’ideology,involvingselectivecitationfromIslamic

sources.IntheNetherlands,itwasinthisperiodthattheso-calledHofstadGroupof

terroristswasactive.

Thethirdphase,whichbeganinaboutmid-2005,isadirectreactiontothesecond

phaseandiscloselyassociatedwiththeactivitiesofanewgenerationofradicaldawa

preachers.DrawnfromthesecondgenerationofMuslimsintheWest,theycame

torealisethatIslam’sexpansionandreputationwerebeingdamagedbythepoor

organisationofitsradicalcurrentinEurope,byitsunclearideologicalmessageandby

itsflirtationswithviolence.Thesenewpreachersemphaticallyopposetheuseofviolent

meansintheWest,asaresultofwhichtheyhavebrokenwiththejihadists.Tactically,

theygoinsearchofwell-definedtargetaudiencestoreachwithspecific,tailor-made

messages.

Withtheonsetofathirdphase,theradicaldawaintheNetherlandsandseveralother

countriesinourregionhasbecomeanintegralpartofWesternsociety.Itspreachers,

whogrewupinEurope,representthevanguardofanewmovement.Preciselybecause

oftheirbackground,theyknowexactlywhatissuesconcernthesecondgenerationof

MuslimsintheWestandunderstandtheregion’swidersocialandpoliticalprocesses.

TheAIVDdefinesthisprocessofautonomisation,professionalisationandpoliticisation

astheriseofIslamicneoradicalism.Thenewradicalsbehavedifferentlyfromtheir

predecessors,andtheyalsoemploydifferenttacticsinpursuitoftheirobjectives.

Ratherthatoperatinginsocialisolationandseekingconfrontation,forexample,they

aremorefocuseduponachievingsteadybutpermanentgrowthforradicalIslamin

Europe.

Althoughtheactivistsinvolvedinthisprocessarelimitedinnumber,theirmovement

iscurrentlyexpandingintheNetherlandsandinseveralothercountriesinourregion.


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Since2005,charismaticSalafiyouthpreachershavebeentravellingupanddownthe

countrytodelivertheirmessage.TheydothismainlyatmosquescateringtotheDutch

MoroccancommunityandatIslamicyouthcentres.Inthepasttwoyears,thenumbers

ofsuchcentresandofyouthpreachers,aswelloflecturesgivenandlocationsvisited,

haveatleastdoubled.Attendancesatthemeetingsarerising,too.Itisexpectedthat

thistrendwillcontinue.

MuslimradicalismintheNetherlandsismostsuccessfulinreachingyoungDutch

citizensofMoroccanoriginandyoungmembersofotherimmigrantcommunities

withtheiroriginsintheMiddleEastandSomalia,aswellaswhiteconverts.Andnot

onlyarethosewhofeelmarginalisedbeingreached,butalsothewell-educated.Forthe

timebeing,however,itisnotclearwhetherthisgroupofnewbelievershastrulyand

irrevocablychosenthepathofradicalisationorwhetherinterestinthemovementis

moreofa‘fad’.Butwhatiscertainisthattheinstigatorsoftheprocessaregoingabout

theirworkdeliberately,havebuiltupaprofessionalcadreandcanbeverypersuasive.

Allofwhichseemstoimplythatthemovementhasacertainlastingpower.

Viewedfromtheperspectiveofitspotentialthreattothedemocraticlegalorder,

Islamicneoradicalismemploystwogeneraltactics.Thefirstinvolveseffortstocreate

‘Islamised’enclaveswithinsociety;physicalareasinwhichSharialawprevailsover

DutchandEuropeanlegislation.Thepurposeoftheseenclavesistobecomebastions

servingasbridgeheadsfortheexpansionofpowerandsocialinfluence.TheAIVD

definesthistacticas‘intolerantisolationism’:intolerantbecauseitprovidesthose

whodonotconformtotheprevailingideologywithnoopportunitytoparticipatein

thelifeoftheenclave.TheactivitiesofIslamicneoradicalscanputthewiderMuslim

‘collective’underincreasingduress,withtheresultthatindividualswithinthat

communitymaynolongerbeabletoexercisetheirbasicrights.Suchaprocessis

alreadyunderwayintheNetherlands.Anditcanhaveseriousrepercussionsforthose

Muslimswhoseidentity,opinionsoractivitiesdeviatefromtheultra-orthodoxideal:

women,homosexuals,so-calledapostates,liberalsandsoon.

