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THE ROLE OF AFRICAN UNION IN PEACE BUILDING: A CASE STUDY OF
KENYA
DOROTHY MUSYOKA
REG. NO: R50/67984/2013
A RESEARCH PROJECT PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTER IN ARTS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INSTITUTE OF
DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
2016
ii
Declaration
This thesis project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree award in any
other University.
Signature....................................... Date.......................................................
Dorothy Musyoka
REG. NO: R50/67984/2013
Supervisors:
This research project has been submitted with our approval as the University Supervisors
Dr. Prisca Kamunge
Lecturer
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
University of Nairobi.
iii
Dedication
I dedicate this research project to my family who have been my source of inspiration and most
especially to Almighty God for His abundant blessing and grace. I also dedicate this work to all
who will find time to read and appreciate this thesis project, especially all those who were
involved in its development.
iv
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge the Almighty God, the creator and giver of all things for his sufficient grace
during the time i was undertaking my studies. My profound gratitude goes to my able and
indefatigable supervisors for their constant guidance that helped me in development of this
project. I wish to thank my family for the inspiration, peace of mind and encouragement to
complete my studies and my classmates for their willingness to assist me during consultations.
v
Table of Contents
Declaration ...................................................................................................................................... ii
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iv
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ v
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................... viii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background ........................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ...................................................................................... 3
1.3 Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Objectives of the Research .................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Justification of the Research Problem ................................................................................... 5
1.5 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 6
1.5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6
1.5.2 The Peace-building concept ........................................................................................... 6
1.5.3 Actors in Peace-building .............................................................................................. 12
1.5.4 Concepts Related To Peace-Building .......................................................................... 14
1.5.5 The Context of Peace-building .................................................................................... 17
1.5.6 Components and Objectives/Goal of Peace Building .................................................. 19
1.5.6.1 Reconciling Opponents and Preventing Conflict Restart (Sustainable Peace) ......... 19
vi
1.5.6.2 Addressing underlying structures (structural violence) ............................................ 21
1.5.6.3 Addressing underlying social issues (root cause of conflict).................................... 22
1.5.6.4The AU and Peacebuilding ........................................................................................ 24
1.6 Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................................... 25
1.7 Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 27
1.8 Methodology of the Research ............................................................................................. 27
1.9 Scope and Limitations of the research ................................................................................ 29
1.10 Chapter Outline ................................................................................................................. 29
CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................................................ 31
THE AFRICAN UNION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS ....................................................... 31
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 31
2.2 Unconstitutional Government changes ............................................................................... 32
2.3 The AU as a political arena ................................................................................................. 34
2.3.1 The African Union's Architecture for Democratic Development ............................ 36
CHAPTER THREE : NEXUS BETWEEN AFRICAN UNION PEACE BUILDING AND
THE SITUATION IN KENYA .................................................................................................. 47
3.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 47
3.1. Kenya: The Making of A Crisis ......................................................................................... 48
3.2 The African Union and the Kenyan Crisis .......................................................................... 50
3.2.1 Legal Basis for AU Intervention ...................................................................................... 50
3.3 The Mediation Process ........................................................................................................ 51
vii
3.4 Constitutional Review and Institutional Reforms ............................................................... 55
3.5 Impunity and the Accountability Debate ............................................................................ 56
3.5 Gender Justice ..................................................................................................................... 59
3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation.................................................................................................. 62
3.7 Chapter outline .................................................................................................................... 63
CHAPTER FOUR ....................................................................................................................... 64
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AU’S INTERVENTION IN KENYA’S ELECTORAL
VIOLENCE ................................................................................................................................. 64
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 64
4.2 AU‘s Intervention in Kenya and it‘s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ................................ 65
4.3 AU‘s Intervention and the use of Good offices................................................................... 68
4.4 Successes and Failures of the AU in Conflict Intervention ................................................ 73
CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................ 77
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................................................ 77
BIBILIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 81
viii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACDEG: African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
APRM: Africa Peer Review Mechanism
APSA: African Union‘s Peace and Security Architecture
AU: African Union
CADSP: Common African Defence and Security Policy
CIPEV: Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence
CSOs: Civil Society Organizations
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation
DEAU: Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit
ECK: Electoral Commission of Kenya
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EPCG: Eminent Persons Contact Group
EU: European Union
GCG: Grand Coalition Government
IDEA: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
MOU: Memorandum of Association
NDR: National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord
ix
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU: Organization of African Union
ODM: Orange Democratic Movement
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCRD: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PEAP: Panel of Eminent African Personalities
PEV: Post Election Violence
PNU: Party of National Unity
PSC: Peace and Security Commission
PSC: Peace and Security Council
RECs: Regional Economic Community
TJRC: Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UN: United Nations
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
x
Abstract
The role of the African Union in managing Kenya‘s political crisis has not been adequately
investigated, yet it is an excellent example of successful intervention by third party international
actors in a domestic conflict. Several studies show that implementation of peace building models
developed by third party actors have been unsuccessful, resulting in re-emergence of conflict,
Notable failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia lead to the perception that the UN action is too
little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, and poorly executed. The following were the
specific objectives of this study; To critically examine the role played by African Union in
domestic politics, To evaluate the effectiveness of the African Union in peace building in Kenya,
and To establish factors behind the success of the African Union in peace building in Kenya.
This study was carried out in African Union offices in Kenya as well as the ministry of foreign
affairs that were involved in the Kenyan peace agreement. It will involve employees of different
departments in the institutions. The study revealed that the field of conflict intervention and by
extension conflict management has turned out to be more different and swarmed. Territorial,
sub-local and other global associations and non-administrative associations and private people
are progressively required in intervention exercises. Facilitate, it was built up that in excessively
numerous occasions, clashes have been further disturbed by well-intentioned outsider performing
artists who do not have a decent comprehension of intercession and sufficient planning. A strong
handle of intercession through intervention is expected to better synchronize discretionary
endeavors and oversee desires. To this end, the direction for successful intercession is a valuable
asset. Moreover, the study built up that these middle people order nearby authenticity; have top
to bottom learning of the general public, its history, and neighborhood strife determination
approaches; and frequently host set up contacts with the contention gatherings. Be that as it may,
this closeness to the contention and its on-screen characters has its inadequacies. It regularly
opens nearby middle people to significant individual dangers; now and again they may likewise
be seen as one-sided because of their association with either party. Promote, the study built up
that the achievement of a peace understanding relies on upon the dedication of the gatherings;
along these lines, assertions ought to dependably address the issues communicated by the
gatherings (and the general public) and not those of the go-between. What's more, an effective
understanding ought to limit itself to the primary issues of the present clash and leave space for a
law based procedure to address all the less problems that are begging to be addressed.
1
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
This study examines the role of African Union in peace building through a case study of Kenya.
The AU's all-encompassing target is the growth of "an incorporated, prosperous and quiet Africa,
driven by its own particular subjects and speaking to a dynamic compel in the worldwide field."
The union's more particular vision for peace making reflects mindfulness that the precondition
for accomplishing this overall objective is Africa‘s security and solidness. The conflict situation
that unfolded in Kenya following the disputed presidential elections of 2007 presented an
opportunity to gauge the role of the AU in peace building. This chapter provides the problem
statement, research objectives, and research questions. The chapter also provides the literature
review, the justification of the study, conceptual framework, methodology and finally the
structure of the project
1.1 Background
According to Kirsti,1 achieving sustainable peace through peace-building has had little success
more so through international interventions. Richmond2 explains that peace models of western
have been implemented in post conflict nations but with low success. Implementation of peace
agreements has been dependent on the presence of third party actors such as the UN whose work
is seen to be insufficient. International peace building interventions involving different actors has
also been dismissed on allegations that they do not reflect the interests, needs and rights of the
local actors what Haider3calls ―conflict management imperialism‖. The predominance of donors
1Kirsti, S (2006). ‗Post-Conflict Peace-making and Constitution-building‘ Chicago Journal of International Law,
6:2 1-20. 2 Orfis R. (2001). ―Refocusing violence resolution: The joint problematic between ―Track I‖ and ―Track II‖ Journal
of Conflict Studies, 21:2 155–61. 3Haider, H (2009). Group based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-influenced and Fragile Contexts,
Governance and Social Development Resource Center: (University of Birmingham,). .
2
and other external actors presents a high chance of neglecting local changes and fail to come up
with at sustainable answers. Emstorferet.al4 argues that such dynamics have led to consideration
of indigenous methods to address post-conflict management strategies.
Global intercession in post-struggle circumstances ascended in the mid 1980s when the
worldwide group utilized advancement help to advance peace and compromise. In spite of the
fact that this approach was endeavored in Cambodia, Uganda, and El Salvador it is just in the
middle 1990s that a completely changes as a result of establishments and key records5.
The AU was established in 2002 on an influx of idealism about future of Africa, and was
outfitted with more grounded authoritative components and more prominent forces of mediation
in the issues of its part states than its antecedent, the OAU. The production of the AU built up a
15-part PSC so as to mediate for rights of humans and in case of unlawful changes in
government.
The AU's entrance to neighborhood information and its status as an African establishment give
authenticity on its peace promotion endeavors. In addition, its dedication to give 'African
answers for African issues' and the measures it has taken to do as such, give foundation to its
contribution in residential issues. The AU has committed uncommon consideration regarding the
issues of contention counteractive action, administration and determination inside the mainland,
and is always occupied with interventions and different measures to keep the flare-up of
contentions. The AU convention on peace built up under the African Peace and Security
4Ernstorfer, A et.al Administration Strategies for Post Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development
(UNDESA GPAB/REGOPA Cluster, 2007). 5 Uvin, P (2002). ‗The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms‘
Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 1:15-24.
3
Commission6 gives enter instruments in the territory of refereeing. Article 14 of the Protocol
characterizes its parts which incorporate reclamation of the lead of law, foundation and
improvement of fair organizations and the arrangement, association and supervision of decisions,
combination of the peace understandings, demilitarization, deactivation, building up political,
social and monetary, society and Government establishments, resettlement and reintegration of
evacuees and inside uprooted people among others.
The December 2007 Presidential results disputes led to tension which culminated in the violent
clash between the supporters of the Kibaki and Raila. The pattern of violence and population
displacement revealed many underlying causes of conflict, and stopped only after global
intervention by the AU, drove by the Panel of Eminent Personalities7. John Kufuor, Ghana's
President and by then Chair of the AU made prompt move to guarantee that the savagery in
Kenya stopped. With assistance from previous Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General they amassed
a Panel of well-known leaders that helped in the negotiation and reconciliation process, which
brokered peace for the Kenyan people.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
As a territorial establishment, the AU is commanded to, bury alia; advance peace, security and
solidness on Africa. In July 2002, Member States agreed to "The Protocol identifying with the
AU Peace and Security Council foundation" which announces that the AU has an essential duty
regarding the support of universal peace and security and specifically, in advancement and
upkeep of Africa peace and security. It also underlines that advancement and upkeep of peace,
6 Ibid
7 Langer, J (2011). ‗leardership to govern: Kenya‘s Post-Electoral Crisis‘ Journal of International Service 45
4
security and steadiness are crucial for solid financial and popularity based improvement of
Africa.8
The role of the AU in managing Kenya‘s political crisis has not been adequately investigated, yet
it is an excellent example of successful intervention by third party international actors in a
domestic conflict. Several studies show that implementation of peace building models developed
by third party actors have been unsuccessful, resulting in re-emergence of conflict, Notable
failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia lead to the perception that the UN action is short of
what was expected, misinterpreted, inadequately resourced, and clumsy9 as it didn't have
sufficient associations with the universal monetary organizations, through which to successfully
control the important political-money related linkages vital for viable post-struggle recuperation.
Other scholars also criticize third party because they often reflect the donors interests or due to
corruption accusations and embezzlement of funds for activities supported by the third party
actors. The challenges notwithstanding, there are some positive outcomes, as demonstrated by
the AU‘s intervention in Kenya. This study examines the role of the AU in peace building in
Kenya‘s political crisis, the strategies used by its Eminent Persons to restore peace and promote
reconciliation after the violence, and the follow up of implementation of structural reforms under
agenda 4 of the peace accord.
1.3 Research Questions
The study will be guided by the following research questions;
i. What is the role played by the African Union in domestic politics?
8Ibid
9 Evans G,. and Mohamed S.,( 2002) ―The Foreign issues,‖ Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6: 100.
5
i. What is the effectiveness of the African Union in peace building in Kenya?
ii. What are the factors behind the success of the African Union in peace building in Kenya?
1.4 Objectives of the Research
The main objective of this study is to assess the role of African Union in peace building: a case
study of Specific objectives
The following were the specific objectives of this study;
ii. To critically examine the role played by African Union in domestic politics.
iii. To evaluate the effectiveness of the African Union in peace building in Kenya.
iv. To establish factors behind the success of the African Union in peace building in Kenya.
1.4 Justification of the Research Problem
Conflict affects the lives of the citizens of a nation leading to economic breakdown,
displacement of people, loss of livelihood, and even loss of life. However, the conflict can range
on for some time and the opponents maybe unable to reconcile and build the nation again. This
calls for international assistance from other nations and other reconciling bodies in the world to
assist the nation in reconciling. Mediators parties such as the AU, the EU and UN enable the
success of such agendas by implementing the peace-building programs. However not all
programs are successful and some nations revert back to the old ways. This research study looks
at the role by the AU in peace-building through its engagement in the mediation process of
Kenya‘s 2007/08 crisis, thus, the study will enable better understanding of the role played by
third party actors. Therefore, the research will enable growth in literature in the area of peace-
building and also pave way for more research in the area. The research will also investigate third
party role in peace-building thus addressing knowledge gaps on the causes of failures and also
success.
6
This research study will also benefit and be useful to practitioners of peace-building as it will
enable more understanding of reconciliation and prevention of reoccurrence of violence after
conflict. It will also benefit the government policy makers through an examination of the best
ways to handle domestic conflict and how to sustain peace. The study will also benefit the local
unions for instance the AU to understand the conditions under which peace-building programs
works in domestic situations.
1.5 Literature review
1.5.1 Introduction
Peace building is dynamic and entails different variable that are still debatable. This literature
review looks at the concept of peace-building, actors involved in peace-building, other concepts
connected to peace-building, and AU role in controlling domestic conflicts.
1.5.2 The Peace-building concept
Galtung created a considerable lot of the center ideas that keep on being connected in peace
building work and definitions today, incorporating into the definition by UN.10
Center ideas from
Galtung's11
work consist of: positive peace, negative peace, auxiliary savagery, underlying
drivers of contention and feasible peace. These for the most part frame the center segments of
peacebuilding. Negative peace involves the discontinuance or potentially nonattendance of
viciousness. Positive peace involves the nonattendance of auxiliary savagery, the nearness of
social equity, the run of law and the conditions that dispense with the reasons for brutality.
10
Ibid 11
Galtung, O (1996). ‗Three ways to peace: Peace building, , and Peacemaking in J. Galtung, Essays in Peace
Research, vol. 2, Peace, War, and Defense (Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers,), 282–304.
7
Auxiliary viciousness includes fundamentally roundabout savagery that is incorporated with
structures and appears as unequal power and thusly as unequal life risks and is a basic reason for
direct brutality. Main drivers of contention are signs of basic and social brutality originating
from basic social issues prompting direct viciousness. Supportable peace includes peace and
peace forms that address the main drivers of vicious clash and keep the restart of savagery. This
study take a gander settled working from the point of view of Galtung as this view concentrates
on particular elements that are likewise harmonious with other created definitions and peace
building settings.
