zt ulto[8ê

The role of the Praetorian Guard in the ersonal securi

precauÈions of the Roman emperor, 30 B.C. - A.D. 235,

and cont,emporary perceptl ons of the securlty problem.

Thís Èhesis 1s subrnitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

The DeparÈmenË of Classics at

The Unlversity of Adelaide.

SubmítÈed by

COLIN TURNER, B.A. (ttons) (Adel.)

on the 25th AugusË, 1981.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary

Statement by candidate

PAGE

5

Spyíng and Inlelligence.

Detection.

Routlne surveillance and spying.

The lnformation of opponents.

Lírnltations of the informatíonsystem.

Summary.

Chapter Four. The Phys ical Context of Security. 47

Acknowledgement

Prefatory note

Chapter One.

ChapËer Two.

Chapter Three.

1.

t

3.

4.

Introduction.

Reaction to Crisís.

1. Imperial Property at Rome.

2. Imperial Property outsíde Rome.

3. Property at Rome not owned by

the Emperor.

4. Property outsíde Rome not owned

by the Emperor

5. Military Camps.

Travel.

1. Movement within the ciËy of Rome.

2. Travel ouËside Rome.

3. Sea Travel.

iíi

\rI

viÍ

ví1i

1

8

T6

16

2L

3B

4l

55

59

65

67

72

72

81

l.t

$,

Ë

44

48

'I

Chapter Five.

86

l.!

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Þ

Chapter Six.

Chapter Eleven.

Chapter Twelve.

Appendix

BfÞllography

1

The Enrperor at !'Iork.

tr{ork withln the Emperor I s

Palace.

tr{ork outside the Palace.

Publfc Ceremonlals.

The Spectacles.

Absence of the Emperor from

Publfc Llfe.

Recreatfon.

Health and Food.

The Emperor as Imperator.

The Offlcers of the PraetorianGuard.

The Praetorian Prefect.

Concl-uslon.

PAGE

9L

L24

138

160

t69

L76

188

L99

234

266

284

292

319

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ItI

f'tf,

¡iI.

!jt

lII

2

3

4

5

f

t,Ë I

,i'I

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SI]MMARY

This thesfs represents an attempt Ëo descríbe

in detall the nature of security precautíons taken to

protect t,he lives of the emperors in the period 30 B.C.

Ëo A.D. 235.

Such an attempt has necessitated an examínaËion

of as many aspects of an emperorrs dutíes, interests and

day-to-day actívíties as possible. In consequence, the

relatlonship to hls personal securlty of such elements as Èhe

buíldings used, the methods of travel, the círcumstances

of work and of play for the emperor, his health and the

need for him to go to war (chapLers four to nine) are ex-

plored ín depth.

trrlithin that context, it was also necessary to examine

and describe all of the groups and índividuals who played a

role in the maintenâ.nce of the emperorls safeËy. Only then

is it possíble to assess the role of the praetorian guard,

in particular, with some accuracy. Naturally, the importance

of lnrellígence informatlon, deríved from mílitary and cív-

ilian bureaucratlc and esplonage sources, ís of some l-mport-

ance and so is dfscussed at an early poínt (chapter three).

Of the personnel of the praetorian guard, the officer struct-

ure is extremely interestlng. Research suggesÈs that the

lmportance of the tribunes and cenËurions in the ímmediate

physl-cal proËectíon of the emperor has been underemphasised

Ì

'ttþ

iI

lfliì

I'tlI'

I

I

i

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and underestimated due to t.he overwhelming and reputedly

siníster political significance of the praetorlan prefect

(chapters ten and eleven).

The most crucial segment of evidence êmployed

ís the result of an examination of the various plots and

other fncidents focuslng upon the emperorls safety(chapter

two and appendlx). The factors responsible for the success

or faílure of a conspiracy are reveallng ín regard to the

essentíal issues of security explored throughout.

Areas of particular concern to emerge are the

techniques used to conÈrol access to the emperorts person,

the precise nature and processional order of those r¿ho

accompany him in publíc and the means by whích it is ensured

that no-one outsfde Ëhe security system can bear \^reapons

near him. Not the least of the factors Ínfluentlal upon

thls sítuation is the degree to which lndivídual emperors

needed to t.ake j-nËo account the feelíng of the people and

of the upper classes, ín partleular, that government and life

Ín general be conducted ín certaín well established and

dignif led r/üays. The rarnif lcatíons of methods used to ensure

the loyalËy of all those involved in the maínÈenanee of ímp-

erial safety símllarly stress the lmportance of the indlvidual

emperorfs personallty in the security process.

Attitudes to security, Èherefore, can be as crucial

as the nature of the precautíons themselves. Although essent-

tally an attempt Ëo describe these measures and thus concentrate

i

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upon íflmedíate security circumstances, it has been nec-

essary, nevertheless, Èo evaluate them at many poinËs

wíÈhin Ëhe broader context of long-term securíty issues.

The effect of work and securlty needs upon each other is

central. The relatlonshfp is a dynamic one.

il

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Thls is to cerÈ1fy that the fol-lowlng thesis

contains no materíal- which has been aceepted for

the award of any oÈher degree or dfploma ln any

unlverslËy and that, to the besÈ of my knowledge,

It contalns no materfal- previousLy publlshed or

written by another person, except where due ref-

erence is rrade Ín the text.

COLIN TURNER

-vii-

ACKNOIüLEDGEMENT

I would like Èo Ëhank the fo1lowlng peopl-e

who gave me support durlng the preparation of thls

thesís. Angle Bartesaghl for Èhe excellent typfng.

Ron Corney, Dr. Frank Sear and Hugh Llndsay from

the Classics Department for their interest. and advice.

My supervlsor, Dr. Ron Newbold for critlcism when it

was needed and for dlrectlon and encouragenent at al-l

times. My parents and family for unfaillng support.

Above a1-1, to Jo, ny wlfe, for glving the most to me

when tfmes rirere hardest.

I

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PREFATORY NOTE

Detalled informatlon about plots agalnst

Èhe lives of the emperors has been summarised Ín

the appendix. Reference to that lnformat,ion t,akes

the form of a number code 1n the Èext of the thesis

(v. p. 8, n. 1). In order to facílitate easy recogn-

lËíon of the meaning of such numbers, a lift ouË

suilnary of the appendlx appears at the very end of

the thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.

The question of the personal security precautions taken

for the protectíon of Roman emperors is largely a neglected one.

I¡'Ie do not have a clear indicatíon, for example, of the nature

and number of securíty personnel around the emperor while he

works ín publíc. Consequently, my prlmary interest is in the

lack of detailed knowledge about the roles of security grouPs

and, in particular, the techniques employed to ensure Lhe emperorrs

safety.

The imporËance of these precautions ís directly related

to the key polítieal position of Ëhe princePs. After the final

triumph of Octavian, the emperor and hís advísers permanently re-

placed the Senate as the ultimate polícy makers ín the staËe.l The

problems of resistance aÈtached to this situation and responses to

them focus upon the person of the emperor, hís personality, his

chíldren (or the lack of thern) and a varieËy of other factors.

The significance of the praetorian guard consequently assumes

consíderable proportíons .

Modern research on the guard has been detailed, particul-

arly ín the case of Marcel Durry who examined ít as an institution?in toto.¿ Important contríbutíons by more recent wrfters include

This process is described ín J.A. Crook.Cambridge U.P., f955.

consilium Principis.

M. Durry.1968 (rep

Les cohortes rétoriennes. París: E. de Boccard,rínt o 1938 edítion A. Passerinirs Le coortí

pretorie. Rome, 1939, \¡ras not consulted in detail slnce ítwas deemed to be of little direct relevance to the centralaim of thís enquiry, c.f. review ín JRS. 29r L939' 255 fby G.R.C . Davis .

1

2

-2-

those of L.L. Hore3, with ínformation on the later development

of the prefecture, and Michael Grant4, who has supplied a good

overview of the política1 signífícance, ín particular, of the

guard wíthin its context as part of the arrny of the principate.

Closest yeË to my purpose is the huge work of Fergus ltillar5

whích gíves a detailed account of the relatíonship between

emperor and subjects of all kinds. Yet his mention of the

personal securíty forces and their role remains essentially

just that.6 In shorÈ, none of the betËer modern accounÈs gives

an adequately detailed description of the procedures implemented

by securlty groups. To do so is my central airn.

An important poínt to make from the start ís that the

praetorian guard is only one component in an urban garrison

structure which enËailed several groups of differenË composiËion

and purpose. The decay of law and order during the late Republic

had taught Augustus the ímporÈance of conÈrol at the centre of

politíca1 nor...7 After decades of experimenËation, an urban

securíty system evolved whi-ch allowed the enperor to monopolise

the use of force within the cíty, just as he came to do in the

L.L. Howe. The aetorían refeet. L942. ChicagoI1linoÍs University Press.

4 M. GranÈ. The Army of the Caesars. London, trIiedenfeld andNicolson, I974.

F. M1llar. The Emperor in the Roman trrlorld. London,Duckworth, 1-977 .

idem. pp. 6L - 66.

A.I¡,1. Lintott. Vi-o

3

5

6

7

L968.lence in Republican Rome, Oxford U.P. ,

-3-

case of provincial commands and by a sirnilar set of tactics.

AppoÍ-ntment of commanders is the direct responsibilíty of the

ernperor. Choice of Èrusted followers is often the rule.8 Puy*ur.t

of troops is controlled índependently.9 TuncÈions are de-

signed to overlap or aPpointments are made so Ëhat cross-

checking sources of information about the conduct of officers

are available to the emperot.to The process is traced by

several modern researcher".tt The point made for my purposes

ís that in order to understand Ëhe role of the praetorian guard

in a better perspective, it. has been necessary Èo assess the

extent to which other garrison uniËs played a role in the .main-

tenance of the emperorts personal securiÈy.

The method of approach adopted was based partly on an

inítial survey of the evidence avaílable. From that, the large

number of plots directed at the emperorrs person I.7aS Seen to

provide a dístinct unit of evídence which immediately gives clues

to the nature of security problems (chapter two).

Before probing those íssues in greater detaíl it seemed

necessary to explore Ëhe relevance of the spying and informatíon

9

The urban and provincial appointments v/ere made by the emperor'aided by such officials as Èhe ab epistulis. q.v. ch. 10 p' 250

and ch. LL P. 271'

Note, for example, the role of the financíal procurator inGaul ín revealing Ëhe Èreachery of Vítellius in A.D. 69,Tac. Hist. L.I23 see also A.H .M. Jones. Studíes in Roman

.Government and Lavr, ox. u.P., Basíl B1ackwel1, 1968. Ch. l.10 v. H.-G. Pflaum. Procurateurs E uestres sous 1e Haut-

Emp ire Romai[, A. sonneu've, Paris, 1950.

11 Grant, op. cit., perhaps sumnarÍses the situation in themost clear fashion.

B

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instit.utions of the period. Although the section of the system

implemented by Èhe government \^ras essenËially bureaucratíc and

long-term in nature, the system overall deserves attention for

the various poínts of applícation to the emperorr s personal

security Èhat are apparent (chapter three).

Sínce the emperort s life could be ÈhreaÈened at any

stage in a day, Èhe bulk of my enquíry has been into the lifestyle

of the emperor, around the clock and through all the varíed

actívítíes arísíng out of his responsibílitles as p rinceps

consequently, research has been undertaken into Èhe buíldings

he lived and worked in, the circumstances of travel, of work

and relaxatíon, the emperorrs health and his participation at

the battlefront. consíderable ground is covered, Èherefore

(cTrapterrs four to nine) .

To complete an assessment of the praetorian guard!s

role ín thís overall sítuation, it was necessary to look closely

at the roles of the praeÈorian officers and of the prefects,

noË as a unit but rather as distinct, yeË related, enLítíes,

each with valuable functions of their oltrn to fulfil (chapters

Èen and eleven).

The line of enquiry directing my research is focused

by a definitíon of securíty that rests on the irnrnediate phys-

íca1 safety of the emperor. For this reason the comparat.ively

rare provincial movements to unseat an emperorr most vtvidly

repïesented by the civil wars of the period, are largely

ignored. Such a workíng definition nevertheless has links to

long-term security consíderations since opposition could result

from the dynamics of personal ínteraction, so essential to the

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style of government of the príncípate. It is also for this

reason that the most stable and typical phase of this politícal

form was chosen for study, 30 B.C. to A.D . íj'5.L2

For this period there are obvious vagaries in the

quantíty and reliabilíty of sources. Despite the occasional

use of epigraphíc, numismatíc and archaeological information,

I have relíed predominantly upon the rnajor liÈerary sources of

the era. Naturally, the historians and biographers were of

most value, concentrating as they do on the circumstances of

politícal life. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that all assume

detailed knowledge in theír readers of the role played by

security forces and sirnilarly of the consequences of Lhat role

for ímperial social, political, judicíal and rni'litary life. As

a result, the occurrence of plots assumes great importance as

evídence. At no other Èime are procedures brought so sharply

ínto focus.

Yet there are certain dangers wíÈh such evidence. trIe

cannot always be safe in extrapolating normal conditions from

reactíon to an extraordinary siËuation, although the possibÍlíty

ís always present. The major authors are often anËi-ímperial

Ëo some extenË, whether openly or by the use of such devices

as innuendo and condemnation by associatiot.t' Sources .most

valuable for the later part of the period under discussion can

L2 Although the principate and the existence of the praetorianguard does not conmence officially until 27 8.C., it isclear that certain aspecÈs of the urban security structureand procedure were evolvfng afËer victory at Actium. Ourevídence for the years of experLment under AugusÈus i.s never--theless relatively vague, one of the .more conspicuous gapsiu t¡ur knowledge.

On such devices, see R. Syme.1958, passim, as a guíde.

13 Tacitus (2 vols.) 0x. U.P.

-6-

mistakenly see condítions of theír oútn day as valid for the

earlier p.riod".14 Accounts of some plots \^re suspect favour

those who survíve. Nevertheless, despite such problems, a

large amount of lnformation seems well establíshed' large gaps

in our abitity to reconstruct notwithst"ndí.lg.15 one question

whích may suffer through these gaPS, however, is whether or not

there are indicatíons of any evolution in security procedures.

By contrast, evidence emerges which does suggest that the

majority of our sources had a very clear concepÈ of the pre-

cautíons ín operatíon.

One ínterestíng facet of these primary sources is the

attitudes to the issue of securlty revealed Èherein. Much in-

formatíon about this theme is revealed throughouÈ my accounÈ

of security precautions, noÈ least in the variable reactlons of

individual emperors, ranging from outright paranoía to studied

índifference. That reaction in ítself emphasíses the crucíal

ímportance of the emPerorts personalíty ín determíning the

extent to which security precautlons htere imple.menÈed aË the

expense of senatorial libertas. The relationship beÈween these

two factors is an imporÈarit one for the interreaction of

emperor and senaËors, itself a long-term security factor since

it acËed as a barometer for the senaÈorial class of the auto-

cratic nature of each régíme. Members of the senate,imbued

L4 This ís a notable feature of Díots work at times, 9.v.F. Millar. A studv of Cassius Dío. Ox. U.P. L964.

15 c.f. n. 12 above. Other major gaps occur through the lossof large porÈions of Tacitusr Annals and Hl-stories. TheAntonine period as a whole ís also poorly attested.

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16wíth Republican t.raditíons , seem to have viewed the security

strucËure as an ínstrument of oppression, hence the innuendo of

Tacitus agaínst ímperíal pre-empt.ive strikes at Èhe aristocra"yrLT

despite the fact that many will have vier,red Ëhe principate as a

necessary alternatlve to the fratricídal destruction of civí1

r¡rar. In eonsequence, sínce many of our sources 'htroËe with an

oblique and careful pen in an autocratlc atmosphere, our view

of their perceptions ís largely interpretetíve. [,Ie take notice

as much of what we know Ëo have been omítted as of that in-

.l.rd"d.18 Despíte the difficul-tíes, a preliminary conclusion

is apparenË. In general, the arístocracy was fearful of the

emperorfs overwhelrning machinery of seeurity to the extent that

resignation is a coîìmon reactionr19 "d.qrrate

testi'trtony to some

degree of effectiveness.

Nevertheless, there are enough plots known tQ' üs. to

prompt the askíng of questions on the effícÍency of securÍty'

precautions. I,üíth that framework now added, let us begin our

enquiry.

16 see, for example, R. MacMullen. Enemies of the Roman Order.Harvard U.P., L966' ch. 1.

L7 e.g. the famous prima novo p rincf.patt mors of T4c.Ann.13.1

18

and íts predecessor at Tac. Ann" 1.6.

For the difficulties of composf.tion under the princÍpaÈe see,for example, Millarls commenËs on relevant passages i'n Dio,op. cit. , p. 85 .

v. MacMullen op. cÍt. ch. 1-2 and also C.G' Starr.t9Cívílization and Ëhe,Caesars. New York,Norton, 1965,pp. 226, 27I f. and passim, both wÍth relevant cotrments onsuicide.

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CHAPTER TI,TO: REACTION TO CRISIS.

The purpose of Ëhis chapËer ís to sunnarise the

security issues raísed by the detailed descríptíon of in-

dívidual íncidents ín the appendix.l ,h. latter is never-

Èheless a bríef look at the ways ín which security precaut-

ions were breaehed, firstly as an index to Èhe securlty

mechanisms themselves and, secondly, to the diffículties

faced by those responsible for maintaining them. Certain

dÍfferences between successful and unsuccessful plots are

relevant. The issue of successíon is also worthy of dis-

cussíon as a facÈor in the emperorts securíty.

Success, in the case of conspiracies within the palace,

r¡ras more likely if those who controlled access and the flow of

information to the emperor \¡Iere involved, notably his relatl-ves,

domestlc staff consíllum members and personnel of his mllitary

securiÈy fo.""".2 The necessl-ty for Ëhe organísers to be in

such a position of trust or control varies accordíng to the

The appendix will be referred to Ëhroughout the thesisas a means of avoiding repeËitious description of círcum-sÈances. References wí1l be framed as in the followíngexarnple, "q.v. app. (3) t'. My concern in chapter two isto generalise from that evidence as a r^ray of pointing ouËthe direcËions of enquiry, íe. obviously,it would be use-ful to read chapter thro ín conjunction with the appendix.

ttPalacett is used in the sense of palatíum, a generic termfor buildings used by the emperor as resídence and head

1

2

quarters, g.v. Míllar, F . The Emperor in the Roman world.London, Duckworth, L977, pp. L9-22. Consequently, includedare events aÈ app. (4), (11), (29), (36), (45).

-9-

means used to murder an íncumbent. If poíson is to be used,

it is necessary merely that personal atËendants, poison

tasters and physJ-cians in particular, be recruited to betray

Ëheir *aster.3 If open violence is to be used, obviously

Ëhe process is facl-litated by bodyguards beíng diverted or

índuced to act against their supreme "orr"rrd"r.4

Especially

dangerous was the involvement of the praetorian prefect as

is suggested by the number of successful plots in whl-ch he ís5ínvolved.- Selection and treatment of such an offícial, who

could bring dornn an emperor by averting hís "eyes and ears",

was of paramount ímportance. Similarly, farnlly facËíon could

be critÍcal.6 Yet it ís notable that no successful large

scale movement involves members of Ëhe ímperial familyJ E*p.tot"

r¡rere careful it seems Èo give po\¡rer largely to designated

heirs, people without motive for usurpation.S The younger

3

4

5

v.CD

v.

app. (4), (11)' (19)' (10¡' (41)' c.f. Herodian 3.]-5.2'76.t4app. (13), (24), (42), (72), (44), (45), (47), (48).

v. app. (13), (19), (30), (41), (42), (45). Yet note thatonly BurrusrPetronius Secundus (d.4.D.97) and Aemilius Laetussurvived to influence later evenÈs.

v. app. (4) , (11) , (19) , (44) , (47) .

Of course, the success of Elagabalus ín A.D. 218 ls stronglyrelated to the fact thaÈ hls great-uncle was SeptirniusSeverus, founder of the dynasty r¿hl-ch held power príor toMacrinus, g.v. app. G6).e.g. Gaius and Lucíus, grandsons of Augustus; Tiberius;Germanicus; Drusus The Elder and Drusus The Younger;Titus; Hadrían; Couutodus, the father of Lucius Verus.

6

7

8

10-

ones íri particular had distínguished retínues whose members

were firmly loyal to Èhe .*n"tot.9

That Èhe majority of successful plots involved con-

spiracy from within pronpts the question wheËher securíty

groups were themselves successful against outsíders. Un-

successful plots índicate thaË Èhe actlvíty of the bodyguard

forces \nras not alone responsíble for the continued safety of

Ehe emperor, all of whích forces us to ask what their real

value r^ras as security corps. Theír forËé seems to be ín

suppression of a plot rather than the detection of ít in the

first place, a process more dependenÈ upon the private initiat-

ives of the delator. Once detected, a plot r¿as usually mopped

up with rut.hless efficíency, bY praetoríans in the main i-t

would """*.10 Inítial índications are, Ëherefore, that the

securíty forces are intended to lnhibit or react to critícal

events raÈher than detect them direetly and aggressívely.

Thís construction of conspiracíes failíng primaríly

through early betrayal ís afforded some confirmation by a

series of íncidents that did not exist in fact but only in

the mínd of the person wishíng to have another elimínated.

Some are more realístícally interpreted as attempts by Èhose

in influence to conËrol the flor^r of information and so secure

the successíon than plots by legal or 1íkely heírs against

dying r.n.11 Those which fall ínto the more routine pattern

9 e.g. retinue of Gaius in 2 8.C., of Drusus tn A.D. 14 (incl.Sejanus, praeËorian prefect) q.v. ch. 9 p. 204.

10 When praetoríans are ínvolved, either another group is used,q.v. app. (9), or praetoríans less likely to have beeñ. ón'fluen-ced by the traitor (q.v. (43)).

11 v.r e.B.rapp. (4).

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of plots provide an unusual glance at the l^7ay emperors them-

selves imagined threats being made on theír own lives. As

official versions of already suppnessed plots they needed to1t

be plausible.^-

One specific area that requires more detaíled treat-

ment at Ëhis point ís that of the succession which, although

essentially long-term in sígníficance' certainly applies to

short-term procedures and brings into prominence Ëhe political

implications of the praetorian guardrs security funcËíorr".13

Heirs to po\,üer already in possession of imperium

rarely faced significant problems, the salutation of the

praetoría1 grr".dl4 and confirmatíon by the Senate followíng

very quíckly. The two most insecure of successions in this

regard are t,hose of Nero, (4.D. 54) and Domitian (4.D. 81). Both had

no imperium,des pite other actíons by their predecessors to indícate

them as heirs to their nor"r.15 Nerors faction, however, needed to

ensure that Britannicus did not accede to any pohrer . Afranius Burrus

sole prefect and appointee:l of Agrippina, assured succession by

t

L2

13

v. app. (14), (2L), (22), (34), (38)' (43).

The discussíon here owes much to M. Hammond. The trans-missíon of the powers of Èhe Roman emperor from the deathof Nero ín A.D. 68 to that of Alexander Severus in 4.D.235'MAAR 24, 1956, 61 - 133.

The praetorlan guardt s choice was usually followed by thelegions. Note,ín A.D. 69,the German armies asking thepraetoríaris to select a successor to Galba (Suet. Galba 16);Èhe Syrian trooPs sent symbolic clasped hands in homage(Tac. Híst. 2 .8) . c. f. Durry, op. cít. , p . 372.

Hammond, op. cit., pp. 65 f, 83 ff; also app. (19)'(2e) .

L4

15

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havíng Nero acclaímed by the excubiae cohort at the palace and

then at the praetorian camp. At the Senate, Claudlusr wÍ1l \,ras not

read (CD 61 .I.Ð.16 In Domitían's case, his status as unofficíal ,

defacto,heir to the power of Ehe childless Titus, who wanted his own

heír, necessitated quíck actíon on the emperorts death. Domitian

sought support from the milítary at the praetorian camp before

going Èo the Senate. Such insecurity r¡Ias largely elíminated in

the later part of the era under consideration after the joint

accession of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. At the deaths

of Lucius Verus (4.D. 169), Marcus Aurelius (4.D. 180) '

Septímius Severus (4.D. 211) and Geta (4.D. zLZ) ' theír

colleagues as Augusti simply carríed on r,vithout the Potentially

traumatíc necessity for troop salutations or confirmation of

their porüers as heirs by the senate. tr'lhere the heir does have

imperium, changes to key administrative or securiÈy personnel

are rarely radical or frequent.lT

Succession through vícËory in civíl war we will

largely ígnore since it is the legíons who have the final say.

A few ínterestíng poínts are to be made, however. In three

such cases ít is Ëhe defectíon of Èhe praetorian guard and

other securíty forces whl-ch seals the fate of the emperor ulÈim-

.t.1y.18 rn A.D. 68 and 193 the SenaËe is sufficiently moved

to declare Nero and Dídius 'Juliairus, respecÈively, as heglis. At

the end of those two periods of dísruption, major reconstruction

T7

c.f. app. (f1). Gaius Caligula sought Macrols supportto ensure succession.

c.f. removal of Narcissus (Tac. Ann. 13.1), Commodust

attitude to the advisers of his father (CD 72.1.2,Herodían 1. 6), Caracallats reacËíon to the associates ofGeta (CD 77. 4. 1, Herodlan 4- 6).

v. app. (24), (72), (48).

16

18

-13-

of Ëhe urban garrison and the praetorian guard, in particular,

followed.19 Vespasian even gave prefecture of the guard Ëo

senatoríal members of his own famíly as part of this process

which was desígned to ensure firm loyalty to the new régíme

whíle ít consolidaËed its poter.20 The polltícal signiflcance

of the guard meant that as far as possÍble it had to be above

suspicíon.

Conspíracíes at the centre of power, the palace, mosÈ

clearly demonsÈrate the importance of security forces ín the

succession. Even ín cases where Èhe downfall of the prevl-ous

emperor had been connived at by high personnel in the guard

2Land without the approval of rank and file guardsmen, the

support of Èhe guard as an lnstítution remained crucial. Those

aËtempËíng to manípulate events through them needed to exer-

cise extreme caution, even in the case of the praetorian

prefecÈ who was involved Ln ^

pLot-zz

l{ith the politieal ímportance of the guard indicated

ín thts fashion, \{e can on the basls of indicaÈions obtalned

from the survey of the ploLs, noI^I pose pèËtf.n"ent questions about

security issues to direcË our course of enquiry'

19

20

Durry, op. cít., pp. 77 - 89-

í.e. M. Arrecinus Clemens and his son TíÈus, Durry, id''p. 162, l7B; c.f. Plautían under Septimius Severus, Durry,ibid.v. app. (13) ' (30), (41).

v. app. (42), (45) 1-e- the prefect hírnself could notconspire without anxiety of detectl-on' c'f' CD 74' 16' 5'Uy plrpose in dlscussing the succession issue at this lengthhãs- been to point Ëo the necessiËy for famíly members to be

protected under Lhe securlÈy uurbrella. Long-term securítydepended upon the present safety of all'

2L

22

-14-i

rl

¡

J;f¡

fl

Information control fs of key ímportance. trrlho

controlled its flow? How and by whom was ít acqulred? trlhat

were the príoríties of such a system? tr'Iho analysed Ëhe ín-

formation? What sources of ínformation enabled plots to be

suppressed? I,rlhat is the role of the praetorian guard, here?

Can we evaluate the efficiency of thís sysÈem?

Control of access emerges as an imporËant funcÈion of

securíty forces. Can we develop a relaÈively precise picture

of the manner in whích this was done? Are there any specifíc

targets for such controls? Can we define the nature, numbers

and functíons of varíous securíty groups for the spectrum of

public and prívate circumstances of the emperorts life? Are

there signífícant differences here? If so, why? Is any one

group of particular importance in the maíntenance of personal

securíËy? Is there evídence of cross-checkíng devices upon

such personnel? How ímportant is the manner in which they are

treated?

Is there good evídence for specific securíty tech-

niques? Do we have clear impressíons of Ëhe way in which poison

was guarded agaínst or r^reaPons searched for? Are there special

methods to ensure Èhat urban garrisoú groups are not inter-

fered with? Is there evidence as to those who are permitted

to bear r^reapons close to the emPerorts person? trrlhat factors

or considerations influence the extent to which certain pre-

cautions are implemented at different points? Is any evolution

of securíty procedures apparent over this period?

-15-

How lmportanË is the personaltty of each emperor ln

deËermíning conditions and attfÈudes to his oum security?

Ilow are security precauÈions applied to family members' part-

icularly those important for the successlon?

The evidence cul-led frorn the descriptíon of plots fn

the appendtx has allowed Ëhese quesÈlons to be asked. It wlIl

contínue to be of consfderable value as the securlËy issues

so rafsed are probed in dePth.

,t¡l

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¡i

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II1,

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-L6-

CHAPTER THRNE SPYING AND INTELLIGENCE.

Concern for the emperorrs securlty r^7as not confined to

times of crlsis only. Many crises qrere successfully handled by

the emperor and his agents because routine security procedures

\^rere operative. The collectl-on and use of íntelligence ínform-

aËion, backed up by powerful manpo\^Ier resources, is an import-

ant element of those techníques. Here, we wíll attempt to trace

the machinery of this system and the signÍfícance of the pTocess

for the emperorrs safety. The ways in which oPponents acquir-

ed and used information for their own deslgns wíll also be

dlscussed.

1 DETECTION.

FirsÈ1y, there is need for a brief discussíon of detecÈ-

lon techniques as \^ras alluded to 1n chapter trao. Although

imperial adminlstration is passlve and receptive in the *alrr,1

it is structured to generate information in certaín areas.

NeverËheless the problem was that serlous plotters

did not publiclse theír activíties. Suspicion of someoners

motlves or actívíties could lead to a secret lnvestigatíon.2

On rare occasíons, lnflltratlon of the suspectrs group by

1 q.v. F. Millar The Emperor ln the Roman l¡üorld . L977 .

passim, for this process.

2 Examples are provfded by Ëhe case of Libo Drusus in A.D. 16

and Marcus Aurellus. Precautlons ímplemented against Drusussuggest he was dlstrusted beyond mere suspl-cíon, R.S. RogersCrlmínal Tríals and Criminal Legislation under Tiberius.Am. Phtl. Assoc. monog. No. 6, 1935, pp. 13 ff. Marcussecretly ínvesËigated senaËors and then made his findings

.t

il'!

ùr^

I

t'IF,:i

ft I

publLc, as a prlvilege. (SHA. Marc. Aurel. 10).

-17-{

È

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itì,,lì

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I

i

agents of the emperor could end l-n the leaderrs betrayal,

as occurred in Ëhe case of Clemens in A.D. 16 (q.v. app. (6)).

Alternatively, the tried and proven use of "agetrts provocateurs!'

was very effective. Good examples are recorded under Tiberíus.

Agrippina the Elder and her son' Nero' \^rere encouraged to

foment rebellion at the head of the German armies (Tac. Ann.

4.67). This betrayal by social equals is clearly seen in the

case of Títus Sabinus, who was tricked into treasonable utter-

ances wíth a "friend" whíle accomplices listened ín secret

(Tac. Ann. 4. 68 f). The tale told by Epictetus of the practice

of thís deadly art by plain clothes policemen' during Domitíanrs

reígn shows that this v/as an ever possible and feared situation.3

The Ëerrifyíng effects of such events \¡/ere compounded

by the well known insËítution of delation. I4Iíth ancíent lítíg-

ation dependent upon private initíatfve, since there \'üas no

Lpublic prosecutorts officer- íncentíve for a person to betray

his partners rnras a share of Ëhe condemned mants property.

Regardless of the potential abuses of such " "y"t"ts, ít is

clear Ëhat many plots failed as a result of delatíon. Even if

the numbers of judícial murders resulting hTere not as great as

Tacitus would have us think, \^re cannot doubt the qualitative

Millar, F. Epíctetus and the imperial court. JRS. 55'1965, p. 143.

Modern accounts of value include R.S. Rogers, op- cit.,R.A. Bauman The Crimen Maiestatís in Ëhe Roman ublicand tan Princi aËe. Jo burg, 1 7, and Impíetasin Princípem. hen, L974; also v. Tac. Ann. 3. 28 in

a-Poppaea; c. f. Tiberius¡ state-merit on the sysÈem, Tac. Ann- 4- 30.

There were ttprofessionalstteven here, e.g" Tac' Ann' 6'5'6.7 .

I

3

4

reference Èo the Lex PaPi

5

18-

effect of such occurrences. Freedom of expression is ínhíbíted.

Colleagues are dístrusted. Effective unified opposition Ëo the

emperorrs will, backed as it is by such force, ís Èerrorised

out of the majority of opponenËs. The hístorian Josephus

reveals the anxietíes suffered by the successful eonspirators

against Calígula before Ëhey could confess their feelings.)aÀ ). Ào S

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OOS T 1I òs f ov ßul re r vôevo t ÀÀt¡s

vu

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A more unusual method of detection Èo the modern

reader is Ëhe use of astrology.T YeË, it becomes.logical and

plausible to accepÈ the casËing of horoscopes as a means of

discovering potential conspirators once the alrnost uníversal

belief in fatalistic astrology by the Romans is grasped. A

senator who belíeved ít to be "inevitable" that he was to become

emperor, as a resulË of an astrological predicËf-on, could eas-

ily be tempËed to take fate into his ovm hands by rebelling

or plottíng the emperorfs death. Since fe¡nr aristocrats chose

to advertise such a dangerous horoscoper many emPerors rirent

beyond the use of expulsions of astrologers and of prohibitive

laws. In order to see who represented a possíble threat., they

6 Josephus, A.J. 19. 5f.7 The general acceptance of astrology as the most scientífic

of divination techniques and the politÍcal signíficance ofwidespread belief and use by the upper classes Ís díscussedby F.H. Cramer. Astrology ín Roman Law and Practice"American Phílosophi cal Socíety Memoirs. 37 , L954, passim.

-19-

commissioned horoscopes by court asËrologers unless, as in

the cases of Tiberíus and Hadrian, they were expert enough

to do it themselves.B U*...rtions to pre-empt the possíb-

ility of conspiracy did occur as a result, a notable example

being that of MeËtius Pompusíanus. Vespasian and Títus had

Ígnored his horoscope, placíng greater faith in their own.

Domitian could noÈ do so.9 On the other síde of the coin,

as a counter inËellígence policy, the horoscope of Èhe emperor,

and so the dangerous knowledge of the time of his deaËhrwas

kepË secret. Augustus revealed his ornm very late in hís reign

to quell seditíous rumours that he \nras to die sooner than ex-

_10pected.

Although the methods described thus far are not the

only ones used to gather informatíon abouÈ plotting, the consp-

icuous success of delation in a predominaùË: number of foíled

conspíracíes forces us to assess the extent to vlhich it was

necessary to rely upon ít. Initíally, it must be indicated

how the armed'forces investÍ-gated a plot, once discovered.K¡s¡,¡laãoa

of as yet unknown accompllces was obtained in various rrays.

Tiberius forecast Galbars future elevation and Hadrianplanned a yearfs activities on thís basis. The ínfluenceof astrologers on court life generally was immense. v. Cramer,op. cit., pp. 82, 94, 106, L75. An ínteresting addition tosuch techniques ís the use by Dídius Julianus of crystaL gaz-ing, based on magic, q .v. E.R. Dodds The ancienÈ eoncept ofprogress, and other essays on Greek literature and belief.Ox. U.P. L973. chap. X "Supernormal phenomena ín classicalantiquíÈy", p. 187.

9 Cramer, op. ciË., p. L42 (Mettíus)and passirn. Sirnilar methodsof accusaÈion include the use of dreamsr e.8. app. (14). c.f.Tíberíusr belief he was beíng ínfluenced by magic, CD 57. I5.7

10 CD 56. 25.5 c.f. Septimius Severus concealing detaíls of hisdate of birth, Cramer, op. cit., p. zLL.

I

I

I

8

-20-

I^Ieakness by the first arrested person ín the face of intim-

idation could lead to the beÈrayal of partners.ll U¡d.t th"

early princípate substantial developments were made the cir-

cumventíon of laws which prohibíted the use of the evidence

of slaves against theír *""t".".12 TorËure could then be

used, as it was against the freeborn, including arisÈocrats,

when the emperorfs security vlas "t "ttk..13 The diaries, file's

and correspondence of those ímplícated were a further' particularly

valuable source. An emperor would not be very happy

íf these were destroyed without hís authority.14 NeverËheless,

as reactíons to and reprisals in the face of plots demonstrate'

mílitary action was swifÈ' secure and effective.

Assumíng theír effícíency ín this regard, we must seek

clarifícaËion about their role as invesËigators.

11 Accused persons turning state I s evidence could be a veryimportant source of information in revealíng accomplices,as occurred, for example, ín the aftermath of the conspír-acies of Sejanus in A.D. 31, q.v. Rogers' op. cit.,pp. I24 Í.f., and of Píso in A.D. 65, Tac. Ann. 15.56.

L2 These developments are discussed by R.A. Bauman ImPietas ínpr incipem. München, L97 4, pp . L73 f.f -

v. P. GarnseyRoman Empire.

Social status and lesal privileee in theOx. U.P., L97O, pP. 143 f.f.. This is also

an índicatíon that household members \^rere \¡IorthY targetsof ínvestigators of various kinds.

An early example of such control saw Augustus burn thefíles of M. Antonlus (cD 52. 42. 8), although some vrere

retained and used later, ín fact. c.f. Caligula, Suet" Cal.30. FurËher examples occur with the records of an astrol-oger under Nero (Tac. Ann. L6. L4), of Otho before hissuicide (Tac. Híst. 2. 48) , of Vitellius after his death(Tac. Hist. 4. 4O), of Antonius saturnínus under Domitian(CD 67. 11. 2, destroyed without authority), of AvídíusCassius in A.D . L75 . Even when Ëhe ab istulis of thelatter \^7as capËured, Marcus Aurelíus díd not use the l-nform-ation (CD 7f . 28, 72" 7.4).

13

L4

-2L-

2. ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE AND SPYING.

Although Ëhe emperor l¡/as the focus of a bombardment

of unsolicited ínformat.ion as a result. of being the source of

conslderable beneficia ít is Ëhe sígnifícance of the methods

of collection, processíng and use of solicited admlnistratíve

ínformation that ís of ínterest aÈ thís point.

Such materíal flor¿ed regularly to the imperial officia

through the nature of the organísational structure. Augustus

had begun the process by spreading ímportant Posts among the

less ambitious equestríans and freedmen from his o¡nm familía.

Ultimately, there would be Ëhree relatively independent social

groupings in a variety of important posítíons, with the emperor

controlling tenure and promotiorr.15 Aristocratic admínístrat-

ors in both senatoríal and ímpertal provinces \^7ere eÍther shad-

owed or direcËly underpínned by equestrian or freedman procur-

ators who malntaíned índependent financial control of th. "t"".16Just as Ëhe separation of milítary and financial elements of

administration was crucial to provincial securíty, so ít is in

these Ë\^ro areas thaÈ detalled informatíon \¡/as actively sought

15 0n liberti, v . P.R.C. trrleaver Família Caesaris. CambridgeU.P., L972. 0n equestrians, v. H.-G. Pflaum Les Procura-Ëeurs Eq uestres sous le HauÈ-Empire Romain. A. Maisonneuve,París, 1950. 0n bureaucratic evolution, v. T.F. CarneyBureaucracy ín Traditional Society. Coronado Press, Kansas,L97L.

On control of the fiscus, v. P.A. Brunt. The fiscus andirs development- .,IIRS. 56, 1966, 75 - 91; A.H.M. JonesStudies ín Roman Government and Law. Oxford: Basil Black-well, 1968, ch. 6; F. Míllar. The aerarium and its offic-

L6

ials under Èhe empire. JRS.54, L964, 33- 40.

-22-

and stored in the fíles of the central secretaríat at Rome for

promotion and survelllance nrrtno".".17

The apparent conËent and usage of files at Rome strongly

indícaÈes that all higher government officials and personal del-

egates of the emperor \¡rere expected to send regular reports to

hím about staff and events in the provinces. In a society where

precedents \¡rere gteatLy valued, the enperor savr to it. ËhaÈ immen-

se reserves of such material on individuals, groups, adminl-strat-

ive areas, finance and jurisdictíon \¡Iere maíntained.18 Promotl-on

in mitiËary and civilian administrative posts would. a.p.rra trr.f,

on past performances recorded thereín, a valuable means of main-

tainíng a good 1eve1 of conduct.

By way of dígression Ëo some degree, it is clear Èhat

many emperors wished Èo control the actlvities of senators at

Rome using sím1lar Ëechniques and often on their own ínítíatíve.

More sinlster types of records are well in evidence. Tiberius

kept personal notes on treason tría1s and subsequent enquíries.

Knowledge of their existence intimidated manyriÈ seems, for

Caligula burnt them as a public gesture' only Èo produce copies

later as evidence againsË various people (Suet. Cal. 30, CD 59.10.8).

Calígula had his own collection of personal files held by hts

freedman, Protogenes. A suggestive glance from the latter and

a sÈatement implytng that the senator Scribonj-us Proculus hated

L7 The ab epistulls would have received and filed rouËine re-porËs from governors, while the a líbellis recelved applic-atíons from soldíers for promoËion to the centurl.onate (q.v.GranÈ, op. cit., p. 74). v. trrleaver, oP. cit., pp. 259 ffon these and other secretarial positions.

v. F. Millar The Emperor in the Roman I,rlorld.1Bon fíles, thelr storage and usage.

L977, pp.260 ff

-23-

the emperor were enough to have that man literally torn to

pieces by his fellow senators, terrified but relíeved that

roday it was not their turn (CD 59. 26. L-2).

There were also records of a more publíc nature.

AÈtendance at the Senate and at the empe rorts salutatio was

recorded in published acta so that the public, as well as the

emperor, knew who were fulfilling the obligations of their

ttprivi legett. Absence \^Ias recorded as a beneficium to be ob-

tained or, t.qrr."t.19 The emperor also had consideiable control

over Ëhe freedom of senators to travel outside the areas clos-_20est to Rome.

Senators \^Iere restrícted not least in the area of in-

formatíon f1ow. Taught by painful example, information could

not be acted upon in the Senate withouÈ the emperorts opinion

being knor^¡n. The sunmary executíon of Clutorius Priscus ín

A.D. 21 while the emperor \^ras absent led to a mandatory ten day

)1delay of punishment ín future.-' FurËhermore, there are several

examples of the Senate, despite encouragement to be índependent,

beíng afraíd Ëo make decisíons wiËhout learning the opiníon

of the emperor first.Z2 Decision making was by nor^r largely

L9 on salutaËío v. J.P.V. D. Balsdon Lífe and Leisure in Ancient

20

Rome. London, Bodley Head. L969. pp. 2L - 4.

Besides the ban on Egypt, senators \¡/ere allowed free movemenÈ

only within ltaly, slcíly and Gallia Narbonensis by the timeof blaudius (Suet. Claud. 16 and 23). Note also Tiberius'strictness about regular attendance at the senate (cD 58.2I.2).

Rogersr op. cít., Pp. 63 f.Under Tíberius we find a senator keeping mínutes for him (Tae.Ann.5.4). Under Nero, the consuls díd not dare put amotíonto the vote wíËhout consulÈíng the emperor (Tac. Ann.13.26).Before Vespasian returned to Rome in 4.D.70, Helvidius Priscustríed to prompt senatorial independence withouÈ success. (Tac.

HísË. 4. 6-8).

2L

22

_ t/, _

out of senatorial hands, except for those staËesmen who

advised the emperor as members of his consilium.23

Political control, both insíde and outsíde Rome,

was based, therefore, on control of informatíon, Ëo a cons-

iderable degree. AdrninísËratíve material flowíng to and from

the provinces r¡ras transported by an elaborate courier system

evolved by Augustus and known as the cnt"rr" Prrbli.,r".24

Pfl.aumr s work looks at possíble precedents for the system,

its organisational structure, uses and relatíve efficiency.

Among Ëhe most ímportant conclusions of that work for our pur-

poses is that the system r^/as designed exclusively for the

emperorts personal edíflcatíon, carrying boËh routíne and more

urgent messages to hím by rapÍd t.rarisportation.25 ,h" courier:i

personally took the message over the entíre route and thus was

able to add comments from his personal observaËíons, if necessary'

23 v. J.A. Crook Consilium príncípis. Cambridge U.P. 1955.p assim. The consilium could perform probouleutíc functíons,liaising wíth the Senate, testing opínion etc.v. H.-G. Pflaum- Essaí sur le cursus publicus sous le Haut-Empire Romaín, in Mémoires présenLés par divers savants àLrAcadémíe des Inscriptíons et Belles LetËres de LÍ InsÈitutde France, 188 - 390; A.M. Ramsay. The speed of the Rou¡an

imperíal post. JIRS- 15, L925, 60 - 75.

25 I^Iíth regular sÈoppíng stations and horse-changing stopsalong the great roads of the empire, a courier could traversevast dístances at the average speed of 50 miles per day, veryfast for routine land transport ín antiquíty. q.v. Ramsay,op. cít., passim and C.A. Yeo. Land and sea transPortaÈíonin imperial ltaly. TAPA. 77, 1946, 22L - 244.

24

_25_

hence the origin of their double role as courier and spy.

Different types of courier \¡rere used at differenÈ times, be-

gínnlng with a combination of civílian tabellaril and military

speculatores. 26 ,n" milítary elemenÈ increasíngly predominated,

27particularly after the use of frumentarii non-praetorian

commissariat offícers from the legions whose experience and

norrínal independence from Èhe guard gave a wider span of lnfor-

mation sources to the emperor. I,{íth the messengers used by adrnin-

istÍattve bureaux aÈ Rome for short distance communícation,

such díversifícation enabled the emperor Ëo receive independent

sources of j-nformatíon (alËhough perhaps from overlapping sþheres

of influence) which would be very hard for one official to con-

trol and so abuse, perhaps.

The importance of control of this system to the emperor

ís revealíng. Rígorous conditíons for íts use and penalËles for

mísuse were imposed. Only a limited number of passports

(díplourata) were lssued Ëo each governor' wíth only the enperor

and, interestinglY, the praeÈorian prefecË otherwlse able to

authorlse usage. Nymphidius Sablnus, for example, was able to

prevent the consuls usíng it in A.D. 68 to lnform Galba of his

offícía1 accession. Even wtth Ëhe creaÈion of a freedman offic-

ial to conÈrol some aspects of the issue of passports (the

a díplornatíbue) and an equestrian to control transporÈation

aefecËus vehiculo , ulËímate authority remaíned exclus-

ively with those initíally responsible. All passports bore the

26

27

v. GranË¡ op. cít., passim; Durry, oP. cit., pp. 108 ff-

v. I{.G. Sinnig€n. The origlns: of the frumentarii. }'IAAR.27'L962, pp.2L3 - 224. They are also discussed by Grant andDurry, but the reign ln whlch they were first used as spiesremains uncertaín.

-26-

emperorrs seal and an expíry date.

The postal system was also designed so Ëhat any inter-

ference \^rith ít or any faílure of certain couríers to maintaín

thelr schedule very quickly alerted the emperor that something

\^ras hrrong. The governor of Spain in A.D. 68, Galba, virtually dec-

lared \irar upon hís emperor Nero by ínterceptíng a letter not

intended for hlm, although he was aI¡Iare thaË it ordered his

execuËion (suet. Galba 9). Thís had been dírected because

Galba was gullty of not fulfillíng a function for which the

postal system was also used. Regular. rePorts \^lere expected of

governors not only upon their o!ùrt province but also on those near-

by, íf anything unusual was occurríng. Galba had failed to re-

port that a rebellion led by Vindex had begun in Gau1. Sirnílarly'

'offÍcfals within a province could report suspicious

behavíour, partícularly by the governor. The rebellíon of

Vitellius 1n A.D. 69 was reported by the financial procuraÈor

in Gaul. The message v/as sent by the State Post (Tac. Híst. L.I2),

Also, 1t is clear that there \^lere checks to ensure that

the post. was used only for officíal purposes, as PerLinax dis-

covered prior to his accession (SHA Pert. 1). Except'in the most

flagrant of circumsÈances (Tac.Híst. L.67), holrever, private

communication through the posÈal servíce may have been.difficult

Èo prove. AttenËiveness by their subordinates will have allowed the

emperor to minimise the possibility of commanders allying

therrrselves against hirn (c.f . p. 21 supra). Some generals v/ere'

nevertheless, able to conmrrnicate wÍth each oÈher if they

_27

\¡rere persist.ent enough and prepared to take Èhe rísk. Cent-

urions or other officers on leave could make the contact' as

\^ras suspected of Tiberlus whíle he was ín voluntary exlle on

the island of Rhodes from 6 B.C. to A.D. 2. Tiberius demanded

to be supervísed in order to prevent such suspícions taking

root ln the rnínd of Augustus (sueÈ. Tib. L2). other sources of

corrnunicatlon could be prívate leËters directed vía famíly in

Rome or even by merchants, friends and the like. IË was perhaps

after realísing the potential of a netr¡ork of support among the

former legionary legates of the greaË Neronian commander, Corbulo,

that the lat.ter r¡ras sumnoned to Greece 1n A.D. 67 and forced

to suicide with the commanders of the German ".*i.".28 Some

alliances were only revealed after a plot was felt to be naturing.

Reprisals Irere made or Lhreatened agaínst provincíal governors

after the downfall of the prefects Sejanus 1n A.D. 31 and Perennis

in A.D. 185.

It ís clear that Ëhe courlers ï7ere used as sPies'

although Èhere is no índícatíon that they acted or were trained

ín the fashion of modern ag"rrts.29 The manner fn which the

praetorlan é1ite sPeculatores or the legl-onary frumentarii

gathered ínformatíon is a matter of speculation. In the provinces

28 Secret surveíllance of the mail is aÈtested under Hadrlan(SHA. Hadr. 11) and in more Seneral fashlons, Tac. Ann.16.10, Tac. Hist. 1. 85. For Corbulots nexus, v. R' Syme

Tacítus (2 vols.) Ox. U.P. 1958, Appendíx 84.

29 v. V. Marchettí and J.D. Marks The CIA and the Cult ofIntelligence. London, CoroneË. 1976. passim, where the pre-domínant lmportance of open data co llecËlon 1s also stressed.At Rorne, bureaucratíc surveíllance Seems to have had some

ínhíbítive effect. Nevertheless, cloak-and-=dagger spyinghas some spectacular successes.

-28-

it ¡.rould be a matter of keeping theír eyes and ears open'

generally observing events and talking to theír local peers

who were able to maíntain constant surveíllance on events

at their base. Plalnclothes t.echniques have been alluded to

r1"o.30 Access to informaËíon was probably attained through

the slaves, freedmen and clients of ímportant p"op1..31 rt

is possible Ëhat they had pohTers of interrogation'32

The operation of these men closer to the modern methods

of spying occurs rnainly ín the civil war periods, A'D' 69 and

A.D. Lg3-7 ín parÈícular. Only then do we have a situation

which closely resembles the fearful competitíon of modern

SuPerPoI¡IerS.

It is only at these times that we have Èestimony for

the usage and need of codes. Information travels long distanc-

es at a time when Ëhe emperor for once does not monopolíse dt

overwhelming maJoríty of physícal force. Any communicatlons

falling ínto the hands of the pretender could cause problems.

To take an earlier example, ín 30 B.C. Octavian was sti11 wary

enough of the stabillty of the siEuatíon despíte hís vÍctory

at Actíum, Ëhat he sent instructl-ons to Agrlppa at Rome in

"od..33 rn A.D. 69 otho used plainlanguage code as a means

30 That they normally \irore a uniform is suggested by the flightin disguíse of the defeated Macrínus, q.v. app. (40¡.

31 Interesting in this respect, perhaps, ís Senecats discont-inuation of hís saluËaËio (Tac. Ann. L4.56). Was he cuttingoff ¡ source of information Èo Nero, who \¡Ias noül hosÈile to hirn?

32 The direct successors of the frumentarii Èhe agentes in rebusof the late Roman empire, díd heve such por,rrers, g.v.t^i.C. Sinnigen. Two branches of itre Later Roman secret servíce.Aü.80, 1959, 238 - 254.

33 CD 51. 3. 7.

_29_

for hís freedman, Onomastus, to announce in Galbats presence

that the plotters were ready (Tac. Híst. 1. 27), Simllarly,

in Ëhe same year, we find the Flavian party smugglíng ín-

formation ín and out of Vltellian Rome (CD 65. 18. 2). Our

evidence for the use of secreË inks is less secure. Its

possíbility lies maínly in the fact that Ovid tells us it I s

the only r^ray to contact your lover if he or she is m"ttied.34

In the same perlod, agents T¡Iere senË on símple

reconnaíssance míssions by Vitellius, for examplerwho needed

torture and a suícide to be convinced of the results.35 More

common aÈ such a Ë1me were attempts to assassinate Èhe enemy

leader since a revolt usually collapsed Ëhen. Galba (Tac.

Hist. 1. 7), Otho and Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 1. 75), VesPasían

(Suet. Galba 23), Didtus Julianus, Septimius SeverusrPescennius

Niger and clodius Albinus (cD 73. 15. 3, s.H.A. Dtd. Jul.5)

all tried such a move or were fearful of it. Success was

exÈremely lírnited perhaps due to extraordinary precautions

taken at such t1*e".36 The men used in such attempts r^Iere

assigned due Ëo their experience as assassins and executioners

2Ars Amatoría. III. 627 f. c.f. Loeb edltion L979. p. 162. n. I.34

35

36

Tac. Híst. 3. 54 cf. 2.96. This 1s one of the few in-dlcaËtons we have íncidentally that such emíssarÍes, atleasË on missions of special importance, reported directlyto Ëhe emperor. cf. Suet. Tib. 22.

e.g. those of Septírnius Severus, CD 73. 15.3. Less dangerousto the emperorIs ímmedl-ate security was the infÍltration ofËhe city or of camPs to acquire Ínformatíon or Ëo spreadïumour, for ínstancerHerodj.an 2. L2, cf. Vitelllusf distrustof the evídence of spíes who had been given a guided tourof Èhe advancíng Flavian armyts camp, Tac. Hist. 3. 54.

-30-

ín more sËable times. Certainly, theír vicÈíms could offer

less resistance then. Clearly it is here that speculatores,

frumentaríl and praeËorian offÍcers had a major ínhibiti:ve

effecË. If there rnlas an arísËocrat of excessive ambítion,

a senator convlcted of plotting, an exiled person too dang-

erous Ëo alloru to líve because he might become the focus of

a rebelll-on, or even a member of the ímperial farnily Èoo far

out of line, it was men such as these who saw to the execut-

ion, or the "suicíde."37 At tímes Ëhe emperor had the operat-

ion supervísed by an imperial freedman but thís was rarely38necessary. ¡uch men dld not often .tt.39 Thís would seem

to stress once more the repressive and inhibitíve role of

milítary "spies" agaínst Ëheir ínvestl-gatíve functíons.

A less dramatic extension of this role is the sur-

veíllance of imporÈant exile"r40 " function most frequently

fulfilled by praetorians, ít would seem. In partieular, thís

meant members of the ímperíal farnily who had fallen inËo

37 The role of praetorian officers in Èhis area 1s more fullydiscussed in ch. 10 pp. 237 ff , with detailed examples.

v. app. (16) or the case of Rubellius Plautus and SullaFell-x, Tac. Ann. 14. 59. Similarly visual proof wasnecessary at tímes, hence the transportation of heads tothe emperorfs sight, €.g. Tac. $tt. 14.59, Tac. Ann. 14.64,Tac. Híst. L. 44, CD 7L. 27. 3-.c.f. Tac. Híst. 2. 63 f..

Not all exiles ü/ere supervised. It seems to have fallento the Urban CohorËs Ëo ensure that none re-entered Rome,q.v. F.C. Mench The Cohortes Urbanae of Imperíal Rome:an Epigraphic Study. 1968. p. 499; aLso Tac" Hl-st - 2-63-

39

40

38

-31 -

disgrace. For example, Agrippa Postumus (app. (5))' Julia

the Elder (Suet. Aug.65), Agríppina the Elder and her son,

Nero (SueË. Tíb. 54, 64), and Octavla (Tac. Ann. 14.60 ff)

were all kept under sËrict supervislon, all being potenÈial

foci of opposition (c.f. apP. (1) and (6)). People banished

to islands would obvíously find ít difficult to ."."p..41

Those close Èo Italy, to whieh members of the imperial family

hrere sent in partlcular, were probably kept under regular

supervision by the Misene fleet as Part of its regular patrol

duËies ln the area.

To return to Rome, it must be pointed out by way of

balance that public communícation was l-mmensely important to

the emperor. Sources of such l-nf ormat.lon are as varied as

the public activities of the emperor. At the ludÍ' r¿hich

were íncreasingly contïolled to the emperorrs exclusíve ad-

vantage, popular opiníon could be g,o,uged and occasionally

villains betrayed42 "1rr"" publíc expressiorl T¡Ias largely tol-

erated Êhere. Sirnílar1y, petitions from every social strat-

43um-" provlded information abouÈ other grouPs, including PTov-

íncial governors. These !üere presented At occasions such as

4I There were increments of penalËy fot attempts to escape'as may have occurred with Crassus under Hadrian, SHA Had. 5.6.

ch. 6.''PP. 160 ff .

Suet. Nero 20, 23i

43 An exËraordlnary example with application to security is theapplícation by 120 rnen for reward over Galbars death. Allhrere execuÈed by Vítellius through thís written evldence.Tac. Hist. 1. 44.

42 For more detailed dlscussíon of the ludl' v.For open conÊrol of public expressioû, e.8.CD 63. 10. 1o. c.f. Suet. TiÈ. 6.

-32-

the salutaËio, the 1udí, while the emperor \^ras travellíng,

at officlal reception .of embassíes, at the dístributíon of

largesse and, in fact, on most publlc appearances where the

emperor was accessibl..44

FurËher important sources are the many peoPle ln

constant attendance upon the emperor such as members of the

consilium wÍth their vast social contacts, freedmen and such

attendants who were in a good posiËion to control Ëhe flohl

of informaËíonr45 "orrttiers such as actoïs, intellecÈuals

and the astrologers. Control at. such a hígh level becomes

increasingly difflcult. There is doubtless some ínformal

cross-checkíng by jealous fellow courtiers, ambitious for

themselves. The ideal setting for much of this informatlon

is soclal. Banquets and other such gatherings would have

been parËicularly valuable for a grapevine system. There are

tales of arisËocrats not belng sufficiently cautíous over

Èhel-r cups and giving themselves away as a resutt.46

Taking into accounË the emperorts sources of inform-

ation, it is self-evídent' nevertheless, Ëhat the way in which

these \^rere processed, controlled and used was of crucial im-

portance.

For Ëhese circumstancesr v. ch. 6, passirn, ín particular.v., ê.8. r app. (14), (16) ' (38).

An interesting contrast ís provided by Tíberius I appoint-

44

45

46ment of Piso as raefectus urbi the final test beingpassed when ít was clear that Èhe candidate could becounÈed upon after drinkíng wíne for two solid days, SuetTíb. 42.

-33-

Decision making ü/as a complex process dependent

upon the quality of analysís of informaÈfon, any stage of

which \¡/as open to corruptíon for various Purposesrranging

from conspiracy to atËempts by officials to consolidate wealËh

and influence by arranglng events for others. Although ít is

apparent that the emperor personally read much ÈhaË \¡/as sentL1

to him,-' there can be no doubË that various of Èhe libertine

and equestrían secretaries hrere aË times commissloned to do

substantive work for easy ingestion by the "tn.tot.48Reviews of personnel ftles for promotion purposes is one such

example. The more notorious of these men Iirere renowned larg-

ely for "brr"."49

and, more rarely, valuable long-te.* ".trrí"".50There was only so much that an emperor could do in the way of

cross-checks upon such top personnel.

That. some individuals or groups could aspire to ímmense

poT^rer through an extraordínary degree of control over the in-

formatíon system is well aËtested' yet largely in cases where

the emperor allows thís Ëo occuï of hl-s own wi1l. Praetorl-an

,prefec¡s are cases in point. In additíon to holding routine conË-

rol of informatÍon through theír influence over the posËal and

praetorian couríer systems, prefects such as Sejanus, Macro,

47

48

v. F. Míllar. Emperors at work. JRS. 57, 1967, 9 - L9.

Tíme and work load are surely crucíal factors. Unusualand resented, slgníficantly, was the very close watch oversuch events kept personally by Antoninus Pius, SHA Ant.Pius 6.

49 e.g. t,he a rationíbus Pallas, whose personal fortuner^7as vast, Q.v. trrleaver, op . cít . , p. 283 f..

50 c.g. the father of Claudius Etruscus' a member of the imper-ial famílía from Tiberius to Doml-tían, finally holdíng thep ost- a-ÎãEioníbus also. q.v. I¡Ieaver ibid.

-34-

Perennis and Plautían aËtained exÈraordínaríly incre-ased

control in cases where the retírement or acquiescence of the

emperor allows them Èo act as ímperial depuË1es. ImperfecÈ

control is evident ín each case, neverthel."".51 Similarly,

the power of a secretary such as Narcíssus \^/as not to be taken\)

lightly.-- Again, Seneca, the great amicus of Nero, in con-

juncÈion with the prefect Burrus, hlas able to control much

imperial decislon rnakíng in the fírst half of the relgn.53

Indeed, the importance of advísers and amíci l-n such proc-

esses should not be underestimated. !üidely experienced in

civil and rníl1tary adml-nistraËion, they provided a steadyíng'

tradíÈion-orientated ínfluence upon the handll-ng of materíal

and the creation of po11.y.54 Less statesmanlike fígures,

indeed anyone in close proxímiÈy to Ëhe emperor, could exerË

strong influence, nevertheless. Lesser members of the

faríliar55 actors and enterÈainersr56 "orr"rrbines "rrd

tív""57

51 v. app. (9), (11), (38), (+:¡. c.f. Titus, app.(27),SueË. Tit.652 v. app. (19). The faction of Agrippina felt the need Ëo dis-

tract Narcissus, so vigíla¡rt was he. c.f. apP. (16).

53 v. J. Crook Consllium Principis. Cambridge U.P. 1955.pp. 45 ff.

54 Nevertheless, the controls placed upon the Senate cannot havebeen wíthout thelr influence upon them. OuÈspoken advice wlllnot have been wise. For Ëhe emperorts weapon of renuntiatloamicítíae Bauman, op. cit., pp. 109 ff. Rivalry betweenadvisers could be dangerous, as well as valuable, e.g. Caecinaand Valens in A.D. 69, Tac. HisÈ. 2.93' 3.36.

55 esp . cubicularíl q.v. app. (30) , (38) , (40) , (41) .

56 e.g. the pantomime, París, who ínformed agaínst Agríppina forDomitía, Nerots aunt, and I¡,ras Saved from the results of calumnlaby his popularity with the emperor (Tac. Ann. 13. i9 -'22¡'t.

57 They obËained audience easíly, iË seems, e.g. AD 48 and 190(app. (16) and (40)). Also v. ch. 7 pp. L82 f .

,v

-35-

are all attesÈed in crj-tical situations. The emperor \rras

vulnerable Èo a huge varíety of pressures' it would seem,

and was yeË responsible if a bad decislon was made.

Evidence that the emperor suffered eíLher in public

image or in personal safety as a result of manipulation of

ínformation, or "disínformat.lon"r58 abo.rrrd". A notable example

is the deaÈh of Valerius Asíatlcus under Claudíus after cír-

cumstances of hís tríal, held i ntra cubiculum were engineered

by advisers workíng wíth Messalina.59 Sírnilarly, Claudíust

judgement aË the receptlon of an embassy was influenced by the

deliberate mistranslaËíon of theír \^rords by Narcíssus (CD 60.33.6).

Disinformation lecl to the deaths of at least Èhree "tn.tot"r60

tllustrating that decisions of the emperor could be vital to

his security. Vespasian, ít seems' hlas wise enough to realise

that he could be deceíved or unlnformed in certain cases

(Suet. Vesp. 15).61

Even so few examples demonsËrate quite clearly the

emperorrs need to exercise certain controls, beyond Ëhe

assumption that personnel appointed by him were probably loyal

to hís lnterests. Some techniques vrere essentially bureau-

cratic. By subdívidíng adrninísËrative departmenÈs and areas'

and by increasing the number of senlor officers with over-

lappíng po\^rers ín those areas, the emperors had more sources

I¡

rì|

¡

It

ïII

I

ì

I

58

59

For the term "disinformatíont', v. V. Marchetti and J.D. MarksThe C.I.A. and the cult of intelligence.. London, CoroneË.L976. ch.6.v. D. MacAlindon. Claudlus and the senators. AJP.78, L957,p. 285.

q.v. app. (25) , (30), (44) .

c.f. Suet. Claud. 16.3 where it emerges very clearly thatthe emperor vras acutely embarrassed in publl-c by the poorinvestigative work of his agents t

60

6L

magna inquis itorum neglegen tia sed suo maiore dedecore

-36-

of information upon símilar events and, conversely, officials

had a limited conÈrol over the flow of informatl on.62 It

r^ras Èo the emperorts advantage íf no single Person could

exercise complete control of that flow.

Equally important was the necessity to take care

wlth the out.flow of confldential material . Restrictlons rr¡ere

lncreasingly felt in all areas of government. as the emperorrs

role extended. Financial staÈements rationes i ril- vrere

no longer issued after the early Julio-Claudían "t".63 The

trial of Piso in A.D. 20 raised to ltght the prínciple that

the correspondence between Ëhe emperor and the governors of

hís provinces was not to be revealed publicly at any cost

(Tac. Ann. 3. L4). At moments of crisis, such as the succession,

milítary force was used to ensure no such leakage of Lnformat-

iron.64 That technique was bruÈally used in more routine

circumstances a1so, naked force setting sternexamples. A slave

of Augustus had both of his legs broken for leaking lnformatÍon

(Suet. Aug. 67). Simílarly, an inÈellectual coúTtlerunder

62 As a result of arl-stocratic uncertainty pri-or to knowledge ofthe emperorrs íntentíon, increasÍngly unsollcited and, aLtimes, discouraged consultatlon by governors meant more lossof independence to imperíal lnÈerference' q.v. Garnsey, op. cít.p. 81 f.SueË. Cal. 16.

Important examples occur in A.D. L4, 54, LI7, q.v. ch. 2

p.11 ff. This was a momeritary paradox, of course. Once anhel-r was chosen, advertisement üIas imporÈanÈ to securíty (.e.g.the heír was princeps l-ùventutís). SuccessÍon lÈself was dis-played by a number of vtèual signals such as seal rings (e.9.23 8.C., Grant, op. cit., p. 43), a dÍamond ring (Hadrian fromTrajan, SHA. Hadr. 3. 7; it was not officíal, B.trrl . HendersonThe Life and Príncí te of the eror HadrLan. A.D. 76-138.London, Methuen, L9 3. pp. , 33) or a statue o t goddessFortuna in the imperl-al bedroorn (q .v. M. Hammond. The Antonine

l{

rìþ

I¡t'

Itt

,]

II

I

I

ü

tti

luT,

I

63

64

Monarchy. Rome, American Academy. 1959. p. 100).

-37-

Tíberius who trled to ascertaín the emperorrs reading material

for Ëhat evening s dinner questÍons was forced Ëo sulclde

(Suet. Tib. 56). The same care with information was expected

of close advisers, such as Fabíus Maximus, who was alleged to

have díed shortly before the death of AugusÈus as a result of

an índiscretion in regard to Agripp" Po"trltrr".65 Such warnings

aside, the emperorts wisest course \.ras to restrict knowledge

of decisíons to as few as necessary until the course of action

r,rras undervray. Consequently, unless the emperor wished other-

wise, the Senate could be quíte in the dark on certaín issues

66ot rmporEance.

Before giving an overall assessment of the surveillance systen,

its relevance to the emperorrs personal security and the role of

urban security forces ín it, two more areas need to be discussed.

Our perspectíve will be extended by a brief examination of the

manner in which the emperorts opponent6 obtained and used

infornaÈion against him, and also by an evaLuation of the limitations

of the sysÈem.

65 c.f. app. (5) and artícle by Pappano (1941).- Note also the fal1 from grace of Maecenas in Ëhe aftermath

of the Caepio/Murena affair of 23/22 B.C., possibly overthe leakage of information, q.v. app. (50).