Islamicneoradicalism’ssecondtacticisthedisruptionandobstructionofthe

democraticlegalorderasapoliticalsystemandaformofsocialorganisation.The

Islamicneoradicalscalldemocracyanunjustsystembecauseitplacestheauthority

ofmanabovethatofGod.Theirchosensystemisoneinwhichallpoliticalactivities

aresubordinatedtothesupremacyofGodand,byextension,ofIslamiclaw.They

thusrejecttheopennessandpluriformitywhichcharacterisedemocracies.Andthey

sometimescallforanti-democraticbehaviour.Insodoing,theydonotshyawayfrom


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adoptingprovocativetactics,deliberatelyattemptingtopolariseorfosteringhostility

towardsthesupposedlyanti-Islamicoutsideworld.Inthelongterm,thisapproach

couldundermineoursociety’scohesionandmutualsolidarity.

Whereastheother,earlierformsofIslamicradicalismenjoyedonlylimitedsuccess–

inpartbecauseoftheirtendencytosympathiseopenlywiththeviolentjihad–Islamic

neoradicalismisdifferent.Preciselybecauseitrejectsviolenceandpresentsamessage

ofaspecificnature,itisreachingamuchbiggeraudienceandcouldevenevolveinto

amassmovement.Whetherthatactuallyhappenswilldependverymuchuponhow

resilientthedemocraticlegalorderprovestobeinfacinguptothischallenge.Andthat

abilitytoresistisenhancedonceonerealisesthat–despitetheirconvincingmodus

operandiandtheirclaimtospeakfortheentireMuslimcommunity–thecurrent

generationofradicalsinfactrepresentsaminoritycurrentwithinEuropeanIslam.

ThevastmajorityofMuslimsintheNetherlandsandtherestofWesternEurope

wanttoparticipateunconditionallyinanopen,pluralsocietyandareactuallyharmed

andintimidatedbytheactivitiesoftheIslamicneoradicalfringe.Inparticular,that

intimidationdetersmanymoderateMuslimsfromdaringtoopposeradicalopinions

andconduct.Andthisinturnpreventsthemfromdefusingitsappealtotheiryounger

generation.Inresponsetothisthreat,onlyanapproachwhichbothconfrontsand

engageshasanychanceofsuccess.Butthatisstillnotbeingdoneeffectively,largely

becausethedebateintheNetherlandsabouthowtotackleIslamicradicalismisstill

characterisedbyhighlevelsofbothrelativismandabsolutism.

Therelativisticviewisthattheproblemofradicalisationrepresentsmerelyapassing

phaseintheprocessofemancipationthroughwhichDutchMuslimsarepassing.From

anabsolutistperspective,ontheotherhand,thatprocessisasuresignthatthetotal

IslamisationoftheNetherlandswillbecompletedwithinafewdecades.Butneither

visionreflectsthetruepicture.Itwouldbefarmorepreferableifamorerealistic

approachwouldbeadoptedandsotackletherealprobleminafocusedway.Andthat

entailsbothdirectconfrontationwiththesmallyetinfluentialgroupofinstigators

behindIslamicneoradicalismandtheunconditionalsocialinclusionofthemajorityof

moderateMuslims.