Peacebuilding turned into a well known idea inside the UN taking after Boutros-Ghali's
statement, Peace Agenda, which characterized peacebuilding as activity to cement peace and
evade backslide into struggle. In 2000, the Brahimi Report characterized it as "exercises
attempted on the furthest side of contention to reassemble the establishments of peace and give
the instruments to expanding on those establishments something that is more than simply the
lack of war." 12
In Kenya, the 2007 post-race brutality gives an immaculate case of the issues above. Universal
intervention through the AU in counsel with the United Nations prompted constituting a well
known leaders among them Dr. Kofi Annan to intervene the emergency. The intervention group
united agents from both the PNU and ODM and both consented to a National Peace Accord and
to sharing political power.
12
Ibid
8
Clarke13
observers that traditionally, peacebuilding concerns many activities and functions
connected to political, social, and economic reconstruction designed to help recover
relationships. This activities range from: democratic development including electoral reform;
rule of law; humanitarian aid; economic reconstruction and reform; human rights protection;
security sector reform; justice sector reforms; and reconciliation among others. These reforms
enable economic development and prevention of conflict thus healing the nation as exemplified
by the Kenyan situation where the mediation process led to birth of a power-sharing government,
bringing the war to an end.
The Kenyan intercession group particularly recognized and conceded to four plan things to direct
the procedure: i. Plan Item Number 1: Immediate activity to stop viciousness and reestablish
principal rights and freedoms. ii. Motivation thing Number 2: prompt measures to address
philanthropic emergency, advancement of compromise and mending process. iii. Motivation
Item Number 3: Resolving the Political Crisis through power sharing. iv. Motivation thing
Number 4: Addressing Long Standing issues and Solutions. Motivation Item 4 recognized six
long haul issues that prompt the emission of the brutality, they include: Constitutional,
institutional and lawful change; Land change; Poverty, disparity and provincial unevenness;
Unemployment, especially youth unemployment; Consolidation of national attachment and
solidarity; Transparency, responsibility, exemption. These issues had been feeble the nation for a
considerable length of time prompting brutality in various parts of the nation.14
Africa Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM) in its 2006 appraisal of Kenya observed15
, "rivalry for assets and
access to them, and the assembly of ethnic personalities in political and financial power battles,
13
Clarke, Y., (2013). ‗Gender and peacemaking: Conceptual vision‘ Africa peace and conflic Journal, 87-92 14
Ibid 15
Ibid
9
minimization of areas and also local irregular characteristics, in light of the nation's polarization,
cautioned that Kenya was probably going to confront genuine difficulties unless it found a way
to determine these fundamental issues."
This means peace building is a pre-struggle and in addition a post-strife handle. Galtung16
clarifies that peacebuilding is hard to characterize and considerably more hard to accomplish by
and by. Lambourne17
characterize post-strife peacebuilding as the procedures intended to
advance a safe and stable enduring peace in which the essential people requirements of the
populace are met and fierce clashes don't repeat. Peace building consolidates the objectives of
both negative peace and positive peace as initially illustrated by Galtung. Be that as it may, as
per Univ18
, a urgent issue in the post-struggle motivation identifies with the absence of solid,
quality information. Diplomats, help facilitators, and program administrators are confronted with
the issue of not recognizing what's "truly" progressing, though the zones of direct worry to them.
Questions emerge in such ranges as approaches appropriation and their imaginable results,
military and political first class divisions, spending plans or military spending dependability and
the perspective of the populace as to this matters.
As per Kieh19
Peacebuilding is a long haul preparation that happens after the stop of brutality or
after vicious clash has died down. Peacebuilding exercises incorporate societal change, limit
building, and compromise. Basically, it looks to encourage the foundation of strong peace and
works towards anticipation of the backslide of savagery by for the most part tending to the main
16
Galtung, J (1969). ‗Conflict, and Peace Analysis Journal of Peace Research, 167-191. 17
Ibid 18
Uvin, P (2002). ‗The Peacemaking: History of Changing shifts‘ Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 1:15-
24.
19
Ibid
10
drivers and impacts of contention. Burton20
clarifies that contention determination is a political
rationality that goes past the minor determination of debate and rather, points further into uniting
clashed parties. It likewise concerns exercises expected to bring parties into an encouraged,
intelligent circumstance and locations underlying drivers of contention which are
characteristically attached to fundamental human needs, for example, nourishment, sanctuary,
and access to assets. Karbo and Nelson21
clarify that peace-building goes for reestablishing the
limits of governments and groups to modify and recoup from the assaults of war. Nonetheless,
tending to the part of compassionate guide in monetary recuperation in post-strife social orders is
basic to peace-building.
As indicated by Spence22
the procedure of peacebuilding requests for new methodologies and
practices. These methodologies and practices must be adaptable, consultative and communitarian
and ought to work from a relevant comprehension of the main drivers of contention. Lederach23
explains that such an approach is transformative in nature and is based on the termination of
something undesired which is violence and the building of transformative relationships and
establishment of conditions for peace. The approach taken by the panel of actors in the Kenyas
PEV can be said to be the most innovative, flexible and transformative in Africa. The mediation
and negotiation process take by the panel ensured a stop in violence and establishment of a
coalition government. In the negotiations, Kofi Annan met the two Principals and exhorted both
principals that the losers of the war were the general population of Kenya.
20
Burton, J (1993). violence Resolution Practice: Integration and utilization (Manchester, Manchester, University
Press. 21
Karbo, T. &. Nelson, C (2010) . ‗War issues: choices for changes‘ Africa peace and conflict journal, 4 14-24 22
Ibid 23
Ibid
11
Also he clarified that more drawn out term issues and quick political issues should have been
tended to and that the Principals ought not dismiss Kenya's part in guaranteeing provincial
strength. He demanded that the Principals ought to cooperate to convey particular results and
give Kenya's kin a feeling of advance. This is additionally the point of view voiced by Ryan that
the assignment of peacebuilding mostly includes changing the consideration far from the
warriors to the demeanors and financial conditions of the common individuals who bear the
heaviness of the contention, accordingly moving far from peacekeeping which is on creating
obstructions amongst the fighters to peace-building which tries to assemble connects between the
normal individuals24
.
Building peace in nations rising up out of contention is a gigantic, complex undertaking. It
includes a bunch of various players. Its exceptionally definition is the subject of lively level
headed discussion. Peacebuilders are along these lines confronted each day with the question:
how would we manufacture feasible peace? This paper plans to convey some clarity to the
viewpoint of the peacebuilder, particularly the AU peacebuilder. It is not a scholastic
investigation of peacebuilding, nor does it offer complete answers for its issues. Rather, it
contains down to earth direction on the best way to manage the repeating difficulties of
arranging, programming, prioritization and assets. To upgrade its down to earth pertinence, the
paper contains numerous cases of genuine peacebuilding, its mix-ups and in addition its
triumphs. These are lessons shared by the AU group who do peacebuilding in the field. They
represent how the standards depicted in this paper connected in real peacebuilding
circumstances. From these conclusions can be drawn on the effectiveness or other and even put
24
Ryan, S., (1990) Stephen, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Aldershot: Dartmouth,), pp. 61-2.
12
forth suggestions on what can be done to enhance the understanding of the AU peace building
role and position.
1.5.3 Actors in Peace-building
As indicated by the AU,25
diverse establishments and Non-state performing artists have been
contribution in peace-building including worldwide and local associations, Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs) and the private area, likewise casual gatherings, for example, religious
groups, informal organizations, and customary powers. NGOs mostly from the west and CSOs
look to address the underlying drivers of contention and the remaking of divided connections
amongst gatherings and on-screen characters. Common society associations likewise think on
workings at administration positions instead of the center range and the grassroots.
Moreover, compelling systems join 'base up' and 'best down' activities clarifies the GPPAC
which is a system of a thousand and more common society associations framed in 2005, however
nearby proprietorship still stays basic. For instance dismissal of fundamental needs at the
neighborhood level including unemployment can conceivably turn into national and even
universal brutality and wrongdoing. However this study takes a gander at these methodologies
from the point of view of them not enhancing correspondence and foundation of connections
between clashing gatherings does not consequently prompt the understanding of end of
contention. The suspicion that working with common society at the villages will normally have
an impact at the national level need particular results which have turned out to be practical 26
.
After the change of the AU from the OAU support of peace and security quickly turned into the
essential issue on the AU plan. The new standards and principles set up framed the premise on
25
Ibid 26
Ibid
13
which the PSC Protocol and the CADSP were to be authorized27
. The development of the PSC
has gone far in encouraging the procedure of peace working in Africa among other peace plans.
The AU‘s Article 4(h) indicates that AU has the privilege to mediate in part states' in such
conditions as genocide, violations against humankind and atrocities. Moreover, the AU has the
order of reestablishing security in any AU part state in view of the suggestion of the PSC. The
PSC has the power to settle on choices with respect to Africa security needs, running from
defensive strategy to post-struggle peace building. Be that as it may, in genuine emergency
circumstances just the AU gathering can settle on extreme choice with respect to regardless of
whether to mediate based upon the PSC's suggestions. More on AU is talked about further under
part of AU28
.
In the Kenyan case for instance, the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities worked first
keeping in mind the end goal to secure a peace assention between the two principals. The AU
chairs also President of Ghana, perceived the size of the circumstance in Kenya and required a
crisis meeting of the AU Commission and counseled African presidents and the UN. With the
developing clash Kufuor sent a mission to get ready for his visit, he then met in Ghana with Kofi
Annan in and talked about of the path forward. In spite of the fact that Kufuor's visit was not
respected, the two identities concurred that Kufuor ought to visit the nation29
. Subsequent to
being welcomed by the then president Kibaki he attempted to discourse with the two principals
Kibaki and Raila yet the two standards declined to get into any understandings30
. Confronted
with this circumstance Kufuor set forward a board to be driven by Kofi Annan with Mozambique
27
Ibid 28
Volt V.K and Shanahan, M. K (2005) Building for Peace making: UN involvement with the African Union and
ECOWAS Washington, DC
29
Hansen, T.O. (2013), Kenya‘s Power-Sharing agreement, International Journal of Human Rights, 17:2, pp. 307-
327. 30
Kufuor J , (2008) letter to Kofi Annan on the Kenyan situation, 11 January.
14
president Graça Machel and Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa so as to help with the peace
building procedure and locate a quiet path forward. The board over the long haul empowered
compromise and conveyed a conclusion to the brutality. The understanding was come to after the
board and the standards concurred that a portion of the issues, for example, the constitution,
auxiliary changes and main driver of contention must be managed.
Kirsti31
clarifies that one of the regions of societal discourse that emerges in UN oversaw
keeping peace is the selection of a common constitution-production. The procedure of
constitution having an awesome effect of nations particularly taking after common war, as it
goes about as a compromise device in this way empowering its move to vote based system. This
is one of the regions that the board utilized as a part of request to secure peace for Kenya. It
gives answers for the divisive or challenged issues that prompted brutality. It can likewise
prompt the majority rule instruction of the populace, start a procedure of mending and
compromise through societal discourse, and fashion another accord vision without bounds of the
state.
1.5.4 Concepts Related To Peace-Building
Because of the scope of work and history under clash and post-strife settings numerous ideas,
terms and vocabularies have risen. This segment gives the refinement between these ideas and
peace building. In any case take note of that open deliberation around the implications and
interrelationships of these ideas is still new and change concerning the setting of contention
influenced territories. What's more, much the same as peace building extraordinary open
deliberation still wait in their definitions. To begin with, Boutros-Ghali contended that for
proactive peacemaking and helpful mediation in his report "the 1992 An Agenda for Peace".
31
Kirsti, S (2006) . Constitution-Making‘ Chicago Journal of International Law, 6: 2 1-20.
15
Real territories of action distinguished included preventive strategy; peacemaking; peacekeeping;
and peacebuilding32
. Preventive strategy includes the determination of debate before they grow
into brutality. Tending to contrasts of clashing gatherings as they create empowers the
anticipation of any acceleration of question which can prompt clash. Peacemaking looks to
elevate a truce and to arrange an assention. McCandless et al.33
clarifies that it by and large
alludes to endeavors to determine or settle brutal question including procedures, such as,
strategy, intervention, and arrangement, for example, the one completed by the board of AU. The
UN adjusted its definition as a political, strategic, and some of the time military mediations
guided at conveying clashing gatherings to understanding. Be that as it may, Peace building goes
past the strategic transaction of negative peace to that of supportable peace that is certain peace.
Supportable peace plunges further into the main drivers of contention, for example, those pointed
out in motivation 4 of the Kenya peace accord. Explaining such issues requires some serious
energy and calls for joint responsibility for peace prepare by both the performing artists
furthermore the administering parties furthermore other common society bunches34
.
Peacekeeping includes the organization of UN regularly the UN military or potentially police
staff furthermore regular citizens. It a one of a kind and element instrument created by the UN
and it guarantees that conditions for enduring peace are built up in war torn nations. These
missions are no more drawn out conventional which was entirely military in nature and are
presently progressively "multidimensional" which includes execution of exhaustive peace
32
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations,). 33
McCandless, E., and N. Tschirgi (2010), strategic plan for Accountability‘, Journal of Peacebuilding and
Development, vol. 5, no. 2,. 34
Ibid.
16
assentions and early establishments of practical peace. Then again peace-building continues over
a more drawn out timeframe contrasted with the peacekeeping exercises35
.
Different ideas identified with peace building incorporate refereeing, strife determination, and
struggle counteractive action among others. Fisher et al.36
clarifies that peace making includes
advancing positive practices among clashing gatherings on request to confine and dodge
acceleration of future brutality. Then again peace building incorporates the same however goes
past the procedures that address behavioral viewpoints. Struggle determination includes and tries
to address reasons for strife and take a stab at the foundation of new and enduring connections
among the threatening gatherings. Peace expanding then again includes a more extensive scope
of exercises including yet not restricted to the connections. Struggle Prevention goes for keeping
the episode of viciousness expulsion of basic treacheries that may prompt clash; this approach is
significantly more basic in peace building37.
The study plans to draw out AU's way to deal with peace-building endeavors in Kenya which
mirrors its individuals' inclination for consensual decision-making, both inside the PSC and
between hawkish groups—directed out of people in general spotlight. For a significant part of
the post–Cold War period, struggle relief activities rotated around a hunt down workable tip top
deals as power-sharing understandings.
35
Ibid
36
Fisher, S (2000), Working with violence: policies for action, London and Birmingham,) 37
Ibid
17
1.5.5 The Context of Peace-building
Evans38
explains that the idea of peace building is the notion of meeting the needs of people
ravaged by war, to ensure the establishment of order and security, provision of a sensible way of
life and the acknowledgment of character and worth. The contention determination hypotheses of
John Burton expand this concentrate on the fulfillment of human needs. The peace building
process calls for practices and states of mind that are new, adaptable, cooperative and
consultative and those which work from a relevant comprehension of the underlying drivers of
contention. From the point of view of this approach it is straightforward the purposes for the
contention and in this way makes the approach transformative principally in light of the fact that
it is established on end viciousness which is undesired and foundation of something sought
through the change of connections and development of the conditions for peace.39
Peace building programs have different activities that are considered important for successful
peace building. Peace building programs have grown over the years and become more invasive.
Whereas the ‗Agenda for Peace‘ as explained early stressed state sovereignty, the 2004 UN
account titled 'A More Secure World'40
centered of the power of the state as well as on the
privileges of the people influenced. This was obviously found in the Kenyan mediation when
Benjamin Mkapa entreated the Panel to think about Kenya's kin and set divided requests aside.
