The Retoric of Cynism

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GEORGE E YOOS

St. Cloud State University

The Rhetoric o ynicism

To speak of rhetoric and cynicism in the same breath is to bear a doubleburden of pejorative jeopardy. The pejorative freight of either term, ' 'rhetoric''or cynic, weighs heavily against anyone who tries to use these terms innon-pejorative ways. Such people are quite simply trying to swim against atorrent ofpejorative everyday usage. Yet sorne ofthe positive historicallegacyof the traditions of classical rhetoric and of the ancient cynics is still around anddoes carry over into contemporary contexts, especially when we speak ofrhetoric and cynicism away from the marketplace and in academia, whererhetoric still is the art of persuasion and cynicism graces Iiterary texts withclever displays of verbal play and repartee.

Wayne Booth ata recent conference, in discussing the problem ofthe public

image of rhetoric, quoted a colleague as referring to sorne fellow as anasshole, but at the same time explaining that the term was not intended in itspejorative sense. The twist of irony in the remark stimulates our imagination tocome up with a context in which someone could be an asshole in a nonpejorative sense. Quite possibly there is a virtue in acting like an assholetowards others who act the same.

Let us lea ve aside any question of a non-pejorative sen se of rhetoric. Whatpossible approbation can there be for the cynic, or for the use of the role of thecynic in our rhetoric? What is the rhetorical payoff of a cynical ethos? What

function do cynical remarks serve in rhetorical strategies? To pursue thesequestions 1 caution against question begging assumptions when we examine thephenomenon of cynicism, for cynicism is a loaded term. But first off, cynicalremarks do not a cynic make. Yet certainly they are used s evidence forattributing cynical attitudes, beliefs and cynicism to the one who makes them.Note in your own experience the degree to which the attributions of cynic andcynical are simply allegations that a sin has been committed. A second note ofcaution. The phenomenon of cynicism is, 1 believe, recalcitrant to any essentialist description, and we ought to avoid the pitfalls of pursuing a phantom

of cynicism, that is, seeking to describe or to define the essential nature ofcynicism. lf you are not willing to take my advice on this matter, 1 commit youto chasing your tail endlessly in verbal circles, a game called · whose paradigmis on first?

54 Rhetoric Review Vol. 4 No. 1 September 1985


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What I propose rather in trying to understand the phenomenon of cynicism isto try another less circling pursuit. I propose to investigate the remarks ofself-proclaimed cynics and alleged cynics to see what threads run this way andthat through theirremarks. In that way I hope to come away with at least a roughdescription ofwhat is running through the phenomenon. t is my contention thatan analysis of cynical remarks reveals interestingly related considerationsbearing on the phenomenon. l t raises, in addition, an interesting variety ofproblems. And last of all it does pro vide us with sorne measure of understanding

of the phenomenon.But before tuming to the literature of self-proclaimed and alleged cynics, let

me first illustrate sorne peculiarities in the use of the terms cynic andcynical by engaging in sorne ordinary language philosophy word play. t

would first off be quite odd for someone to say that they were cynical aboutGod. We would, however, readily understand their meaning ifthey were to saythat they were cynical about religion. What is it about being cynical, unlikebeing sceptical, that seems to apply to religion and not to God? s it the case thatno one is so despicable as to be cynical about God? Or again, is it that being

cynical about God is like being cynical about Mother Goose? Or again, is theresomething about the logic ofthe term ' 'cynical' ' that apparently rules out its usein characterizing attitudes towards God? We might, for example, be cynicalabout holy water, but would it not be rather strange to say that we were cynicalabout salt water? Is being cynical about salt water odd just because we havesorne psychological incapacity to be cynical about salt water, or is it oddlogically, that is categorically, that the object of cynicism cannot simply befacts? I want to apologize for sounding very much like an ordinary languagephilosopher, but I found the mimicry useful to illustrate that there is a strangemixture of presumptions about rules and conventions of language mixed withpresumptions about beliefs and attitudes operating in situations where cynicsand cynicism are at play. What I ha veto say in what follows will focus primarilyon the si de of presumptive attitudes and beliefs rather than on the grammar andlogic of cynical remarks. In a secondary sense, however, I will be saying sornethings about the pragmatics or functions of cynical remarks.