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Appendix

Historical sketch of modern Salafism

ModernSalafism41hasitsoriginsincentralSaudi-ArabianArabia42andcanbe

regardedastheinternationalexpressionofWahhabism,areligiousmovementwithits

rootsinHanbali.43Wahhabism–atpresenthighlysimilartoapoliticalSalafism–is

namedafterthe18th-centuryclericMuhammadIbnAbdAl-Wahhab(1703-1792),better

knownsimplyasIbnWahhab.44Hewasatravellingpreacherwhoobjectedtowhathe

regardedasthelaxobservanceofIslaminhishomeregion,thepresentdayAn-Najd.

Inresponse,hedecidedtoreturntotheoriginaltextoftheKoran.Thisresultedin

theestablishmentofamissionarymovementcallingforliteralinterpretationofthe

scriptureandunconditionalcompliancewithveryconservativemoralvaluesunder

whichindividualconductisstrictlydescribedandregulated.In1745IbnWahhab

enteredintoanalliancewithMuhammadIbnSaud,ruleroftheDiriyahregion,whose

subsequentcampaignofconquesthedeclaredtobea‘holywar’.45Together,IbnSaud’s

horsemenandIbnWahhab’s‘brothers’(‘ikhwan’)foughttheirwayacrosstheArabian

peninsula.Eventually,in1925,theirdescendantswouldconquertheentireHejaz:the

regioncontainingMecca,MedinaandJeddah,andtherewithtoday’sSaudi-Arabian

Arabia.

41ModernSalafismshouldnotbeconfusedwiththereformistmovementwhichoriginatedin19th-centuryEgyptasareactiontocolonialism.Thisschoolofthought,thefoundersofwhichalsocalledthemselvesSalafis,ascribedgreatimportancetohumanreasoning,soanycomparisonwithmodernSalafismisutterlymisplaced.

42FortheearlyhistoryofWahhabismandSalafism,andtheirpoliticalandinstitutionallinkswithSaudi-ArabianArabia,see,forexample:HamidAlgar,Wahhabism:Acriticalessay,pp.1-70,NewYork,2002;DoreGold.Hatred’sKingdom:HowSaudi-ArabianArabiasupportstheNewGlobalTerrorism,pp.17-89,Washington,2002;FalahA.Jabar,TribesandPower:NationalismandethnicityintheMiddleEast,pp.219-227,London2003;As’adAbukhalil,TheBattleforSaudi-ArabianArabia:Royalty,fundamentalismandglobalterror,pp.50-76,NewYork, 2004;GillesKepel, Fitna:Oorlog inhethart vande islam (‘Fitna:war in theheartofIslam’),pp.212-262,Harvard,2005;andMadawiAl-Rasheed,ContestingtheSaudi-ArabianState:Islamicvoicesfromanewgeneration,,pp.22-58,Cambridge,2007.

43OneofthefourschoolsoflegalthoughtinSunniIslam.44Al-Rasheed,p.22.45Algar,p.20.


86

TheKingdomofSaudi-ArabianArabiaitselfwasproclaimedin1932,withAbdulAziz

IbnSaud–underwhoseleadershipthefinalconquestofthepeninsulahadbeen

completed–ascendingthethrone.Wahhabismbecametheofficialstatedoctrine.

MuhammadIbnSaud’sdescendants,theHouseofSaud,remainthenation’ssole

politicalforcetothisday,whilstitisthekinsmenofIbnWahhab–theal-Sheikhs–

whocontinuetodominatethereligiousestablishment.46Inotherwords,thealliance

forgedin1745stillformsthebackboneofmodernSaudi-ArabianArabia.

SincetheHouseofSaudtookpower,ithasderivedmuchofitslegitimacyaspolitical

masterofthecountryfromthesupportitreceivesfromtheWahhabiestablishment.