According to him, each individual is vital, regardless of for whom they voted, and that the
legislature was chosen to serve the general population focusing on that the sacredness of life was
38
Evans G. (1993) Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. (Sydney: Allen &Unwin,), p. 39. 39
Lederach P., (2000) Journey from Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding in Cynthia Sampson and John
Paul Lederach (eds), From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peace building (Oxford/New
York: Oxford University Press,),pp. 45-55. 40
Ibid
18
being damaged41
. Peace fabricating along these lines grows to incorporate the insurance of
human rights, reconstruction of human identity and establishment of community relationships
turning away from the focus on the cessation of hostilities and rebuilding of infrastructure.
Reflection on the view of Galtung42
the expansion of peace building activities in this direction
mirrored a willingness to conceptualize peace not only as negative peace that entails the lack of
direct physical aggression as explained earlier in the literature, but also as positive peace which
necessitates the absenteeism of structural violence. The protagonists of positive peace reiterate
that centering only on negative peace tends to be insufficient, as it disregards the numerous in
which individuals may suffer in the middle of conflict. In this regard a focus only on negative
peace means that great effort and resources are used in order to reach a cease fire between
conflicting groups disregarding the fact that other forms of insecurity, inequalities, and
vulnerabilities may be left unaddressed. For example, unequal status of women and children or
even domestic sexual violence and rape is not addressed by negative peace. United Nations43
Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping Reform explained that peace building comprised of activities
that provide tools that are more fundamentally build on foundations of something that is more
than just the absence of war. Ali and Matthews claim that peace building involves moving from a
condition of negative peace to one of positive peace. This indicates that the areas of concern to
peace builders have generally expanded to include issues and activities that were formerly
considered to be outside its scope.
41
Ibid 42
Galtung J. (1969), Conflict, and Peace study, Journal of Peace Research, pp. 167-191. 43
Ibid
19
In a general sense, the AU's peace building assignments can just decrease the most exceedingly
awful side effects of progressing outfitted clash. The study plans to build up whether the AU was
really ready to determine the basic reasons for the savagery that has done as such much to curse
Kenya's advance.
1.5.6 Components and Objectives/Goal of Peace Building
Newman et al.,44
explain that the components and objectives or goal of peace building are
subject to debate and cannot be easily described. However, broad definition of these goals
mainly involve; the prevention of re-occurrence of conflict and building up a tough and self-
maintaining peace. Furthermore, tending to the hidden wellsprings of contention, thirdly,
building or revamping tranquil social foundations and qualities, including regard for human
rights and fourthly, building or remaking organizations of administration and the control of law.
Such a broad approach to peace building entails a wide range of activities.
1.5.6.1 Reconciling Opponents and Preventing Conflict Restart (Sustainable Peace)
According to Kwuelum45
peace building currently involves conflict prevention which includes
prevention of recurrence of violence, management of conflict opposed to the original context of
post conflict recovery efforts which involved promotion of reconciliation and reconstruction.
Fagen46
observes that issues of reconciliation also involve restitution or compensation for losses
and will determine whether peace is found or war reoccurs.
44
Newman, E., Paris, R., and Richmond, P.O. New dimensions on liberal peace making, (United Nations University
Press, 2009) 45
Kwuelum,C.O (2014): Discourse as a peace making for social integration reconstruction
: A retrospect of Nigeria 46
Fagen, P.W. Peace and IDP issues, report prepared for the Brookings- Bern Project on Internal
Displacement(2007)
20
Orebiyi et al.,47
explain that maintainable peace is described by the nonattendance of physical
and auxiliary viciousness, the disposal of segregation, prompting self-supportability. Reychler
and Langer48
clarify that the point of practical peace building design is created to for the most
part reinforce the collaboration between the diverse peace building endeavors. The creating
countries are confronted with rough clashes and lion's share of the world's poorest nations has
encountered a savage clash amid the previous decade. This has been an indication that without
sustainable development the nations revert back to conflict and the only way to achieve
sustainable development is to ensure success in sustainable peace building and in order to
achieve this reconciliation efforts must be established, followed through and achieved.
Such programs as disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR) should be designed
and implemented to link those of sustainable peace effort. These programs should also include
reform in the security sector, and development of socio-economic frameworks that target
national government. In addition they should not be put in place without considering the peace
building processes. The success of these programs will ensure that the nation does not relapse
into conflict.
United Nations Report49
explains that peace building includes a scope of measures focused to
lessen the danger of slipping by or backsliding of contention in nations rising up out of
contention. The establishments of reasonable peace and advancement are accomplished by
fortifying national limits at all levels and by tending to key reasons for strife. Such measures as
47
Orebiyi, T., Orebiyi, A.O. and Fogbonjaiye, S.S. (2013) Preventive peacebuilding and supportable improvement in
Africa Journal of Business Administration and Management Sciences Research, 2:8, 178-186 48
Ibid 49
United Nations (2000): Human Security and Peacebuilding in Africa: the requirement for a comprehensive
approach,United Nations
21
reforming the security sector, developing institution capacity, electoral reforms, and human
rights monitoring facilitate and ensure the success of this process.
According to Heemskerk50
durable peace needs a ―culture of prevention‖ and a ―culture of
peace‖. This is achieved from both top down and bottom up. This also demands that the state
focuses of its citizens, provides and also protects its population. Therefore for sustainable peace
to exist all actors must work together. Such third actors as the AU, EU, UN and others, regional
organizations, governments and civil society must be involved. Therefore, ensuring that the
needed changes and therefore achievement of sustainable peace.
1.5.6.2 Addressing underlying structures (structural violence)
According to Schirch51
structural violence alludes to the incapacities, variations, and even
passings that are experienced by a gathering of individuals coming about because of frameworks,
establishments, or strategies that address the issues of one group of people to the expense of
others. This could be experienced ethically, religiously, in terms of class age language and even
gender. These experiences can lead to violence as when state are unable to or unwilling to give
basic necessities to the citizens might lead to war. The exclusion of people in such states
encourage economic and social disparity and lack of full involvement in public life and
decision-making leading to suffering of individual groups which turns to violence as this groups
fight for their denied rights.
Adebajo52
observes that structural violence should be a problem that is given priority in to be
peace building. Therefore, peace building should involves development of programs that
50
Heemskerk R.,(2007) The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Civil Society Engagement. (Demilitarization
Forum,No. 2,) 51
Schirch, L.,(2008) Key Peacebuilding: State of the Field, Peace Prints, South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding,1:1 52
Adebajo,A.: Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa.Ohio University Press • Athens
22
encourage inclusivity to the marginalized groups thus giving access to resources and institutions,
that empower these groups and ending discrimination against the disadvantaged groups,
encouraging redistribution of income and dealing with land ownership issues.
According to Johan Galtung53
Structural war comprise of marginalization and poverty and not
only physical violence. Galtung asserts that lack of addressing underlying structural violence
after conflict makes it difficult to achieve peace. Peace building is an action where the state and
international community works towards developing ‗structures of peace‘54
. If people needs are
met it‘s difficult for them to turn to violence or become hostile towards the state. Thus reduction
poverty and inequality are important and this however can only be achieved by development and
establishment of better structures55
1.5.6.3 Addressing underlying social issues (root cause of conflict)
Diamond‘s56
view is that conflict resolution lays emphasis on the intervention of gifted yet frail
outsiders who work informally with the clashed unions to encourage new cooperations, new
opinions and new connections that will empower recuperation of a country, steadiness and peace.
Strife determination is accomplished through meeting and this can best be tended to by the
recognizable proof of fundamental underlying drivers of the contention in this way empowering
the improvement of effective procedures of contention determination57
.
53
Galtung, J. ‗Brutality, peace and peace explore,' Journal of Peace Research, 6:3 (1969)167–191.. 54
Connolly,L. Equity and peace working in post-struggle circumstances: A contention for incorporating sex
investigation in another post-strife model(Occasional Paper Series, Issue 1, 2012) 55
Agwanda,T. and Harris,G (2010) People-to-individuals peacemaking and peace constructing: An audit of the
work of the New Sudan Council of Churches.( Institute for Security Studies) 56
Diamond, L (1994) The worldwide goal: constructing a popularity based world request. Current History. Vol. 93,
no. 1, pp. 1-7. 57
Omoyefa,S (2014) Post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation South Africa: A Need for Genuine Conflict
Transformation ,Journal of Conflict ology, 5: 1 89-90
23
Stewart58
set up that the significant underlying drivers incorporate political, financial, social
disparities, extraordinary destitution, monetary stagnation, poor taxpayer driven organizations,
high unemployment, ecological corruption, and absence of monetary motivations. The
comprehend and tending to of such underlying drivers of rough and struggle advance peaceful
systems, minimizing brutality, and encouraging structures that meet essential human needs and
in this way boosting open cooperation which thusly prompts soundness and peace.
The UNIFEM characterizes peace working as a transformative procedure that endeavors to build
up a sturdy peace by tending to the underlying drivers of contention. What's more this
incorporates the compromise of human connections, foundation building and the advancing of
comprehensive and impartial social, political and financial frameworks59
. Baksh and Munro60
view is that peace building is seen as tending to both physical and auxiliary brutality and
endeavoring to kill all types of separation
Kieh61
watches that DR Congo has yet to conquer security issue in spite of endeavors to restore
state organizations, national solidarity, and compose races what's more the instance of
Mozambique talked about in section to portrays the outcomes of not managing main drivers of
contention as even after the foundation of the establishments the natives still have uncertain
issues that influence the advancement of popular government in the nation. The principal reason
for this is the powerlessness to address the main drivers of the contention in the nation. The
inability to address these issues is expected to some extent to the overarching process of building
peace that depends on past ideologies, which concentrates on the top administration and full
58
Stewart,F (2002) Education and verbal confrontation: Root sources of vicious clash in creating nations,
Development Studies, (Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford OX1 3LA) 59
Ibid 60
Baksh,R. furthermore, Munro,T, (2009) Learning to Live Together: utilizing separation instruction for group
peacebuilding (Commonwealth of Learning, Vancouver,) 61
Ibid
24
scale level while overlooking most of the populace and small scale level clash change and
connections.
As indicated by Kuwali62
killing interruptions to development empowers accomplishment of
peace and support of peace and security however this must be completely acknowledged by
address the underlying drivers of contention and along these lines manufacture serene social
orders. As Neufeldt63
put it, peace building is utilized to allude to exercises that are gone for
enhancing connections and tending to underlying drivers of contention with a specific end goal
to keep, lessen or recuperate from brutal clash.
1.5.6.4The AU and Peacebuilding
Herbst and Mills64
explain that the marking and endorsement by 50 presidents and AU
Constitutive Act of the which occurred in capital city of Zambia, changed the OAU into the
mainland AU. The constitutive demonstration of the AU licenses for obstruction in the inside
issues of part nations in instances of illegal governments changes, genocide, and clashes that
debilitate local strength. What's more, the Act additionally gives an Economic and Cultural
Commission, the support of African common society performing artists, and sets up a Pan-
African Parliament. The AU received the PSC in Durban, South Africa which now serves as the
mainland's aggregate security and early-cautioning instrument. The United Nations65
clarifies
that its targets incorporate suspecting and averting strife, and peace building and peacemaking
capacities for the determination of contentions and its capacities incorporate early cautioning,
preventive tact, and peacemaking using great workplaces, intervention, mollification and
62
Ibid 63
Neufeldt,R.C., Exploring issues in Peace examination, (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict
Management - First launch August 2007) 64
Herbst, J and Mills, G (2003) The fate of Africa: another request in sight? Oxford/New York.Adelphi Paper 361 65
United Nations (1992), Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States, New York: United
Nations, , pp.33-45
25
enquiry. For example, the Kenyan mediation included diverse identities from both the AU and
the UN, furthermore different identities from Africa, the procedure guaranteed rapid stop of the
savagery and compromise of adversaries.
Kimokoti et al.66
clarifies that the AU works on PCRD created in 2006 which is an apparatus
produced for the combination of peace and counteractive action of backslide of brutality, tending
to the main drivers of contention, the optimizing of arranging and execution of remaking
exercises, and the improvement of coordination between different on-screen characters occupied
with PCRD forms. The Management of the mainland's vicious clashes effectively, was the
fundamental purpose behind setting up the AU. The PSC, which is made pretty much along the
UN Security Council model is in charge of undertaking peace-production and peace building
capacities for the determination of contentions67
.
1.6 Theoretical Framework
In order to succeed in peace building the third party actors must consider the components of
peace building which incorporate negative peace, positive peace, feasible peace, basic savagery
and main driver of contention. These segments shape the center calculated hypothesis of peace
created by Galtung and accordingly frame the hypothetical system of this study. The theory sets
that the fundamental point is that peace is a connection, between at least two gatherings. The
gatherings might be inside a man, a state or country, an area or progress, pulling in various
bearings. Peace is not a property of one gathering alone, but rather a property of the connection
between gatherings. Saying that in no sense puts down the essentialness of the gathering's
66
Kimokoti Susan N., Matanga Frank, and Ododa Harry (2014) A Review of the Integrated Post-Conflict
Management Strategies in Kenya‘ International Journal of Managerial Studies and Research (IJMSR) Volume
2, Issue 4, May, PP 68-75 67
Ibid
26
expectation and ability to assemble quiet relations. In any case, similar to a marriage, it is not the
entirety of the abilities of the gatherings.
The bases of the role of the third party actors in post conflict peace building, in this case the AU
is thus based of these components. In order to have a successful peace building process the third
party actors has to accomplish these components. This research study will look into role played
by the third party in peace building in accordance with these peace building components. The
study will concentrate of three components which include reconciling opponents (Sustainable
peace), addressing the underlying structures (Structural violence) and addressing the underlying
social issues (root cause of conflict). Which form the base of the study objectives which are: to
find out the role of AU as a third party Intervener and to establish if the AU has been doing a
follow-up on the peace Agreements made in the NARA( Agenda 4 items).
Sustainable peace entails the reconciliation of opponents and thus prevention of reoccurrence of
conflict and violence. In order for the third party actors in this case the AU to be successful in
peace building they must consider this variables. The reconciliation of opponents after conflicts
enables understanding of the opponents‘ needs and grievances therefore giving room for
negotiations and eventually reconciliation. This is reorganized by the development of agenda 1 to
3 in the peace agreement. Prevention of re-occurrence of conflict can be achieved by ensuring
justice and equity is achieved among the reconciling parties this enables development of
structures that ensure sustainable peace.
Agenda 4 of the peace agreement forms addresses the structural violence and the root cause of
conflict. In regards to the above, structural violence is another role that should be taken up by the
third party actors to ensure successful post conflict peace building. This mainly involves
27
addressing the underlying structures that will ensure sustainable peace. This role involves the
establishment of government structures, justice institutions, and security apparatus among others.
Thus, this ensures the the rule of law is empowered thus enabling justice and peace in the
country.
The root cause of conflict must also be addressed by the third party actors in order to ensure
success in peace building. This entails addressing underling social issues that may have been or
contribute to violence. These issues may stem from resource deprivation, political orientations,
ethnic grouping, poverty, injustices and so on. Lack of addressing such issues highly affect the
peace building efforts and may lead to reoccurrence of conflict and violence.
1.7 Hypotheses
The study proposes the following hypotheses:
H0i: Sustainable peace underpins the African Union‘s involvement in domestic politics.
H0ii: The AU has been effective in peace building in Kenya.
H0iii: There are governance factors behind the success of the African Union in peace building in
Kenya.