What strikes me immediately in surveying cynical remarks is that manyattitudes and beliefs thought to play essential roles in cynicism, and oftenconflated with cynicism, are on many occasions simply absent from the phenomenon. Moreover, it is also the case that many roles and attitudes presumedto be a part of cynicism simply overlap and appear causally related in complexand intricate ways with the phenomenon. To get at the heart ofthe problem weneed to peel away these conflated attitudes and assumptions that appear to beplaying essential roles in the phenomena. But this task of sorting is made even


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more difficult by the fact that cynical remarks are quite often epigrammatic,figurative, conspicuously rhetorical in the pejorative sense, and often are ironicin very unstable ways; that is, we do not know where the author stands in hisirony. Thus, most cynical remarks are ambiguous both in what is being said andas to the presumptive roles and attitudes evidenced in making them; con-sequently, cynical remarks are open to a variety of plausible interpretations.One last complication to consider: interpretations of alleged cynical remarksal so vary from the viewpoints of authors and readers. From the point of view ofthe reader, a remark is sometimes interpreted to be cynical, apart from theauthor s implied intentions, by mere surface features of the remark. If theremark is, for example, amoral, carping, or sarcastic, it is frequently consid-ered cynical without reference to any presumptions of what the author in tended.

The following line by Osear Wilde illustrates sorne of my points about thedifficulties of interpreting whether a remark is really cynical. Obviously I haveintentionally removed the remark from its original context to generate ambi-guity; and, as presented, it is ripe with contextua) and pragmatic ambiguity, that

is, ambiguity about what the author is doing in saying what he does. Wilde sIine goes, A gentleman is someone who is never unintentionally rude. If wetake Wilde s remark straight, that is literally, it is not at all cynical. t simplysays that a gentleman avoids being rude unintentionally, which is pretty muchto say that he is never rude. But the line reeks with irony, saying one thing andmeaning its opposite. Interpreted as irony, the line still has two possibleinterpretations depending upon the speaker s presumptive attitudes and beliefs.n both interpretations the gentleman when rude is deliberately rude. But for the

remark to be really cynical the speaker must, it should be noted, hold certainethical views. The speaker must condemn the rudeness, the pretensions, and thehypocrisy of the gentleman. On the other hand, if the speaker were to hold asomewhat Nietzschean ethical view, the speaker would be praising the gentle-man, not condemning him for his skill in manipulating and controlling people,especially dolts. The remark would be an expression of admiration for thepower and the ability of the gentleman to rise above the weak, the stupid, andthe impotent. As such. it is not cynical but ironic. But nevertheless the remarkmight still be cynical from a hearer s point ofview, as for example, ifit s hearer

were charitable, benevolent, anda lo ver of all humanity. n su m then, whetheror not a remark is cynical in part requires that we take into consideration theethical assumptions both of the speaker and the hearer.

Let us now focus on those presumptive attitudes and beliefs that appearessentially a part of cynicism but are not. I wish to show that an analysis of sorneof the ways these attitudes play into the phenomenon of cynicism helps us trace


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down many of the motives behind the strategies of the self-proclaimed and

alleged cynics. Among these beliefs and attitudes that I wish to consider arescepticism, pessimism, irony, a self-interest ethic, misanthropy, disenchantment, and idealism.

Cynicism has been frequently confused with scepticism. If all cynics weresceptics, the confusion might be innocent or trivial, and no real confusionwould obtain. They are, however, quite opposite in many respects. Indeedmany cynical remarks are both sceptical and cynical. For example, MarkTwain' s remark about the large number of nails in Europe that ha ve come fromthe true cross is both sceptical and cynical. In Twain' s case scepticism appears