66 At the same time it could ensure that Ëhe implementatíonof the emPerorrs orders relevant to thaÈ body was notabused, c.f. its reactlon to Macro shortly before Tiberiustdeath, Bauman, op. cit., P. L34.It ís unnecessary Èo explore the ímplementaÈion of imperíaldirectives ín depth at this point. Actl-oned by the same

personnel as Ëhose who transmitted ingoi-ng ínformation,the process is subject to very similar potential for abuse

and similar cross-checking systems.

I

I'

$

t

-38-

3. THE INFORMATION OF OPPONENTS.

Publicly available lnforrnatlon about the emperor I s

locatlon, activity and characterístíc conduct was, in fact,

quíte substanËial. His schedule of public appearances, his

meËhod of travel, the level of securíty precautions lmple-

mented ín certain círcumstances wíll have been relatively well

known to the majoriÈy. Such a situation natuTally has bonuses

and drawbacks. It also tends to assume, as lndicaLed prev-

iously, Ëhat hriËh publíe contact occurring in well defined

patterns, the presence of security forces ís deslgned to in-

hibit and, if necessary, react to crises. Public feeling

required thaÈ access not be cuÈ off, whether at religious

festivals, banquets, judíeíal sessions eËc. Plotters too

could assess their chances of escape.

Other information could be obtained from grapevine

sources and methods such as astrology, with its ínherent

dangers. The ludi gave people good indication of Ëhe emperorts

character and of hís popularity. It is relaËed, for instance,

that Cassius Chaerea and his accomplices r¡Iere encouraged by

the hostílity to the violent quashing of public protesÈ at

Call-gulats ne\^r taxation measures. (Jos. AJ 19.25 ff.).

Precise ínformation about the emperorrs location

could also be obtained from the elaborate travel schedules,

publlshed in advance of a major imperial journey so as to

allow careful planning of provisionlng at various poinËs. Such

plans r^rere not always fulftlled, however, as the subjects of Tibe.rius

I

iI

þ--

'ltf,

I

I

tII

-39-

67hrere r^/ell a\^rare (Suet. Tib. 38, CD 58. 1. I ). Grant

(op. cit. p. L75) conjecËures ËhaË lt ¡¿as on thí.s basis that

the Vinícían consplracy of A.D. 66 may have been planned.

Often more dangerous than such publíc sources trere

types of ínformation t.hat the emperor díd not wish to reveal.

Unfortunately for him, the very people to whom Èhís was

entrusted could become the source of some anxíety as the people

best able to explolt lnside ínformation. Measures to prevent

the leakage of informatlon (p . 36 f ¡ were least effectlve

when Èhose responsible f or their maintenance 'hrere involved.

The key factors behind successful plots are often closely related

to Ínformatlon supplied by the emPerorts close attendants' freed-

men secretaries, securlty personnel, amicl- and relati-ra".6B

Outstandíng examples are the assassinaÈions of Domitl-an (q.v.

app. (30) and Commodus (q.v. app. (4f¡¡ each of which included

several such people whom the emperor had alienËated. The most

dangerous ínformation in such circumstances is knowledge of

(and control, in the most successful instances) the conditions

of access.

67 The vísual manifesÈation of arrival at cities on the Journeywas Èhe adventus q.v. ch. 6 pp. L42 f. One possibledeliberate departure from the practice o f publishing a

schedule occurred ín A.D. 39. Caligula hastened northrwithno príor announcement' to put dor^m the suspecËed plot ofGaetulícus before it could mature. How he would stop all news

of his advance gettíng Ëo that governor is not clear, however.q.v. app. (5'1) .

68 c.f. ch. 2 pp. 8 ff The ínformatíon supplíed by Clemensin the first years of Tiberíusr reign seems to have been ofvalue to others, although his aristocratic associaÈes werenot Ëraced after hls capÈure, q.v. aPp. (6), (7). The

emperors T^7ere r^7ary of any interference with thelr farnília'c.f . the índictmenË of TiËus Sabinus in Ã-D- 27 (q.v. Bauman,

op. clt., p. IzL) and of L. Julius Ursus Servlanus late ínHadríanrs reign (q.v. app. (68) and SHA. Hadr. 23).

-40-

Simllarly important was information about imperial

habits, orlce again most acutely dangerous when those on the

insíde are acËlng against the emperor!s ínterests. Claudl-us

\¡ras accusËomed to allowing a docËor to administer an ernetic

to hirn while he was asleep. Poison may have been administered

so ín A.D. 54 (q.v. app. (19)). Dornítlan kept a dagger under

his pil1ow. Hls assassins ensured that the blade r^ras removed

before aÈbempting to kill him (q.v. app.(30)).

Some informaÈion it was the emperor!s responsibllity

alone to secure, parÈicularly when moves were being made agal-nst

people ín powerful posítions. The consplrators in A.D. 96

and A.D. L92 both discovered death r¡rarrants agaínst thelr own

líves by accident and so acÈed out of self-preservation. In

A.D. 2L7, N[acrinus was fortunate to be able to read a letter

Ëhat would have meant his death (q.v. app. (45)). Nevertheless,

although accidental revelatíons, they demonstrate Èhe importance

of the emperor hímself looking very carefully to his own securlty

of information.

Most of Ëhe methods of aequiring ínformatíon dangerous

to the emperor also ínvolved great danger themselves. No

doubË this ínhibíted some from such aÈtempts. The very earnest

plotters who dared, remained undetecËed more easíly if they were

on the i-nside, acquiríng the information as part of their routine

dutíes and were also able to block or control certaln channels

of informaÈion to the emperor. Abusage and disinformation by

trusted personnel could be very dangerous to the emperor.

-4r-

Certainly, many plots based upon good informatíon

did fail, however. Delatíon from \^IiËhin the conspiracy was

Ëhe usual source, a factor Ëo be combatted only by the main-

tenance of secrecy and careful self-control of those mosÈ

closely ínvolved. In the case of a group large in numbers,

varíed in motivaËlon and aim, with hesítancy before action,

the risks of betrayal were immense. The failure of the

Pisonian conspiracy is l-llustratíve in all these aspects'

betrayal fínally emerging due Ëo the highly suspícíous con-

duct of one member. Allegations of earlíer revelatíon of the

ploË came Ëhrough an attempt to suborn the commander of the

Misene fleet, showing that ín the necessity to recruit wider

support great care v/as advisable (q.v. app. (23)). By

contrasË, the widespread awareness of Ëhe praetorian based

plot agaínst. Caligula díd not cause it to be revealed, although

Ëhere were anxious moments (Jos. AJ. L9. 61).

Control of ínformatíon by plotters vlas not always as

tighË as it should have been.

4. LIMITATIONS OF THE INFORMATION SYSTEM.

AtËempts by Ëhe emperor Ëo ensure as diverse a flow

of informatíon as possíble involved the multíplication of

overlapping channels of informaÈion to cross-check other ín-

coming maÈeríal. Securíty ín such a system rested upon those

people supposedly most inÈeresÈed in maíntaining the emperorrs

safety, those who controlled access and information. Corrupt-

lon occurred at all 1eve1s, although most frequently for non-

-42-

polítícal purposes. The personalities of such people in

posiËions of overlapping influence could be crucial, the

dominance of one causing others Ëo be ineffective or the

diversion of such a person allowing others free rein temp-

or"rily.69 A reasonably attenÈive emperor benefitted from

the variety of sources reaching hírn, whlle a Lazy one r^7as

even more at the mercy of hls subordinates.

Límítatlons upon Èhe naÈure' quantity and supply

of information are largely ínherent. trIhíle travelling arday

from Rome, for ínstance, the effícíency of the emperorts

communícations and abilíty Èo analyse ínformation could be

impaired. For símple logistical reasons, there was only a

lirnited amount of file material he could consulË without delay.

The use of advisers comites staff and secretaries dld much

to fill thís gap, however. CommunicaËlon by letter elimin-

ated many of the posítive advantages of personal contact

avallable at Rorne, nevertheless. ttGrapevinett information,

gossíp and rumour \^rere open to much mistranslation and delib-

erate disinformation.

The spyíng system was limíted basicafly by problems

of access to keeplng a general observerts eye on events

ín most situatíons. Plainclothes men could penetrate the

low life of the cíty to guard against disorder. However,

the prime objective was the aristocracy which, because of

social consíderations, alone considered itself eligible for

imperial pourer. For ordinary spies of the milítary or cívil

69 e.g. Narcíssus in A.D. 54, q.v. app. (19). c.f .

rívalry between co-prefects of the guard, 9.v. ch.pp. 269 f.

the11

-43-

adminístratíons to oPeraÈe against aristocrats, they would

have to observe the cllents and farnílía members of such

people. Only people with social acceptance could penetrate

the lives of people at the top. DelaÈion and "agents

provocateurstt vlere the maín sources there and Ëhey were far

from reliable. Plots did mature without Èhe emperor being

a\¡rare of hís danger untí1 lt was upon hím. FurÈher' once a

delaËor or ttagent provocateurtt obtained a reputatíon for

betrayal, his true colours were shown. It would requíre

someone particularly careless to give himself away to such

a person thereafter.

The use of torÈure is another area of the system of

gâthering information subject to serious limÍtatiorl.70 atulre injust-

ice no doubt resulted since the invalidity of thÍs method of acquir-

íng tnformation !üas not generally recognísed. There T^lere many

restrictions upon íts use but these were ignored when there

r^ras a snlf f of plotttng or treason in the aír. Then the upper

classes were also subjected to iË, regardless of the fact that

official suspicíons rrere almost always confirmed as a result.

LimitaÈíons upon the collectlon and evaluaÈ1on of

information can be sunmarísed by reference to C-G. Starrrs

Polltícal íntellíeence in classical Greece. l'{nemosyne Supple-

menÈs, vol. 31. L974. Fírstly, leaders, the declsion makers,

were often limited in thel-r knowledge of theír own area of

influence, for various reasons. Information avaílable was

often incomplete and possibly erroneous. Intelllgence was

70 v. Garnsey, op" .ciË. ' PPthe usage of Èorture.

143 ff for a full discussion of

-44-

üras noÈ always properly used, often as a result of stereo-

Èyped Ëhinking due to the personallties of leaders and

advisers. Such conclusions are not always accurate for the

siËuaËíon aË Rome. Yet there ís sufficient analogy to

suggest that Éhe lirnitations indicated throughout this chapt-

er made the emperorfs analysls of lnformation, particularly

ín a crísis at Rome, sornething like a guessl-ng game at times,

albeit one supported by probabillties based upon experience

and precedent in the declsíon making machinery. The only

cerËaín method of controlling an opponenË lilas to k111 him and

Èhat, parËicularly if done without judiclal authority, creaÈed

great hostility and dangerous reserves of fear among adrninistraÈ-

ors of Ëhe aristocratic class.

5. SI]MMARY.

Sínce Èhe informatíon system is treated as a

distinct unit in my dlscussion, a brief suumary will give

precise perspective about. its applicatíon to securíÈy meas-

ures at the personal level before vre move on to the descript-

ion of those precautíons.

Bureaucratic surveillance, based upon the admlnisËrat-

ive structure whlch promoted equestrians and imperíal freedmen

as the key to control of the seriators' \^ras aimed primarily

at the arístocrat.ic governors. Observation by independent

offlcials, cross-checklng each other, and information obtalned

by courier-spl-es through Èhe lower ranks and socíal orders,

inhibited Ëhe freedom of governors to challenge the emperor.

-45-

The efficiency of the postal system ensured that various

t.ypes of information T¡rere moved with regularity and assur-

ance of delívery to and from the central bureaucratic complex.

In thls the surveillance system was efflcfent. The relatívely

few rebellions were quickly locallsed and stamped out. The

great civíl r^rars occurred because the resources for control

hrere totally mísmanaged by N,bro-and Commodus.

Spying upon individuals at Rome by the military groups

\^ras certaínly far less successful . Problems of access meant

that delation from wLÈhin and the use of "agents provocateurs"

gained the most specËacular results agaÍnst the arístocrats.

The role of the praetorian guard in thl-s situatíon was relatívely

small, in conseq uence. The speculatores performed routine

courier, escort and investígative duËies, until they were super-

seded in some of their functions by the frumentarií ín about

A.D. 100. I,üith the officers of the guard, they vlere occasíonally

assigned specíal misslons, usually the execuËíon of troublesome

arisËocrats.

Thereín lies the essence of their value. It 1s

apparent from our sources that fear \rlas created by such killíngs.

Once informatj-on was placed against a conspirator, they were

swift to react. I,üith detection ineffeetive, force alone was

left as a meaÍìs of inhibiting attempts on Èhe emperorls l1fe.

Such seems to be the conclusion ïIe are left to examíne 1n the

remainder of the thesis, since it is clear that the role of the

praetorians v/as of minor sígnificance in the quest for inform-

atíon. Perhaps the one praetorian to be consídered apart Ís

-46-

the prefect who fulfílled funcÈions 1n regard to the inform-

atlon system that. ç¡ere not ÈyPíeal of Èhe guard as a whol-e.

A final- conclusion l-s that the role of Èhe emperor

himsel_f was of crucial ímportance. He was responsíble for

ensuring that Èhose able to abuse the flow of informaÈion

to hÍs fatal disadvantage had no reason to do so. The

governmenÈrs lnformatÍon sysÈefl worked exclusively for hls

benefit and interests. If others shared those inÈerests, he

had no need to rÀrorry.

-47-

CHAPTER FOUR : THE PHYSICAL CONTEXT OF SECURITY.

Our aim aË thís point ís to examine varíous questions

about Èhe nature of structures used by the emperor to carry

out publíc and privaÈe functions.

The residential buildings of the emperor will be seen

to be governed by different conditions Èo structures with a

long tradition of publíc usage. Are there signs, for example,

that features of imperial palaces are designed with a direct

conceïn for security? Are oEher facËors more ímporËant in such

design?

!üith those structures not built with an eye to imperíal

securíty, how did securiËy forces react to those circumstances?

Is theír reacÈíon modífíed by factors concerned with the

interrelatíonshíp of emperor and subject aÈ such places?l

Is the emperor known Èo be more vulnerable in certain

of these coritexts? l{ere securiËy forces aided or irnpeded by

any of the sËructural factors? Ï'lere any buildings designed to

be defensible? I^Iere any specifíc buildings resorted Ëo when

críses arose?

In short, ís the relatíonshlp between securíty and

the form of butldíngs used by the emperor an ímportant one?

T intend to treat these quest.ions by examining the buíldings

owned and those not ovmed by the emperor, boÈh ínside and

outside the city of Rome. Mill-tary camps will also be discussed

briefly.

1 The cenËral purpose of thís chapter is to assess the import-ance of structural aspecËs of buildíngs as a factor in thenature of security precauËions. The precautions Èhemselvesare discussed in deËail ín subsequenË ehapÈers.

-48-

1. IMPERIAL PROPERTY AT ROME.

The major structural complex to be described here

is the Palatine area, which persisted as the focus of irnperial

residence Èhroughout the period under consideratlon. The

hill itself r¿as most suitable for the house of an ímportant

public figure because of its proxímlty to the forum. Ho\,rrever,

it díd not become the monopoly of the imperial domus for some

years, nor was it anything like an íntegrated complex until

the larger scale constructíons of Nero and the Flavirn".2

Over a period of time, there seems to be a gradual

change in imperíal attitude to Èhe scale and luxury of the

palatium. Augustus was dellberately unpresumpËuous, prê-

serving a residence of aristocratic, Republican form and scale

in line with hl-s public image as primus inteï p"r.".3 As the

monarchic elements of the princípate began to obtrude, the

emperors increasingly felt the need and perhaps a popular

expectatlon for them to buíld a structure in accord boÈh wíthIt

their status and their consíderable publíc and prívate roles. '

The emperorts role incorporates many aspects and

funcËions of a Republícan aristocrat. The Palatíne home of

Augustus was partly publl-c properÈy and so used for state

2 v. F. Millarworth. L977.

The Emperor in the Roman World. London, Duck-pp. 18 ff.

3 For Augustus t deliberaËe cultívatlon of the tradíÈionalvirtues of frugality and self-sufficiency, v. Suet. Aug.72 - 74.

4 The f lrst enlargement r¡ras by Tiberíus, although he may haveused it rarely himself , g.v. A. Boëthíus and J.B. l{ard-PerkinsEtrusean and Roman ArchiËecture. Hafmondsworth, luffddlesex:Penguin. p. 204. By the end of that dynasty, the domus aureahad been buílt, although not to the satlsfaction of all,cD 64. 4. lf .

-49-

q

funcËions.- This pattern of public and private sections

wíÈhín the híllts structures persisted, as did the perístyle

form. Specific rooms or areas \nrere set aside for functíons

such as adjudication and the reception of ambassadors, or the

morning salutatío or banqueÈs. Thís concept received its

fínal expression for this period wíth the construction of the

Flavian Palatíne complex in r¿hich a private residential area

was offset by a large section devoted to contact vrith public

^groups." Essentially traditÍonal ín design but not in scale,

iË sununaríses in its form the emperorts at times awkward

blend of powers and auËhoríty, of officíal and unofficial

roles to fulfil.

The essence of imperial accessibility is pointed to

ín this structure. control 0f access \^tas facilitated for the

various guard forces by the apparent restrictíon of entrance

and,exít to a single, princípal vestíbule approached from the

-7forum area.' Similar monumental entrances had been features

of the palaces of Nero8 and Ca1ig,r1"9 b"fore hím, that of the

latter belng an addítíon to the domus Tiberíana. In addítion

5 L.R. TaylorConn. Amer.

. The Divini of Ëhe Roman eror. Ml-ddleÈown,soc o . Assoc. Mono-

graphs No. 1), p. 153; Millar,op. cít., p. 19.6 For E.he palace built by Dornitian, basic accounts can be read

in Boëthíus/I,Iard-Perkinsr oP. cit., pp. 230 ff and}tr.L. MacDonald The êrchitecËure of the Roman Emplre'Yale U.P. 1965. PP. 47 - 69.

7 e.g., Plín. Pan. 47. 4 ff.; also BoêÈhius/I'trard-Perkíns, oP' cit',pp. 234 f. where the importance of guard roons near vestíbuleand approach ramp ís Pointed to.

8 A. Boé thius The Golden House of Nero. Ann Arbor. 1960 p. 112.

9 Bo'éthius/tr{ard-Perkins, oP. cit. , p. 234 .

-50-

Ëhere 'hras a gatekeeperrs lodge close by, as well as external

barracks for the praetoríans performing duty "" .*.rrbi"".10

The vigilance of those supervísing at such points of access'

nevertheless, remained paramount (c.f. app. (15)), the

structure íËself merely an aíd to them.

The prinelpal aspect of the publíc areas Ëhemselves

i-s their size and openness, desígned to accommodate large

numbers of people wíthin the palace. It is only under

Domitian, ín his paranoioclast moments, that any physical

alteration is evldent that ís related to securíty. He Èook

the precauËion of insËalling highly polished sËone walls so

that he could see all who approached hit.11

Motives in the method of constructíon of the private

secÈor of Dornítíants complex are certaínly different. The

símple exclusion of noise may have been important (Suet. Dom.

2I, c.f . Juv. Sat. III. 232 f.f.). Privacy and recreatíon are

also probable motives. The basíc design is traditíonal stí11,

Èhe rooms entering on to a central courtyard which acted as

líghtwell and pleasure garden. There are also several feat-

ures which would , f.actlitate the security of Ëhe area' although

thaÈ this was the ínËenËion is unattested. Access to this area

was limit.ed. The only main external entrance I¡Ias on the south-

rnrest face, close to the Círcus Maximusr part of a curved aspect

l0 €.8., of gatekeeperts lodge, Suet. Cal, 57. 2. The locat-ion of barrack rooms is not always certain, perhaps inmore Ëhan one spot, c.f, n. 7 above, û. 12 below.

11 Suet. Dom. L4. The precíse location of these faced wallsís not known, c.f . MacDonald, op. cít., P. 54. --."-

-51 -

the various external rooms of r¿hich may have been guard---L2nouses. Internally, Èhe slngle entrance to Ëhis secËion

of the complex, which was predomLnantly at a rower level,

$/as a narrot¡r sÈaírcase, very easily srrp.rvís.d.13 A

further aspeet, close to the imperial bedroom, is Èhat the

corrídors comprise enfilades, enabling efficient surveill-

ance of all access Ëo the emperort" chamb"r.l4 This had also

been a feature of Nerols nehr palace. rt is signifíeant thaÈ

ín this area the emperoïrs safety depended upon personal

bodyguards, commanded in Dornítíants case by the cubícularíus

Parthenius. External attack upon the palace \^ras very unlikêly.

rnternal treaehery succeeded (q.v. app. (:o¡¡. rn such cir--

cumstances' the narrow corridors and exí-t poinÈs r¿ould be a

positive híndrance for escape purposes. pliny summarised

the faËe of Dorn_itian.

...though he thought to protect his life behíndwalls and masonry, locked in wiËh him were treachery,conspíracy . . . .15

An aspect of palace security potentially irnportant r^7as

the use of doors and locks to obstruct speedy progress towards

the emperorts person. There is abundant evidence for theír

signifícance. The main doors of the palace entrance were prob-

ably large, heavy and proÈected by meËal, on the analogy of some

L2

13

L4

15

v. Boëthius/I,,lard-Perkíns, op. cit., p.v. MacDona1d, op. cit., pp. 65 f.v. MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 34, 63.Plin. Pan. 49. 1.

233.

-52-

temple doors which do survfv..l6 ra was at such points thaË

searches would be made and credentíals checked by guards' port-

ers and various attendants. Locked doors !ìlere a sign apparently

that the emperor did noÈ wish his privacy disturbed (Plin. Pan.

79. 6) orr alternatively, thaË Ëhe emperor hlas not accessible

through íllness, as the presentaÈion of Nero to the cohort on duty,

after the death of Claudius, shor¿s (Tae. Ann. L2.69). The degree

of accessíbility depended upon the emperorDs attítude, Trajan earn-

íng praise (Plin. Pan. 47.5, 49.2) and Vespasían wonder (cD 66.

10, 4 f). That the latter left the doors open all day wíth no

guards presentrand envinced astoníshmenË, strongly confirms the

rouÈíne presence of troops. Equally sígnificant is the fact that

outside certain prescríbed hours, access \^IaS not permitted.

The varíous palaces had a number of lesser doors

also, probably attended ín some way. Claudius was forced Ëo

use one Ëo escape a rioting mob in the forum ín A.D. 51 (Suet.

claud. 1B). Otho laËer used one Èo leave Ëhe palace on

Jan,lary, Èhe fífteenth, A.D. 69, in order to meet his

fellow conspirators (suet. otho 6. c¡'f. Tac. HísÈ. 3. 70).

That such doors and the princípa]- entrances I¡/ere strong enough

to make the palace defensible against outsíde attack' there are

f irrn indications. Galba \^las Prepared to def end himself behind

barred doors in A.D. 69 (Tac. Híst. L.32 f), although the

populace was able to break them down soon after Èo congratulate

hím on othorsrãeaËh" (Tac' Híst' 1' 35)' when praetorians'

mutínied later that Year' ne foribus quíde-m Palatii coercitus

L6 v.¡ e.g. The RotundaKjeld de fíne Licht"ations. 8, L966.

ín Rome. (a sÈudy of Hadriants Pantheon)Jut land Archaeolo gical Society Public-

-53-

uo minus convivium in erent (Tac. Hist. 1.

BÐ.I7 Sirnilarly, ln A.D. 193, PerËínax \^las challenged by ín-

vaders who had rushed past Èhe unarmed porters (Herodian 2.5.

2). It appears that wlth the forces at hand and the hindrance

of tlthe gates of the palace and the other lntervening doors"

(CD 74. 9. 3 f), Pertinax could have saved hirnself . Dldl-us

Julianus shared that belief and added latÈ1ce gates and stronger

doors (CD 74. :16.4). It would seem, Ëherefore, that both before

and after the construction of the Flavlan palace' external doors

of some strength, secured by locks and bars and .manned by troops

and attendants, t/ere 1n cormnon use by the emperor.

So, Èoo, \,rrere lnternal doors, which are likely to

have been manned by personal bodyguards and attendants from

the ímperíal familfa.lS Yet the reasofis for whlch doors could

be locked cannoÈ be ascribed Ëo the emperorls securiËy needs

alone. The homes of senators and wealthy citizens doubËless

had doors which could be locked and/or b"tt"d.19 The abílíty

to secure a building in a crísis may have been a consideration.

Equally lmportant, perhapsr mâY have been the concern for

prívacy and the securíÈy of fíles and stored wealth. Usage

17 ne foribus quídem Palatii may yet be an example of Taeiteanstyle Ëhan a testimony to the strength of the doors. The dís-regard of normal behaviour during cívll war is a theme of theHístories. c.f. the similar descríptíon of the circumstancesof the deaths of Galba and Piso, Tac. Hist. 1.40.

18 e.g. SueÈ. Nero 47, Tac. Hist. 3. 84, CD 74.9- 4.

19 A notable example from an earlier era is the assasslnationattempt on the life of Cicero in 63 B.C. by Catllinarianconspirators. The plotters apparently were barred from entry,q.v. Clcero. fn Cat. I. IV. 10. The plighË of the poetslexclusus aflator is confirmation of the wídespread usage oflocks and Ëhe barring of doors.

-54-

of locked doors depended much upon the índivldual emperorts

attitude to securíty. Even more crucial was the loyalty of

those staff who supervised Ëhe keys.

A unique example ln which structural alterations

were made for security purposes occurs in A.D- 2LL - 2I2

where Ëwo fraternal emperors of virtually equal constiÈutíonal

nor.r20 divíded the palace between them, blocking connecting)1

passages.'- The only conmon room' that of Ëheír mother,

Julia Domna, was the location for Getars murder (q.v. app. (44))

IË is notable that this rtlas not the only securíËy measule Èaken

by Èhe broÈhers. SecuriÈy forces were dívided, Ëo some degree;

precautions against poisoning \¡rere Èaken (Herodían 4. 1) .

In a sense, however, those circumsÈances are merely

an exaggeratíon of the normal. UlÈimately, security of both

prlvate and public areas, aíded though such personnel may have

been by structural factors, rested upon Ëhe efficíency, strength

and loyalty of guards and other aËtending officials.

This conclusion applies equally to other imperial

properties in Rome and the suburbs, l-n prínciple. The key

difference ís that these structures ' as wtth Ëhe early PalaËine

20 The major offíce not shared was that of tifex maxlmusq.v. M. Hammond' The transmíssion of the powers of Èhe

Roman emperor from Èhe death of Nero ín A.D. 68 to thatof Alexander Severus ín A.D. 235. I'IAAR'24, 1956, p. LL1 '

2I Herodían 4. L.5. This raises the question of the crypto-porticus, or connecting passage ín the palace. A feaËure

"f s.te palaces prior to Domitian, Nerors cerËainly (q'v'MacDonald, op. cit., p. 34), they were long' narrovr' funct-ional corridors. Once trapped wíth hostíle forces there,escape would be diffícult. c.f. Galba!s experience in spainin A.D. 68 where he suspecÈed attendants who were a giftfrom one of the emperorrs freedmen' an interesting fact inítself (Suet. Galba 10. 5) .

-55-

dwellings, cannot have been desígned with imperial security

needs in mind. Typícal aristocraËic, urban dwellings or

horÈi nearby, acquired as Ëhey were from such influential

people, they shared features with the Palatíne, nevertheless.

Most r,rere large enough to be secured from exÈernal noíser as

ís indicated by commodus I obliviousness to disturbances ouÈ-

side ín A.D. 190 (q.v. app. (40¡¡. Protectíve personnel

successfully adapÈed to the circumstances of these buildlngs '

it seems. That they were aíded by walls and strong gates and

doors aÈ varíous access poínts ís clear. Caligula, inspecËing

urban gardens while líst.ening to an embassy (Phí1o. Leg;

ad Gaium 351), and Nero, aË the horti Servílíani on his last

níght (q.v. app. Q4)), had to cope with locked doors. vespasian,

aË the horti sallustiani (cD 66. 10. 4 f) is stated to have re-

moved guards from Èhe doors. By and large, Ëhese dwellíngs do

noÈ seem to have been used on a long term basís by most emperors

while at Rome, partly because the Palatine was more suited to

ímperial duties which were facilitated by accessibility Èo Èhe

public and to areas of busíness activíty. vespasian (cD 66.10.4 f)

and Commodus (Herodian 1. L2.5) are the princípal exceptions to

that rule.

2 IMPERIAL PROPERTY OUTS]DE ROME.

Outsíde Rome, it ís clear that there hlere greaÈ

demands made upon the emperor by people unusually blessed with

his presence and the benefíÈs Ëhat ít brought. The many ímperial

villas of the Italian maínland, in partí.cular, In7ere not desígned

i,{

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i

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II

:I

ì

I

I"i

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-56-

Ëo obstruct the normal flow of busí,ness to and from the

emperor's person. Millar's account of them22 *"k." it clear

that an immense range of working and recreational activities

\^rent on at these sites. I,tre cannot doubt Ëhat emperors hrent

to these places t,o rest, Èo some degree, buË it is also well

attested Ëhat they r¡/ere pursued there wíth some success by

embassíes and petítioners, that law cases were heard still and

that the consi-lium accompanied the emperor so thaË affairs of

state could be discussed as usual. Coupled with the fact

Ëhat these villas seem to have fallen into the paËËern of

Republícan dwellings of the arístocrats, íL would seem fruit-

less, in consequence, to díscuss at greaÈ length structura.l-

features of Ëhese buildíngs.23 Apparently they were used in

open and accessible fashíon, given that the same protectíve

forces and conÈrollers of access will have operated there.

The one major excePËion, worthy of lírníted descrípt-

ion as a contrasË to normal accessibility, is the case of the

villas constructed by Tiberius for his reclusíve years on Caprí.

In hís case, the severe restrictíon of access and conÈacË Seems

to have been a priority, although he was a\^rare of the bad

effect it had upon his public image (Suet. Tib. 40). Despite

tt!not residíng solely on Caprl-r"- with Ëhe fact Èhat Tiberíus

22

23

op. cit.., ch. 3

v. J.H. DtArmsL97L for a genercentrates on Èheevídence is lirnisecurity factorsq.v. G. Mancini

Romans on Ëhe Bav of Naples. Harvard U.P.al survey of these víllas, although he con-Campanian area, of course. Structural

ted. A possible indicatíon thaË certainhrere considered oceurs at Hadrianrs villa.

Hadríants Vílla and Villa DrEsËe.Instituto Poligrafico dello StaÈo. Roma. 1976 esp. pp. 7,

24 v. DrArms, op. cit., P. 86.

J4ì;

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tt

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-57- J

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hTas yet able to mainÊain adequaËe cont.rol over the relns

of por^rer (e.g. his disposal of Sejanus, Q.v. app. (9)) '

Ëhe emperor clearly fulfilled the potential for isolation

Èhat the island afforded (Tac. Ann. 4.67, Suet. Tib.40).

He buílt twelve villas on the island, the most famous and

dominating of whích was the Villa Jo.ri".25

Modern descriptions of the vi11a26 t"u"^L thaL,

more than the Palatine structures of DomitLan, the building

aídS the emperorts guards and attendants Ëo exclude people

from his presence, íf he so wishes. From Lhe steep híl-l on

which ít is built, all approaches r^7ere easily surveyed (c. f .

suet. Tib. 60) . Entry is through a rnulÈí-storey vestibule

complex that houses guards. Access to the imperial resid-

ential area is via a circuítous route which eulmínat.es at

the doors and guard rooms of that sector. Isolation could

be maintaÍ-ned very easily. This would have been more the

case if visitors were kept on the maínland until audíence was

granËed, although evldence for such a pracÈice is purely)7

conjecturaL.'' The unique positíon of Tiberius here also

'lIt,rì

À

I

I

I

I

f{r

25

26

Idern, pp. 88 f .

Boëthius/I{ard-Perkíns, op. cit. ' PP .

IÈs Histo and its Monuments. Rome.234 f.f.; A. Maíurl CaPrí -InsÈituto Poligrafico

Dello Stato. 58. pp. 33 - 60.

27 Tiberíus could ísolaÈe hiurself totally, if desired (Suet.Tib. 65. 2, CD 58. 13. 2 Ð. The fleet at Mísenum would playan important role, lf access hras controlled from the rnainland,q.v. C.G. Starr The Roman Imperlal Navy. Cornell U'P" 1941'passim. rne tteet was ilnportant in the surveillance of nearbyr^raters. The communicaticn sysËem wlÈh Èhe mainland offers no

enlightenment, being controversial ín f.tself. Although ft isclear that bad weather could prevent couriers crossing toCapri (c.f. DrArms¡ oP. cit., p. 86), tt is not clearly estab-fiãfre¿ that the lighthouse \^ras part of a smoke signallingsystem, as Maiuri 1p. 57) claims on the basis of the downfall[cont. fd next page . See fooÈnotesl

-58-

poses problems in regard to Ëhe number of securlty uníts in

attendance at the ísland. Evidence clearly points to the

presence of praetorian cohorts at Rome during the emperorts

absence íc.f . app. (9)). trrlithout adequate facilltles for

Iarge numbers of Ëroops, unless billetting and campl-ng aided,

l-t ls dtfficult to reconsËruct the nature of the presence of

securlty forces on the island. The datly change of cohorts

occurring at Rome must have given \,ray to some rotaÈíon sysÈem

with a longer tirne uniÈ.28 The duttes of those forces present

will not have differed to any greaË degree from those performed

at Rome, however.

Two other villas on Caprl deserve mention. Damecut^r29

on the heíghts of the Anacapri, well caught the sea breezes

duríng the surnrner months. It features a difficulty of access

on the híllsíde simílar to that of the v111a Jovis and relaËíve

ease of survelllance both of approach by others and of the

fe. 27 cont. of Sejanus. Suetonius (Tfb. 65) establishedthat this was an exËraordinary back up to the usual messen-gers of the fleet or the cursus lieus - rather thanpraeËorian speculatores in this case' \^7e suppose. Mostcommunication with Rome was by letter, c .f. the Ëime stiP-ulatíon following the execution of CluËoríus Prlscus (CD

57 . 20. 3) . The speed of the smoke stgnal \^las very rarelynecessary. I,Iíth other lighthouses nearby' it líkely hadnavigational functions for the great commercial harbour ofPuteoll- (v., e.g., Senecar Ep. 77, c.f. StatlusrSllvae3.5. f00 ff). Even so, ít ts not impossible that a signalsystem could have been used for such a purpose as informíngthe fleet at Misenum Ëo bríng visitors across to the island,c.f. signal s)zsËems descrtbed by L. Rossi. Trajants Colugrand the Dacian trrlars. London. Thames and Hudson. L97L. p.131.@ly were transported wíthout delay.There is no conclusive indicaËion of where other vísitorsawaited audience.

For discussion of such r.otatlon, V. ch. 10. PP. 263 f .

v. Maíuri, op. ciË., PP. 60 - 69.

i

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28

29

-59-

emperorts person while there. A vestíbule area arid a

dwelling area ahtay from the villa, at the end of a walkway,

will have allowed Tíberius to secure the ísolation he sought.

DífferenË ín structure and location is the "palazzo t *tt."r30

built at sea level, close to the maín harbour of the island.

Easíer of access than the other sítes, Maiuri conjectures

that it was used more by Augustus who was closely involved

wiÈh the life of the tor^m when on the ís1and.31

Other than personal preferences, it would seem, there-

fore, that the weather vTas a consideratíon applíed by Tiberius

to his choice of sites, as is likely the case for most ímperial

villas in Italy given their recreational purposes. For

Tiberius, securiÈy and ísolation r¿ere other determinants. Rel-

atively difficult of approach, easy to supervise and to defend,

the víllas used mainly by him also íncorporated private dwell-

íngs ísolaËed from the maín compl-ex. Nevertheless, the import-

ance of attendants and guards would have been considerable.

Theír task was made easier by strucËures which on theír own

eould not secure the emPeror.

3 . PROPERTY AT ROME NOT OI,üNED BY TTIE EMPEROR.

This category of buildings covers an enormous range

of structures, varyíng accordíng to function and type of

ownership. I^Iíth the emperorts needs obvíously not taken into

30 ídemr pp. 70 - 76.

31 For Augustusr ParticlPation,

f'

'it'

Ilr

v DrArms, op. cit., pp. 74 f.

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account in their desígn, our examination is aimed at exposing

security problems posed by such structures.

InforrnaÈion about Èhe homes of arístocrats, freedmen

and other associaÈes visited by the empeTor ís very limited.

The purposes of a visit vary from attendíng a banqueÈ to

visittng a sick fríend or, índeed, seeking the privacy to re-

cuperate hirnself.32 Most such dwellings doubtless conformed

to the traditional patËern of an arístocratic home in the city'

some with the addítion of hortí. Our sources make it apparent

thaÈ the structure ltself was largely irrelevant, although

aristocrats and the wealthy doubÈless buí1t in such a \¡lay as to

ensure the security of themselves and their own valuables. Gen-

eral reaction to Trajants dísmissal of security forces when he

vísited sura tells us Ëhat íË was the people and circumstances

wíthín the buílding that caused most concern and so engendered

Èhe employment of bodyguards aÈ privaËe banquets and oÈher such

occasions, variatíon depending upon differíng ímperial attitudes'33

I^Ihen buildings ín which the emperor performs publíc

duties are díscussed, the expectatíon of accessibilíty by the

populace looms large as a factor which modi,fies the abílíty

of the security forces Èo implement precautlons appropríate to

the physical círcum"t"rr."".34

32 Examples: Banquets - Suet. Ang. 53, Tac' Hist' 1' 24,Suet. Vit. 13' CD 68. 15. 5. Enquiry about someonets

healËh - cD 57. 11. 7, Suet. Claud. 35. View of the circus -Suet. Aug.45. Stay overnight - CD 57. 11. 1+. Recuperatíon -SueÈ. Aug. 72.

on banqueÈs, v. ch. 6 pp. 119 ff and ch' 8 pp' 194-198'

on thís factor and public duties, v. ch. 6 passim. Descríb-ed in detaíl there are the precaut.ions taken at all suchfunctions referred to in Ëhls sectíon.

i

33

34

-6L-

Partícipatíon ín senatorial business at the curia

is a good example with which to begin Èhe díscussion. An

assessment of the physícal circumstances is complicated by

the varíeÈy of sites chosen for meetlngs. However, as is

shown by the study of L.R. Taylor and R.T. Scott,35 all

buíldings involved, whether the curla ín the forum or temples

such as those of Palatíne Apollo, very close to the palace,

and of Jupíter optímus Maxímus on the capitol, !ìIere buílt to

a traditional, long-standíng design, altered líttle, if at all,

by Augustus and his successolls. The emperor had a choíce of

places to sit at a meeting (c.f. Suet. Cl-aud. 23), usually at

Ëhe poínt farthest from the entrance. Aid ín a crisis would

be too long in arrival. Furthermore, consideration of digníty

for supposed co-equals meant thaË the emperor entered the

chamber in the same fashion as they, totally unaccompanied.

NeverÈhe1ess, clear indícattòns.ì that guards waited ouËside

(q.v., €.8., the praetorians senÈ back to their barracks from

there by Macro in A.D. 31, aPp. (9)) suggesÈ Ëhis as a classic

instance of their po\¡rer to control and to intirnidaËe, ovêr-

coming their inability to gíve the emperor protection at close

range. Among the rare instances of troops within the curía is

the unique constructíon of an unusually elevated tribunal inside,

policed by Èhem, under the suspicíous and distrustful Caligula

(cD s9 . 26. 3) .

35 Seating space in the Roman senate and Ëhe se-l1etore9--PedaTi!.TAPA. 100, 529 - 582.

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Similar círcumstances exist at Ëemples r¿hen the

empe ror fulfíls duties as pontifex maxímus. Once again, the

emperor \^Ias operatíng in the presence of numbers of aristocrats

and, iÈ seems, at some distance from his securíËy forces. Trad-

itíon restricted the nature of personnel closeiby in this a most

formalisÈíe religious sysËem. Sacrífíces r^lere performed at the

altar in the 1arge, open space before the Èernple buildíng, all

of the .*p.rott" aiding, aristocratic pontifices carrying deadly

ceremon,ial weapons (q.v., ê.g.rSuet. Tib. 25).

The ímperial fora and the basilicas on thelr perimeter

\¡rere usually enployed for p'rblic jurisdictional and diplomatic

purposes. The key strueÈures ín these circumstances are the

Ëribunal and Ëhe rostra. These are places where significant and,

often, transitional events oecurred, such as tríumphs, the

reception of diplomats, the cror^¡níng of foreign kin$s and the

i6 Símílarly, Ëhe less ostent-delivery of important sPeeches.-

atíous duties of routíne, public jurisdiction by the emperor

r,rrere undertaken there.37 The key to the use of these structures

is Ëhat they ensured thaË the ímperíal buslness transacted there

was made public (CD 69. 7 . 1), if the aim was not unashamedly

propagandist. Thelr essence is thus Visíbility and not necess-

ariLy accesslbility, other than in a verbal sense (c.f. Suet.

Claud. 18, Martial Epigrams 11. 98). The tribunal and rostra

36 Examples: Reeeptíons - CD 56. 1. 1, Suet. Tib. 17, Tac.Ann. 13. 5. Accession of an emperor - Suet. Galba 10.Attempt to abdlcate - Tac. Hist. 3. 68.

37 Examples: routíne jurlsdicÈion - SueË. Claud. 33, CD 69.7' 1'ínvolvement ín Republiean courËs - Suet. Tib. 33. c'f' thedísrríbuËion of consiaria - cD 60. 25. B. c"f . ch. 6 pp.L25 f.f ,L47 rf..

-63-

Ëhemselves are evídently of such a heíght as to allow visíb-

ilíty to a great number and ease of the control of access to

iÈ.38 The placement and capabílitíes of those responsible for

such control was thus of some importance, both at the side

ramps and the rear steps' íf any, of such sÈructures.

The venues of the spectacles, the theatre, anphi-

theatre and circus, present us with a similar concern for

ímperial visibility, orr.t"ll.39 The viewing areas of the

emperor and hís retinue aTe generally designed to a1low hím

to be seen by as many spectators as possible, although excePt-

ions are attested.4O These structures, the Podfum (Suet. Nero

L2.2 and. description by Èhe Loeb edítor, vol. II. p. 104) and,

more commonly, the pulvinar ¡¿iÈh its religious associations,

are evidenËly raised platforms set apart from the publf.c seats

and are reserved for famíly members and great dígnitari.".4l

38 v. L.R. Taylor . Roman Vo Assemblies. Ann Arbor, Univ--. L966,ersity of Míchigan Press

pp. 4L, 45.Jerome Lectures, 8th series)

39 A further advantage of the Palatine ís apparenÈ here. Most

of the enterËainment centres valued for communícatíon withthe public are close Èo the hil1. The circus maximus was

very close, although noÈ dírectly connected' c.f. the Hippo-drome at Constantinople, g.v. A. Cameron Circus Factíons -Blues and Greens at Rome and Bvzantium. Ox. U.P. 1976.pp. 180 ff. Also nearbY was Ëhe Flavian amphitheatre, wíththe theatres of Pompey, Balbus and Marcellus, and the CircusFlamlníus not much f arther al^/ay.

40 e.g. Nero (Suer. Nero 12. 2) and Domitían (?lin. Pan.51.5),c.f. Trajan, Plín. Pan. 51. 4 Í.

4I A privParthidignltF.B. S

Magna.

iJege to sit there, CD 59. 3. 4; Augustus displaysan hostages, Suet. Aug. 43. 4; Claudius excluded foryr s sake, Suet. Claud. 4. 3. Also, v. J.H. Hurnphrey,ear, M. Vickers. Aspects of the círcus at Lepcís

Estratto da "Libva Antiqua". vol. IX - X, 1972 - 73'pp. 4l tf.

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It is also apparent that the emperorrs seatíng area r^ras atlL)

a height-' which will have allowed security personnel to

survey those approaching the emPeror ín order to make a request

or present a written petítion. Accessibílíty to the emperor

there \^ras certainly not denied. An appropriate disposiÈíon

of security personnel would see Èhat access ütas suPervísed

efficiently. It seerns that the structure of the emperorts

vlewíng area did facílítate Ëhe tasks of bodyguards.

An aspect of concern coutmon to all of these physícal

circumstances is Ëhe rouÈes taken by the emperor to and from

such venues. Often a feature is Ëhe constrlction of avaílable

space so that the emperorls protective forces are strurig out

in length, as occurred Ín A.D. 41 (q.v. app. (13)), although

also crucial to success there was the treachery of key security

personnel. The locaËíon ¡nlas a narroüI corridor or passage\^7ay

ín the palace area. Calígula also suffered, earlíer in hfs

reign, the indignlLy of fallÍng down the sËeps at the spectac-

les (Suet. Cal. 35). Passage\^Iays in those buildíngs were

evidently used by emperor and subject al-íke, no special access

route beíng provided for the princeps. A seemÍng feature t/as

Èhat not all sectors \¡rere well lit, at least in comparison to

the illuuLinatíon outsíde. An assassin almost exploited Èhis

wiÈh success ln A.D. 182 (q.v. app. (37)).

Although the conditions of travel wíll be dlscussed

in detaíl ln the nexÈ chapter, a further factor of signífícance

42 Suet. Nero I2.3, Jos. AJ 19. 91, c.f. Suet. Claud. 2L.L

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here 1s the system of roads and streeËs vrithin Rome íËself.

The city had evolved in chaotic fashion over the centuries

with no regard for the newer planning techniq,res.43 Roads

hrere narro\¡r, congestion vlas a major problem through heavy

traffic and the spilling of stalls ínto the thoroughfares.

There \¡/ere no street sígns, ín íÈself not a greaË problem

Èo security forces who knew the city well (c.f. tpp. (25))'

Legislation ís in evídence in regard to the width of streets

and the obstructícns that were in th"*.44 An emperor travellíng

normally had people to clear the rouËe for his ttti,,.45

Although there are no attestations of these problems ínvolved

in securíty contexËs, ít can be wondered whether there were

problems of movement in day-to-day circumstances and whether

Èhe emperor would have difficulty in reaching the ç99!Ie

raet.oría íf an emergency necessítated it.

4. PROPERTY OUTSIDE ROME NOT OWNED BY THE EMPEROR.

The pattern of the emperor payíng social ca1ls

on people at their homes ín Rome seems to have been follor¿ed

elsewhere also. Studíes of the importance of Ëhe client

system in the provinces suggest that an emperor travelling fot

43 v.r e.g. L. Friedlander Roman Life and Manners under Ëhe

Early Empire. London. George Routledge and sons. vol. I.1908. ch. 1; also U.E. Paoli Rome, its'people. life and

customs. London, Longman. ch. 1.(1964).

44 For legislatíon on the width of streets, v. Tac. Ann. 15

On the stalls in the streeÈsr v. Martial Epigrams VII.c. f. similar controls on what could be sold so as to stopdangerous loitering at taverns and so on' v'CD 59. 11. 6

60. 6.7.45 e.g. llctores and. viatores, 9.v. Plin' Pan' 16' 8'

. 43.6L

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peaceful or military purposes r^tould stay at the private

homes of exísting clients or those of men worth cultívating,

ín additíon no doubt to the residence of the local governor'

if it was in that city.46 The consolídatíon of such contacts,

important to the maintenance of provincial control, would be

a high príority in the aims of such journeys, so conferring

honour upon Èhose in whose homes the emperor stayed.

In many respects, therefore, the conclusíons made

about the physícal factors of homes visited at Rome apply here,

although whíle travelling the emPeror apparenÈly had a very

much larger milítary escort at his disposal. IÈ remains to

point to our two best attested examples of flaws in security

under Èhese circumstances. Staying at a private home in Spaín,

Hadrían rìras attacked by a slave of his host (q.v. app.35)). The

perimeter of the garden Ëhere was probably'guarded, allowing

the emperor Ëo relax \^rithin without the necessíty to be followed

closely by protective forces. Secondly, ín A.D- 65, one of the

postulated plans of the Pisonian conspirators hTas to arttaít Nero

at Pisors villa in Carnpania which the emperor visited quite

frequently and wíthout any guard (q.v. aPP. (23)). In such an

lnstance, apparenÈly rare (c.f . CD 68. 15. 5), the emperor \ilas

at the mercy of the household in which he stayed. More usual

surely, was the attendance of excubi¿ê and custodes at a personal

46 The client sysÈem ín the easdiscussed by G.l{. Bowerstock

tern empire, for example, isAugustus and the Greek I^lorld.

Ox. U.P. 1965. passim; also v. R. MacMullen. Two riotes on

Imperíal properties. ATHENAEIIM. 64, 1976, 19 - 36.

-67-

level, thus rendering Èhe structural factors of such buildings

irrelevant.

trlhen travellíng through ltaly or Ëhe provínces, the

emperor could not ah,rays stay at private residences or with

the local gcvernor. His immense retinue ímpeded travel speed

and necessítated the regular stockpile of resources for theír

use. Recourse vras thus rnade to the use of the state postal

47service and its regular mansiones even r¿hen close to Rome

(e-.g., app. (29)). These \^rere temporary stopping places only,

not designed for ímperíal needs (c.f. CD 77. 9. 6). The

emperor wíll have stayed in the mansio T¡/e assume, there to

be guarded by his troops. They adapted to the structuresr

features in such cases.

5. MILITARY CAMPS.

As buílding types, miliÈary camps are' of course,

in a class of theír o\¡rn, designed in themselves to be defensible

with ease. I^Ie are concerned here, t.herefore, wíth the extent

to whích they were used by the emperor Èo maintaín his ornm

security. The Vímínal camp of the praetorian guard is our

most frequently attest,ed example.

The, castra praetoría ís fully described by Marcel

Dr.ltry.48 Basically a legionary I^Iaï carnp in permanenÈ form,

it had battlements with rounded corners, patrol p1aËforms, an

47 v. H. -G. PflaumHaut-Empire Roma

Essai sur le cursus ublicus sous le

48 op. cit., ch. 2

ln. L9 pP. 337 - 379.

-68-

armoury, sÈables and admínistrative praetorium, as well as

barracks for the Ëroops. The forbidding size and nature of

the structure is evident. Its potential for intimídation and

defenee is well attested. Although Sejanus may have had

personal motives in its coristruct ior.r49 it seems clear that

Tiberius ïras a\^rare of the implÍcations and expected to main-

tain control. He changed nothing after the downfall of

Sej anus .

Several aspects of the buildingrs nature and location

are interest.ing. Firstly, iÈ faces towards the cíty of Rome

and is evidently meant to intirnídate, as our sources indícate.

The camp is also outslde the pomerium and so could sÈable

horses, the fastest avaílable land transport. Thís allowed

for the possibiliËy of speedy entry into the cíty of addítion-

al security forces, if a crisis arose (c.f. Tac. Hist.1.40

and 1. 80), and for the speedy escape of the emperor from Rome

once he had reached the camp. If necessary, it was thus used

as a safe refuge in the face of a securíty threat. Claudius,

in A.D. 48 (q.v. app. (16)), and Caracalla, ín A.D- 2L2 (q.v.

app. G4)), sought the castra after a crísis.

However, that they did so \^ras the result of who ín-

habited Ëhe camp rather than the structure itself, at least

ín parÈ, is suggested by other evidence. AttempËs to interfere

wíth the members of the garrison so as to undermíne the emperorts

por¡rer could occur at the camp although this l^7as not necessarily

49 v. Tac. Ann.4. 2, CD 57. L9.6. c.f. Suet. Tib.37

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so. Agrippína caused the death of Britannicus by taking up

hís cause and intendíng to have him declared enperor at the

camp (Tac. Ann. 13. 14 and app. (20)). Ten years later the

Pisonian conspirators suggested a similar move ín desperatíon'

with at leasË some prospecÈs in view of the number of praetor-

ían officers involved ín the ploÈ (q.v. apP. (23)). Otho

succeeded via the speculatores and so Galba fell (q.v.

app. (25)). The most sÈrikíng íllustratíon of the value of

the camp Ëo iËs inhabitanÈs occurred in A.D. 193. After

deceivlng the praetorians and disarming them, SepËimius

Severus also seized the camp and its armoury in theír rear

so that they had no chance to reorganise (CD 75. L. I-2,

Herodian 2. 13).

The varíous examples of claimants to power seekíng

approval from the praetorians confírm it is Ëhey who are of

political sígnificance, albeit rnost sígnifícant when ËhefAre

unifíed in one structure. Conversely, an emPeror himself

could see the need for a visit to the camp Èo reaffirm loyalty

after a plot (e.g., Tac. Hist. 1. 82, Tac. Ann. 11' 31, 35)'

although he could be wary of their stabílity (e.g., Tac. Hl-st.

L.82 tum Otho ingredí castra ausus).

Obviously, with the praeÈorians housed there, it was

important for the emperor to secure the camp against interference.

The offícers themselves \,feïe meant to be a\ilare of any treachery

from withín (Jos. AJ 19. 39, 44, 47, 5f)' Claudius per-

ceíved one potential source of trouble as his ban on soldlers

ent.ering the homes of senators would indicate (Suet. Claud. 25).

This did not. stop later conspirators esÈablishing such contacts

-70-

both at officer (e.g.¡ aPP. Q3)) and rank and file (Tac.

HísË. l. 25) levels. MosË importantly, access to the camp

by arístocrats rnrould not have been advisable. The reporÈ

of an unknown arístocrat journeying to the camp sar¡ Galbafs

advisers discussíng courses of action (Tac. Hist. l. 29).

Otho did need those soldiers now symPathetic to him to obtain

entry (CD 64. 5. 3). Simílarly, Dio indicates Èhat the

soldíers were alarmed r^rhen Pertínax entered the eamp fn

A.D. 193 (CD 74. 1. 2). It seems conclusive, as well as

obvious, that such a pracËíce was in force, políced at the

points of .rrtty.50

The casÈra praetoria is thus a building of important

politícal significance for the emperors afÈer A.D" 23. It

\^ras an extraordinary building in iÈs context ' a permanent war

camp 1n an Italy Ëhat. r^ras previously a traditionally dernilit-

arísed area and outsid.e of,but facíngrRome in intimidatory fashion.

Although it v¡as not essenÈial as a source of refuge, since oLher

buildings could usually be secured to an extent adequate for

the emperorts safety agaínst a relatively small number of

attackers, the camp demonstraËes one similarity, aË leasË,

wíth the other structures we have examined. The loyalty':of, the

securit.y forces working within ít was paramount"

I^lar camps, on those occasions when the emperor did

go to the front,tt Uo not deserve intensíve discussíon' Sur-

50 v. Durry, op. cít., ch. 2. In addition to the excubfaecohort on duty at the palace, ít is evÍdent that a second

cohort and its trlbune maintained supervision of the camp'

Durry, op. cít.r P. 274.

51 q.v. ch. 9. Passim.

-7L-

veillance of poínts of enÈry to the camp hras rouÈíne52

and Ëhe emperor I^las aËtended by large bodyguard forces,

the officers and cusËodes of which were positfoned very

53close to Èhe emPeror t s praetoríurn. There are ample ln-

dicaËlons of the size and relative luxury of that structure'

even at the batËlefront ltself (CD 53. 1. 2, Velleíus

Paterculus 2. 114). As other íncidents clearly indicate'

guards r¡Iere present at the entrances (q.v. n. 52, c . f . app '

(33)). The emperorrs safety rested with Èhem (c.f. app.

(48)). If the army fatled or the protectíve forces were

Èreacherous, a ÈenÈ could offer no protectíon.

52 q.v. ch. 6. pp. IO2 fE where references to Polyblus and

Vegetíus, ín particul-ar, point Èo the vigllia system ofsupervision aÈ the four enËrances to a camp'

53 v. Míllarr oP. cit., PP. 40 f.

-72-

CHAPTER FIVE: TRAVEL.

The methods of transportaÈion used by the emperors

deserve examínationr not least on the basís Ëhat movement

outslde the easily defended palace rendered Ëhem open Èo

attack ín larger spaces. Such travel often was for a highly

specific purpose, related to public functions carried out

by the princeps. Those duties are conditioned by an ímmense

number of different physical and cultural factors. A central

aim of this chapËer, therefore, is to evaluate the nature of

modification to methods of movement and precautions taken ín

those circumstances. By revealing issues of security in this

manner, certaÍn relevant factors for the círcumstances of the

emperor aË work will be delineated.

The díscussíon falls inÈo t\^7o sections, in an attempt

to dístínguish factors applícable withín the walls of Rome and

those outsíde.

1. MOVEMENT I,IITHIN THE CITY 0F ROME .

Tradítíon, practicality, uníversal public expect-

ation and, consequently, an emperortS concern for his public

image all demanded thaË walking was Èhe only Ëruly acceptable

mode of transporÈ insíde the cíty for a publíc figure fulfill-

ing a public duty. The emperorts involvement. in political

lífe was nothíng if not publicl Arnple testímony to the rigid-

ity of this expectatíon and hostílity when it was not met

is afforded sirnply by a comparison of the situations in which both

walkíng and the use of litters or sedan chaírs are referred to.

-73-

I{alking was employed ín a vast array of círcumstances.

The highly formalised movement of the ontífex maxÍmus through

his involvemenÈ in the major religious festívals of the Roman

calendor, is one ".r"h "t.".1 Although the circumstances ín

which Calígula entered and exited from the ludi Palatini ín

A.D.4l are inËeresting ín regard to Ëhe order of guard uníts

ín the processíon of the emperor, the unusually consËricted

rouÈe makes the vulnerabílity of the emPeror ín that incidenÈ

difficult to generalise from in all of íts aspects. It is

useful, neverÈheless, ín clarífying that praetorian officers,

amici and other members of the retinue, the litter bearers,

the Germaní were all present, ín advance of Èhe bulk of the

praetorían cohort on duty.2 By contrast, it is ímplied that

the german custodes would normally present a countervailing

influence Èo that of the praetorían officers, who rarere expected

to be above suspicion, space permitting the order of procession

not to be so sËrurig ouË.

ThaÈ walking was the main mode of transport to and

from the games for the emperor seems clear, alÈhough the use of

litters ís also attested (Suet. Claud. 10. 2, c.f. Suet. Cal'

s8. 3.).

It is self-evident that most emperors would attend suchmajor festivals, assuming their presence at Rome. Augustusdid so even in íll-health, although he did noL walk then(Suet. Aug. 43. 5). trlhen an emperor could not attend, a

worËhy substitute attended, q .v. A. Cameron Circus Factions -Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium. Ox. U.P.1976.--pþ.'L63 f,c.f. SHA. Ant. Pius 11.

and especially the account of Josephus AJ.v. app. (13)76 - rLg.

1

2 L9.

- 74 -

Further areas of formalised movement that involved

walking, albeit rare ín occurrence, are funerals for members

3of the lrnperial family, arrival adventus and departure

(profectj-o) ceremonials, both of which illusÈrate the signif-

icance of the boundary between civil and mi-litary spheres forIt

thís area.- In these cases, the 1aËter Èwo, ín particular, we

see the presence of lictores, oÈher official attendants and

praetoríans. The emphasís in adventus \¡ras upon accessibílity

to the populace, once the city boundary *"" "to"""d.5Coupled \4rith the slowness of walking, certain dangers are

apparent, suggesting that crowd control procedures would be

va1uab1e.6 Such seems to have been the case with the highly

formal walking when embassies of special noËe hrere receiyed'

although Èhen the populace surely cannot have expected the

emperor to be accessible personatty.T The more

3 q.v. ch. 6 pp. Lß ff for fuller discussion. Here, v.¡ ê.8.CD 75. 4 Íf, SHA. Sept. Sev. 7.8 f, c.f. CD 57- 2.2.

4 v. Tac. Hist. 2. 89 (c.f. Suet. Vit. 11. 1 f)' CD 75. 1. 3.In such unstable times, the flouting of some aspects of trad-itíon doubtless had an ímportant function. The ne\¡/ emperordressed in cívíl fashl-on as a concesslon to expectationsr I^laS

followed by an awe-inspíring army.

5 for adventus , v. ch. 6 PP. L42 f Here, v. Plin. Pan.22 - 24 (c.f. Suet. Dom. L9 ).

6 Crowd conËrol- could take a number of different forms, e.g. lin-ing the route with troops (Suet. Galba 18. 1-; c.f. Jos. AJ. 19'1Oi, Suet. Cal. 58.2, Suet. Claud.10.1; Tac. Ann. L4.45),quashíng dissent víd-ently, whether at Ëhe spectacles (cD 59. 28.11;Suet. Cal. 55. 1 - 3) oï near the palace (Tac. Ann. 14. 61)' and,most parLicularly, consequent uPon a plot (Tac. Ann. 15. 58)'

7 e.g. the reception of Tiridates in A.D. 65, CD 63. 4.3. Norm-a1ly the praetorians r^rere Ëogate. Here they were fully arn-oured in Ëhe city, c.f. Tac. Ann. 3. 4 f.

- 75 -

rouÈine jurísdtctional- activitles upon the tribunal seem

to confirm this by contrast. The hungry mob whieh attacked

Claudius near hís tribunal in A.D. 51 was able to apPly

pressure so successfully because the emperor Ì^ras on fooÈ.

He had to escape via one of the rear doors of the p"1""".8

It is clear, therefore, Èhat the emperor l^las escorted while

travelling on foot (Tac. Ann. 1. 7, c.f.2.34 where the

empe ror acts as a privatus.).

The síze of the contingent so escorting the prínceps

ln such circumst.ances \,üas probably the basic unit of one

praetorian cohort, the one stationed at the palace when the

emperor was in residence. Thís seems quite an unwíeldy number

(c. 5-600, in theory), supplemented by personal bodyguards such

as the Germani speculatores or Equites Síngúl-ares, and

offícial public aËÈendants such as the licËors. They are

better understood when theír functions as- honour guard (c.f.

the publíc retinue of a Republican senator, in part?) and

ínhibitíve, proÈective force are known.

The precise functíons of these personnel- r.rhile the

emperor \iras walking through the street.s are not always easy

to deflne. By analogy to the siËuation at the palace, Ëhe

emperorts gëgubíag troops will supervise periflherâl access' as

the tribune's responsíbility for the dally password would

suggest, while the custodes protected hiur at Ëhe most immediate

level. In this case, however, such dutles are seen to be

Tac. Ann. L2. 43, Suet. Claud. 18. 2. For an inËerestínguse of battle tactics to secure an emperor in unsÈabletimes, v. Herodían 2. 6. 12 f .

8

-76-

modífíed by the emperorst concern to appear freely accessible.

Freedom of approach ls attested commonly as a tradítion (e.9.,

pIín. pan. 22 - 24, 47 - 49) even under an emperor paranoíoc

abouË securíty (c.f. Suet. Claud. 35), the more so in cases

where an edict \^Ias necessary to prohíbit contact (CD 59 . 7 ' 6,

c.f. suet. Tib. 40). Thís would necessitaËe the presence ín

Ëhe emperorrs retínue of advisers and atÈendants, personnel

withouË an inrnedíate role in securíty but necessary for the

fulfilment of responsíbilíties to subjects. Despite the apparent

constraints of such a demand for accessíbílity placed upon their

functions, Ëhe security forces were t.here for a purPose, never-

theless. There is líttle evidence for crowd control in the more

ínformal circumstances of walking, although the líctors and

praetorian officers evidently could clear Ëhe path for Ëhe

oarnp.tot.' It seems reasonable to suppose that securíty forces

were sufficiently close to the emperor to be menacíng to any

potentlal aggressors. They would naturally be on the look out

for such people and in any case would make escape vírtually

impossíble. The speedy reacÈion of these troops in A.D. L82

demonstrates their abílity Èo react qrrickly'10

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9 v. Plín. Pan. 23.3,76.7 ff, and see n. 6 above, particularlyin reference Lo the circumstances of Caligulats assassination.

10q.v.app.(37).Simi1ar1y,ËhedeathofCalígulaoccurredwhíle travelling from the theaËre, although structural factorsd,o come in to Play, q.v. ch. 4r PP. 63 f c'f ' also,app. (18) . An occasion l^lhen no guards are ín cl-ose proximityseems to be that of walklng for relaxat,ion. Thís occurred inthe privacy or. wall-enclosed resÍdences at Rome, for the most

part. For more detail, v. ch. 7, pp' 178 f'

-77- i,i

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The use of liËters, sedan chaírs and símilar convey-

ances reflects different circumstances and motivation, ofËen

in il-l.uminating ant.ithesis Ëo Ëhose of walking.

Ill-health or physical infirmity seem to be the main

reasons, acceptable to the public, for an emperor not walkíng.

Claudius was the fírst emperor to use a covered chair consistent-

ly while Èravelling to perform public duties (CD 60. 2. 3)'

rnainly as a result of his varíous inabílities. AugusËus (Suet.

Aug. 43. 5, 33. 1) and Tiberius (Suet. Tib. 30, CD 57' 17' 6)

used a litter only in the case of íllness. Not all emperors

r^rere so scrupulous about theír public appearances' overtly auËo-

cratic rulers such as Caligula (SueË. Cal. 43) and Domitian

(Plin. Pan.24.5, Suet. Dom. 19) not being so concerned abouÈ

the way people Ëhought of them, either inside or outside Ëhe

cíÈy.

It seems to have been consídered Lazy and arrogant to

use a conveyance which was designed for use ín prívate circum-

stances. A clear dichotomy is revealed by the careful Augustus'

conduct. Such conveyances were used either when he was not hold-

ing any public office or when not performing an official duËy

(suet. Aug. 53). That this could also indicate to the public

that the emperor díd not \dant to have his privacy disturbed ís

also apparent, desplÈe evídence that accessibility could still

be expected also (Suet. Tib.27). The use of a litter seems

to have absolved the amicí and retínue of the emperor from the

obligation to accomPany hím in travel at Rome (CD 69' 7' 2 f,

c.f. 57. 11. 4), although honour could be conferred Èhus with

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Ëhe case of carriages (CD 69. 7 . 3) . More precisíon is rend-

ered by the dístinctíon between closed and open vehicles.

Closed lítÈers or sedans seem to have been an acceptable signal

thaË the occupant did not wish to be dísturbed. AugusÈus was

able to Ëake a nap while travelling Lhrough the cíty in a

litter (Suet. Aug. 78. 2). Nero was able to go to the theatre

without detectíon ín this manner (suet. Nero 26. 2, CD 6L.8.2),

In the latter case, inconspicuousness may have been

achíeved by dírnínishing the size of the guard escort. Routine

procedure clearly involves a larger group. Although the honour

guard funcÈion ís unnecessary in these circumst.ances' by and

large, private contact with aristoclats meant that the guards'

presence was still motívated by the usual apprehensions of that

interrelationship. The presence of personal bodyguards and

other soldiers at banquets (e.g. Tac. Hist. l. 24 referting t.o

excubiae and sP eculatores;c.f.Suet. Claud. 35. 1) suggests a

large group for such ínf ormal events. I,üe cannoÈ be precise

about the numbers involved, although the escort normal for

walking ln publíc would seem to be probable. Theír ínhibitive

povreï was invalrr"bl..11

The functions of the escorts ín this circumstance will

not have been díssimilar to those for walkíng. A like peri-

pheral surveillance ín cases where access liTas sti11 permíssd-ble

will have merely adapted to the need to prevent access Ëo the

vehicle when the emperor did noÈ wísh this or when its closed

11 Although Ëhe sítuaËion is not tyPical' ít is of ínteresËthat Galba is accompanied by the enËire palace cohort as

he travels in a sedan chair before his death, Tac. Hist.1. 35.

l'llt

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-79-È

,{

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nature gave Ëhe sígnal. By and large, lítters do not seem

to have been offensíte to the populace or the aristocracy'

who also used them, provided Èhey were used in acceptable,

tradítional circumstances. Security needs of the emperor are

sËill subject to a respected pattern of accessibility, unless

an indívldual emperor chose to exhlbít his leadership ethos

ín a dífferenÈ manner. Ultimately, of course, the emperorts

security resËed \^Iith hís bodyguards. tr{ithout Èhem ín open

space, Galba was easíly assassinated (q.v. app. (25)), for

example.