1.8 Methodology of the Research
According to Barney68
research design alludes to the course of action of conditions for
accumulation and investigation of information in a way that means to consolidate pertinence to
the research process. Cooper and Schindler69
explain that research design is the blueprint for
fulfilling objectives and answering the research questions. Kothari70
notes that descriptive
68
Ibid 69
Cooper, D. and Schindler, D., (2008) Business Research Methods (USA,McGraw Hill. Ltd,). 70
Kothari, C. R. (2007) Research Methodology – Methods and Techniques (New Delhi India: New Age
International Publishers,).
28
research determines and reports things as they are and attempts to illustrate things for instance
possible behavior, values, attitudes and characteristics. According to Barney71
the descriptive
design is a set of methods and procedures which describe variables. Descriptive variables answer
the questions who, what and how. This study will use descriptive design in order determine the
role played by AU in peace building.
There are two kinds of data that is primary and secondary data. Primary data is that which is used
directly and scientifically for the research for example collection of specimen,
observation.72
Contrary secondary data is data that are compilations and interpretations of the
primary data mainly acquired from libraries, reports or publications73
.The study used both
qualitative and quantitative data analysis thus both secondary and primary data will be used in
the analysis. Descriptive materials that will be used in the study will include extracts from in-
depth interviews, conversations, and documents. Secondary analysis will be sourced from
archives including government reports and autobiographies.
An administered questionnaire was used as the primary data collection tool. The questionnaire
will be administered to different institutions that were involved in the peace building process.
These methods of data collection and analysis have mainly been selected in order to effectively
answer the research objectives. As the first objective involves the mediation/intervention process
data from the process can effectively be sourced from secondary material due to the qualitative
nature of the process. On the other hand the second objective (the effectiveness of the African
71
Barney, J. (1997) Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage (USA, Addison, Wesley,). 72
Anderson, S. W. (1995) A framework for Assessing Cost Management System Changes: The Case of Activity
Based Costing Implementation at General Motors, 1986-1993‘. Journal of Management Accounting Research , 1-
51. 73
Ibid
29
Union in peace building in Kenya) is more quantitative thus calling for a primary approach to the
collection and analysis of data.
Mugenda and Mugenda74
explain that population is the whole group of persons, events or objects
with a familiar observable attributes. The total population of this study will be 30 of employees
in different institutions). The sample selection for this study will be according to the departments
in the African Union offices in Kenya as well as the ministry of foreign affairs.
1.9 Scope and Limitations of the research
This study was carried out in African Union offices in Kenya as well as the ministry of foreign
affairs that were involved in the Kenyan peace agreement. It will involve employees of different
departments in the institutions. Some of the limitations that may be experienced include:
One of the major limitations of this study will be access to the third parties. This will be
mitigated by the use of reports written by the third parties who may be accessible through their
websites and archives.
During data collection there is a probability that some respondents may not give factual data and
this can be a limitation since it might affect the variables of this study. The researcher will
depend on help from opinion leaders in the organization to sensitize the respondents on the
significance of giving factual data to the researcher.
1.10 Chapter Outline
This chapter introduces the topic of the research study which is the role of African Union in
peace building, a case study of Kenya. The chapter then looks at the statement of the problem,
objectives of the research, justification, literature review, the concept of peace building and
74
Ibid
30
dynamic factors involved in peace building, the theoretical framework, hypotheses, the
methodology of the study and finally the scope and the limitations of the research.
31
CHAPTER TWO
THE AFRICAN UNION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
2.1 Introduction
The AU's all-encompassing goal is the rise of "an incorporated, prosperous and serene Africa,
driven by its own residents and speaking to a dynamic compel in the worldwide field75
." The
union's more particular vision for peace promotion mirrors a mindfulness that the precondition
for accomplishing this set out in different lawful overall objective is security and steadiness
Africa. The AU's vision records and deciphered and actualized by an arrangement of interrelated
foundations that constitute there is nothing if not yearning, especially when contrasted with,
peace and security in Africa, the OAU. It sets up an extensive rundown of errands identified with
the counteractive action, administration, and determination of contention crosswise over Africa.
The vital components of the goal are supported OAU‘s organ, and 54 African presidents. Be that
as it may, the get together just meets twice every year, making it unsuited to regulate everyday
peace promotion. Subsequently the PSC, a fifteen-part chose gathering, oversees vital and all
operational choices. The Constitutive Act of the AU, which went into compel in 2001 May, plots
the association's vision of peace promotion. It confers AU individuals to quicken political and
financial reconciliation of the mainland, on the improvement of a typical African security;,
regional honesty, and autonomy of its part states; to advance peace, security, and to empower fair
standards of good administration, human rights, and feasible advancement.
The AU goal has numerous components of coherence with the former OAU. The AU holds its
forerunner's accentuation on the sovereign equity of individuals; keeps confidence with the
legitimate regulation of uti possidetis, which in this setting stipulates that pilgrim regulatory
75
AU (2012) Commission, Strategic Plan 2009
32
limits would get to be worldwide limits when the political unit being referred to accomplished
autonomy; keeps up the mainland's solid hostile to settler customs and subsequently underpins
African answers for clashes wherever conceivable; maintains its inclination for nonuse of
constrain and serene settlement of debate; and keeps up the general duty to noninterference in the
issues of its part states76
. However the AU refers to two progressively critical special cases to its
general inclination for neutrality. To begin with, the union has over and over affirmed that it
won't endure "illegal government changes." Second, it guarantees another privilege of helpful
mediation under Constitutive Act Article 4(h).
2.2 Unconstitutional Government changes
Since the late 1990s the wrongness of unlawful government changes has risen as a focal
principle of the AU's way to deal with peace promotion, a noteworthy break with convention.
For the initial thirty years of the OAU's presence, the association was unconcerned with how
African administrations accepted power. Albeit especially fierce dictators every so often
produced feedback inside the OAU, it was not until the late 1990s that the OAU ostensibly
censured upsets in Sierra Leone and Burundi proclaiming the juntas ill-conceived and supporting
reclamation of established government. These occasions made another African standard
delegitimizing military overthrows as a method for expecting power. Since 2003, the AU has
reliably denounced each fruitful overthrow in Africa. It is likewise now typical for the AU to put
forth open expressions for vote based administration, and the union has unequivocally connected
"dictator" administration structures and emergency episode. Obviously, this approach has its own
difficulties.
76
Ibid
33
In 2002, the AU Assembly received a wide meaning of "unlawful government changes" to
incorporate the oust of an equitably chose government by its military, hired fighters, or equipped
revolts and additionally the refusal of an occupant government to give up power subsequent to
losing a free and reasonable decision. Hazardously, however decisions turned out to be
progressively normal in numerous African states post–Cold War, restriction triumphs were still
unequivocally uncommon. In late 2009, after a drawn out level headed discussion in the PSC
over a more extensive meaning of unlawful changes, the PSC at last received a wide
understanding of "illegal changes" that incorporated the utilization of illicit intends to look after
power.
The other significant takeoff from the OAU way to deal with peace promotion is conceding the
AU meeting the privilege to intercede in a part state "in regard of grave conditions, in particular:
atrocities, genocide and violations against humankind." The correct wording in Article 4(h) came
about because of a fairly odd juncture of components. In the late 1990s, Libya started
campaigning for a more grounded AU with forces to on the whole activate against outer
animosity, creating an arrangement of open deliberations about the state of the new union; at
around similar time, the ethical catalyst to stop mass barbarities was developing in remarkable
quality, especially after the discharge in May 2000 of the OAU's provide details regarding the
worldwide inability to keep Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Once the Libyans had put the issue of
mediation on the move plan, other African states—quite Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria—
viably seized the motivation, molding the wording of Article 4(h) to make a restricted right of
African intercession in circumstances where monstrosities were being dedicated77
.
77
Ibid
34
And also flagging a noteworthy social move at the AU, Article 4(h) raised some prickly political
and legitimate issues. Initially, "mediate" in Article 4(h) infers that the AU meeting could
approve military constrain for helpful assurance intention devoid of the host government's agree
or before an UNSC determination—in conceivable disagreement to Article 53 of the UN Charter.
Though there exists open deliberation on the issue, the heaviness of worldwide lawful
supposition sees compassionate mediation approved outside the UNSC as illicit. Likely in
acknowledgment of this issue, by 2005 the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African
Standby Force expressly expressed: "The AU will look for UN Security Council approval of its
authorizations activities. Thus, the [regional monetary communities] will look for AU approval
of their intercessions78
." A second issue is the sketchy responsibility of numerous AU part states
to the possibility of humanitarian intervention. At least three factors explain the AU‘s reluctance:
first, the strength of the host state; second, the residual power of the principles of noninterference
and anti-imperialism within the African society of states; and third, and the AU‘s lack of
practical military capacity for humanitarian intervention. Therefore, even if the assembly wanted
to invoke Article 4(h) it would struggle to quickly marshal the necessary military capabilities,
except against the smallest and weakest AU member states. The AU‘s unwillingness to support
UNSC intrusion to defend Libya citizens in 2011 merely reinforces this point.
2.3 The AU as a political arena
Territorial establishments, for example, the AU are not just on-screen characters; they are
additionally political fields in which different performing artists cooperate and where thoughts,
qualities, and strategies go after predominance. As the support of the APSA, the PSC functions
as two interrelated political arenas. In one sense, the PSC is a forum for debating how
78
Ibid
35
transnational and potentially globalizing norms interact with conditions in Africa. Through
discussion in the PSC, AU members reconcile and adapt these foreign norms to local situations
and identities.79
The PSC thus mediates between the AU‘s approach to conflict administration
and the prospect of ―outsiders‖. The PSC‘s roles in promoting democracy in Africa and mass
atrocity response have provoked the greatest controversy.
In another sense, the AU is a political arena where its member states interact alongside a
transnational bureaucracy, in this case the bureaucrats within the AU Commission and in
particular the DPS. All the players in this arena are ―insiders‖ but tensions surround member
states‘ willingness to cede autonomous power to the commission. Particularly in its first few
years it was commonly argued that the commission‘s bureaucrats "gained boundless and
overpowering force" and assumed the main part in "setting the PSC timetable, proposing its plan,
setting up its draft reports, and drafting dispatches, which are typically given just minutes before
the meeting for thought and reception.‖80
The advancement of law based standards and establishments, prevalent interest and great
administration is one of the goals of the AU. In 2007, AU part states received the Elections and
Governance and African Charter on Democracy. As of late, the AU has over and over denounced
overthrows d'état and encouraged its part states to regard protected administer as a method for
advancing security, steadiness and peace in Africa. Initially roused by the (constrained) desire to
avoid upsets in Africa, the AU has continuously built up a more extensive regulating
environment for African constitutions and, specifically, the methodical sacred exchange of force.
79
Adesina O (2012) Monitoring and observing Nigeria‘s 2011 elections, Journal of African Elections, 11, 1, , p.
154. 80
Ibid, p28
36
This study indicates to reveal insight into the regularizing structure and also on the act of the AU,
specifically its PSC, in managing unlawful government changes, with an emphasis on the PSC
arrangement of requiring an arrival to protected request as a solution for illegal government
changes. In opposition to the foundation of this communicated AU faith in the estimation of
established run, this article gives careful consideration to the ascent of force sharing
concurrences in Africa. Such arranged settlements are much of the time depended on, with AU
support, as between time and additionally afterwards reactions to circumstances of unlawful
seizure of force, inside equipped clash and post-discretionary brutality. Control sharing plans are,
nonetheless, often inconsistent with winning protected standards about how political power is
agreed to, exchanged or potentially kept up. They regularly require fleeting protected
modifications while likewise advancing all the more long haul established change forms
2.3.1 The African Union's Architecture for Democratic Development
Keeping in mind the end goal to advance the improvement of law based values in Africa; the AU
built up certain institutional structures and standards. Such standards incorporate the revelation
on the structure for the AU's reaction to unlawful government changes, the announcement
representing popularity based races in Africa, and the affirmation on watching and checking
races. As for unlawful government changes, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
conceded to the accompanying meaning of circumstances that could be thought to be illegal
government changes, indicated in the Lomé Declaration.81
Armed forces rebellion against an
equitably chose government; involvement by soldiers of fortune to supplant a justly chose
government; substitution of fairly chose governments by outfitted nonconformist gatherings and
revolt developments; and denial by an government officeholder to surrender..
81
AU (2007), African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG). Addis Ababa: AU, , Article 25.
37
through the (ACDEG) the definition was extended to incorporate a fifth thing, in particular
'control of constitutions and legitimate instruments for prolongation of residency of office by
(an) occupant administration82
'. The consideration of residency prolongation, also called the third
term plan, as a constituent of unlawful government changes was justifiable. Residency
lengthening had, at that specific time, get to be alluring to African pioneers83
. Somewhere around
1990 and 2005, 18 Africa presidents had achieved the finishing of two terms and were naturally
banished from looking for a third. Out of these, nine opposed the allurement of a 3rd
period,
while the others endeavored it84
.
Standing up to the difficulties of unlawful government changes was not debatable, given its
substantial tolls on maintainable vote based system and improvement on the mainland. Unlawful
government changes are symptomatic of popularity based unsteadiness which, thus, impedes
remote direct venture, monetary development and opportunity. Also, unlawful changes in
government 'build up tyrannies, subvert majority rule administration, block the practice of the
privileges of individuals to constitute or change their legislature, and prompt gross infringement
of human rights'85
. The AU perceives this reality when it pronounces in the prelude of the Lomé
Declaration that 'the wonder of overthrow has brought about blatant infringement of the essential
standards of our AU and the UN requiring a stern loyalty to 'standards of good administration,
straightforwardness and human rights', and the 'reinforcing of majority rule foundations.
82
Omotola J.,S (2011), Third term politics and the de-institutionalization of power in Africa, Africa Review, 3, 2, ,
pp. 123–140.
83
Ibid, p42 84
Ibid 85
Ibid p43
38
Sub-provincial and national instruments have been conceived to manage any of these issues or a
blend of them86
. At the provincial level, for instance, the AU Constitutive Act gives among its
foundational standards measures to advance vote based qualities, including judgment of unlawful
government changes. Article 4 of the Act expresses that the Union might work as per: Respect
for majority rule standards, human rights, the lead of law and great administration; Respect for
the holiness of human life, judgment and dismissal of exemption and political death,
demonstrations of psychological oppression and subversive exercises; and Condemnation and
dismissal of unlawful government changes 87
. The inconvenience of authorizations as suspension
of any legislature that expects control through additional sacred means might be viewed as a
showing of the AU's dedication to this arrangement.
The AU also builds up a companion weight instrument via the EPCG to be assembled at the
occasion of the AU chair. Firmly adjusted to the prior dealings is the development of the
guideline of non-apathy, rather than the age-long rule of non-obstruction in the residential issues
of part states. The lawful establishments of non-lack of interest notwithstanding its accentuation
on sovereign balance of part states, regard for fringes existing on achievement of autonomy and
non-impedance, conceives in its Article 4(h) an association that can mediate in the household
issues of part states 'in regard of grave conditions, in particular: atrocities, genocide and
violations against mankind and additionally a genuine danger to an authentic request to
reestablish peace and steadiness' (accentuation included). What's more, Article 4(j) of similar Act
ensures the privileges of part states to demand mediation to reestablish peace and security. It is
unnecessary to include that in every one of its repercussions, illegal government changes, as
86
Ndinga-Muvumba A & T Murithi (2008) (eds), African Union and its Institutions. Johannesburg: Centre for
Conflict Resolution,. 87
Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.
39
characterized by the Lomé Declaration, constitute a genuine risk to a true blue request. The PSC
instrumentality was set up in 2002 for the usage of the principle of non-aloofness88
.