Inreturn,Wahhabismisgivenvirtuallyunlimitedpowerinreligiousmatters.Almost

allpoliticaldecisionsofanyimportanceareco-ordinatedwiththeclergy.But,however

politicallyusefulitmaybe,thisalliancecanalsoleadtotensions:theHouseofSaud

certainlyincludesfigureswhodonotnecessarilysharethesamereligiousviewsasthe

officialclergy.Directconfrontationisavoided,though,becauseeachsideneedsthe

othertojustifyandmaintainitsexistence.Saudi-ArabianArabiaiseffectivelygoverned

byacomplexformofpolitico-religiousconsensus.

Eversincethemid-1950s,whenArabnationalismandsocialisminspiredbyEgyptian

presidentGamalAbdelNasserbegantotakeholdandtheregionseemedtobe

secularising,theSaudi-Arabianreligiousestablishmenthasfearedwhatitseesas

anerosionofIslamicvalues.Tocounterthisprocess,itandthecountry’spolitical

authoritieshavetogethersoughttoencouragetheglobalpropagationofWahhabi

doctrine47–oftenundertheideologicaldirectionofexiledEgyptianmembersofthe

MuslimBrotherhood48–intheformofaradicalinternationaldawa.Inpursuitof

thisquest,theyhavesetuparangeofnon-governmentalorganisations:theMuslim

WorldLeague(MWL),theWorldAssemblyofMuslimYouth(WAMY),theIslamic

InternationalReliefOrganisation(IIRO)andsoon.

46Al-Rasheed,p.27.47Seealsothe2002AIVDreport,Saudi-ArabianinfluencesintheNetherlands–linksbetweentheSalafistmission,radicalisationprocessesandIslamicterrorism,foradescriptionofthisdawainpractice.

48UnderNasser, Egypt clamped down hard on theMuslim Brotherhood andmany of itsmembersdecampedtoSaudi-ArabianArabia(seealsoKepel,p.230).OneprominentfigureamongsttheseexileswasMohammedQutb,brotherofthefounderoftheTakfiridoctrine,SayyidQutb.


87

As‘guardian’oftheholycitiesofMeccaandMedina,arichoil-producingnation,the

generallyacceptedhomebaseof‘pure’IslamandoutoffearofsupposedWestern

decadence,theSaudi-Arabiangovernmenthassincetriedtoplayaleadingrolein

theIslamicworld.Atfirst,theseeffortsmetwithlittlesuccess.Sincethedefeatsin

the1967and1973Arab-Israeliwars,however,andwiththesubsequentideological

declineofArabsecularism,theSaudi-Arabiandoctrinehasgraduallybeengainingin

influence–atfirstwithintheArabworld,butlaterbeyonditaswell.Andthishasledto

anupsurgeinMuslimfundamentalism.49Thesubstantialriseinthepriceofoilfrom

1973onwardsenabledSaudi-ArabianArabiatogaininfluencebybuildingmosquesand

religiouseducationcentres,payingimams,publishingIslamicliterature,providingfree

placesatitsreligiousuniversitiesandbankrollingmissionaryactivities.50

1979: the radical dawah intensifies

Thisprocessreceivedamajorboostin1979,whentheShahofIranwasoverthrown

andAyatollahKhomeiniseizedpower.ThefactthatIranwasnowpresentingitselfas

thenewmodelIslamicstate,withKhomeiniusingfiercelyanti-monarchistrhetoric,

causedgreatconcerninSaudi-ArabianArabia.Ninemonthslater,severalhundred

Saudi-ArabianextremistsseizedtheGrandMosqueinMeccatoprotestagainstwhat

theyallegedwasthedecadenceofthekingdom’srulersandtheconsequenterosion

ofthefaith.Ofparticularconcernwasthefactthattheseextremistswereactually

partofthereligiousestablishmentandwere,ineffect,attemptingtobreathenewlife

intothereformsandthestruggleagainstidolatrybeguntwocenturiesearlierbyIbn

Wahhab.The‘idolatry’inthiscasebeingtheHouseofSaud’ssupposeddecadence,

lustforconsumptionandflirtationwiththeWest.Itwasonlywithsomedifficulty

thattheauthoritieswereabletoputdowntheprotest.Butthewarningitsentfrom

thereligioussectionofthepopulationdidnotgounnoticedbythecountry’srulers.