A corollary of Èhe facË that arístocrats also travelled

in thís fashíon is that they could be brought into the emperorls

presence in a closed vehícle. The potential danger of this was

brought to AugusËusf atËenËion by Athenodorus, who leapt out

wiËh a sword and Èhen suggested to the emperor thaË an alteration

to security procedure be made (CD 56 . 43. ÐL2. None was made,

ít seems.

A final element of travel wíthín the ciËy ís the virt-

ually non-existent use of horses or horse-drawn vehicles. There

was, of course, a ban on such vehicles within the wa11s other

than at night when produce and buildlng materials were brought

ín wíth heavy r"gorr".13 The principal reason in the case of the

emperor, however, ís the long standing perception of horses ín

L2. InÈerestinglY, the particular conveyance used here, a

covered litter, suggested its occupafit. I^7AS A hToman.

Paoli .

Longmans.Rome! its people,

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U.E.v13.London 1964. pp. 28, 35

llfe and cusÈoms.

-80-

military contexts. Quíte acceptable, lndeed virtuous, on

campaígn (Velleius Paterculus 2. 1-74, c.f. Suet. Dom. 19)'

emperors made a point of adopting cívi1 attire at Ëhe gates

of Rome, an essentíal asPect of the adventus ""t.torri"l.14Only the ovaÈio, or the triumph ín respect to charlots,

allowed Èhe emperor to ride into the city.

That the wal1s and gates of the city' or' more prec-

isely , the pomerium (the augural line of demarcation between

civílían and military areas) was the point at ¡¿hich horse

travel began or ended, we have several indications. In A.D. 69'

horses are used twice to enter the cíty wíth the greatest

possible speed, in the firsË case to kíll Galba (Tac. Híst. 1.40)'

in the second to save otho (Tac. Híst.1. 80). Tacitus leaves

no doubt that thls was shockíng conducË. These and other extra-

ordinary incidentsl5 "hot us the normal siÈuation. Horses could

be stabled, ít seems, in Ëhe various military camps, imperial

villas and hortí ouËside Ëhe pomeríum, to be used either in a

críËical situation wíthin the city oï as a means of escape from

a threaËening circ.r*"t"rr"..16 The element of horror ín our

sources at the use of horses within the city in any other than

ceremonial occasíorr"l7 ".ats to confírm our conclusions that the

standard mode of urban tïansport was basically pedestrian.

l

L4

15

For adventus and Ëríumph ceremonies, V. ch. 6 pp.140 - 143'

Notably, the fIíghÈ of Nero from the horti servíliani toPhaonrs villa (CD 63. 27 f, Suet. Nero 47 f) and the street

190 (Herodian 1.I2).baÈtle ínvolvíng Equi tes Sineflares in A.D.

For theír use in recreationr v. infra. P. 84'

Included as part of certain ceremonies was the use of thecarpent um- res trícted essentially to ímperíal r¡romen accorded

such as Èhe Agrippinas, Livia and Antonia,great honour,

L6

L7

Tac. Ann. L2.42, Suet. Cal.15. 1, SueË. Claud. L1.2.

-81 -

The irnplications of this pattern for securíËy concepts

are ínteresti-ng. Popular expecËations about methods of travel

withín Rome and Èhus the emperorts concern for his ímage would

normally preclude the use of speedy, horse travel to escape

any threat. He could have difficulty in gaíníng access to

horses quickly enough ín such a case. No danger would usually

be anticipated ¡¿hích would requíre such actiori. Those threats

forseen were by assailants equally restrícted ln speed and

mobílíty, able therefore Èo be conf,ronÈed or inhibited by the

security forces and their procedures. Danger arose when these

groups were of suspect loyalÈy. They controlled most of Èhe

emperorts horses near the eíty also.

Conversely, iË ís appaïent Èhat the emPeror!s body-

guards also walked when within Rome. It is an indicatíon of

the dífferent levels of responsibilíty in securiÈy that those

who escorted the emperor on horses when outside Rome custodes

groups, speculatores and praetorian officers) were also those

who performed the mosÈ vital, ínner-clrcle security functions

wíthin the cíty, on foot.

2. TRAVEL OUTSTDE ROME.

Our meagre evidence for travel outside Rome, based

on extraordinary incidents in the main, nevertheless suggests

thaÈ in the case of the cities and towns journeyed through

condítíons \^rere very much as at Rome. Accessíbility was evid-

ently a hlghly prized privílege, to be revoked with careless

whirn (Tac. Ann. 4. 67, Suet. Tib. 40). Travel by litter was

i

-82-

considered Lazy (Suet. Cal. 43), at least for publíc aPpear-

ances üre can presume from the edict of Claudíus (Suet. Claud.

25. 2). Consideration and digníty, rather than any arrogance'

hrere expected (c.f. Suet. Vit. 10). That walking was pre-

ferred seems to be confirmed by Galbaf s adventus aËtested

for his march Ëo Rome. (Suet. Galba 18). The emperor dís-

mounted from his charíotl8 at the cíty gates, the crowd cont-

rolled ín thís ceremonial oecasion by at least one speculator,

not necessaríIy praetorían.19 In such citles and towns the

emperor seems to have been required to perform a public role

very often and to be accessl-ble, since the benefíts of hís

appearance could not be obtained again 1n many irr"t"rr""".20

üIalkíng, with the conditions and factors applicable much as

at Rome, would thus seem to be the most frequent rnethod of

movement Idithin such towns. A basic difference, of course,

was that the ernperor \^tas accompanied by a rnajoríty of the

praetorian guard and other protective groups, at least when

he went on campaign. Their essenÈial dutíes were the same.

Travellíng ín the open countrysíde saw walkíng employed

ín a number of ü/ays, both in Public and prívate circumstances.

18 CharioËs were used by emperors in a hlar zone' q.v. ch. 9

- p. 20l- Galba evídently assumed a warlike postureuntíl his arrival at Rome (Suet. Galba 11). He evidentlydid not enËer to\^ms and citíes ín his essedumra chariotdifferent to the trlurnphal currus.

19 trIould praetorían trooPs have had time to rendezvous withGalba yet? As mounted ímperial messenge rs some speculatorescould concelvably have reached Galba very quickly. Theylater served as his eust.odes after the dísmíssal of theGermani (Suet. Galba L2. 2 The bulk of the garrison force

met violently outside theseemingly stayed at Rome to begates of the cíty (CD 64. 3. 2).

v.ch

. Míllar The EmperF

4

20. and passlm.

or in the Roman l¡üorld. L977 .

-83-

It was an ímportant means of exercíse and recreation, of

course. More importanÈ in the publíc eye \¡ras the use of

walkíng by the emperor-as-general. Affinity with Èhe soldiers

\^ras seen in act.íon, morale benefítting accordíngly (e.g. Tac.

HisË. 2. 11, although Otho did not lead his army ín battle).

Dígnity r^ras a príme consíderation here as in any imperíal?'l

activity.-* Security, at least in the mílltary coritext' hras

probably less so. At the head of an army, accompanied by fully

armed protection groups, an emperor had l1ttle to fear, unless

they were dísloyal (e.g. apP. (45)).

. Peaceful circumstances suggest the private nature'

once more, of lítÈer travel and thus íts very restricted use

ín official or public circumsËances' such as travelling through

tornrns and cíties or progress toT¡Iard the baÈtlefro nt.22 Augustus

preferred to travel by 1ítter at night but was not able to

regulate all dangers (Suet. Aug. 82, 29. 3). Tiberius used

a lítter for relaxatíon ín the countryside, apparently preceded

by a centuríon to guide the way (Suet. Tíb. 60). Agrippina

(Tac. Ann. L4.4) and Titus (Suet. Tit. f0) used lítters for

their final journeys by land, the 1atËer only after fa11íng ill.

Unlike hírn, Agríppina had lost her great escort (Tac. Ann. 13. 18 f,

CD 61. B. 6) and was nornl accompanied by Ëwo atÈendants, ít would

seem (Tac. Ann. 14. 5). Only age or infirmity excused an emperor

2L The naÈure of the retinue and íts size was ímportanË, 9.v.A.J. Marshall. Governors on the move. Phoenix. 20, L966,23L - 246. c.f. examples in cíties: Germanicus (Tac. Ann.2.59>, Nero (CD 63.9, SueË. Nero 21.1, CD 63. 28- 3),Vitellius (SueÈ. Vit. 16).

22 v, ch. 9 passím for more detailed discussion of the emperor atbattlefront, whether he used foot, litter or horse travel toget there.

_84 -

from the charge of laziness (c.f. Suet. Cal.43, SueË. Dorn.19)

if he used these vehicles ín public contexÈs. Private usage

in the counËryslde was acceptable. From a security víewpoínÈ,

such a method of movement l¡ras slow and cumbersome, rellance

upon loyal Ëroops beíng necessary. !üe have no record of an

attack based upon this situation, however. A large escort

would be expected (c.f. the centurion of Tiberius, accompanied

by a unit of troops in all likelihood). Anonymity could be

secured also, to a degree (c.f. SueË. Tib. 64).

For publi-c consumption the emperor on horseback was

a most acceptable sight (e.g., Velleius Paterculus 2. LL4,

c.f. Suet. Dorn. 19). Its usage went far beyond mere exer"i"..23

Status could be indícaÈed (Suet.Aug.64.3, c.f. Jos. BJ 7.L52),

usually ín circumstarices where speed as a securíty faetor l¡ras

unimportant. Digníty and security operaËed ín uni-son when Èhe

emperor hras on campaign. His various custodes- an-d hís military

of f icers l¡Iere moun r"ð,24 and it is these personnel who super-

vísed hís safety mosË closely there. Horses allowed speed,

flexibilÍty and qulck effective reactíon to a crísís, unless,

of course, a force superior ín number l¡ras encountered, such as

could occur ín battle (CD 75.6.6 f, Herodían 3. 7.3), or

when treachery worked from within (q.v. app. (45)). In routíne

23 Many emperors are known to have exerclsed so, including atÈhe hunt. e.g. Hadrían,CD 69. 7. 3 (hunting); Marcus Aurelíus,CD 72. 4. 3; Septimius Severus, CD 76. L7. 2; CaracaIIa,CD 77. 11. 3. In such circumstances the danger of a fallcould noË be legislated againsÈ, c.f. Suet.. Nero 24.4,cD 76. 7. 2.

24 v. ch. 9 pp. 2L3 f and M.P. Speidel. Guards of the Roman

Armies . Habelt,B.önnr,1978;'lAntf{-ulras Reihe l' Abh. ztt altenGeschichte; Bd. 28. r;P . 19 .

-85-

círcumstances, partlcularly on campaígn (c.f. app. (33)), they

would supervise the emperortS communlcation and eontact \,fíth

others.

Vüar chariots are very poorly attested and' perhaps'

little used because of their relative inflexibilíty. That

they could not turn easily at speed might have been dengerous.

Caracalla evidently did use one ín some fashion (CD 77. L3. 6).

He is less likely to have parËicipated in the battle than to

have toured the area as commander (c.f. Suet. Galba 18.1. ?).

Elagabalus used them to transporË the imperíal r,¡omen to

bartle (CD 78. 38. 4). Less dignified usage by sueh as Calígula

(Suet. Cal. 19, CD 59. L7.4) and Nero (Suet. Nero 22, 24)

aside, chariots v/ere used for the great ceremony of the triumph,

in the maín.

certainly a more frequent method of Ëransportation

outside Rome was the use of horse-drawn carriages, which allowed

great dístances Ëo be covered at a moderately good pace' Lítters

were used for shorter journeys or those in which the comfort

of the traveller \¡ras a prime consíderation' The cursus blicus

had the best resources of carriages. Titus r^7as so travelling

untí1 íllness forced hím to transfer to a litter (Suet. Tít. 10)'

The extraordínary number of carriages ín one examPle of Nerors

travellíng suite (sueÈ. Nero 30. 3) nevertheless indicates

thaË an emperor Èravelling some distance, wíth the necessary

admínisÈratíve and domestíc staff, would require many such

-86-

25vehícles. To accompany the emperor in his carríage was

certaínly an honour, restricted mosËly to aristocrar".26

trIith such a slow method of t.ransport, securiËy was assured

in most cases by the urajority of the praetorian guard,

swifter reactíon undert.aken iniÈíally by the mounted escorts,

often barbarian, of which Nerots Mauretanians are one example

(Suet. Nero. 30). There would be few groups capable of

challenging such a force and Ëheir approach would be easily

detected by scouts.

3. SEA TRAVEL.

In stark contrast to land transportatíon, the

signíficance of the demand for irnperíal accessíbílity upon

the nature of security precautions employed while qravelling

aË sea is virtually a non-existent factor. There are no regulat-

ions or popular expectaËions about sea travel, other than

some consíderat.ions of image at times. Generally, of course,

it was quicker, more economÍcal and comfortable Ëhan land

25 v. H. -G. Pflaum Essai sur le cursus publícus sous leHaut-Empíre Romain. 1-940. passim for theímperial usage of the ínstitution, most often as the focalpoínt of supply storage (c.f. Phílo. Legr.,:ì, ad Gaíum.250 tf.). Information about imperíal travel schedulessuggesËs the size of íurperial reÈinues very clearly, q.v.ch. 3. pp. 38 f ; see also Míllar, op. cit., p. 31.

26 Hadrian, CD 69.7.3, did so; c.f. the lesser honourof Lucíus Verus, ridíng wíth the praetorían prefecÈ,SHA. Lucius Verus 3, and the shock when Narcissus joínedthe emperor in the wake of the dÍscovery of Messalinarstre-achery, Tac. Ann. 11 . 33. (_r"_"o¿"* g.rt"ri".

".

-87-

transport. Suitable weather r¡/as the key f actor. 27

The imperíal navy was a very important means of

travelling to various provinces of the empire, whether

the emperor r^ras en route to a campaign or on an inspecËion

to.rr.28 Such travel was not without risks. Even a routine

journey could be dangerous. The imperial flagship of

Caracallars fleet sank when crossing from Europe to Asía

(SHA Caracalla 5. B). The proxlmity of the fleet admíralrs

vessel saved the emperor and his praetorian escort who were

on board wíth him. InterestinglY, the emperorts vessel had

a life boaË, even Èhough the emperor r¡ras an excellent swimmer

(CD 77. 11. 3). lle cannot conclude that all important sea

journeys involved accompaniment by other vessels as a secur-

ity precauËion. Routine loca1 transporation or joy rides

along the Campanian coast, for example, could use only a

single vessel, as is suggesËed by Agrippínars flnal voyage

in 4.D.59 (Tac. Ann. 14. 5). A shÍpwreck could be devast-

atíng enough Ëo prevent the use of li-feboats. I^Ie cannot

conclude that her vessel did not have one. Caligulats in-

ability to swim (Suet. Cal. 54. 2), yer use of sea travel

nonetheless, would probably ensure that vessels of this era

did have them.

27 The saíling season T¡Ias restricted by the seasons, navígat-ion not beíng underËaken from míd-NovembeÏ Èo the beginningof March, at least in theory, 9.v. H. Pavis dtEscuracLa Préfecture de lrAnnone service adruinístratif í riald Augus te Constantin. Rome. L976. p. 219 and n. 103.

28 v. C.G. Starr. The Roman ImPerial NaW. Cornell U'P'Lg4L. passim; and ch. 9 pp. 2OO f for the situatíonín warfare.

-88-

Risks could be exacerbated by the need for speed, a

príme characteristic of sea travel but not usually a consÍd-

eratiori ín the movement of the emPeror. Claudius had chosen

to cut several days from his travelling time to Britain by

crossing from IËaly to Gaul by sea and so was almost ship-

wrecked (Suet. Claud. L7. 2). In A.D. 69/70, Vespasian de-

liberately risked a sea journey towards Italy from Egypt

during the winter in order to esËablísh personal control in

Rome after the víctories of his followers over Vitellíus.

It was necessary to use merchant ships rather Ëhan the imp-

eri41 fleet for at least part of the journey (Jos. BJ 7.

2L f., Tac. Híst. 4, 5L). In such conditions, the speed and

inaccessibility to others of the fleeËs htas an insÈrument

of ímperial security, although not without risks ín usage.

Faílure to monoPolise the imperial fleets raras potent-

ially fatal , just as r¡ras the ease with horses near Rome, that

other mosË speedy method of transport. The fleet at Misenum

\¡/as especially valued whether for the surveíllance of key

exí1es or, ín more rare ínstances, the contingency of escaPe

íf the emperor was in danger of losing political control, as

was possible ín A.D. 31 (q.v. aPP. (9)) and factual in A.D. 68

(q.r. app. (24)). This particular fleeË was also the apparent

object of several plotters, notably tn A.D. 65 (q.v. app. (23))

and allegedly in A.D. 62 (q.v. app. Q2)). As in the cases of the

urban garrison aird legionary forces, care against interference

needed to be exercised here.

-89-

Naval vessels could also be used for river Ëravel.

Most will have done so in safety (Suet. Tib.72. I, Suet. Vít.

10. 2) but even here danger was possible, particularly at

the delta areas where weather off the sea hlas influential.

Germanicusr fleeË suffered dísaster in a storm in A.D. 16'

at the height of summer (Tac. Ann. 2. n ff). Sirnilarly,

Trajanfs arrival at the mouth of the Tigris-Euphrates system

r^Ias greeted by violent weather (cD 68 . 28. 4) . Both incid-

enËs r¡rere nearly catasÈrophíc for the commanders.

Saílíng could be a source of great pleasure, of

course. Augustus(Suet. Aug. 82. 1, 98. 2), CaLigula (Suet.

Cal. 37.2), Nerors family (Tac. Ann. L4.4 f), Domítian and

Trajan (PlÍn. Pan. 81 - 2) ' to name but a few, enjoyed it s

recreational value. Yet factors such as pleasure, speed,

economy and comfort do not take away the fact that considerable

risks were involved and \¡Iere accepted by the emperors. Attend-

ance by advisers, domestics and protecÈive forces such as Ëhe

praetoríans and the custg[þq r¿ere obvíously of no avail againsÈ

the ímmense and usually unpredictable forces of ,r"t,rt".29

security forces would be of little value in most foreseeable

29 It is ínteresting Ëo note exampl es of other such naËuralphenomena endangerÍng the emperorts security, e.8., líghtu-ing, Suet. Aug. 29. 3, suet. cal. 57. 2, Suet. Dom. 15. 2,

SHA. Hadr. L4, 3; earthquake, CD 68. 24 f., Suet. Nero 20. 2,J.H. d fArms Romans onc. f. Tac

the Bay. Ann. 15. 34; Volcano, v.of Naples. 1970. P. 101, c. SHA. Hadr. 13. 3,

. Ann . 4. 59, Suetf

Suet. Cal. 51. 1; cave collaPse' Tac

Tíb. 39; storm, SHA. Hadr. L4. 3; plague, SHA' Luc'Ver. 8. 1, SHA Marc. Aur. 28, Herodian l' L2' I f' Some

dangers were beyond the scope of security measures '

-90-

crises assocíated with naval Lravel' even when a journey

that hugged the land was intended (e.g. Philo. Leg''.1''¿¿

Gaium. 250 f.f.). The role of the praetorians and securíty

groups of oÈher types r^Ias negated while travelling "t ".".30Obviously, theír normal dutíes r¿ould be resumed the instant

the emperorts vessel berthed.

On land, security forces have a general supervísory

function, restrícËíons upon them being ímposed by considerat-

ions of dlgnity and, in partícular, of accessibÍlity.

Loyalty of these Èroops and of the officers above all was

crucial. The value of land trooPs, when the emperor t::avelled

at his necessarily slow pace' was related to the

inhíbitive, psychological impact of their size and to theír

ability to secu.re the emperorfs rouËe in advance, whether

in the ceremonial movement, such as adventus or at more

ínformal tímes when lictors and a variety of protecÈive pers-

onnel guíde the emperorts path. Coupled with their speedy

reaction to crísis, the risks associated with Èhe relatívely

free accessibilíty of the emperor consequently seem a I ¡ ttle

less remarkable. Sea travel is an area of consíderation unto

itself in thaÈ these siÈuations do not. exíst as a security

issue there. As we have seen, however, as a method of Èrans-

port, ít has se'tsof risks t.hat no emperor could take lightly

buÈ about which little could be done by human agency'

In a more unstable period the danger of piracy would have

made armed protection valuable and advisable' In theimperial era, that scouïge \^Ias largely elimínated by themaintenance of the Pâx Augusta, 9.v. C.G. Starr, op' ciÈ',passím.

30

-91 -

CHAPTER SIX: THE EMPEROR AT I,TORK.

The circumstances of the emperor at work deserve

lengthy consideration. It ís in this conËext that the

emperor has his most intensive and important contacËs h7íth

others, wíth arist.ocrats in particular. The quantity, variety

and complexity of these situatíons makes it diffícult to grasp

the nature of hís work. üle are aíded by several ancienÈ sËate-

1menÈs.

Hard work and long days were necessary if you intend-

ed, as emperor, to undertake the functíons of leadershi-p

personally. Reading reporÈs and submíssions, meeting

embassies and other petitioners, aËÈendlng Ëhe Senate, partic-

ipating in jurisdiction, overseeing the appointment of civil

and military administraÈíve officers, these are among the most

basíc and frequent Ëasks. The emperorts work ínvolves a cura

reí pub licae (Suet. Tib, 41), determination of officíal polícy,

supervision of admínisËratiori, legislation and jurisdiction'

conducËíng hlars and religious ceremoníals.

The naÈure of t'work" varíed wíËh each reígn and each

princeps according to numerous factors. Ag", ill-health or

physical infirrnity restricted "o*".2 Problems of communicaËion

could intervene.3 Fear could motivate an emperor to cut down

upon public appear"r,""".4 The personal-ity of each ruler was

F. Millar The Emperor in the Roman l,trorld. L977. pp. 203-2L2.V

V

v

1

2

3

ch. 8 passím.

ch. 3 passim and PP. 35'

, Claudius, Suet. Claud.Comrn. 5. 1, Herodian 1

ín particular.3. 2; Commodus,

4L ff4 e.g.

SHA

36, cD 60.. 5.11

-92-

vital in hís percepËion of how he should meet the demands

of work placed upon him. Some could abandon their resporì.s-

íbílitíes in favour of their own actívíÈies and pleasures '

wíthout .o.r""í.rr"".5 Most were àcutely aI¡laïe of the need

to perform according to expectations or an image of good

government, hence Ëhe sËeréotyped ttelectíon promisestt of

several emperors on theír first contact with the Senate

afËer accessíon to potet.6

The relationshíp beÈween such consíderatíons of

publíc image and the emperorrs security needs is a crucial

one, to be explored throughouL Èhis chapter. Our interest in

the nature of securlËy personnel and Ëheir Ëechníques r,¡ill

be furËhered by an examination of various working environme€ts

both l_nside and ouËside the palace, wíth specíal reference Ëo

ritualístic public ceremoníals and to the ludí, ín the latter

case.

1. I/üORK I,IITHIN THE EMPEROR'S PALACE.

The traditional structural form of the palace

establíshes an important crit,erion here, symbolísing the

public and prívate aspects of Èhe emPerorrs working role in7

Roman society.' Different types of work seem Èo have been

undertaken in each.

5 e.g., Nero, CD 6L. 4. 1 f;6 e.g., Tac. Ann. 13. 3 f. c.

to death, q.v. R.A. Baumanpp. 2L4 fr..

Commodus, SHA. Comm. 5. 3.

f.. the oath not to Put senatorsImpiet as r in Prlncíperh. 1974.

7 For the Palatine area, v. ch. 4 pp. 48 - 54.

-93-

Much public, official activity occurred in the

imperíal residence. Jurisdíction (e'g., CD 55' 33' 5; also

in the couritry' Suet. Aug. 72. 2) and salutatio (c.f., e.9.,

CD 57. 12. 2, cD 57. 2I. 4, helrl by others) are important

examples. Nevertheless, there is indlcation there of the'

at tímes, confusíng status of the emperor and hís roles' as

a public figure operaËing withín a prívate dwelling' That he

wasconsideredmainlyapersonofpublicstatusispointedto

by the atrempr of vítellius to abdícate ín A.D. 69 (Tac. Hist.

3.67f,CD64.1:6.3ff).TheemPeroremphasíseshisdesire

to contïact out of his staËion by attempÈing to move from the

palace to the privaÈe home of his brother and by disrnissing

híspraetorianguard,althoughonlyforashorËti-me'The

latter points also to a perception of the guard as a feature

of his role as prlnceps, a public fígure ' Yet his privacy

was also secured by those troops. He eíther retires into the

palace, guarded by the praetorians externally, at a publíc

levelrorhedirectsthetroopstoensureÈhataccesslsnot

permítted. The manífestatíons and implicatíons of this vacil-

lation between publíc and prívate status in relation to work

are therefore necessary to díscuss. The hesiÈancy does allow

forpossíbleshadíngsofemphasisinregardtothewaysecurity

íssues hrere perceived and acted uPon'

Anequallyimportantfactortobekeptinmindatthis

point ís the apparent avlaïeness by the emperors of the powerful

public expectation that they should underÈake a cerËaín amounË

of work in public, do it ín certaín recognised areas and in a

94

traditional manner. Símilarly, restriction of access to his

person was resented. That Augustus felt the need to gíve a

reason for hís discont.inuation of his saluÈatlo and his

attendance at public banquets (CD 56. 26.2, i.e. the German

war) and that emperors sent honourable substiÈutes when they

could not atËe4d the games (e.g. Suet. Cal. 18, Suet. Claud. 7)

are firm indications of such pressures and their importance.

tr{hether or not the comparative absence of such expectations

influenced the forms of security Precautions in the mosË private

círcumstances of the palace, as opposed to those of the public

sectors, we will now begin to explore in greater detail.

The nature of work underÈaken in the prívacy of the

inner sanctum seems essentially to have been the preparatory

acÈivity for adminisÈrative procedures which occurred in

publíc or had public sígníficance. The primary examples of

the daily routines of emperors confírur this (q.v- n. 1 supra).

Reports from the various offigia were read, as hrere letters.

Rescripts \^Iere composed. Reports for promotions \^/ere processed.

Judícíal business was considered' pronouncement to be made

later (e.g., Suet. Nero 15). Material r¡las prepared for the

Senate, often with the advice of the consillum.

The personnel present at such work sessions will have

included all attested to have ínfluenced such decísions, notably

amici, freedmen andfor equestrian admínisËratíve direetors,

jurísconsults, praetorían prefects, astrologersr personal attend-

ants, wives and concubínes. These are all líkely' depending

upon the círcumstances and Ëhe nature of work underËaken at any

-95-

time. It is inËeresting, however, that there are no references

t,o protectíve soldíers present in the rooms where such busíness

transpired. Good reasons can be suggested. As we will see,

the screening procedures applied Ëo those outsíde the palace

r¡rere usually adequaËe enough to ensure Ëhat no undesirable

people could reach the emperor in this area of the palace.

Also there ütas a desire to prevent leakage of lnformation about

decisions taken Ëherein. The fewer people so knowledgeable the

better (c.f. Suet. Tib. L4. 4) Above all, these people are

those that the emperor must be able to trust. Security precaut-

íons aímed directly at them could harm morale dangerously.

Analogous sÍËuations \^lhere the public enters this inner sanctum

offer support, although their incidence may have been rare.

Private ínterviews bet\^Ieerì. Èhe emperor and other indiv-

iduals could have been relaËlvely co1nmon. A feature seems to

have been the absolute absence of other people, including body-

guards, as adverse reaction by Antonia (Suet. Cal. 23, c'f'

sHA. Marc. Aur. 10. 6) and Tiberíusr reactíon to an interview

with Ll_bo Drusus (suet. Tib.25.3) make clear. Freedom of

access by family members especially seems to have been Ëaken

for granted (c.f. app. (16), (40¡¡. Such prívate audiences

could also be of an extraordinary nature, ínterrupting the

emperorfs quiet to give urgent informatlon about a consplracy

(Suet. Dom. L7.1, Herodían 3. L2), a fact which poínts Ëo

accessíbílíty being restrícted to "busíness houTs" (c.f. Plín.

pan. 49. 4, CD 69. 7. 2). Certaínl¡a more rare event than

such private intervlews is the occurrence of the trial intra

-96-

Bcubículumr êr extremely unpopular practíce. Our most de-

tailed account 1s of Èhe case of Valerius Asiatí"rr".9 The

accused, enchained, ís brought before the emperor, prefect(s)

of the guard, imperíal dornestíc staff, advisers and the

emperorrs wífe. By Ëhis point there ís no danger from the

victím, the nature of retribution being the only lssue. The

presence of security forces within the room is of no value

10or necessity.-" Control was better exercised aË other points.

Al1 consíderations in regard to thls area of the

palace force us to conclude that securíty corps operated out-

side ít, or at least outside the various rooms Ín which evenËs

occur. The domestic area is onewhere the emperorfs prívacy is

to be interrupted only in an emergency. How and by r^rhom the

securíty of the emperor in this inner area \ras maintained íË

is now appropriate to examíne.

Firstly, ín the case of arms bearing corps, we find

little precise evídence about procedure employed by thern. A

basic distincÈíon between the praeÈorian excubiae and Èhe

custodes, such as the foreign Germani corporis custodes or the

11Equites Síngulares, ís contaíned within their nomenclature.

8 Decisions hlere usually published, if not decided upon inpublic. c.f. The "election promise" of Nero on this sensít-ive issue. He would not. hold trials Íntra cubiculum and soallor¿ the influence of a few to be excessive. Tac. Ann. L3. 4

9 Tac. Ann. 11. 2 f.10 Troops could be present at ínquisitíons, of course, c.f. Tac.

Ann. 15.58, Suet. Tib.62. L. An indication that troops andofficers could be ouÈside rooms awaiting instructions occuTsat Tac. Ann. Ll. 37.

11 v. Durry, op. cit., PP. 22 f., 29 f.f..

-97-i{

Èì'

Praetorians stood guard outside while Ëhe custodes protected

the emperorrs body. Evídence clearly points to the latter

group, the personal bodyguards, serving very close by. In

essence, they seem to have supervised the hallways of Èhe

domestic area, Ëhose close to the emperort s bedroom, in

partícular.12 Nerots custodes deserted his bedroom in A.D. 6B

(Suet. Nero 47. 3, CD 63.27.3), Commodusr assassins needed

to bypass them in Ã.D. 192 (Herodían 2. 1. 1ff) and it is such

protecEors who sËand immediately outsíde the door of Septimius

Severus ín A.D. 2O5 (Herodian 3. L2). trrle can perhaps surmise

Ëheir presence near Domitíanrs room in A.D. 96 since the

assassin, Stephanus, ís quíckly cut do*.13 Further, ít is

custodes who are employed to prevent movement of personnel

or information around the dead bodies of Augustus and Claudíusl3o

(Tac. Ann. 1. 5, L2. 68). Sírnilarly, it is wiÈh surprise that

Suetonius notes that an lllyrían camp orderly (Suet. Aug. 19)

and a conmoner (Suet. Claud.13) had been able to get close to

the imperíal bedrooms of Augustus and Claudius, respectively,

wíth weapons.

The command strucËure of Ëhese forces is of considerab-

le ínterest. The speculatores present no problem. As élite

v.ch.4 pp.50f.CD 67. L5 - 17, yeÈ not too close since others were senË inby Parthenius to finish Domitian off, before guards realíse

I

{f,li

II

i

I

I

T2

13

somethíng ís amiss, c.f. Suet. Dom. L7 (c.f. p. 104

A qualification necessary here is that we do not knowit was Equítes Siggulares or speculatores oPerative at

infra. )whetherthís

time, q.v. E. BirleYpp. 100 ff and P. 25

13a. In these tr./o cases the custocles are pertraps noÈ

Roman Britaln and the Romansupra on the rumenE

ftiftlI

necessarily to be seen as distinct from rnilites,

L96L.

-98-

praeÈoríans, they are dlrectly responsible to the praetorían

prefect. The Germani present a different sítuation since,

fundamentally, they are members of the emperor's familia.14

If we accept the maxim that they \^lere trusted becau-ee they

were foreign (Tac. Ann. 15. 58)' it would seem logical to

assume they were riot comanded by praetorian personnel . The

cubicularius of Calígula, Helicon, is our first attested example

(Phílo Leg; ad Gaium 175). His successor vlas the Thracian

gladíatorrl5 Sabínus, a man of irmnense strength whích rnay

suggest he was often active close Èo the emperorts person

(Jos. AJ 19. L22, CD 60. 28.2, c.f. Tac.Ann.15.66). The

role of Narcíssus in the mílitary aspecËs of imperial security,

other Ëhan his single daY as praefectus praetorio (Tac. Ann.

11. 33), ís noË known. Parallels are suggested' although by

cubicularíi who seem Èo have held the title a holder

iÈt^

I

It

!I

I

I

t

of the dagger, a symbol of life and death usually given to the

prefect and ímperíal gener"l". 16 It ís not clear that l-t

could also apply to Èhe command of the household bodyguard.

Parthenius, under Domítian, ís known to have had the title

and, as cubicularíus , \^ras able Èo control immediate security

precautions in t.he domestic area of the palace' as the assassín-

atíon successfully demonstrated (CD 67. 15, c.f. app. (30)).

L4 q.v. P.R.C. tr'leaver1972. pp. 83 ff.

Familía Caesaris. Cambrldge U.P.

15 c.f. M. Grant The Armv of the Caesars. L974. p. 180

on Nerots gladiator, Spículus, conjecturing a simílarrole.

L6 On Narcissusr v. CD 60. 30. 6\ (Zonatas), where iË isimplíed he wore the pugío because he was ab epistulis'aconnectíoq not, made elser¿here. On the pugio, v. Mommsen'

St. R. i' 434 f and Èhe Oxford Latin Díctíonary, secondedition, p. 1515.

-99-

I{íth Comrnodus t cubicularius Cleander, it is not always so

easy Èo rltí'rstíngtíish his involvement wíth the praetorian guard

17and ¡¿íth the custodes here the Equites Sínsulares. As

prefecÈ of Ëhe guard, he could command the latter via theír

commanders, two praetorian tribunes.lS

Our few examples, nevertheless, suggest that these

commanders seem to be appointed according to no rigid eríteria,

other than close assocÍation wíth the emperor. During the

Julio-Claudían era there is no suggestion that personnel out-

síde the familia Caesaris were used. Each emperor r,síll have

chosen such a person accordlng to his o'.n¡n criËeria of the day,

surely a strong point for Èheir important functfon. fn more

stable periodgrcommand seems to have fallen to the praetorian

prefect, notably under the Antonirr.".19 Emperors who felt

Iess secure, particularly with their oIn/ïì praetorian p.t"orrrt.lr20

ofÈen gave such security control to a chamberlaín, as a cross-

check upon securíty forces based upon Ttalian recruitment. The

Julio-Claudían perÍód seems to be Ëhe one duríng which the

separaËíon of the Èwo was most rígídly and consístently preserved.

L7 For a díscussíon of two ínscriptíons related Ëo the problem,v. C.R. trrlhíttaker, Loeb edítion of Herodían, vol . 1, P. 76 fn. 1.

J

,t

Àt^

I¡

rt

t

'I

't

I'

I

I

i

J.rI

liII'r,

18

L9

v. Durry, op. cíË., p. 32.

v. Marcus Aurelius. Meditations 1. 17 on the lack of guardsat court.; also R.I. Frank. Scholae Palat.inae. AmericanAcademy ín Rome. Papers and Monographs. 23 , L969r pp. 24 - 30

on custodes. Yet his conclusion, based on Aurel. Víct. De

Caes. 13 . 9 , that there \Álere no custodes in this era seems

unwarranted. That theír cross-checking role was díminisheduntíl Commodus (p. 29) does not prevent a retained distincËionfrom excubíae functions.

20 e.8., Calígula, CD 59. 25. 7 f.

Corrnodus, Herodían 1. 9. 10.Domitían, CD 67. 15;

-100-

At thís stage, a normalised relatlonship between emperor and

senatoríal order, wlth a code of expectationsr \¡ras stíll

evolvíng, as the number of plots and the nature of oppositlon

would suggest. Later, 1t is only emperors who grossly offend

such prineiples who are required to implement certain security

measures to bolster an undersÈandable anxiety. The appoínt-

ment of a non-praeËorían commander for Ëhe custodes Seems to

have been one of th."".21

The síze of the uníts, commanded thus, whíle on duty

at the palace, is an important factor. Unfortunately, we have

no single, dírect attestation of ít. An interesting indícation

can be conjectured, at least for security procedures during the

níght, by a careful examínation of the evidence for similar

processes of legíonary forces, in particular. This line of

argument will also introduce observations about the parallel

functions of praetoríans on the perimeter of the palace.

Before díscussing the way in whích protectíve forces

were deployed, it is valuable Èo consíder índicatíons of the

basíc uníts and their numbers, There are suggestíons that,

ín the first century A.D. at least, the maniple was the unit of

Roman infantry troops, whlle Èhe turma applied to cavalry, ín-22

cluding those of the praetorian guard. The specula tores.

2L obvíously, such a generalised schema as this has exceptions.Essentially, however, the situation points to the ímportanceof the indívidual emperorts personality as a factor in therelaÈionship between princeps and senate. An ínteresÈingaberratíon ís the case of Titus' unique as both heir and

praetorian prefect under Vespasf-an. I^Iith the Germaní dís-banded (Suet. Galba 12) , he wlll also have commanded thespeculatores, Èhose most likely to have been performingduties as custodes in this Period (c. f . app. Q7)) .

i

,t

tf'

¡t'

td'li

tI

I

I,1

22 v. Suet. Claud. 2L. 3, Tac. Ann. 1. 34, L2' 56, 15' 58'

-101-

élite praetorians who were also couriersr l^7ere so organised,

wi:th 24 - 30 troops per turma' one of which was attached

to each cohort of the gu^rd.z3 It seems reasonable Ëo imagine

tha t the number of speculatores on duty at the palace each

day was therefore, abouÈ 24 - 30, each cohorË beíng accom-

panied by its own élite force' Such a number of troops as a

close Personal bodyguard is very aËÈracËive ín virtue of its

manageabilítY.

In Èhe case of non-PraeËor ian custodes units of a

similar size are in evidence or can be suggested. The Equítes

Sín ares were a numerus of 500 men, of 1000 from SeptímÍus

i

S"*r"rrr".24 rf we accept that they evolved from the ala síngula-

.írr*,25 an auxiliary strucÈure will be antíciPated' Durry

statesjustthat.Thenumelusissubdividedintoturmae,each

connnanded by a decuríon. Auxilíary turmae comprísed about

30 men for a nugerus of 500.26 Less is known of the stïucture

oftheearlierGermanirestimatesoftheirnumbersvaryíng

frorn 100 to 500 ^"n.27 Important, neverthelSss, ís the fact

23 q.v. Durry, op. cít.r PP. 109, 138; Grantr oP' cit"nn, 90 f.- The praetorian force of speculPtores-'approxim-äiely 300, is signifícantly larger than that of each

24

25

26

legíon, aPProxímatelY 10'

Durry, op. cít., P. 32.

idèñ. p. 31 and n. 3 esP'

q.v. G.L. Cheesman.Oxford UniversitY Prnumerus was 1000 strong' each turma was about 40 men íncomposítíon. I,'Ihat is als ci inËeresitúng is the existence ofan élíte grouP of hastiliarii withín the uites S

about 50 men out of 500, q.v' DurrY' oP'

27 Durry, .id.i,. . P. 22.

The auxília of the Roman ínper+l armY-

ess. l..gL4. PP. 25f.f . I^lhen the

cit., p. 32.ares

-L02-

that they Ï^7ere organised in decuriaras \^Iere other

2Bmembers of the familia Caesaris. Although we have no

certain knowledge in thís instance, the affinity of the

GeruraÉ with other groups of custodes woúld suggest that a

similar number Per unít 1s likelY'

Are Èhere.othe-r areas where indicatíons of a possible

equivalency of Ëroop nurnbers might add weight to the ídea

that a simílar number of praetorian and non-pTaetorian personal

bodyguards $lere on duty at any one time is a principle of

security?

Procedure in the legíonary camps is one possible

parallel for night time security at the palace' The term

vigilia is used of the watch by níght and this was divided)o

ínto four three-hour periods (vigiliae).-'source materÍal

for the legionary camp ín Polybír,rs (6' 33 - 37, esP') and

Vegetius (3. 8) suggests an interestíng comparison with the

positions of both the custodes and Èhe praetoria" g""td'30

Polybiusatt'eststoadoubleguardsystemfortheouter

wall of Èhe camp, the ouÈsid.e being supervised by velites or skirm-

ísh troops, ten men at each of four gates for each of four watch

periods, a ÈoÈal of 160 men (6. 35' 5)' The second guard on

theinsídeofthegateswasdrawnonemanfromeachmaniple

28 l,rleaver, op. cit., p. 83. c.f . Suet' Dom'

Oxford Latin Dictionary, first edition'Germanorum. .. (= CIl,. III 4345) '

L7. 2; also v.p. 523,... decurío

q.v. Oxford Latín Díctionary, fÍrst edition, p' 1990'

Although Durry (op. cit., pp. 77 Ð sees in the origin ofthe guãrd a denial of their status as a legíon, their orig-lns ãnd probabl'g procedure mark them as an élite forcein relation Ëo the legions.

i

29

30

-103-

of the legíon for each of four vígiliae, i.e. 25 - 30 men

per watch, 100 - L2O for each night.3l Six or seven men

were deÈailed to each gate. The watch is supervised by four

legionary cavalrymen who go the rounds for one watch each,

accompaníed by fríends as r^liÈnesses (6. 35. 9 ff) .32 Tèssera

(passrrord) procedure ínvolved the tribune of the níghtrs

vigíliae distríbuting the tokens at the fírst watch, to have

Ëhem collected by the supervisíng cavalrymen and returned at

dawn (6. 35. 6 1,36.3 f, 36.6 ff). Punishment for failure

to meet this cross-check ensured few crrors (6. 37 . 6) . Change

of watch was indicated by bugle (6. 36- -5).

Vegetíus tesËifies to procedure with a cohort of six

cenËuries ín *irrd.33 He sËates that four ínfantrymen and four

cavalrymen \^rere assigned from each ceritury for guard duty, the

cavalry to serve extla vallum. A double guard system is

suggested once more, here wíth two forces of ldentical size.

Changíng and supervísion of the waËches is very much as

described by Polybius. The number of Ëwenty-four guards emer-

.34ges once agal-n.

31 i.e. it is not clear how many maniples formed this cons-ular legion, 25 (10 lraslgÉ, l0 principales, 5 triarii)or 30 (3 per cohort fõr T0 cohctt-:r as in Ëhe Marian legionat the latest).

32 Figures are complicated by the fact that a consular army

could have two legions' c.f. Mommsen St. R. í' 47' n' 1'Despite thaÈ, the passages are of value for givíng thenumber of men drarnrn níghtly from a force of approxímatelylegionary size.

33 v. Vegetíus 3. 8 for thís paragraph.

34 The manner in which Vegetius sees Èhem being used for fourwatches and at four gates is not clear, however.

-104-

That the praetorian guard \^las of legionary ori'gin

and structure and that one cohort \^tas on duty at the palace

ín the evening is suggestive. If the procedure of the

legíons was adapted to the palace, thís would allow the trib-

une síx men per watch, quíte acceptable in this ínstance

since Ëhere was d-eliberaËely only one main access poínt to

the palace building.35 This number would be sufficiently

large to supervise enÈry and to alerÈ offícers, íf they

needed to be consulted, or the rest of the force who must

have been on call in rooms nearby, if not patrolllng other

points on the perimeter of the palace.

The analogy of the camp clearly suggests that there

vras a strong external patrol. At the palace, internally

norr, the nearest sízed force would be a cavalry turma which

we have seen to be the basic unit of the Equites s:Lq8]llgleq'

among the non-praetorian custodes. If this was the basic unit

at the palace during the níght, síx or seven would be on duty

aË any moment, certainly by the emperorts bedroom and perhaps

near the main entrance, on the inside. A unit of thís size, if

it served wiËhout the sort of large-scale backing given to

those doing watch duty outsíde, could be a little overstretched

in the event of a crísis. Perhaps iË was anticípated that ín

rouÈlne circumstances no persorl or group could get past the

excubiae and still challenge a turma of custodes (c.f. aPP. (2),

35 q.v. ch. 4, PP. 49 Í.

-105-

(17) ) . Their numbers r¡rere more than adequate agaínst the

small scale consPírator.

Unfortunately, the argument related to the number

of custodes wíthin and Èhe guards outside the palace gates

at night musÈ remain conjectural, although the likelíhood

that legionary procedures \^7ere adapted in some fashíon to

these conditions is a clear one.

The role of the various custodes in the procedure of

admíssion to the inner Sanctum musË also be seen in the con-

text of roles performed by a number of oÈhers' noË least Ëhe

mernbers of the imperial farnilia specifícally designated a role

in admíssions.

The procedure of the signum is re1e.'"rrt h.t..36 Thié pass-

word was given daíly to the tríbune of the day ín command of

the praetorían cohorÈ at the palace. It was also given Ëo

the speculatores (Tac. Hist. 1. 25). The extent to which

thj.s applíed to the foreign grouPs of c-ustodeg is un-

certain. The Eq uites Singulares, more than the Germani, mây

have understood enough Latín for this procedure to have been

políced by thern also but there is no índícation that they

made a challenge in their sphere of ínfluence upon this basís.37

36 v. Oxford Latin Dictionary, fírsË editíon' p'a definítion of thís Procedure.

Although foreígnersrthe Equites Singulares were trainer]for the legíonary céttnriããat" (q.',t. Frank, op' cit', p' 29)'Theír commanders r^lere praetorian (q.v. Durry, oP ' cit ' ,p. 32). Tt is notable that they listened to Pertínax'slast speech (Herodian 2. 5. 4 f, CD 73. 10. 1). By

consËïast, the Germaní díd not seem to understand Latin.The crowd at the theatre ín A.D. 41 had to waít Ëo addresstheir pleas. to the praetoríans (Jos. AJ 19. 138 ff')'

1698 for

37

-106-

All Roman tïoops \¡rere exPected Ëo demand the password (Suet.

Cal. 58. 2, more militlae, which apparently gave free rnove-

ment beyond that poínt (Tac. Híst. 3. 73). The signum thus

serves the purpose of keepíng out those who did not have

access to 1t and so had to apPly for audience with the milíÈ-

ary and cívílian officíals responsible at this poínt '

Access to the palace ouËside ttbusíness hoursrt seems

to have been acquired only rareLy, as the círcumslances of

the betrayal of the Pisonian conspiracy in A.D. 65 demonstrate.

After t,he informant is challenged externally, his request for

audíence ís referred firstly to doorkeepers ían1Èores from

the emperorrs famílía and then to a freedman administrator

(Tac. Ann. 15. 55). Thís is líkely to have been the way

stephanus wa-q admitted by Parthenius in A.D. 96 on a day when

orders to prevenË access had doubtlessly been given (suet.

Dom. L6. 2, CD 67 . 17 . 1) .

The extensíve naÈure of the offlcíum admíssíonis

38is well attesËed to. This must include the íanítores whose

role overlaPs to some extent with the crlbicularii and other

close attendants of the emperorts person. The íaníÈores pres-

umably conÈrol keys for Ëhe doors and gates of the p"1""..39

The offícium admissionis was evidently of some size

and complexity, lncorporating a hierarchical structure and

40specialísed functionaries such as nomenclaËores. Members

3B

39

40

v. lrleaver, op. cít. ¡ PP

q.v. ch.4. PP.51 ff;A Hístory of Technology.

.252-4.also v. C.J. Slnger, et al.Ox. U.P. 1956. vol. 2. PP. 415 ff .

p. 253.v. I,'Ieaver, op. cit. ,

-107-

of this offíce are the first non-mílitary barríer Èo be

faced by anyone wtshing Ëo see the emperor during hours of

prívacy. Unless they were explicítly told Èo refuse entry

to a specifíc Índividual (Suet' Vesp ' 14),4L their por'\ler

to admit gave them ínfluence and wealth (c.f. Tac. Ann. 4. 74)

Interestíng aspecÈs of Ëhe sítuation emerge from the explicit

picturepresentedbythebetrayalofthePisoníanconspiracy

(Tac.Ann.15.55).Finaldecisionuponadmissíonístaken

by the a libellís Epaphroditus' not the praetorian excubíae'

Ëroops.Thelatterrhavíngascertainedthatthepersonseek-

ing access did not know the password, are very likely to have

supervlsedtheapplicationforaccess'¿iththeianlËoresSÈaÈ-

ioned behínd the locked gates. The official there in charge'

the ab admis sione. presumably anshTered to higher officials in

Ëhe familia, such as Homilus under caligula (Philo . Legt;"-': ''

ad Gaium 181) or Narclssus, the ab epistulis of claudius (Tac.

Ann. ll. 29 ff, CD 60. 34.4), in the event of a difficult

decision. If any trouble occurred, the praetorians would pol-

ice ít at this Point.

In the domestic area of the ímperíal residence' the

cubícularíi are seen Èo have ímmense ínflu"n"".42 The head

chamberlaín, usually referred to sirnply as a cubicularius'

was ín control of a staff of consíderable size, it would seem

4L Illumínaof the o

ting addítlonal aspects of the serni-public rolefficium admissionís are discussed inf,ra

::p.L22.q.v. üIeaver, op. cít., passím, and Millar, oP' cit"pp. 74, 79, 80 - 83.

42

-108-

43c1ear. It is useful to remember, therefore, that the

custodes \^rere not the only members of the familía in the

area. The chief eubicularíus if he did not actually conË-

ro1 the custodes as thelr commander (pp. 97 - 100 supra),

could exercise considerable control over movement in the area

of the emperorrs bedroom, the efforts of Partheníus ín the

assassination of Domitian being an important illustration.44

The l-nfluence of the familía Caesaris in i mperlal

securíty \{ithin the palace thus bullslarge during our períod.

Indivíduals of excessíve and notorious power o\^7e their posiÈ-

ions to peculiar írnperial favour, whether on the central

secretariate or dornestic staff. It was Ëradítíonal to entrust

such functions to Ëhem. Their loyaltlr was assured, assuming

good choice of personnel ínitíallyrby a judlclous cornbínation

of feared punishment, the íncentíve of promotlon and reward,

and the avoidance of mistreatmenË. They \¡lere an important

componen¡ of his security network, therefore, as their reaction

of a fearful drop in morale could "tot15 Equally, Èhe emperor

43 Examples of specíalised staff are bath attendanËs (Suet.Dom. 16'.2), readers (Suet. Aug. 78.2), those in care ofhis health (Suet. Vesp. 20, although not always ímmedÍatelypresent. c.f. suet. Tib. 2I.2, 73.2). For an indícation ofroutine attendance, v. Suet. Don. I6f. The sc.ale of atteandanceis suggested by Ëhe presence at. Domltianr s death bf a decuriocubiculariorum. (Suet. Dom. L7.2).

44 q.v. app. (30). c.f. Cleander. q.v. apP. (40). Also, forÈhe unoffictal influence of Èhese people under an emperorstronger ín his control of them, v. Suet. Vesp. 2I.

45 v. e.g. Callístus (CD 59. 25. 7 f, Jos. AJ 19. 66),Partheníus and Entellus, after the execution of Epaphrodítus(CD 67 . L4 f., Suet. Dom. l4. 4), Eclectus (Herodian 1. L7);c.f. the famílla of Pertinax, CD 74. 8. 1.

-109-

r^rent to great lengths to ensure that they dld not leak in-

formation nor \^rere interfered with by outsid"t".46

Agaínst this background, the custodes emerge as

one of the ulËimaËe in a series of groups t.o be employed to

secure both the safety and privacy of the emperor duríng

non-business hours. In thís regard the círcumstances of the

downfall of Plautían in A.D. 205 (q.v. app. (43)) are ínter-

esting. Although the tribune of the ¡¿atch is alleged to have

free access to the emperor, Ëhe pretext of an urgent, secret

message from the praetorían prefect. is posited as necessary

to gaín access at this point. Either Èhe tribune normally

communicated with the emperor only at Èhe beginníng of hís

t\,üenËy-four hour ð.uty47 or the urgency hras necessary to secure

access alone with the .*n..ot.48 The incident tends Èo

suggesË that, for thís period of the day, the custodes had

standing orders to permít access to no-one unless that person

had Èhe express authoríty of the emperor.

Variable factors are evídent' nevertheless, in such

a process, not least in the area of efficíency. The guards

ín the corridor outside Commodust bedroom were sleepy on the

46

47

q.v. ch. 3. pp. 36 f , 39 (and n. 68).

v. reference to article by Hohl ín Loeb editíon of llerod.ían,vol. 1, p. 337, n. 1.

The tríbune may have been accompanied by hís centurions,for instance, or by others r¡ho were to pass on Ëhe signum,e.g. the tesseraríus of the sPeculatores (Tac. Hist. 1. 25).

48

-110-

night of hís assassinatíon, the effect of drinkl (Herodian

2. L. 2). Thís ís not the only occasion in whích they are

caught by surprise (Suet. Aug. 19, Suet. Claud. 13).

On a different level, access clearly r¡ras noÈ totally

prohibited to all by the custodes, as the standing order describ-

ed would suggest. CerËain farníly members could obtain an ínter-

view with líttre fuss aÈ aLL.49 others seen to have had

access to varying degrees, noËably favoured domestic staff, at

least while on duty. Simílarly, the emperorts concubines, such

as Marcía in A.D. 190' can ínform on others because access ís

difficult to refuse (CD 72. 13. 5, c.f. Tac. Ann. 11. 30).50

Even the praetorian prefect suffers by comparison to such fig-

ures. He requires an appoíntment or a special applieation for

audÍence at the p"1....51 Custodes would, neverÈheless, cast

a watchful eye on all admissions' \¡Ie it.gin".52

49

50

51

52

ê.8., Suet. Cal. L2. 3, Herodían 1. 13. 1, c.f. Suet.Cal. 23. 3, Tac. Ann. L2. 68.

c.f. ín A.D. 48, the senior Vestal Vírgin, Vibidia' tríesto speak to Claudius about Messalina. Narcíssus couldonly delay, not refuse, Tac. Ann. 11. 32. 34-

e.8., Sejanus, CD 58. 7. 5; in A.D. 48, Tac. Ani.11. 31; Plautíanr' Herodían 3. L2. 11.

SueÈ. Dom. L6 f, CD 67. 17 suggest that the cusËodes werenot immediately outside the bedroom, perhaps because it ísstill daytíme and they may supervise the access poínts Èo

the private wing. Herodían 3. L2. 1 poÍnts Èo theír close-ness, at night. Herodian also indícates that Ëhere \^rere

domestic matters it was not Ëhe responslbilíty of thecustodes to know about (2. 1. 2).

-111-

A reconstruction of admission procedure to the

palace during hours of prívacy thus reveals varíous checking

procedures. Successive challenges by praetorian excubiae,

members of the officíum admissionis hígher admínistrators

from the familia, domestíc cubicularíi and the custodes

ensured considerable difficulty of access at thís period ofRA

the day." The most striking feature of this procedure is

that admíssíon and access ís granted ulÈimately on the auth-

ority of the members of the famíliarwíËh the two corps of

armed personnel present to provÍde vistble backing to Èheir

auËhority andi:Ëo reacË to any crisis. The loyalty of all

was crucial, each acting partially as a cross-check upon

other groups. Overwhelming ínfluence by one such official

could be dangerorr".54

The ways ín which the control of access and secur-

íty alters with the ínvolvement of the emperor in public

activitíes within Ëhe palace, the non-resídential area spec-

tfícally, is instructíve. Both business and socíal activ-

íties occur there.

The ceremony of salutatio?5 an" daily morning greeÈing

of most days in " ,""t,56 owed its formallsed practices to

53 For Ëhe frusÈratíons of attempts to gain access evenduring the day, v. Plín. Pan. 47. 5 f.

54

55

e.g., Cleanderts career, Q.v. aPP. (38) ' (40¡.

q.v. L. Fried lander Roman Life and Manners under theEarly Empire. vol. 1. 1908. PP. 86 - 93; J.P.V.D. Balsdon

. L969. pp. 2L -23;Lífe and Leisure ín AncienÈ Rome

J.A. Crook Consilium Príncipis. 1955. pp. 22 - 27.

There \^/as no salutaËio on the days when the Senate met,56Suet. Aug. 53. 3; on dies relieiosí , cD 69. 7. 2.

-tt2-

traditional Republícan procedure. An important opportuníty,

nevertheless, for some ínformal inËeractÍon beËween emperor

and upper classes, complex considerations of etiquette and

dignity enveloped the public and private business which was

transacted there. In fact, the emperors as a rule did as

much as possible Ëo facilitate its operation at all ti*"".57

CusËomary practíce seems Èo have requíred the emperor-as-patron

to be togate, standing ín the reception hal1 or a sinilarq

suitable placer-B "..""sible

to those who desire ít59 and

prepared to confer a kiss of greeting and an embrace of honour

upon those of suítable rank ot f".ro,rt.60 The possible

implícations of thís situation for security are interesting.

Firstly, Ëhere are no indicatlons that Èhe Germani

play any role in this sítuation. They, or other custodes, are

líkely to have been nearby when an emperor greeted his closest

advisers ín his own bedroorn (Suet. Vesp.2L, CD 71- 25.4)-

Procedure elsewhere (pp.1f9ff) when the emperor allows the

publlc inÈo the palace might suggest Ëhat the custodes groups

shrínk back to the perlmeter of Èhe private residentíal area'

although the salutatio of all irnperíal activitíes in the

57 e.g.i Suet.:4ug.53. 3, CD 57. 1f. 5. c.f. CD 56. 26. 2.Some, however, díd díshonour Èo the institutíon, allowingímperíal T^Iomen to hold thern (q.v. Fríedlander, oP. cit.,87 f), or those of lower social status (CD 57 . 2L- 4), orLhemselves misbehaving (CD 80. L4. 4).

58 c.f. Cícero, q.v. Millar, op. cit., p. 30.

59 Not to Èhe commons it seems, however, c.f. Suet. Aug.53. 2, CD 66. 10. 4. c.f. Friedlander, oP. cit., p. 86.

60 v. Frle-dlander, op. cit., P. 92.

-113-

palace, seems to have consídered the feelings of those

present to the least degree, aÈ times. The rol-e, lf any,

of these personal bodyguards here is invisíble. !üho

protected the emperor here and what techniques vrere used?

The emperorts entourage was clearly sizeable.

Severan protocol, perhaps formalising the reality of earlíer

periods, poínts to the praetorian prefeet(s), amic:L,

príncipales offícíorum (administraÈive' departmental direct-

ors) and finally men of the senatorial and equestrian o.d.t".61

The presence of the principalee, probably prlor to dawn with

thelr brevlaría (daíly summaries of business, Suet. Vesp. 2L)

and suggesÈed analogously elsewhere (CD 60.33.6)' is a clue

to the nature of Ëhese meetings. The praetorian prefecË alone

carríed a \4reapon close to the emperorts person.

Admission seems to have been supervised in a way very

simílar to that for the palace as a private residential area'

discussed above. It seems clear that trooPs rirere present

externally as routine procedure (c.f. CD 66. 10. 5). Access

\,¡as controlled and "business hours" sígnalled by the opening

of the palace gates (p. 52 ). There was only one major access

point to the roorn in the public sector of the palace, used for

salutatio.62 rfr" role of the soldíers seems to have been super-

61 v. Millarr op. cít., P. I2L. Sejanus was the fl-rst prefectknown to have atÈended or held such sessf.ons, CD 57 " 2L. 4,c.f. Tac. Ann. 4. 74. Note also favouriËes admitted early(Suet. Vesp. 2L) and a cohors amicorum, often resldentlal,q.v. I,rleaver, op. cít., PP. 100, L57 and Frl-edl-ander¡ oP. cit.,P. 74.

62 For these vesÈíbules in various palaces' v. ch. 4. pp. 49 f,and Míllar, op. cít., p. 2L.

-114-

vísory and intimidatory, no escape for a plotter being

possible.

The role of the farnilia suggests thís clearly.

The role of the officíum admissionis is apparent. Nomen-

clatores among thelr number aided the emperor to remember

the names of all he greeted, although not all required such

help (Suet. Aug. 53. 3, SHA. Hadr. 20. 9). Further, they

are responslble f-or a set of screening proceduresr an impress-

ion of r¿hích can be assembled from varíous pieces of evldence.

The names of callers \¡rere published in Èhe Acta Diurng (e'g'

Tac. Ann. 16. 22). Recognítion v/as made by a number of methods.

The use of rings was short-lived, although the different grades

of entry p"t"i"t"d.63 It ís a freedman who informs Vespasian,

under Nero, that he ís no longer an amicus and access has been

prohibited (Suet. Vesp. 4.4, CD 63. fO t").64 Along with

Plínyts account of obstacles to be faced (Plin. Pan' 47' f)'

thts suggests that the líberti here responsible for admission

virtually checked each caller against a ro11 of some descrípt-

ion. Their decisÍon would be backed by the authorit.y of troops

close by.

Although aÈtempts were made to maintain this tradit-

ional ínsÈitutiorr65 some emperors allowed their anxietÍes to

Índuce them to implement a system of bodysearching at the salut-at io .

63

64

q.v. Balsdon, op. cít., P. 2L.

Princípem. L974. pP. 109 ff.For renuntlatio amícit.iae v. R.A. Bauman Impíetas in

65 q.v. Balsdon, op. cit., p.221' Míllar, oP. cít', p' 15 f'

-115-

Claudius was the flrst to do so, although whether or noÈ it

is directly linked to the discovery of Cn. Noricus with a

hTeapon at the salutatio (q.v. app. (15)) ís not clearr ur-66 . 67 r rr_fortunately."" It I^ras disconÈínued by Vespasian. -' Indic-

atíons suggest íÈ was both unpopular and offensive to the

dignity of the upper classes and so was dangerous. Claudius

reluctantly ("i¡) gave up the stricter Fype of search, ob-

viously under some pressure, and Vespasiants motíves can safely

be linked with an aËtitude by whích he was later concerned to

stress hís accessibilíty (Suet. Claud. 35, CD 66. 10. 5).

trüho it. was thaË actually carríed out these examinatíons it is

difficult to determine. Both the soldiers and imperial servants

would have given offence, although ín a 1íke supervisíon of

banquets Claudius chose élite praetorians, speculatores' to see

to his security (Suet. Claud. 35). Asíde from this aberratlon,

the symbíosis between the needs of ímperial security and the

demands of image and of senatorial dignity seems to have been

a healthy one, by and large, at the salutatío.68

66 SueÈ. Claud. 35. Many of claudiust increased security pre-cautíons were íntroduced early in the reígn. The fullmeaning of Reliquo... tempore is not made clear by Suetonius.

v. Fríedlander, op. cit. , P. 89.

The motivaÈion of claudius is clear buË why he allowed onlysalutatio to involve bodysearch is not. Response to theC". Nrdc"s plot would provide an easy solut.ion. Salutatíodoes not seem t.o have involved any less consíderation ofdignity than other conËacts with senators.

67

68

-116-

After salutatio ít is clear that under mosL emPerors

a number of Ëhose who had attended stayed behind to act as

assessores for the emperor duríng the morningrs work of receivíng

embassies, considering petitíons and undertakíng jurisdiction.

These men \^Iere the more prominent of the emperor I s amici. All

three aspects of imperial activity cíted are línked to the

expectation that the emperor lras the ultímate source of

beneficium la¡v and jusLic.e. 69

The emperor works from a tribunal erected ín a specially

desl-gnated area of the palace, partícularly once the Flavl-an

palace was built, although the exisËence and usage of such a

tribunal is aÈtested for the reign of Augustus (cD 55. 33. 5). 70

He ís sitÈing dor^rn, ín contrast to the saluÈatio this dtfferen-

ce due to the fact that he ís to act from a position of hígher

auËhority rather than conmunicate with theoretical co-equals

(Philo. Leg. ad Gaium. 350). The emperor'" ëËgt" are orì

the tribunal with hlm, presumably behind hi*.71 The two part-

icípants (or groups) in the issue stand before the emperor,

ranged on each side.

69v.Míllar:oP.cít.,pp.240152Tffandpassimforanexam-ination of the evidence for these circumstances '

70 v. Millar, íd., PP. 229 f, J.A. Crook Consíliurn Principis.1955. pP. 106 ff.

7I Phílo. Leg. ad Gaium.350, cD 60. 4. 3 ff, Suet Nero 15. 1,Tac. Ann. 13. 5, CD 69- 7.1, SHA' Hadr' 8, 9, CD 75,16'3 - 4. Crook, op. cit., shows Ëhe evolution to a more formalbody in the secãnd century A.D.'l{ith the amíci were favouredproiessional -.jutísconsults. The most interesËing additionís Èhat of thã praetorían prefect. Millarr oP'clt', pp' 4 f'g,230, poínÈS out that his presence wíll have brought a Sense

of irnmedíacy to thoughts of the emperorts power by petition-ers, seen most forcefully in the example of Bassaeus Rufus.The latter ls the only example known of an assessor inËer-veningrwhich suggests the amount of work done personally by

the emPeror.

-r17-

The presence of others of the public beyond these

people is uncertain. The presence of the assessores would be

enough to ensure that business trarisacted was considered to

have been done in public (CD 69. 7. l,c.f . CD 59. 18. Ð.72

The existùnce of offícials specifícally appointed to control

admíssíon, with consequent dífficulty of audíence at.tes,ted,

would suggesË that only those directly involved in a case u/ere

present withín (c.f Tac.Ann.13.5). The role of the offícium

admíssionís would seem overshadowed here by the presence of

officials, nevertheless from the familia,at least in the first

cenËury 4.D., whose funcËl-ons were related to these circumstanó-

es. Under Caligula, we learn of Hornilus who was ín charge of

admitting ambassadors (Phílo. Leg. ad Gaium. r8l). More generally,

officials from the central secretarlate wíth a clear role in

this business wíll have had some ínfluence upon the way in whích

issues r^rere to come to the emperorts attention.T3 trüíth such

control over entrance, Èhe number to be faced by the emperor

in most cases may have been smaller than for salutatío.

The role of the praetorían guard seems to have been

supervisory and exÈernal once more, as Vespasiants removal of

them during "business hours" would suggesË (CD 66. 10. 5). our

evídence reveals no example or indication of the presence of

soldíers wíthln the audítorium or public receptlon area of the

f

72

73

v. Crook, op. cít., p. 108.

Notably such as the a cognitionlbus, a-liÞelliq, ab epj-stulis,q.v. Ialeaver, op. cit., pp. 260 ff.. Examples of such officialsare Epaphroditus, Tac. Ann. 15. 55,and Narcíssus, CD 60. 33'6 . NeverËheless, Èhe emperor r¡ras riot toËally at the mercy ofsuch rnen, e.g. Philo. Leg. ad Gaium. 181, c.f. SHA. Ant' Pius6. 4.

Examples of large embassies and their supporters do survive,e.g. Jos. AJ L7.300 - 323; MiLLar, op. clt., p' 230'

74

-118-J

,{

tì,

palace' not ln itself conclusive' (The parallel of the trials

íntra cubieulum (p. 95 f) is noË inapposite') The external

troops of the emperor can adequately secure the building' even

at times when there Írere no bodysearches.T5 ¿,a public judicial

sessíons there was acute an{areness by Èhe e-mperor of being on

publícdísplayandofËhedignityofaristocraticparticipanEs.

ln consequence there vlas no disposiEion of troops r'¡ithin'

Unlike salutatio, the Ëribunal made contact \^/ith the emperorrs

pe.rson more dif f i"rrlt ' 76 !tríLh the praetorians covering the

onlyrouteofescape,controloftheemperor'sr.lorkingenviron_

ment was strong, therefore'

-Neveriheless, a relativel.y ]-ow-key aPploach by mÍ1Ítetry

forces ís suggested by reaction to crisis ' Intra cubiculum

trials involved Severe restrictíon of accesS and secrecy of

infortnation, e.nsured by the troops' This occurs ín a similar

fashion when a ner¡r emperor seeks the castra praetoría during

the crisís of succ"""iorr.77 rn A.D. 4g, claudius is hurríed

there to assure his safety and the loyalty of the troops ' It

ís ín the camp, on the tribunal' that Ëhe trials and sunmary

executions of the conspirators is directed (Tac' Ann' 11' 31'

35; app. (16)). Troops used to restríct access r^lere not

Vespasianrs action perhaps suggests he bel-ieved the pres-ence of the guardsr even externally, to have had an inhib-itive effect ,rpo, ã...ssibility and freedom of expression.Their presence nearby, ready to react Ëo a crisís

' impeded

communicaÈion.Thisisthetltr'nustofMíllarlssectiononescorts and guards (pp. 61 - 66) and his reference toBassaeusRufus(v.n.7|).An'extremelyblat'antexampleofthephenomenon\¡/aSthetrialofTl-rraseaPaetus,Tac.