The PSC might take activities and activities it considers suitable with respect to circumstances of
possible clashes, and in addition to those that have effectively formed into out and out clashes. 89
The PSC might likewise take dealings that are needed so as to keep a contention for which a
decision has as of now been come to from raising. PSC might utilize its prudence to influence
passage, whether through the aggregate mediation of the board the chair or the Panel of the Wise
as a team with territorial instruments. Besides, Article 7(g) engages the PSC to 'foundation
sanctions at whatever point an unlawful change of government happens in part states, as
accommodated by the Lomé affirmation‘.
This arrangement was injected with new life by the ACDEG, when it gave the accompanying
corrective procedures in instances of illegal change: Non-cooperation of the culprits of the
unlawful decisions changes held for the arrival to the protected request and the prohibition on
them from possessing senior positions in the political organizations of the express. The ACDEG
accommodates the endorsing of any state party that incites and backings an illegal change of
government in another country; denial by the state gatherings to get or concede haven to the
culprits of unlawful government changes; consenting to of respective arrangements; and the
appropriation of lawful tools on removal and common lawful help.
Keeping in mind the end goal to add teeth to these instruments, the PSC at last settled the
advisory group on authorizations in congruity with the arrangements of Article 8(5) of the PSC
convention on 13 March 2009. Aside from these territorial structures, there are additionally sub-
88
Ibid 89
Ibid, p45
40
local systems against unlawful government changes in Africa. In the ECOWAS, every increase
to control should be via free, reasonable and straightforward races; nil resistance for power got or
kept up by unlawful means; accepted cooperation in basic leadership, stern adherence to law
based standards and decentralization of force at all levels of administration; The military must be
objective and below the order of lawfully made political power; no working individual from the
military may try to keep running for politics.
Article 9 of similar convention gives that 'the gathering or potentially applicant who loses the
decisions might surrender thrashing to the political party or competitor at long last proclaimed
the champ, taking after the rules and inside the due date stipulated by law. At long last, national
systems against unlawful government changes additionally possess large amounts of numerous
Africa nations. This is generally done through protected arrangements that preclude whimsical
methods for catching force, particularly military overthrows. In Nigeria, for instance, segment 14
(1–2) of the constitution indicates, as a component of the basic goals and mandate standards of
state approach, that 'Nigeria should be a state in view of the standards of vote based system and
social equity'. Subsequently, 'sway has a place with the general population of Nigeria from
whom government through this constitution infers every one of its forces and power'.
Lamentably, the implementation of this protected arrangement, profitable as it might show up,
can't be completely predicated on legitimateness, yet requires a more prominent arrangement of
political will with respect to the chiefs of the framework.
At a more particular level, in any case, areas 217 (1–3) and 218 (1–4) detail the arrangements in
regards to the foundation, reason and control of the Nigeria military. Two applicable matters
emerge from these arrangements. To begin with, the military are not permitted any thoughtful
related obligations, just simply military obligations, most outstandingly safeguarding the power
41
and regional honesty of the nation on any type of hostility. Second, all military foundations and
officers are unavoidably subjected to common powers. In particular, the president with energy to
designate all administration boss and the ability to delegate, advance and train all individuals
from the military of the league. Clearly certain administrative standards and standards are
progressively being classified into the vote based system and administration design of Africa; the
essential point of which is to discourage any type of unlawful government changes over the
mainland. These standards and standards exist at national, provincial and local levels, and are,
without a doubt, interrelated; for example, local and sub-local systems just accept the drive of
law inside a national ward when sanctioned by the influenced nation. What stays to be seen, be
that as it may, is the level of systematization of these administrative standards and standards; at
the end of the day, the difficulties of avoiding unlawful government changes in Africa just start
with the order of these standards and standards. Be that as it may, the more noteworthy
difficulties lie in the level of regard for, and stern observance to such standards.
The law in principle is, all things considered, not basically the same by and by. ACDEG was
received by the AU amid the eighth Ordinary Session of the presidents and Government met in
Addis Ababa. The sanction has six substantive areas, each dedicated to particular components of
decisions, vote based system and additionally administration; for instance, the principal
addresses the matters to do with rights of human and the administrator of law in a fair society.
The second fortifies the longstanding conviction that vote-based system is not achievable, not to
mention economical, without peace, accentuating the indistinguishable relationship amid
themselves. The sanction additionally expresses the centrality of practical and powerful
institutional establishments of majority rule government, for example, the presence of free,
proficient and fair-minded race administration bodies for the union of vote based system.
42
Though as an impression of the weight connected to the issue of illegal government changes by
African pioneers, area five of the contract additionally addresses the components for fighting the
test of unlawful government changes on the mainland. At last, the sanction underscores the
critical point that popular government can't be confined just to the political circles. Or maybe, it
must suit the social and financial bases of administration, where satisfactory consideration is
likewise dedicated to the welfare needs of the general population, not just to the development of
the political space for gathering and constituent governmental issues. Race observing has come
to be all around acknowledged as an essential segment of race administration and fair
advancement.
Baradei characterizes 'election monitoring' as the way toward 'taking after and watching the
decision procedure, guaranteeing that it is without any infringement, is as per overseeing laws
and controls, then taking supply of any infringement and reporting them, while keeping up
objectivity as a spectator or screen'90
. It is 'a procedure through which race is examined and
assessed for motivations behind deciding its unprejudiced nature as far as association and
organization'91
. In a more intricate definition the IDEA characterizes it as takes after: the
intentional social occasion of data with respect to a decision procedure and the making of
educated judgments on the direct of such a procedure on the premise of the data gathered by
people who are not characteristically approved to intercede all the while, and whose contribution
in intercession or specialized help exercises ought not be, for example, to endanger their primary
perception obligations'92
.
90
Ibid 91
Ibid, p49 92
Ibid
43
Comprehensively, election checking envelops, or ought to incorporate, the three principle phases
of the constituent cycle, in particular some time recently, amid and after the decisions. The pre-
decision stage may include 'assorted exercises, for example, following up on media scope of
races, observing races spending, and checking voter records, in addition to preparing volunteers
on the checking procedure'. 'On race day,' as Baradei93
contends, 'the screens beware of all parts
of the surveying procedure and report all points of interest related thereto, whether the
accessibility of voting material, the protection issue, the security accessible and the weight
applied, assuming any. They may moreover direct fast parallel tallies of voters utilizing
inspecting procedures to approve the later reported government comes about'. Amid the post-
decisions period, race checking 'may take part in other related exercises, for example, teaching
nationals and campaigning for change of the races procedure.'
This incompletely clarifies why Baker94
likens decision checking to an examination procedure
which is currently 'a surely knew method whereby several assessors speaking to many self-
named "examination sheets", both residential and outer, investigate the survey and purport their
decisions'. The import of the prior is that the writing on the connections between race observing
and vote based improvement is challenged.
Past this, consideration has additionally been attracted to the more major vote based essentialness
of race observing, particularly when surveyed utilizing the yield, result and effect viewpoints for
decision checking95
. In such a circumstance substantial yield would incorporate the checking
reports delivered and dispersed, the volunteers prepared, and the mindfulness sessions directed.
93
Ibid, p49 94
Ibid, p49 95
Omotola JS (2006) The limits of election monitoring: The 2003 Nigerian general election, Representation: A
Journal of Representative Democracy, 42, 2, , pp. 57–67.
44
The long haul results would incorporate race framework changed, the political mindfulness level
raised, the enhanced checking directions received and the observing code of morals held fast to.
The long haul results would be the general transcendence of a more law based administration and
culture, coming full circle in the change of the race framework and advancement of a majority
rule culture in the public arena. A few researchers have contended despite what might be
expected, underscoring alternate sides of decision observing.
Baker96
, ideologies, making experiences from the checking of the Zimbabwe decision in 2002,
contends that 'the present arrangement of race observing needs satisfactory support, is helpless
against being hoodwinked, is a vague science, and now and again seems to take after scripts pre-
composed by their patrons'. Drawing on similar 2002 races in Zimbabwe, Dorman97
likewise
stresses the expanding politicization of universal race observing which, as indicated by him, do
not have to do on viciousness or of discretionary misrepresentation but on Mugabe government's
rough assaults on white ranchers and logical encounters with European benefactors'.
Kohnert98
likewise fights that 'the developing polished methodology' regularly ascribed to
decision checking 'did not really prompt less one-sided perception comes about'. It is, in this
way, barely astounding to see Carothers99
additionally watching that global race perception is
given what he calls the 'unavoidable confinements of watching', including inadequate
consideration regarding further political capacities and settings of races, slippery measures, and
the prejudice of a few eyewitnesses.
96
Ibid, p50 ibd
98 Ibid
99 Carothers T, ‗The rise of election monitoring: The observers observed‘, Journal of Democracy, 8, 3. 1997, pp. 21–
26.
45
In spite of the progressing discuss over the vote based utility of race checking, there is by all
accounts some measure of accord in the writing that if all around oversaw, race observing could
be a suitable procedure for enhancing the respectability of races around the world. Therefore, the
AU has given generous consideration and assets to cultivating law based improvement in Africa
through decision observing. The AU has been doing this through the formation of institutional
standards, most outstandingly the DEAU built up inside the AU and DPA, whose center duty is
the perception of races, as well as the usage of the AU's program for the advancement of vote
based system and fair races in Africa.
Drawing basically on the outdated OAU, for instance, the AU sets rules for its constituent
perception and observing missions. The standards, which were embraced by presidents express
the accompanying, entomb alia: 62 Democratic decisions are the premise of the power of any
illustrative government . . . what's more, must be directed a) uninhibitedly and decently; b) under
just constitutions and in consistence with steady lawful instruments; c) under an arrangement of
partition of forces that guarantees specifically, the freedom of the legal; d) at standard interims,
as accommodated in National Constitutions; e) by fair, comprehensive able responsible
constituent establishments staffed by very much prepared faculty and outfitted with satisfactory
logistics.
The standards likewise order all part states to hold fast entirely to these arrangements as per their
protected procedures. All things considered, the archive illuminates the criteria for deciding the
nature and extension, orders, rights and duties, and sets of accepted rules for AU eyewitnesses
and screens; for instance, one vital standard is the way that the AU can just watch or screen races
in any nation on the off chance that it gets a formal welcome from the nation sorting out the
races through the fitting government foundation, for example, the constituent body. Nonetheless,
46
an official welcome is not an adequate reason for the organization of screens. It must be upheld
by a cautious evaluation of the accessibility of assets to the AU, most outstandingly the
accessibility of lead-time for arrangements, fundamental arranging data, proficient mastery and
monetary assets, among others.
These are notwithstanding a preparatory assessment of the host nation's common social,
financial, political and sacred plans. On the off chance that a choice is taken to send eyewitnesses
or screens, the mission is qualified for flexibility of development inside the host nation; non-
separation in the accreditation procedure; opportunity to speak with all contending parties,
applicants, other political associations, common society associations, electorate, the media and
decision heads; and ought to have access to other institutional framework that may help its task.
Likewise of vital significance is that the quantity of long haul spectator groups is normally an
element of the quantity of appointive units the nation over; the foundation and geology of the
nation; tricky or 'problem area' regions that are probably going to be challenged; human and
money related assets; and the sending of other national and worldwide onlookers. Once
conveyed, AU spectators and screens are ordered to agree to every single national law and
directions; keep up strict unbiasedness and nonpartisanship; oppose all weights, including offers
of blessings, favors or affectations from any competitor, gathering or association required in the
race.
While it might be hard to find out the particular impact of the AU's observing of races in Africa,
considering the shortage of quantifiable information, it can even now be contended that checking
African decisions has been one of the significant courses through which the AU takes an interest
in African legislative issues.
47
CHAPTER THREE : NEXUS BETWEEN AFRICAN UNION PEACE BUILDING AND
THE SITUATION IN KENYA
3.0 Introduction
After the 2007 elections, Kenya plunged into unprecedented war that reportedly left 1,300 and
over dead and displaced more than 500,000.100
The intervention of various actors for example the
African Union, Sub-Regional bodies, UN, individual nations, other international actors and civil
society led to a negotiation on 28February 2009. The agreement, the National Dialogue and
Reconciliation Accord (NDR) created a Grand Coalition Government (GCG) consisting of the
two major parties – PNU and ODM, chaired Kibaki and Raila respectively.
Apart from a specific agreement on the establishment of a TFRC, and the creation of a
Commission of Inquiry to probe the PEV that eventually specified the founding of a Special
Tribunal to put on trial key criminals, the NDR process also produced an agreement on ‗long
term issues and solutions‘ – essentially a blueprint for transitional justice broadly.101
This
agreement is popularly known as Agenda Item Four of the NDR.102
As a result of the NDR, the government is currently implementing a number of reform measures.
Application of a new constitution by popular referendum was done on 27August 2010.
Institutional reforms touching on the judiciary, police, civil service, parliament and land are
currently underway. Despite numerous problems, measures relating to establishing
accountability for past human rights violations are also being addressed by both national and
international institutions. While the ICC has indicted six individuals considered to bear the
100
Legislature of Kenya, Report of the Commission on Post Electoral Violence(2008) [CIPEV Report]. 101
Musila Godfrey (2009) Options for transitional equity in Kenya: Autonomy and the test of outer medicines'
International Journal of Transitional Justice Vol.3, Issue 3 445-464.
102
NDR Agenda Item Number 4.
48
greatest responsibility, the TJRC is investigating human rights violations from December 12th
1963 and February 28th 2008. Since the signing of the National Accord, AU-appointed Panel
members of Eminent African Personalities (PEAP) that includes the Chief Mediator Kofi Annan,
Graca Machel, Benjamin Mkapa and Joachim Chissano have remained engaged with the
implementation process through the NDR Monitoring Project, conducted by South Consulting, a
local firm.103
In reflecting on the role of the AU, the contribution describes in some detail what has been, or
could have been the role of the AU in the Kenyan crisis, focusing on the TJ mechanisms outlined
below. The roles of other actors such as sub regional intergovernmental bodies, the international
community and civil society are also extensively discussed. As a matter of introduction, it is
possible to conclude, as the contribution does, that the evidence supports the view that despite its
belated entry, the intervention by the AU in Kenya is perhaps one of its most successful since the
organization transitioned from the OAU a few years ago. The intervention managed, in the short
term, to bring the violence to an end by brokering a power sharing agreement and in the long
term, to lay a foundation for a broad based TJ project that will have far reaching ramifications in
relation to how the country evolves and is governed in future. It is not accurate to suggest that
this success is due only to the AU. To the contrary, it is suggested that it would not have been
possible without the crucial roles played by a range of other players.
3.1. Kenya: The Making of A Crisis
While the aggregate of factors that produced the 2007-2008 PEV has a longer history,104
it could
be argued that the ‗first shot‘ of the violence was fired in 2005when Kenyans voted in a hotly
103
ibid
104
Ibid
49
contested and divisive constitutional referendum. At the referendum, a draft constitution
attributed to the President and a section of government was rejected. It is perhaps more accurate
to attribute the trouble to an earlier event in 2003 when the NARC government coalition
collapsed following President Kibaki‘s failure to honour pre-election MOU with a key coalition
partner, led by Raila Odinga who was to later contest the 2007 ill-fated election against the
incumbent President Kibaki.. Although the fallout may have been triggered by the alleged
rigging of the Presidential election, the manner in which the ensuing violence manifested both in
geographic spread and those involved suggest that the root causes lie elsewhere.