Internally,religiousrulesandregulationsweretightenedupconsiderably;externally,

theradicaldawawasintensifiedandextendedbeyondtheIslamicworld.Assuch,itwas

essentiallybeingusedasadomesticdefencemechanism.ByspreadingtheWahhabi

messageintheWest,itssecularandmaterialisticvaluesmightpossiblybeundermined

fromwithinandsolosetheirimpetuswithintheIslamicworld.Thencamethe

SovietoccupationofAfghanistanfromlate1979.ThisalsoencouragedSaudi-Arabian

Arabiatointensifyitsradicaldawa,outoffearofCommunism’satheisticideology.

49MichelField.IndeArabischewereld(‘IntheArabworld’)pp.87-89,Utrecht,1997.50FortheglobaldimensionoftheSaudi-Arabiandawa,seeAbukhalil,pp.138-146,andDore,pp.125-157.


88

TheconvergenceonAfghanistanof‘mujahideen’(‘holywarriors’)fromthroughout

theIslamicworldheraldedtheriseofjihadistSalafism.Thiscurrenturgesahighly

offensive,ratherthanmerelydefensive,formofjihadwithaviewtoconvertingthe

wholeworldtoIslamthroughviolence.51Virtuallyalloftoday’sinternationalIslamic

terroristorganisations,includingAl-Qaeda,arepartofthismovement.

1991: the rise of political Salafism

Saudi-ArabianArabiaplayedanimportantroleindrivingtheinvadingIraqiforcesout

ofKuwaitin1991,withthebulkofcoalitionforcesstationedthere.When,attheendof

1990,theSaudi-Arabian-ArabianGrandMuftiAbdAl-AzizIbnBazdeclaredonbehalf

ofthepro-governmentCouncilofSeniorScholars(‘ulama’)thatthedeploymentofUS

forcesonSaudi-ArabianterritorywaslegalunderIslamiclaw,thestatementdividedthe

country’sclergy.Onefaction,ledbySalmanAl-AwdaandSafarAl-Hawali,52resisted

IbnBaz’ruling.Undernocircumstanceswhatsoever,theyasserted,mustcoalition–

thatis,infidel–troopsbestationedinSaudi-ArabianArabia.Thatwouldbeafrontal

assaultonthevirtueofIslam.Itwasthisoppositiontothereligiousestablishment

whichmarkedthebeginningofpoliticalSalafism:adoctrineinspiredbyWahhabism

butwithapoliticalpositiononcurrentevents.AclampdownbytheSaudi-Arabian

authoritiesonAl-Awda,Al-Hawaliandtheirsupportersstifledtheconflict,butcould

notextinguishit.Inresponsetotheclearanti-governmentmessagecomingfromone

sectionoftheclergy,theauthoritiessubsequentlyinvestedthesympatheticreligious

establishmentwithevengreaterpowerandinfluence.

Thisprocessisstillunderway.Toconsolidateitsdomesticpowerbaseandtoeliminate

anyfeelingsofdissatisfactionamongstthestronglyreligioussectionofthepopulation,

thepoliticalauthoritiesensurethattheclergypossessespower,53influence,money

andotherresources.However,Saudi-ArabianArabiatoleratesneitherthepreaching

ofviolencenoractivesupportforterroristgroupsinthenameoftheradicaldawa.

Inthebattleagainstjihadistterrorism,thenationisafullandvaluedpartnerofthe

internationalcommunity.

51 JihadistSalafismalsoopposestheHouseofSaud.52 FormoreinformationaboutSalmanAl-Awda,SafarAl-HawaliandtheirclashwiththeSaudi-Arabianreligioussystem,see,forexample,MamounFandy,Saudi-ArabianArabiaandthepoliticsofdissent,pp.61-115,NewYork,1999.

53 Field,pp.373-384.


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