I

tili

't

II'

i

I

1

75

76

77

Ann. 16. 27.

v. ch. 4. pp. 62 f..

v. ch. 2. PP. 11 f and ch' 4' PP' 67 Í.f .

-119-

normally enployed in this manner for jurísdiction and the

recepËion of embassies. It was offensive and unnecessary.

Such a prínciple of balanced response usually collapsed only

duríng a security crísís.

The occurrence of banquets r¿iÈhin the palace further

illuminates this process of compro*i"..78 Inlhen the emperor

dined privately, a triclinium ín the residentíal area is Ëhe

most likely locaÈí o1..79 At other tímes, a special room desíg-

ned to accommodate a large number of people is in evidence, both

Ín the d omus aurea and the domus Flavia 80tor example.

Meals on such occasions were índeed state banquets, or publie

banquets convlvl-a ublica 9t "a which the emperor \¡ras "working",

to a degree.

State banquets hrere an opportunity for the emperor

Ëo work at his relatíonshíp with the upper classes in a semi-

formal fashion. Dignity, once again, I¡Ias a consideration of

great írnportance, mosÈ emperors giving attenËion to the rank of

fheir,guests, dress an<'l. demeanour from the time of entry to

that of departure, the exceptíons revealing much about senatorial

7B On banquets' v. Friedlander, op. cit., pp. 82 - 85,93 - 97

and Balsdon, op. ciË., pp. 33 - 51. Further informatíonabout eating is given ín ch. B, particularly in reference topoisoníng and security. AddlËíonal features to be discussedhere focus upon the control of access to the banquet halland the nature and role of varíous personnel therein.

79 v. sueË. vesp. 2L, servants there called domesticí. Yetsuet. otho 8 . 2 aLso calls the maín banqueÈ hall by the same

name, c. f. the tricliniarchus described on p. L23.

80 v. ch. 4. pp. 48 f and for an indicatíon of numberspresent, Suet. Claud.32.' Plut. Otho 3' 4'

81 For the phrase, v. SHA. Alex. Sev.34. B' For epulum,v' PP. 158 f.

;

t

Þ

,iI{f'ti

'l

ïiI

I

I

I

ürr

11

-L20-

82expectations."- Although banquets served as an informal

source of informaËion Ëo the .*n.totr83 his conduct there

T¡ras an indicator to his social "equals" of the tenor of his

rule (c.f . CD 67. 9).

tr{ithín the palace and outside "business hourst', it

is yet clear that the semi-public nature of the banquet alters

the nature of security precautions taken by the emperors for

thaË context. It seems Ëhat the supervísory measures of

custodes and membels of the familia, normal for the privacy of

the palace, contract from the area in "publíc" use, probably to

the residential area or the periphery of thaË momentaríly

public room. The reign of Claudius from Ëhe

beginníng marked a turning point in one respect. He intro-

duced the use of t.roops' presumably togate as usual

(c.f. CD 64.9.2 f), into convívia, speculatores present as

his bodyguard, carrylng theír lances, and ordinary praetorians

serving his food (Suet. Claud. 35. 1). Diots more vague comment

may indicate Ëhe practice was used at Ëhe homes of others also

Rlr(CD 60. 3. 3).o* He also asserts that the procedure survíved

to hís own day in the Severan era. It is ínterestíng that of

,I

ùì'

,lt'

ü

'l

II

)

I

1

få'i

iìl

B2 Examples: Rank - Suet. Aug. 74, CD 57. 11. 3. The honourof an invitaËion - Suet. Vesp. 2. 3, where servílity isalso a feature (c.f. Tac.Ann.2.28 on their frequency)'Dress - SHA. Hadr. 22.4. Demeanour - CD 57.11' 3, Suet'Tíb. 72. 3, SHA. Hadr. 22.4. Exceptions are díscussedfully by Fríedlander and Balsdon' v. n. 78.

v. ch. 3. P. 32'

c.f. Tac. Hist. 1. 24, a convívíum aË Othols home r¿here

soldíers are certainly present, although ít is not statedwhether they are inside or not. Dio t s suggestion of thecontinuity of the pracËíce does not necessaríly mean all

emperor s used iÈ, c.f. n. f9.

B3

84

-LzL_

all the unusual precautions implemented by the jíttery

Claudíus, this hras not challenged by succeeding emperors'

perhaps suggesting that Ëhey assessed some greater vulner-

ability there and that lË required a precedent to a1low the

mainËenance of such a practice. Sirnilarly sígnífícant is

the fact thaÈ spe culatores rather than Germani were employed

here. Despíte the presence of securíty forces ín this un-

precedented location, there is stíll some sensÍtívity for the

feelíngs of the guests.

The routine Presence of the milítary ís known for

other stages of enËry to the banquet hall. The invasion of

the praeÈorians as Otho díned with a large group of senators

in A.D. 69 suggests this (q.v. "pp.

(26)). TaciËus descríbes

the force with which they broke through the external barriers

(Tac. HisÈ. L.82, c.f . CD 64.9.21), índicating that the

normal excubiae cohorË on duËy at the maln vesËibule area vlas

confronted by a sizeable group of mutineers. Troops aÈtested

to have been presenÈ aÈ the doors of the banquet hall itself

(plut. Otho 3. 6) were bolstered by an indeterminable number

of praeËorían officers' both tribunes and centurions (Tac.

Hj_sÈ. 1. 82, Suet. Otho 8.2). The situation at banquets

thus provides evídence of a seríes of rnilitary sËaÈions covering

access to Ëhe emPeïorts person aÈ three successive poínts, from

outside the palace to the doors of the hal1 ítself and fínally

wíthin, around him. I^Iith the exceptíon of the addítíonal officers

present, it is probable that all were drawn from the cohort on

duty outside the palace. It seems evídent, therefore, that the

tI

,t

ìr'

i

'I

ïit

I

I

I

I

-r22-

emperor \^ras both conscious of his o\¡tn securlty and did not

want hís parËy inËerrupted by uninvited grr""t".85

The fact that the latter could and díd occur de-

monstrates that the soldiers lilere noË solely responsible for

controllíng access Ëo the emperorrs convivia. whilst in Gaul,

Calígula learnt that a wealthy províncial gained access to his

banqueÈ hall by bribing the officials who íssued ínviËations

(Suet. CaI. 39. 2, the vocatores . Thís suggests once more

that ít was members of the officium admissionis who examined

the credentials of those enlering. In thl-s case' neither those

officials, nor indeed soldiers if they díd look at them at this

stage, would have no reason to doubt the ínvitatíon of this man,

his name having been placed upon the offícial líst. The sold-

íers are there to supervise and reacË to any threat at the sev-

eral sÈages of access at which they are positioned.

Evidence also indtcates the presence, immedíate or

nearby, at these banquets of a large contíngent of slaves and

freedmen with various funcÈions to fulfil in relation to the

meal itself. DespíÈe the attestation of Èroops serving food,

after Claudiusf innovatíon, it is apparent thaÈ officials such

as the a potione, a vinis and the praegustator, all involved

with the service of drinks, and the tríclíniarchus possibly

l

85 UnforËunately, Èhis is Èhe only subsËantial íncident thatreveals such a practice. The presence of praetorianofficers outside Claudiust door in A.D. 48 occurs at a

most extraordinary tíme and, it seems clear, not aË a Statebanquet (Tac. Ann. 11. 37).

-r23-

the organiser of all such staff, are all well aËtested. 86

This bespeaks a considerable number of busy people, constantly

rnovíng about the banqueË hall, servíng the emperor or to secure

the emperor, not least the praegustator as the emperorrs last

human line of defence in hís efforts noË to be poison.d.87

It is interesting to note that there is evidence for the

existence of a group of such men. An inscription tel1s us of

a man who was procurator praegustatorum.SSrrta ír organisational

principles we have little evidence of, although ít seems clear

that only one accompanied the emperor at any tlme.89 I¡Ie can

assume that any of them feeling ill was not assigned to duty

Ëhat day. IÈ ís also evident that they did not remain poison

tasters through their careers, some going on to be tríclíniarchus90for example.'" Random rotatíon of tasËing Personnel may have

made it difficult for them to be used by plotÈers, from the

outside, at least.91

B6

B7

88

v. Inleaver, op. cit., pp. 6, 31, 34r 227r 229r 274.

v. ch. 8. p. L97 on Ëhe antídote theriac.v. pl.4I/52 of the computer index ot CIL by E'J' Jory and

D.G. Moore. tr'Ialter de Gruyter and Co Netherlands. L975.(7 Fasciculi). (=Corpus inscrlptlonum latirìarum. Indicesvocabulorum nomínibus propríls ínclusis)e.g. Halotus, with Claudíus in A.D. 54 (q.v. app. (19)).A constant flow of such people may have necessitated a

"training program" of some sort, c.f. ch. 8 pp. 195 f.v. I^leaver, op. cit., p. 274.

Naturally, those able to plot from the inside had littlesuch trouble, e.g. 4.D.54 (n.89) or 4.D.55 (app.(20) ) .

B9

90

9L

-L24-

Banquets \^líthin the palace thus would seem to be

between the accessibility of publíc life and the rigid

Jinaccessibilityoftheprivateresidentialarea.FromËIrereign

of Claudius, concern for dignity is less adhere'd to wíth Èhe

vlsible,multi-levelattendanceofbodyguards.Theemperorls

various precautions for actívities in the palace were larg-

ely abandoned, buË for Ëhe inËroduction of sPeculatorge at

banquets. Part of the reason for this relative disregard

of digníty may lie in the semi-public and semi-formal nature

of these banquets. certainly, the precautions íntroduced

and accepted seem to have been significantly different Ëo

those for tradítionallY more Pub líc events such as salutatio

and jurisdíction. The presence of soldiers, albeíÈ public

soldiersr Dây indicaËe that the emperor felt he could do as

he liked to some extent wíth hís own residence during social

hours and be oPen about it. 92

2. I^IORK OUTSIDE THE PALACE.

TheaímaËthispoíntistoexaminetheconductof

the emperor in his day-to-day contact with various socíal

orders in public, on Èhose occasions when he was not con-

strained by the d,emands of ceremorrí.".93 TacíÈus (Ann. 1. 7. 5)

92 Alternatively, ít was mainËaíned in Èhis less publiccontexË as a means of intírnidatíng the upper classes 'This ís evident in extreme cases, of course, e.g. Calígula(Suet. Cal.32) and DomiËian (CD 67' 9), but may have

been employed otherwise as a permanent reminder ofimperíal Pol^7er.

q.v. sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, on public cere-monials and the ludí.

93

-I25-

neatly encapsulates the princípal areas of concern when

descríbing the operrj.ng of the reign of Tiberius,

miles in forum miles in curiamcomitabatur. (Tac. Ann. L.7

These are the focal areas of public 1ífe ín Rome.

Having arrived at the forum, the behaviour of those

guards, advlsers and attendants who had accompaníed the

94emperor there'- was beseÈ by cornplícaÈed expectations, with

results not always apparent to us due to assumptions of

knowledge made by those sources upon whích we rely'

llhen consíderíng jurisdiction and the reception of

ernöagSfåS: ín these public circumstances, r,7e must attempt to

díscover to whaÈ exËenË the emperorts working environment

was able to be controlled, as díd occur at the p"1"t"'95

In the forum, an expectation of consíderable, general

accessibility seems to have been fulfílled by mosÈ emPerors

who chose to work th"re.96 The tríbunal was certainly well

attended by the populace when the emperor \^Ias present.9T

The extent to which the tribunal affords the emperor protect-

íon ín these circumstances is really dependenË upon the way

in which security personnel were deployed nearby' 98 A"""""ot."

attended the emperor in most reígns (c. f. CD 60 ' 4 ' 3) but

were of little value when an emperoï allowed as much physical

94

95

96

v

v

ch.

pp.

5. pp. 75 f.f..92 - L24.

Evidence suggesËs that the public areas of the Flavianpalaee were increasíngly used in preference, q'v' Millar'àp. cít., pp. L2L, 343, 350, Crook, op. cit', P' 107'

v. Millar, op. cít.., p. L2O, n. 68 re Augustus and

for Claudius, Suet. Cl. 18, Tac. Ann ' 12' 43"97

98 on the tribunal, v. ch. 4. PP - 62 f.

-L26-

accessibility as Claudius did (SueË. Claud- 15. 3 f' c.f.

33 ). Besídes the faílure to indícate Èhe frequency of

sueh imperial public jurisdicËionr99 o.rt sources are most

lacking in suggestions about the nature of troop pTesence or

Èheir use ín crowd control, for example. The public Ërad-

ition of jurísdicËion, inheriËed from the Republic, makes

offícials such as the lictores and viatores Ëhe most. likely

candidates to control access to the tribunal. It is they

who accompany Ëhe emperor whíle he travels in the city and

who summon people to his pt.""rr"..100 Needless to say'

their numbers were ínadequate if any Latge scale trouble

101arose.

The locatlon and functíon of the troops and custodes

who accompanied the emperor to and from the sites of his

public dutíes are difficult, to discern. It ís possible that

they remained very close to his person, just as the retinue

of a Republican senator did, according to the requirements

ro2oï gravlEas. The large open spaces of the forurn would

require Some means of control Ëo ensure the emperorts safety

as he carrled out his functions. The one detaíled example

99 Imperial jurísdiction ín the forum is descríbed byMíllar, op. cít., PP. 228 - 240.

100 v. ch. 5. P. 76 and A.H. M. Jones Studies ín Roman

Government and Law. Oxford: Basíl Blackwell. 1968.ch. 10.a role.

10f q.v. A.lü. LintottOxford U.P. L968.

The offícium admissíonis may also have plaYed

Violence in Republícan Rome.pp. 89 ff.

L02 q.v. Z. \avetz Plebs and Princeps. Oxford U.P. L969.. passim. The absence of a decent escort r^las cons-ídered reprehensible, CD 55 . 9 . 1. -:' -

t27 -

of a disturbance ín the forum rtrhíle the emperor T^Tas present

as judge does give some aid.

ThesuggestionlwishËodíscussísËhaÈtheescort-

ing troops did noÈ remain in the closest proxímity to the

emperor while he was on the trlbunal. one wonders how

desperate a crowd would have to be, faced with the prospect

of a corn famlne, Ëo challenge a cohort of praetoríans and

a corps of Germani in order to get theíT message across to

the emperor aÈ close range (Suet. Claud'18, Tac' Ann' L2' 43)'

The extraordinary accessibility of claudius in these círcum-

stances suggests either thaË he allowed thís, with his troops

closeby, or that the bulk of hís protecÈors had wiËhdrawn Èo

some sll-ghÈ dísÈance.

The latter deserves some consideration. The praetorian

guard \^ras concerned wíËh crowd control in large Spaces, as much

as with the emperor's personal security, "t títt"'103 Such

a practíce would allor^r Èhem to prevent riots and inhíbít

assassination attempÈs at once, sínce they could react quickly

to eíther type of crisis. The basíc organisational unit of

Ëhe guard when contingency plans were mobilísed or crowd

control procedures \^/ere ímplemented seems Ëo have been the

*"rrip1".104 rn this situatí.on, this woul-d allow Èhe cohort

attending the emperor to splít up to patrol or be stationed at

varíous polnts ín the forum, wiÈh the addítional vírtue thaË

the emperor would at least seem to be more accessíble'

103 q.vLO4 q.v

ch. 5. p. 74, n. 6

p. 100, rì. 22.

-L28-

- It is, Ëherefore, of ínterest in Ëhe conclusion of

the ríot ín A.D. 51 that a globus of troops secures the

empeïorrs safety and that they are *ilit.".105 The word'

globus denotes no particular size of force but rather implíes

soldiers massed to force an opening wíÈh a thrusÈing

rtt""k.106 obvtously, such a tact.ic has applicatíon in thís

context and has an ínterestl-ng parallel ín the proÈection

afforded to Didíus Julianus upon his succession (Herodian

2. 6.13).107 FurÈher examination of the sources quoted by

Furneaux for this word also suggest that a globus \¡ras a group

deliberately or accidentally splíntered from a maín force.108

105

106

L07

108

According to Frank, op. cit., pp. 24 f., the word milítesexcludes custodes. 0f the armed personnel, the custodesar" among-ffi more likely to have remaín"d .loõ-to tlteemperor, assuming Èhat t.he majoríty reÈíred to a smal1

dístance.v. Furneauxts edition of Tacitus Annals. Oxford. 1884-91.vol. II p. 115 n. (1ine)5 and references.

These are, therefore, sËrong indl-cations Ëhat troops ofthe guard practised certain techníques which could beused to secure Ëhe emperor.

Examples ín Tacitus: Ann. 1. 25. I (groups of armedmen rearly 1n a camp), 4. 50, 4 sÈationes st rengthenedby more men), J4.6L.2 (€þbi drlve rioting sympaÈhisersof Octaviafrom the palace area with whips and \¡reapons,strongly suggesting the divlsíon of one unit to meetapproaches to various parts of the perimeter) ; Hist. 3. 22

(small, distincÈ and confused bands). c.f. SHA. Pert. 11.4(300 soldiers ínvade the palace in wedge formation). The

evidence of Vegetius ís ínteresing (3. 19):

Globus auÈem dicítur qui a sua acie separatus vagoervenË íncursat ínimicos conËra uem alËer

propulsior fortí or inmitËitur slobus.

For other souïces, v. Thesaurus Linguae Latínae p. 2055'

-L29-

If the unít r¡ras, indeed, divided into maniples or another

sub-unit, the closest of these would have aided Claudius '

soon accompanied by the others nearby. They were then able

to secure the emperorts path to a backdoor of the palace

closeby (Suet. Claud. 18. 2). ThaË such a practice I^Ias

used regularly, if at all, when the emperor performed such

duËíes in the forum must remain conjectural.

Thís is our príncipal example of a riot placíng

víolent physical pressure upon the emperor, which probably

signifies the raríÈy of such evenËs. Popular discontent

rras more likely to be expressed by groups at Ëhe spectacles'

for example. In the forum, the close proxímíty of troops,

whatever the form that Ëook, seems to have inhibited violence

near the emperorts person wíth great success. An unarmed,

índiscíplíned populace wí1l usually have come off a poor

second to t.he praetoríans (e.g. CD 59. 28. 11' Tac. Ann.

14. 6L. 2).

In some respects such comments apply equally to the

public reception of embassies. Often contentíous in nature'

ambassadorial business sugges ts a cognítio pro tríbunall-109

type of siEuatíon \Álas oPerative. The emperorfs dígnlty

and cíviliËas could be promoted by such 'transacËions 1n

public, not least by the use of careful jurisdictíonal proc-

"drrr.".110 A difference wiÈh the routine jurísdiction of the

r09

110

v. Crook, op

ê.8., CD 57.cD 55. 33. 5

. cit.,L7. 9,

p. 107 ff.Jos. AJ l-7. 300 - 323 c.f

-130-

forum is that such receptíons could ínvolve rnuch ceremonial

formalíty. The receptíon of Tíridates ís an exceptional

example, ínvolving rígíd control, ít would seem' and the

presence of heavíly armed atoop".111 Most involved some

ceremony but allowed discussion of issues between emperor

and subject a1so.112 Less accessibiltty to the public at

large is probable, however, and direct crowd control more

likely ín view of the ceremonial elements. I,le do not have

enough evidence to provide a more precíse índícation.

Our evídence for the circumsËances of the emperor ín

the Senate is certainly better in quantity and qualíty than

Ëhat for the public tribunal, reflecting Ëhe soclal origins-

and interests of our sources. Busíness ín the curia was

often of a rubberstamp nature or petty by comparison to that

conducted privaËely by the emperor and his varíous assistants.

Nevertheless, the emperor needed the Senate to provide the

officíal basis for his por¡/er and its members as principal

executors and admínístrators of his policies. Issues of the

emperorts securíty are inextricably línked to his interacËion

wíth members of t.hat group.

The curia itself was only one of a number of buildings

used by the Senate for its meetirrg".l13 The emperor sat elther

with the consuls, in vírtue of his r_mp erium. or wíth the trib-

unes, reflecting his trÍbunician pohrer. In either case' he sat

111

TLz

113

v. ch. 5. p.Tac. Ann. 12

ê.8. CD 60.

v. ch. 4.

74,

32. 4a;

p. 61.

n. 7;ff,36

c.f. the receptíon of Caratacus,Durry, op. cít. , p. 278.

Míllar, op. cit., pp. 410 - 418.

-131-

aË the point farthest from the door beyond which his escort

could not proceed, by tradiÈíon, alÈhough there he would be

readíly visíble to them, since the doors I^tere open. Repub-

lican officials were better able to secure the emperor

within the chamber. Vítellius and Vespasían summoned

plebeian tríbunes to their aíd (CD 65.7.2, 66' L2' 1) but

in more dangerous moments wíll have looked to ther líctors

and the líctor proxlmus, ln particulat.Ll4 It is lnteresÈing

ín the case of Traj ants líctor proxímus that he htas an imperial

freedman well favoured by Èhe emperor. The lictors, while

at the SenaÈe, seem to have acted ltke polícemen'. seeing to

Èhe Ëoken execution of a man who suicides wtthin the chamber

(Tac. Ann. 6 . 40, CD 58. 2L. 4) and lnËervening between

Soranus and his daughter during a trialbefore the consular

tribunal (Tac. Ann. 16. 30 - 32).1r5 Nevertheless, normal

Senate procedure would suggest that the lictors díd not

enËer the buíldíng, whether the emperor ülas present or fiot.

The emperor t s proLectíve escort to the curia was

that of praetoríans, custodes and Republican attendants. It

was abnormal for anyone Ëo eriter wtth hlm' Those groups

LL4 v. Millar, oP. cít., P. 67. 0nof Trajan, V. R. SYme Tacitus

the lictor proxamus(2 vols) Oxford U.P.

1958. ' P. 240.

115 In such círcumstances \^7e cannot be sure that Èhe emperor

\¡ras Present in person. Nerors sPeech in the latter case

is read by the uaestor Caesaris. Some emperors used

substitutes due to infírrnitY cD 54. 25. 5, 56. 26. 2) ,others so as to attend Lhe senate less (CD 60.2. 2, re-lated to infirmities). Most attended and dfd so, withinthe chamber, alone (Suet. Tib. 30)'

-r32-

clearly assume some disposition ín regard to the buÍldíng

so as Ëo secure approach and exit TouËes, possibly to the

extent of surroundíng it. Their po\¡Ier of intirnidaÈíon is

evídent. Extraordinary examples give an inËensified

glímpse of such procedure (CD 74. 12.1, Tac. Ann. 16. 27).LL6

Only in Ëhe absence of praetorians, and thus of the emperor

clearly, did public rlot pose any real threat to the Senat ".LL7

Equally, it was extrernely rare for larger troop units

to enter the Senat..1l8 Evídence for the presence of other

smaller groups of non-senatorials is more consístent and

signíficant. Honorifl-c grants of a seat in the Senate for

praetorían prefects are as infrequent as their usage as liaison

fígures with Ëhe seriate for absent emperor".119 For a period

116 An interesting aspect of the latter case is the use of aglobus of togate troops to Protect the approach to theSenaËe (c.f. n.108). Thls is a further example of thecohort normally on duty being split up, it would seem.Other small groups (cuneí) patrol the nearby areas of theforum, suggestíng a contíngency plan similar to that ofa recent tense period (Tac. Ann. 15.58) or ad hoc arrange-ments allowed by the extraordinary presence of two cohortswithín.

LL7 c.f. Yavetz, op. cit., Pp. 17,26,28 ín reference toriots of 22 8.C., A.D. 20, 29, 37. Tn 22 8.C., the curiaseemed least protected with the emperor absent. No seriousdanger occurred in the other cases' praetoríans cerËaínlybeíng present.

118 Examples: Tac. Ann. 16. 29 - 32, CD 74- 8. 4 f,74. 12.1,SHA. Carac. 2. 9.

119 The fírst example occurs under Augustus, CD 60. 23. 3 andDurry, op. cit., p. L77 f. No similar granÈ seems to haveoccurred until Claudíus. Sejanus and Macro extraord-ínaríly acted as virtual viceroys fot the absent Tiberius.The cases of Nymphídius Sabínus and Acilíus Attianus aresímilar. v. ch. 11 passim. The emperor would be wary ofgívíng such a role to the prefect normally.

-133-

of the Julío-Claudían dynasty, however, the issue of armed

attendance within the chamber I^las a real onerignoring the

affront to senatoríal digníty. Augustus took precautions

within only at a personal level when he was suspícious

(CD 54. L2.3). In 4.D.32, a senator proposed that Tiberius

accept a personal guard of armed seriators within the chamber

(CD 58. 17. 3 - 18.1, Tac. Ann. 6. 2). Dio points to the

role of the praetorians on the perimeter making such a step

valueless and explains that Tiberius rejected ít because there

Ì¡ras no precedent (c.f . Suet. Aug. 35. 1 f). The sítuation

clearly confirms the emperorrs solltude wíthin as normal.

Soon afËer, Tiberíus hímself requested a guard of praetorian

compositíon (Tac. Ann. 6. 15, CD 58. 18. 5).120 A com-

prehensive decree followed, including the provisíon for

bodysearches.

These measures vlere never implemenËed since Tiberius

did not return to Rome before his death. However, Lhey are

certainly the precedent for his successors. In A.D. 40, the

senate "reconcíled" ítself wíth Caligula by votíng for hi-n

an unusually high tríbunal in the senate with a rnilitary

guard to secure his unapproachability "even there" (CD 59.

26. 3). The measure vlas ímplemented, in part at least, if

\¡re are to lnterpret the presence of Cassius Chaerea in the

curía, shortly before the conclusíon of the plot against

L2O v. R.S. Rogerslatíon under Tib

Criminal Tr ials and Criminal Legis-erius. Middletown, Conn. Am. philol.

assoc.; see Ame

1935. pp. LL6 f.r. phílol. assoc. Phílol. monogr. no.f.

6

-L34-

Gaius, as part of such a procedure (Jos. AJ 19. 60). Again'

Claudius soughÈ permission to bríng the prefect and tribunes

of the guard into the chamber with him (Suet. Claud . L2) ,

probably early in the reign (CD 60. 3. 2, c.f. 60. L6. 3

in A.D. 42).

Several poinÈs emeïge from this evidence- Firstly'

it is remarkable that the emperorts choice of a bodyguard

for these circumstances comprises the upper offícer struct-

ure of the praetorian guard, in the case of tribunes more in

number than would normally have been on duty as leader of the

one cohort escorting the emperor """h d"y.l21

Secondly, Ëhe context here ís an acutely revealing

one for the interaction of emperor and senat.ors. The propos-

als for guards wíËhin the chamber all occur in times of

crisís and suspense, indeed when relaËions l¡Iith the emperor

are strained and so normal procedure and expectations are

waíved so Ëhat the emperor can feel secure. As Diors comment

about the exËernal sÈrength of the security forces shows

(cD 58 . I7 . 4) , the issue of ínternal security \^Ias essenËíally

a token one around which a workl-ng defínition of Ëhe emperorts

changing relationship with the senate could be framed' A

nervous or suspíclous emperor and a terrorísed Senate díd not

make for relaxed interaction. Therefore, alËhough outwardly

concerned abouÈ the emperorts Securíty, measures directed

against ítself by the senate can justifíably be ínt.erpreted

72L v. ch. 10 passim on the guard officers.

-135-

as efforts to dísarm suspicions. Better to lose some dígnity

Ëhan face an anxious emperor, as Tíberius well understood

(c.f. Suet. Tíb. L2. 3, on Rhodes). A clear case of guilty

misconduct \¡ras not requíred to elíminate someone (e.g. Tac.

Ann. L4. 57 - 9). Consequently, a constant attempt by Ëhe

seriate to define Èhe manner of conduct of the emperor can be

discerned throughout our period of enquir rl22 ot, failing thaÈ,

a cannibalistíc verve for self-preservaËíon under the more

tyrannous emperors. In Ëhís sense, Ëherefore, the seriaËe

showed a strong interest in the security of the emperor' even

at theír o\¡rï. expense, ín ítself an indicatíon of the ímporËance

of their digníty in the normal relationshíp between the two

and its application to issues of security.

Also, it ís notable Ëhat the Germani are not to be

included among those admitted in Ëhese circumsËances. Although

they were among the closest of those who escorted the emperor

to and from the building and they \^rere renowned for fíerce

loyalty, neit.her senatorial nor imperíal Ínítíatives in this

area mention them. The presence of G".rgli in public involved

sufficient affront to dígnity. AtÈendance within the- senaters

chamber would have been difficult to tolerate.

There is little evidence for the procedure of these

escorts once they did enter Ëhe curía. The numbers involved

are beyond reasonable conjecture' there being no parallel

L22 v. Bauman, op. cit., ppput. senators Èo death.

2L4 - 217 on the oat,h not to

-136-

sítuation. The senatorial decree, which was Ëhe precedent,

imposed no limitatíon.123 Their attendance uPon and super-

vísion of the emperor will have done enough to deter any

plotters and to remÍnd them of Ëhe huge force outslde.

The question of body searching ín regard Ëo the

curla is reveallng both about Ëhe importance of digníÈy ín

the lives of the senators and the hostility which must have

been generated by such procedures ín any context. The only

reference to a bodysearch in a public sit.uaËion ls the use

of lt by Augustus during a híghly sensitive lectio (Suet'

Aug. 35. 2). There are no such ínstances in regard to the

curía. Indeed, a charge made 1n A.D. 24 that Piso had

carried a sr¡¡ord into Èhe house is dropped as "Èoo atrociouslL3o'

to be true" (Tac. Ann. 4.21), although the need to reassure

Èhe emperor later Ín the reígn prompted the senators to Te-

commend thís (CD 58. 18. 6). Caligula's apparent use of

Èroops did not include search for weapons as fs índícated by

the meeÈing shortly before that emperorts death (Jos' AJ

19. 62). Evidently, desperation overcame the feeling of

ttatrocíousnesstt. In necessiÈy, it seems Èhe presence of

Ëïoops l.Iithín the chamber htas less offensive than the practice

of a bodysearch. Even at the salutatio there was enough

hostility aroused.

L23

123a

v. p. 133 Any number of a manageable slze isfeasible. lO (Suet. Aug. 35. 2), 20 (Tac. Ann' 6'2)are possible, c.f. pp. LO2 f.f on the vigília and

ch. 10 pp.234 ff on the extra tribunes occasionallyattendíng Èhe emPeror.

Quod ut atrocius vero tranissum

-L37-

An area which deserved some caution was the use of

stili (sharp writing ínstruments) withín the curia, swords

and oËher \¡reapons beíng attesËed little, if at ^II

.L24

Julíus Caesar had injured one of hís assas'sins wiËh his

(Suet. Jul. Caes.82.2). Simílarly, the senatorial attack-

ers of the víctím of Protogerìes under Caligula achier¡ed -thêir

purpose with these insËruments (sueË. cal.28, CD 59.26.1 f).

Claudius had been injured by one in his court of law (Suet.

Claud. 15. 4) but seems to have taken precautíons with them

only at hls salutatio (Suet. Claud. 35. 2) . Stíli \,üere

certainly preserit but never used agaínst Ëhe emperor there,

it seems. The taking or use of a weapon of any sort inside

the curia in most conditíons \¡las as taboo Èo the senators

as it seems to have been for the emperors to institute a

bodysearch Ëhere.

The fínal group attested to have rìaccompanled the

emperor ínto Ëhe curia are his freedmen. Essentially' this

is an extraordinary phenomenon' rangíng in examples from the

reader of the will of Augustuslz' ,o the more frequenÈ apPear-

ances of Protogenes under Caligula (CD 59. 26. L - 2)-

Instances under Claudius are more regular (e.g- cD 60 . L6),L26

124

L25

L26

Praetorían prefect and officers would be armed, ofcourse. Augustus (CD 54. L2.3) and Caracalla (SIIA.Carac. 2. 9) wore breastplates, whíle Caligula (CD

59. 25. S) and Claudius (Suet. Claud. 34. 2) carríedh7eapons.

v. CD 56. 32. 1 - 33. 1, Suet. Aug. 101' Suet. Tib.23, Millar, op. cit., p. 72.

v. trrleaver, op. cit., p. 282; also Taylor / ScoËt,op. cit., p. 543 n. 36 with references to discussíon byMommsen.

-138-

rnTith rare examples in later reígns (e.g. CD 74.8.4). The

influence in public llfe of such líberti reached its zeníth

under the Julio-Claudians through theiT control of adminí-

stratíon in Èhe central secretariate. Standíng behiríd Ëhe

emperor (CD 60. L6.5) rnaínly in such a capacíty, they could

nevertheless come to his aid in an emergency (c.f. SueË.

Aug. 67, SueË. Dom. L4. 4). Yet they are not a significant

addiÈíon to the emperorrs security net\,rork for the senate.

They are part of a period when the emperor was both anxious

and less than careful Ín the maintenance of a dígnified inter-

relationship. Fear of the Germani and Ëhe praetorians (c'f.

Jos. AJ L9 . 115 f f ) r¡ras an adequate deterrent.

3. PUBLIC CEREMONIALS

Most of the activitíes engaged in by great public

fígures had elements of ceremonial involved, since religíon

had been closely ínterrelated with the life of the state

continuously sínce Ëhe regal period. The emperor hímself

frequently participated as pontifex maximus. The recent work

of Liebeschuetz makes some important points for our n,rtno".".127

DespiÈe consíderable disíllusíon \.líth the state cult as a

means of personal fulfilment' a process well advanced by the

time of the princípate, it is apparent that Èhe aristocratic-

ally eontrolled religion continued to have validity for the

res publica. The maintenance of the pax Deorum \¡Ias essential

,t

¿

ù

¡

itt(

If.

I

1

L27 J.H.I/Í.G. Liebeschuetzrelígíon. Oxford U.P.

ContinuityL979.

and chanse ín Roman

-139-

for the well-being of the sËate. Augustus I revíval of

the staÈe culË Ëurned Ëhe pax Deorurn to personal politlcal

advantage, indeed to a consciousness that the princePs was

the mosË essenËlal índívidual for the welfare of the state.128

Consequently, wÍth imperial cult worshíp, sacrlfices and

vota pro ""lrrË"r129

Ëhe personal safety of the emperor be-

came a matter of public concern. The securíty of the emperor

was coincident with that of the state. Further

...aparÈ from the Roman co1leges, the men

most conËinuously occupied ín rítual of loyalty \¡rereímperíal officials and soldÍers. rJU

Our examínatíon of the many public ceremonials must

take lnto accounË the extent of religious feelíng which clung

to such situations. The method of approach, however, is based

upon the purely physícal clrcumstances of these ceremonies.

I¡le will begin by looking at ceremonies ínvolvíng processions

of some sort and then those whích focused upon a sÈaËic locatíon,

such as tribunal, rostrum or temple.

.1

{

Èf'

{

;truT.'

L28

129

v. Liebesehuetz, íd., ch. II I'The Augustan Revival"and esp. p. 63.

CD 55. 34. 3. For further examples and discussíon: v.lI. trrlarde Fowler The Rellgious experience of Ëhe R.omanPeople. Cooper Square, New. York. L97I (reprinÈ of1911 editíon) p. 437; R.M. 0g11vle The RorÍrans and theirgods . ChatÈo and tr'Iíndus, London. 1969 . p . 39;S. I,{einstock Divus Jullus 0x. U.P. 1971. pp. L67, L7r(ternple to Salus after A.D. 65 plot), L72 ff , 220 f. (dis-cussing tribunician sacrosanctitas )

130 Liebeschuetz, op. cit., p. 79.

-r40-

Despite uncertainty about the frequency of ímperíal

aÈËendance at some ceremonial"rl3l our concern is with

security on those occaslons when he did. Those involvíng

processíons are among Ëhe most conspícuous and magnificênt,

veïy rarely avoíded by Ëhe emperor (c.f. Tac. Ann. 3. 3).

Triumphs, public funerals, the reception of special embassies,

decursíones and the more frequent adventus and profecÈíones

all involve religious and/or military elements of a símílar

nature and have been díscussed ín detaíI by VersneLL.L32

The essence of a public event such as a triumph is

the ceremonial cofltmemoration and/or achievement of a transít-

ion for the state and often, specífically, for its most

íllustrious member, the emperor. The key phase of the Ëriumph,

adventus and profectio ceremonials, in parËicular, seems to be

the passíng through the gaËes of the city walls at some poínt

ín the pomerium, thus an act .of magíca1 signifícarr"u.133 There

are a number of reasons for plots being less feasible ín these

circumstances than on other occasions.

Clearly ín the case of the triumph, the emperor re-

enËered the city with the wholehearted support of the majority,

r3r Some routine events hrere a chore (Suet.Aug.78.2) and

deputies could be used (SHA. Ant. Pius 11. 5, c.f.Hammond, op. cit., p. 69 on promagíster). Evidently'not all r^reïe as conscíentious as a Claudíus or AntoninusPíus (SueË. Claud. 22, 25. 5; SHA. Ant. Pius ll. 5,c. f. CD B0 . 14. 3, Suet . Vit. 11. 2) .

L32 v. H.S. Versnel Tríumphus. An enquiry into the origin,development and meani ng of the Roman triumph. LeidenE.J. Brí11. L970.

133 Versnel , íd., PP. L62,

J

t

¡ìþ

i

ïII

I

I

I

f'

fl

353, 385, 389.

'J

{

¡r-14n-

l-34having \,ron a campaígn. Psychologícally, the cause of

any assassins would be betÈer served by seeking opportuníties

in other situatj-ons. Further, there can be no question that

the emperor ütas accompanied by an aüIesomely large array of

troops, guards and reÈainers. A Èríumph rePresents the one

occasion when troops in full armour could enter the .ity.135

Descriptíons of thaË cere*otr136 and the parallel one of

great funeralsl37 *"k" it clear that all of the praetorian

guard and líctors, the latter closely precedíng Ëhe emperot,138

were in the processíon. Praetorían offícers' mounted outside

the walls of the cit.y, closely attended the emperot'139

Escape for any plotter would be out of the question. Even

once the crucial entrance was passed, the triumphal procession

of the emperor continued ín very formal fashion and involved

much more ceremonial. There is no evídence for crowd control

procedures here, although the weight of numbers on such an

occasion are likely to have made them necessary'

'l¡lt

t:i

'1

'lII

I

I

i

i

['xÊ

L34

136

135

L37

138

ExcepËions occur wíth triumphs of Callgula (Suet' Cal'47), Nero (SueË. Nero 25) and Domitian (CD 67. 7.3 ff)'A brillíant exceptíon ís the tríumph-like reception and

crowning of Tírídates in A.D. 65 (Suet. Nero 13)' c'f'the funeral of Germanicus (Tac. Ann. 3. 4); Versnel ,

op. cít., p. 192.

v. Versnel , íd., P.95, the maín example beingJos. BJ. 7. LLg - 157.

v. Versnel , id. r PP. 99, 124 f.f , 384'

For excellent visual materíal on the lictors' v'A. Bonnano Roman relief portraitu re Ëo Sep Ëiml-us Severus.B.A.R. SupplementarY Series' 6. 1976. passim.

v. VelndicThatGuard

rsnel , oP. cit., p. 95 on the processional order,ating the officers as closest to the emperorts charlot.they were mounted outslde Rome, v. M. Spei del The

s of the Roman Armies. Bonn. 1978. p. 19, n' 93'

139

-r42-

Although similar to Ëhe triumph in thaË a gater¡lay

is passed through and relígious vows may be ínvolved, an

essenËia1 difference in the case of adventus and profectío

ceremonials ís Ehat troops in full armour cannoË enter the

"ity.140 The transition between civil and military spheres

is symbolised ín part by the ceremon.iá1. mutaËio vestis a

change into or out of military uníform presumably just out-

side the gaËer^ray and wítnessed by the crowd of citizens,

spectators to the officíal exchanges between emperor and

magÍstrates (cD 51 . Ig . 2, Plin. Pan. 23 . 1) .141 I^líth

anímal sacrifices occurríng (Suet. Galba 18. l), there ís

considerable formality of procedure Èo this point, in the

case of arrival advenËus . There is inadequate evidence Ëo

allow great precísion about the significance of this transition

for security precautions. l{e may Presume that normal pro-

cedures are re-establíshed, Ëhat one cohort of praetorians,

Ëheir officers and custodes also underwent some form of cloth-

ing change and accompaníed him ínto the "ity.l42 The oËher

f40 v. S. MacCormack. Change and continuíty 1n late anË-iquity, the ceremony of adventus. HisÈorío. 2L, 1972,72L - 752. c.f. n. 96, in particular, which poínts todecreased formality once the emperor was ín the ciËy;also Versnel , id.r PP. L62, 353, 387.

L4L v. Versnel , id., p. 353; also Hammond, opi cit., p. 35'

L42 Lictors are one example of this change, of course. l^Iithinthe city, they do not have axes in their fasces and theydo not accompany their general/emperor wearíng thepaludamentum. v. Versnel , id., P- I92; also E.S. Staveley'The fasces and imperium 4aiuq. Historia . L2, 1963, 458-484.NevertÏrelèss, Ëhe magístrate going off to war (one

l

occasion for a profectío) mustthe auspícia were favourable and

have been paludatus oncevota made aË the Capitol,

c. f. Versnel , íd., p. 353. Presumably the lictors alsoso dressed ln the cíty at such a Ëime.

-L43-

ímmediate effect of the emperor crossing the pomerium is

that, with t.he formal element of the ceremony over'

he ís once more subjecÈ to the demands of public accessíb-

ility. plínyts account of thís stage of Trajanrs fírst

arrival at the ciÈy as emperor makes this c1eat.t43 The

usual líctors and soldiers are preserit by Ëhat stâge' As

with Ëhe tríumph, there are no ínstances of a plot beíng

planned for these circumstarr""".l44

Funerals of the greal_ are ímportant not. least because

they occur at that most crucial point of Èransition, in many

cases, the succession to po\^rer of a nev/ emperot.145 Security

Ëhereín certainly could be an issue. Mindful of the funeral

ofJuliusCaesarrTiberiussoughtgreaÈerprotectionaËthe

funeral of Augustus than the presence alone,of the praetorian

guard(cD57.2.2).l,Iorkingonthepremisethathonourshown

r43 Examples of formal elements under the emperors lncludethe cult of Fortuna Redux (CD 54. 10. 3, c.f. Herodian4. 1. 3) , q.v. r-ieUeschuetz, oP

emperor thence wíshed to stressop. cít., pp' 7?.2, 737 and n. 96

that process, q.v. ch. 5, PP. 72

63. TheQ.v. MacCormack,was parÈ of

0n Trajan,

. ciÈ. , p.civilitas. llalklng-76

L44

L45

v. Plin. Pan.22 f..

Note the pracÈice of avoidíng ceremonial greetíngs, Pot-entially a !üay of removing a plottet's sureiy of theemperor-'s locãtion. e.g. Suet. Aug' 53' 2, CD 54 ' 52'4'CD 57. B. 5 f. Unwíllingness to trouble the people isthe avowed moËlve.

On succession, v. ch. 2 pp. 11 - 13 The fullest def-Ínition and account of the public funeral appears inJ.M.C. Toynbee Death and Burial in the.R94an l¡lorldThames "rrd

tt'd"o@ pp ' 56 flf, c'f ' versnelop. cit., pp. 99 f. A publíc funeral was granÈed toothers outsíde the imperial farníly' a notable example

being Licinius Sura lcn Oe. 15. 3\.

-L44-

to the dead emperor r¿ill reflect in parÈ Èhat to be given

to the new, the role of security forces in this sítuation

is of some inÈerest.

I^Ie are fortunaËe to have several detailed accounts

of imperíal funerals, with their orígins in the ínagines -

bejewelled ceremonies of ÈradiÈíonal Republican practi"..146

The funerals of the ernperors and the more prominent members

of their families owed much Eo the triumph as a means to

attainÍng a Roman form of apotheosi".L4T

The form of the ímperial funeral was fírmly establíshed

by Augustus wlth the death of Agríppa in L2 B.C-. It was

the model for the funeral of Augustus hímself ín A.D. 14

(CD 54. 28. 5) and also' rnre can presume wiÈh some líkelihood'

Ëhose of Drusus the Elder and Gaius and Lucius Caesar ín the

ínterveníng period. This may not be without iÈ s relevance

L46 On Republícan funerals, v. Friedlãnder, op. cit., vol. 2

pp. zLO - 2L8. For the empire, CD 56. 29 - 43 (AugustusCD 54. 28 (Agrippa), CD 54. 35 (Octavia), CD 55- 2

(Drusus the Elder), CD 75 . 4 f. (Pertínax), Herodian4. 1 f (Septimius Severus); also CD 59. 11 (Drusilla,sister of Caligula), Tac. Ann. 3. I - 5 (Germanicus).

L47 v. Versnel , op. cit., PP. 116 ff, L22-

)

-L45-

for the issue of theír attendance by praetorians, lncíd-148ent.all-y.

AlËhough equestrians seem to have had the honour

of carrying the late emperorts body ín the processlon within

the city,149 praetoríans and Èheír officers clearly have a

role to play, whether it be ceremonial and ritualised man-

oeuvres around the pyre or Ëhe actual firing of the pyre

it""1f.150 The guard Ëhen most conspícuously fulfíls iÈs

function of providing an escort of honour to the emperor, both

in life and death. Their role is surely also to protect and

honour the new emperor, as Tiberius t requesË makes clear

(CD 57.2,2). The posíÈion of the rank and file appears to be much

148 The praetoríans cerËainly felt great allegiance to heirsto or co-equals in power irnmedíately after the death ofAugustus. Germanicus and Drususr son of Tiberiusr vlereafforded Ërrro praeÈorian cohorLs as escort and guard, a

standard number for such a dígnitary, it seems (q.v.ch.9, pp. 208 f.f ), c .f. ín the case of adventus Suet.CaI . 4. The same number \¡Ias involved in the translatiocadaverís, here Ëhe ashes of Germanicus, Tac. Ann. 3. 2,c.f. Versnel , 1d., pp. L23, 384. IË may be more thancoíncidence that "officers" played the sarne role forDrusus the Elder (CD 55. 2. 1) and for both Gaíus andLucius Caesar (CD 55 . 12. l) , although we cannot be surethaÈ they \¡rere praetoríans. Nevertheless, the highlydeveloped schemes of successíon devÍsed by Augustus sawvaríous scions of the líne trained for po\,rer (e.g. CD 54.6. 5) by giving them experience and strong línks with themilítary, íncluding the praetorians (c.f. Suet. Nero 7. 2).The predecessors to Germanicus and Drusus the Younger, asheírs to pohrer, may indeed have had substantial praetoríanescorts.CD 55.2.3, 56. 3L.2, 75.5.2, Herodían 4. 2. 4, c.f.tr'Ieínstock, op. cít., p. 350 on Sullats funeral .

Manoeuvres - CD 56. 42.2, 75.5. 5, Herodian 4.2.9,c.f. Durry, op. ciË., p. 226 f on their training for this.The pyre - CD 56. 42. 3.

L49

150

-146-

as in life, at the rear of the procession (CD 75.4.6).

That of the officers ís not nearly so apparenÈ' although

151the analogy of the triumph may offer some clue.--- Con-

sideríng their normal function of close escort to the emperor'

they nay have gíven immedíate support to him at the rear(c.f.

cD 75. 5. 3). As with tríumphs, this strict ceremoníal draws

no sígn of a plot, both digníty and life beíng at stake for

the conspirator who would challenge the relígious lmporÈance

of the processíon and the extraordínary number of armed

personnel ínvolved.

The final processional element to be discussed is

the decursio ínfrequent events in public whích yet T¡/ere

evídently part of the trainíng of the Roman soldíer and most

valuable to Ëhe praetorían who would particípate in the publíc

ceremonials of the emperor. Notable examples of such manoeuvres

beíng dísplayed are those occasions when an emperor demon-

strates to the senate ín toto Ëhat he ís in cont.rol 0f the

essence of power (e.g. CD 57.24.5,59' 2' 1) or an heír ís

being inËrod.uced publícly to control and influence over Ëhe

guard (Suet. Nero 7. 2). Such intiml-dation often occurred

at the campus ouÈside the castra praeËoria (suet. claud.

2L. Ð.L52 The security ímplications of such a display

extend, moreover, to the importance of decursíones and their

líke for the abílíty of large units to 'deploy quickly

and effectively ln different fashions to meet a variety of

151

L52

v. p. L4L.v. Durry, oP. cit., PP. 54 ff.

-L47-

threats on the battlefield. Adapted to their functíons at

Rome, Ëhe praetorians are likely to have practised such

movements when not on duÈy elsewhere. The need for effici¿nt

disposítion of troops duríng a ríot (c.f. Tac. Ann. 15.58)

ís self-evident. There are dísti.nct suggestions Ëhat nilit-

ary straËegems could be used (v. pp. I27ff.). hlhen the emperor

invited the senate to a decursio , he was reminúíng them not

only of the numerical síze of the guard.

Once procession into the city has occurred, certaín

other readily ídentífiable cerernonies take place' noÈ least

those on trlbunals and rosËra. Indeed, some processions

ended wiÈh a ceremony at such "

polrrt.l53 oÈherwise, functions

such as the distribution of conglaria by the emperor toL54

commemorate great eventsr--- ceremonials connected \dith Ëhe

electíon of state offí""t"r155 censorial tt"k"r156

adlocutiones to the troop"ls7 "nd a varíety of public meetings

contiones ,1,19- r*te- hetd:aË--sueh ,.veaues .

153 e.g. Lríumphs (Suet. Tib. 20), funeral orations (CD 54.28.3,54.35.4 Í.,55.2.2,56.35. 1, 75.5. 1) andËhe receptions of great foreign kíngs (Tac. Ann. L2. 36,CD 60.32.4a,63. 4.3, Suet. Nero 13. 1 c.f. pp.67F.

L54 on congiaria, K. ScotÈ The Imperial Cult under Èhe Flavians.Stuttgart. 1936. p. 184, which shows Lhe conjunction ofcongíarum and temple. There is a wealth of general refer-ences to the practíce, c.f. CD 57. 10. 4, Plin. Pan. 28.2,in particular.

155 e.g. Plín. Pan.64, CD 60. 10.1 f; c.f. Loeb edition ofHerodian, vol. I, p. 379, n. 1 on the rostra vetera andI,tr. I¡Iarde Fowler¡ op. cit., p. 203.

The census declíned under the Julio-Claudians. Thelectiones of Augustus \^rere unpopular, Suet. Aug. 35.c.f. Tac. Ann. 11. 25, CD 54. 2. 2",e.g. CD 56. 1. 2 (to equestrians), Tac. Hist. 3. 56,Suet. Claud. 22, 25. 5.

L56

L57

1 ff,

c.f.

158 v. Míllar, op. cít., p. 28.

-148-

There are several common features. The majority

of such occasions are infrequenË and so must be víewed as

special, unroutíne events. Consequently well publícised,

planning of a plot would be possible. To counter this' it

is clear that the more formal would ínvolve the inordinaÈe

presence of the majority of the praetorians and that crowd

control is very ttkety.159

Physical aspects of the rosËrum/tribunal are import-

ant.160 rt is clear that Ëhey are a focus for the conjunct-

ion of politícal and religíous elemenËs ín Roman public life,

since they were ínaugurated as t.ropl".161 Thus demarcated

from Èhe profane, there I^las a religious barrler to the

emperorts person, although the value of this in the face of

a deËermined plotter is arguable. Perhaps more valuable was

the fact that the rostrum was about three and a half metres

in height,162 rrrr"r, made access extremely difficulÈ other than

by poinÈs of passage that could be controlled with ease by

attendants at grourrd 1"rr"1.163 The exístence of such pre-

cauLíons seems likely ín the face of an aristocratic plot to

hurl Julíus Caesar from ther ".164

The fact remaíns that the

159 c.f. LintotË, op. cit., p. 74 and L.R. Taylor Roman VotingAssemblíes. Ann Arbor, University of Michígan Press

ures, 8th seríes). L966. P. 33.(Jerome Lect

c.f . ch. 4. pp. 62 f and ch. 6. pp. L25 ff., L47 f-f '

v. Taylor, oP. cít., passlm for this secËíon on therostrum etc.v. Taylor, íd., p. 41.

c.f. the methods of control to the tribunal of Augustusduríng a lecËío, Suet. Aug. 35. I f, security needs dis-placing the importance of senatorlal dignity.

see next page.

160

161

t62163

L64

-L49-

emperor \¡ras escorted to and from the rostrum/tribunal by

a procession of attendants, assocíates and mílitary re-

t.ainers.

I{ith more elaborate processions involving large

numbers of troops, it is indicated that they remaíned with

the emperor, arrayed nearby so as to reflect upon the

emperorts presence in both auresome and honourable fashion

(CD 63. 4, Suet. Nero 13. 1). 0n less specËacular occasíons,

the scale may have altered only, the usual praetorian cohort

and other escorts fulfilling the s¿me functíons. About

their procedure \¡re cannot be sure. Bodysearching is attested

only ín the most extraordinary of circumstances (Suet. Aug.

35. 1 ff) , outside the palace, although Ëhere was evidently

care and concern about the wíelding of hleapons near the

emperorts person at ceremonial events, seemingly based upon

suspicíon (Suet. Tib.25.3) or uncertainty (CD 63. 2. 4).

The abilíty to regulate access Ëo the rostrum is clearly

possíble (n. 163), so that no large group of persons approâch-

ed the emperor at âny one Ëíme. In the early days of the

princí.pate, it seems only senators could remaín on the

L64 q.v. Taylor, op. cít., p. 79. Demands upon imperíalaccessíbility there seem to vary, i-n part according tothe extent of ceremony involved. e.g. Tiberíusr angerthaË a petítioner approached hís grandson, Drusus, duríngthe Latin fesÈíval (Tac. Ann. 4. 36), c.f. Suet. Claud.15. 3.

-150-

platform \,üith the .tn"tot.165 The presenee of troops nearby,

at least ín the case of ceremonlat"l66' seems to have ensured

that there \^Iere no dangerous incídents at these locations.

Among the most formalised of all ímperial actívities

is theír role at Èhe temples of the gods and in the many

festívals whích fílled the Roman calendar. ConstrainÈs of

tradition and the unalÈerable rltual of sacrífice were extrem-

ely rlgid. Few \^rere more subject to this than the emperor since,

from 12 8.C., Augustus and all of hís successors held the

position of pontifex maximus and were members of all the major

L67príestly colleges of the state culË.

Evídence for imperial eactlon to the circumstances

of a sacrifice is relaÈlvely good, a number of íncídents fn-168

volving r,üeapons coming to the fore. The number of people

16s

L66

At judícíal sessions, for example' the assessores of theemperor \¡rere senatorlal amíci aË Ëhis sËage (q.v. p. 117 ).Sirnilarly, at the receptíon of TiridaËes the emperor ísaccompanied by the senate onto the rostra (CD 63. 4. 3) .

Exceptions to Ëhís are extraordinary (CD 60. 33. 7, c.f.Tac. Ann. f3. 5). It ís noteworthy that aËtempÈs tosecure the emperor, either on his ornrn initiative (Suet.Aug.35) or that of the Senate (Tac. Ann. 6.2), couldínvolve senators as firsË preference to praetorians (Tac.Ann. 6. 15, c.f. Suet. Dom. 14. 3, equestríans now.) ínËhese early years.

c.f. the suggestíon that troops may have been at a great-er disËance for the routíne jurisdíction of the forum,pp.L27 ff , where greater accessibility is prized.

v. Ogilvie, op. cít., p. 106 f.

Sacrifices seem to have been involvedappearances of a ceremonial nature byOgilvie, íd., ch. 3; tr'I . hlarde FowlerMacMillan, London. 1899. p. 333; S.R.F. Príce. Betweenman and god: sacrifÍce in the Roman imperial cult. JRS'

70, 1980. 28 - 43.

L67

168 in almost all publícthe emperor, q.v.The Roman FesÈivals.

-151-

attending the emperor ín this context seems to have been

large and varíed. Hls usual retínue of senatoríal amlci

was supplemented by rnembers of Ëhe príestly college appro-

priaÈe Èo Èhe o".t"íott.l69 The lictors, usually in

attendance for the, emperorrs publlc duties, are strongly

attested to have been present, ínvaríably ít would "."*.170

They were the officlal state escorÈ, surviving from a

Republic which made an indelible mark on the nature of cere-

monial and so are more likely as the emperorts closest escort

ín this sítuation. At the síte of the sacrifice ítself, an

altar immedíately ín front of the temple and so easily vis-

ible to the public, a variety of attendants r^tere there to aid.171

Among them was the fluteplayer whose notes were íntend-

ed to exclude noises whích might interfere wíth the execution

of the ceremoníal procedur".'7' The presence of such a funct-

ionary ís an ímportant lndícaÈion of the official attitude'

based in ancíent practíce. Nothing profane qTas to cross into

the sacred templum ^r"^L73 and in order that the sacrifice was

successful , aII people '/ere expecËed to be peacea¡t".174 As

L6g v. LiebeschueË2, oP- cit., part II on Èhe Augustan re-víval, esP. P. 64 where it is relaËed how AugustuscontrolledthepersonnelatÈaíningpriesthoods,potenE-1ally an important fttgFeat throng" presenalso ÍJ. tr'Iarde Fowler

actor ín his securlt at ceremonials, S

The Relíeious ExPe

ty. For theuet. Vit. 11. 2;rl-ence of the Roman

170

l-7L

172

L73

L74

People. L97I. P. 437-

v. n. 138 suPra.

v. Ogilvie, oP. cít.., PP

v. Ogilvie, íd., P. 48.

v. trù. !'Iarde Fowler ' oP.

v. Ogilvie, oP. cit.' P.

41 - 51.

cit. , p.

2L.

L74.

-L52-

\^rith the rostrum, thís fs a survival from an era when such

devices enabled aristocrats to control vltal polítical and

religíous everits. Under the emperors, this may have meant

that all others were excluded from the precinct area' ín-

cludíng praetorlans, at least durlng the time when a sacri-

fice was .rod.ttty.175 Although r^Ie are not sure how well

atÈended Ëhese occasíons üIere'l.76 't seems líkely thaË on

the greater occaslons some form of crowd control \¡ras nec-

""""rr.177 The praetorians, at least' are ltkely to have

played such a role, assumíng some disposition according to

the manner in which they accompanied the emperor Èo the

"""rifi...178 Their deployment at the reception of TiridaÈes

and similar occasions r.rould suggesÈ a parallel (60. 63. 4).

Early indications suggest' Èherefore, Ëhat troops could not

supervíse the emperor at their usual ímmediate level and,

consequently, had to control peripheral access and prevenË

the escape of anyone involved in an íncidenÈ close to Ëhe

emperorts person.

:-75 EnígmaÈíc references to chaerea atÈefiding ca1-igula as

Ëhe emperor sacríficed for hls daughter (Jos. AJ 19" 71)

do not necessarily refute this. The danger is descríbedfor the moment Gaius distríbutes largesse from the palaceroof rather than the more formal moment of sacrifice. Theseoccasions are not necessarily ttpubll-ctt as a state cultfestíval was.

l-76 v. Líebeschuetz, oP. cit., P. 80.

177 v. Ogílvíe, op. ciÈ., p. 73. At the great processions,the entire guard rnras present. For more routíne occasions,the single excubiae cohort ís likely, perhaps aided by theurban cohorts.

L78 Liebeschuetz, oP. cit., P. 81.

-153-

An examinatíon of some of the íncidenÈs relaÈed to

Ëhis situation Èends to confirm this. In A.D. L4 - L6, for

example, Tiberiust suspicion of the aristocraË and Pontifex,

Líbo Drusus, caused hím to Ëake precautions at officlal

sacrifices where all priests carrled the tradítional and

L79presumably deadly secesplta. How a leaden knife was sub-

stítuted we have no indication. The incident may also

suggest that securit.y personnel \nlere not close enough to

prevent such an arístocrat attacking the emperor in this case.

Under Claudius' an equestrian was detained afËer he

was discovered Èo be carrying a huntíng knife, whíle the

emperor sacrifíced at the temple of Mars (Suet. Claud. 13. 1) '

Thls ís one of the few mentions of equestrians at rellgious

180events. We presume he r¿as apprehended by praetorians, or

other members of the urban garrison, whose duties will have

including beíng alert to the possíbility of conceal-ed hleapons.

The incidenÈ gives no addítional lnformatíon as to the dis-

positíon of such troops at these events. Such an assassín

cannot have hoped Ëo escaP".l8l

179 Suer. Tib. 25.3 and v. note (a) on p. 332 or. Loeb editíonof Suetonius, vol. 1.

180 Theír role in processions ís beËter establíshed, as in Ëhe

case of funerals (n.149 ), c.f. Ovtd Ex Ponto 4' 9" 4 ff'

181 The role of equestríans in other public appearances is of1.nterest. At adventus they are an ídentífiable grouP

presented to the emPeror, after the senaËors23. 1). Simílarly, Ëhey had a special seaËthe theatres, the firsË fourteen rows (q.v.

(Plin. Pan.allocation ato.C.D .2 p. 937

on Roscius Otho). It is possible that Èhey had a part-icular vantage poínt at major religious events also, closeto which Èhe emPeror Passed.

-L54-

Under Hadrian, two incídents províde further

lllusÈration. A part of the official version explainíng Ëhe

executlon of the four consulars in A.D. 118 (q.v. app. (34))

was Èhat they plotted to assassinate Hadrian while he was

sacrifícing (SIIA. Hadr. 7. 1 f). IrJe presume circumstances

sÍmilar to those of the Líbo Drusrr" "ff.it.182 The díminíshed

presence of security forces close to the emperor at such a

point is suggested once more. Confirmation of the emperorrs

percepLlon of hís vulnerabilíty here occurred ín Greece.

Hadrian ordered that all who came to sacrífice with hím should

not bear arms of any sort (SHA. Hadr. 13. 2). This clearly

ímplies enforcement and so' presumably, a bodysearch which was

presumably implemented by the only substanËial mílítary force

travellíng with the emperor, the praetorian grr"td.183 It ls

an example of acute securíty consciousness prevailing over

consideraÈíons of traditíon and dígníty. trIeapon search was

anathema in regard to the "rrtít184 and we may pïesume a

similar attitude here. It is noËable, for ínstance, that

Libo Drusus was not totally depríved of his ceremonial

dagger (n. L79). Conversely, an arístocratíc plotter may

182 The event híghlíghts the potential dangers Èo an accedingempehor iri the priests appointed by his rpredecessor, pa*ü--ícularly if the temper of the reigns are considerably diff-erent. This problern ís clear in other areas, e.B. CD 74'8'1'

183 Presumably the officium admissionís would play no role atpublíc ceremonial occasíons (c.f- SueË. Claud. 22; Ogilvie,op. cÍt., p. 47). The guard is thus suggested for a proced-ure attesËed l-n Ëhe salutatio at the palace. Thís role inpublic may make them the more likely to have fulfilledthe function at the Palace.

184 v. pp. 136 f.

-155-

have deemed it unthinkable to use a weapon in thís context

(c.f . Tac. Ann. 4. 2L).

Some íllumínatíon on Èhe contexÈ of sacrifíces is

províded by an examínation of the festívals and processlons

which lead up to and follow them. Obviously ímportant is

the fact that the emperor \¡Ias accompanied by at least one

cohort of praeËorians and its officers to and from the scene

of the sacrífice. Their presence close by was important

for his dlgnity and his security. The question of their

armamenË is, therefore, signíficant.

Triumphs involved the futl milttary presence of troops

wlthin the cíty. For adventus and rofectio ít seems

likely that normal praetorian escort for civíl progress oper-

ated within the walls, the troops carrying concealed hTeapons

wiËhin their togas. As in the case of the triumph, funerals involved

the enÈíre guard performing manoeuvres of honour in the procession

which were similar to those of the decursio. There ís no suggestion

that the troops lrere unarmed in a ceremoníal whÍch reflected duties

they performed for the late emperor in hís life time.

Against such a background of processions involving

armed troops, r^re must refer to suggestions by Herodían that

troops did not cal-ry r^Teapons at the ceremoníals of public

f""ti.r"l".l85 Both seem to be rebutted by the more reliable

Cassius Dío, who clearly was better acquainËed wíth the ímmed-

iate circrr*"ttrr..".186 The praeÈoríans met the army of

185

186

Herodían 2. 2.

cD 75. 1. 2, cOx. U.P. L964.

13. 2.

Míllar A SÈudy

9, ')

F.139

f.p.

of Cassíus Dio.

-156-

severus ín normal dress and were dísarmed in vírtue of

the superíorlty of numbers of the legionaries. Ithitttk"tl87

reports the doubts of Hohl over the statements of our less

relíable sources in relation to eeremoníal dress and the

carryíng of weapons. Certainly, there are not sÈrong grounds

for a ceremonial uniform dístínct from togate or full mílitary

apparel, as Durry "r"r.".188 Most festivals were of a civil,

even agrícultural, nature and so civilian conduct and attire

wouldbeexpected.FurtherruleaponshTereroutinelyconcealed

wíthin the folds of the toga in any case' although the

speculatores. for example, carríed spears (SueË. Claud' 35' 1,

suet.. Galba 18. 1) . There are indicatíons also that üTeaPons

hrere carried during festívals, certaínly during the Julio-

Claudian era from which our examples are derived' In A'D' 41'

itisapparentrhatalloftheofficersoftheguardcarried

r¡reapons at the PalaËíne games. The speedy reaction of the

praetorian rankers and the Germani shows that they also were

armed (q.v. app.(13)). The presence of armed ËTooPS at all

spectacles, often associated with fesÈíval processions and

sacrifices, and the speciflc nature of a planned conspíracy

at the games in A.D. 65 (Tac. Ann' f5' 53), all tend to con-

firmËhestrongassocíationofarmsandrelígiousceremoníals.

v. Loeb edition of Herodían' vol'1'pp' 228 f' n' 1'

Although he does Èry to dístinguish more than tr^ro Èypes

of appãrel, with 11ÈË1e evídence' Durry, op' cit.'pp. 207 f.f . On the TnosÈ brillíant of occasions f ulliield armour is in evidence, e'g' CD 63' 4' 2' Other-wise, Ëogas were de rigueur unless an emperor choseblatantly to ignore that expectation, e'g' Tac' Ann'

L87

188

L6.27 duae rae toriae cohortes arilatae.

-L51-

Logic may require Ëhat ín any case. At times when ceremonial

formality could restricË the movements of securíty forces,

to have had them unarmed and let all know it would have been

unwíse.

The laws relating to the carrying of weapons wíthin

Èhe city had evolved considerably during the last century of

the Republíc and the early Príncipat".189 Augustus was able

to prohibit their carríage ln the .itylgo and make a contïa-

vention equivalent t.o treason on the part of the manifestly

191guilty person.--' Praetorians, cusËodes and urban garrison

forces were above this law sínce, naturally, they were

responsíble for polícing its effectiveness. That Ëhe praetor-

ians were Ëo coriceal theír r¡Ieapons reflects Ëhe contradictíons

fi.illr

t]

189

190

191

v. Lintott, op. cit., Passim.

The three principal excePtions to this law were the casesof huntíng, voyaging and journeyíng, q.v. Lintott' íd. 'p. I23. Obvlously these circumstances do not apply to thecity, although üteapons could be sÈored there for thesepufposesr \^7e assume.

For the concept of manifest guilt, v. Bauman, op- cít.,pp. ;'B2 f.Í ; Líntott, id., P. 104 in regard to thetriumvirs. The fact remains, in relation to these laws,that r^rith a short períod excepted, Èhere hlas no consistentpolicy of bodysearching for weapons under the empíre and

even then iË was applied only to salutatio (pp. 114 f) '!üith the emperors ' the lex Julia de vl became íronclad,preferríng to put the onus upon senaËors and others ofdeciding whether or not Èhey wíshed to risk their livesfor Èhis orie aspecÈ of their líbertas (q.v. LintoËË, íd.,p. 204). Nevertheless' arms r^Iere noÈ diffícult to obtain(v. n. 190 and noËe the number of senators who carriedone duríng the conspiracy of Caligula, Jos. AJ 19 - 62) .