to be the ground for his cynicism. But does scepticism necessarily give rise tocynicism? A sceptic about astrology does not become cynical because of hisscepticism about astrology. Freud is sceptical about man' s capacity to becivilized, but he is notcynical about man. Thus, although scepticism might wellbe a causal factor in generating cynicism, it is not a necessary condition of it.Scepticism characterizes primarily our attitudes towards beliefs concerningmatters of fact. Cynicism, on the other hand, seems directed towards situationswhere matters of value are at issue. Osear Wilde cynically illustrates the cynic sorientation towards questions of value in the following: What is a cynic? Aman who knows the price of everything, and the val u e of nothing. Manycynical remarks frequently express moral attitudes or value judgments of anegative sort. One might call cynicism a sort of moral or value scepticism. Butscepticism is essentially negative, and many cynical remarks rest upon quitepositive beliefs. For example, La Rochefoucauld said, In ove, he is bestcured who is first cured. Or as I ha ve heard attributed to Westbrook Pegler,

Never underestimate the stupidity of the American people. Such cynicalremarks presume strong beliefs about something or other. To characterizepositive attitudes as sceptical on the grounds that they are sceptical about thenegation of a positive belief is to stretch the terrn ' 'sceptical'' beyond its use inmost contexts. That is to say, it would be odd to characterize scepticism as adisbelief in a disbelief. In that case we would have the odd contention that atheist is a sceptic about atheism. However, since much cynicism discounts thetruth of much that is accepted, much cynicism understandably is connected toand is overlapping with scepticism, consequently the confusion that they areconstantly conjoined and identical.

While scepticism primarily relates to questions of fact, pessimism on the

other handis

an attitude towards the realization of value or the value of apresumed value. Frequently pessimism and scepticism again trail alongtogether. The following claim made by Charner Perry, an o id teacher, is bothpessimistic and cynical: ' 'No civilization has been able to recognize its fun-

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damental problems, let alone be able to do anything about them. But thetradition of the pessimist is one of resignation. Such resignation is contrary tomuch that went on in traditions of the Classical Cynics in Greek and Romantimes. Cynical remarks were barbs in the classic tradition to prod moral reform.Equally toda y many cynics, such as Mort Sahl or William Buckley, are social,political, or moral reformers. They are objecting cynically to prevailing pretensions and hypocrisies. The rhetorical force of their remarks is provocative ofeither reform or reaction. Swift's modest proposal certainly was cynical, not

pessimistic. Pessimistic remarks rhetorically tend to disincline one to action,not provoke it.

A very significant point, 1 believe about cynicism, is that many cynicalremarks, such as Swift's modest proposal, are ironic. The frequency ofirony incynicism suggests again that there is a close correlation between the two. Notethe irony in the cynicism of Benjamín Franklin's remark that the thing that helikes about rational people is that they ha ve good reasons for everything. Whatis striking here is that irony centers on the ambiguity ofthe terms referring to the

objects of irony or cynicism. Franklin s irony plays with the appearance and thereality of what are rational people and good reasons. Wilde was doing the same,ifwe accept his lineas cynical, with ' 'gentleman'' and ''unintentionally rude.n sum, cynicism uses irony to transfer attention from apparent to real, and this

shift enables the cynic to bring into better focus the ground of his cynicism,namely the contrast between a real value anda pretending value, a real rationalperson and a pretending rational person, a real gentleman and a pretendinggentleman.

Other cynicism seems attached toa self-interest ethic. A self-interest ethic,sometimes called ethical egoism, usually maintains that man naturally acts forself-interest, and that since he cannot do otherwise, that he ought to accept itasright and go with the flow and not to oppose it. La Rochefoucauld's cynicism,for example, apparently grows out of the view that psychologically man actsnaturally from self-interest and that deep in his heart every man is out forhimself. The question in interpreting La Rochefoucauld is whether or not he issad that this is so, whether or not one can do anything about it, or whether or notone should even bother to try. One of the bitterest of his maxims, 1 believe, is

the following: In the misfortunes of our dearest friends we always findsomething not entirely displeasing. Do cynics, such as La Rochefoucauld,necessarily hold a self-interest ethic? 1 think not. But either way, the attack onconventional morality makes t easily understandable why the cynic is thoughteither immoral or amoral. For any attack on the hypocrisy of conventionalaltruism or benevolence is perceived as an attack on morality itself.