The result was exclusion of large sections of the population. The inequalities that resulted from
exclusion had bred inter-ethnic tensions that were to play out violently during the crisis. Second,
years of centralization of power, corruption, cronyism and other machinations to capture and
hold onto power had resulted in weakened institutions of governance. The incompetence,
ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of the existing electoral institutions and inappropriateness of
systems were a major trigger of the PEV. This had manifested in previous election cycles.105
The inability of the electoral commission to establish a clear winner and the outright refusal by
the Orange Democratic Party (ODM Party) to challenge the endorsement by the
now disbanded the electoral body of President Kibaki as duly elected speaks for how institutions
were regarded. Third, although inter-ethnic hatred has been reported to have played a dominant
role in the PEV,106
scarce resources, dispossession and social economic disparities,
marginalization of certain communities and regions and the politics of exclusion provided fertile
105
Odhiambo A., (2006) Hegemonic issues and tools of existence: ethnicity and democracy in Kenya African
studies (2003) as cited in In the quest for a culture of peace in the IGADregion: the role of intellectuals and
scholars 30
106
International crisis group, Africa report No. 137, 21 February 2008
50
soil for the conflict. In the Rift Valley province, which was widely regarded the ‗epicentre of the
violence, competing claims relating to land features centrally in explanations for the violence.
The alleged rigged ballot served only as a trigger.107
Lastly, the general context of weak rule of
law in which impunity appeared to be the norm and the rule of law largely absent served as an
ideal backdrop for the tragic violence that shook the social, political and economic foundations
of the country.
3.2 The African Union and the Kenyan Crisis
3.2.1 Legal Basis for AU Intervention
For many decades since the wars of liberation in the 1950s and 1960s, the African continent has
been afflicted with countless ills, ranging from military coups, civil wars, gross violations of
human rights and various forms of suppression of popular will. These were often done behind the
cloak of sovereignty. A continent still smarting from the deprivations suffered under colonial
rule condoned these ills partly by adopting an absolutist stance on non-intervention in the
internal affairs of sovereign nations. In part informed by excesses of dictatorships around the
continent, the horrors of civil wars and changes on the global scene, there has been a radical shift
in orientation in the regional bloc.108
By adopting AU Constitutive Act in the year 2000, the regional bloc has been repositioned –
normatively at least – to one favourable of constructive engagement and intervention in conflict
situations and post conflict situation. Despite numerous challenges, including meagre resources,
the AU is more open today to intervening in such situations in various ways: preventive action
and diplomacy; peacemaking, peace keeping and peace enforcement. There are at least two
107
Ibid
108
Ibid
51
major instruments, and a host of other fringe instruments that anchor such action as well as a
number of institutional arrangements to give effect to those commitments. The PSC Protocol is
the other important instrument. The Protocol interalia identifies implementation and promotion
of peace-building and post conflict reconstruction activities as one of its core objectives. It
underscores the need for development of strong democratic culture, following rule of law and
human rights, implementation of programs on post conflict revival and sustainable development
policies as vital prerequisites for security, peace and stability. Under article 2(2), the PSC is to
be held up by the AU Commission (secretariat), a Continental Early Warning System, an
African Standby Force a Panel of the Wise, and a unique Fund.
These institutions, together with arrangements at the Regional Economic Community (RECs)
level, jointly constitute what is commonly known to as the APSA. The commitments of AU‘s in
relation to democracy and good governance have now been codified in detailed fashion in the
Elections, ACDG. It is against this institutional background that this contribution undertakes a
critical analysis of the function of the AU in the unfolding transitional justice process in Kenya
beginning with the mediation process to the specific TJ mechanisms adopted currently unfolding
in Kenya.
3.3 The Mediation Process
Although as noted the discourse on TJ in Kenya dates as far back as 1992, the mediation process
provided a forum through which several TJ issues could be considered in a broad unified
framework. Previous engagement with any set of TJ issues was either in isolation – for instance
constitutional reforms considered separately from accountability for human rights violations
issues – or had long been abandoned by political players for want of will to carry the process
through. As noted for instance, the idea of a TJRC had been expediently jettisoned in 2003
52
before it was revived by the NDR process. For many actors therefore, while the crisis emerged
from a specific set of circumstances, a disputed presidential poll, the mediation process provided
an opportunity to place on the agenda a broader set of concerns beyond the narrow electoral
conflict. It has already been noted that the AU involvement in the mediation of the Kenyan crisis
was almost fortuitous. This is in the sense that it was not evident from the start of the crisis that
the continental body possessed both the right tools and will to intervene as it eventually did. A
set of factors combined to ensure that the AU would emerge as a hesitant, perhaps late entrant to
the process: its historical posture on non-intervention and the multiplicity of actors (including
UN, key western governments and sub-regional bodies) who could espouse different reasons of
their own to intervene. As the violence escalated soon after the contentious announcement of
Kibaki as elected president on 31 December 2007, the extent of violence widely reported by the
media (both local and international and later, largely international media after a reporting ban
was imposed on local media by the Internal Security Minister) had called attention of a number
of international personalities to the need for intervention. Desmond Tutu of South African was
the first international figure to land in Nairobi on 3 January 2008 at the invitation of Citizens for
Peace (CCP) members. CCP was an outfit formed by five well-known Kenyan civil society
peace activists and mediators on 31 December 2009.
Tutu with Ms Brigalia Bam soon departed when it became evident that there was no room or
appetite for intervention at that stage. He however managed to meet PNU‘s Kibaki and ODM‘s
Odinga and urged them to embrace dialogue.109
Although the possibility of a Tutu-led mediation
was immediately dashed with the PNU side‘s rejection of any role for outsiders and their
assertion that there was no conflict to be mediated anyway, it opened the doors for other
109
Embrace Peace and Dialogue‘, Urges Tutu, All Africa Conference of Churches, Nairobi, January 2008
53
potential mediators. Jendayi Frazier the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
came afterwards after 4th
January, then on 8th January four former heads of state: president of
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana. They visited camps of those displaced in
Eldoret, one of the main centres of violence, and jointly called for an end to violence and
mediated solution.110
Their visit coincided with that of John Kuffuor, AU Chairman and Ghanaian President, who
arrived at the invitation of President Kibaki. Kuffuor‘s attempts to broker a mediation process
between PNU and ODM hit a snag when the two factions refused to meet each other. However,
was to return to Nairobi second time once the protagonists realized that to unlock the crisis
mediation was inevitable. For his part, president of Yoweri Museveni came on a 2 official visit
on 22nd January, offering to mediate, even openly declaring his preference in the contest.111
After much dithering, PNU and ODM leaders eventually agreed to invite the AU to mediate the
Kenyan crisis. President Kuffuor made a second visit to Nairobi. It was
jointly agreed that the mediation will be headed by former UN Secretary-GeneralKofi Annan,
heading a PEAP comprising of Benjamin Mkapa and Graca Machel. Upon Annan‘s request,
President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, who had assumed the chairmanship of the AU, joined the
mediation team in the final stages of negotiation. The mediation was announced on 10th
January
2008.The talks began on 29 January 2008 (with a one week delay), only to end five weeks later
with the signing of the National Accord.112
However, the delay provided an opportunity to build a firm foundation for the process and for
the mediation team to consult key constituencies. During that period, negotiation teams for both
110
Ibid 111
Elizabeth Lindenmayer and Josie L Kaye, 112
Ibid
54
sides were constituted while a secretariat to support the mediation team was set up. The
secretariat immediately embarked, with input from the members of the negotiation teams.
According to Lindenmayer and Kaye, since part of the Chief Mediator‘s strategy was to have a
comprehensive and clear mediation process. By the time the talks began, the four item agenda
for the mediation process was more or less settled. Although there were to be many starts and
stops during the talks, the public announcement by the Chief mediator of the timeline, and the
separation of short term and short term issues, ‗offered the peace talks impetus by offering the
parties with matters they to be agreed on then moving more controversial issues. In terms of the
timeline, violence was to be ended in seven days. As the talks stalled on Agenda Item 3 (power
sharing), a combination of pressure from various actors includes EU, Canada, the US (who
jointly threatened to impose travel bans) and AU and the threat of escalating violence pushed the
talks towards conclusion. Supported by action by other key actors, the AU was to intervene
further on a number of occasions. The arrival of President Kikwete towards the end with a yet-
to-be divulged message from President Bush seemed to magically secure the signature of the
leaders on the National Accord.
When the President and Prime Minister were unable to agree on a joint cabinet, and appeared to
dither on the implementation of the Accord, the AU spoke again.113
It is noteworthy that this
process was not devoid of support from the international community. In particular, the UN
volunteered technical support. This was marked by a visit to Kenya of the UN Secretary General
Mr. Ban Kimoon who held a consultative meeting with the leaders of the two factions and the
mediation team. He further underscored UN‘s support for the process in his address to the AU
summit on 31 January 2008.
113
Ibid
55
Pressure from several other sources kept the process on course. For instance, the European
Union, the US and Canada repeatedly issued threats of travel bans to those who attempted to
obstruct the mediation process. The instrumental role played by the CSOs and the media cannot
be ignored. While the CSOs created a favourable environment for the negotiations, directly and
indirectly enriched the mediation agenda at the formative stages and applied pressure on both the
parties and the mediation team,114
the media ensured that Kenyans were informed on various
aspects of the process and that the message of peace prevailed in time of rancour and conflict.115
3.4 Constitutional Review and Institutional Reforms
Once it was clear to the parties and the mediators that a disputed presidential election was merely
a trigger of the violence and that the real causes lay elsewhere in longstanding historical issues,
the mediation process could not limit itself to garnering a power sharing arrangement (Agenda
Item 3). The NDR therefore agreed that the following long standing issues at the root of the crisis
needed to be addressed: legal and institutional reforms; constitutional; land reforms; inequality,
poverty, and imbalances of regional development; youth unemployment; national unity and unity
consolidation; and accountability, clearness and impunity. As part of the effort to tackle long
term issues, a number of key institutions were agreed upon during the course of talks. First, the
NDR agreed on 11 February 2008, on the establishment of Kriegler Commission to look into all
facets of the 2007 elections and make recommendations for future reforms. IREC was to submit
a report recommending far reaching electoral reforms.116
114
Ibid 115
Wachira G.,, Thomas Rendshorst and Simon M Charles, 29-33; Elizabeth Lindenmayer and Kaye, 7-8. 116
Government of Kenya, A document of the assessment Commission, 2008 [IREC Report
56
As a result, the Electoral Commission of Kenya that oversaw a flawed election was disbanded.
Secondly, the NDR agreed to the formation of a PEV commission.117
CIPEV was established by
the government after the national peace accord.118
CIPEV was later to submit a report
recommending the establishment of a Special Tribunal and reserving a role for the ICC. Thirdly,
on 2008 February, the NDR adopted formed TJRC, to account for post-crisis Kenya.119
One o the
main agreements to come from the NDR, as part of Agenda item 4,relates to the need for
comprehensive constitutional reforms, which anchors broader institutional reforms touching on
parliament, the civil service, police and the security forces as well as the judiciary. As later
discussion shows, significant progress has been made, with some external input,
in implementing constitutional and institutional reforms.120
4.5 Impunity and the Accountability Debate
Beyond the fairly easy decision to establish a TJRC and the CIPEV, accountability for past
crimes and past human rights violations has predictably been one of the most contentious aspects
of the NDR. The international community and the Chief Mediator had pushed constantly for
prosecutions either in Kenya or at the ICC, arguing that prosecutions would help abate the deep
rooted culture of impunity and begin to address victims‘ demands for justice, the
government‘s position has vacillated between lukewarm endorsements to subtle opposition.121
117
NDR Process, Agreement on CIPEV (2008) 1 118
Kenya Gazette Notice No. 4473 vol. cx-no.4 of 23 May 2008. 119
Agreement on agenda item three: How to resolve the political crisis KNDRC (2008) 3 120
Ibid, p70 121
Musila G (2008) issues for Justice in Kenya: The Special sitting for Kenya, The Truth, Justice And
Reconciliation Commission, and the International Criminal Court‘ South African Yearbook Of International
Affairs: 143-153
57
Despite averments to the contrary, coalition government politics have shaped the debate on the
fight against impunity122
and the contestation within the coalition government has been such that
there is no clear government position on any mechanism of accountability, be it the ICC, Special
Tribunal or the TJRC.
Espousal of support for any of these mechanisms even at the highest level of government appears
more as an individual view than a government position. This is best exemplified in the failure by
the Principals – President Kibaki and PM Odinga – to agree to refer the post PEV violence for
investigation by the ICC, as well as the fallout relating to the pursuit of deferral and admissibility
challenge. It appears that while one side of government has supported ICC investigations, the
other has fought doggedly to stop or slow the process. Once the CIPEV suggested the formation
of the Special Tribunal, various actors – including the Chief Mediator Kofi Annan – applied
pressure for the government to act decisively. However, wrangling and subtle opposition from
within the GCG ensured that the tribunal would not be established, culminating in several
unsuccessful efforts to pass a Special Tribunal law.
The US, UK and EU had been at the forefront of those advocating for action on impunity,
urging government to form a ‗valid, autonomous, naturally secured tribunal to end the exemption
by culprits of the post-survey viciousness inside the concurred time span‘. After much
prevaricating and with pressure mounting, Cabinet resolved on 30July 2009123
to abandon the
Special Tribunal and deploy ordinary criminal courts instead, together with the Truth
122
Ibid 123
Cabinet‘s Memorandum on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal , supra n 73
58
Commission, which had been created on 22 July 2009with the naming of nine commissioners in
terms of the TJRC promulgated in December 2008.124
Having failed to persuade the government to reverse its stand, which many interpreted as an
attempt to evade justice, the Chief mediator finally handed over the list of names of alleged
perpetrators prepared by CIPEV to the Prosecutor of the ICC. The handover elicited but muted
response from government, which once again failed to act locally on its own. As at publication,
the ICC is planning confirmation hearings in respect of charges facing the six Kenyans named
above.
For its part, the TJRC has been mired in controversy around its chair, Ambassador Bethuel
Kiplagat, whose integrity to lead the Commission has been questioned. Reports have cited
episodes of past human rights violations in which he is likely to be a witness, a situation that if
true would render his membership of the Commission problematic. His initial refusal to resign,
and the failure of government to activate the judicial mechanism within the law to resolve the
matter in timely fashion had caused concern in many quarters, with the Chief Mediator at one
time urging government to resolve the challenges facing the TJRC. What is clear is that the
Commission had little to show for its first year of existence. It appears that the Kiplagat
controversy had obscured much deeper problems facing the TJRC, with commissioners accusing
government in early 2010 of usurping its independence, financial sabotage and in frustrating its
work.125
It is vital to know that since the arrival of the CEO and Secretary to the Commission, and later,
the recruitment of key staff in July 2010, the Commission had become much more visible. Its
124
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act no 6 of 2008. 125
Ibid
59
work plan and rules were published. The public face of its work started with the launch of the
national drive of statement taking in September 2010. The TJRC public hearings commenced on
March 2011. These developments notwithstanding, the government‘s commitment to fighting
impunity in general has remained questionable. The politics within the GCG continues to be
responsible for lack of clarity on the accountability project as a whole: while some have
supported the fight against impunity generally and the ICC and the TJRC particularly, others
appear less committal or are opposed outright. Lack of attention to accountability issues may be
attributed to the fact that perhaps too much is happening at once. With the implementation of the
constitution in full swing, accountability issues have received but fleeting consideration. Perhaps
rightly, many regard the new constitution implementation as the centerpiece of the transitional
justice project.