The praetorians still had to keep an eye out for anyonewith a r^leapon, therefore. The law did not prohibít owner-ship of r^7eapons. It is interesting in Èhe case of thet\¡ro equestrians caught close to Claudíus that one carrl-eda hunËing knife (c.f. n. 190) and Èhe other a disguisedÌ¡Ieapon, Suet. Claud. 13. 1.

-r58-

of their presence ín the ciËy, servlng a man who was both

lifetirne commander-l-n-chief of the armed forces and yet

also the princípal clvilian of the staÈe.

Once a public ceremonial was completed in its most

rigid requirements of processlon, sacrifj-ce and publíc

address, a banquet seems to have followed on most o""."iorr".192

Our sources in regard to these means are very poorr often

merely recordíng the fact that Ëhey were gíven on "so many"

occasions or in ttsuch and suchtt a style since glvíng Ëhem

amounted to a form of congia.Í,*.193 Thls ís parËicularly

the case wíth triumphs, although public meals were held on

more routine occasions during the religious ""l"nd"t.194Augustus founded many such occasíons but found the special

group of epulones already ín existence to facilitate these

imporËant socíal o..""io." 1195 with the emPeror atteritling

the mosÈ important.196 l¡e have 1íttle evidence as to

fairrnl

t1

tts

I

t[,"rii

'l

II

I

I

L92

193

l-94

195

L96

v. Versnel , op. cít., p. 119; Líebeschuetz, op' cl-t',p. 81.

fixamples are numerous: Suet. Tib. 20, Suet' Cal' L7, Suet'Vit. 13. 2, Suet. Dom. 4- 5, CD 55' B' 2,59' 29' 5,60. L7. g, 62.15 1 ff, 67.4.5,76.1. l, 80. 9.2, Tac'Ann. 15. 37, Jos. BJ 7. Lzg f., 156. c'f' Claudíus' pte-caution, cD 60. 3. 3, and Augustus excusing himself fromthem, cD 56. 26. 2. Nevertheless, it musË be ímagl-ned thatat tímes l-t was only a restrícted portion of people who were

ínvíted.v. Ogilvier oP. cít., P. 95.

v. Ogilvie, id., P. 110.

Personality factors could determine each emperor I s attend-ance at Ëhese events. The sense of oblígatíon that made

Augustus, at least, proffeï a reason for non-attendanceis a further índex that ernperors will have at.tended most

major fesÈívals' CD 56. 26- 2.

-1s9-

cooking procedure".197 on the basis of the anecdote thaË

Claudíus may have been polsoned by hís Èaster, Halotus, at

a banquet for a prlestl-y college on the Citadef it ís

possible that a praegustator attended the emperor ín pub1lc'

although we have no i-ncident Èo confirm Ëhis (Suet. Claud.

44. 2). Simílarly, Ëhe attendance by speculatores on the

emperorts person from the relgn of Claudius at banquets

(Suet. Claud. 35. 1) may apply to thís situatíon also. Con-

clusions about procedure aË this evenË are conjectural,

therefore.

An overview of public ceremonials suggests that the

constraints possible upon an emperor t s conduct and security

precautíons could be at theír mosÈ extreme here. At the

most crucial moments of transítion, such as sacrífice or the

passage through a gaLevray, the demands upon procedure are

rigidly determined by Ëraditional practíce and Ëhe dígnity

of the particípants. The emperor I s retinue of líctors and

aristocrats at such tímes could be exclusive of praetorian

offícers and rankers at the more formal momenÈs. The latter

yet seem to have been close by, perhaps involved in crowd

conËrol measures, and were likely disposed according to the

manner in whích they had escorted the emperor to the locatíon

of the focal ceremony. Their presence in large numbers, armed,

Of the functíons described for Halotus, Lhe ÈasËer ofClaudius, it ís related he brought the emPerorrs foodÈo hím, Tac. Ann. L2. 66. He cannot have supervisedevery moment of the empeïorrs food in preparaÈion, how-ever. v. ch. B passím for further suggestions' Random

choice of food rnight obviate the need for a taster atsuch large-scale public banquets as I¡Ie are discussing'

.t

,{

rìþ

l

fïil1

L97

-160-

wíll have inhíblted most thoughts of conspiracy ín these

circumstances. Escape from such protectors, when loyal,

would have been extremely difficult.

4. THE SPECTACLES.

At the amphitheatre, theatre or circus contact

between Èhe ernperor and his subjects was frequent and intimaËe.

The nature and significance of this process has been explored

Ín detail by a number of scholarsl98 "rrd so only those aspects

related to security need be dlscussed further-

During the Julio-Claudian "t"199 and certainly by the

time of Domítian, a process occurred which caused al1 of the

major gladiatorial schools wíthin Ëhe cíty of Rome to come

under imperial "orratol.200 Regulations r^rere passed to ïe-

stríct'the number of gladiators to be used by non-imperial

magisÈrates in theír public g"*.".201 Consequently, Èhe fear

198 v. L. Friedländer Roman Life and Manners under the Earlv1.andd

Empíre. London: George Routledge and Sons. 1908-13. vo ]I

i,t

ùþ

I

id,li

I,l

I'

I

I

I

pp. 1 130; M. Grant, Gladiators. London: Inleidenf eldNicolson . L967; A Cameron. Circus Factions Blues an

Greens at Rome and Byzantium. Ox. U.P. L976.

Lgg The crucial difference between Republic and Empíre in re-gards to the abuse of gladiators in personal retínues bypolíticíans is the monopoly of force secured by the emperors.The urban garrisonrs role \^ras to elíminate Street violence,whíle the new political realíty made such an occurrencelargely fuËile, 9.v. Lintott, oP. cit., passim.

2OO v. Grantr op. cit., pp. 36 f.f.r 40,4L,45. For suspicíonin regard to privately owned famíliae of gladiators, suet.Jul. Caes. 10, 26.3, 31, c.f. Tac. Ann. 1. 22. For in-creasing imperial control, Tac. Ann. 11. 35. 7, Suet' Dom'

4. 1.

zOL v. Grant, íd., p. 37, the emperor as arch-patron at the ludi.AugusÈus (CD 54. 2) and Tiberius (suet. Tib. 34) implementedthese restrictions.

-161-i

ii"-

iof the emperors that gladiators could be used by others as

a private army l^ras much dimirr1"h.d,202 although Èhe fears

of society at Large of a danger in their midst did not dís-

appear entirely.203 The emperors themselves were able to

employ highly skílled gladiaÈors for their own ends, whether

as executioners (Suet. Nero 47) , commanders of their German

household gu^td,z}4 a supplement to military forces in a

crisis (Tac. Hist. 2.11), entertaíriers at banquets2o5 ot

merely favouriËes ín theít t"tí.rrr..206 From the emperor's

vÍewpoint, control over them t^" gnod.207

An additional well-attested aspect of the spectacles is the

promotion there of the image of the emperor

as the principal benefactor of Roman society. Besi<les gívlng

the mosÈ magnifícent games of all descriptíorr"r208 unimpeded

by restricËions placed upon other maglstrates, the emperors

202 NeverËheless, some senatoríal familíae must have in-cluded men who could act as gladiators, c.f. the fear ofthe troops in A.D. 69 (Tac. Hist. 1. B0). tr'Ie may presumethat gladíators r^rere generally kept unarmed.

The memory of the greet gladtator-based slave revolts dídnot disappear, q.v. Grant, op. cít., P. 90. They werehighly skilled men after all. c.f. Tac. Ann. 15. 46 forthe breakouË at Praeneste, where Spartacus is referred to.

v. Grant, íd., p. 88; Suet. CaL. 55. 2; ch. 6r PP.98 ffsupra.

v. Grant, id., P. 45.

e.g. Commodust associations wíth them, Herodian 1' 16' 1 ff'c.f. 77.2.2.An exception occurred in A.D. 48, the procuraËor of theirnperial gladiatoríal school being ínvolved in a plot'Tac. Ann. 11. 35, aPP (16).

The tolre ís set bY Res Gestae, 15.

203

204

205

206

207

208

-162-

often gave banquets to the spectators ín their seats (e.g.

CD 59 . 29. 5) . Sirnílar largesse occurred \dlth the missilía'

a lottery-like dolíng ouÈ of prizes on líttle balls and

hurled to the crowd by the emPeror himself (e.g. Suet. Nero

11. 2). Neíther practice can have done him much harm. The

degree of accesstbílíty required for such promotion needs

furÈher considerat,fon, however.

Firstly, the presence of urban garríson security

forces for the ludí must be noÈed. The attendance of both

praetoriêns and urban cohort,s seems líkely. 209 wiËh strong

evidence for thís role for the urban cohorts ln the Severan

"r"210 and the same tasks in maintaining public order in thé

earlier Julto-Claudlan periodr2ll ah.a group ís very likely

to have been presenÈ at all times. In the case of the praetor-

ians, ít would seem reasonable to assume that they attended

only when Èhe emperor \¡ras present, but that proposítion faíls

to Èake into account the publtc order role of the praetorians

at the beginning of the príncipat ".'I2

They are good candidaËes

209 v. F.C. Mench The Cohortes Urbanae of Imperial Rome: an

Epísraphic Studv. Yal-e: Ph.D. DisserÈatíon. 1968. P. 480,which refers to Tac. Hist. 2. 21 where Ëhe urban garrisonas a whole seems to be accused of corruptíon by thecircus and theatre.

2LO v. Mench, op. ciÈ., p. 47L f. dlscussing a 1ega1 delineat-íon of the duties of the praefectus urbl.

2IL v. T.J. Cadoux, review of G. Vituccl' Ricerche SullaPraefecture Urbi in Età I ríale Sec. I - III (1956),ín JRS 49. 195 pp. 1-56, 160.

v. Durry, op. cit., PP.27B f on the maíntenance of orderin lÈaly. In theír absence with the emperor from the city,riotous behaviour could re-emerge: 9.v. P. L32 suPra'The emperorts presence at Èhe games encouraged orderlínesstCD 57. 11. 5. c.f. Tac. Ann. L. 54, 77.

l

2L2

-163-

for those excused from rouËine duty at the games ín A.D.

55 - 56.213 As had been the case when the emperor \¡Ias

outside Rome duríng the early principat "r2L4 it ís probable

that the urban cohorts assumed an íncreasingly exclusíve

responsibilíty for order at the .ludí, as well as the city

at large, whíle the emperor I^las atlay at l^7ar iri the later

second and early thírd centuries 4.D.215

His routlne securíty situatíon aË the ludi provídes

the necessary background for the games as a vlÈal communic-

ation línk with the emperorrs subjects. Even in his absence,

events and requesEs made there $rere reporËed to him for con-

sideratíon2L' ^nd

so it was in his interest Lo preserve these

venues for public expression. Their loss through intolerably

disordered conduct by the masses r¿ould have been ""tÍorr".217The value of the games meant frequenË attendance by the

emperor, although substiËutes could be used when other business

pr."".d.218 The diffículËles experíenced by indivídual emperors

213

2L4

2L5

SueË. Nero 26 and esp. CD 61. 8. 3 where the reason gíven1s that Ëhey ought not to perform any but military duties,surely a reference Ëo the guard in víew of the otherduties of the Urban cohorts (q.v. Mench, op. clt., p.498 f).The irnrnedíate use of the same excuse for removíng Agrippinarsescort poínËs to them:-ãlso, CD 61. B. 4.

v. Cadoux, op. cit., P. 153 f.For the emperorts lncreaslng absence from Rome, v.M. Hammond The Antonine Monarchy. Rome. 1959. passim.

2L6

217

v. Cameron, op. cit., p. L74.

In A.D. 56 it rìras necessary to restore the troopsr v.Cameron, íd., P. 224.

Claud.163 f,

2L8 e.g. Suet. Aug. 45. 1, Suet. Cal. 18, Suet.CD 53.1. 6,60.23.4; v. Cameron, id.' P.c.f. CD, 60. 25. 8.

7,175.

-164-

in their attempts (or flagrant indifference) to fínd the

correcË balance of dign itas and cívilitas are revealing.

The emperort s attitude to the games themselves, hís method

of conrnunicating with the people and hís Ëolerance of expressed

opínions could all creaËe a reaction of anythíng from approval

Ëo openly expressed "orrt"tpt.219 rn exÈreme cases, this could

have an immedíate bearing upon the emperorrs securirr.2'O

The círcumstances in which petítions r^lere Presented at

the ludí were of vital concern for the emperorts security. Un-

less an emperor was trying to demonstrate hís accessibility in

consplcuous fashíon (e.g. Plin. Pan. 51. 4 f), ít would seem

Ëhat mosÈ emperors sat on a raised platform that was set apart

from their fellow cítizens and yeË was clearly vlsible to the

2L9 v. Cameron, íd., passím for thís process. An extremeaspect of thís 1s the public performance by "bad" emperorsat the varlous spectacles. (q.v. Grant, oP. cit., P. 95'and e.g. Tac. Ann.15. 33, L6.4 f, Suet. Nero 20 f, 24,cD 63. 1. I f, 8. 2,9. l, 72.10. 3, 17.2 ff, SHA. Comm.

5 , 8, L2) , thí.ê deceriotaËíon of relatíonship with Èhe

upper classes worseníng when he bade thern perform. Securityforces could be disaffected, more dangerously (Tac. Ann.15. 67, CD 72. 19. 4, Herodlan 1. L6. 1 ff). Security \'ras

also a concern in the perf ormance itsel-f . Commodus \^7as aldedas gladiator and venator by praetorían pre(CD 72. 10. 3, L9. 4), or the animals were

fect and cubiculariusrestricted (CD

220

72.18 f, Herodian 1. 15). Nero vüas accompanied by militaryand cívilían retinue ín Èhe theatre (Suet. Nero 21, c.f. CD

63. 9. 1). These incídents remain curiosiÈies but demon-strate the dangerous hostilíty whích could be generated.

In A.D. 41 ,the conspírators \^Iere encouraged by hostílityexpressed at the theatre' Jos. AJ 19. 25 - 27.

-165-

majorlty. These strucËures facÍlitated control of accessib-

ílíty wlthouË elíminatlng ít ' as \^las the case wlth the

rost.ra and tribunal. In cases where no such platform existed

or the use of one r¡ras scorned, ít seems likely that the nearby

presence of soldíers and officers of the guard are the closesË

securiËy personnel Ëo the emperorts person and ¡¡ill have been

the last ltne of access "orLtto1.222

The nature of the emperorts security escoTt as a whole

ís not at all dissímílar to that descrlbed for public ceremon-

ial events since spectacles are often merely the ultimate

event ín a celebraÈion thaÈ involved processions and sacrifi"".223

Praetorians, most often the single excubia" "ohott1224 their

officers, the emperorrs lictors and orie of the custodee groups

all accompany the emperor in a fashíon most tellingly índicated

by the circumstances surrounding the death of Calígula (q'v'

app. (13)). rt ls clear thaÈ all \^rere armeð' ^I"o-225 The

disposítíon and procedure of these various groups is noË totally

clear. The central role of the officers ís apparent (n. 222) '

The considerable bulk of the remaíning armed men served best

if ít üras a vísible deterrent to all. Their díspositfon is

suggested by their public order maintenance role and the use to

At least by mílitary. The identiËy of praeËorJ-anoffícers seems to have been well known to the public,q.v. ch. 10. pp. 238 f . In A.D. 41 (Jos. A.J. 19. 91)and A.D. 65 (Tac. Ann. 15. 53), Ëhe proximíty of officersis clear as a normal practice. The precise locatlon oflictors and custodes is not knohm to us, at the games.

Note the orlgin of gladiatoria,l games in funerals, Grant,op. cít., p. LO2.

c.f. Suet. Nero 21. 1 excubabaË.

222

223

224

225 v. pp. 155 ff.

-L66-

which these men r^rere put ar one extraordinary moment. Despite

the high tolerance of free expressíon of opinion and taste

aË the Lud,l ,226 order wl-ll best have been assured by careful-

and visible divisfon of Ëhe troops among the various sections

of the specÈacle venues. Revealíng here is TaciËus I descript-

ion of the praetorlans controlling applause, standíng per

cuneos (Tac. Ann. 16. 5), during Neror, ,"ign.227 l,Ie have

no concreËe indícation of the dlsposítíon of the custodes,

although it seems most líkely that Ëhey would be stationed

close to the emperor. Nevertheless, the reported plan for

the Písonlan conspíracy of A.D. 65 suggests that the praeLorian

officers would be the closest (Tac. Ann. 15. 53).

In regard to security procedures, general supervision

alone seems probable. There 1s no evidence of weapon searches.

Thís would have been exËremely undignifled in this publíc

corìtext. It is noÈable in the A.D. 65 plan that the petltion-

er does noÈ inÈend t.o carry a IdeaPon hímself but rather will

irnmobilise Ëhe emperor while those already wíËh weapons,

the praetorlan offícers, finlsh Nero off (Tac. Ann. 15. 53)'

testimony to the role of the officers when loyal. They

could cast a penetraËing glance over anyone approaehing Ëhe

emperor to present a petltion and so stlll allow the appear-

ance of free access. IË is perhaps by a similar surveillance

226

227

v. Carneron, op. cit., pp. L62, 190' 193, 294.

For applause control, noÈe the Augustíani under Nero,a large group of youths who could serve a bodyguardfuncÈion in part (CD 61. 20. 3, Suet. Nero 20; Cameron'íd., pp. 235, 246). More sinister control was exercisedby Títus as pïaetorían prefect, plantíng.men Ln the aud-ience, Cameron, id., P. L73 and ch. 3 supra. c.f. CD

59. 28.11, 67.8.3.

-167 -

that the equestrian wíth the sword-cane was eaught at the

theatre during the reígn of Claudíut.228 A further tactfc,

however, mây have been to linit the numbers of people

approaching Ëhe emperor at any one momenE.229

In thís ïegard, the corrposition of the emperor!s

retinue ls of lnterest.. Praetorían offícers vlere not far

away and yet certainly were not the closest to the emperor'

indícatíng Ëhe síze of his retin,r"23o and the lmportance

aÈt.ached Ëo being ín such a posiËion. A rnultltude of amicí

accompanied hírn, ?31 ^"

well as such oÈhers as the Parthian

hostages, fn the case of Augustus (SueË.Aug.43.4), which

228 Suet. Claud. 13. 1. He was discovered as Claudius \¡Ias tocome ouÈ of the theatre (c.f. apP. (37) for A.D. l-82),suggesting that the offícers'conËrol of peripheral accesssaw them seeuring Èhe emperorrs path fn advance, q.\¡. ch. l-0

passim. An intêresËíng point here ís Ëhat senaÈors andequestrlans will have had little anonymity in whlch toexpress themselves, unlike the masses. The emperor' or hisnomenclator knew them well (c.f. Pl1n. Pan. 23. 1). Thiswíll have been l-ntensífied after Claudius and Nero gave

them special, reserved seating areas (Suet. Claud, 2I' CD

60. 7, Tac. Ann. 15. 32n Cameron, íd., P. 188). Thisapplíed to an extent in most siËuations' \¡re presume.

229 c. f . AtrgusÈus at a lectio senatus. q.v. p. 136.Such a

tactic may have been reserved for times of crisis andanxiety.There was honour in its size, c.f. CD 55. 9. 1, 63. 9. Ie.g. Jos. AJ 19. 88, SueË Tit. 9, CD 59.29.5' 68. 3

Cameron, op. cít., P. 23L.2;

That was an extraordinary incident, however.

230

23L

-168-

clearly demonstrates the publíc relations value of such

appearances. Indeed, progressing to and from the ludi and

while there, the emperor r¿as liËerally surrounded by Ëhese

worËhíes who could ínclude .o"rí"".232 rn the case of two

emperors, Titus and Nerva, ploÈting arístocrats hrere lnvited

to accompany Ëhe princeps and aíd him in his dutíes as editor

of gladiatoríal games in the officíal testlng of the t"tnorr".233

That securit.y forces kept a hlary eye on the "best ment' is

clear from Chaereats knowledge thaË a massacre of senators

and equestrians would resulÈ if Gaius Callgula was kílled in

the auditorium rather than the passagerÁray (Jos. AJ 19. 100) .

The emperorrs retfnue is a clear lnstance of upper class dígníty

and public ímage takíng precedence over securiÈy, although it

seems clear also that the presence of so many armed men in-

híbited thoughts of plots since escape hTas so unlikely. The

securíÈy forces did not need Ëo enclose the emperorts person

ín a cocoon ín order to protect him efficient rr.'34

Contact \^rith the masses at large does not seem to have

been frequent. Expressions of opinion on social issues or a

request for special favour occurred in Èhe main by group chants,

it seems, wiÈh the emperor replying by bulletin board, his ornrn

232 e.g. Jos. AJ 19. 88, CD 59.29.5. The numbers are sugg-ested by Chaereats fear that íf he returned to the theatreto assassinate Caligula 1n the open, a huge massacre of sus-pected upper class people would occur' Jos. AJ 19. 100'This was narrowly averted, Jos. AJ 19. 138 ff.

233 Suet. Tír. g, cD 68. 3. 2. Such deliberate risk takingby an emperor could easily have frustrated the effortsof securitY Personnel in a moment.

234 v. Durry, oP. cit., p. 283 f on Juvenal Sat' XVI and thefear praetorians lnsPíred.

-L69-

voice or through a herald.235 Neverthelsss, there are examples

of emperors rningling l^Iith the crowd freely, seemíngly unaccomp-

aníed and as a goodwill exercis ".236 Naturally, this beíng

so rare and irnpromptu, a plot could not be based on the poss-

ibilíty that an emperor would do so and the ímposing presence

of troops would dirninish the chances of this occurring.

The essence of the ludí remains Èhe expectation and

usually the fulfllment by the emperor of extraordinary conmun-

icabillty and vlsíbílity, if not totally free accesstbility.23T

The ludi developed, against the decllne of other

Republican institutions such as elections and the contio,

as the major venue for direct communication between emperor

and subjects at large. That situation clearly influences the

emperorts accessibility and, more so, his Èolerance of express-

ion. Nevertheless, Èhe security system worked very effecÈively

within those consÈraints, the very presence of a large number

of troops beíng a successful inhibiting facËor, provided they

remained loyal.

5. ABSENCE OF THE EMPEROR FROM PUBIIC LIFE.

ParÈly by way of summarísing the relaÈionship of

the emperor to his public working environment, ít l-s useful

Ëo díscuss factors whtch caused the emperor to decide to

235

236

237

v. Cameron, op. cit., p. 167. Note the information of a

philosopher placed againsË Perennis at a festival, Herodian1. 9. An emperor would need to be wary of such material.

e.g. Suet. Aug. 43.5, CD 60. 13. 5, Tac' Ann' L5' 44'

c.f. Tac. Ann. 15.53. Part of the plan owed itself toNeror s accessibilitY due to laetitia sPectaculi.

-170-

absent himself from it. In terms of the emperorts írnrnediate

security arrangemenËs, the question Èo be answered is whether

or not he deliberately absents hinself at any Ëirne ouË of

fear for his or^m safetY.

The context for such a discussion is provided by a

large variety of other facÈors which índuce absence. Part

of our problem remains that our sources may not always have

been aware of the true motivation of an emperor, or his ad-

vlsers for that matter, ín these situatíons. A publicly

issued reason could readíly conceal anxiety about securíty.

Contrariiwise, there are cerÈainly moments when an emperor

does appear despiËe fears about ""..rriay.238 Attítudes to

work are revealed ín each case.

A cornnon type of absence occurred when private re-

creatlon was enjoyed, in Rome or outs,ide the "ity.239 Unless

irresponsibly excessive in the use of such time, work cont-

ínued in private circumstto".".240 Access could be controlled

betËer then. Nevertheless, the att.ítude emerges clearly thaË

the emperor \¡ras expecËed to fulfíl public duties on a regular

basís, to be accessible as a good Patron'

unexpected or irregular reasons for non-attendance

included a degree of failure in the emperorrs heal-th, whether

238 Notably, Tiberíus when ]-ibo Drusus ís under suspicíon,q.v. .-p. 153 . Precautions were taken'

On recreation, v. ch. 7 Passim.

For work in private circumstances, v. ch' 6 pp' 92 Lfand, e.g. Herodían 3. 13. 1. For the effect of theemperor atÈending the battlefront upon adurínistratíon,v. ch. 9, pp. 202 fL, 224 ff.

239

240

-171-

24LThethrough disease, physical weakness or old age.

announcement of such news h/as naturally of some concernt

both to those lnterested ín the emperorfs survíval and

242those not so. At Ëlmes, emperors tried Ëo conceal this

ínformation even to the extent of appearl-ng in publíc when

rest r¡ould have been more beneficial (e.g. Suet. Tib. 72).

In the case of an emperor noÈ seriously i11, work continued

and praíse followe d.243

On occasions with an element of ceremonial ínvolved,

including the ludi, the reasons for absence are usually rnotlv-

ated either by a deslre not to trouble the peopl- "244

o, ín"

occasional whim Ëo watch from a prívaËe viewpoint, in the case

24sof the spectacles. The ceremonials of adventus and profectio

are, of course, íntimaËely concerned wíth the presence or ab-

sence of the emperor l-n the city, ríËualistng and ínsÈíËutional-

ising concern for his safety and t.he benefits of hís attendance

24L

242

243

e.g. CD 54. 25.5, where Augustus is present but 1s repres-ented by a quaestor because of hoarseness (c.f. CD 60- 2.2);CD 56.26.2, old age; CD 66. 10. 6; CD 53.25.5 ff,Augustus wlthdraws from the conduct of a r,rar because of i11-ness; Suet. Aug. 72, stayíng at the mansion of luÍaecenas whenill. Also v. ch. 8 passim.

The successíons of Tiberius, Nero and Hadrian are marked bya conËrol of medical bulletins to assure their accessions, q.ch. 3. p. 36, c.f. the control of astrological Lnformat-íon about the death of Augustus, P. 19, and Tiberlusravoidance of medical examínations in the closing períodof his reign, CD 58. 28. 1.

e.g. Suet. Aug. 43, Suet. Tib. 72, Suet. Vesp. 24-

cD 59. 7.(Tac. Ann.

v

244 v. pp. I42 f on adventus ín partieular. c. f.At times, the preservation of privacy was desíred4. 67) .

245 v. t,p. f63 on t.he absence from specËacles and the useof honourable substitutes. Such randomness could foil aploËterrs plan.

6

-L72-

for the people.

Prolonged absence from Rome by an emperor could

ínvolve serious difficultíes for the adrninlstratlon of govern-

ment, desplte the fact that much of 1t focused upon the

emperorts person. The most extraordínary example is the ten

year absence of Tíberius at the end of his reígn. Although

there were dangers ín giving immense po\der to subordinates

such as Sejanus or Macro, albeit Ërusted, Ít remains that

such absences as a rule \^7ere not motivated by fear or the

need to increase securíty. Personality or the pressing dernands

of externaL affairs are readily ídentifiable as the real reasons.

This ls not to say that absences moËivated by security

needs did not occur. Several examples show that they certainly

did. Tiberius is said not Èo have moved out of the vílla he

was living ln for nine monÈhs after the fal1 of Sejanus (Suet.

Tib. 65). Claudíus díd not enter the SenaËe for thirty days

after his accessíon Ëhrough anxiety over the círcumstances of

caligulafs death (cD 60.3. 2). He reacËed in a similar fashion

later ín his reígn after the díscovery of an attemPt to stab him

at a sacrífíce (Suet. Claud. 36). In A.D. 69 Otho r¿as so r{aÏy

of the mood even of his o!,t-n praetorian guard after they had

mutínied on his behalf Èhat he dld not enter the castra aetor

to speak to them untíl they had been calmed by the prefects

(Tac. Hist. 1. 82 ff.). In A.D. 96, Domitlan evaded exposure

to the public only for a very short speciflc tíme prescríbed by

astrological prediction, only to flnd that fact used by those he

-L73-

r^ras relying upon to protect hlrn (SueË. Dom. L4, 16). Commodus,

líke Tiberius, díd wíthdraw substantíally from publlc lífe'

delegating authoriËy Èo this praeÈorian prefecÈ, Perennis.

This was the result of a plot in A.D. 182 which involved his

sister tu"iLira.246 It is ínterestíng that Cormtodust withdrawal

produced a tight control of information reaching hím, broken

ín the case of Perennis by a philosopher performíng at a festíval

and, ín Ëhe case of Cleander, by a relative reportÍng popular

agítation at the ludi (Herodian f. 9. 3 ff, 1. 13. 1 ff).

A simílar withdrawal from the conduct of adminístration at

Rome occurred in the case of the Severi after A.D. 205 when an

alleged plot by the praetorlan prefect, Plautian, \^Ias revealed

(Herodian 3. 13. 1). Finally, in A.D. 2LL - 2L2, the Augusti,

Caracalla and Geta, avoided public apPearances that would in-

volve contact with each other, in the process of envelopíng

themselves in a security blanket aímed in each case at each

oÈher (Herodían 4. 1. 5).

It is of importance t.hat these incidents are so few

over quarter of a mílleníum. Absence certal-nly \^las a technique

used as a reactíon to extTeme crísis, perhaps wise ín some cases

while leads were followed, Èhe situation assessed and then

a measure of calmness restored. This must be seen as the least

employed reactíon strategy, due both to the expectatíon that

Ëhe emperor atÈend the staters affairs in public as regularly

246 A temporary íncrease in the number of protectlve guardsfollowed, Herodian 1. 11. 5. It ís notable that thísoccurred rather than change of technique in securltyprecautíons.

- L74 --

as possible and to Èhe fact that the presence of the praet--

orian guard and the various other bodyguard entj-tfes seems to

have inhibíted atËempÈs on the emperor!s life with some slrccess.

Reactlon to the majority of plots r^ras a temporaïy sÈrengthening

of numbers and precautions around the emper or.'4' That this

Ìiüas temporary indicates that the security system, as evolved

early in the principate, found a relatívely effective balance

between securlty needs, the Republícan image of the régÍme

and the obligatíons of accessibility irnposed upon the emperor.

The concept of securíty precautÍons evolving finds 1ittle

support, in consequence. Other than the permanent statíoning

of guards at banquets from the relgn of Claudius and the in-

crease in garrison size under Septl_mlus Severus, or even the

odd reshuffles ín the nature of custodes forces, there is no

evidence for a distínct evolution of attltudes to security

or the precautl-ons Ëaken in conseqrr.rr"..248 Aberratíon occurs

most frequently 1n the case of traditíonally "bad" emperors who

freely neglected, or felt forced to neglect, the dignity of

aristocrats and Ëhe expectatlons of other "tount.249

247 v. Jos. AJ L9. 74:^¡To IS dUTo ouo tv ål I e lpeîvKCT eÀÀ

fo ovrII os0

OU

o v(¡s.

248 CD 60. 3. 3; on Septímius Severus, v. Durry, op. cit.,pp.82 - 88, although Ëhat change is perhaps more a Ërans-ítl-on to the later empiref s central rnobíle reserve forcethan a beefing up of proËectíve guards; for the historyof the varíous custodes groups, v. Durry, id., pp.22 ff;also ch. 3 pp. 24 f.f. supra on the cursus publícus.The decreasing respect for outwardly Republícan ínstitutionsis part of the process which resulted in the Dominate, artinterest.ing indÍcatíon of which is also the decreasing de-gree of accesslbllíty to the person of the ruler in that lat-er era¡ g.v. M.P. Charlesworth. ilmperial deportmenÈ. JRS.37, Lg47, 34- 38.

t6CXV vou fo

249

- L75

Prolonged absence directly assoclated with a plot

occurs only ln the later prineípate, at which time adminí-

stration had become more heavily cenÈralised around the

person of the emperor in any caser a necessary situaËion

given the time spent on the frontiers of the empire. Never-

theless, ín these cases avoidance of public appearance was by

no means absolute but seemíngly more a conslstent choíce of

conduct. Only ín A.D.2l]- - 2L2 was it acutely necessary for

each Augustus to be wary of every publlc appearance.

In view of the many and varied reasons for the absence

of the emperor and the relatíve rarity of absence as a reactíon

to a security problem, a conclusíon seems evident. Security

was rarely a facÈor l-n determíníng whether or not the emperor

attended to the public obligations of hts work. Indeed, Ëhe

great importance of visibílity and accessíbíllty would Èake

príority over such a consideration in most instances. Once

the emperor was ttat \^rorktt, howeverr a securíty system \^Ias

l-mplemented to erisure that any danger was lnhibíted by the

sureness of swíft and violenÈ reacËion to a problem'

-L76-

CHAPTER SEVEN : RECREATION.

The emperor at recreation cannot be díscussed

in lsolaÈion from the circumstances of work sínce the demands

and implications of his lífe as the princípal fígure in the

Roman state constantly encroach upon hl-s privacy. Never-

theless, it is clear thaË all emperors needed and expected

to enjoy periods of relaxatíon and the pursuance of prívate

interests ln order to relieve the stress of their positions.

The approach of índfvidual emperors to Èhís search must be

seen agaínst a background of quite rigid restrictions of many

types. The important arístocracy hTas disgusted by any

emperor displayl_ng talenËs best left to performers of Ëhe

basest classes, at least in publíc since many of these skills

were relaËed to thelr onn acceptable privaËe pursuits such as

huntfng or ll-terary composltion.l A líttle less offensive was

the interference wíth work in publíc by these pastímes'2

In a great many círcumstances it hlas expected of the emperor

that he be accessible, necessitatlng edicts to ensure prívacy'

if it was desíred (q.v. p. 81). Further perspectives upon

these restríctions emerge as \¡Ie discuss the types of relaxation

sought by most emPerors.

The majority of the emperors \^/ere interested ín wrítíng,the stage, hunting and so on, all the traditíonal compon-

ents of an aristocratic educatlon in Greece or Rome. As an

example, note the broad and acceptable range of activítíesand interests of Antoninus Pius, SIIA. AnE. Pius 1l'

Suet. Dom. 2L, c.f. Hadriants approved approach,CD 69' 10' 2

1

2

-r77 -

Beginning with outdoor actívíties, huntíng was

enjoyed by many emperors although information about the

degree of ínvolvement by most ís scanty. Obvíously a

dangerous pastime by ÍÈs very nature' several emperors

feature in revealing anecdotes. AlÈhough Ëhe nature of the

emperorrs reÈínue ts díffícult to be precise about, iÈ ís

clear that he remaíns the focus of their attention, witness

the atËiÈude to a dispensator from Èhe r_mperial familía who

acted with cowardíce in the face of a boar headíng to\^rards

Augustus (SueË. Aug . 67).3 Familia members vlere expected to

preserve the life of the emperor wíth their o\Â7rl' a principle

applíed in law to the relationshíp of all masters and "1".r"".4The presence of amicí is strongly aÈtested, huntíng being a

sport indulged in partícularly by arístocrats.5 I^Ie imagine

them sharlng the hunt very close to the emperorts person,

hence the basís of the alleged plot by the four consulars

against Hadrian (q.v. app. (34)). It musË be recalled that

Ehe laws on the carryíng of weapons made provísion for hunting

as a case when they could be carried wÍthout guilt.6 "rk"

3 A number of slaves or llberÈi could be present to see tothe emperorts needs, íncluding specialists in the art ofhunting, CD 69. 22. 2.

4 v., e.g. the execution of all slaves following the rnurderof the urban prefect in A.D. tt (fac. Ann- L4.42 - 45)'concealment of ínformation r^las meant to be discouraged.The prlncíple was not applied so rigídly Lf an emperor diedwith the complicity of a member of the familia. Domitianused ít later in hís reign against Epaphroditus ¡.¡ho had ai<iedNero to suicf.de, at this laÈer t.fme, however, as a warningÈo his ov¡n familia. It backfl-red. Suet. Dom. 14. 4; 16 f .

5 For general ínformation on thev. J.P.V.D. Balsdon Life and Le

arístocracy and hunting'isure in Ancient Rome .1969.

pp. 159 ff , 2I9 f.6 q.v. A.I,J. Lintott Violence in Republícan Rome.1968. pp' 109'

L23.

-178-

the ceremonial daggers worn by arisÈocrats at sacriflces

(p. 153 ), the use of weapons in Ëhese clrcumstances

must have given the ímperial security forces many moments of

anxiety. !Ííth so ltttle evídence about the nature of Èhese

forces I^Ie can only speculate Èhat praeÈorians and theír

officers, in parÈicular' ü/ere prominent. Not least would be

those skllled ín horsemanship slnce hunting r¿as effected from

mounts at Èímes. It 1s also noËabLe that praetorians ¡¿ere

occaslonally debased by usage in the hunts of the arena

venaÈlones7

"rrd archaeological evidence suggests a connect-

íon with those beasts at Rome.8 Despite those accompanylng

him, however, Ëhls pUrsulÈ fnvolved the emperor ín a consider-

ably hígher amount of risk taking than was usual, a powerful

anímal being a great deal more difficulÈ to defend agaínst

Èhan a human plotter.9

Along with sea Ëravel, hunting thus renains one of

the very few Ëypes of relaxation undertaken in the open wiËh

its consequent d"rrg.r".10 The majority of attemPts to obtain

relaxatior:t occur in envíronments readíly controlled by Èrad-

itlonal techniques of access control and inhibition used by

the security forces. In the majority of círcumstances where

relaxatlon occuïs wíthln the palace at Rome or oÈher properties

of Èhe emperor, such as horËi and country vlllas, mllitary

7 v. Durry, op. cit., P.277.B v. Durry, id., P. 57 on the vivarlum.

9 Examples of the risks, CD 69. 10. 2.

10 v. ch.5 pp.86 - 90 on sea travel and esp. n' 29'

I

i

ü

,l

,{

ùr^-r79-

control and the use of custodes is almost exclusively on the

external perlmeter of the area in use by the emperor, wíth

decisions about access on the basis of an emergency, for

instance, made by powerful ltberti such as the cubicrrlarii.ll

Examples of such situations occur wíth the emPeror

taking exercíse or bathíng. trIith exceptions (Suet. Nero 10. 2),

exercíse was usually indertaken ín prívate, whether its form

be gymnastícs, horse-riding or walking in the company of friends.

Slrnilarly, all imperial dwellíngs seem to have had satisfactory

bathing facíl-íties as a part of the innermost resídential sectort2

where members of the farnília gave assísËance. Few emperors

ventured ínto the publíc baths (Suet. Tí,8. 8, SHA. Hadr. L7).

Those who did were lookíng for further opportunitíes of contact

with their subjects, suggesting that the need to relax 1n prívacy

was usually an ímportant factor in non-publ1c bathing.

Outside of the palace, however' external control of

access is rarely deemed adequate for the security forces, no

longer on "home terrítory". In visiting fríends and associates

ít was not taken for granted that they could be trusted. The

emperoïS Seem to have tríed to create the impression, in many

ínstances, that they were still private citlzens once the business

of the day concluded. Visits to sick friends, attendance at the

prívate social gatherings and banquets of these people were

13quite common.-- Yet security in a routine manner seems to have

v. ch. 6. pP. 107 f.e.g. Jos. AJ 19. 98' Suet. Dom

e.g. CD 65.2.2, 66. 10. 6,SHA. Ant. Pius 11, Suet. Aug.

¡

t[,riI

':

II

i

I

I

llï1

t!

11

L2

13

L6c .f. Suet. Vesp. 21 also.4, SHA. Hadr. 9,69.7.

s3. 3.

-180-

been relatively strlngent even from an early d"t".14 Emperors

seem to have exercised oPen Precaution during their private

social activitíes, although the exËent to whlch such events

can be seen as truly private ís questlonable.

This 1s clearly an area where the exceptíons point

Ëo the rule. It was rare' for example, that an emPeror

vísíted a sick friend without an armed escorË (CD 57. 11. 7,

c.f. 68. 7.3) and yeÈ equally uncofltrnon for the room to be

searched for weapons before the emperor entered (CD 57. 11. 7,

c.f. Suet. Claud. 35). The same may be said for the aÈËendance

of the emperor at the banquets and gatherings of friends. It

is clear that the speculatores attended the emperor wíthin

Ëhe homes of such men as a regular practice and that excubiae

hrere statíoned outside, very much on the parallel of banquets

in the p"1".".15 On that basis, Èhe praetorian offl-cers would

control movement ln and out of the buildlng. lle may surmíse

the attendance of a praegustator sínce the use of one at a

funcËion outside the palace ls attested (Tac. Ann. L2. 66,

suet. claud. 44. 2). Again, the exceptíons are lllumlnatfng.

Those vislted wiËhout attendance uPon the emperor by security

forces were beíng shown signs of speclal favour and trust.

L4 CD 60. 3. J makes it plain Ëhat claudius defíned Ëhe proce-dure for banquets, fÍnally. Procedure before then ís un-clear but that thls alone of Claudius' innovations cont-inued uninËerrupted is interesting, c.f. pp- L2O ff.

15 Speculatores : Suet. Claud. 35, CD 60. 3. 3, Tac. Hlst'

J

{

rìi^

,ilti

'ftI

I

I

1

Itti

{r

1. 24, CD 68. 7.v. Tac. Ann. 15.controlling acces

3 and v. Pp. l2O ff.. For private banquets'52, an extraordlnary example. For officerss at banqueËs' v. P. I2L.

-181-

Trajan r^rent so far as to Èrust hírnself to the cooks, barber

and physícían of Lícinius Sura (CD 68. 15. 5). fn A.D. 65,

the Pisonian conspiraËors were quick to see an opPortunity

for míschief ín Ëhe unusual accessibility of the emperor at

Písors Baiae vílla (Tac. Ann. 15. 52). Standard practice

here, therefore, Seems to demonstrate a uniformíty of proce-

dure ín regard to banqueËs, whether ín Èhe circumstances of

the palace banquet rooms, the houses of amicí or public meals.

Only ín the trusted inner sancÈumof the palace does this seem

to relax, partlcularly since in those círcumstances the emperor

did need to show his trust of hls o$m attefidants and fa*í1y.16

Also notable ís that Ëhe importance of these escorts to our

sources emerges maÍ.nly through their absence. Otherwise, they

T¡rere accepted as a routine presence whlch \^7aS successful against

personal att'ack.

of wíder focus in our discusslon are the ímplications

of the emperorts sleeping arrangements. I,Ie have seen that the

emperor I s bedroom \^tas f irrnly secured by custodes in attendance

at the door ouËside, that the nearby corridors hTere surveyed,

that even the tríbune of the r¿atch needed an extraordinary

reason to enter during the night and that access \^ras controlled

by multíple levels of screenrnr.LT cerËainly, a good nightts

sleep could be obtaíned in such quiet círcumst""tt"'18

16

L7

1B

v. ch. 8 passim.

v. ch. 6 pp. 96 - 111.

For the qulet c.f. Suet. Dom. 2l and, by contrast' Juv'Sat. III 232 ff1' not all could sleep, despite that'SueË. Aug. 78.

I

,t

rìþ-

iI

ttrÌ

IïiI

I

II

å

þI

-L82-

I^That the emperor díd with such privacy is important.

Human beings, after all, their sexual drives existed and

were satisfíed whether by wife or by concubíne. The most

cruclal ímplication, of course, is Ëhe íssue of succes"íorr.19

I¡Iives, aÈ least, of the emPeror lüere expected to produce heirs ,

inabilíty to do so being grounds for divorce (Tae. Ann. 14.60).

Not all of the emperors confined theír sexual relatíonshíp to

hromen (e.g. cD BO. 15. 4) but all seem to have been influenced

by those with whom they shared such íntimacy. Irnperíal hístory

is punctuated in many cases by evenÈs related to the actl-vitíes

of women, their behind-the-scenes influence being immense,

naturally since by traditton they could not Ëake any actlve

publíc role. The reputatíons and deeds of Livia, Messalina,

Agríppína the Younger, Julia Domna and Julía Maesa, to name

only the mosË notorious, speak volumes about the power such

hromen could w-i-eld. Yet their role was riot necessaríly actíve

or even conspiratorial. Agrippína the Elder became a povler-

ful focus of opposition to Tíberíus and as such was danger-

orr".20 Marrlage for her was out of the question and was

similarly underÈaken with extreme caution ín the case of other

sueh ímperial females (Tac. Ann. 4.53, c.f. Tac. Ann. 15. 53)

They were línchpins to poÌIer. Sex wl-th such a \^Ioman' even

on a casual basis' \¡ras equally dangerous, adultery being

19 On succession, v. ch. 2. pp. 11 - 13.

20 v. B.M. Levick Tiberíus the Politicían. London: Thames

and Hudson. 1976. pp. 165 ff ; D.C-A. Shotter.Julians, Claudians and the accession of Tiberius. Latomus.30, r97Lt LLI-T - LL23.

t--

I

-lB3-

consËrued as conspiracy. The two Julias, Messalina and

others such as Octavía and Antonia, daughters of Claudius'

fel1 to such a "htrg".2l

It was difficult to cut off the

emperorfs prívate l1fe totally from public view (c.f. SueË.

Tíb. 42 ff). The irnplications of Èhese activities were of

public concern.

In additíori to the sexual activities of Èhe emperor

and hís famíly, theír conËact with frlends when relaxing

was of similar lmportance. Most notorlous in our senatorial

sources, of course, are the actors, charioteers, gladiatorst

musícians and, above all, the libertl who attended the emperor

ín his cubículum. Two very illuminaÈing pieees of evídence

in relatiori to cubicularii are worÈh quoting. The influence

of Helicon upon Calígu1a is described by Phílo:/\

ouoss Kc[ [ oÀo OUOOS

i

ovo st

v euKcx l.

TOK 'to OS cl elil VCI S

). lor cr fT 0e (.KOO,S C[

OS

0o

ôtÙ

a

Símilarly, the recepÈive mood of Vespasían after

exercíse, bathíng and dinlng is seen Ëo be exploíted by the

familía membersrín the words of Suetonius:

Nec ullo temPo re faciiíor aut indulg eltior traditur

S cto

2L v. app. (52), (54), (16), (22)- on AnÈoníâ, v. Tae' Ann

15. 53, Suet. Nero 35.

Philo. Leg. ad Gaíum. L75. Note also 174.

Suet. VesP. 2L.

22

23

-184-

The degree Èo which indivídual emperors hTere influenced by

their liberti varied considerably buÈ it seems clear that

all were to some e*E"nt.24 At times, Èhis could have a

darnagíng effect upon Ëhe emperorts public ímage wheËher the

emperor was acËive or acquiescent in their ttabusett of his

recreatíon. There are enough examples to see a símilar'

although less dangerous in potenËial, influence exercised

by artísts and performers, often wíth a similar scandalis-

ing effect ín the eyes of ¿he arístocracy.25 o".""íonally

disaffected, libertl in particuilar could engineer events

to the emperorrs dísadvantage, but only 1t seems when theír

own position was seriously jeopardis "d.25^

IË is clear, therefore, that the emperorts manner of

seekingrelaxationdidhavelong-termeffectsuponsecurity.

Here, persohalíty i.s eviciently paranount since each empe-ror

himself determined the natul:e and pace of his recreation in

most regards. Further, despit'e the need for privacy' it seems

24 v. P.R.C. Weaverpassim.

Tamilia Caesaris. Cambridge U 'P ' 1-972'

25

Ann. 13. 19 ff).v.r ê.8., app.(13), Callistus; (30), Parthenius; (41)EclecÈus; c.f. (16), Narcissus; (38), Cleander.

25a

-185-

that a gïeat deal was known publlcly about the emperorfs

habits or at least to biographers, such as Suetonius, with

theír wealth of anecdotes. Some emperors símply were ob-

lívÍous to the need to keep certaín things secret '

Elagabalus lost the favour of the soldiers, it. ls alleged'

because of his openrhomosexual affaírs (SHA' Elag' 5) ' Other

lost respect for pursuíng theír recreation during ruorking

26hours.'" MosË of them did not do this precisely because they

recognísed that accessibílity for the graver tasks of govern-

ment was expected of them at certain times of the d^y.27

Thís merely serves to focus upon the vague separaÈion

of the emperor as public figure and as privaÈe citízen. Those

needlnghísaiddidrecognisehisprivacyneedsbuthovered

on the perimeËer so as Ëo be able Ëo approach him at any

moment. The emperorts víllas throughout lÈaly were builÈ

for the purposes of "geÈting ar^lay from ít all" to a large

"*Ë.rt28 and yet, if away for anything more than the shortest

26

27

Suet. Dom. 2I, c.f. CD 69. 10' 2, PLin' Pan' 81' 1'RespecË was lost by those emperors who ranged the streeËsmísthievously at night¡ e.8. Suet' Nero 26'The mosË grandiose ãbrr"" oi working Ëime is surely Nerofs

self-indulgent tour of Greece, late in his reign' HosË-

ility magnifíed ímmensely during ÈhaÈ period'

CD 69. 10.2, Plin. Pan.81' 1' Conversely, the irnperíalneedforandríghttoprivacyatcertaintí-mesandplacesdoes seem Èo have been recognised and regarded, e.g" the

lack of accompanimenË in a litter by night (CD 69 ' 7 ' 2 f) 'Èhe closed litter during the day suggesting inaccessib-ility (Suet. Aug. 53), the need for an urgent reason todisrupt privacy at night (Herodian 3' 12' 1)'

28. v. F. Míllar The Emp

and pp. 55 f suPra.eror in Èhe Roman world. L977 ' pp' 24 ff

-186-

of períod5, Èhey vlere pursued by enbassies and appellants

(ptrito. Leg. ad Gaium. fS5). In consequence' the emperorrs

security troops act after ttoffice hourstt as much Èo Secure

hls privacy as his personal safety'

tr{ithsuchaheavydemanduponthelrtimeandatËentlon,

it ís not Ëotally surprísing that the emperors ofÈen sought

forms of recreat.ion involvíng considerable risks. Rlsk Èaklng

is an extremely ínÈeresting aspect of the overall pícture of

the emperorrs securiÈy. In order Ëo remain accessíble' a

degree of potentially dangerous public contact was routinel-y

permítt.ed and at tlmes greater risks were taken than !Ùere

reasonabletoexPect.I'IithrecreationalactivÍtles'wíth

hunËing in parËicular, the rlsks are heíghtened' Protective

forces could only do so much in a situation where the emperor

delíberately exposes himself to dang "t ''9

Finally, although we have good information about the

nature of recreatíon taken by the emperors, we have very

scanÈy amounts in regard to the role of the security forces

in these siËuations. The prínclpal exceptions are those in-

stances when the emperor is relaxing wiËhin his own residence'

Strong, multí-level control of access meant Èhat there was

no need Èo have troops within hís private chambers ' Once

29 e.g. Augustus in the Èheatre, Suet' Aug' 43' 5; Titus

"r,ã n.t.r" with plotters at the games, SueÈ' Tit' 9'

C.D. 68.3.2; r,ot. also Nerots nìcturnal romps' Suet'Nero 26;

for an interesting parallel, see the discussíon of risktakíng by Adolph ttilr"t in P' Hoffman' l[!et'-ç--ggIgglglsecuril-y. London: Macmillan' IgTg' p' 264f ' where mot'ivationis discussed.

-187-

the perlmeter is secured, it took a very urgent situation

to interrupt the emperorrs privacy. llith privaËe situatíons

ouËside the palace and in Rome, h7e are on less sure ground.

Nevertheless, índications strongly suggesË the open use

of securíty forces of all types. I{e have no indication of

numbers other than to poinÈ to the forces that travelled

with the emperor between venues (p;. 75 ). '- A1so, the

case presented here for banquet sltuaÈlons may suggest that

when the emperor \^ras exposed to a gathering much Èhe same

in content as during ttworking hourstt, securíty precautíons

were similarly open and rigíd. It thus seems logical to

assume that on the majority of occasíons, all' or a large

part, of the cohorÈ on duËy aË the palace for that day would

accompany the emPeror.

-188-

CHAPTER EIGHT HEALTI1 AND FOOD.

ThedaytodayhealthofÈheemperorT¡IaSnoÈpurely

a personal matter. I'Jtth hís perf ormance in hís various

publíc functlons depending to a great degree upon hís mood'

health bêcomes a matter of serious concern for Èhose who

workcloselywithhimandforthoseínínfrequentcontact.

Vows for the emperorrs health (salus), made regularly and'

particularly, when he left the ciËy or \¡Ias ill , reveal hím

as essential to Èhe stabílity of the state.l Such prayers

\^Iere noË to be utÈered frivolously, as thlo flatterers during

Ëhe seríous íllness of caligula díscovered (suet. cal. 27. 2).

The índividuality of each emperorrs background'

constítution and preferences fills the subject of their

health wíth diversity. Augustus, for example, had Ëo cope

with various seasonal disorders (Suet. Aug. 81' 2)' Tíberius

and Vespasian were very healËhy, consultíng docËors rarely'

ifatall(Suet.Tib.68.4,SueË.Vesp.2o).Claudiuswas

subject to severe physical handicaps (Suet' Claud' 2' 1' 31)'

At the end of hís lífe, Hadrian v/as hTasÈed by disease for

several years (SHA. Hadr. 23. 1)'

Inadditíontosuchindividualdifferencesofcon-

stituËíon, much depended upon how the emperor reacted to the

stressful demand,s placed upon him by his position' Lengthy

periods of jurisdiction, conferences with ambassadors or

wlth key counsellors, response to written communications,

1 on vota pro salute. v. p. 139 '

-189-

publíc ceremoníal functions and so on would all be very

taxíng, both physically and menËally, regardless of how much

ground work was delegated to subordinates.2 If not as

conscientious as this range of duties requl-red' an emperor

could relax by releasing some of Èhe reins of power to others

in varyíng degrees, although not without danger from viceroys

such as Sejanus or Perennís.3

Inthefaceofsuchstresses'allemperorstooksome

regard to relaxation, even when old age restrlcted agillty'

as iÈ díd for AugusËus and sepÈirnius severus, for l-nstarr.".4

popular were bathing and varíous forms of exercise such as

walkíng, rídíng, gymnastics, practising the sk1lls of war and

huntíng or, less respectably, the disciplines of acting'

síngíng, chariot-racing and fighting as gladlator or anímal

hunter ln Ëhe "t.rr".5Thepotentialofsuchpastimesforinjurywasconsíd-

erable. Iladrlan \¡7as injured several times while huntlng

(SHAi,: Hadr. 26.3). Similarly, chariot racíng produced a faLL

for Nero (suet. Nero 24. 2) and a broken leg for caracalla

(CD 76 . 7. 2). Precautlons in such s1ÈuaÈions would be extrem-

2 v. ch. 6 passim on work demands and esp' p' 91 n' I on

the primary source materlal for the work routines of.*p"ior" such as Augustus, vespasian and septimíus severus.

3 v. app. (9), (38).

4 Augustus, CD 55. 33. 5, 56. 26' 2; SepÈlmius Severus'SHA. SePt. Sev. 16. 6.

5 For recreatíon, v. ch. 7 passlm. Note thaÈ the therapeutÍcvalue of many of these recreational media wasknornrnof .Bath-irg, in particular, \¡ras a treatment for some dlseases' e.g.Aulustus-and Marceilus in 23 8.C., Suer. Aug, 59, CD 53. 30;

Narclssus in A.D. 54, Tac. Ann' L2' 66: Vespasian' Suet"

Vesp. 24.

-190-

ely hard to take and possibly dangerous themselves ln the

.6sense that the emperor I s príde \^Ias at stake '

Giventheriskofinjuryandthelrhumansusceptib-

ílity to disease, it is not surprÍslng to see the presence

of court physicians and with thern the spectre of the pois-

oner.7 CourÈ physicians were in powerful and dangerous pos-

itions, able to influence routíne decisions of the emperor

by their advíce (e.g. Herodían l' L2' 2) ' They were usually

obtained at great cost to serve the personal needs of Èhe

emperor and his family,8 whíle lesser doctors served his

família.9 fh. responsiblliËy, rewards and risks for such

men \¡rere considerable. Antonius Musa saved the lífe of

AugusÈusi-:n23B.C.but\¡/asunsuccessfulwiththeheirappar-

ent, Marc"rrrr".l0 The power of lífe and death that these

6 v. ch. 7 passím for precautíons taken in recreational con-

texts.NoÈeherethemeasuresintheextraordinarycÍrcum-stances of Èhe emperor performíng as gladíator and venator'CD 73. 18. 1, irg. 4, or the use of praetoríans at the theatrewhen Nero performed, Suet. Nero 21' 3'

Tv.T.C.AllbuttGreekMedicíneinRome.London:Macmillan.L92L; E.D. Philrip@' London: Thames and

Hudson. Ig73; J.- Scarbffigh. - Roman Medicine.London:Thames and Hudson. 1969. Allbutt in pãfttcular gíves excell-ent ínformaËion about poisons and antídotes'

g Antonius Musa seïved b_gth AueusËus and Marcellus (n. 5)'while Drusus' son of Tíberiüs¡ \'7âs alleged to have been

poisoned with the aid of the physician who attended Ïrimself

' an¿ his wife, Livilla (q'v' apP' (B))'

9 v. S. Treggiari. Domestic staff atClaudian PerÍod, 27 B.C: - A'D' 68'r973r 24L - 255.

10 Suet. Aug. 59, CD 53. 30'

Rome during the Julío-Soc ial Histoxv. 6

-191-

menliterallycouldwieldagaínsttheemperormadethem

the object of manípulat.ion by ambltious courtíers at certain

crucial moments in lmperi"l history.ll Vle may suspect ËhaË

thelr contacts could be kept under some form of surveillance'

Storesofmedicínes'necessaryfortheimmedíatecare

of the emperor and his fam1ly, were probably maintaíned under

theguidanceofsuchphysicians.Medicinecouldeasilybe-

come poíson, of course, given the varíation of mixture and

dosage, as may have been the case for Drusus, son of

Tiberíus (q.v. app. (8)), and Burrus (Suet. Nero 35,Tac.Ann.14.51)'

forexample(c.f.SFIA.Hadr.23.16).Poisoncouldbeusedas

an efficienÈ, indeed the most secret, means for some emperors

toelíminaterivalsrpartícularlyatthetlmeoftheíraccess-

ion.ThedeathofTíberiusGemellusI¡IaStheresulËofsuch

aplausi-blepremise.Hewasforcedtosuicídewhenarnedicine

he had Èaken was interpreted as an anÈídote to a poíson he

allegedly suspected Gaíus would use against hl-m (q'v' app'

(12)).BritannícushTasremoveddirectlybypoíson.-(q.v.

app.(20)).Slmilarly,AgrípplnahadthedístanErelativeof

Nero,JunfusSilanus,killedinA.D.54bythismethodbecause

hehadthedangerousbloodofAugustusínhisveíns(Tac.Ann.

13. 1, rhe ima novo rinci atu mors

11 Notably the use of xenophon in the murder of claudius' at-- Àgrippir,"t" instigation (Tac. Ann. L2. 67) and the efforts

ofComrnodustohaveËhecourtphysíciansendthelifeofhis father on the northern frontíer in A'D' 180 (q'v' app'(36)), c.f. Herodian 3' 15' 2'

-L92-

Forsuchpurposesrthereforerafewemperorsestablished

and maintaíned díverse stocks of poísons among their medicines'

to the extent that it I¡Ias necessary to keep a catalogue (Suet'

Cal. 55. 2). The stores of both Caligula (CD 60' 4' 5) and

caracalla (78. 6. 3) were destroyed by their successors.

Thê-.rost,concentratedperiodofsuchincidenËsoccurs'

incidentally, in the later Julio-Claudian era, seemingly as a

result of the sponsorship of Agrippina the Younger. A condemned

poísoner, Locusta, r¡Ias recruited for her use late in Ëhe reign

of claudius and. soon left a trail of destructlon through aríst-

ocratic soclety and the imperíal f"*ily.12 Locusta later

established a school for Nero, presumably so that he could

have other similarly knowledgeable agents (suet. Nero 33. 3).

Locusta \^7as supervised by a praetorían trlbune' incidentally

(Tac. Ann. 13. 15).

All of this was not publicised, of course' The public

stance and reaction of all emperors to poisoners \¡IAS Severet

slnce such a secretive, anon)rmous and terrible devíce could

not be condoned. It is notable that after the circumstances

of the death of Britannicus \^7ere greatly suspecËed, a scape-

goat rnlas found in a man who sold poisons (CD 61 ' 7 ' 6) '

Locusta was publicly execuÈed under Galba as an example

(CD 64. 3. 41) . The mere possession of pofson was enough

to secure a convíction, even many years after the alleged

attempt (Suet- Ttb . 49. 1)'

ThoseknownorallegedtohavebeenpoisonedinthÍsperiodinclude Claudius (q.t. aPp. (fg)), Appius Silanus (Tac' Ann'

13. 1), Britannicus (q.t. app' (20)), Nerors aunt' Donitíaiõl oi. 17 . I f), two importanË lmperial freedmen (Tac' Ann'

L4.65) and the iraetoriàn prefect, Burrus (SueË' Nero 35)'

t2

-193-

The emperor himself and his heirs, íf they stood in

the way of someonets ambition to succeed, \¡Iere prime targeËS

for poison attempts. Success would resulÈ íf key securíty

personnel or famíly members collaborated in Èhe attempts.

Our most positíve instance is the use of poison by Marcia'

the mistress of Connnodus, who I¡IaS above suspícíon because of

her sÈatus.l3 IÈ weakened the emperor so that he was des-

patched with greater ease by the athlete, Narcissus (q.v.1Ir

app. (41)).-* Yet a brief survey of the deaths of other

emperors and family members or associaÈes reveals an aston-

ishrng number of rumoured poisoniog".15 AlËhough most are

aËtributable to slander, the acute a\¡Iareness of poÍson ln

Roman socíety ís noËeworthy and doubËless justified to some

degree by experi"rr"".16 In consequence' the nature of

security precautions implemented in Èhis field is of great

1nËerest.

13 í.e. in the sense that Connnodus would still believe she was

una\^/are that a death sentence hung over her head. As r¿as thecase wiËh Livia (q.v. app. (4)) and Agríppina the Younger(q.v. app. (19)), anyËhing she prepared was evldenÈly notsubjecÈ to poison Èastíng procedure.

14 The poison failed in ítself because Commodus vomited it up

wiÈh hís foodbeforehand, c,

fleand wine, p

,terhaps because of an antidote Èaken

qoI o Àet S. EKOOTOTE fTfI o cd So

T o s Àcr VE v,{ t{r.e-oe0i.'c-vr i'll' ¡o )

15 v. appendíx, passlm. '-Lhe existence of so Inany rumours is part-ly attributable to ignorance of the cause of death in theabsence of modern pathological techniques, partly to hostilepost eventum wrlËínBS, illustraËing some of the difficulÈíesof our sources in thís Perlod.

16 The majority of medícines h/ere carefully determíned doses ofpotson, posslbly fatal in excess (e.g. SHA' Hadr ' 23' 1.6) 'A further illustration of socíetyr s avlareness of Lhis problemis the exílex Cornel

sÈence of a distinet quaestioras a result of theia de sicariis et veneficis of Sullars dictatorship,

t.o handle such related incidenÈs ' q

Dictionary of Roman Law. TAPA.43, P

under veneficí and venenumr P. 760.

.v. A. Berger. EncYc lopaedícart 2, L953. v. entries

',1

,t

t!-L94-

The emperor I^tas called upon to eat 1n a varíety

of siÈuaËions. The palace, both "public" and private sect-

ors, places of entertainmentr temples, private homes and

villas of arfstocrats are all likely '""'"""'t' He was

constantly aËtended by guards and other retainers, particul-

arly in non-domestic circumstances.18 The speculatores are

clearly aËtested 1n this role ín preference to barbarian

custodes, probably atÈending outside before they were aduritted

wlthín by claudius and his succe""ot".19 Their duties matnly

ínvolved waÈchíng over the emperor, his food beíng served by

non-élíte mílítes (Suet. Claud. 35' 1), aíded by a taster

(praegustator)\^7e presume. In cases where imperíal cooks

r^rere noË being used, and perhaps even "or20 soldiers may

have paid some atten,tion to the kitchen since there were

several stages at which poison could be íntroduced to a dish.

IllìjJ.ì

f3

L7

1B

L9

20

Thís type of circumsËancel has been referred to at severalpoínËs ín the thesis, hence a slíghtly summary treatmenthere. For my conments elsewhere, v'PP'119 ff, 158 f, L79 ff''

The necessit.y for guards, as for poison tasÈing procedures'would normally not be requíred 1n purely domestl-c cl-rcum-

sËances, c.f. ch. 6. PP. 95 f'

IÈ is interesËíng that they openly bore javelins in these

banquet situaËíons, Suet. Claud' 35' 1' External guardingon ih" perímeËer is suggested perhaps by CD 57' 1l' 7 forthe years Prior to Claudius.

The extraordínary events of A.D. zLL - 2I2 demonstrate a

possíbilíty for normal circumstances. caracalla and Geta

had separate kíËchens and tried to infiltrate the other(Herodian 4. 1. 1). Simílarly, Julia Mamaea veÈred Èhe

cupbearers and cooks for Alexander Severus when he was

CaLsar Ëo the Augugtus of Elagabalus (Herodian 5' B' 2)'ñt"."sting atso iã the attempt of Septímius Severus tohave hís couriers induce Èhe cooks and cupbearers of ClodiusAlbinus to poison him (Herodian 3' 5' 5)' These people were

trusted more easily under normal circumstances, perhaps'Their multíplicity may have acted as a cross-checking mech-

anism, however, if troops did not supervíse them'

J

,t

Þ-195-

Contrarir^rise, cerËain emperors aÏe known to have waived

normal procedure as a means of showing tTust to favoured

indívíduals (Tac. Ann. 15. 52; CD 68. 15. 5)'

The naÈure of poison tastlng procedure is f'aírLy

clear both by our evidence and the logic of the sltuation.

The prae tator tasted all of the emperorrs food and drink

before hís eyes' a process which applíed to some members

)1of the imperlal famlly also, it seems.-* Parts of the

tastíng process could be manípulaÈed, however, as ís attested

in the murder of Brltannicus (Tac. Ann. 13. 16). In that

case, the taster himself was involved, it seems, as also

occurred in the murder of Drusus (q.v. app' (8))' Their

loyalty !ìras essentl'a1. .22 trüe have drawn attentíon elsewhere

(o. :.23 ) to the numbers of praegustatores. It ís interesting\r -

to speculate to ¡^¡hat extent traíning I^Ias involved l-n their

duty. It is possible that they learned Èo detect poíson by

smel1 and taste, just as a wine connoisseur learns to detect

varyíng quantities of certain flavour componerits' The sugg-

esËion of a school for poisoners under Nero, although extra-

ordinary, is interesËing in this regard (SueÈ' Nero 33' 3)'

Presumably, ít rnight be dangerous to allow them exposure to

these substances, however. Equally, it could be unwíse to

2T Heirs, in particular' \^7ere given protection, t'f'p'Brítannlcus ís the prime example, 9'v' aPp' (20)'

The attendants of Britannicus, as well as the loyalty ofpraetorian offícers, had been manipulated by Agrippinaàgaínst him, e.g. ch. 10, p - 252 ; Tac' Ann' L2' 26'

I

it'I

II

I

I

jlìrjlr

{}

22

',:

,t

Þ-L96-

a1low the tasters access to the compound, or the recipe,

of -: -- theríac, an antidote to poíson prepared by the

.23pnysr-cl-ans.

More cornrnon ín our sources are the rumours of pols-

oning which expJ-o,ft círcurnstances in which tastlng precauËions

ürere not used, notably in the prívate domestíc lives of memb-

ers of the imperial famíly. Ingeníous methods are attested'

such as Livia smearíng poison on the figs of a tree in Augustus'

garden (q.v. app. (4)) and the alleged poisoníng of Lucíus

Verus with a piece of food contaminated by a knife coated

wíth potson on one side of the blade only (SIIA. Luc. Ver.