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The cynic, instead of holding a self-interest ethic, may simply be callingattention to the degree that men deceive themselves about their own motives,and that they pretend to be operating on moral grounds when in fact they areonly acting in self-interest. A cynic, for example, may be simply denying thehonesty of most people.

But does the cynic thereby deny the value of al honesty, even the value ofbeing honest with himself? The cynic who proclaims that "honesty is the bestpolicy racket" may be condemning what he sees as moral pretensions in men,

but is he necessarily denying the values ofthe virtue he proclaims to be a sham?Again, is it not the duality of appearance and reality that is behind the denial ofthe value ofhonesty? When Diogenes, the cynic, supposedly lighted acandle inthe daytime to loo k for an honest man, he did not deny the moral worth of thehonest man. Even Immanuel Kant admits that one can never be certain .thatanyone has ever acted from apure motive ora disinterested motive (25). Thecynic easily operates in this sphere of questionable motives. La Rochefoucauldis direct about this matter in the following maxim: ' 'Self interest speaks al sortsof languages and plays al sorts of roles, e ven that of disinterestedness.'' Thecynic challenges as appearance what others claim to be a real value. No wonderfrom the point of view of the righteous the cynic appears amoral or immoral.One can see how easily it would be, especially so for anyone holding aself-interest theory of ethics, to be attacked for amorality when he is attackingthe altruism of others as sham, hypocrisy, or self-delusion. The logic is simplefor the righteous: You attack morality, namely my morality; therefore, youmust be amoral or immoral. Your cynicism is a rejection of morality."

Misanthropy is characteristically found in many cynical remarks. Note thecynicism in the statement "People are no damned good. Mark Twain'scynicism about man has brought him the abe of misanthrope. A frequentquotation from Twain is ' 'The difference between dogs and men is that a dognever bites the hand that feeds it. The asceticism, the shunning of humancompanionship that marks the ancient classical tradition of the cynic, lendscredence to the view that the cynic is anti-social and disdainful of mankind ingeneral. But again, the tradition of the ancient cynic, so praised by the Stoics,depicts him as a moral reformer. Such a portrait of the cynic operates againstany view that cynics completely despair of mankind. The cynic's sarcasm may

be perceived as a formof

moral shock therapy, and if the cynic is engaging inrhetorical therapeutics, then he cannot be in complete despair about his patient,especially if the therapy is free.

Final y, cynics are sometí mes characterized as disenchanted or disillusionedidealists. Here 1 think líes the crux of the matter in understanding much of thephenomenon of cynicism. For in one sense the cynic is sayingjust the opposite,


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that he is not an idealist. He claims that ' ' a cynic is a realist. s one cynicalremark goes, The power of accurate perception is called cynicism by thosewho lack it. To say that a cynic is a realist brings out the ambivalence inviewing the cynic. An unstable irony, playing on the term realist, succeedsin understanding what is fundamental. Cynical remarks oscillate between whatis an apparent value and what is a real value. They force the hearer to recognizethe value of oppositions; consequently, irony as a mode of speech as airead ysuggested is ideally adapted to express cynical remarks, for it directs attention

to the basic opposition between appearance and reality in the vision of thecynic. The cynic 's scom of those who consider cynicism as a vice instead of avirtue is based upon this very opposition. But nevertheless the irony is unstablefor anyone rising above the viewpoints of both speaker and hearer, for theoutsider may not see truth in either side of the issue. Both parties are damnedwith the presumptions that they are right. Ambrose Bierce in his Devil sDictionary, or as he first entitled it, The Cynic s Wordbook, illustrates thisoscillating point in his definition of a cynic. A cynic according to Bierce is ' 'onewhose faulty vision sees things as they are, notas they ought to be. Hence thecustom of the Scythians of plucking out a cynic's eyes to improve his vision61). The cynic for Bierce sees what is real. The cynic's critic sees the cynic's

faulty vision. We have the basic opposition of what is appearance and what isreality at issue in the cynic's eyes. From the point of view of the cynic's critic,however, the cynic fails to see truly what the critic thinks the cynic ought to see.But, as outsiders we wonder about the vision ofboth cynic and his critic, and wequestion the confidence of the cynic in thinking that he sees what he sees.