3.5 Gender Justice
In their seminal article on feminism and transitional justice, Christine Bell and Catherine
O‘Rourke126
consider current approaches by feminists in transitional justice discourse. They find
that current feminist approaches that attempt to introduce or fit a feminist understanding of
justice in TJ frameworks are unhelpful in securing ‗goods‘ for women. They suggest, as an
alternative trajectory for feminist theory on TJ. Of relevance to arguments the author makes in
this part, Bell and O‘Rourke identify two major problems that have hindered beneficial
approaches for women during transition: 1) the absence/exclusion of women from forums; 2) the
absence of gender in TJ, in other words, the absence, at conceptual level, of gender
considerations in TJ processes.
126
Bell and Rouke (2007) ‗Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay‘ The
International Journal of Transitional Justice , Vol 1,: 23-44.
60
Before assessing the question of gender justice within the Kenyan TJ process on the basis of the
two criteria, this contribution briefly reviews Kenya‘s ‗gender report card‘ and outlines
circumstances that make it necessary for women‘s concerns to be placed on the front burner in
the transition. While Kenya has continued to make important strides in matters of gender and the
rights of women, women and girls have continued to bear the brunt of oppression and human
rights violations including systemic discrimination, harmful cultural practices and
marginalization in various spheres.
Within the specific context of the PEV, a number of reports have documented that gender based
violence took a particularly brutal dimension. Citing a number of reports, the ICC‘s Pre-Trial
Chamber II decision authorizing formal investigations into crimes on humanity in Kenya records
high rapes cases in six affected Provinces, the general outlook is glum: 876 rape cases and1984
cases of defilement were reported in Kenya throughout 2007; 443 mostly rape and defilement
cases between 27December 2007 and 29 February 2008 and; the Nairobi Women's Hospital and
other hospitals got at least 900 sexual and gender based violence cases between January and
March 2008. Evidently, gender issues require specific focus through both accountability
mechanisms and broader TJ measures.127
one way of beginning to ensure that women‘s concerns
are addressed during transitions is by adding women to forums where TJ mechanisms are agreed
upon and designed.128
Like many TJ mechanisms, the TJ mechanisms proposed in Kenya
emerged – directly or indirectly – as a effect of dialogue between warring parties and mediators
127
Ibid, p76 128
Ibid, p76.
61
aimed at ending conflict. Harriet Martin writes that both protagonists and mediators have tended
to be overwhelmingly male.129
In Kenya, both PNU and ODM) were represented by only one woman each during the
NDR(Martha Karua and Dr. Sally Kosgey respectively). One out of five mediators was a woman
(Graca Machel). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the input made by the women
representatives went beyond ending violence and power sharing – the main issues framed by the
mediators for resolution. Bell and O‘Rourke130
suggest that advocacy for representation of
women in forums where TJ mechanisms are agreed upon and designed is underpinned by the
hope that changes will bring about different changes. However, since representation, however
important and indispensable, does not necessarily deliver goods for women – as the Kenyan case
shows – perhaps the best way of addressing exclusion of women in TJ is through reforms
of legal standards and processes of TJ: by adding gender to both answerability instruments and
the broader negotiation process.
With respect o accountability at the international level, adding gender has entailed: recognizing
sexual and gender based violence as international crimes; prosecuting this violence as crimes
and; instituting victim-friendly courtroom procedures to prevent re-victimization of sexual
victims.131
Two important inferences – that later inform specific recommendations at the end –
can be made with respect to the role of the AU and Sub-Regional bodies in enhancing gender
justice. First, just as the role of the AU mediators was limited insetting the agenda for the NDR,
especially on matters of accountability, so was their ability to influence on who would represent
the protagonists in the talks. The selection of Graca Machel by the AU as a member of the PEAP
129
Harriet M.(2006 ): Pawns of War: The Untold Story of Peace-making (London and New York: Continuum,), xi
noting that 99% of those who negotiate peace are male. 130
Ibid p74 131
Ibid
62
does not seem to be influenced by the fact that she was a woman (and would thus champion
women‘s issues) but rather that she is an influential African personality. Second, the
NDR produced only broad agreement on the establishment of the TJRC and the need toaddress a
number of long-term issues (Agenda Item 4). The failure to place gender-specific concerns on
the NDR agenda has left much leeway to those implementing the TJ project.132
3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation is essential to the implementation of any project, especially one that is
long term, involves numerous actors and is multifaceted in scope. It is clear that the NDR
articulated a fairly clear agenda involving items to be put into practice temporarily and long
term: ending the violence; addressing the humanitarian crisis and; finding a solution to the
political impasse arising from disputed presidential elections; constitutional and institutional
reform; tackling destitution and disparity, and additionally battling provincial advancement
inequity; tackling joblessness, especially among the adolescent; merging national cohesion and
solidarity and; tending to straightforwardness, responsibility and exemption.
In their judgment, the Chief Mediator and the PEAP took the view that the implementation of the
national accord, in particular elements of Agenda Item 4 of needed constant follow up. The
mediators decided to retain the services of South Consulting, a consultancy firm based in Nairobi
to lead on the NDR Monitoring Project. The NDR Monitoring project is modelled on the AU‘s
APRM, only on as smaller scale and lower profile. The decision to appoint a private consultancy
firm was largely dictated the fact that the AU lacks an appropriate mechanism to perform this
function. As part of its brief, South Consulting was required to review progress on specific
aspects of the NDR and to submit period (quarterly) reports to the Chief Mediator and PEAP.
132
63
South Consulting‘s mandate was to: avail objective data on the progress in the implementation of
the National Accord; provide data to inform interventions; and provide information on emerging
socio-political issues/challenges that impact on the implementation of the National Accord.
Since their appointment, the monitor has submitted several quarterly reports to the PEAP.
3.7 Chapter outline
This chapter provides a description of the events that led to the culmination of conflict in Kenya
eventually leading to the need for the AU to step in for the peace building process. The following
chapter provides the analysis of the data collected in order to establish the role of AU in peace
building in Kenya.
64
CHAPTER FOUR
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AU’S INTERVENTION IN KENYA’S ELECTORAL
VIOLENCE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter basically ties the knot by linking the three chapters discussed earlier on and
provides an analytical perception to the thesis. The theoretical framework of the ripe moment is
the analytical tool that forms the basis for determining the relevance of the hypothesis with a
view to meeting the objectives of this thesis while presenting the findings.133
Through narratives
in the previous chapters, the study has been ready to incorporate itemized examination of
different occasions and in addition to rearrange the truth by deciding the components of the
authentic records that are striking and deserving of consideration, and those that are irrelevant
and require excluding.
Kenya has been filled with viciousness all through. The 2007 postelection viciousness in Kenya,
be that as it may, was of an alternate size. The greatness of the injury and basic viciousness that
occurred in Kenya after the fourth presidential elections took everyone unsuspecting.134
The
violence took 59 days. All things considered, the brutality that happened couldn't just have been
anticipated; it could in all likelihood have been forestalled. One of the establishments of this
contention examination is that what occurred amid the Kenyan 2007 decisions had its underlying
foundations in a feeble national constitution that logically needed solid balanced governance
framework inside the government branches. In three decades, constitution alterations were made
to deliberately dissolve these parities for fortifying presidential forces.135
This chapter therefore
seeks to establish how the principle of responsibility to protect having been adopted in 2005 and
133
Tim (2002). Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as EvidenceThe
American Political Science Review, 96(3): 481-493. Maupeu, H. (2008). 53 134
Ibid 135
Ibid, p75
65
embraced by both international and regional organizations such as the AU has changed this state
of affairs in respect to conflict intervention and management. The chapter will further discuss on
how the adoption of good offices by the AU played a significant role in managing Kenya‗s
electoral conflict. This is in the respect of the objectives derived and hypotheses postulated in the
earlier chapter of this study.
4.2 AU’s Intervention in Kenya and it’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The Kenya PEV prompted carnage and uprooting on a huge scale. Past the gloom and
indignation regarding destitution, defilement, and the requirement for political change
notwithstanding a deceitful decision, the mobs additionally uncovered the hidden pressures
between ethnic gatherings that had been filled by the presidential battle. These strains finished in
a conflict between of Raila followers and Kibaki followers. The war brought about more than
1,000 passings, because of security strengths and in rough ethnic conflicts, and in addition
around 600,000 IDPs.136
UN SG Ban Ki-moon described the post-race ethnic conflicts in Kenya
as an issue worried of the R2P, a moderately new rule that forces the obligation to end mass
savagery. Mr. Boycott found a way to address the viciousness by empowering intervention
endeavors by previous UNSG Kofi Annan.
The standard of R2P has made four fundamental commitments to the contention mediation
banter about: (1) turning the center of the verbal confrontation from helpful intercession to an
obligation to ensure individuals caught in strife circumstances; (2) building up another
comprehension of sway where the state does not control but rather principally secures its natives;
(3) setting up clear criteria of what the R2P, by and by, ought to mean, illuminating that it
comprises of a great deal more than simply military mediation; and (4) commanding that if
136
Ibid
66
coercive activity is viewed as essential, it must be lawful and genuine.137
In reality, there was
trust that the polarity amongst power and intercession has been overcome by recognizing human
security and the non-eliteness of state sovereignty.138
For quite a while, the global group guaranteed to offer need to early activity and the
improvement of the political limit for a viable reaction to a contention inclined circumstance. At
the point when the ICISS distributed its investigate the Responsibility to Protect in December
2001, three columns were created: forestall, respond, and rebuild.139
These three mainstays of
R2P must be considered as a total arrangement of methodologies framing a toolbox to handle net
philanthropic crises, especially genocide, atrocities, ethnic purging, and violations against
mankind. The duty to keep, the principal R2P column, depends on the possibility that states have
an obligation to guarantee that local pressures are tended to before they heighten. States
additionally need to give certain measurements of good administration (like straightforwardness
and the run of law), wellbeing, wide support, and monetary improvement. It is on this ground ha
AU discovered its ethical ground to intercede in the Kenyan constituent clash which will
undoubtedly inundate a considerable lot of its honest residents. It did as such under the
sponsorship of its board of the savvy and the then AU director John Kufuor. Disappointment by
states to make a move when mass viciousness happens brings about an exchange of obligation to
the universal group. UNSG Ban portrayed the post-race ethnic conflicts in Kenya as a R2P
circumstance and found a way to address the brutality in mid 2008. In opposition to the gracious
strategic dialect utilized by UN authorities, Mr. Boycott was limit amid a visit in Nairobi in
February 2008: ―The individuals and pioneers of Kenya, especially political pioneers, have the
137
Ibid 138
Newman (2009) Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions (New York: Columbia University
Press,), 190–191. 139
Ibid
67
obligation, and the duty, to wake up and switch this shocking way before it grows into the
abhorrence of mass killings and decimation we have seen in late history140
. The worldwide group
was lucky that Kenyan powers acknowledged local (AU) and global inclusion; thus the
intercession in sovereign undertakings was not tested—an issue typically challenged with R2P
cynics. Also, R2P's application to the Kenyan emergency did not include any sort of assents or
military intercessions, which implied that the UNSG could abstain from politicizing the level
headed discussion by conjuring R2P as an answer even without the approval of the UNSC, which
would have effortlessly politicized the civil argument 141
. In Kenya, Mr. Annan demonstrated the
estimation of outside engagement when he prevailing with regards to keeping an acceleration of
post-decision viciousness, a result that he saw as a fruitful case of R2P in real life 142
. The
achievement accomplished by Mr. Annan demonstrates that a joint undertaking by the UN and
other multilateral and provincial associations can be effective. Without the joint exertion, the
gatherings would not have felt the weight to get together and work out an understanding.
Conjuring R2P was critical to show to the Kenyan political tip top that the global group thinks
about the emergency in Kenya and stop the cycle of savagery. Rather than severe conflicts and
constrained dislodging, R2P mattered in light of the fact that it gave a strategic arrangement. Mr.
Annan himself said ―when you have ethnic brutality, on the off chance that you don't intercede
rapidly, you get a miserable circumstance. It took Mr. Annan somewhere in the range of 40 days
to persuade both sides that there was no chance either side could run the nation without the other
and that without an understanding the nation would be in a political gridlock. At long last, Mr.
Annan finished up gladly ―when we discuss intercession, individuals think about the military.
In any case, under R2P, compel is a final resort. Political and discretionary mediation is the main
140
Ibid 141
Thakur R., (2010) Law, Legitimacy and United Nations,‖ Melbourne Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 142
Ibid
68
instrument. What's more, I think we've seen an effective case of its application [in Kenya].143
Indeed, with the birth of the principle of responsibility to protect and consequently its
observation by the AU in the Kenyan electoral conflict saw the watering down of the non-
interference principle hence enhancing the capacity of the regional body in conflict intervention.
4.3 AU’s Intervention and the use of Good offices
The violent electoral conflict in Kenya raised issues regarding the intervention in the conflict by
international, regional and sub-regional organizations. Both the use of good offices by the
chairman of the African Union, and the later visit of the secretary general of the United Nations
underline the salience of intervention by such organizations. Intervention in this context means
various actions by external third parties aimed at influencing the direction of events in a
sovereign state. There are various degrees of intervention by third parties, in which military
intervention is the sharp end.
In the Kenyan case, the degrees of intervention did not reach the high coercion level of military
invasion, although some Kenyan parties had called for it, and the US assistant secretary of state
speaking in Addis Ababa had come very close to suggesting that limited military action could be
an option to the west‗s response to the electoral conflict in Kenya. By and large, western
intervention in this conflict was restricted to the diplomatic (for example speeches, and support
for one of the parties), economic (for example threatening to cut aid off), and social (for example
using immigration laws to target individuals). The intervention by the AU Union consisted of the
use of chairman Kufuor‗s good offices, and the support of the mediation that was conducted by
Kofi Annan. Good offices are a way in which a third party parry intervenes in order to try and
avoid a conflict escalating, facilitating the parties‗ movement towards negotiations, or the use of
143
Ibid, p79
69
any other peaceful means to manage the conflict.144
Good offices can be undertaken by the
parties‗ invitation, or the third party can undertake the task without such an invitation. Whatever
the case, the person using good offices should be accepted by the parties in conflict, otherwise it
would be impossible for the good offices to yield positive results.