11 . 2 f.f.). That tasting procedures \^Iere not used here is made

clearer by examples from domestic meaIs. The offence taken

by Tiberius because Agrippina Ëhe Elder r¡ould not eat an apple

handed ro her by hlm (Tac. Ann. 4. 54, Suet. Tib. 53) and the

role of her daughter in the alleged poisoníng of claudlus

(q.v. app. 19), c.f. n. 13) poínt to this conclusion' It

would normally be unwíse, of course, to indicate to fauríly

members thaÈ they were under suspiclon by the employment of

such a procedure.

Afurtherprecautionwithsomehistory\^Iastheuseof

antidotes before meals, or alternatively the developmenË of

some innnunity by the gradual ínÈake of small doses of various

poisons. The most notorious example is Agrippina the Younger

Finally, on tastíng procedure, it seems to have been used

g.rr.t"ily ín public contexËs, c.f. Pp.I79ff, although is notãlr.y" likely Èo have been necessary when the emperor dínedwith hís officers and men at Ëhe battlefront, 9'v' ch' 9

passim, where the importance of a good lmage with the tTooPS

ls pointed to, c.f. Velleius Paterculus 2' 114'

'lt'

I¡1,

li

I

ïtI

I

1

i

ir I

23

-L97 -

whose "extreme" use of such precautlons (CD 61 ' L2' 2'

Tac.Ann.14.3)rnayhavebeencausedbythelndelibleírn-

print upon her mind of the death of her father (q'v' app'

(7)) and not least by her or^7n aggressive use of poíson as a

political \^reapon. As a result of her immunity and her very

careful choice of loyal attendants, Nero was forced to seek

alternative means of removing her (q'v' app' (21))' rt is

notable here that developrnents Inlere made during Nerots reign

Ëo the strength of the antidote known as the'i^c'z4 perhaps

the result of research sËimulated by the events of those years '

MarcusAureliuslateruseditasamedicine,creatíngashort-

líved social fashíon more than any added a\^TaTeness of security

problems (CD 71. 6. 4). Antidotes could well be an important

ítem in the medical supplíes maintained by court physíeians'

Thlsisaprobablesourcefor"-hemedícineusedbyTit¡erius'

Gemellus (q.v. app. (12)). Taking an antídote against the

emperorfs table, just as with Agrippina refusing to eat an

applefromTÍberíusthandr\nlastreasonablesuspicionofthe

emperorrs motí.r"s.26 spasmodic references make clear Ëhe

24 On Lheriac, v F.H. Cramer Astro logv in Roman La¡^r and

Practice. L954. P. 189; L' Friedlander Roman Life and

Manners under the Early Empire. 1908. vol. 1 p. 180;

Allbutt, oP. cit.' PP. 353 ff.

¡It¡

iþ-

i¡

Ifrti!

lI

i

;

I

25

25 Interest.íng, but exÈraordl-nary' is Nerots personal super-

vision of experíments by Locusta to develop a fast workíng

poÍ-son for use against Brl-tannícus (Suet' Nero 33)' Titus'àirrirrg at Èhe saãe table, can only have had the smallestsip (ðuet. Tit.2), íf we aïe to credit the tale'

c.f. Caligula sending poisoned swegt meats Èo certaln people'

Evidence ifrat ttrey had not eaten them was pfain for the

emperor to see (Suet. Cal' 38' 2)'

26

-198-

the knowledge of and Ëhe probable use of antidotes Ëhroughout

our period of enqurtr.2T

Itre can conclude by suggesting that evidence of the

use and abuse of security Precautíons in thls sphere of

health polnts once more Ëo the polítical lmportance of the

emperor. All of these measures depended upon the loyalty and

effíctenèy of those executLng such responsibilitles. The

emperor needed to work to ensure that these qualítíes did

not suffer.

27 v. AllbutÈ, op. cit., Pp. 353 ff for a full treatment ofthe issue, indl-caËing long term ahrareness of Èhe possíb-llities of antldotes.

l

I

-L99-

CHAPTER NINE : THE EMPEROR AS IMPERATOR.

The concept of ímperator durlng the Republican

period had an ímportant personal element ' Although' bY

implícat,ion, signifying a magistrate or promagistrate who

wielded ímperium, iË was also a salutatíon by victorious

troops, in recognítíon of their leaderts role in the víctory'

Under the empire, coíns mínËed to pay troops and thus bearing

messages appropriate to them, were often issued to extol a

greaË conquest or the various sanctífied personal qualities of

their leader which supposedly inspired victory'1 Sirnilarly

some of the greaËest public festívals at Rome were either

triumphsfortheemperororannualfestivalstocolrunemoÏate

maghúflôen..t; achíevements by themselves or predecessors '' "

i-s no accídent that from the very beginning of the príncipate

such honours became the almost exclusive preserve of the

emperor and members of his farnily, particularly prospectíve

heirs. It is also signiflcanÈ thaÈ Ëhe very title ímperator

was líkewise restrícted, indeed that it became part of ímperial

nomenclatrr.".3 Milítary por¡/er was the essence of imperial

po\Àler.

1 v. C.H.V. Sutherland Coínage ín Roman ImPería 1 Policy.31 B.C. - A.D. 68. London: Methuen 1951. passim forexamples.

On ceremonial asPecËs, v. ch' 6' PP'illustraËíons from coins, v' M' GranË

Issues. Cambridge. 1950' Passlm'

140 ff; also for

J

2Roman Anniversary

v. pp. 22L infra for more detailed dlscussion'

-200-

How the emperor used this por,rrer and how he maintained

the military elemenËs of hls image T¡Iere very ímportant. To

some extent the basic pollcy of non-expansion evenËually

formulated under AugrrsËus4 and the emperorrs tighter control

over actual or potentially unstable frontier areas meant that

there was less opportuníty for triumph hunting'5 In reality'

the pri-ncípate meant the ínstítutionalisation of many facets

of the extraordinary command, Ëhe existence of whlch had

signalled the end of the Repùb1-ie. control was achieved by

the princeps. Yet, dtd he live up Ëo the expectatíons of

that posttlon by conductlng the wars of Rome hínself? Such

an issue has complex impllcatlons' AspecÈs of the educaË1on

ofhelrs,thephysicalcírcrimstancesoftravellingËothe

front, the necessltíes of admínístratlon for the rest of the

empl-re and the personal securíty needs of the emperor musÈ

be considered in order to assess them'

trühentheemperororamemberofhlsfarnilydldunder-

Ëake to lead a milítary campaign, hls meËhod of gettlng there'

who accompanled him and how he ensured good rearguard communic-

aËion were determined by a number of factors'

Tr:avel to the more dlstant parËs of the empire was

often facilitated by the use of the imperial navy' ín partícular

4 v. M. Reinhold. Marcus-AgriPpa' New York' 1933' p' 161 f'

5v E. Badlan Roman Imperialism l-n the Late RePublic.Oxford. Blackwell. 1968. passim on Ër iurnph hunting.

-20L-

the fleet statíoned at Mlsenum on the \^Testerrì Italian

seabord, 6 Arrg,r"t,rs (CD 54 . 9 ' 7) and Claudíus ( Suet ' Claud '

L7 . 2) providing two examples ' At leasË duríng Ëhe sailing

season, the fleet also functíoned as a, ' speedy means of

communication for the campaígn, as well as for the trans-

portatlon of troops and supplies and of Ëhe emperorts person'

Naturally,itcouldactasoffensiveanddefensívehreapons

agalnst enemy ships and positíons'

Movements over Ëhe land ínvolved a variety of trans-

7 ,- R o

port modes.' tr{alking, líttersro hot"t" and charíots" are

a1l attesÈed, while public feeling about Ëhe context of theír

usage ís also ln evídence' The use of the horse was particul-

arlyfavouredaspartofamilítarísticimagecultivatedfor

the benefit of the soldiers, an importanË facËor in troop

morale and loyalËy.10 Movement on horseback was particularly

6 on sea travel, v- ch- 5, PP' 86 90. Also, v. C.G. StarrThe Roman eríal L94L. passim for Ëhe varíousfleet s and theÍr emPloYmen t in milltary campaigns.

7 on -trand travel, v. ch. 5, PP' 72 - 86' The attitude of

the publlc to these modes of movement 1s discussed more

fully there.

e.g. Tíberius (Velleius Paterculus' 2' L14' 2)' c'f'the reprehensibrà and Lazy use by Domittan (suet. Dorn. 19).

on chariots, v. ch. 5, P' 85' Chariots were less easy

to manoeuvre than a horse. There attestatíon is brief'other than i-n ceremonial circumstances' c' f ' CD 77 ' 13' 6'

Suet. Galba 18. 1.

e.g. Tiberíus (Velleius Paterculus 2' LL4' 3) c'f' ch' 5'pp. l9 t , 84 f on the image factors'

8

9

10

-202-

important aË the battlefronË ltself, slnce it allowed

speed.andflexibl-lity,althoughthisdidnotpreventËhe

lives of Trajan (cD 68. 31. 3) and Septimius severus

(CD 75. 11. 3) being placed at great rlsk' An important

element in this siËuaÈion is the us

with its regular stopping statlons '

emperor,

e of the cursus Publicus11 üIith northern defens-

íve wars íncreasíngly common from Domitiants time, the prov-

isioning aspecÈ \^las espectally developed, involvlng an

amalgamation wíth t.he army supply section' The courler system

therein remaíned the basis of the emperorrs abilíty to connun-

lcate relatively qulckly with other military centres and the

bul-k of the administratlve apparatus sttll at Rome' The

emperor himself may have used postal service vehícles' as did

some Roman goverriortrL? particularly tf speed was of some

importance.

Rearguard control was important , even to the extenÈ

at tlmes of brínging senators on campalgn who eoncelvably

posed a threat if left behínd (Tac ' Hist ' 1 ' 88) or removing

rhem from high office before leavlng (cD 59 . 20. 1) . Altern-

ativelY' control of Rome was left to ågents well trusted by the

posslbly supportdd by a praetorian prefect and an

13indeËerminable number of trooPs. IncreasínglY, in Ëhe

later peridd of the era under consideratlon, Ëhe focus of

11 v. ch. 3. PP. 24 ff.. on the cursus Publicus and íËsímportance for adminlstratlve control'

v. A.J. Marshall' Governors on the move' Phoeníx' 20'Lg66, p. 246. Note also the use by Titus within ltaly'tm*eátalely before his death (q.v. app' (29))'

v. pp. 270 f .

L2

13

-203-

politicalandadminlstrativedirectionshiftstothe

person of rhe emperor and his palatium, wherever he resíded

ln order to be close to Ëhe front.l4 The urgency of per-

sistent pressure from external rnigratíng tribes or the

empires of the east nornr produces a siËuation in whích the

emperor feels it increastngly necessary to aÈtend to the

campaígn personally and for longer períods' However' Ëhe

needs of administration did noË diminish'

The emperor or hís representative rnras accompanied

on campaign by a great irumber of varied personnel' from

members of hís farnilia to comites of the highest aristocracy.

Depending Ëo a degree upon how active he íntended to be or

how close to the front he resíded, Èhere vlere varyíng degrees

of creature comforts which the emperor allowed hirnself '

Bearers, cooks, bath attendants and docËors seem Èo have

been essential, even when actively involved ín the campaign

(velleius Parerculus 2. LL4, c.f. app. (36)). Abuses asíde

(CD 67 . 6. 3) , long campaigns meant a more normal lífesËyle

fortheemperor,transferredfromit'sRomanorltalianseËtíng'

andhenceagreaterneedfortheusualhouseholdstaff,part_

ícularly if other relatives accompanled the 3orrtrr"y.15 The

L4 v. F. Millar4L '2, c.f.

The Emperor in the Roman !üorld. L977. PP. 20'p.5fonjurisdicÈ ion there.

t5 ExamPles of females of the ÍmPeríal farnílY goíng to the

front include AgriPPina Ëhe Elder with Germanicus (Tac.

Ann. 1. 40), Sabína with Hadrian (q.v. F.H. Cramer

Ast.rology in Roman Law t L954. p. 17f) , Faustlna

with Marcus Aurelius ( v. P A 716), Julia Domna wíthCaracalLa (she remained in Antioch con trolling administraËion,CD 78. 4. 2f) , Julía Mamaea wlth Alexander Severus (kílfedtogeËher on Ëhe northern frontíer' q.v. app. (48)).

-204-

greaËer the apparenË normalcy, therefore, the rnore llkely

Ëhat security procedures standard ln Rome would operate

at the semí-permanent headquarÈers behind the lines. our

purpose is to díscover r¿hether the extraordínary clrcum-

starices of a campaígn altered the emperor t s behaviour and

the securlËy procedures whtch operated for him and members

of his family.

Security \^tas certainly more Ëhan the Ímmediate

protectíon of the emperorts person. The conËext I^Iithln which

these procedures operated was deËermined Èo a degree by the

nature of ímperial decisions. A mlstake could produce host-

ilíty within the emperorrs forc""16 ot defeat aË the hands

of external enemíes (Herodian 6. 5)' ConsequenËly, the

emperorrs reËinue conÈalned many of the besË advisers and

adminlstrators who aided hl-m when in Rome. The similarity

\^rlth the staff of a Republican governor ís obvl-ous, although

here Ëhe emperor is concerned with emplre-wíde issues, wheËher

presented dlrectly to him or by wrítten rePort or petitl-on'

The presence of amici would ensure Ëhat experienced, tradltion-

orienLated advlce was given to the emperor as a suPplement

to Ëhe ll-mited quanËíty of flle material which could be taken

on such " 5ot'rrr,"y.17 Not all emperors heeded such advlce.

Otho paid the price for not dolng so (Tac' Híst' 2' 32 f' 46 f)'

Alexander Severus was k1lled ultlmately because he pre-ferred diplomacy to conf,ronËation with the enemy (q'v'app. (48) ) .

v. Millar, oP. clt.¡ P. zLO, 268, 27I, c'f' ch' 3'p. 22 supra.

L6

L7

-205-

whlle Caracalla abused thern by preferring the company of

coflrmon soldiers (CD 77. L7. 3 f)' Marcus Aurellus consulted

them at every turn (SHA. Marc' Aur' 22' 3' c'f' Herodlan 1' 8)'

Such work díd not stop despite the frontier setË1-ng. An ínp-

ortant role for such men \^/aS attefidance ín the retinues of .

heirs to the Ëhrone as they trained to succeed' Drusus in

A.D.14hadthebonusofthepÏesenceofthepraetorianprefect'

Sejanus (Tac. Ann. l. 24)' Nevertheless' the presence of

M.LollluswíthGaiusin2B.C.didnotprevenÈtheemperor|s-18

adopted son being wounded treacherously'

Of crucial importance l¡/ere Ëhe personal bodyguards

of the emperor' ín particular Ëhe praetorian guard and its

commander, the praetorian prefect, here eomíng closer to

their origlnal functl-on as pïotecËíve corps and battle strike

force than at any other poitt.lg !,Ihether or noË it was the

entire praetorian guard ühat travelled wíth the emperor' how-

ever, is a point well worth explorlng'

The various alternative funcËlons of the guard are

relevant. The more usual tasks performed by the guard at

Romewereofasurveíllanceorlawandordermaíntenance

natrrre.20 There are suggestíons of supervlsion of imperial

18 v. PIR2 r 2L6 c.f. G.trI. Bowersock Augustus and the Greek

l{orld . 1965. P. 23 f . Also in êttendance \^/ere' llbertineand laÈer, equestrían admlnistratlve secretaries' most

notably the ab epistulis (q.v. M1llar, oP' cít., p. 79;

M. Grant The Armv of the Caesars. 1974. p. 223;

G.B. Town end. The P ost ab e sËulis in the second centurY

A D. Historia. l0' 375 38r. and the a libellis, part-ícularly when journeys of some duration were undertaken'

L9 The emperor t s escort force will rarely have been as díverseas thal of Otho ín 4.D.69, Tac' Hist' 2' 11' 33'

v. Durry, op. cit., PP . 274 f'f , c'f ' Suet' Nero 19 and

Grant, op. cit. , p. 165 for unusual tasks '20

-206-

property (e.e. Suet. Tib. 60) ín addltion to thelr service

asexcubiaeatthepalace,althoughmembersofthefamilia

are also aEtesËed (Phílo' Leg' ad Gaium' 351) ' This would)1

ínclude lmperial gladíatoríal schools (c.f. Tac. Ann. L5.46) '--

Ceremoníalro1esarelíkelytohavefocusedstrictly

upon the person of the empeïor. The ludi which followed many

fesÈívals, hovrever, did tnvolve the supervision by praetorians'

supplementíng the urban g^ttirtor.'22

Again, Èhey seem to have fulfilled a law and order

function in ltaly, partlcularly when Ëwo thirds of thelr

number \^Iere stationed outside Rome prior to A.D ' 23 arlð'

attested only ínËermittently thereafter (e'$' Tac' Ann'

L3. 4Ð.23 Theír presence at Rome did seem to add a dlmenslon

ofsËabilitytopollËicalaffairsthere'mostnotablebytheir

"b".rr".24 and by the effecÈiveness of crowd control procedures,

parÈicularly when manifested as a type of curfe\¡l and super-

vísion of potential trouble spots at a moment of crisls (e.g'

Tac. Ann. 15. 58).25

2l on lmperial control of various aspecÈs of the ludi'v. ch. 6. PP. 160 ff.q.v. ch. 6. pp.160 - 163 for fuller discussion of these

círcumstances' íncluding the process by which the emperors

monopolised controt of gtaaiators, partly out of fear oftheir use as a Prlvate army'

Theír role also includes the supervlslon of important exilesand the arrest and executíon of those Ëhe emperor felt itnecessary to liquidaÈe, q.v' ch' l0' pp' 237 ff'

On the effects of the absence of praetorians from Rome'

y. ch. 6. p. L32.

on crowd control procedures and contingency plans forurban security, ;. ch. 4. p' 74, n'6; ch' 6' pp' I27 ff(c.f . Suet. l{ero 13) , L46 f .

22

23

24

25

- 207

In additlon to the regular demands of these funct-

lons, there are suggestíons of the feaslbillty of trooPs

remaíning behind Èo secure the capital. Such a reason has

been postulated for the addtÈíon of Ëhree cohorts, probably

by CaliguL^,26 and of one cohort, probably by Dornítian.27

campalgns on the northern frontiers and insËabilíty at Rome

at those periods would support such a reconstructíon, whích

remalns essenÈ1al1y unsure. More concrete índícations emerge

from Èhe absences of other emperors from Rome' It is clear,

for example, that Tl-berius was protected on Caprí by only a

portion of the gu^rð,.28 The ínsËance ís a little extïa-

ordinary ín that the emperor \¡/as relatlvely close to Rome and

stí1l in politícal control of the situatíon there. Nero left

HeliusrhisfreedmanrinchargeofRomewhileinGreeceín

A.D. 67 (CD 63. L2.1 f). It seems llkely that his authoríty

ín the emperort s absence was provided by the support of a

praetorian prefect. Only Tigellínus is atËesÈed to have been

ín Greece with Nero. The emPeror will have wished the clty to

b. """rrr..29 Similarly, at the outset of Hadríants reígn,

Les Cohortes Prétoriennes.26 v. R.JRS.

Syme, Review of M. DurrY-29, 1939, P.243.

27

28

v. Durry. oP. cit., PP. B0 - 81'

A full discussion of the siÈuation on Capri, based on theprobabílity that guard cohorËs \^lere rotated between Rome

ãnd the island, occurs aÈ ch. 10' p ' 263, n' 62'

There had been two plots agalnst his life ín recenL years'the Pisonían (q.v. app. (23)) and the Vinician (q'v' app'(62)), ín A.D. 65 and 66 respecuívely' Securing the city\^7as as important as immedíate security, 1n some respects.

29

-208-

the prefecÈ Acillus Attíanus returned to Rome while the

emperor organised the frontlers to his ornm satisfaction.

The prefect reconmended the executl-on of certain aristocrats

(sHA.Hadr. 5.5) and was alleged.to have been involved in Ëhe

execution of the four consulars (q.v. app.(34)) before the

return of the enperor.30 ,h""" examples suggest that prefect

and presurnably praetorians in some quantity could remain

behind if the political situation was delícate. tr{e- have no

harcl evidence, hor¡ever, Èhat praetoríans remained if both emperor:

and pref ect r,rere ,b""na- - 31

AfurtheravenueofinvesÈigationemergeswlththe

knowledge that praetorian guard cohorts f¿ere asslgned to

members of the ímperial family. If they remal-ned ln Rome

while the emperor travelled, would guard units stay wlth thern?

ourínformatlonappliesprincípallytokeypolítfcal

figures such as heirs Ëo por¡rer. The earliest years of the

principate províde Èhe mosÈ solld evidence in relatíon Èo the

divísfon of the guard sínce after Drusus' son of Tlberius' and

Germanicus, Ëhere 1s vlrtually no comparable example of an

emperort s hel-r having independent (or delegated) rnilitary

command ín frontier areas. Germanicus had two cohorts \^7ith

30 on the prefects who remained behind, furËher díscussionoccurs at ch. 11. PP. 270 f.

31 In the case of Tlberíus, f-t ls posslble Èhat praetorlansremained at Rome whlle Sej anus made brief vislts to theempe ror. In the Severan erat Plautl-an and Macrinus, soleprefects t both accompanled Èhetr emperors on campafgn' InÈhat later era, there are sugges tions that Ëhe role of the

praefectus urbi became íncreasingly lmportant for Romets

securíty. As earlY as Hadrianremoval (SHA. Hadr. 5. 5). Inwho tried to \^rarn Caracalla o

app. (45)). That emPeror hadcont. 'd next Page)

AËÈ íanus had recommended his

^.D. 2L7, 1È was thls offícial

f Macrinus t ttlntentions" (q. v.tried to remove C1lo from the

-209-

hÍrn,ín Germany (Tac. Ann. 2. 16) and t\nlo more \nlere

ordered to meet hlm on hís return (Suet. Cal.4)' The same

number accompanied his ashes through Italy 1n A'D' 19 (Tac'

Ann. 3. 2). In A.D - L4, Drusus had been escorted by two

cohorts, supplemented by Germanl corporis custodes' when

he was sent Ëo quell the Pannonían muÈ1ny in the weeks after

the death of Augustus (Tac' Ann' 1' 24)' The latter is an

extraordinary example. Yet t\^lo cohorts emerges solidly as

the number assigned to an heir of the line when he commands

an army personallY.

LaËerexamplesofferlíttleaid.Titusisescortedby

legionary lancers r¿hile commander 1n Judaea (Jos. BJ. 5. 48)

and the lengthy reconstitution of the guard aË Rome under

Mucianus (Tac. Hist. 4.46) may have prevented praetorians

goingoutËomeethlm.Símilarly,boËhGalba(CD64.3.1)and

Trajan (CD 68. 5. 4) may have been met only when close to Rome

or at theír olvri request.

trr/ecannotbesureonwhatbasisDrususandGermanicus

weregivensuchescortsrthereforetnorwhetherornotthey

were the firsË to receive them. Gíven Tiberius I own conservat-

ism in regard Ëo Augustan precedt"t" 32 and his o\^ri strong

posíÈlon wlth the guard in A'D' 14 (Tac' Ann' 1' 7)' however'

íË is quite possible tlìat previous heirs such as Marcellus'

Agrippa, Drusus the Elder, Gaius and Lucius Caesar had all

(fn. 3l cont.'d.) same position in L'D' 2I2 after the murder

ofGeta(CD77.4.4).Therewasconsiderablepo\¡Ierlntheposltion.

32v.D.C.A.Shotter'Tacitus,TiberiusandGermanícus'Historia. L7 , 1968r P ' 200 '

-2L0-

received some sort of praetorían escort whíle on campalgn

and in virtue of their stâtus "" h"it".33 Such examples

are confined mainly to Ëhe early principate when the use

of Èhese farnily members prevented important. frontier forces

being commanded by potentlal opponents and allowed the

emperorrs heir to be educated in the milítary sphere and

Ëo be made familíar to the arrry.34 In the laËer Antonine and

Severan periods the exÈensive use of dual Augustí aÍ.med at

lnstíÈutionalislng the secure aspects of this sltuatl-onr35

a corollary being the dlvislon of praetorlan forces, unless

both were on camPaign Ëogether.

Are there parallel privi leges for family members when

at Rome? The role of excublae praetorians at the palace

would suggest a type of blanket cover for all members of

the famíly withln thaË structure, as does the development

of the oath of loyalty to the entlre do*rr".36 l¡ornen, in

particular, are attested with bodyguards, perhaps due to

such a practice beíng exËraordinary in some degree. Agrippina

the youngerts escort of praetorians and Germani (Suet. Nero

34, Tac. Ann. 13. 18) r¿as large enough Èo be conspícuous by

c.f. ch. 6. pp. L43 ff, n. 148 esP.33

34

35

36

c.f. the use of decursiones q.v. ch. 6. pp. L46 f .

IË also facílítaÈed successíon, of course¡ 9.v. ch. 2. p. 12

on Ëhe oath of troyalty' v. ch. 10' p' 242. Critlcalincidents, however, show that loyalty was to the emperor

above all others.

-2TT-

lts absence (CD 61. 8. 6)' Julia Domna had a similar escort

(CD 78 . 23. 2). Less extraordinary examples' even on the

basís that 1t ís lmprobable that members of the lmperíal

family moved outside Èhe palace without any protecËion'

suggest that some praetorian escort may have been given Èo

them. Oertalnly, it was undignified for Luclus Caesar to

enter the theatre unaccornpanled (CD 55. 9. 1)'37 In A'D'

69, albeit ín the circumstances of civil commotion' Piso'

the heir to Galba, is accompaníed by a centurion (Tac' HÍst'

'2Q1.43).30 ,r,4.D.54, Í-t is clear that Nero (c'f ' Suet'Nero 7'2;

and possibly Britannicus, Tac'Ann' L2'6g)had developed

fanilíarity with members of the praetorian guard'

Furthermore, lt emerges that when the emperor

travelled away from Rome he \^las not always accompanled by

heirs and other family *"*b"t"'39 Tn A'D ' L75' commodus \^las

ímmediately brought to Marcus Aurelius on the norÈhern frontíer

when news of the rebellion of Avidíus Cassius was received

(CD 71 . 22. 2) . If there rnTas praetorian protectlon for him

37

38

39

on Ëhe importance of dignity with travel' v' ch' 5' passim'

I¡IecannotbesurethaËthecenturionT¡Iasaccompaniedbyamaniple of troops, for instance ( c'f' Tac' Ann' 14' 59)'

Such proportÍon may have been appropriaËe to the dignityof tfrä hàir within the city' It seems not ln this case'

unless they hgd betrayed the emperor'

Many heírs did accompany Ëhe emperor on travels' e'B'Gaíus and Lucius Caesar- (Suet' Aug ' 64) '

Marcus Aureliusand Lucius Verus with Antoninus Pius (SHA' Luc'Ver' 3'5);Hadrían with Trajan on campalgn (c'f' CD 68' 33' 1)'caxacaLLa and Geta with septr ius severus (Herodían 3' L4' 2)'

-2r2-

at Rome, it was yet deemed safer for hl-m with the emperor'

Sirnl-larly, in the absence of Tiberius from Rome' Lívia is

l1kely to have received escort from Ëhose praetorians at Ëhe

capital (n. 28). Agrippina the Elder certainly dld so'

although it s purpose ïlas devious (Tac' Ann' 4 ' 6D'40

Julía Domnar s pïaetorían escort while Caracalla was at the

fronr has been nored (cD 78. 23. 2). Tacltus (Ann. 13. 18)

clearly implíes that the wífe and mother of the sovereign

were entitled to "r, .".ott.41

A concluslon based upon thís evidence of functions

atthecapiËalintheareasofurbansecurítyandtheproÈect_

ion of ímperial property and famíly members' in partlcular'

wouldsuggestÈhatitisíndeedpossiblethattheemperorüIaS

not accompaníed by the entire guard when travelllng or at

Èhe front. Variation according to the demands of the momenË

and the approach of each emperor seems Ëo be in evidence' If

Ëroopswereleftbehlndforanyreasofl'\^IemustassumethaÈ

a force of moderate size is involved, perhaps in the order of

Ëhree cohorts on the precedent of circumsËances prior to

trtA.D. 23.'-

40 c.f. Tac. Ann. l. 4L for the escort gíven to her whileat the \^lar camp of her husband, Germanicus'

6r. B .4) Nero also staÈes that v oáv* 'd¡.¡,ov lq'4L Yet (CD't 6 -rd,ur(¡v ll

^^)V TOU OUTOK ctTo OS eio0cr v0 \. DesPiteo

ex.pedient inEerpretation, it seems

the farnily T¡/ere given an escorË and

loyalty was Ëo the emPoror alone.

both ËhaÈ members ofyet that ultimate

42 q.v. ch. 10. P. 263, n. 62.

-2I3-

Thedutiesofgarrlsonforcesthatdldaccompany

ËheemperorÐ\^temustassumer\^rerenotdissimllartothose

performed aÈ peacetimeil-nRome, although the quantitíes of

Èroops ínvolved are obviously on a much greaËer scale'

Immedíatebodilyprotectioncouldbeundert'akenbyéltte

groups such as the praetorian officers and Èhe various

custodes groups, who were all mounted outslde Rome' Their

speed and flexibillty would then be vaLuable' particularly

at the baËtlefronÈ itself' The praetorlans' encamped close

to the lnPerlal p43raetorÍum, will have performed excubiae

functions' resËrictlng access by persons without authority'

In baËtle, of course, their role would be more that

ofanélitestrÍkeforceandprotectionescortfortheemperor.

Trajan is depícted on his column concerned wiËh the Dacfan

\¡Iars aS belng surror¡nded by praetorlans in such circumsta,,""".44

Septimius Severus, duríng the clímactic battle agaínst Clodius

Alblnus,ledsuchaforce'atgreatpersonaldanger(Herodlan

3. 7. 3, CD 75. 6. 6)' Thelr effectiveness in these cl-rcum-

stances may have been limlted 1f a very large opposing legionary

43

v. L. Rossi Tr

ce for the waY in whlch Èhe

n camPaígn is extremelY

:î î:'5.:'"ii::,fo;l; ål;"i:aÈíons (of Rorrrans ,'-¿¡I least, c'f ' n' 49) Ëo be searched when

they greeted the.tp.tot (SHA'Sept' Sev' 6:2)' that the

emperor or his famliy member brought along- his own cooks

and atÈendants (vrellelus Paterculus 2. 114). By and large'.t¡re must say thai there is 1itt1e evidence for alteration of

procedure excePt that more securlty men are present and

they could operate more openly' Consideration of the

dignity of others is sÈill lmportanË (c'f' CD 77' L7' 3 f)'The expectatlon of access to the emPeror in some circum-

stances here, however, mâY not have been as great'

44pêssím.

anr s Column and the Dacian lüars. L97L.

-2L4-

force \^Ias efrcountered or mlssiles hurled from a great

distance came close ro their mark (cD 68. 31. 3, 75.11. 3).

A mounted escort corps could not combat such Èhreats.

one factor certalnly diff,erent to the sit.uation at

Rome is theomnipresence of weapons near the emperorts person

at the battlefront. His guards would naturally carry them

openly, as all soldíers at the fronÈ and unlike the praetorians

when at Rome, who then concealed them within theír ,ort".45

custodes seem to have carried spears in routine fashion

(c.f. Suet. Claud. 35. l, Suet. Galba 18' f)' The Scythian

personal bodyguards of Caracalla could only use thefl in the

final analysís, however, to kill the emperorts assassin rather

than prevent his murder with success (q'v' apP' (45))'

The emperor himself would be armed when on campaign

(e.g. CD 64. 3. 4), not least because he wished to cultivate

an impressive militaristic image with his men' Otho wore

armour and marched wiËh his men for this reason (tac. Hist.

z.11, c.f. Herodian Z. 11. Ð.46 Imperial armour was evíd-

entlyquitedistinctive,asmightbeexpected.Trajanchanged

hís for battle but was recognisedr' nevertheless, because of his

tîs ôà lo À läs &utoûtò tcrupov 47(cD 68. 31. ?) It seems likelY' however,

45

46

on the !üeapons of the guard, v. Durry, op' cít', ch' 7 '

AspecËs of the importance of rnilítaristic image are dís-cuåsed in chapter 6 ín connection with the muÈatlo ve'Ëisof adventus ceremonies, pp. L42 f' See also the section on

trj-rr*Ph, pp. 140 f and ch. 10 passím for its importance ínregard to loyaltY.

47 on Roman armourt v. H.Londoni

Russel Robinson The Armour ofImpe rial Rome. Arms and Armour Press . L975.

l,t

ù-2L5-

that such protection hras only for display or battle, rather

than for normal camp 1ife. The consËanË use of armour by

septímíus Severust bodyguard and probably by hirnself as he

marched on Rome in A.D. 193 was motivated by fear of Èhe prob-

abílity that síngle assassins had been sent against hím (SHA.

Sept. Sev. 6.2',, CD 74. 15. 3). The risks of battle alone

would normally require such protectíon. Indeed, an anecdote

about Títus, when heir to Vespasían and commander in Judaea' re-

lates his presence on a reconnaíssance misslon without armour

on the likelihood Ëhat no Ëhreat would materialíse. This did

not always happen as anticipated (Jos. BJ' 5' 59 ff)'

Danger hras ever possible at the front' even if not

as great as during battle. Several íncídents of danger gs

emperor or heir are related 1n our sources. Tiberius, prior

to his accession, (q.v. app. (10)) and Trajan as emperor

(q.v. app. (33)) were both fortunaÈe to escaPe assasslnation

attempts by enemy infilÈrato.".48 I¡Ie have noted the escapes

of Trajan and Septímíus Severus (p.202 ). Battles and

siege warfare provl-de further examples. TíËus \^7as permanently

ínjured at the siege of Jerusalem when struck on the left

should,er by a stone projectile (cD 66. 5. r). Gaius caesar,

grandson and adopted son of AugusËus, \¡IaS seriously wounded

during a conference wíth the enemy and eventually díed

The princípal analogous sltuatíon is that of the competit-ion beËween rivals during the civil war perlods, when

spy-cum-assasslns were in constant use' q.v' ch' 3'pp' 29 f'

I

Ir

.t

tI

I

1

I

;it1f,'

48

-216-

J

,t

¡r

(Velleius Paterculus 2. LO2' 2)' 49

Obvlously, only so much could be done Èo protect

theemperororhisheirsinsuchcírcumstances.tr,Ieapons'

armour and bodyguards could not combat powerful missiles

hurled from walls. Nor could suffícient proËection be en-

sured tf the empeïor or his represenËatlve chose to lead a

battle strlke force or some retaliatory rald l-nto enemy

territory. Germanicus (Tac. Ann. 2 . L7, 20 f) and Septimius

Severus (Herodian 3. 7' 3, CD 75' 6'6) led such cavalry

actions personall-y, at times, buÈ not withouË grave risk'

49 The circumstances of certain díplomaËic exchanges in-volvlng Èhe emperor while on campaign are interesËing'The extraordinary guard of Septimlus Severus in A'D' 193

screened a senattrtal deputatíon for weapons (SHA' Sept'

Sev. 6 . 2). More routinely, Galus Caesar was wounded

fatally in a diplomaEic exchange (Vetleius Paterculus2. LO2. 2), t" t" have seen' Tíberius later received the

surrender of the leaders of the Chauci on a camP Ëribunal

after they were disarmed (Velleius PaËerculus 2 ' 106 ' f) 'NeromeËTiridatesatNeapolisbeforetheobelsanceceremonyín the forum. Tiridates refused to lay aside hís dagger'

IË was nailed to the scabbard, instead, to conciliate Ëhe

dignity of one and the safety of the other (CD 63 ' 2' 4)'irã3"rr.- received Decebalust envoys when they sought peace'

They díd not bear arms in his presence (CD 68 ' 10 ' 1) 'There are thus l-ndications that the presence of hTeapons

in such meeËings, in particular for meetings where the

Romans have the upper-hand, was carefully regulated'Fully armed Roman ttoop", by contÏast' are often 1n evid-ence near Ëhe tribunal. One example of a more evenly dls-posed encounËer is the ttsummitttbetween Gaius Caesar and

the kin$ of Parthía (Vellelus Paterculus 2 ' 101) ' Re-

tinues on both sídes are equal and armies ate arrayed

opposíËe each other. For examples of troops (offícers' inpäitf.rrtat) operatlng near the,tribunal' v' VelleiusPaterculus 2. 106. 1; CD 68' 19' 2 ff' Jos' BJ' 7' 5 f'f'Tac. Ann. 1. 34, +4 (c'f' Tac' Hist' 1' 18)'

I

fl

i,{

tþ-2t7 -

certainly a rêmarkable aspect abouÈ these lncidenËs

ís Ëhat they are so few in number' It is loglcal to assume'

given the value Romans placed upon aehlevement in warfare

and the exlstence of sufficient panegyríc material, that the

acËivities of Roman leaders at the battlefront would be well

reported. The question r^/e must pose' Ëherefore, is whether or

rçcrt there I¡Ias any prevatllng attitude' if not polícy' about

the emperor or his famtly actívely leading Èhe leglons on

campaign.Secondly,wemustassesstowhatextentconsider-

atíons of the emperorts securíty played a role 1n framing

such an attitude.

Evidence shows Ëhat approximately half of the

emperors in the period under conslderaËion at some sËage

commanded legionary forces in defensíve or offensive .a*ptig""'50

Various factors modify thís ínitial lmpresslon of lntense

activíÈY bY the Princeps, however'

AtËimes,absencefromthefrontoccurredbecause

no major campaign demanded the emperorrs aÈtention. Extra-

ordlnary examples suggesÈ this was not always so' I'{ithin

weeksofhtsaccessíon,Tiberi-us\^Tasconfrontedbyserious

revolts in the two garrison areas potentially most dangerous

to Rome, Germany and Pannonla' Tacitus (Ann' l' 47) ls

revealing.

'' I

IÍli(

I

ïtI

I

I

I

I*"à{¡

$

Those who dld not venture to Ëhe front once Ëhey had50

ri

È- 2L8

fmmotum adversus eos sermones fixumqueTiberio fuit non omittere c AD uÈ rerumneque se remque publicam i-n casutn dare.

In the same chapter, TaciÈus says he used his sons so as fiot

t.o hazard the ímperial majestY maiestate salva . Tacítean

blas asíde, Ëhe charge is interesËlng' not least 1n vlew of

politícal uncertaínty at Rome (q.v. apü. (5)). Under Nero,

the s1Ëuation in the east demanded lengthy atÈention by Rome.

It was Corbulo who eventually assumed a p roconsular imperlum

Ëo deal with it.51 Nero rnade belated efforts to forge links

with the mílitary, includíng a campal-gn to the east, but

dlscontent arising from the situatíon he was tryíng Ëo remedy

was already roo grear (q.v. app. (24)). In A.D. 69, Vltellius

and Vespaslan are notable absentees from the field of battle.

Vítelliust two-pronged sËrategy required twin commanders in

any case, but he chose to advance slowly wíth reinforcemenËs

Ëhrough Gaul, leavíng Caecina and valens to win his throne

(Tac. Hist. 1. 61). Simílarly, Vespasian stayed ín Alexandría

whíle his ì;líeutenant, Mucianus, lumbered towards Ttaly with

his forces. Vespasiants role in securing an economÍc blockade of

rtaly from the East was vital, of course' Ho\irever, once agafn the

bloody side of the business is clearly delegated to a sub-

ordinate officer (Tac. Hist. 2. 82). These are extraordinary

lnstances. In general, most of the emperors who dld not go

on campalgn hrere not confronted by serlous exteTnal threat.

)v. pIR¿ D L42. The precíse extent of his po\¡rer is uncert-ain. His lnfluence over senatorial provÍnces such as

Bithynta (v. Loeb editlon of Tacitus, vol.IV, P ' 254, n' 2)

and a comparison Ëo Pompeyrs pírate command (Tac. Ann. ]'5.25)are suggestíve, however.

iI

It

'l

ïlI

!

I

I

I

51

-2L9-

The sltuatlon when we examine ínstances ín whích

emperors did undertake to direct campaigns is slgnlficant '\)

Augustus actively led no rnilltary enËerprise after 23 8.C.,"-

yeÈ \^Ias only forty years old and several major crises hrere

to occur on the northern and eastern frontlers ' IÀIhat he dld

dolnonecrlsis,atleast'\¡IaStogoËoarroTthernlÈalian

toüm to faciliÈate communication wlth generals at the front

and also to maintain close contact and control over Rot.'53

Caligulats expeditlons to the north ín A'D' 39 involved

almost no contact with barbarians (Suet' Cal' 45 ff)' Claudius

\^renË to BrlÈain for its conquest only when hackwork had been

completed and mopplng up operatíons remained' The governor

was Ëhe real protagonist (Suet' Claud ' L7 ' 2' c'f' CD 60'

2L. 4). Otho conducËed his campaign against the Vltellians

from a town behind the lines, to the dtspleasure of his troops'

HeusedhísbrotherorothersassubstíËutefieldcommanders

when he was doubtless aware of the inspirational value of his

presence (Tac. Hist. 2. 33 is very revealing) ' Domítian led

sev?,ral campaigns againsË the Dacíans and yeË merely directed

affairs from the rear (suet. Dom. 6, CD 67.6' 3)' Simílarly'

Lucius Verus dtrected hls Parthian campaign from Antioch (sHA'

Luc. Ver. 7. I ff, CD 7L' 2' 2) and Marcus Aurellus his

northern wars from Sirmlum (SHA' Marc' Aur' 22'2 and' e'g''

v. Grant, oP. cit., P. 63.

CD 55. 34.3, Suet. Aug' 20' Similarly' Ln 20 B'C" he

\^¡ent to the east but ailowed Tiberius to contact Ëhe

Parthiaris,CD 54. 9. 4 '

t^

i

52

53

-220-

CD 71. 3. 2). The leaders who actually got close enough

to the fighting to risk ínjury \¡rere very f"t'54

Ho\nz are \^7e Ëo lnÈerpret Èhls situatíon' wlth so

líttle d,írect indícation of the policy of the emperors?

There can be no doubt that all realised that theír povTer rested

upon the rnilitary and Èhat it was crucially important Ëo maín-

Ëaín Èhe regard of the soldlers55 "rd, more particularly,

the conrnanders. claudius T¡Ias warmly 'praised because he had

journeyedtoBritaintoleadhisvictoríousÈroops(c.f.CD60.

22. f f). There had not been an emperor aË the front on a

genuine campaign for over fifty ,ttt"'56 Nero had realísed

only too late the folly of not doing so (q'v' app' (24))'

Otho shaped up in the tradiËional mould o'f, an lnspirational

commander as he shared Ëhe hardships of his Ëroops whíle

marching north, only to disappoínË them by not directíng the

battle (Tac. Hist. 2. 33)'

Further íllustratlon of the political ímportance

of rnilitary pohrer is seen in the relative ease of succession

for those with ímplicit or expliclt mílítary backing' In

particular, there are several emperors who were dependent

upon frontier forces for their rise to po\^Ier' notably Galba'

54

55

v. pp . 202,213 ffssupr.a. Note also the dangers of Alexander

Sevàrns in the east' Herodian 6' 5'

Dísregarding the northern campaigns of Galus' -the achieve-

ments and propaganda value of which are doubtful' Augustus

was Èhe laãt prínceps to lead the legions' prior to 23 B'C'

(n. 52).

56

-22L-

Vitelltus and Vespasian in A.D' 69 and Septimlus Severus

inA.D.r93.SirnílarLy,MacrinusandElagabalusacceded

because of the backlng of frontier forces 1n civ1l strife

sítuations. Otherwíse, we find Trajan, Hadrian' Commodus'

Caracalla and Geta all l-n command of, or with their

fathers at, major mlllÈary garrisons and so able to exert un-

spoken ínfluence agalnst any possible suggestion of their

unsuitability to succeed.

A number of different types of people acted as

subsËítute field commanders for the emperor, whether he

r^ras on campaign or noË. The earliest example is of Agrippa57

who successfully directed several campaigns for Augustus '

A notable feature is the use of lmportant members of the

ímperialfarnílytodirectcampaigns,examplesbeíngTlberíus

and his brother, Drusus, Gaius and Lucíus, Germanícus'

Drusus, soÍl of Tiberíus, and Titus' The use of such men'

often young and relatively inexperlenced, probably served

several purPoses. I'fith the presence of experienced comites'

to advise them, iË enabled prospective heirs to be schooled

intheverypracËicalskillsofwarfareandËheorganisation58

and adminísÈration of military forces and provlncial areas '

57

v. J. Crook Consilium Princípís' 1955' passlrn for the

use of cornítes-Tã-ffiã such younger men. Note alsorror,-s"nãEãTial advísers, ê.g. Sejanus as rector íuveni

58

to Drusus in A.D. 14 (Tac. Ann' 1' 24)'

-222-

Dto (cD 55. 10. L7) says of Gaius caesarrs first command,

flo Àe ov oùoávo, åto¡,áunoav o<¿tot \ our

KCI

veTo ÀÀ Ke ì.vo s Ðv ev TET 0ô

K v6uvo ( À o ls lTp ooet ovTo.

Secondly, 1Ë allowed proconsular imperlum to be held

by someone v¡ithin the imperial farníly, someone unlikely to

abuse tt.59 There rnrere occasíons, of course, when such

po\^ter had to be given to another' a member of the irnperial

farnily noË being avatlable. Avldíus Cassius in A'D ' 175

(q.v. app. (i1)) and Corbulo 60 before hím reawakened i:fear of

the effecËs of the great command, so destructive ln the late

Republic.Evenwlthlntheimperialfamilyfearofallowing

commanders to hold almost supreme pol^7er for lengthy periods

\^las not eliminated. Tiberius ís saíd to have feared Germanicus

greatly, not only because the latter \^Ias posited by the German

legions as an alternaËlve candidate 1n A'D' L4 (q'v' app' (5)) '

but also because Germanicus and Agrlppina allied Ëhe legionarles

to themselves so successfutty.6l Germanicus nevertheless

59

60

These youths dld not have major povrer inltlally' Galus

held command ln the north (CD 55' 10' 17) before hismajor eastern venture' oDfusus \¡Ias consul desl-gnate

"ttiv i" A.D. 14( v. PIRZ T- 2Ig). Germanlcus wes the

legate of Augustus ín Germany at firsË ( v. PIR' I- 22L).

v. Grant¡ oP. cit., p. L75. Corbulors twetrve year

command in the east eãtabllshed an extenslve nexus' itseems (q.v. R. Syme Tacitus' l95B' App' 84)' Nero islikely to have "rr"p""ted

it (CD 63' 17 )' The sur-vtvors, such as Muàianus and Tiberius Julius Alexander'

supported Vespasian 1n the A'D' 69 civíl war'

v. D.C.A. Shotter, oP. cít ' , pp ' 195 f f '

ve :IV 0clvev

6L

-223-

held maius ímperium proconsulare ln the east when trans-

ferred there (Tac. Ann. 2. 43, c.f . Pft2 T 22L).

trrlhat 1s also signlficant abouE these extraordinary

commands ís that. the emperor r^ras prepared to use heirs as

substíËutes for hirnself. The anguish suffered by Augustus

on the frustration of his successfon plans is well known.

tr{e must assume, therefore, that the necessíty to educate

heirs and to use safe personnel for commands of great

significance, using immense and dangerous resources, over-

rode consideraËions of their personal safety. The deaths of

Drusus, brother of Tiberíus, and of Gaius caesar whlle hold-

ing such commands must have drawn atËention Ëo the risks that

r.." trk.n.62 Tíberius (Velleius PaËerculus 2. 105. 2),

Germanicus (Tac. Ann. 2. l-7' 20 f) and Títus (Jos. BJ. 5.

59 ff) Ëook considerable risks on campaign, leading retaliatory

raíds and reconnaíssance míssions inËo enemy terrLtory or

direettng síege operations from perilously close range

Another important substitute commander was the

praetorían prefect. The practice rnTas presaged by the use

of prefects by emperors 1n the A.D. 69 civíl T^7ars. The

circumstances of tha¡ tíme produced Ehe choice of mediocre men

Ëo lead vítal forces, rather than risk betrayal (e.g. Tac.

Hist. 1. 87, 2. 39). In more normal círcumstances' \^7e

2 262 v. PIR C 857 (Drusus) and PIR T 2L6 (Gaius). Despitemy suggestion that lt was possible that these helrs hadpraetorian escortG.v;pp-i45(n. 148), 207 f.f.),it is also possible that escorts were provided in re-sponse to these incidents, rather than throughouË thereign.

-224-

firsE find Èhe prefect used as fteld commander by Domitian

agalnst the Daciarr".63 obviously, prefecÈs \¡rere expected to

direct affairs from close proximiÈy' Several díed ín64

battle ín various northern campaígns over Ëhe nexE century.

others fought with greaË distinctíon and achíeved noËable

successes. A key facÈor ín the use of the praetorian com-

manders, of course, was their eligi-bílity as "safet' mílitary

leaders, just as family heirs had been during. the earlier

Julio-Claudian era. EquesËrian status \¡/as Seen as an in-65

surmountable soclal obstacle to any ambition on their part.

An attempt to explaín why the emperor used heirs to

the throne (admittedly wíth some educative purpose) and

other substitute commanders, rather than participate dírectly

ín battle hlrnse1f, should províde an index of the extent

to which securíty considerations are a príority in the

emperorrs lifestyle on campaign and, indeed, his choice

about whether to go to the front or noÈ '

Firstly, it musË be stated thaÈ, although great

conceïn was taken to ensure political sËability at Rome,

it was not necessary for the emperor to reside there, if

governmenË vras to be "ffecti.r".66 Rome was the seat of

i.e. Cornelius Fuscus, 9.v. Durry, op. cit', P' l70'

e.g. SHA. Marc. Aur. 22; c.f. Durry, íbídem'

For more detailed discusslon on thís factor and thepraetorian prefects, v. ch. 11' pp. 267 ff..

on urban securíty measures in the emperorts absence,v. pp. 206 f, 270 f.

63

64

65

66

- 225

senatorial sovereign authoríty and of legítimate govern-

menÈ. On that basis, SeptÍmíus Severus made a poinÈ of

capturing the city and galnlng official imperíal status

before moving against hls two rívals in A.D. 193 (Herodian

2. 11. Ð.67 Nevertheless, despite some difficultíes,

upper level policy cïeation, jurisdíction and adminísËrat-

íve dlrectlon emanated from the emperor and those key

offlcials who accompanied him no matter what hls locaËion

68\^ras. Uecasaons were lmplemented perhaps with only some

addítíonal delay due to the disfance factor 1f the emPeror

\^7as at one end of the empire. Much of the adminisËratíon

that came Ëo the emperorts attentlon was of a slow naÈuret

in any case.

In addition, any large scale movement againsË the

emperor would be sufficiently long ín comlng to a peak that

he,himselfrhad plenty of tíme to be informed of them and

Èake counter measures. The logtstics of ancíent warfare

ensured Ëhat speed was not a major factor' This was, of

course, one of the virtues of the Augustan frontier sysÈem.

The standlng army was dlvided ínto sufficiently small,

flexible uniËs so that any one conunander would usually be

confronted by a much larger composíÈe force íf he was unrn¡ise

67 Note also Tac. Hist. 3. 64. "Gratitude for ending thewar wlll belong Ëo the man who selzes the ciËyrr' Note,further, Tiberiustrefusal to leave Rome in A'D' L4

(Tac. Ann. 1. 47) and Calígula securing the city beforehis deparËure in A.D. 39 (CD 59. 20. 1) '

68 q.v. pÞ. 20L f f -supra.

-226-

enough to revolt.69 At the same tíme, choíce of commanders

for Ëhe closest legionary forces ín Germany and Pannonía

\¡/as a matter of some "orr."trrr7o in additlon Èo the appoínt-

menË of substltuÈe commanders for major campaigns.

Thecentralaimofanysuchrebellionwasthedeath

of Ëhe reigning emperor' a necessary precondition for any

successful usurpatíon. The efforts to secure the death of

MacrinusinA.D.zLsandsoprevefithimreachingthewest

to rearm are a guide (q.v. app' (46))' One wonders how

long vitellius would have survíved íf his abdicatlon attempË

had been successful (Tac. Hist' 3' 66 ff) ' The numerous

politícal assassínaËions of relatives to the írnperíal

famílyintheJulio-Claudianperiod,inparticular,provide

grisly confirmation of this circrr*"t""""'71 Impairment of

69

70

7L

c.f.restrictionsoncommunicationbetweenconmanders,ch. 3, pP. 26 f..

Successful usurpers from these areas include Vitelliusand Septiml-us Severus. Unsuccessful attempts are those

by Gaelulicus in A.D. 39 (q.v' app' (57), c'f ' Tac' Ann'

6'.30), Scríbonianus ín A'-D. 42 (q'v' app' (59)) and

SaËurninus ín A.D. 89 (q.v. app' (65)) ' NoËe also theenforced sulcide of the German commanders in A 'D ' 67

(CD 63. 17 ), the crisís there in A'D' 14 (q'tt' app'(5)) and the constant attendance of imperial heirs inthis area ín the early Julío-Claudían era, q.v. pp. 22L ff.supra. i.e. even when the emperor rnlas noË at Romet sec-,rrity of the city remal-ned important for polltícal purposes'

v.D.MacAlíndon.SenatorialoppositiontoClaudiusandNero. AJP. 77, 1956, 113 - 132' The systematlc eliminationof the-Junii Sílani because of their blood relationshipto Augustus is documented there' Note also those elimín-ated ãs potential focl of re'bellions - Agrippa Postumus

i0.". ap;. (1)), Aþrippina Ëhe Elder (app' (56)), Tiberiusie*.ff,t"- (app. (f2)), Brltannicus (app' (20))' Agríppinathe Younger (app. (21)), Octavía (app' (22))'

- 227

or dlstraction from Èhe emperor as the focus of loyalty

and power could not always be toler^t"d.72 In consequence'

mosË attempts on hls life r^rere at an immediate, personal

level, made by indlvlduals or small groups' as a survey

of the appendix shows. Such aÈtacks could occur equally

easily ouËside Rome.

The security of the emperorls person \¡las viËal,

whatever his locaËíon, therefore. Rome itself \^¡as not

of paramount strategic ímportance in that sense. Most of

the major bodyguard forces and the Misene fleet (especially

íf travelling to the east) are likely to have been wiÈh the

.rnp.ro..73 The relative ease with whích emperors of even

the early princÍ-pate had ltved out of Rome in varying cir-

cumstances illustrates the relative unimporËance of the7/

ciËy, ín fact./a What did matËer most' from a politlcal

víewpoinË, \^ras who possessed Èhe greaËest rnilitary sËrength

and Ëíght control at the centrer wherever the ttcentrett

happened to be, Ëo ensure that rrfrontier feudalismtt and/or

chaos at the focus of potlttcal power did not o..rrt.75

72 Ore unfortunate side effect was that, by A.D. 68' therer¡rere no male helrs to succeed Nero.

73 For dlscussion on the numbersr v. PP. 204 - 217.

74 e.g. Augustus intermittently in the first decade of hissofe power and Tiberius ín the lasË decade of his princ-lpate, in particular c.f. ch.4. pp. 56 ff,ch. 10.p.263,n.62.

75 Eor the related concept of praetori-anism, v. S. AndreskiMilltary Organisa t.ion and Society. London: RoutledKegan Paul. L954.

ge and

-228-

Possession of Rome can be discounted as a prímary factor

in the lack of direct participation fn warfare by the

emperor.

An essential consideration ls surely Ëhe style of

leadership of each emperor. In itself, this was the pro-

duct of an amalgam of factors such as the personal health

of the "*n"totr76 his personality, the influence of ad-

visers, the expectations of different socíal groups and'

in particular, for the soldíers, the projected image of

his leadershíP qualítles.

The ways in whlch various emperors reacted to the

demands traditionally made upon thelr performance was sign-

ifícant. Imperial coinage (n. 1) shows the lmmense ímport-

ance of victory symbolism. The troops expected the emperor

tobetheproviderandProtectoroftheirínterestsand

tastes. Victoria sti evolved to become a numínous virËue

of the emperor which supposedly inspired his varlous deleg-

ates in the provinces. By such logic as this, triumphs

became the exclusive property of the emperor and his family.77

76 On the emperorts health, v. ch. I passim' ParËícularexamples in relatton to rnTar are Augustust wíthdrawalfrom campaign due to illness (CD 53 ' 25 ' 7) 'rhe departuie of Trajan from the east (CD 68' 33' 1)'and the delay to a campaign caused by the cripplingínffrmíties of Septímius Severus (Herodian 3' 15)'

The paËtern \^7as set by Agrippa, q'v' Reinhold, op' ciË''pp.fiZ ff. The focal auctqritas of Augustus was allimportant now. Legatí oE the major armed provinces now

under his conËrot proan.ed salutations of imperator onlyfor hirn or his family. To share trlumphs with otherswould be to weaken the solitary control upon whieh imp--

erial power rested. Delegates who won the victories had

77

to be satísfied wíËh t he lesser ornamenËa triumphalia.

229 -

Any emperor who dtd not ll-ve up to the expect-

atíons of his soldiers in some way could be ln trouble.

The importance of such a concept as Víctqria Augusti has

some ínterestlng írnplicatlons for our discussl-on of the

emperorfs atËítude to acÈive service on Ëhe front' FirsËly'

in theory at least, the maintenance of imp erial dignitas

díd noÈ require personal attendance at the front once the

concepË of the influence of tmperial victoria had evolved

and attached ltself to the emperor' After the aucÈoritas

of Èhe dynasty was established, the varlous virtues could be

relatlvely impersonal, in the sense Ëhat the emperor díd not

have to prove his or,¡n abillties. The deeds of others would

íncrease or maintaín the prestige already inherited by hin

from the accumulated successes of his ancesLot"'78 This

78 The influence of dynastíc auct,oritas can best be gc.uged

when a new dYnastY is creaËed. Vespasian trled to con-solldate power without the initial religious aura ofAugustus who was d lvi filius (c.f. Suet. VesP. L2)'Unttl his sons acquired Ëhat títle, he concentrated uPon

the accumulatlon of RePublfcan offícial honours (consulate'censorship etc. ) , initiated a program of associatfon wlthvarious numinous ttvirtuestt and assoclaÈed himself wíth theprevlous dynast tlS

q.v. K. ScotË 936,passim and K.H.Phoenlx L7 ) L963, 198 2L8. This tyPe of Process ex-plains in part Ëhe extraordinarY concentratlon of Personalmilltary activtty at such tímes' After actual or Potentialcivll war periods (44 31 8.C., A.D. 4r, 68- 69, 97 8,

L93 6, 2L7 222) , the new ruler PlaYs a ProminentlYpersonal role ín order Ëo dístract garrison forces frompolitics and to gain anevl a reputation for strong militaryand politícal Power so Èhat the dynasty has a solid found-ation. The Process often culminates 1n a sPectacularËriumph which visuallY cements the emPerorts rePutaËlon(e.g. Augustus (q.t. R. Syrne Ttre lc4gg-Re\te1qlieg. 1939.

p. 303), Claudlus (Suet. Claud. L7. 2; CD 60. 22- 1, 23),Vespasian (Jos. BJ. 7. 122 156), Trajan (CD 68. 10. 2),Septímíus Severus (CD 76. 1. 3 f.f , Herodian 3. 10. 1 f ,SHA. Sept. Sev. i6. 6 f)). Once heirs emerge'prominence of the leader could díminish'

the early

-23Q-

could be qulte useful, 1n effect, by allowlng the emperor

an ,'escape clause" from dírecË responsibility for his sub-

ordínates. By not beíng present, a "plausíble denl-al" 1s

possible for the unsuccessful acËions of othtt"'79 Perso-

nal faílure by an emperor would be extremely damaglng to

his public image as a míllt"ty *""'80 He must be lotlçttq

i¡ image, if not ín deed. Notably, Claudius travelled to

Britain only once victory $/as assured (Suet. Claud. L7. 2),

while caligula (SueË. Cal. 47)anð, DomíËían (Tac. Agr. 39)

mountedtrtumphswhennonewasjustifiedbytheircampaigns.

Thl-s care for l-mage 1s one possíble reason for the use of

substiËute commanders, therefore'

The existence of the numinous and relatívely impers-

onal concept of Víctoria did noÈ mean' however' that the

soldiers, in particular, did not expect it to be maintaíned

in a certain style. Nero (q'v' app' (24)) and Alexander

Severus (q.v. app. (48)) losË support because of theír manner'

The latterrs reputation had already suffered through íncomp-

79 "Plausible dení41" ís a modern usager 9'v' V. Marchettland J.D . Marks The CIA and the cult of inte l1i e.L976. p. 48. An anclent examPle ís that of Caesennius

Paetus, defeated bY the ParÈhians aË Rhandeia in A'D ' 62'

Nero pardoned him ín such a l¡lay as Ëo ensure that all knew

it was Paetust t'tendencY to Pani c" whlch caused the defeat(Tac. Ann. 15. 25).

80 Augustus played down hosËility to the Varan disaster by

delaying ilberiusr Pannonian Ëriumph (Suet' Tib' 20)' The

pt""àrr"ã of consillum members with irnperlal heirs was de-

signed to preîõt-ãrrch místakes. Tibertus corrected him-

selfinthelightofthisraccordingËoSueËonius(Tib'18) .

animadvert eret Varianam cladem temet:itate etneelegentia ducis accídisse, nihil non deconsilíi sententia esit

-23L-

etent personal leadership ln the east (Herodían 6. 5) . In

consequence, the use of substitute commanders could be

unwise, at cerËain Ëlmes.

In concluslon, T¡Ie can staËe that iÈ appears the

emperorrs self-percelved role was Ëo be the focus of

ttghtly controlled organisation in civll and rnllitary

affairs, rather than the executor of policy' It would

take extraordinary círcumstances for an emperor Èo parf-

icipate personally and directly ln a campaígn, notably

civil war, the lack of any totally suitable and rellable

substltute commander (or heir) to lead a major campalgn

or Ëhe necessiÈy for subsÈantlal improvement of publlc

image to facilitate rule 1n oÈher spheres and Èo ensure

more ready acceptance of a ne\¡r dynasty' Prestige depend-

ed upon success in acËionr at some poínt' Thus, ln

many cases' lt would be unwise to take the rlsks of 1n-

volvemenË from an image viewpoint and a positive dlstr-

action from the ofËen very pressing needs of polley

81directlon.

As a result, desplte the many opPortunities to

particípate, \^re are confronted by the conclusion t.hat there

81 It was dífflcult for the emperor to lead both rnilitaryand adminisËratíve areas with efficlency' Trajan re-turned to consíderable administratíon after the Dacianr^7ars (cD 68. 10. 2, 15. 1). Much must have been con-slgned to subordinates at wartime, unless a semi-perm-

"rrãrrt headquarters r^ras esËablíshed as f or Marcus Aurelius '

q.v. Mlllar, op. cit., PP. 4 ff and passlm.

-232-

r^ras a deliberaÈe pollcy of indirect conmand under normal

cj-rctrmsÈances. The circumstances of cÍvil war point to the pree-

ise relatíonshíp of thls sítuatíon to the needs of the

emperorts securíty whl-le on campaígn. In those ínsÈances,

personal securíty ís doubly important. The survlval or

foundation of a dynasty depended upon Ëhe safety of the

emperor or hls opponent. In thaË case, the absence of the

leader does have a securiËy emphasis.

In normal campaigns' personal securiËy does not

seem to have been a prime factor ín the decísíon to go to

the front or sËay behlnd. That decísíon was deterrnined by

factors detalled above, alËhough security could be an

ínfluence (c.f. Tac. Ann. I. 47). It hTas essentíally polit-

ícal. Once on campaígn, there do not seem Èo have been

extraordírl.ary Precautíonary procedures implemented' The

function of the personal bodyguards and varíous security

forces close to the emperor r^Ias, as at Rome, largely ín-

híbítive ln an attempt to díscourage assault by virtue of

the size of the forces protecting him and by the restrlction

of access Ëo authorised. personnel, at the emperorrs direcËion'

The main dífferences, perhaps, are of sLze and appearance.

A greater number of guards could be necessary against the

possibility of enemy attack, partlcularly in batËle, of

course. Here, guards could be far more open and conspicuous

in the execution of their duties, carrying weapons and wearing

armour. sirnilarly, personal bodyguards hTere mounted and so

able to react very quickly. Procedure ítself seems Èo have

-233-

been líttle different. securlty needs could be met in

peace or r^7ar by a number of Proven methods which did

not normally require supplemenÈation. Their príncipal

additional task was Èo accompany the emperor in numbers

into battle, as escoït and stríke force, if that rare

eventualíty occurred. There, however, the apparent

element of risk was conslderable and no number of men

\¡rere sure Proof agalnst danger.

To sum up, Ëhe personal securíty of the emperor

\¡ras noÈ a major factor ín hl-s Presence at or absence

from the front, in most situations. once there, however,

his proximity to the actual battlefield may have been

conditioned by the necessity to preserve hls lÍfe and was

thus an important faeËor ln his l-mmediate response to the

demands made upon his behavlour. The form of safety measures

was only rnodified to the needs of the campaign front ín

terms of quantity raËher Ëhan the nature of procedure.

- 23lt -

CHAPTER TEN : THE OFFICERS OF THE PRAETORIAN GUARD.

The princípal ídea to be explored 1n thís section

is that the role of the offícers of the praetorian guard

(other than the prefect(s)) was Ëhe most imporËant of all

in the emperorts security system.

One of the most vague areas of awareness about the

guard is that of the speeifíc role of the offícers, of the

centurions and tribunes, in security duties. Reputatíon

assigns the guard as a whole or the praetorlan prefects, ín

parËicular, a role at times siníster ín imperial history.l

The officers are not promlnenË ín thís picture and their role

does requíre some reassessment.

IÈ would be valuable to establish from the first

a relatívely clear picËure of Ëhe numbers of men to whom we

are referring. Assuming a base of Èen guard cohortsr2 th"."

r^rere ten tribunes and sixty centuríons from that force

available to the emperor at any tíme. Each day one cohort

v/as responsible for duty as excubiae troops aË the palace,

therefore placing at leasË one tribune and six centurions

at hís irnmediate disPosal .

Nevertheless, iË ís elear that the emperor could

uËilise more if he wished. Several instances poínt to the

posstbilíty that on certain types of occasions furËher

1 v. R. Syme. Revíew of M. DurrY.JRS. 29, I939r PP. 242 ff..

Les Cohortes Prétoriennes.

2 On numbers, v. Durry, op. cit., ch. 1. pp' 9 - 11' and

ch. 3, passlm; also SYme, íbídem'

-235-

offícers were indeed present, in particular oËher tribunes'

At the Palatine games in A.D ' 4J_, aÈ least two tribunes and

an índ.eterminable number of centurions are present' all

ínvolved ín the ploÈ (q.v. app' (13))' It was evídently

Ëheir role to secure personally the route which Gaius vlas to

take. They, rather than the Germani (nevertheless present'

followingthelitterbearers),performthísessentialsecur-

íty task. Of all Ëhe securíty forces present on that day'

they move ín the closest proxírniËy to the t*nttot'3 The

Plsonían conspiracy of A'D' 65 provides the second example'

One plan suggested Èhat the guard officers ' including tribuní

(Tac. Ann. 15. 53), rush to kill the emperoÏ as he was pinned

down by a petítioner. They were obviously the closest pers-

onnel to hím (q.v. aPp. (23))' At the Juvenile games'

offícers had been presenÈ in greaÈer number, similarly (Tac'

Ann. L4. 15). Other than at the spectacles' there are few

references Ëo such Ptottdt""'4

Nevertheless, these examples point to the potential

usage of large numbers of officers and to the security funct-

ionofthesemen.NotonlydotheyliaisewiËhandco_ord-

inate the activiÈíes of rankers. They are also most prominent

3 On crowd control, v.infra.

p. 74 arrd n. 6; also PP ' 257 ff ,

4 NoËe Nerots use of officers while he performed on stage'

an extraordinary and humillating task iÈ seemsr 9.v.Durry, op. cit., pp. 276 f, 279' Note also the presence

of several tribunãs with Galba at the palace on 15 /L|694.D., Tac. Hist. 1. 31. The siËuation is unusual'

j¿

{

;

,t

È-236-

among the ínnermost circle of the emperorts immedíate

atLendants when he is actíve in public'

Other areas of public contacÈ offer examples in

r¿hich offícers play a key role or apPear in unusual numbers'

At palace banquets it is officers who police points at whích

access is controlled.5 ,a is they who are sought by Tiberius

as hís personal escorË when he \^Ias to enter Ëhe curía, a

locatíon in which by tradition no armed force \^7as to enter.6

They seem Ëo have done so under caligula and claudius. of

the securiÈy personnel acceptable to the emperor, they were

the most acceptable to others in a social sense' Further'

they were a small, ídentífiable and easily managed group of

proven experíence and Èoughness' Indeed, their role may ofËen

have been more Ëhan the securing of the emperorts person. As

was the case wíth the officers of the legíons (e.g' Tac' Ann'

2.L2,Tac.Hist.3.54),ËheirexperÍencemadethemexcell-

enË advisers and sources of ínformatl-on'

EvensuchacursoryintroductiontotheacËivities

and numbers of those officers attendíng the emperor strongly

suggests that they were highly valued in a variety of roles'

It is our task to describe and inËerpret these roles as far

as possible.