Let me summarize my analysis so far. The term cynic shifts relative to

moral points of view. The critic of the cynic speaks of the cynic as essentiallycallous, captious, fault-finding of what he considers moral. The term cynicthus becomes pejorative in the eyes of the person towards whom cynicism isdirected. The speaker or author of a cynical remark, on the other hand, whorecognizes himself as cynical, is critica) ofthe morality of others and finds theirmorality a sham ora pretense; and consequently his attitude of fault finding is avirtue to him instead of a vice. The cynic in making his cynical remarks playsu pon the duality of what is a value and what is a pretended value. The force ofhis remarks is toward correcting someone's vision of what is the real value in a

situation. The critic of the cynic fails to see the necessity of having his ownvision corrected about what are real values. The cynic's critic looks upon thecynic as basically disillusioned and disenchanted about life. He looks upon thecynic as having no sense ofvalue or having a corrupt sense ofvalue. The cynicfrom the cynic's point of view is a moral critic. The cynic points out mistakenappearances of value. From the cynic's point of view he is sceptical of


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traditional or accepted values. Since the cynic looks upon many traditional oraccepted values as a sham ora fraud, he appears pessimistic about the forcesthat carry civilization and mankind towards the future. Since sometimes thecynic sees little hope for man s future with accepted morality, his attitudetowards a value tradition casts the cynic in the role of an amoralist, a disenchanted person, a misanthrope, anda pessimist. Since much of the cynic scriticism of traditional virtue takes the form of showing that much of thetraditional ethic is self-interested rather than disinterested, he seems to be

upholding psychological or ethical egoism, and consequently a self-interesttheory of ethic. Since for many, a self-interest ethic is amoral or immoral, thecynic s remarks are presumed to be grounded in amoral or immoral beliefs andattitudes. Consequently, the cynic is frequently thought amoral or immoral, andthe terms ' 'cynic' ' and ' 'cynical'' are used evaluatively in a pejorative sense tocondemn attitudes, persons, beliefs, and actions. The cynic s irony and hisapparent disenchantment and disillusioned idealism merely reflect the dualityin much ofthe phenomenaof cynicism. The cynic resorts to irony, to overstatement, and other forms of figurative language that play on the duality of apparentand real virtue. The rhetorical force of his remarks against sham and pretensetake on a note of exaggeration, distortion, and despair that easily lead to theconclusion that the cynic is disillusioned and mistaken about reality. But onecan easily interpret mistakenly the cynical stance by taking cynical remarks tooliterally. The cynic in his resort to irony, tongue-in-cheek statements, overstatement, caricature, and distortion easily confuses those in his audience whoare the object of his cynicism. A basic lack of sincerity and ambiguity ofintention displays itself in loase and figurative ways of speaking. His ironybecomes unstable. The language of cynicism is the source of much of theconfusion about where the cynic stands. Irony plays with honesty. And if thecynic slips in maintaining his own moral honesty, he may develop the cynicalconsciousness of the liar that Sartre speaks about. At that point the cynic passesbeyond the boundary of healthy cynicism and probably is guilty of many of theneurotic states of mind attributed to him. He becomes the cynic, such sShakespeare s lago, placing himself outside the moral point of view. The cynichas reached Sartre s ideal description of the liar a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying in his words, and denying that

negation as such.

Works Cited

Bierce, Ambrose. The Devil s Dictionary. New York: 1911. 61.


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Kant, Immanuel. Werke Bank IV Grundlegund zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Darmstadt: ZweiterAbschnitt, 1963. 25.

Georg e Y oos is chair of the Department of Philosophy and director ofthe Rhetoric Program at S .Cloud State University. He is editor of the Rhetoric Society Quarterly. His early work was inaesthetics and philosophy of language. More and more his work and interests ha ve shifted awayfrom philosophical concems with rhetoric and its history to empirical approaches to the study ofdiscourse and discourse strategies, especially in writing, in argument and exposition.

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The Retoric of Cynism