The Constitutive Act of the AU directs matters of intercession by the AU The introduction of the
Act practices the AU's assurance to advance peace, security and soundness; to solidify fair
foundations and guarantee great administration and the control of law. Two of the goals of the
AU which are specifically identified with its intercession in the Kenyan discretionary clash are
advancing peace, security and steadiness on the continent145
, and advancing majority rule
standards and organizations, prevalent support and great administration146
. A portion of the
standards of the AU specifically identified with its mediation are the tight of part states to
demand intercession from the Union so as to reestablish peace and security the regard for vote
based standards, human tights, the run of law and great administration, and judgment and
dismissal of illegal government changes.147
The conflict in Kenya after the 2007 elections gave rise to violence and a humanitarian crisis
including, the problem of DDPs. These issues fall under the philosophy, aims of the AU. Besides
this, the assembly of the AU‗s role is to authorize and to deliberate on, and act on situations such
as those that obtained in Kenya. Although the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of a member state is enshrined in article 4 (g) of the Constitutive Act, its interpretation in
contemporary international law and diplomacy does not support its strict interpretation in cases
of violations of human rights. In contemporary international law, grave violations of human
144
Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (NewYork; United Nations, 1992). 60 145
Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 146
Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 147
Article 4(j), (m) and (p) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
70
rights cannot be overlooked as internal affairs of a state. Clearly, the good offices role of the AU
in this conflict was in order. It was justified on the grounds of international of law and of current
African diplomacy. The AUs‘s good offices President Kufuor Spent three days in Kenya, and his
good offices exercise ended on 10 January 2008. President Kufuor‗s good offices were intended
facilitate negotiations between the two parties. Its success would have been most publicly gauged
by a meeting between Kibaki and Raila at the end of Kufuor‗s facilitation. At the end of
Kufuor‗s facilitation, the parties bad not agreed on a framework for negotiation. They both
blamed each other for this: the Kibaki team accused the Raila group of being unresponsive;
while the ODM accused president Kibaki of failing to honour the mediation.148
The issues that
led to the deadlock were the ones that each party had provided as conditions, and although they
had both publicly professed a wish to see Kufor‗s mission succeed, they were still divided by the
issues. The issues for Kibaki were that he needed the ODM to remember him as being
authentically chosen, to acknowledge that there was an administration set up, convey a
conclusion to the savagery, and consider the conceivable making of the position of non-official
PM. Then again, the ODM requests were that president Kibaki ought to acknowledge that he was
misguidedly in office, that ODM had won the decisions, that there ought to be a re-counting of
the presidential votes, and a re-keep running of the presidential race highlighting just Kibaki and
Raila, and a coalition government with ODM getting an official head administrator's position.149
The idea of power sharing is one that Raila Odinga hinted at during the whole process. In an
interview with a Germany‗s ARD television he hinted that president Kibaki could remain in
power, while the opposition could put up a prime minister; and that all pentagon members were
148
Daily Nation, 11 January 2008, p.1. 149
Ibid, p82
71
ready and willing to take up positions within the cabinet if the deal was sealed.150
However, he
insisted that Kibaki first implement constitutional reforms to enhance the independence of the
judiciary and give stronger roles parliament, and the executive.151
Both Kibaki and Raila were later to deny that the prime minister‗s post had either been offered,
or accepted as an issue for negotiations, resident Kibaki refined any claims that he had offered
Raila such a post, which did not exist in Kenya‗s constitution. Kibaki stated in a press release
that he had not offered the prime minister‗s position to Raila Odinga, that the issue of prime
minister was a constitutional matter, and that in the Kenya constitution, there was no provision
for the post of prime minister.152
Raila Odinga on the other hand stated that he had never said he
was considering taking up the position of prime minister, under Kibaki. He argued that he was
not ready to join president Kibaki‗s administration as prime minister, and the only option to
resolving the dispute was for president Kibaki to resign from office.153
These demands by the
ODM were said by a commentator to be attractive, but not constitutionally viable. The reasons
for this were that for there to be a re-run, it must have been pursuant to the constitution or a court
order; and under the Kenya constitution, a re-run can only occur if the winner of the presidential
election in terms of the highest vote could not garner 25% of votes cast in five of eight
provinces, or if a court so orders.
It was also argued that there was no legal basis for limiting the re-run to a contest between
Kibaki and Raila since the conflict was about the disputed presidential tally, there are no
constitutional provisions for a re-run. Even if there were to be a renm, president Kibaki could in
all probability not participate as he would have served his second term, and would have agreed to
150
Kenya Times, 24 January, 2008, p.1. 151
The People Daily (Nairobi), 24 January,2008, p.2. 152
The People on Sunday (Nairobi), 27 January, 2008, p.24. 63 153
The People on Sunday, 27 January, 2008, p.24.
72
a re-rim in a manner not provided for by the constitution.154
The issue of Kibaki naming a part
cabinet before Kufuor‗s good offices began, raised protests, especially by the US, Jendayi Frazer
called on Kibakj at state house on January 2008, the day Kufuor was beginning his role.155
Kibaki‗s response to this was contained in a statement. It stated that the government must keep
on functioning; that the Partial bureau would guarantee that the administration runs the nation as
required by the constitution and that when the legislature turned out to be completely constituted
following the conflict, it would be broad based, and the appointment of the partial cabinet did
not rule out that process.156
The reason the US and western communities complained about the
naming of the cabinet is ‗that right from the outset, they had decided that the only Solution
would be one that included ODM in government.157
President Kibaki‗s naming of a partial cabinet at this stage was either an inspired move in the
political chess game that bad begun to evolve, or poor strategic thinking While reasons of law
and the need for continued government functioning were reasonable explanations for the move,
the chicken later came home to roost after the idea of a grand coalition was agreed. At that later
point; the ODM insisted that he had already named half of his share in the cabinet. They argued
that the size of the cabinet should be thirty four ministries, half of whom he had already
appointed. President Kufuor announced that the meditation would be carried out by previous UN
secretary general Kofi Annan, as leader of a group of prominent people. Kufuor summed up his
accomplishment just like that the gatherings had concurred that there ought to be a conclusion to
the viciousness, that there ought to be discourse, which ought to be about peace, the gatherings
had consented to cooperate with a board of famous African identities headed by Kofi Annan, and
154
The Sunday Standard (Nairobi), 13 January 2008, p.13. 155
Daily Nation. 10 January 2008, p.1,2. 64 156
Ibid, p83 157
Ibid, p83
73
that every single exceptional issue including protected and appointive changes would be
addressed.158
In his statement, President Kufuor gave an interesting inkling about what his tasks had been in
Nairobi. He stated that in the hectic two days, ―we have launched the talks.159
This suggests, that
he saw his task as being to engage the parties in the pre-negotiations stages of the process, while
other third parties would continue the process through the negotiation stage. In this engagement
therefore, Kufuor dearly intended to play the diplomatic role of using his good offices as the
chairman of the AU Good offices as a method is not intended to conclude negotiations between
parties, but to create the environment and agreement that negotiation would take place
subsequently In this reading of Kufuor‗s role, dearly he can be said to have succeeded in using
his good offices This interpretation is strengthened because in an issue as sensitive as this, it was
unlikely that two days would have been sufficient to complete a full-blown negotiation process
that addressed all the issues on the agenda. From reports received, president Kufuor had in any
case not seen his mission in Nairobi as being to conduct a full-scale negotiation between the
parties. It was a more modest one of getting Kibaki and Raila Odinga to publicly meet; after
which the proper mediation would be left to the group of eminent African persons.160
Thus,
together with his team they exhausted their capacity and played a facilitative role through the
good offices which saw the belligerent partis come to the table.
4.4 Successes and Failures of the AU in Conflict Intervention
There have in fact been victories and disappointments. This is exceptionally justifiable, since
unity ‗can never be only a basic, direct perfect. It is constantly tested and confused by the
158
Daily Nation. 11 January, 2008. P.2. 65 159
Ibid, p84 160
The East African, January 14-20, 2008, p.1. 66
74
substances of differences and disunity. In any case it ought to be noticed that solidarity, and
especially African solidarity, has been the principle perfect of the AU more than one decade, as
well as of its antecedent, the OAU, over right around four decades. Truth be told, the name of the
first Organization broadcasted the conviction that the solidarity as of now existed. The
Organization was not set up as one trying for or towards unity, however as one depended with
guardianship of peace. Regardless of such hopeful vision, in any case, the Founding Fathers were
extremely sensible about marvels and premonitions of disunity. They headed their rundown of
purposes with advancing solidarity and solidarity, and organizing collaboration161
, yet they
likewise settled a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration162
. For the most part
because of recognition of the guideline of non-obstruction in interior issues163
, in any case, it
must be conceded thirty years after the fact that ‗the Commission has been for all intents and
purposes torpid since its foundation '. At that point, in 1993, the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution was set up. This flagged ‗Africa's assurance to fathom
its own problems and its dedication ‗to cooperate towards the serene and rapid determination of
all contentions on the continent164
.
From its foundation in 2002, the AU appeared to have more clout to mediate when strife
undermined or happened. In its Constitutive Act the rule of non-obstruction in interior
undertakings was connected to part states among themselves, yet the promptly taking after
standard was the right of Member States to demand mediation from the Union with a specific
end goal to reestablish peace and security.' similar standards were embraced in the Protocol for
the foundation of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. The move of center from
161
Ibid 162
OAU 1963. OAU Charter. Addis Ababa, OAU. Article. XIX. Available from: 163
Ibid 164
Ibid
75
anticipation to intercession unavoidably achieved an adjustment in the responses from part states.
In a counteractive action situated association adequate accord may generally be accomplished;
however in an intercession engaged union, contrasts of conclusion or potentially responsibility
can frequently be normal.
The AU's intercession and peace-production endeavors exhibit that a range where the AU has a
noteworthy near favorable position over outer performing artists is its capacity to accumulate the
trust of gatherings to a savage clash, especially of governments which for the most part protest
outside obstruction. The AU has possessed the capacity to utilize this trust to persuade the
gatherings, as in the Darfur circumstance, to concede to transactions and to secure bargain. An
interesting but quite biased - analysis of the success for Kufuor‘s good office‗s and to a greater
extent the AU‗s role was offered by a commentator. The commentator argued that the mediation
did succeed because the Mediator in the capacity of AU chairman; ‗ emerges as a middle person
with a fractional position and certified enthusiasm for peace and security in Kenya, the weight of
the universal group (western world basically), which will coordinate ‗the prepare, the changing
local geopolitical and monetary circumstances (for instance, the postponement of products
touching base into the landlocked nations of the district) in east, focal and Horn of Africa may
influence the outcome of the process.165
The commentator also argued that there were factors
that could lead to the failure of Kufuor‗s good office: no sincerity by Kibaki to seek a negotiated
resolution because of his belief that the conflict was an internal Kenyan matter and that ‗all was
well,‗ his naming of a cabinet before the mediation could begin; and Kibaki‗s exhibiting of
‗authority‗ by calling the 0DM and religious leaders to a peace in quest of meeting. The
commentator argued that ODM‗s readiness to have an external third party was genuine since
165
Ibid, p86
76
they had always persisted on an international arbitrator, and that Kibaki had named a cabinet that
did not include MPs from some group of people (which would hence delay the reconciliation).
This commentary, though interesting, was founded on the wrong premises. Its reading of
Kufuor‘s role as a mediator was misinformed, and did not take into account important aspects of
third party roles in the diplomacy of conflict management. President Kufour was not a mediator
and had not considered himself to be one. He indeed played the classic role of good offices in
conflict management diplomacy: It was however true that the government‗s insistence that the
Kenyan conflict was a domestic matter was ill-informed, given that the conflict had already
become internationalized. Indeed, the entry, and role of Kufuor was ample illustration of the
already internationalized basis of the electoral conflict in Kenya.
77
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The field of conflict intervention and by extension conflict management has turned out to be
more various and swarmed. Provincial, sub-territorial and other worldwide associations and also
non-administrative associations and private people are progressively required in intercession
exercises. Getting it done, intervening on-screen characters have mixed behind a lead middle
person, served a typical procedure, and utilized their relative preferences to most extreme impact
working at various levels of the procedure. Best case scenario, rivalry and difference over system
and subsidizing host allowed gatherings to discussion shop, in this manner hampering peace
endeavors 166
.
In an excessive number of examples, clashes have been further exasperated by good natured
outsider performers who do not have a decent comprehension of intervention and sufficient
readiness. A strong handle of intercession through intervention is expected to better synchronize
political endeavors and oversee desires. To this end, the direction for viable intercession is a
valuable asset. The nearness of different outsider performing artists can bolster compelling
intercession where their endeavors are correlative and composed. In any case, clashing
methodologies and parallel procedures can likewise work to undermine the adequacy of
intervention endeavors. For sure, at times, the outside procedures may themselves turn into a
noteworthy part of the issue. It is in this manner critical that outsider go betweens look to
participate and cooperate. On the off chance that this is impractical, systems and procedures must
address this as a need, to guarantee in any event that intervention choices and procedures depend
166
Mason (2009),, Insider Mediators: Exploring Their Key Role in Informal Peace Processes, Bergh of Foundation
for Peace Support, Mediation Support Project
78
on evaluated dangers. Contingent upon the conditions there is a practically vast scope of
contemplations in deciding how best to participate and organize among outsider on-screen
characters. There is developing acknowledgment that intervention is not the restrictive domain of
outside intercession performing artists. Nearby middle people who originate from the contention
nation can conveniently lead neighborhood intercession endeavors or supplement local or global
initiatives167
.
These go betweens order neighborhood authenticity; have top to bottom information of the
general public, its history, and nearby clash determination approaches; and frequently host built
up contacts with the contention gatherings. Be that as it may, this closeness to the contention and
its performing artists has its deficiencies. It frequently opens nearby middle people to impressive
individual dangers; now and again they may likewise be seen as one-sided because of their
association with either party. Additionally, they frequently have less money related assets
available to them and need access to specialized skill. All things considered, neighborhood
middle people have played an assortment of intervening parts, for instance in Zimbabwe and
Kenya. Enabling nearby go betweens, where proper, can be a viable means for building national
responsibility for peace handle.
A functional thought in such manner could be the foundation of AU local mediation focuses in
nations near different clash circumstances which every single significant partner can feel good
making a trip to or connecting with. These focuses can likewise enhance the coordination
abilities of the AU, while in the meantime serving to assemble the limit of nearby on-screen
characters, be it the sub-provincial associations, NGOs or Member States. Regardless, when
there are numerous on-screen characters required in similar intercession prepare, a collaboration
167
Ibid, p89
79
of endeavors is required, either through coordination by the AU or by means of the supremacy of
no less than one of these on-screen characters, with a specific end goal to keep away from the
undesirable results of rivalry, duplication and confliction which may prompt inadvertent damage
to the procedure and to every others' endeavors. For struggle intercession activities to be
esteemed effective any assertion came to must be sensible, implementable and acknowledged by
the gatherings. Every peace understanding is sui generis, in view of the unique situation and the
interests of the gatherings to a contention. In this way, we can't name subjects which must be
incorporated into an assertion, with the exception of security: a nation rising up out of a rough
clash will undoubtedly confront a prompt, testing circumstance as far as security.
In a first stage, a peace understanding needs to indicate how security is to be given in the fleeting
so as to ensure regular folks and re-set up typical living. Moreover, an assertion ought to likewise
involve some preparatory choices on the way toward rebuilding and improving the security
segment. Clashes are dynamic, and main drivers are regularly taken cover behind new conflict
issues. Given the dynamic way of contentions, the grievances and sharpness of the gatherings
and their conflicting positions, far reaching accords may when all is said in done not be a
definitive answer for existing divisions in social orders. Additionally, encounter has
demonstrated that even the most far reaching understandings can't illuminate all the clashing
issues between the gatherings included. Hence, concurs tending to the most problems that need
to be addressed are critical, and they are to be comprehended as beginning stages in a more
drawn out process as opposed to final products.
The achievement of a peace assertion relies on upon the dedication of the gatherings; along these
lines, understandings ought to dependably address the issues communicated by the gatherings
(and the general public) and not those of the middle people. Also, a fruitful assertion ought to
80
keep itself to the primary issues of the present clash and leave space for a popularity based
procedure to address all the less problems that need to be addressed. In the event that vital,
procedures and strategies ought to be intended to address the unsolved issues in the stage after
the consenting to of the peace arrangement. Usage must be consulted inside the transaction
procedure. Along these lines, all accords need to incorporate organizations and procedures
equipped for observing the usage and determining clashes that develop amid the execution stage.
At long last, it this study prescribes the requirement for middle people to have ability and expert
support and perceives the requirement for watchful appraisal, appropriate arranging and standard
observing and assessment keeping in mind the end goal to upgrade the odds for achievement and
minimize struggle management and specifically intercession blunder. The significance of a
steady outside environment for the intercession procedure is underscored, with accentuation put
on the requirement for collaboration among substances required in intervention. While every one
of these variables are essential, the achievement or disappointment of a contention intercession
handle at last relies on upon whether the contention parties acknowledge intervention and are
focused on achieving an assertion. In the event that the gatherings are really eager to investigate
an arranged arrangement, middle people can assume a significant part.
81
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