Firstly,itisvaluabletorecallthatthepraetorian

officers owed much to thelr predecessors in the Republican

legions. Both in the Republic and under the emperors' ceiË-

¡

it

'l

II

I

I

I

ât;il

fl

5

6

v

v

ch

ch

, PP'

r PP'

tzI f..

133 f.6

6

-tI

,t

Þ- 237

urlons ín parÈicular played a crucial role ín traíning neI^7

troops, maintaíning díscipline and implementing the orders

of higher officers. The élíte capabllities of such men

.7could be put to good use as spy-cum-assassans.

The centurionate was also a focal point for exper-

lenced rankers. Capable veterans who chose to re-enlisÈ

evocati were often promoted then to the rank of centurion.

The rank of centurion itself was a major social stepping

stone for those with arnbítíons for upward mobilfty.

The legionary cerituríonate was not merely a model-

for the guard officers, however. The very source of the

first praetorian guard and íts officers in 27 B.C. must have

been the triumviral legions of Augustus. Connections lTere

to be naintained thereafter wíÈh movement in bofh directions.S

Praetorian offícers are surely mosË renor¿ned as

executioners of the emperorts more gruesome orders, They

carríed out mosË frequently the executions of upper class

figures, whether overt or covert' presumably aíded by a forceq

of troops.' Similarly, they were used Èo supervise the

exíle of dangerous members of the imperial faml-ly and Ëo see

Èo theír deaËhs in the "rrd.10 Agrippína Ëhe Younger alone

7 e. ch. 3. PP. 29 f.-

B This process ls discussed aË length by Durry. My ËreaÈment

of this issue is on pp- 254 f.f ínfra'9 e.g. Tac. Ann. L4. 59, a centurlon backed by his rnaniple;

Tac. Ann . 14.64 (Octavia); Tac. Arrrr.. 15'60ff (Plautius;Seneca)

10 e.g. Agrippa Postumus, Suet. Tib. 22.1' Suet' Aug' 65' 3 f(dãscríbing the confinement of Julia the Elder also), Tac.Ann. 1.6; Agríppina the Elder, Suet. Tib.53. 2,64;octavia, Tac. Ann. 14. 64. These are the most notoriousexamples.

I

¡,t

ü,ll

1

II

I

I

I

dåìif,ì

,!r,'

-238-

seems to have had suffícient influence with the guard'

of all those killed by Èhe emperors, to have necessítated

the use of non-praetorian executioners (Tac' Ann' L4' 7)'

That such qualms díd not exisË elsewhere is demonstrated

by the paÈhetic appeal of Octavía Ëo the highly revered

Germanicus, her uncle, before she was killed by praeËorians

(Tac. Ann. L4. 64). In certain instances' the emPeror sent

an ímperíal freedman to supervise the executíon' notably in

the cases of Messalína (Tac. Ann. 11. 37 f) and Rubellius

Plautus (Tac. Ann. 14. 58 f)' It was rarely thought to be

necessary. Praetorian guard officers, in person' are un-

questionably the prlncipal hatchetmen for the emperorrs most

crucial líquidatíons. It ís they who remove potential sources

of opposition or eliminate an opponent apparenËly guilty of

conspiracY.

It comes as no surprise, therefore' that the use of

atríbunetoescorthomeanunpopulardefendanËinasenator-

ialtrialcouldbeinterpretedasaslnisÈeractintheeyes

ofbystanders(Tac.Ann.3.14).Thisillustratesaparticular

aspecË of the effectíveness of praetorian officers ' Many

would be well known to the public and their reputation would

go before them (c.f. Jos. AJ 19. 53). To some degree' they

should be compared to those legionary centurions r¡ell knornm

for their abilíties as assassir,"'11 Further' the role of

11 Examples of such officers sent to assassinate opponents

during a civil war period and well knor'¡n for thelr skillsdo exist, ch. 3. pp. 29 f t' 'I¡fith the praetorian guard

no single officer sÈands out in regard to such abílity'All prãsumably had similar skills and experíence, arisingfrom Èheir díLciplinary duties, ln part' for the legíonsand Ëhe guard, e.g. tac' Ann' 1' 29 f, Tac' Hist' 1' 85'

i

.iù

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Þ_239-

praetoïian offlcers as interrogators and Ëorturers will

have been Public k,owledg"'12

The ability to ùse víolence l-n fulfílurent of the

emperor's orders was thus a pre-requísite for the job' It

madethesementhetoolsofthepolíticalStabiliËyofthe

régíme, a function írnplied ín the very existence of a milit-

ary unit about the person of the emperor' YeÈ' it would be

simplísttc and incorrect to see officers merely as Ëhugs'

called upon to act occaslonally' Their role in the mainten-

ance of securlty is more complex than Èhat'

At the least r^7e must see them as indíviduals ruith

distinct politieal consciences ín many cases' Ambition on

behalf of a claimant more suitable, the abuse of power by

an emperor in regard to hts subjects and even personal

humiliation could all motivate one or more officers to betray

theirtrust.ourmostvívidillustraÈionsofthepoËential

índependenceofguardofficerscomefromtheactiontheydíd

in fact take in a number of plots' At the same time' these

focus aËtention upon the critical imporËance of routine serv-

ices performed by thesemenin the protecËion of the emperor'

To delíneate tftese is our aim'

I¡

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-248-

Four partieular íncidents are illuminating' The

successful ploËs against Gaius Caligula in A'D' 41 (q'v'

app. (13)) and Caracalla in A'D' 2L7 (q'v'app' (4S¡¡' and

the unsuccessful plots againsË Nero in A.D. 65 (q.v. app'

(23)) and Septimius Severus / CatacaLla in A'D' 205 (q'v'

app. (43) ), all owed theír crítical nature to the role ofl1o

offícers of the praetorian guard' The functíons of these

men at these times \^tere to secure safe passage' to supervise

access whíle travelling or at the games, or again to super-

inËend aspects of the internal palace security at night Ëírne '

Consequently, all are able to exploit the proximity they

have to the emperorts person and the virtual monopoly of

force Ëhey have there, despite the presence of custodes'

The comparatlvely low number of such examples of

plots ínvolving praetorían offlcers agaínst the emperor prov-

ídesagoodstartingpointforadiscussíonofthekeyvirtue

of any security officer, his loyalty'

Itísvaluabletorememberthesimplefactthatboth

emperor and offlcers \^7ere human beíngst \n/arts and all'

personallty clashes could not always be avoided, although a

wiseemperorwouldeitherchoosecarefullyhíssecurityoffíc-

ers or remove one seen to be "ns"ltab1"'13 Gaius Caligula

þ-

l

11o For the importanÈ role of prefects in these plotsr v'P'149in

13Periodsoftransitl-onafterthesuccessionofanewemperorare most notable for this. An emperor accedlng through viol-ence to his predecessor usually rel-nforced the principlethatthi-swasundesírablebyexecutingthoseresponsible,e.g. Claudius, CD 60.3' 4 (c'f'CD 59' 29' l); Vitellíus'Suet. Vít. lO.f; frajan and the mutínous Praetorians' CD

68. 5. 4; Septimius Severus, CD 75' 1'1' At its most exÈreme'

thíscouldinvolvetotalreconstructionoftheguardfollow_irrg tfr" demobilisation of a previously corruPË one' notablyin"A.o. 69/70 (Suet. ViË. 10, Suet' Vesp' 8) and A'D' 193

(fn.cont. rd next Page)

fxa "

-24L-

represenËs Ëhe folly of doíng neither, at its extreme'

The manner in whíeh he humlliated the tribune cassius

Chaerea ín public must be seen as one climactic factor

contrlbuËing to the faÈal sequence of events in January,

A.D. 41. Símilarly, thwarted ambition could have serlous

consequences. As a result, the emperorts dírect' ultimate

responsibility for the appointment of offícers of the rank

of centurion and above Ï{as a vítal securlÈy function in it-

self.ThosewhornissedouÈandwerebíttercouldbedanger_

ous, as Caracalla discovered in A 'D ' zfi 'L4

Beyond these simple' personal emotions' ít is self

evídent Èhat the general lmage projected by the emperor rÀras

of crucial importance. The praetorían guard r¡las a míl1tary

insÈitutionandsoiÈsofficerscanreasonablyT:eexpected

to have held in high regard the typical míl1tary virtues' The

efforÈs to project such an image are clearly visible at times'

as ís the effect when the emperor allows the projecÈlon to

decay r"*ark"blY.15

Such stereoÈyped behaviour apart' the efforts of the

emperoïs to secure the allegiance of the guard seem to have

been successful overall. Although llnked in many ways to the

legíons at large, the guard hlas encouraged Ëo relish its own

élitísm. The presÈige of service close Ëo the emperor' the

fn. 13 conË.td. (C.D. 75. I f, Herodian 2. 13)' Even withpeaceful accession' an emperor might wísh to assure hímselfof conÈrol of his guard'

L4 On Promotíon, v. P. 250 ff infra'

15 On rn:ilitaristic image, v' ch' 9' pp ' 214 f '

-242-

valuable prívi leges of an urban garrison éltte and the

extravagant donatives and larger pay set them apart mater-

ially and spiríÈually from fellow soldiers (c'f' Tac' Ann'

L. L7). All would be aware that they owed their unique

status to their role as the emperorls guard' This system

was reinforced by rítualístic devices such as the oath of

1oy"1ty16 and emperor worship linked to reveïence for military

TheextenttowhichoffícerssharedinthísSystem

of motivaÈion, the extenÈ to which ít was effective with

them, can be assessed by examtning the contrasting attltudes

of rankers and officers in evidence at certaín times ' The

loyalty of rankers r^las usually totally devoted' even if their

purpose was ascribed a little cynícally sn occasíon to a

desire to preserve for themselves exploitlve licence and

privilege (e.g. CD 73. 1. 1)' Perhaps with more opportuníties

to see behlnd the scenes and certainly more expo'sed' Èhrough

thelr greater proximíty to his person' íf an emperor acted in

humíliatíng fashion in public, the same cannot be said for

officersatvariousperiodsrwithconsequenthostilitybetween

them and rank and file being quite manj-fest'

L6 The oath is discussed by M. Hammond ' The Ëransmisslon ofthe powers of the Roman emperor from the death of Nero inA.D. 68 to that of Alexander severus ín A.D. 235. M4AR' -24'Lg56, p. 67. The development of the oath to cover the lmp-

eríai iamily as a whole occurred ín the Jullo-Claudían era'yet oÈher factors meanË Agrippina Ëhe Younger alone \^/as not

tiff.¿ by the praetorlan guard, v' PP ' 237 f supra'

For the association of lmperial l-mages and mílítary síg+a'

v. Durry, op. cít., ch. 11, pp' 310 ff; a notable example

occurs wíth the final desertion of allegf-ance to Galba'

Tae. Hist. 1.41

T7

ml- litum studia.eo siqno rnanifest aln Othonem cmnium

-243-

It must be stressed that the evídence for this

phenomenon is patchy and can often be explained by the cir-

cumstances of a particular period' An extreme example is

the highly unstable period of about A'D' 64 - 70' Dis-

satisfaction by officers at Nerots conduct seems to have

evolved slowly (c.f. Tac' Ann' 15' 67 f) ' Cornplicity of

several in the Pisonían conspiracy of A'D' 65 was climactic'

TheseverepurgeÈofollowwíllhavemadesurvlvingofficersa

little edgy. The course of decay in Nerots reign thereafËer

is r¿ell knovm. The effect upon the morale of the officers

seems Ëo have been considerable. Seeing the inevítable ín

A.D.68rtheyweresufficientlydísaffectedtorefuseNerots

request (sic) to accompany him 1n his flight ( Suet' Nero 47)

and also Ëo allow their commander, Nyrnphidius Sabinus' to

engineer the Èransfer of allegíance to G"lb".18 The tale does

not end Ëhere. The rankers had enjoyed licence under Nero

and revered his memory' The officers seem' in contrast Èo

have found in the stern and experienced Galba a man they could

Ïespect.Thegrowingriftbetweenofficersandsoldierswas

openly expressed soon after when all offícers \^lere forbidden

access to the ascendant Otho in the cas tra Draetoria on

fanuary 15, A.D. 69 (Tac' Híst' 1' 36' c'f ' 1' 82)' Indeed'

Otho had come Ëo po\^7er ín unique fashion, undermining their

The word "allow" ís surely accurate' officers could easily

"beÈray" their commander if he vlas not acting in the best

inÈerests of the empe'ror' as the downfall of Plautian 1n

A.D . 205 demonstrates (q .v. app . (43) ) . This T¡tas exceedtnglyuseful as a cross-check upon the praetorían prefect, therefore.The abandonment of Nero, here, htas comPensated for the rank-ers by a promísed donative (CD 64 ' 3 ' 3) '

18

-244-

authoríty by tapping a groundswell of disaffection against

Galba among the rankers. Shortly afËerwards, urban garrlson

troops revolted against officers when it r^las suspected that

they were secretly supplyíng a hostile senatorial faction

to depose their or¿n oÈho (q.v. app. (26)). In the same

year, Vítellius \nlas to decide that the decay of the of ficer

and troops relationship had gone too far and so ordered a

ËoËal reconsËructíon of the guard with troops firmly loyal

to hím (n. 13).

Further points aríse out of that complex períod'

Firstly, Èhe mutíny of the Praetorians r¡ras partly motivated

by routine ruthlessness and cruelty of the officers (Tac'

Hlst. 1. 80). Secondly, iË is clear that Nero had done

little to maintain the respect of his officers ' As with

the populatíon at large in this trad'ítlonally rnllitarisËíc

society, officers expected military virÈues to be upheld' aÈ

least, if not develoPed'

Other such períods of instability' officer unrest

and ranker hostilíty occur in A'D ' 40 - 4L' 96' 1-92 - 3'

2L7, 222. üIíth an emPeror who flagranÈly flouted norms of

expected conducË, his death resulted from a series of events

created by his ówn lack of control and of insighÈ inÈo the

mechanics of the soclety he lived in' This ís a further

illustration of the lmportance of the personality of each

emperor in government and hís relatíonship hTith his o\Àln

bodyguard.' The point, surely' is that officers were ob-

duraËely loyal to an emperor who behaved within reasonable

_245-

bounds of conduct.

One very ímportant asPect of this perlod is that the

officersl9 ,.r. able to establísh links wíth members of the

senatoríalorder.I{ithextremedissatisfaction,ofcourse'

an alt,ernatíve candidate for the princípate would be needed,

one sËill P ramus ínter pares. The rlgid socíal and political

structure of the Roman world necessitated a senator ' Galba

is the paradigm of Èraditional virtues required (e'g' Suet'

GaLba L2). How could such contact be made?

Any intense connection between officers and members

of the senaËorial order would be construed as dangerous' fn

fact, this I^ras an area of constant imperial'vigÍlance, if

not outright paranoia at times. There are significant

illustratíons of hostíle reaction to acËual or suspecËed

interference with the urban garrísons, notably in the cases

of the Germaní in A.D. 69 (Suet. Galba 12. 2), the summary

execution of Caecína Alíenus ln A.D. 79 (SueË. Tít. 6; apP.

(27)) and the allegedly repeated aËtempts of Crassus under

Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian (q.v. app. (3f¡¡. Even if these

lnclude attempts to frame an individual, the use of such a

char.ge ís instructive as to lts extent of public crédibtlity.

The spectre of the realíty wíll have haunted rnany an emperor

r9 some distinction is necessary here. Not all officers were

clÍsloyal . Immediately following the clearise of Burrus theguard wil-1 have helcl appointees ínfluenced both by

iigellinus and Fae.ius Rufus. The recomrnendatio's of thelaiter are likely to have produced those r'-mplicated in A.D. 65.

-246-

and caused hím to lend a xeady ear to such a charge' The

manner in which Otho aÈtained l-nfluence I¡las surely extra-

ordínary and that in itself perhaps explains why his gift

of an aureus to each guard at dinners he held was tol-erated

(Suet. Otho 4. 2, c.f. Tac. Hist. 1. 24)' The officers

(and prefect) were the more l-mpoTtant object of attentlon

because of their roles as execuËive adminisËrators of the

emperort s household trooPs.

Themostinsídiousanddelicat'eexamPleswehaveof

alleged ínËerference, hoüIever, are by members of the imperial

farní1y.20 The brtghtest insËance is that of Agrippina the

younger. she secured a basis of her po!,Ier, after her marriage

to claudius by manoeuvring her own appoíntees to control

officer and prefecÈ levels of the guard and so shutting out

Britannicus ín Nerors favour at Claudíusr death in A.D. 54

(Tac. Ann. L2. 4L - 2, esp.). At the zenith of her own

influence, her escort included both Germ¿nl and praetorians'

whílst her Pr lvate salutatio íncluded officers (Tac. Ann'

13. 18). At the first weakening of her l-nfluence' she could

easily parry a charge of interference wíÈh garrison troops.

That the charge associated her with her own nomínated prefect,

Burrus, is a reflectíon of her considerable influence with

that.corps.Thecircumstancesofhermurderrfinallyrreveal

Vespaslan devísed one solutlon to the problem, giving theprelecture to his son Títus in order to secure the fLrsÈera of the new dynasty. Much hostlliÈy v/as aroused by

Títusf methods, however, 9.v. Suet' Tít' 6' 1' 7'

20

- 241

the loyalty she inspired. Soon afterwards, offícers re-

quired prompting to reassure Nero about an act he could

not completely rely upon them to carry ouÈ (Tac' Ann'

?1L4.7,10).--For members of the ímperíal family, Ëherefore'

contact wíÈh guard officers \^las relatívely easy' Although

moredifficult,desperatepeoplewillhavedaredtomakean

approach Ëo offícers, if it hlas necessary to the success of

their plans. trüe have seen how dif f icult it \^Ias to establish

who your frlends were in a society whose legal system \^7as

based upon the substantial incenËíves of private delatíon'22

Neverthelèss, there r^Iere opportunities for communication.

Basic as a method wíIl have been Ëraditional patron/

client relatlonships. The links between sejanus and the

aristocracy are instructive, although perhaps a little exËra-

,1orðj:nary.tJ That plots did occur ínvolvíng praetorian

officers and members of the aristocracy demonstrates that

establishíng línks between them cannot have been too

difficult, although approached with extreme caution' That

línks did exist is suggested by the sole legal atËemPt - Ëo

othersoftheimperialfamllyassociatedl-nsomewaywithan actual or possíble interference with mílitary groups

include Agrippa PosÈumus (q.v. app. (r))' Agrippina theElder (Tac. Ann. 4. 67), octavia (q'v' app' (22))'Domítian (Suet. Tit. 9. 3).

v. ch. 3, PP. L7 1, 45.

Most notably wíth Blaesus' governor of the legions ofpannonia at the very crucial moment of TÍberíust accession(Tac. Ann. 1. 16); v.r e.g. R' Sealey' The polítical

attachments of L. Aelius Sejanus. Phoenix. 15, I96]-t 97 - Ll4.Such blatanË links will have been advísably strong at thíscrucial point but probably not so in later years ' The rat-íonale of the equestrian career paÈÈern was in opposition

Ëo such links, of course' Further olì Blaesus' v'n' 34 ír.fxa'

2L

22

23

-248-

prevent ttsoldíersrr attending Ëhe salutationes of senators

(Suet. Claud. 25. L).24 In some T^Iays' the difficulty may not

havebeeninestablishíngthelinksbutratherinclarífying25

a similar hostile purpose toward the emperor''- The measure of

elaudius seems not to have survived his reign and would have

2(been very dífficulr to police.'o The possibílity for links

to be formed aË points during t\e workíng day is present'

although contact beËween soldíers and officers' on the one

hand, and amicíron the other, at such times as salutatl-o

jurisdictional activities and other public duÈies will have

been open to the scrutiny of oËhers' The mechanisms of

contact thus remain obscure' That detaíled contact occurred

we have many other indications' The relationship between

Afranius Burrus and Seneca ís surely only a more prominent

example of the links which could develop between prefects and

amicí. Sírnílarly, the assassins of Dornitian and Commodus were

able to prime aristocraËic candidates to succeed' Interestíng-

Ly, the more powerful of such alliances could not be sustained

without the presence of one or other partner' Seneca soon

24 Trre manner of Caligulats assassínation musË have left a

deep impre"sion upãn the mind of Claudius' Desplte the

execution of implicated officers (n' 13) ' Claudíus seems

to have ignored the role of many aristocrats' c'f' Tiberius

over Ëhe clemens aff.air (q.v. app. (6)) and to a lesserextent after Sejanus (e'g' ea"tllit"s' Tac' Ann' 6' 30)'Thls decr.. luorrid advertise Claudiust nervousness to all.

25 v. ch. 3. p. 18, referring to Jos' AJ 19' 51'

26Thosewhowouldpoliceitwerethemselvesthetargetofthe measure, q.v. ch' 3, PP ' 27 f' Nevertheless' it does

demonstrate thís type of contact as a source of ínformaËion

upon senaEors' c.f' Tac' Hist' 1' 85'

-2&9-

fell from influence after the death of Burrus (Tac. Anr,l .

14. 51 f). Equally, arlstòcratic connections of the mosË

notoríous prefects, such as Sejanus and Perennis, suffered

in purges after the deaths of those men.

The officers of both centurion and tríbune ranks

clearly, therefore, are subject to the influence of aristo-

crats, although Ëo what extent independently of the praetor-

ian prefect ís problemaËical. Our four key examples of

officer involvement (4.D. 4L, 65, 205, 2L7; v' p' 240)

also involve a praetorian prefect ín each case ' Thls does

not exclude the possibility that officers could be approached

índependent-ly. It suggests, perhaps, that for a conspiracy to

succeed a large cross-secËíon of prefecË and officer groups

at once was desirable and, therefore, that the supervision

of offícers by the prefect was an ímportant proce "t '27

Nevertheless, thls does not detract from the essenrial poínt of

those incídents. All hrere so dangerous precisely because Ëhe

security functions of these officers, rather than the prefect,

vrere not only círcumvented but also thaÈ they themselves T¡Iere

involved. They were the conËrollers of security at the most

immedíate physical proximity to the emperor'

Thekeyímportanceofthesemeninroutinemalnten-

anceofpersonalsecurityisclear.Itbecomesobvious,in

consequence' that the emperor needed to be able to exert

27 v. ch. 11, Passim.

-25n-

relíable control over this group of men' A number of 1n-

herent asPects of the system offered aid'

Promotions to Èhe positíon of tríbune and centurlon

intheguard(andindeedtoposítíonsoutsideit)weredeterm-

íned in a welr regulated fashion. Regular reports on candid-

at'e.s were handed to Ëhe central secret'ariate by ",,p..io'".28The epístolary reconunendatíons of influential friencls in hígh

circlesplayedtheirpart,underlyingthecontinuedimportance

of the patron/client- system in military, as r.rell as poliËical '29Il_Ie.

The implicaËions of this system of appointmenL are

very interestlng from the persPectives boËh of the emperor

and any potentlal oPponents' The emperor was ultimately

responsible for every promotíon of centurlon level and above'

That in ítself ís an lnvaluable indícation of the importance

attached by Augustus and every successor to a sound control

of the ídentity of new officers' This process will have

-31applied all the more so to hís bodyguards'-' As a bonus' in

view of the rePoÏts' personal recommendatíons and the obser'vat-

30

28

29

30

31

ts of the Promotion system' v'p. For the r^7ay this informationin an irregular critical situat-

y in Pannonia in A'D' 14 (Iac' Ànn'

1.44).e.g. Plin. Epp. III'8' However' \¡re cannot be sure that such

Ínfluence will have been brought to bear: for candidates for

positíons in the praeEorian guard' c'f' E' Birley'Equestrian

officers of the nàrnan Army. Durham university Journal Xr.

On the bureaucratic asPec

ch. 3. P. 22 and t' 17 es

could be surmnoned for use

Íon, note its availabilit

1949 - 50. P. L2.

v. M. Grant The A.rmy of the Çaesars ' 1974' p' 74'

For the choice of commanders of custodçs' v' ch' 6' pp' 97-100

A further illusËration of the roæñe-e importance of this proe-

ess is the deLiúãrate choice of mediocre officers at tímes of

ínstability, the civil war of A'D' 69 providing the besr

exarnple in rhe choices of Vitellíus' Tac' IIisÈ ' 2'92

-25L-

ions of himself and close aídes, the emperor will also have

had some invaluable inslght into the complex paËronal net-

worksbeingestablishedasthebackgroundtohisaPpoíntments.

Any doubt by the emperor in thís area could be líkely to

prevent aPPointment.

One may question Èo lfhaË extent the emperor super-

vised the entire decision making process and consequently

askofthenatureofanylínksbetr¿eenofficersand.members

of the cenËral secretariate' Even Ëhe most conscientíous

emperor will have found ít difficult to scrutinise all re-

ports for all promotions' r¡7e may suspe"t'32 Yet wtth appoint-

merits to guard officershíps more care must surely have been

taken, even on a statistlcal basís'33 Men of leadership

abilíÈy, loyalty and Ëhe abílity to follow orders carefully

wí1l have been considered'

32

33

v.F.Millar-Emperoratwork'JRS'57,L967'pp'9-L9for perspecÈives on Ëhis situatíon'

If we assume relative fluidity of movement both in legionsand praetorian guard' as an overwhelmlng amount of epi-grapirical evidelce indicates in career patterns' certainî"ty g.rr"ral calculaËions are posstble' llorking on the

base of 30 legions, each with 60 centurions and severaltribunes, there will have been about 1'800 - 2'000 officerscommissíoned at any one poinË in tl-me' If each 1s trans-fered about every iorrr y""rs (q.v. Bírley, oP. cit., pp.

10, 19), the empåror needed to approve about 400 - 500

moves each year. nlr",, allowing that this is a sLmplisticstatistical calculatíon, ít l-s apParent Ëhat a huge amount

of work is involved for the emperor and his staff' although

manywouldmeanonlythe''rubberstamping''ofrecommendat-ions by superiors. On the same basís, only 15 or so out of60 - 70 guard offícers would have to be considered annually'thus enabling greater care Èo be taken over the choice'especíally in ttre cholce of the important tribunates '

-252-

The emperorts freedom of selection is in doubt at

Ëimes, however. The role of key farntly members stands out'

Tiberius feated for his own safety on Rhodes because of

visíts to hím by cenÈurions whose promotíons he had secured

(Suet. Tib. l.2.3). It would be interesting to learn of

Tiberius I role ín the appoíntment of praetorian offícers

in the laËer years of Augustusf life34 and, sirnilarly, whether

or not Ëhere was any such background to the popularlÈy of

Germanicus with the g.r"rd.35 our best attested example of

such ínfluence remaíns that of Agríppína the Younger, although

a similar role might be suspected for Julía Domna' wífe of

SepËimius Severus.36 succession for Nero r,rras facilítated by

the mastery Agríppína had secured over the uppermost

echelons of the praetorian guard in Ëhis manner (Tac' Ann'

12.4L-2,68f).Theroleofsuchappointmentswascertainly

34

35

Theappointmentoffatherandsonasjoint'prefects(Seiusand sãJanus) and of Blaesus, uncle of Sejanus' as govern-

or of Pannonia point to this process ' There is no evid-enceofinfluencewithofficersbelowÈhatlevelintheguard for this períod (c.f' Agrippina, Tac' Ann,' L2' 41-) 'áttfrorrgtr ít seems likely ín order to secure such an un-

precedented transiËion of po\Àler '

If he \^tas riot able Ëo influence appointment, Germanicus

certainly attained immense popularíty with the guard as

a whole i..g. Suet. Cal. 4)' IIe had been escorted by two

praetorian ãohorts since the death of Augustus at the lat-äst, at which time he became joint heir wíth Drusus' son

of íiberius (q.v. pp. 2OB Íf )'It would be valuable tolearn whether o, ,rãl guard units h7.ere rotated in this serv-íce, thus allowing "lt to become famLliar with hÍm' c'f'n. 62 infra.The continued concessíon of a praetorían escorÈ to her

by Macrinus in Ã.D. 2L7 - 2]-,B (CD 78 ' 23' 2 f) was in-tended, perhaps' Ëo prevent suspicion about his ovm rolei' C"rá"àlta'ã murdei (q.v. app. (45)). Unllke Agripplna'however, it had not been necessary for her to manipulate

appointments to secure the accession of her son in the firstplace.

36

_253_

a long term factor 1n securitY.

Exanples in which the connecEions of officers and urin-

isters of the sec.retal:iat acted in concert against the emperor

suggest strongly the different po\nlers that boËh could exer-

cise and equally the need for both to be trustl'Torthy and

well treated by the emperor. Our three instances all result

from a similar conjunction of clrcumstances' if we are to

trusË our sourc.".37 Callistus in A.D. 4L, Parthentus ín

A.D. 96 and Eè:Ilectusln A.D. L92 wete all ínvolved in plots

to kill their masters at a time when the emperor was deeply

suspicious of all around hím, consequenÈly acting in such a

h7ay as to lower the morale of groups such as Ëhe most lmport-

ant liberti cubícularii in the last Ëwo examples) and praet-

orian officers. The elirnination of key líberti such as

Epaphroditus (Suet. Dom. 14, c.f. SueÈ' Nero 49), jusÈ as

purges of rhe praetorían offlcer structure at unstable times,

testlfies to the importance of both in security. The role of

Partheníus ín A.D. 96 is our most ínstructíve example (q.v.

app. (30)). The daily línks between freedmen ministers and

praetorían officers are difficult to elucidate. Liaison and

co-operatíon wíll have been necessary for Ëhe maintenance of

peripheral security both at níght and duríng the d"y'38 To

what extenË orders to the guard officers \n7ere transmiÈted

37 The simílaríty of events in A.D. 96 and L92, in partlcul-etr; is suspicious, suggestíng a story concocted tojustífY the assassination.

38 v. ch. 6. PP. 106 f.

-254-

by minísters of the secretariat as a matËer of routine it is

difficult to say. Narcissus so ordered the execution of

Messalína ín A.D. 48, but in quite extraordinary círcum-

stances.39 RouËine orders for the daily cohorË of excubiae

are llkely to have been given by the emperor as the password

was sought by the tribune, whíle the prefect is likely to have

briefedhisofficersregulaxly.Theconjunctíonofthepo\^7erS

of liberti and praetorians agalnst the emperor occurs only

when he gave most groups common cause to feel threatened'

Normallyrthesetvro\nlereintendedtocross-checkeachoÈherrs

activiËies, to some exÈerit 'It is clear, therefore, that the officers of the guard could be

ínflueneed by others, either by those responsible for Èheir appointments

or during routine performance of rheir daily tasks. NeverÈheless, it

remains that they performed their duËies with loyalty and skílI through-

out the majority of the period under consideration' Before attempting

to assess the exËent to which the praetorían prefect !,¡as resPonsible

for Èhis ín the next chapter, vle must. discuss these duties in specifíc

detaí1.

Durry's chapter on the offlcers4O í" c'o"c'erned

primarlty to esuablish the general importance of the ínter-

relationship of praetorian and legionary offícers for the

39 Tac. Ann. 11.emperor (Tac.to the extentfecË for thatmaY have beenËhat basis.

37. funid the contradictory conduct of the

Ann. 11 . 34 fÐ, Narclssus had selzed povler

of having hímself appointed praeËorlan pre-day only (Tac. Ann. 11' 33) ' The officersreteivíng his orders wíthout question on

40 v. DurrY, oP. ciË', ch' 5'

-255-

spreading of Roman ways through the provínces ' That process

is cerÈainly signíficant for ímperial security' Once the

path of promotíon had become more or less regularised' iË

meanÈ that officers, the Ëríbunes in particular, had an

imnense breadth and depth of experience in both clvil and

milítarymatËers,boÈhíntheprovincesandatRome'enabling

them Èo understand the complexlty of many situatíons for secur-

ity purpo".".41 Again, assumÍng the long term effect of the

flowthrough of centuríons and tribunes to the legions' every

provínclal governor will have had highly trained former praet-

orian officers ln executíve, administrâËive control of his

legion(").42 Thls will have inhibÍted many a thoughÈ -of

attemPting to ínterfere with the troops' by such'serrators'

Also, the ernperor had men on the spot whom he knew personally

and could rely upon Ëo be loyal to him' Each of these men

wouldbeaperfectsourceofinformationfortheregularly

arrívlng and departing couriers of the cursus Publicus '

4lContraríwise'lüemaywonderaboutthelevelofLrainlngofthe ranket". Cu"tã"it" t"tt élite' of course' often serving

intheurbancohortsfírst,forexample.Theyweretrainedby the cream ãi tft" armyrs officers' with lndicaËions thatit could be speclalísed towards urban condiÈlons' viz'decursio-relatedmanoeuvres(p.L46f.)andconËlngencyffitot "ti;;;

(w.tzl ¡¡ ) ' Yet, this was somewhat less

demanding Èhan legionary se:vice' c'f' Tac' Hist ' 2' 19

Tac. Ann. 1. 17.

42 'ÍhLs is related to P raetorian domínance of the prirnípílateand particularly of the highly presÈlglous Position of

discussed full-Y bY DurrY, oP' cit. ,orimipllus bispp. L4O - L46. presence of such men at Rome

iàn tribunate, but also ín theThe

only ín the Praetor

is seen notnumerus

orimipilarum'supernumeraryily under theand availableThe positioncenturY A.D.

q.v. Durry, id. ' P. 2I f. This grouP ls a

corP s of former legionary primiÞili' temPorar-

cormnand of the P ïaetorian Prefect once more

for specíal tasks before promotion elsewhere'

of raml ilus bís is so focal onlY from the s econd

-256-

Evenmorepracticalandsinlster,t'heyrepreserrtarealsword

of Damocles over the heads of governors ' Any open rebellíon

could see the guílty man executed by one of the offícersl!2,

under his cournand, åt leasÈ in theory'-' Although conclusíve

evidence Ëhat the implications of the system worked precisely

in this fashíon ís laeking, it does seem to represent a strong

link ín the chaín of cross-checks used by emperors to inhibiÈ

senatoríalgovernorsfromenËertairringtreacherousdesigns.

However, it is at those times when these men are

servíngËheemperorathissidethattheyareofmostimport-

ance to his personal security' Durry fails to discuss in

depth the security funcÈions they perform' leaving us to ínfer

mosË of them from his sectíon on the life and dutl-es of the

ttltpraeËorían soldier.++ The routine duËl-es and fatlgues of the

guard are there ímagined and established' Theír functions ín

regard to the emperorts security are our prímary concern'

In essence, the majorlty of their securlty Ëasks are

derived from the central function of supervf-síng access to

the emperor's person when he is ín public' It is in this role

ÈhattheiÏpotentialforvíolentreactiontocriticallncídents

ls put to best use ín a routine manner'

43 Note the case of Avídius Cassius, supremo of the easternpart of the emP ire j-n A.D. 175. Having revolÈed on the

spurious rumour of the death of Marcús, Aurelíus (q.v.app. (7I)), he was ass asslnated bY a centurion and a decurion

once this was known Èo be false (CD 7L. 27. 2 f). It would be

inËeresting to know Ëhe

Interesting Parallels o

c.f. Tac. Hist. 1. 12.

rank and origín of Èhat centurion.ccur: Suet. Galba 10

44 v. DurrY, oP. clt., ch' 9

liberti

- 251

The proposítion that the officerã-are a crucial

component of the emperorts innermost circle of security must

be qualified, therefore, by stating tl'rat this is so mostly

in the public sphere espite the at tlmes

amblvalent posture of the praetorían guard' as a public and/or

private institution, theír control of access to Ëhe emperor

isofËhataccessbymernbersofthepubliceitherl-npubllc

locations or ori the periphery of the emperorts prívate resi-

d.rr..".45 Naturally, it ls in those areas Ëhat the emperor, his

staffandsupporterswouldperceívethegreatestltkelíhoodof

danger under normal circumstances ' It was at such times that

theemperorhTasexpectedËobemostavailabletohissubjects

andthereinwasthecruxoftheproblemforsecuritypersonnel.

The precise functions of officers ín access control

vary, ín consequence, accordíng to individual locaÈion' the

expectations of the emperorrs subjects and his own whin'

Fínal decision upon the nature of crowd control procedure aË

any one moment seems to have rested with the emperor' l{hat

emerges quite clearly, however, is Ëhat responsibility for

ensuringthatsuchord.erslÀIereexecutedeffectivelywasplaced

squarely on the shoulders of the praetorían offícers present '

ParÈicularly in confined spaces, thís they did personally by

progressing ln the closest proxlmity in advance of the emperor'

Thiswíllhavehadseveraladvantages'mosËímportantlythat

J

,i

È

I

jj

13

45 v. ch. 6, Passim'

_258_

they were ;able to come to the aid of the emperor quickly

since they were the most experienced rnllitary men at this

dlsposal. A1so, they could liaise r¿íth Èhe mass of rank

and file bringing rrp the rear from a posiEicn close to hirn.

one aspect that 1s not too clear ts the relationshlp

of the praetorían officers to the other armed groups close

to the emperorts person. I^Ie do not have enough detailed

informat.ion to establish Ëhe preclse roles each were required

to fulfil. Lictors, of course, march in advance in rítual-

istic fashíon, although their att.ested appearances duríng

Trajanrs reign suggest they had a role to play in conÈrolling

access and, further, that 1t is l1kely thaË the emperor en-

sured that hand picked men held these positions.46 ,fr. Germani,

speculatores and Equites Slngulares fulfilled escort functions

very close to but not inadvance of the emperor' It was more

important for Ëhem to view his actívity' Only the Germani

\¡rere not commanded by praetorian offi """'47 The of ficers

of the guard were also evidently very close to the emperorts

person as he travelled in publíc. As the extraordinary circum-

stances of caligulats assassínatlon would suggest (q'v' app'(13))'

',:

,{

È

I

itI

IïtI

!

I

I

I,,j1

fx

46 For Trajants use of lictors, v' P-1in' Pan' 6f ' 7 anð

23. 3 esp. That they and the "soldiers!' together couldacËívely restrlct contact with the emPeror 1s implied by

thelaËterpassage.Forímperíalinfluenceinthechoiceof lictors, noËe the líctor pEoximus of Trajafi at hls death'a member of the ttp.rffi' R' syme Tacltus'ox. U.P. 1958. P. 240.

47 v. DurrY, oP- ciË., P. 32'

',:

,{

Þ- 259'. -

it was abnormal for custodes or officers to be strung out

as the physícal context there dernanded' To a great extent'

therefore, Ít ís logícal to conclude that Ëhey normally acted

as a cross-checking influence against each other (c'f' Tac'

Ann. 15. 58).

Guard officers, therefore, are directly responsible

for Ëhe control of precautíons taken to safeguard the emperorts

life at the mosË immedíate, Persofial and everyday 1evel. Spec-

ifícally, Ëhey exercise supervision over weapons control near

the emperort s person, just as they are responsible for the

password "y"t"*.48 They see to ít Èhat the emperorts

i

tessera

path of Progress is secured in advance, controlling crowd

movement if that has been ordered and doubtless watchíng out

Lqfor suspicíous conduct.*' They are his guides and in order to

achieve thís effectively they are also ín control of virtually

all naked force near hís person Ëhrough their command of most

50subordinate securíty forces and groups '

EvenwhenËheemperordírectsaccesstobeallowedto

all comers ' \¡7e can lmagine the tnhibitive ef fect of theír

presence very close by and the attentiveness with which they

will have scrutinísed all appllcants' Their ornm role is that

of the praet.orian guard ín microcosm' They oversee and are

ready to react' rather than restrict access direcÈly unless

J

f1

lr

48 On Ëhe nature of weapons controlrv' ch' 6' pp' LL4 fon passr^/ord procedure' v. ch' 6, PP' 105 f '

On crowd control, v. P. 74, n' 6'

The only suggesËion Ëhat the gerrngq! hrere suspect occurs

with thãir ãisbandment' Suet. Galba 12' 2'For the command sËructure, v. ch' 6'pp' 97 - 100'

I

49

50

',1

,{

È-260-

that ls the wish of the emperor. An lndex of the lmportance

of their presence nearby seems to be the virÈual lack of

incidents in which the emperor is attacked in public.5l

Equally, several thaË are known for such a context involved

suborning members of that very praeËorian officershtn.52

once reaction to crlsís is involved, the full potent-

lal of t,hese men \¡7as realised. Hunting out ploÈters' suPer-

vtsing lmportant prisoners, torturing and executing guilty

parÈ1es are tasks which they performed with an efficiency that

was alarming at the time, no doubt. The number of such examples

may not be faithfully reflected in our sources since they

concentrate upon notorlous incidents among the senatorial

ranks, in the main. It is difficult to imaglne the persístent

repuËation for such efficiency of the guard and of íts officers'5â

ín particularr,, b.irrg based upon relatively well-spaced

incidents alone.

The effective links between Èhe routine, inhibitive'

supervisory and gulding tasks of the offlcers and thelr skilled'

ruthless use of violence against those condemned personally by

the emper ot54 ^r" essentially those of Ëheir tralning and the

contingency plans for críses involving the emperor. Traíning'

51 e.C. 4.D.41-(app. (l-3)); A.D. 51, the mob attacklng Claudíusin the forum Ì". pp. L28 f); A.D. 65 (app' (23)); A'D' ]-82

(app. (37)); also the attack on Claudius, intended by a rnan

wíth a sword-cane (aPP. (18))'

52 Notably A.D. 41 and A.D. 65'

53 Reputatíon, v. P- 234, D. 1.

54 q.v. DurrY, oP. ciË., P. 279'

I

Iq

!

I'|tI

I

I

I

ú

p

-26I-

ofcourse'occurredoveralongperiodofexperiencein

various posts whlch enabled only the more capable and suitable

officers to reach Èhe praetorian tribunate, in partícular'

The exisÈence of contingency plans is of more immediate

interest.55 Ttre extent to whích higher officers to the guard

were ínvolved in the formulatíon of such plans ís beyond our

knowledge. They are líkely to have been consulted' as the

most experienced men ín legionary and praetorían security

sítuaËions. Much of the stimulus for change doubtless orígin-

ated in the mind of a paranoiecemperor' notably in the cases

of Claudíus and DomíËian.56 Evidence suggests there \^Ias very

líttle evolution, Ín fact.57

f'

i

55 By contíngency plans, I mean to suggest permanerit' routíneand basic tyPes of acËion, consolidated by training'\¡7e pres-ume'inwhichoffícersandrankersquícklyreacÈÈoanyvíol-ent threat to the emperor ' Less routine types are attestedfor Tiberfus (suer. rit.65.2) and Nero (sueË. Nero 47. 1),

for example. The routine type of planning must have been

based to some degree upon Republlcan miliÈary procedures'adapÈed Ëo urban conditions by the emperors' c'f' note on

decursio, PP. L46 f ú

56 The extent of imperíal awareness of and involvement ín securityprocedure" p.t"orr"lly will have varied from reign to reign'Common denomínators are the emperorrs control of travel \¡Iarr-

ants(p.25),thedevisingofthedaílywatchr¿ordandpersonalËransmission of it to the tribune (pp. 105 f) and such tasks as

selection of officers ln boÈh guard and legions (p.250 )' Also'1Èwashisresponsibilitytodeterminethedegreeofaccess.tohis person, thànce regulated by hís escort groups' varying from

toral resrriction (Tac. Ann.4. 67) to full access (cD 66' 10'5)'ParanoiordevelopmentsoccurredwithClaudius(weaponscofltrolvia bodysearching, banquet protection; sueÈ. claud. L2, 35) and

Domitian (increaãád suiveillance of officer records, 9'v' Grant'

op. cit., P. 223; polished walls, Suet' Dom' 14' 4 c'f' Plin'Pan.49.1),tothedetrimentoftheirrelationshipwiththeirsubjects.Essentl-ally,theseareaberratlonsfromanorm'based,rpoi ....ssibílity and cordiality, which was the basic pattern

of conduct througirout this period. unpopularíty and danger

accruedtoËhosewhodeparted'fromit,toentertheirownvíc-lous circle of fear.

57 v. P. L74'

-262-

Such contingency plans and securl-ty procedures

as do seem to be in evldence owe much to tradlÈional leg-

íonary process' as \^7e have seen in the case of the nlght

watch procedure58 "rrd

as is also doubtless the case in the

disci-plinary procedures of the grr.td.59 once a crisls does

occur, Ëhe reaction of guard unl-ts' as moblllsed by iËs

offlcers, seems to have been swíft and effective, lntensí-

fylngnormalsurveíllancepract'iceslnpublícplacesand

employing swift retrlbutive vlolence Èo fragment and neutral-

ise opposítion.60 That such contingency plans are reactive

rather than preventive points to Èhe lmpotence of the guard

as a detecËíve force, once *ot..61 Yet, toor the essential

imporËance and also the routlne sirnplicíty of the functions of

the offlcers is suggested. Their one basíc Èask ís to super-

vise those who are to gain access to the emperor in the flrst

place. They are hls last l1ne of defenge (along with custodes'

ín most insËances) and thus the executors of aËtack once re-

sponse Ëo crísís was required. They are vltal to his security'

l

58

59

v. ch. 6. PP. IOZ f.f .

Roman mllttary justlce had always been severe for routínederelíction of duty, e.g. decimation for cowardlce by aleglon and the fate of those who failed to carry outni[trt watch procedure correctly (p' 103)' Naturally' thepenalty for consplracy was death (n' 13 supra) ' Sirnilarly'officers \^7eïe purged ín the wake of plots lnvolving praef-orfans, e.B. Tac. Ann. 15. 66 ff; c'f' ch' 3'pp' 36 f on

methods of preventlng leakage of informatlon'

v. Durry, op. cít., p. 278 on various reactions to plotsand crises; also v. ch. 2 supra, passim, r¿lth referencero rhe appendíx; also ch.6. pp.l-27 ff-, L46 f..

v. ch. 3. PP. 19 f .

60

6T

-263-

The most successful plots against emPerors and the

routine functíons of offícers demonstÏate the crucíal nec-

essity for the emperor to maintaín their loyalty' Further

aspects of that situation can nohr be discussed ' Certain un-

usual sltuarions aside (suet. Nero 26. 2,47; CD 77. 17.3)'

a degree of intimacy will have been fostered by the routine

and frequenÈ contact through traditional duty' The rotat-

ion of the excubiae cohort and the frequent attendance of

other officers meant Ëhat the emperor was able to mainËaín

the relatively personal Ëies between hímself and his officers62

as a valuable tool of loyalty and ínformaÈíon'

62 The concept of rotation is an interestíng one from the

security viewpoínt. After A'D' 23, the routine involvesthe daily change of the excubíae cohort, with-íts officers'The tribune sought the waÈchword daily' In additíon toallowingtheothercohor.tsÈorest,thisallowstheemperorto maíntain contact with all, with each group of officers'ín partícular. Of related interesÈ here ís the situatíonon ðaprí from A.D. 27 (c.f . ch' 4' pp' 56 ff ) ' tr'Ie have

lítt1e information about the cohorts there oËher than thatthey were divíded between Rome and aÈtendance upon the

"*pLtot (e.g. CD 58- L2. 2, c.f' GranË, oP' clt" P' f4f)'

A system of rotation ís suggested by the situation prior to

A.D. 23, a mere four years earlier' Only Ëhree of thenine cohorts hreïe blllLtred wiÈhín Rone (q'v' Durry' oP' cit"p. ß fÐ. Rotation of troops must have occurred as a reg-,r1"t pt""tíce for fifty yeaÏs (27 B'C' to A'D' 23)'Similarly, movement vlas necessary wíth the guards assign-ed to Drusus and Germanicus (pp' 208 fÐ ' It ís reasonableto assume this for Tiberius on Capri. The presence of coh-

orts up to three in number, for instance (on the basis ofthe three at Rome guardíng the emperors prior to A'D ' 23) 'would allow a Laxgá force to be present at Rome for urban

security purPoses j-n the emperorts absence' In consequencet

all cohorts and officers would be in Èouch with TiberiussËill, allowíng him to maínËaln control over the force as

a whole. In the final analysis, the emperor r'Ias not sure he

could conËrol them, to their indígnation (CO 58' L2'2) 'Yet, this rotatíon system, in part, must have enabledTiberius to break sejanusr control oveÏ conmunication withthe outsid.e world (q-". app. (9)), There is- considerable;;i".î;ih-ã-sys-t"*.

^ã.f . il'ossi, op. cit., P. 93 on rnilitarvsub-units detached for service at the front'

-264-

Thís close proxímíty of offlcers to the emperor's

63person, from hls successíon untll his death' meant that

an understanding of the expectations and motivation of

each was vítal Èo the relaÈionshlp. Despite the complexity

ofËhatsiËuationandthevaryingusetowhichtheywereput

by the emperors, it is aPparent that only three pti""iP""64

were abandoned by their o\Ärrì. security personnel and these

\^7ere emPerors who openly and persistently flouted expected

norms of conducË ín publíc and prívate circumstances' It

rnras up to each emperor to see to it that those responsible

for his securiÈy should not have thelr ínterest ín it under-

mined.

Inthefinalanalysis,theviÈalfunctíonsoftheofficers

must not obscure rhe fact that they are one comPonefiË, albeit

a very imporËant one, of a systern of immedlate security

around the emperorts person which involved preference for

several grouPS. Numericall-y, Ëheir presence w111 have been

counterbalanced, from the vlewpoint of treachery, by the

63

64

Despite the importance of the officers, there is verylirnited knowledge of any influence they broughË to bear

upon the emperor' q.v. M1l1ar, op' cít', p' 64'

(app. (48)) lost support of Ëhe army as a whole'

-265-

others. A plot involving one component of Ëhat lnner

círcle needed to ensure that the others hlere neutralised

and thaÈ escape from them was possíble, as occurred in

A.D. 41 (q.v. app. (13) ) .6s

Part of the chapter to follow will- explore some

of the ramifications of the interrelationship of officers

and praetorían prefect(s).

65 Even the processíonal information of Callgulars assassin-atJ.on (p. 73 ) gives little precise idea of the posit-ions of eaeh group. One suggestion 1s to see the praet-orian officers, togate, walklng on each slde of the emperor'themselves screening those wishing to approach' The onlyparallel, vague and extraordinary, l-s the double 1íne ofsoldiers in the senate house when Caracalla explained thedeath of Geta, SHA. Carac. 2- 8 ff. Thís ís plauslblebut unattested elsewhere for the emperors. A second poíntís Ëhat Èreachery wlll not have been antlcipated fromthese people. Furt.her, the díffieulty of escape is a keyaspecË of the system. !{tth officers' llctors' cusËgdes

anã praetorían rankers, as well as various amícl and other"satlllites" (plin. pan. 23. 3 ) in procession lnfront of, behind and beside the emperor, escape for any

soliËary plotter would be almost impossíble' I'ear of theviolenË reaction to crisis which Èhese multíple' cross-checkíng groups could unleash dld ínhíbiÈ many aÈËempts

as ís attested at Tac. Ann. 15.50, in this case for a

praetorlan Èribune, so demonstrating the effecËívenessof the system internallY also:

nísf impuní tatís cup ido retinuisset.rnagn is semper cone,tibus adversa.

-266-

TORIAN PREFECT.t

CHAPTER ELEVEN : THE PRAE

The purpose at this poínt is to explore the role

of the praetorlan prefect in the security of the emperor'

Due to the rnajor signifícance that this office had in the

polítical life of the imperial perlod, this Èopic has been

well researched and documented by modern scholars' There

ls little to be added here' Nevertheless' a summary of

their conclusíons 1s rLecessaÏy to compleÈe our discussion

of the various elemenËs of the overall security sysËem'

By doíng so, the inËerrelationship of these elernents will

bebroughËintosharperfocus.Animportantinitíalpoínt

to be made is Ëhat, desplte the apparent influence of the

prefect upon court life, hls presence and role is largely)

taken for granted by our ancient sources'- As a guide to

our einquiry, it wlll serve to seek to explain for what

reasons the prefecÈ \^las seen as the most cruclal indívidual

ín the urban garrison for a vast array of círcumsËances'

To begin at the beginnlng' \'7e have merely the knowledge

thaË two prefects were delegated to command of the guard

in 2 B.C. (CD 55. 10. fO). From that one fact several points

I

2 v. F. Millar Thepp. 62, 64, L29.

Emperor ín t he Roman !üorld . L977 .

-267-

of discussion arise at once. l,le can only speculate on the

cause of the appointment in that year and the reason for

Ëhe lack of a commander before th"t poirrt.3 of crltícal

importance are the central facts Ëhat the offíce was colleg-

íate and the appointees \¡rere equestrían'

That equesËrian status vTas seen as an unbreakable barrier

to supreme porÂrer emerges throughout the períod under con-

ItsideraÈion.+ This particular prefecture, 1n fact, is Ëhe

ultirnate representative of the entire alternative bureau-

cracy based upon Ëhe equestrian order whích Augustus esÈablish-

ed ín order to wrest effectlve politl-cal po\¡7er from the senate.5

The importance of senaÈorial staÈus for the holder of the

príncipaËe is shor¿n graphically by Ëhe circumsÈances of

varíous conspíracies in which prefects were involved. AlmosÈ

lnvariably a replacement candídate from the highest soclal

order ís intended or wtl1 be sought.6 Prefects such as

3 The sítuation durlng the reign of Augustus \¡Ias one of greatfluxTheof seeming Ëo e the city wit h troops \¡Ias a factor iscertal-nly a PossibílitY' q.v.on the guard as a whole.

Durry, op. cit., PP. 39, 78

Durry, id., pp. 156, 188; c.f. CD 52' 24' 3'

asa n acceptable urban garrlson evolved, Q'v' M' Grantof the Caesars. 1974. Pp - 47, 94' That the fear

4 v.

5

6

v. Grant tTraditiona

op. cít., Passim; T.F. CarneY1 Society. Kansas. L97L. PP.

Bureaucracy ín43 f and passim.

v. ch. 10. pp - 245 f for senaLorial candidates beingsought by oiitcers. The course of social ¡nobility throughthe irnpeiíal períod, aíded by adlectio, hras upwards lntothe senatorial order where great po\¡Ier resíded still' The

only exception Lo the rule is Ëhe accession of Macrinusin À.1. ZL7. Distance from Rome and conËrol of Èhe armed

forces aided his ríse, q.v. app. (45)'

-268-

sejanus, Perennís and Plautian rose to ínordinate prominence

due Ëo special relatfonshlps with the rulerwhích lnvolved

withdrawal of the emperor from the city and so a direct role

in Rome-cenËred polltícal life, or a family relationship in

t.he last case. All three exerclsed a degree of dlrect involve-

ment ln government that r¡ras unusual and created hostill-ty1

towards them.' Th"ir "p1ots" may have been attemPts to atÈaín

some support base agaínst those suspiclous of Èheír moÈlves

or desperate measures of self-preservation once theír posit-

ions were being eroded.B Men ín such posítlons could rarely

retire gr4cefully. If they posed any threat to the emperorrs

security they were ellmlnated.9 Conversely, some prefects Ì¡7ere

stríiped of theír,rea1 $ower by an involuntary "promotion" to

the senate, a true lndicatlon of the essential differences

beËween social posítl-on and the conËrol of naked uilitary

7 All three were lnvolved also 1n important phases of devel-opment of the prefecture. sejanus hTas responsible for theunitication of the cohorÈs 1n the virnína1 camp in A.D. 23

Herodian 1. B. 1.

(v. n. 15 infra), while the later t\nto exercised power ata time when the jurisdictíonal responsibíl1-tles of theoffice r"t. .toLring dramatícally, q.v. L.L. Ilowe' Ths PraetcrianPrefect. chícago. Illinois. uníversity Press. L942. pp. l1ffrZ2 f{".f. Tac. Ann. 4. 4L, CD 72' 9' 1, 75' L4' I ff'

B Examples: 4.D.23 (aPP.(30)),18s (aPP. (38))'2L7 (app. (45)).

(B)), 31L92 (app.

(app. (9) ) ,(41)), 205

96 (aPP.(app. (43) ) '

9 The prefect who engineered an accession could be suspected,e.g. LaeËus ín A.D: 193, cD 73. 16. 5' Other examples of a

feãrfril- emPeror: SueË. Cal. 56 ff' CD 59' 25' 8,72.22. 1.

-269-

for"..10 This is not Ëo deny the importance of senatorial

staËus to the princípaÈe. It merely reafflrms the fact

Èhat, at Rome at least, the emperor wished to moriopollse any

conjunctlon of staËus and force.

Collegialíty was an equally important principle 1n

the creatíon of this offi"".11 A prlnciple well undersÈood

byRomansoftheRepublicandironieallylmplementedhere

by the príncePs, 1t was designed to ensure mínimal abuse

of the office, in fact to ensure securlËy of control by

Ëhe emperor as it was once intended to save the state from

a slngle powerful consul. The parallel is reveallng, of

course. Even from its ínception, Augustus realísed the

politlcalslgnlfícanceofthecommandoftheguard.Noother

posiËion in the urban garrison command structure or the

equestrian bureaucracy üIaS seen to requlre double "ottttd.12

Similarly, it demonstrates lmperíal ar^tareness of the need

Èo have cross-checks upon hls own officl-als '

A frequently dlscussed aspect of this situatlon

is the appointment of about twelve sole prefecÈs duríng this

p"tíod.l3 The dangeïs r¡/ere soon made evident by the Para-

digrnatíc example of Sejanus. The potentíal abuses of the

10 under the AnËonines, a períod of relaËive st.abllity meanË

llttle violence to incumbents of this officêr 9.v. R. Syme.

Guard Prefects of Trajan and Hadrían' JRS ' 70, 1980'64 - 80, where examples of lengthy tenure and non-violentretirement are pointed to, esp. pp'68, 75' c'f' CD 69" 19'

v. Grant, oP. ciË. , p. 94; Durry¡ oP' cft ', p ' 156;

Howe, op. cít., P. L7.

v. Howe, ibidem; c.f. Carney, oP' cit", p' 44'

v. Durry, op. ciË., p. 162; G. Powell.The praetorfan

11

L2

13guard. HisËory Today. 18, 1968, p.859.

-zta-

povüer entrusËed to the emperor I s "depuËy and cotp"níon"14

hrere never forgotËen after t*iose of the prefect responsible

for the A.D. 23 unification of the cohorËs aË the vimínal1tr

camp.r) Nevertheless, Tiberiust reaction to the problem is

important. He did not create two prefects in Sejanus' "a."d.16

Indeed, a tttrnro prefectstt policy did not necessarily ensure

careful cont.rol of the guard' Our specífic sËatements on

the íssue reflect indivldual approach. Agrtppina the Younger

persuaded claudlus of the divisiveness of two prefects (Tac.

Ann. L2. 42), whereas Nero (cD 62. 13. 3), Cornrnodus(Herodian

l. g.10) and SepÈimius Severus (Herodian 3' 13' 1) opted for

two appointees Ëo replace a single commander' The appoínt-

ment of such a number of sole pTefects points clearly to the

fact that many emperors felË Ëhey could trust Èheír man withouË

questíon.

Anadvantageofthetwoprefectsystemwastheability

ofËheemperortotravelandyeËfeelsecureaboutthecíty

of Rome aÈ his back. Evldence indicaËes that whenever possible

an emPeror left a prefect at Rome, perhaps aided by a trusÈed

L4

15

For this phrase, v. Syme, op. cít', p' 77'

For this everiË, v. Durry, op. c1È., PP' 156 f' 398;

Carney, op. clt., p. 43 f. for the statement that thepr.teti emerged as the most po\nrerful member of the new

brrt."rr.t"Ëíc apparatus under Tiberíus; B'M' LevlckTiberius the Polítician. 1976. P. LZL.

Nevertheless, he did not move from hís v11la for nlnemonths (SueË. Tlb. 65. 2, c.f' Herodlan 1' 11' 5'3. 13. I and v. ch. 6, PP. I72 f'

16

- 27). -

and experíenced upPer class or even líbertine agent'17

The second prefect. accompanied the emperor to the front or

on his peregrlnatíorr".18 Two essential concerns of the

prefect are thus revealed, namely polittcal stabilíty in

the city of Rome and the personal security of the emperor'

whatever his location.

FurtherbasícconslderaËionsaboutthecareersof

the prefects in these years deserve tettion'19 Most

lmportantly, all prefecËs owed their appointment directly

to the emperor. Promotion evídently depended upon more than

anobjectlveassessmentofwhichcandidaËehadthebest

sk1lls for the job. As was the case I,ülth Ëhe command of the

.rr"tod"",20 imperlal preference and Èhe influence of those

T7 v. Syme, op. cít., pP. 68, 69,74' There aÏe several ínstancesof extraordinary agents of the emperor at Rome-during hísabsènce. The urban prefect figures of Augustusr reign (q.v.T.J.. Cadoux. Revíew of G. Vitucci, {Bql 1?t 1959' pP' L52 ff)are followed by such as the enigmatic Sallustius Crispus (q'v'Levick, oP. cit., pp. 65 f, c.f. Tac' Ann' l' 6), LuciusVltellius under Claudius and Helius, Nerors freedman' Sejanus

and Macro, during Tiberiust absenee at Capri, will presumably

have made "orr.t"i" any tendency for Ëhe praetorian prefect to

secure Rome while the emperor î,Ias aI¡Iay. They both evídently trans-acted much business on his behalf. Note that there seems to be

ínsuffícient evidence uporÌ which to base conciusíons about therole of t.he urban Prefect in Èhe immediate security precautionsof the emperor.

18 For the frontier role of prefects, v' DurrY' oP'

Millar, oP. cit., pp. I2l- - 130 and ch' 9 supra;e.g. SHA. Luc. Ver. 3, Tac. Ann' 1' 24'

For a díscussion of the career patÈerns of the prefecËs' v'R. Syme, revíew of Durry, JRS. 29, 1939' pp' 242 - 248 and

Guard Prefects of Traj.t otd H"drian JRS' 70r 1980' p' 78'

v. ch. 6. pP. 97 - 100.

cit., p. 170;on travel-,

L9

20

-272-

around the emperor r¡Ieïe "ru"i^L.2L As Syme points out'

congeníality was an importalt factor'22 Logtcally' in con-

sequencer all prefects \^lere chosen because they were felt

very stronglY to be loYal'23

Nowhere is Ëhis more apparent and crítical Ëhan at

thetlmeofsuccessionfromoneemperortoanot'her.TheSucceSS-

ion of a princeps was particularly uncertain when the heír did

not have exístíng ímperium' The role of the prefect in this

sequerice of evenËs Ëhen assumes a revealíng ímportance'

Augustus t res pub lica restltuta was based upon secure

control of military po\^7er' An uncertain heir almost invar-

iably \^lerit to the castra praetoria rather than the senate to

get the backlng required' The guard conferred the legitimacy

of naked military pohTer at the ceritre of polltical lífe' The

prefect was its cornnander, the man who represented lts wishes

when he saluted the heír as emperor or sv/ore allegiance at an

official ceremonial' The accesslon of Nero is a classic example

24of the value of the prefect' The general anxíety and in-

securit.y at such a time is revealed in the frequenË changes

2L

22

23

v. ch. lO. pp.25O ff. on the pÏocess with officers'Agríppinats àppoíntment of Burrus 1s the classic example'

tä".e"" . L2 - 42. c. f ' SHA' Cornm' 6 '

v. Syme, oP. ciË., PP' 68 f,78'

Nevertheless' among Ëhe reasons discernible for appoint-

menr are Èhe lack ãt ¿istinction (Tac. Hist' 1' 46) or

reward for support (Suet' Galba 14)' both in uncertaín

times. On loyalty, v' PP ' 278 ff, infra'

v. Jos. AJ 20. L52, Tac. Ann. |2. 69 (c.f. Tac. Ann.

L2. 42). Similarly, LaeÈus persuaded the praetorians to

acclaim pertinax iiåto¿i"" Z' 2' 1-5)' while Caligula

courted Macro as his insurance policy for power (Suet'

Cal. 1'2).

24

_ 273 -

25

of corunander both soon before and shortly afËer a successlon'

An emperor's securíty could rest upon the choice itself of

a single orfictaL.26

I,,Ihat functlons made the prefecË so important to the

emperorrs safeËy, both long- and short-term? A single mass of

indirect evidence poinËs Èhe way' Two considerations abouÈ

conspiracieswlllenableourenquirytocontínue.Plotsinwhich

prefects became ínvolved tend' to suggest that an offlclal' Pres-

umed loyal, could wreak havoc from w1Èhin. Secondly, íneffíciency

on the part of a prefect could enable a plot to mature'27

Consequently, índications of certaín po\¡rers' privileges

and responslbílities of the prefect emerge for dlscussíon'

As commander of the guard, he will have been responsible ult-

imatelyforthemaintenanceofstandardprecautions,írnple-

mented under the immedlate supervisíon of the offlcers' the

tribune and centurions. This bespeaks a constant inter-

action with both officers and men' a process we cannoÈ be

precise about due Ëo the inadequacies of our sources ' Much

rnlillhavedependeduponthepersonalapproachofeachprefect

to his positl-on. By and large, it seems the majoríty were

as diligenË and skllful as their hatcheËmen díscussed else-

rh"t".28 !,Ie can speculate that there \¡/as f requent contact

25

26

27

v. Syme, oP. cit., P. 78'

v. Míllar, oP. c1Ë., P' L26'

The rarer ínstance of the laically described bY Tacítus

tter Phenomenon ís sPec

for Laco under Galba in4.D.69 (Tac. Hist. I.24 er socordiam raefect

if-

28 v. ch. 3. pp. 29 Ît ; ch' 10' pp' 23!^ff-'^^^Alsov.R.Syme.revíewofDurry'JRS'29'L939'p'242'

- 274 -

between prefect, officers and men, assured by the fact

that theír hold over the guard as a whole \¡Ias feared and/or

succoured at various tlmes.29 ConÈact wlth the offícers

is of crucial importance and ltkely to have been on a frequenË

basís.Acertainunítyoffeelingisoftenapparentbetween

them, to the extent that prefect and officers are usually

eíther supportive or conspiratorÍal t.owards an emperor together'30

The acquiescence of a prefect ín a plot evidently made success

rnorelíkelyrdespiteËhefactthatthetribunesareclearly

responsible for the lmrnediate execution and supervlsion of

precautions. On the other side of the coin' only in rare

circumstancescouldaprefectconspiresuccessfullyagainst

an emperor on his o*.3t These consíderations would suggest

that prefect and officers l^tere very much aware of each otherf s

acËívities and reactl-ons to events '

The supervising role índícated extends to the guard

asawhole,itwouldSeem.Theprefect'LácounderGalbais

29

30

31

During certain plots involving Èhe prefect' the emperor

could eíther not trust the entíre guard (e.g. A.D. 3l'

;.;- "pp. (9)) or feared the hold over established memb-

ers to the extent thaÈ younger trooPs arrested theof fender (e.g. A.D. 205, 9'v' apP' (43))'

v. ch. 10. pp. 243 f where Nymphídius Sabinus

isseentohavebeenallowedtobetrayNero'c'f'CD59. 29. 1, 62. 24- 1.

The death of Commodus is one such example' the prefectLaetus then being aided by Èhe cubicularius' Eclectus ';;ã-;h" emperor'ã concubine, Marcia, in a desperate lastmlnute move Eo save themselves' The free access ofËhese people facllltated the plot, although escape \Âlas

arfficllt still (q.v. aPP. (41))'

-275-

chíded by Tacitus (Tac. Hist. 1' 24) for not beíng ar¡lare

that Èhe speculatores \^lere being suborned by Otho '

TheprefectT^laslnagoodposltl-ontodothisthroughhis

lnfluence over the urban garrison as a whole, albelt l-n-

?)complete.r¿ Qulte naÈurally, all emperors expected vigílance

in this "r""33 and so lË seems to have fallen Èo the prefect

Ëo follow uP any suspiclon of a threat to the ernperorrs

?,tL

securityr'* l-r, this and other areas of concern' The routíne

naËure of securiÈy maíntenance throughouÈ this period would

32

deslrable, therefore.

33 v. ch. 10. PP. 243 f, 247, 249.

!üith the unlficaÈ1on of the cohorts in A'D' 23, the pre-fectrs influence wíll have íncreased since Ëhe urban

cohorts I^/ere staÈioned there also, q'v' Durry' op' clt' 'pp. 15, L67. He also comnanded the speculatgres and

later the orian tribunes,q.v. Durr an era' thisseems to through 1n-fluence over Èhe annona milltaris It, op' cft.'

l"-*d.fficlear that urban garrison

Imperial Rome. L926. PP. 27 f,f*p-af "ppofntees

anã ,rsed to some degree as a possiblecounter to the guard'rr as the evenÈs of A'D' 31' for example'

demonsÈrate. A degree of independence will have been

34 v. Howe, op. cit.r P. L2 Ln reference to the plot ofLucilla (q.v. app. (37)) and the prefect Paternus' c'f'SHA. Comm. 4.

-2û6-

leave adequate tíme for thís.35 The initial politlcal

sígntficance of the prefect, coupled with the types of men

under his control or ínfluence, naturally suggested that he

be employed Ëo some degree as an ínvestigator of those l-rnpllc-

ated 1n plotting and as a spy. Our enqul-rles ln chapter three

impose strong qualificatlons upon these roles, however. The

prefect cannot be seen as a spy master of the tyPe rlre are

famíliar with ln the modern world. Control of the resources

necessary r^ras most commonly restrlcted to the emperor hlmself,

as our discussion wtll reveal. Neverthelessr aÈ rare moments

the potentlal for such control is fulfilled (n. 7), a notable

example beíng the case of AtÈianus, the prefecË of Hadrian'

who recommended to the emperor the llquidation of various

aristocrats and evidently oversal^I the ell-minatlon of the four

consulars in A.D. 118.36 Regardless of such information

acquísit.ion, the prefect ts responsible for implementing

execution orders and other covert ""tiot".37 Evidence also

suggests Ëhe presence of the prefect wíth hís officers at

inËerrogations and torture session".38 This last activity

is entírely consístent \^rith the propenslty of the guard to

excel tn de,fence rather than aËtack, uslng force to ínhíbit

35 l,ùith so little evoluÈion (p. I74 ), a prefect and hisoffícers 1lterally remain the supervisers of a wellesËablished set of security procedures ' Even contíngencyplans seem well rehearsed (pp. 146 f). There was littlescope for lnnovatíon in precautions and countermeasures'

36 v. ch. 3. pp. 33 f SHA. Hadr' 5' 5; c'f' Tigellinusín A.D. 62, Tac. Ann. L4. 57.

v. ch. 3. pp . 29 ff; 237 f-f."

v. ch. 3. P. 20GranË, oP. cit., PP.Princípem. L974. P.

; also Millar,95, 230 and R.A.

op. eit., P. L29,Bauman Impietas in

37

38

-277-

plotËíng in the fírst place and to smash oppositfon l-f 1t

emerged.

This límited form of investigatlon appears to be

the prefecÈts major peïsonal conËríbuËíon to the emperorts

securíty. IË is surely the case Ëhat the prefectts presence

at the emperorrs side cannoÈ have conÈribuËed sígniflcantly

Ëotheimmediatephyslcalproteetíonofhisperson(c.f.Tac.

Ann. 4.59). The essence of that securíty is the group of

officers, lictors and cusËodes who attended hirn very clos"ly'39

The psychological lmpact of the prefect I s presence is more

difficult to gèrrge, however. The anecdote whlch details the

role of Bassaeus Rufus at Ëhe court of Marcus Aurelius ís

.,rivia1o indicaríng rhar rhe prefecr ínrlmidared merely by

4L ^ rL^ ^-^ç^^+his pïesence. Evidence points to the prefect accompanyang

the emperor as an gesegsg! during regular "business hours"'

a set of circumstances whích íncluded public adjudication'

thereceptionofembasslesrpublicceremonlalsandatÈendance

I

39 v.ch. lOrpassim. The examples deËalled there (and ch' 6'pp. ß2 lb of the emperor on rare occasíons taking a body-

ä""t4 of prefect and officers into the SenaÈe \Àlith him

ãrrgg."a the iurportance of this group' Numerically' the

offícers are most lmportant' as outside the buíldíng'

40 v. Mlllarr oP. cit.' P

41 The need for a show ofÈímes of insecuritY (n.decursio ch. 6, pp. 14

the Prefectwielded bY

. 4 f..

force was felt bY some emPerors at39 and c.f. the significance of

6 f). The Power of intimidatíonís clearlY ímPortant and was feltwitness reaction to the deaths of

v. SaÈ . X. 63 f Í., c. f . Suet ' Galbaby Ëhe Public at large'men such as Sejanus (Juls. 2) .

-278-

42at the Senat.e. Hls publlc visíbility ü7as importanÈ, lt

seems. At other momentsr his presence is not seen to be

necessary for the maintenance of precautions or the

execuËion of other orders. Indeed his presence may have

been extraordínary th"rr.43 He could fulfil his supervis-

ory funcËions from a dlstance'

Despite Èhe prefect I s relatively low key role in

Ëhe lmmediate securíng of the emperorts person, it l-s clear,

nevertheless, Èhat his role in ensurlng that precautions

were lmplemented was lmportant' partícularly in regard to

the malntenance of disclpline and morale' An inefficient or

manipulatíve prefect could al1ow a good relationshlp between

emperor and guard Èo deteri ot^'"'44 Key requirements for

the posltion are loyalty and an interesË in the emperorts

securiËy. The initial promotion would produce such a t""'45

.t

,{

Þ

I

tt'I

\f.

I

;1

42 Although \^re cannot be sure Ëhat Ëhe emperor was always

accompanled bY the prefect, 1t seems that such a duÈy

r¡ras exPected and fulfilled, 9'v' Ml11ar op. cit. , pp.,

L2L 130. Indeed, his service as assessor contrlbutedto the imPo rËant evolution of the Prefect s judicial

delega te (q.v. n. 7 suPra; DurrY'po\rers as ímPerialop. cit. , PP. I72and Hadrlan. JRS.I - 2). Once ÈhísIt detracted fromemPerort s slde.

43

44 The success of Otho (q'v'(42), c.f. SHA. PerÈ' 10'c.f. DurrY, oP. ciË" P'

fn. 45 on next Page.

ff , R. Syme, Guard Prefects of Trajan70, 1980, P. 78; also v. ch. 6, sections

function burgeoned , \^te may wonder whetherthe tlme a Prefect could spend at Ëhe

At other tlmes, in the privacy of the palace' sËandard

precautlons restricÈed access to all but those with urgent

ra""on to see the emperor, or Èhose wiÈh an invltatíon'It seems the prefect \^las subject to the same requlrements'as reaction to the presence of PlauÈian in A'D ' 2O5 would

suggest (q.v. aPP. (43)).app. (25)) and Laetus (q.v. aPP'

CD 73. 8 f) lllusËraÈes this'381 f re morale.

-279-

Maintenanceofthesequalitles.t^tasanongolngconcernfor

all emperors. The day to day performance of the emperor ln

all its aspects could be ímporËant here' behaviour that

deviated from the norm in ostentatious fashíon often leadlng

46tolossofsupportwl-thprefecËandofficers.-"Equally

lmportant was the personal relaÈionship between emperor and

prefecÈ. Respectful treatment and incentives to constancY

ürere necessary. Dlsastrous in Ëhls respecË r¡ras the develop-

ment of an atmosPhere of susplcíon between the two' whether

for reallstlc or imaginary reasons' In such a slËuatlon'

executions or a more genËle meÈhod of replacement \^Iere

47common.

Even with a trusËlng atmosphere' certain cross-checks

upon and lnherent short comings ín Èhe prefectts power are

evldent' sure indications of both the potentlal for abuse

andtheactualpo\¡Ierentailedincommandoftheguard.Althorrgh

often the most powerful member of the government apparaÈus from

the reign of Tiberius, the develoPment of boÈh rnilitary and

bureaucratic lnstlËutions ensured that the emPeror did not

rely solely upon the praetorian prefect either for informatíon

J

,t

h

I¡

tt

'I

iI

I

ì

I

t'Ì'it!

45 v. Fp.267ff.supra and yet noËe the promotlon of Burrus

whose lnteresl was equally in Nerots succession as

Claudiusr safety (fac. Rnn. L2. 42' t3' 20 f)'

46 Interesting in this regard ís the conduct of Trajan when hls

prefect shtore allegiance, q'v' Powell' op' cit" p' 864;

also plin. pãn. øll g, CD 68. 16. ''2'

On the signfficanceof the emperor's performance, v. Powell, 1d.l P. 866.

47 v. pp.268 f supra; also v' Millar' op' cit" p' L26'

Executlon of those who had threatened an emperor hras a

firm prtncíple (q.v. p' 240, n.- L3^ -I . ; e'g' CD 68'

5.4, c.f. cD 6ó. l8' 3, 6'8' 3' 3' Plin' Pan' 6'1'SHA. Díd. Jul. 6, SHA' Carac' 4'

{

h_280_

or for personal securlty' unless a princeps allowed thls to

occur Eo an unusual extent' In both spheres' multiple corps

or servants sa\^l to lt that no one person could dominate

proceedings entlretr.43 Of particular lnterest in relatlon

to the guard i-s the role of the officers all of whom were 1n

lntlmate conËact with the emperor on a rotattonal basis

at the 1"""t.49 Unless an emPeror had flagrantly ge'n-

erated hostiltty among his officers, Ëhey were likely Èo

report susplclous conduct, provided they llere sure they could

50prove theír case, of course.-- Offlcers and rankers at large

were keenly aware of the best direction for thetr alleglance'51

I

For the rnultiple information system' v' ch' 3' passlm;

for the various armed corps' v. ch. 10, passim' Líbertineand, Iater, equestrian ministers could exercise a powerful

influence, notably such as the ab ePle!-!1g who played a

key role in ttre promotion of offl-cers¡ Q'v' ch' 10' P'250'Note also family members who had freer access, 9'v' ch'6'p. 110.

v. ch. 10, P - 263 ' n' 62'

e.g. 1n A.D. 205, the tribune allegedly recrulted totrãachery by Plautlan r^ras at some palns to prove hiscase,aftirough he had seen this to be the better course

inãtådi"" 3". L2. 3 ff) ' Any such person as the prefecÈ'

in a positlon of Pohrer, influence and favour' caused

ãrry-pãt.tttial accl""t io thlnk twice, e'g' Bauman' op' cit"p. 179 on Messalina, c'f' Tac' Ann' 11' 36' That all 1n-

äilrtd,rals were bound, yet' to reveal indlscretlons seems

lndicated by the ¿ifiiturty wirh which the conspirators of

A.D. 41 sounded each other out, Suet' Cal- ' 56 ff ' Jos'

AJ Lg. 47 - 51, c.f. ch' 3,' P' 18'

v. ch. 10 passim; Durry, op' cit" pp' L54' I82;Powell, oP. cít., PP' 860, 868'

t'fi11

48

49

50

51

-28L-

Simílarly, just as Claudius had attempted Ëo regulate

soldíers meeËing with senatot"r52 so some contacts of

the prefect \^leïe monltored, it seems' In A'D ' L92, for

lnstance, Laetus required a dlstinct reason to see the

53emperorrs concubine, Marci-a.-- It ís noË difficulÈ Ëo

imagine the majority of the prefect!s contacts being

supervised, no matter how ÈrustworËhy he was'

To summarlse, we can view the prefect as the

ultimaÈe rePresentatl-ve of the guard itself' Nominally'

the emperor I s bodyguard and also his strike force should

he go to \^/ar, it was paËently of major political signific-

ance as the powerful lrnmediate remlnder of the true basís

of the emperorrs control, the legions' It was also an

intimidatory force of unchallengeable dlmension at the

political capital.54 As Ëhe commander of such an inst-

ituËion, the prefect himself was of rnajor politlcal

significance. The twin primary functions of politlcal

stabilityatt'hecentreandthepersonalsecurityofthe

emperor are related. The functíons of the prefect are to

',1

,{

Þ

'¡

ItI

I

'ftI'

:

52 For the Claudian restriction, v' Grantr oP' cit"p. I54.Herodian 1. 17- 7, c.f. n' 43 suPra'

1.e. assuming that Ëhe emperor retained control of the

urban garrison as a whole and so the guard was freefrom rivalry to perform íts central functions' c'f'n. 32 suPra.

53

54

-282-

oversee processes which ensure both long- and short-term

seeuríËy, even if he has ll-ttle role ín the immediate

executíon of Ëhese Ëasks. That the prefect vlas so respected'

honoured, courted' suspected and feared is Èestlmony to

hís power and influence. The power itself arose simply

because the emperor \^7as forced to delegate conrnand of the

guard, whether Èhrough lack of time to command personally'

the need to have an agent who would aid ín the succession

or some other motive r^7e cannoË ""y.55 The delegated com-

mander \¡ras expecËed surely to undertake effectlve control

of thís institution, albeit as the emperorts representative'

spendlng more time fn doing so than the Pr inceps could.

There the dangers 1ay' I'Ííth trust a basic necessity in

this relationship, Ëhe amourit of power developed and

exercised by the prefect \¡Ias very much a matter of what

the prefect created and the emperor allowed' a matter of

the dynamics of personallty to some degree' Beyond thís'

l-t is clear Ëhat every prefect \^Ias potentially dangerous

l

I

55 In2 B.C. concern over Èhe successlon was certaínlypresent, Augu sËus no\nl in his slxties. The evolutlonof the urban garrison certainly grohrs apace in the

remainlng Years of hls reign with the establishmentof the Vigiles ln A.D. 6 and the apPointmenË of a

permanent ae fecËus urbl ín A.D. 13.

-283-

in vírtue of his responsíbility for the effective main-

tenance of the emperorrs ímmedlate securiËy precarrtlorrs.56

Hís slgniflcance, however, lies with much more than thaÈ

alone.

56 A degree of quallflcation to the position (v' n 35)

that:the prefect supervises a well establlshed setof precautiott" is necessary' These precautl-ons \^7ere

eviãently not inflexible, crowd control measures and

contingency plans demonstrating Ehat a variety oft""porrã"" tà situatlons was possible' The danger

frorn prefect (and officers) was ln Ëhelr ability tomanipulate circumstances to the dlsadvantage of theå*p"tot, if such was desired' Knowledge and controlmeãnt the ability Ëo círcumvent some procedures by

working from within. The prefect had conslderablepotential influence upon thís aspect of securlty'Ñote plots in A.D. 41 (q.v. app. (13)), 65 (app' (23))'gø ("pp. (30)) , Lgz (app. (41)) , 2L7 (app' (45))' inwhích prefects are lmplicaËed and security measures are

lnt.erfered with.

-284-

CONCLUSION.

The central purpose of thís thesis has been to

describe Ëhe nature of securíty precautlons taken Ëo

protect the life of the Roman emperor aË the most immediate,

personal level. Certain resulËs are apparent'

on the negative slde, our source materíal was not

such as Ëo allow a preclse pícture of the posl-tioning of

troops and oËher components of the securlty system eiÈher

while the emperor T¡ras moving between venues and ín formal

processíons or at Ëhe sites of events themselves. A recon-

structlon of the role and effectiveness of security groups

consequently depends upon a number of other aspects of the

system.

There are indications of Ëhe numbers involved ín

rouÈine securíty precautlons at certain poinÈs. It appears

thaË slx or severi guards is a feasible possibilíty for Ëhe

number at the external entrance of the palace during the

ntght watch and possibly for the area near the imperial

bedroom also. A turma o'f custodes (about thirty men) is

líkely to have attended the emperor in his daíly duties,

complemented in ParË by a minimum of seven praetorian officers

and certainly more (tribunes, in partlcular) on various occas-

ions. Llctors also attended the emperor very closely 1n public.

The very large escort of the cohort of excublae troops (about

flve to síx hundred men, ln theory) rnarched behind the emperor

while he moved in Publíc.

-285-

The procedures of this ar^Tesome axl.ay of trained

and armed men. are clear in several aspects' Control of

access t.o the emperorts person is decided upon by the

emperor hinself and implemented by his guards' ln publlc'

IttstherethatÈhegreatestpotentlalthreatv/asper-

ceíved normally. Accessibility was strongly expected

of hím when in less formal public circumstances. consequent-

ly, securit.y forces do not actively prohíbit access' They

waËch those atËaining it so as to be able to come to the aíd

of the princeps in an emergency' lüithín Èhe palace' the

degree of public character of an everit in part deËermines hor'¡

access conËrol is to be maíntained ' In thís more private

conËext, overall, the llbertíne and servile agents of the

emperorclearlyhaveapredominantvoíceinËhedecísionto

admit anyone. Troops at access points merely supervise thaË

process. At íts mosË exËreme' Ëhe emperor being within the

domestlc sector of Ëhe palace and at a time outside "business

hourstt, anyone wishing to give hím an urgent message must pass

many levels of supervisíon by the military, by familia members

and by custodes. The use of passwords ensures that thís ad-

missíon procedure applies at the least to all but Ëhose wiËh-

in the security network.

Bodysearching, ín order Èo be sure that \^Teapons \¡Iere

not carríed near the emperor, ís a practice we mlght antícipate.

Revealingly, it occurs for a relatively short period of tlme

(from claudlus to the beginning of Vespasían!s reign) and it

-286-

T¡ras applted only aÈ the morning salutatio ' Dignity rÀIas

offended at that semi-publíc occaslon' There is no

serious atËempt Ëo introduce it as a routine pracËi-ce at any

other funcË1on. It 1s not clear who actually earried out

the search.

By contrast, procedure for the prevention of attempts

Ëo poíson the emperor seems to have been operatlve throughout

ourperiodofconsideraÈion.ForetastlngandtheadminisÈrat-

ion of antidotes are well atÈested as processes r¿hich involve

nonrmÍlitarypersonnel of the emperor once again' From the

reign of Claudius, hovlever, Ëhe attendance aË banquets of

fullv armed praetorian speculalores and rankers was a stand-

ard procedure.

One of ttre most interesting produets of research

has heen the firm suggestions of a key role in securlËy

procedure for Ëhe officers of the praeÈorían guard. whether

creatingfearlnthelrrolesasexecutionersandinvestlg-

ators or as the closest to the emperorts person of all the

Italían armed escorËs when he travels fiil -public, Ëhey fulfil

vltalsecurityfuncËlonstoanexterrtsharedbynootherPraet-

orians.Inmanyl^Tays,theythemselvespersonifycruclalaspects

of the security role of the praetorian guard' The praetorían

prefect, of necessiËy delegated to command the guard' is more

importantwíËhinthecontextofÈhepoliËiealsigniflcanceof

that insËitutíon than ln the imPlemenËation of security prec-

autions at ari immediate leve1'

-287-

A prelímiriary suÍlmary of those procedures just

described would need Ëo query the effectiveness of a mere

supervísíon of access and the predominance of familia

members ín prívate securl-ty arrangemenÈs ' It seems that

the effectiveness of the praetorian guard rests squarely

upon íts po\¡rer to lntímidate and to tnhibit plots. Cont-

inued persistence with the use of peripheral supervision

of access as the mealts of controllíng the emperorts work-

ing círcumsËances alone would force us to conslder such

a conclusion. Examination of the spying and surveillance

sysËem constantly poínts to the inadequacles of the guard

at all levels as a detective force, unable as it is by

espíonage techniques alone to dlscover plots fn advance.

Delation by social equals vras necessarily and nervously

relied upon Ëhere. Consideration of Èhe evidence of p1ots,

by contrast, reveals the guardfs tough methods when ordered

to suppress.:r conspiracíes and its ar{esome ability to execute

potential troublemakers. Contíngency plans for imperial public

appearances suggest not only the capabilíty of a quick and

brutal reaction to any threat to the emperorts person. Crowd

control techniques and strong indications of the abillty Ëo

deploy sub-units in battlefíeld fashlon mean that escape for

any indívidual or sma1l group of plotters \¡las vírtually im-

possible. Consequently, direct control of access is not really

necessary.

Emperors were ín the hablt of reminding the public

-288-

and arisLocrats, in particular, of this lmrnense po\nler aË

Ëhelr disposal. The routine aÈtendance of about six

hundred armed men behind the emperor' on all public appear-

ancesandinacítywherehemonopolísedallrnllitaryforces

and regulated the possession of weapons by law' was relnforc-

ed constantly. Every salutatio meant senators were scrutín-

ísed by troops at the enÈrance' Every banquet the emperor

attended involved lance-bearlng speculatores. Each time the

emperor arrived at adventus or left ofectio the cíËY,

considerable numbers of troops partícipated in the ceremony'

Major public ceremonlals often involved decurslones in order

both to brlng honour Ëo the ceremony and to remínd all that

thetroopS\¡IerestíllpÏactíÍlngtheirdeadlyskills'\¡IeSus-

pect.Senatorsenteríngthecuriaraftertheemperortsarriv-

al, walked through the lines of the emPeroÏrs escort waíting

aÈtheentrance.Extremeexamplesoflntimídation(e.g.Tac.

Ann. f6. 27) are just that' merely the inÈensification of a

normal process which, unfortunately for our purposest our

Sourcestoooft'enËakeforgranted.Thesuccessofthepraet-

orian guard is based upon lts abtllty to inspire genuine fear'

ThereasonsthatsecurityprecautíonshTerereactíve

and inhíbitive líe very much in the conscious role of the

emperor as prlnceps, in contrast to that urhich prevalled 1n

Èhe DominaÈe. Thls trnposes long-term factors upon the day-Ëo-

dayirnplemenËationoftheratherllrnitednumberofprocedures

avaílable to Ëhe security forces. Our enquiry at all stages

reveals a tenslon between the dignity of the emperorrs Ëheor-

eËlcal co-equals, in partlcular, and the very strong expectaËlon

-289-

of accesslbility and clvil conduct by all, on the one hand'

andsecurlËyneedsrontheother'Theuseofbuildingsand

the methods of travel poínÈ to thís situationrwhich most

clearly emerges when consíderíng the emperor at work' Nowhere

1s this better seen than at the curia. External supervision'

the strict avoidance of bodysearchlng and regard for the

superficíaldignttlesofthesenatorsisexpectedthereatall

tlmes.

Severalstepsfollowthereupon.Peripheralsecurity

conËrol emerges as a political necesslty' The form taken by

many precauËions is better understood as a result ' The

largeslzeofguardforcesandÈheirintimidatoryfunctionsare

Seentobenecessarytoensurethatthosewhomustbeallowed

toworkíncloseproximitytotheemperorandwhoseloyalty

is not above suspicíon are lefË in no doubt as to thelr fate

iftheypresefitanyËhreattohím.Equally,withthosecon-

stralnts operative, there is little genuíne evolution in Èhe

nature of securitY Procedures '

FocaltoallaspectsofthíssiÈuationistheperson-

alítyoftheemperorhlmself.Atabaslclevel,hedetermines

the degree of access which troops will allosr' a decislon whl-ch

partly tells his subjects ho¡¿ fearful he is of them' Also'

he is the key Ëo their loyalty, a complex factor' His respons-

íb11ity Ëo himself does not end with his appointment of praet-

orian officers, the cormnander of the custodes and members of

his f amilia t,o key poslt.ions. Since our evidence shows that

-290-

many of the most successful plots matured within the secur-

1Èy network, 1t was necessary to ensure that all such pers-

onnel have no reason to doubt an l-nteresÈ 1n his security

or, more dangerously, their own welfare andt consequenÈlyt

that the network \^tas not interfered with' They needed to

feeltheyweretrusÈed.Sírnilarly,lmageandconductplaytheir

role in this circumsËance' lfhether aÈ the baËtlefront or in

Rome, whether 1n public or in private' the emperor \¡Ias ex-

pected to dlsplay varlous admirable qualities or' at the very

leasË, not Ëo negate them' Such a consideration applies

equally to securl-ty groups and those of whom they must be

\^rary. It was Ëhe emperorts responsibiliÈy to avoid autocratic

elemenËs in hls performance lest dangerous reserves of host-

íl1ty be bullt up. t'Bad" emperors tipped the balance betw-

een security and dignity, either ignoring 1Ë or paranoíacally

feelíng the need to disregard it ' The rnanner ln which safeËy

measures were lmplemented gave all concerned one more indlc-

ation of how the emperor vlewed hls relationship wiËh the

senators and people of Rome' That they feared hís security

system r¡Ias a necessary asPect of it s balanced working' The

personal dynamics of his relationship with them determined

whether or noË the balance \¡/as mainÈaíned '

A final evaluation of the role of Ëhe praetorian guard

must. make several points' The guard' lts officers and prefect

hrere merely one componenÈ of a security network involving

people such as barbarían custg4erlr farnilia members and famlly

-29L-

members. At many Polnts in their publtc and perlpheral

control of the emperorrs working enviroirment' the functions

of the guard are overlapped by those of these others' Such

cross-checks were almost uníversally applied in the most

crucial areas of ímperial activlty, the frontíer provinces'

the emperorts personal activities and the lnformatíon system

which línks them all. Further, the guard can be viewed too

easíly as an intimidatory unit ' All too often critical

incidents reveal that it. \^Ias composed of individuals and groups

ofvarioussízeswíthdifferentmoÈivations.Aboveall,desp-

íte the arxay of examples of resÈiveness wíthin' it is clear

that for the great majority of time durtng the period under

consideration there r^/ere no plots and no internal rumblings

ofdÍscontent.TheguardandltsolÙncomPonerrtsperformedthe

functlons assigned to it with considerable skill and effective-

NESS.

-292-

APPENDIX PLOTS

This appendix is ínËended for use as a source of

reference about the plots which províde a considerable portíon

of the evidence used ín the thesis. Also íncluded are íncidents

deemed valuable for information they reveal abouE security pro-

ceduresandattitudes.Thedescriptíongivenherepointsinthe

maint'ofactorswhicharerelatedtothesecurityissuesandare

discussed in thaÈ context in Ëhe body of the thesís. As far as

possible,theincídentsaretreatedinchronologícalorder'The

source references, PIR, are Ëo Pros opographia Imperií Romaní.

Saec. I, II, III. Ed' E' Groag, A' Stein et al' Second edition

1933 and at. intervals since' I"Ialter de Gruyter and Co'

(1) A.D. L2 (?) L. Audasius and As inius Epicadus.

v. Pappano, A.E .

and Jameson, S.

1975, 287 - 3r4.

Agrippa PosËumus. 36 L94L, 30 - 45

Thetentatívedatingofthisplothingesuponthe

connecÈionofseveralofthosementíonedínAugustus!capaces

imperií speech (Tac. Ann' 1'13) with people involved here and

with a tíghtening of regulatíons about certain exí1es at this

time. The ploË ítself íntended to rescue either of the Jullas

or Agrippa Postumus from Ëheir places of exile and then to trans-

port them to the head of some a''ny group, presumably the German

ones, if Clemenst attempts in A'D' 14 and L6 ate any guides

C.P .

Augustus and Agrippa Postumus' Hístoti-a' 24'

-293-

(q.v. plot (6)). Audasíus vras a convicted forger' a skill

perhaps required to bypass the guards of the exiles ' Even if

Agrippa Postumus was no longer a 1egal heír (v' Levíck'B'M'

Abdica'ion and Agrippa Postumus. Historía. 2]_, L972, 674 - 97),

a Senate threatened by an army would not deny Èhat he had a

legitimateclaim.Hewasthefocusofanti-Claudianpolitícal

elements.

(2) An Illyrian camP orderly evaded Porters and was

found near Augustus' bedroom in the palace at níght bearing a

hunting knife (Suet. Aug' 19)' He was presumably found by the

GermanbodyguardswholookedaftertheinËernalsecurítyofthe

palace.

(3) When ín Gaul, Augustus negoÈiated with a Gallic

chíeftain who could not carry ouË his plan to kil1 the emperor

by throwing him from a cllfftop because of the emperorts serene

expression (Suet. Aug' 79), c'f' plot (33)'

(4) A.D. L4. The death of A tus.

v. Charlesworth, M'P' Tiberius and the death of Augustus'

A.J.P.44, 1923,145 - 157 for an analysís of related events

such as the Agrippa Postumus affair'

This all-eged plot involves one of the more íngeníous

methods of poisoning reveated in our sources (CD' 56 30'2)'

Augustus,loveoffl-gswaswellknoumtoLiviawho,wíËhTíberius'

supposedly wished to hasten the death of Augustus' Ripe figs

stíll on the tree in the emperorts garden vlere poisoned so thaÈ

T,ii¡iia-r could píck and hand one to her unsuspectíng husband '

-294-

(s) A.D. t4 Tiberius. Ëhe first months.

v. Tacitus Annals Bk. I in partícular for these events.

In addítíon Ëo the írnmediate liquldation of Agrippa

Postumus on Augustus' death (q.v. Jameson op' cít' passim),

for which Tiberíus was held by many to be responsible, t\"Io

mutinies broke out ín the rnajor northern frontier armles,

possibly arranged to coincíde wíth news of the princeps!denrise.

The push for Germanícus as alternaËive candidate to Tiberius

and the general upheaval of the moment render the incidents

not above suspicíon. c.f. ShoËter, D.C.A. Julíans, Claudíans

and Ëhe accession of Tíberius. Latomus, 30, 197L, 1117 - LL23.

(6) A.D. 16 . Clemens, the false candidate.

A farniliar face could be exploited for polítical purp-

oses. Dangerous senatorial support is 1íkely in the case of

clemens who was popularly accepted as Agrippa Postumus. The

movement would have made the emperor suspici-ously a\¡Iare of the

dangers frorn withín the ímperíal famj-lia, Clemens being one

such líbertus.

v Millar, F A study of Cassíus Dío , Ox. U.P., L964,

Appendíx V.

(7) A.D. 19. The death of Germanicus.

v. pln2 T zzL and ptR2 c 2g7 (Germanfcus and Calpurnius Piso,

respectively) for the main sources '

Calpurnius Piso' governor of Syría at the time' was

appointed by Tiberius as â cross-checking influence upon Germanicus'

Hís crude interpretation of this role may have contríbuted to the

-295-

death of Germanicus. uncertain as riTe are abouÈ the accusation

of poisoning made against Piso, his príor actions seem to have

engenderedbeliefbyGermanicusthatpoisonandmagichadbeen

used against hím. A supernatural-cum-psychological war of

nerves could be just as dangerous as a dagger in the hand of a

plotter.

c.f. Cramer, F.H. Astrolosy in Roman 1aw and practice.

Phíladelphía, Ig54, passim, for an account of the ínfluence

of astrology ín political affaírs '

(8) A.D. 23. The death of Drusus.

v. PrR2 a. 255 (sejanus), PrR2 r 2L9 (Drusus), PrR2 L 303

)(Livilla), PIRZ A 913 (Apicata); also Balsdon' J'P'V'D'

The murder of Drusus, son of Tíberius' CR' N'S' I' 1951' 15'

Disregarding the question of Apicata! s credibility'

the incident reveals the dangers to an emperor of adulËery

involvingamemberoftheimperialfarníly.Successioncould

be deËerrnined by ties to the female members of the imperial

family, províding valuable legitímacy to outsiders' Sejanus

certainly qualifíed as an outcast in the social aspects of the

po\¡rer game' relative to the imperial fanÍ1y at least' Q'v'

Sumner, G.V. The farnily connectíons of L' Aelius Sejanus'

Phoeníx'19,Lg65,L34-45.TheaccountofDrusus!deathalso

illusÈrates how much a prominent person could depend upon pêrs-

onal attendants. The agents of the alleged poisoníng were said

to be Lívlllars physician and the familyts poison-taster, who

tailoredthepoisontoproduceanapparently.longa¡ddebilitat='

ing d.isease, aided by the effects of hea:vy drinking'

-296-

(e) A.D.3l. The conspir acy of Sej anus.

v. Ptn2 A 255 (Sejanus); also Bírd, Ìi'I^I' L' Aelius Sejanus

and hís political sígnificance' LaÈomus ' 28' 1969' 60 - 98'

and, L. Aelius Sejanus - further observations ' Latomus'29'

LglO, LO46 - 1050; Boddington, A' Sejanus - whose conspiracy?

A.J.P. 84, L963, 1- 16.

This incident well illustrates that the power of the

praeËorian prefect is closely dependent upon imperial support'

Sejanus had been Tiberíust agent agaínst the genuinely dis-

affected famíIy of Germanícus in the 20t s A.D. Sejanust !'support-

ers,' of the senatorial and equestrían classes eventually prowed

loyal to Tiberius above hím as ls shown by the aftermath of

ËheprefectlsfateandindicaËíonsthatkeysenatorialsmayhaye

pressured Tiberius into abandoning his chÍef minisÈer (q'v'

Boddíngton, A. oP. cit') This is riot to mínímise the danger'

TiberiusIrecentambivalencemayhavescaredtheprefectintoa

desperateplot.SejanusIconËroloverthemessengers'thespecu-

latores,dídnotgivetotalcontrolofinformationflowasis

clear from the way ín which the emperor employed Macro, the

former praefectus vigilum, to engíneer the prefectts removal'

MacrohadaccesstoTiberíusthroughhíswlfeEnnlawhowasgrand-

daughterofthecouÏtastrologer,Thrasyllus(q.v.Cramer,op.cít.

p. 105). In the suppressíon of the I'plott'' neíther praetorians

nor urban cohorts r¡rere used, boÈh beíng encamped at the castra

oraetoria and so suspecËed of too much loyalty dírectly to the

man who had unified them there so recently' The vLgiles had

recently been under Macrots command and so were used in preference'

-297-

The elaboïate nature of Tíberíust plans for Sejanusr downfall

and his own conËingency for escape are indicatíons of the

extentoftheprefect'sínfluence.IEisinstructiveËonote

that one of those purged laËer was in control of the public

treasury. trIíth great secrecy, Macro, Laco (now praefectus

vigilum)andtheconsul,Regulus,manipulatedtheurbangarrison.

Drusus, son of Germanicus, was to be resurrected from the palace

dungeon Ëo inspire the loyalty of the troops, if necessary (q'v'

prn2 r 220). At Capri, fleet detachments hTere ready to remove

Tíberius to the easËern armíes, who vTere consíderably less in-

fluencedbySejanusthanthoseofthenorthernfrontiers(q.'.

Grant, M. The Army of the Caesars. London , 1974, P. 141.).

However,pre_arrangedsignalfirestransmittedthemessagethat

this was riot necessary. The prefect was dead and reprisals had

begun.

(10) Tiberius, at the battlefront and not yet emperor'

was in danger from an assassin disguised as an attendant' The

man's nervousness betrayed him' Suet' Tíb' f9'

( 1r) A.D. 37 . The death o f Tiberius.

v. Tac. Ann. 6.50, SueË' Tíb' 73, CD 58 '28'5 as the main

sources; also ptn2 r 2L7 anð. pln2 t 226 f.or sources on Gaius

and Tiberius Gemellus, respectívely'

Gaius \^las not as secure in hís accession as Tiberius

hadbeeninthathehadnoímperiumandTiberiusGemelluswas

joínËclaimanttopol^Terastheco-heirofTiberius,despitehis

youËh. Control of the Senatets expressed views and of rnílitary

298 -jÈ

PoT¡IerhTastobevital.Anumberofrumoursaboutthe'manner

of Tiberiusr death sprang up as a result of the manner of

Gaius,succession,hislatertreatmentofMacroandofTiberius

Gemellus.AlthoughasËrologicalforecasËmadeTiberiuscon-

fident of a further nine or Ëen years of lífe (q.v. cramer op' cit'

p.106f.),hishealthbeganËofailandËoadiscerni-bledegree

(Suet. Tib - 72). Gaíus and Macro are said to have hastened

the emperor's death with a variety of possíble methods' The

truth of the matter remalns uncertain'

(r2) A.D. 38. The dea tho f Tiberius Gemellus.

v. Ptn2 T 226 for principal sources'

CreaËíng a pretext for the removal of a potential

rival for power, Gaius inËerpreted a medicine Ëaken by Tiberíus

Gemellus as an antidote agaínst poison. Manifestly treasonable

to suspect that Èhe emperor would polson anyone' Gemellus \^las

ordered Èo suicide. The act was supervísed by praetorians'

(13) A.D. 4L. The assassinat ion of Calisula.

Sources for Ëhe maín partícipants in these events are

?provided by prR- r 2L7 (Gaius), prRz A 701 (Annius vínicianus) '

prR2 c 44g (Cassíus chaerea), prR2 c 143r (Cornelius Sabínus),

PrR2 A 1073 (Arrecinus Clemens) '

After the plot by Lepidus and Gaetulicus rnras suppressed

in A.D. 39 (q.v. ptn2 t 64I (Aerippina the Younger) and PrR2

T 674 (Julia Livílla)), parts of Gaiusf support base were alien-

ated. Of several independent plots maËuring in A'D' 40' two be-

cameknowntoeachother,amalgarnatedandsucceeded.Thoseín-

volvedfunctionedatahighpublícandd'omesticlevel:Annius

Vínícíanus, Èhe leader of an írnportant senatorial element; at

-299-

leastonepraeËorianprefect,M.ArrecinusClemens,whoturned

a bllnd eye; praetorian tribunes, who acted as the main strlke

force; a key imperlal freedman, Callistus' Thus combiníng free-

dom of access to Èhe emperorts person' knowledge of hís move-

menËs, Lhe freedom Èo carry T¡Teapons near him' the power to

control crowds and the command of other securiÈy forces'

enabling them to be held at a distance from the emperor' the

assassination was relatively sirnple for the praetorian officers'

It ts easy to understand why Claudíus tightened up personal

securl-ty precautíons very early ln hls reígn and consequently

ensured a close affinity lrith Ëhe military'

(14) L.D. 42. The death of APP ius Silanus.

The freedman Narcissus engl-neers this tragedy. Pre-

arranging for the vlctim to call upon the emperor' Narcíssus

revealedadreamtoClaudíusinwhichsilanustriedtoforce

hís way ínto the palace. Hís arrival as "predicted" meant

his immedlate execution, soon afterwards reporËed to the

Senate. Suet. Claud . 37 '

.tI

,t

Èr

fÀ:àl

i!

15) A.D. 47. The p lot of Cn. Noricus.(

The equestrian, Cn. Noricust \¡Ias found to be carryíng

a concealed weapon at the emPerorts morning salutatío. (Tac'

Ann. lf. 19.) It is not clear whether it was found before or

after his admitËance' nor how l-È was found'

If the attempt was mad'e after the bodysearching pro-

cedures had been ímplemented (q'v' ch' 6 pP'114f)' vre must

assume the ploÈter rnlas desperate or deranged' The latter ís noÈ

Èo be disrnissed Èoo easíly, cf. plot (35) ' Someone acËing

illogically so would be less easy to legislate agaínst'

-300-

(16) A.D. 48 . The conspíracv of C. Silius and

Messalína.

v. Ptn2 C g42 (Claudíus) and, ín partícular here' Tac' Ann'

11, 26-38i Suet. Claud. 26; CD 60'31'

Thiseventrevealsclearlythedepende.nceoftheemperor

uponoËhersforhislnformation.Narcíssusandotherimperíal

freedmen had long been aware of Messalinats adulteries but only

acted once a concrete threat to theír own pohTer materiallsed'

sílíus and his supporters seem to have been confident of success'

if his "public" rnarriage with Messalína is an indicatíon' Ner¡s

reached claudius at ostia through Ëwo of hís concubines, primed

by Narcissus. The latter found ít necessary to combat the

hesitat.ion of claudlus by havíng himself appointed sole praetorian

prefect for the day in place of others noË above suspicion'

silíus and his followers ¡¿ere immediately rounded up and executed

bypraetoríanofficers'afteramakeshifttrialattheÓástra

praetoria. Messalina hTas similarly executed, on Narcissus! order'

under the supervision of an ímperíal freedrnan' The praetorians

were addressed Ëo secuïe their loyalty" rt was also found that

the raefectus vi 1um and the superintendent of the imperíal

gladiatorial school were involved, i'e' people controlling armed

forces at Rome.

(17) A commoner r¡las arrested at night near Claudius!

bedroom. Suet. Claud. 13' He was carryíng a dagger'

(rs)Twokníghts\^TerefoundnearClaudiuswíthlùeapons

in separate incidenËs. One was found as the emperor was leaving

;

,t

È

i¡

tt

'I

It,

I

I

{

¡'j

{r

fI

LÌ

ùþ'-301-

the theaËre ín possessíon of a sword-cane. The other was

found wlth a hunÈíng knife as Ëhe emPeror was sacrifícing.

sueÈ. claud. 13. for both incídents. c.f. plot (34) on the

latter.

'l{

19) A.D. 54. The death of Claudíus(

22v. pIR¿ I 641 (Agríppína rhe Younger), PIR- A 6l-7 (Seneca),

t2pIRz A 441 (Burrus), PIR' D L29 (Nero) for princlpal sources.

For a modern interpretatíon, G. Bagnaní. The case of the pois-

oned mushrooms. Phoenix. I.2, 1946, L4 -.. 20'

As in ^.;the

rtmours arísÍng froru rhís inci.denr

reflect the unstable successlon issue in which an adopted older

heirmanagestoedgeoutanotherwhohasamoredl-rectblood

relationshíp with the dead emperor. Two ¡¡ersÍons of this poÍsoning

rumour occur, wlth Agrippina ultfmately responsible in b'oth. usíng

eiËher a poisoned or poisonous mushroom at a domestÍc meal'

Claudíust loss of conscíousness was attrl-buted to hís habitual

drunkenness, usefully exploited Èo dÍsarm susplcfon. Alternati¡¡ely'

claudius ís said to have been poisoned publicly' through his P.raej

gustator, Halot.us, although the precíse .manner in whieh poison

was inÈroduced is not clear. Claudius died later at the palace

through the agency of an ímperíal physícianls poisoned feather.

It seems that claudíus normally allowed hj.s throat to be tickled

so while he was asleep, as an emeÈic. (suet. claud. 33). Both

were Agrippinats agenÈs supposedly. In the.meantime, Narc{ssus

had been convalescing in Campanía, aË AgrippLnal's recoumendation'

(q.v. J.H. DlArms. Romans on the Bay Óf Naples' Harvard U'P'

-302-

Lg7O, p. 141 and, specífically, CD' 6L'34'4')' Narcissus had

kept an attentive eye on 0laudius lrr A.D. 48 but was diverted

here by those interested only in the emperorrs demise'

(20)

c 820

A.D. 55. The murder of Brit.annicus.

(Nero) ;

TAPA. 86,

l

J

IÞ.

,t

{¡1,

ïiI

I

II

2 2v. PIR (Britannicus), PIR D L29

R.S. Rogers. Heirsand rivals Ëo Nero'

AgrlppinahadspreadrumoursofBritannícusbeingínsane

and suffering from epilepsy in her campaígn to see Nero preferred

for the succession. Now that she was pushíng BritannÍcus as leg--

ltimateheír,inanatÈempttobolsterherdecliningpower,Nero

exploitedtheserumoursinhl-splot.AftervigorousexperimentaË-

ionrLoeustacreatedafast-workingpoisondesignedtoappearas

an epíleptic fít, accordíng Èo Nerots interpretation. Brítannlcust'

personal atÈendants had long been more favourable to Nero and were

now used so Ëhat the youËh could be poisoned publicly. A ruse

caused the poison-tastíng procedure to be bypassed' Brítannicus

\^ras cremated thaÈ same evening. All present vlere suspicious'

(2L) A.D. 59. The dea th of Asr l_na.

o')v. PrR¿ D Lzg (Nero), PrR' T 64L (Agríppína) '

Once the more elaboraËe and deceptive plan for Agrippina

to meet wíth an "accídent" had failed, Nero had Èo thínk quíckly

about his next course of action' Now that Seneca and Burrus

\¡rere cerËainly a\¡rare of proceedíngs, his view thaË the praetorians

couldnotbeemployedagaínstthiswomanthattheyreveredso

muchwasreaffirmed.AnicetusT¡TaStofiníshhístask,apretext

being afforded by the arrival of Agrippinats messenger. Ad.rniÈted

see also

1955, L90-212.

303 -

to Nero's presence, a \¡/eapon was dropped at Ëhe emíssaryts

feet. Thus found guilty of plotÈíng, Agrippina was executed'

Nevertheless, Nero had not fooled his own guard officers, 9'v'

Tac. Ann. 15. 67.

(22) A.D. 62. The death of Octavia.

v. Tac. Ann. l4. 59-64; Suet' Nero 35; CD' 62' 13'l'

Anicetus ís involved once more' As commander of the

ímperial fleeË based at Mísenum, he was in a positlon of some

ínfluence. Octavía \^ras accused by Anícetus of cornmitting

adultery with him ín her attempt to suborn the fleet against

Nero. Her baníshment and death resulted, an interesting and

tragicindícaËionofthevalueplaceduponÈhepremierimperíal

fleet ín the emperorrs security and conmunicaÈíonsr 9'V'

C.G. Starr. The Roman ImP eríal Navy. Cornell U,P. 1941 passim

and p . L77 on the role of sailors as couriers '

(23) A.D. 65. The P isonian consp iracy.

v. PrR2 c 284 (Píso), PrR2 Ã 617 (seneca), PrR2 F lo2

(Faenius Rufus) and especially Tac' Ann' 15' 47-end'

Disaffection with Nero ín many quarters of the aristoc-

racy and the military produced this conspiracy of rnajor pro-

portions.Tigellinus,thepraetorianprefect'\^IaSlongsuspicious

of such as Seneca and Piso' The maln hope of the plot was the

secondprefectrFaeníusRufusranothertofearforhisposition

and his lífe. Other praetorlan guard officers were involved'

ThebroadSpectrumofplottersproduceddiversityofopiníonon

method and aim. It was suggested Ëhat Nero be assassínated at

piso's country villa which the emperor aPparently frequented

l

-304-

\^rithout guards. (c.f. Trajan and Licínius sura, cD 68. 15.5.)

Rejecting Ëhis plan on eËhical grounds, it was decided to kill

the princePs at Èhe games as a suppllanË held him down' An

earlier attempt to suborn the Misentrm fleet courmander had pro--

duced earLy warníng to Nero of a plot. It was fínally revealed

by the freedman of the plotter who was tending the "faËal" dagger,

on the eve of its execution. The subseguent investigation and

reprísals moved quickl-y, eventually Èaking ln the ruill-tary

elements who stíll had access to Nero with thelr .tfeaPons, until

Ëhey were suspected. The complicity of key securíty'personnel

made this a plot of the greatest danger'

(24) A.D.68. The downfall of Nero.

v. PrR2 D :r2g (Nero).

Nerors indecisiveness in the face of a relaËlvely mínor

rebellíon ín Gaul caused his posítion to be undermíned seríously

so that =key security forces \^tere induced to abandon hirn' tr'Iith

Tígellinus abandoníng Nero, fellow prefecË Nymphidius Sabinus

workedonGalbalsbehalfwiththeSenatetobríngaboutthe

defection of Nerors bodyguard and a declaration of hím as hostfs'

while the emperor attempted to retreat to Egypt. suicidê prê-

vented a more gríslY death'

(25) A.D. 69. The assassína on of

v. Tac. Hist. 1.L-44, Suet' Galba L6 ff'' CD 64'5 f for

the prínciPal sources.

Galba'sreígn\^Tasacomedyoferrorsandmiscalculations

whichprecipitatedasuccessioncrisis.Hísplantoadoptthe

aristocrat píso early ín fanuary fínally'alienated important

supporËers, notably OËho' As a pÏecaution' Otho had for some

time been cultÍvatl-ng praetorians, especially the élite bodyguard'

-305-

rhe sDeculatores (c.f. Grant op. cít. p. 186). They were

already dlsaffected due to Èhe non-payment of the promlsed

donatl-ve and the dísmissal of Nymphídíusr supporters in Ëhe

urban garríson. Othors attempt rnlas delayed for five days

after the adoption on the adriice of an ast.rologer (q.v. cramer

op. cit. p. L32). Then, Galbats control \^las seen Ëo be inade-

quate. The praeËorian prefect, Lacot \rlas caught una\¡rares'

Galba could not feel confident of the city garrison. He had dis-

missed Ëhe Germani corPoris custodes in A.D. 68 as being potent-

íally dangerous (q.v. Durry,op' cit', p' 23)' Other trosps

temporarilyatRomeandofpossibleuse\^IeÏescattered,difficult

to co-ordinate and unfamilíar with the city. Even the"disin=

formant"who announced Othots I'deathrt, plesumably sent to enÈ1ce

Galbaintotheopen,wasreprimandedunrealistically.lüíthËhe

defecËion of the praeÈorian cohort on duty' Galba died' an o1d

man who failed to see politica1 reallty and to supervise or handle

hís own security forces effectively'

(26) A.D. 69. MutinY o fthep raetorians.

v. F.C. Mench. The Cohortes Urbanae of Imperial Rome:

an EpiqraPhic Studv. Yale PH.D. PP' 475 ff'

Thedangersofamílitaryforceofdoubtfuldisclpline

and cohesion in unstable tímes are illustraËed here' The níght

timeloadíngof\^Teaponsbyatribuneoftheguardprobablydestined

for osËia, the presumed departure point for an expedition agaínst

vitellían forces in Narbonese Gaul, caused praetorian rank and

fíle to suspect an attempt to arm the slaves of senators so pro-'

found was their distrust now of the offícers (q.v. ch" 10 pp' 243f)'

306 -

Killing strÍct centurions and any obstrucÈlve officers or

guards, they almost precípítated a massacre which could have

placed Othots safety in jeopardy' OÈho subsequently made great

effortstoímprovecommunícationsbetweenhimself'hisofficers

and his men.

The incident also demonstrates the difficulties of

discipline for a non-heredltary emPeror who sirnply Èook over

the troops of hÍs predecessor' The problen Ï/as often solved

at the end of a civil war períod by a major reconstrucËion of

the guard.

(27) A.D . 79. The cons t o Caec Alienus and

Epr ius Marcellus.2

v. prR2 r' 399 (Tltus), prn2 c 99 (caecina Alienus) " PrR

E 84 (EPrius Marcellus) '

As both praetorian prefect and legitimate helr' Tltus

r¿as in a uníque posltíon to keep an eye on siËuations which

courd influence the succession. (for furËher actLvlËies as

prefect' see SueÈ. Tit' 6)' A plot was allegedly'uncovered to

suborn the urban garríson slnce Caeclna hras supposedly- caught

r,rliËh a prepared speech on his person in the palace' IIe r^¡as

írmnediaÈely execuÈed. Marcellus suicided. Titust' acknowledged

skillsasaforgermayhavebeenusedinËhissuspiciousincident"

(28) Titus had dlscovered a plot by Èwo patrfcians'

Instead of destroying them, he assured them of his friendship

and trust in varíous \^rays, íncluding allowing thern to Èes't glad-'

iat.orl-al \^Teapons while sittl'ng by hls slde at the games'"

Suet. Tit. 9

-307-

(2e) A.D. BI. The deaËh of Títus

t2v. pIRz F 3gg (Tirus), pIR' y' 259 (Domirían); M. Hammond.

The transmission of the povlers of the Roman emperor from the

death of Nero in A.D. 68 to ËhaÈ of Alexander Severus ín

4.D.235. MAAR. 24, L956, P'84'

Domítianrs sËaËus as legal heir díd not stop hím'

accordíng Ëo rumour, from plottíng constantly against his

brother (Suet. Tit. 9)' Rumour also aËtríbuted Titusr death

to poisoning by Domitían who then secured vital military

Supportforhissuccessionwithíndecenthaste(Suet.Dom.2).

Domítían,s relatívely Ëardy promotion and supposed snubs by his

fathersupplíedthemotíves,bitternessandfrustratedambition.

( 30) A.D. 96. The assassina tion of Domitian.

v. Prpz E 25g (Domitian).

Once Domitiants paranoiocvicious círcle extended to

ínclude domestics (EpaphrodiÈus), security officers and memb='

ers of the imperial family (Flavius Clemens) ' the fear he en--

gendered caused a group of such people to exploit their control

of ínformatíon and access to him for their self-preservatlon'

The plans of DomiÈia, Èhe cublcularius Parthenius, and one of

the praetorian prefeÇ''ts, Petronius Secundus' aÍming to elevate

Nerva (q.v. Hammond, oP' cit', p' 86)' were focused upon Domítían!'s

superstit,ious regard for an astrological prediction of the time

of his death (q.v. cramer¡ oP. cit., p. 143 f)' Spurred on by

the accldental discovery of their ohln execution warrants' they

removed.thebladefromadaggerDomitíankeptunderhíspil1-ow.

'bí"irrfotmed"about the hour of the day by a rehea'rsed servant'

Domitian, believing the faÈal hour Èo have passed' relaxerl

-308-

suffíciently to a1low his assassin to be adrnitted on a matËer

of urgency. Manipulation by the emperorfs "gatekeepers" had

allowed this prophecy, aÈ least, to fulfil ítself'

(31) A.D. 97. The plot of Calpurn ius Crassus.

v. PrR2 c 259.

Later arl unrepenÈant plotter' Crassus tried to suborn

urban garrison trooPsr an area in which Ëhe emperors r^7ere

particularlyvigilanÈ.Thereisnocertaínconnectionbetween

thisincidentand.therevoltofthePraetoriansofthesane

yeaï (plot (32)). Yet, in such a year, especíal care musÈ have

been taken with the garrison (c.f. Grant, oP, cít', p' 226 ff)"

AfterdetectingCrassustactívities,Nervaallowedhimtosit

besidehimatthegamesandtotestgladl-atorial\¡IeaPofIS,c.f.

plot (2S) above. The main upshot of the yearls instability was

the adoption of Trajan, commander of the forces in Upper Germany..

(cD. 68.3.4).

(zz¡

Plin. Pan.

A.D. 97. Mutiny of the praetorians.

5f, cD68.3.3

The íncident points Ëo the importance of the prefect!s

role in maintainíng order and dlscipl-íne among the guardsTnen'

Casperlus Aellanus, reinstated as prefect' reklndled discontent

over Doml-Èiants death' Mutinying, they foreed the defenseless

Nerva to yíetd the culprits to thelr vengeance' Nerva!s humil-

íatíon forced him to secure the successlon and so sÈabilit¡'

A commander of legions was appolnted' able to l-mpose hÍs authority

over the guard if necessary' On his accession' Trajan summoned

v

v

-309-

and executed Èhe ringleaders of the mutiny (CD' 68' 5'4)

( 33) A.D. LO4 AttempË to ass assinate Traian.

the Daclan king' savr an oPportunity to kill

Trajan in hís battlefront camP and so elimínate effective Roman

leadershÍp for some time ' On learníng that deserters ürere

belng admitted freely to Trajants presence for ínformation they

could yield on Dacían strategyt ttdeserters"-cum-assassins were

sent. one was arrested on suspícion and. so that plot revealed'

Decebarus musË have given them tantalisingly good information

for them to gain access' Nevertheless' lt is lnconceivabl-e that

access \¡ras granted wlËhout theír r^TeaPons being removed and Trajan

being supported by advisers, interpreters and other personnel'

(34) A.D. 118. The conspir acy of the four consulars.

v. e. g.

Nigrínus)

PrR2 L 439 (Lusius QuieËus), PrR2 A 1408 (Avidius

for major sources.

TherewasconsíderablelaÈenthostllttyatHadrian!s

retreat from Trajants expanslonísm, especÍally by such powerful

generals as Lusius Quietus who had lost an ímportant command to

Q. Marcius Turbo, the future praetorian prefect' Detaíls about

theallegedplotíndlcateareligioussacrificeorahunÈing

expedition as the venue. Before Hadrian returned to Rorne, the

four consulars had been eliminated after senatorial condemnation,

engineered it seems by the prefect Attianus (sHA. Hadr. 7, c.f'

ídern5.).Considerablesenat'oríalhostiJ.ityhadtobeplacated

on Hadríants return. The incidenË well íllustrates Domltianrs

cD 68. 11. 3.

Decebalus,

-310-

famous aphorism ËhaÈ no ploÈ against an emperor is belleved

unless successful. (Suef" Dom' 2]-')

(35)llhíleínSpaín,HadríanlTaSattackedbytheslave

ofhishostinthegarden.Hadríanpersonallydisarmedthe

man who \¡ras ascertained Èo be mad and his treatment by doctors

r^ras seen to, SHA. Hadr. L2.1'. !ühíIe thus relaxing, on thls

occasion, iË seems that Hadrian was unescorËed'

(36) A.D. 180. The death of Marcus Aurelius.

v. prn2 ^

697 (Marcus Aurelius) and PrR2 A L4B2 (Cornmodus),

specificallY here, CD 71' 33' 42 '

I,{e have mention of a favour given to commodus by the

docÈors of Marcus Aurelius. His illness at Èhls tlme is weJ'l

attestedsoÈhattheplot,lfitoccurred'isthehasteningof

his death on behalf of the oÈher Augustu.s'

(37) A.D. 182. The plot of Lucil1a.

v. PlR2 A' 7O7 (Lucílla) for princlpal sources'

Lucilla'sambitionshadbeenfrustratedsincethedeattr

of the husband, Lucius verus, in A.D, L6g (by a var:íety of poison

attempts, it was rumoured, incldentally" c'f" SHA Lr¡e' Ver' 10 f)'

she now concerted an attempt on the life of her brother, corEtodusn

The assassin conceal-ed a dagger 1n his cloak' waited for the

emperor in the shadowy Passages of the arnPhftheaÈre,- and would

herehavesucceededinkillíngComrnodusashepassedifnotfor

the desire to splutter a slogan, Ít l-s rel-ated. This gave-- nearby'

securitypersonneltlmetocourrterhiselernentofsurpriseandso

- 311 .-

apprehend him. Investígatíon led to Lucillars death ín exile

and various other reprisals, includíng the removal of the

prefect Tarruttienus Paternus' SHA' Comm' 4

( 38) A.D. 185 . The death of Perennís

v. Herodian 1. 9, CD 72'9, SHA Comm' 6'

Perennis had placed men favourable Èo himself in key

provincial posts. Pressure by a detachment of British soldiers

in Rome and the public denunciatíon of the prefect by a phílos-

opheronstageatareligiousfestivalaÈtendedbytheemperor

sarnr to the removal of Perennis for a "plot" ' The mosË líkely

manípulator of these events is the powerful cubicularius'

Cleander.

(3e) A.D. t86/7. MaLernus, Èhe bri

v. Herodian I. 10' (MaÈernus \¡Ias an evocatus and a deserÈer'

which accounts to some degree for knowledge of precautions).

Once pressure was put upon his band ln the \nlestern

provínces,Maternusandhismenlnfíltratedltalywíthaplan

ËomurderCommodus.AttheHílariafestival,particÍpantsÈrad-

íËionallyworedisguisesandraccordingtoHerodiari'praetorians

wenË unarmed (c.f. ch' 6 pp'l55ff for full discussion of this

polnÈ).ThebrigandsweretodisguiseÈhemselvesaspraetoríans

andsogainaccessËotheemperor.Lastminutebetrayalbysome

ofhisownmensawMaternusarrestedandhisbandsuppressed.

The entíre story is not above suspicion'

40) A.D . 190. The dor'rnfall of Cleander.(

v c.R.whíttaker.TherevoltofPapíriusDíonysius.Historía.

13, L964, 348 - 69.

As with Perennis and other such ttvizierstt' the incident

-3L2-

here shows them very much subject to envy' fear and manipul-

ation, targets for plots as much as the emperors' Manipul-

atlon of the corn supply by Papiríus Dionysíus produced faml-ne

and led to rÍots and street battles between the urban cohorts'

the people and the forces at Cleanderrs disposal' Commodus

was informed of the situatíon by a female relative who had

free access to his person, a loophole ín Cleanderrs control

of Èhe flow of information' Theap (q.v. ch. 6 P.98)

was quickly sacrificed to the mob' The manlpulaËors of the

strife soon suffered themselves. The dangers of an emperor

notSupervisinghissubordínatesadequatelyhadbeenpointed

out.

(4r¡ A.D. 192. The assass ínat ion of Commodus.

1?v. plnz 1482 (cormnodus), PrRz A 358 (Aemilius Laetus)

for princiPal sources.

In clrcumstances very siml-lar to those of A'D ' 96'

especially ín the discovery of death hrarrants thaÈ are Ëhe

pïetext for a plot of self-preservatíon' Commodus fe1l to a

desperate consplracy involvíng his concubine' Marcía' his

cubícularius Eclectus, and one of his praetorian prefects'

Aemilius LaeËus. The emperor was kílled by an athleÈLcs

lnsÈrucËor' given access through their agency' after poison

had been admínistered by Marcia with linl-ted success' Hís

body was smuggled past Ëhe corrÍdor guards'

-313-

(42¡ A.D. 193. The as sassanat,íon of Pertínax.

1)v. pIRz H 73 (perrínax), pIR¿ A 358 (Aernilius Laetus) for

príncipal sources; also Durry, oP' cít" p' 382'

Failíng to control the strict Pertinax' Laetus

ploÈted hís replacement. By purging elements of the guard

in the emPeror's name, exisËing discontent was intensffied

to the point that tI^/o or three hundred Èroops, probably

EquiÈes S ineula res. atËacked the palace' Access \^las not barred

to them. RaËher than use Èhe superior numbers of men aË hís

disposal to repel the invaders (-4'v' CD 74' 9'3) Pertinax

attempted to negotíate alone and was kílled'

(43) A.D. 2O5. The fall of Plau tian.

v. Herodían 3. 11, CD 76' 3 ff'

Plautíanfs great pohrer ín imperíal government and over

the lives of the Augusti finally became too.much for his

son-in-law, CataeaLLa' As co-emPeroÏ' Caracalla had his own

contingent of praeÈorians (q'v' Grant' oP' cit" p' 260)' now

put to good use. It seems Ëhat a "plott' by Plautian'was fabric-

aËed so as to remove him' The praetorían tribune of the watch

\nras to assassinate the Augusti ín virÈue of his freedom of

access. Plautian had supposedly given a wríÈten order to thís

effect Ëo the tribune' The tribune betrayed Plautlan and a

irrp \ü"" seË as a result. The prefect arrived wearing a breast=

plateand'wasimmedíatelyexecutedbyCaracalla'sguards.PlauËian

had been especíally dangerous through his farníly ties to Èhe

emperors, a link Sejanus could not attain'

-3r4-

v

(44) A.D. 212. The assas sinatlon of Geta.

CD 77.1 ff, Herodiar- 4' 3 ff, SHA CaracaLLa 2'

SHA Geta Passim.

Serious differences bêtween the two heirs had resulted'

on their reLurn Èo Rome, in the divísíon of facilltles' l'e'

the palace, Ëheir servants, food and drink faciliËies' security

forces. continuous secret plotting against each other had been

fruítless. Catacalla finally exploited the one conmon area

between them, theíÏ moÈher' FeÍ-gning a wish to be reconciled'

they meË ín their motherfs bedroom unguarded' Catacallars

offícers immediately rushed ln and murdered Geta' It is notable'

nonetheless, that not all securíty forces held loyalties to one

broËher only, SHA' Caracalla 2' 7 f '

(4s) A.D. 2L7. The assas sination of Caracalla.

v. Herodían 4. 12 Í.f.' CD 78' 4 ff , SHA' Caracalla 7 '

SHA. Macrinus 4.

The involvement of top security personnel here gave

the plot an excellent chance of success' The praetorian

prefecË, Macrinus' I¡¡as the instigator' using a disaffected

junior officer as the assassin' Macrinus had been alerted to

the danger to himself by accident when given mail to read by

Caracalla, a function apparently noÈ normal for Ëhe prefect'

asthesenderoftheletterandJuliaDomna,handlingimperl'al

correspondence aË Antioch, will have known' The letter from

the aefectus urbi Maternianusr \¡Tarned Caracalla of an

astrological pred'ictíon of an attemPt at usurpation by Macrinus'

As in Domitíants case, the proPhecy nÖvl becarne self-fulftlling

v

- 315

(q.v. Cramer, oP. cl-t, p ' 2L5 f ; note also that Macrinus

received a second warníng from Ulpíus Julíanus who was in

charge of the census, CD 78' 4' 3)' Caracalla r¿as murdered

bytheroadsideinSyria.Hisassassín\¡Iassoonkilledbya

barbarian bodyguard, perhaps in a pre-arranged manner so as

to disguise the involvement of the prefect'

(46)

Herodian

À.D. zLB. The assassínaÈion of Macrínus.

7, CD 80 . l7 ff., SHA' Elag' L6 ff '

5. L-4, CD 78. 30 ff' SHA Macrinus 9 ff'

Macrinus had made the mistake of allowing Julía Maesa

and her ambítious relatives in Syria to survive and near the

winter quarters of the legions, at Èhat' Uslng sun worship

and their relationship to Èhe Séveri as levers, Maesats grandson'

Elagabalus' \¡Ias made the focus of legíonary disaffection' Civil

war resulted. Defeated and tryrng to escape to Rome disguised

asanímperíalcourier,Macrinus\¡rascapÈuredandexecutedby

centuríons.Hehadfailedinthetf'mehonouredartsofefther

elimínating potential rlvals or maintalning careful sur¡reillance

of them.

G7)

v. Herodían 5

A.D. 222. The assassinat ion of Elagáb alus.

JuliaMaesasoonrealisedthathergrandson!sbehavfour

wasunsuitable.Asecondgrandson,AlexanderSeverus,wasused

stepbysËeptoelímínatethefirst.Elevatedinitiallytothe

position of Caesar, the mílítary increasingly favoured the new

candídate. Two attempts by Elagabalus to bríng down his cousin

failed. on Èhe second occasion, the praetorians were sufficlently

-3L6-

antagonlsed to kíll hím and his mother' Maesars ínfluence

over politics was st111 considerable'

(48) A.D. 235. The assassinaÈion of Alexander Severus.

v. Herodian 6.7 ff, SHA' Sev' Alex' 61 ff; c'f' Grant'

op. cÍt., PP. 266 ff-

constant lnternal unresÈ proclai-med Èhe instabílity

of thls régíme, while serious r^lars on the frontíer exposed

the weakness of the empire iÈself. Alexanderts aËtemPts Ëo

concílíate the northern barbarians \^tere diplomatic' The

preference for rnílitary confrontation by the soldiers caused

arnilitaryinstructortobeelevaËed.Alexander,hlsmother

and thetr supporters ü7ere killed in a canp by legionary

of ficers. They had not conformed to the mood of thelr ,vlta]-

element of suPPort.

Excluded are events about whfch littl-e fl-ro¡e is known than

the fact of their occurrence and so Ëhey have a l-jmited ¡¡alue

for ouÈ atËempË to descrlbe security procedures. Nevertheless'

I will líst them here for the sake of completeness' Large

movementsbasedintheprovincesareindicatedl^Tithanasteríqk

(*), q.v. p

a reference

(NlA).

4 of introductíon. Sources are sunìmarised wíth

to PIR2, lísted respecÈtvely', unless not ayaiLable

-3L7-

(4g) 30 B.C. M. Aemill-us Lepidus jr., PIR2 A 368'

(50) 23/22 B.C. Fannlus Caepio and Varro Murena,

prn2 r ttz.

(51) 19 B.C. Activity of Egnatius Rufus, PIR2 E 32'

(52) 2 B.C. Julia the Elder, Iullus Antonius etc.'

PrR2 r 634, PrRz A BOo.

(53) A.D. 4 Cornelíus Clnna Magnus, PIR2 C 1339.

(54) A.D. B Julia Ëhe Younger, L. Aemllius Paulus,

PrR2 r 635, prn2 a ¡9t.

(55) A.D. 16 Libo Drusus,9.v. D.C.A. ShotËer'

The trial of M. Scribonius Libo Drusus. Hístoria. 2L, L972,

88 - 98.

(56) A.D. 29 Agrippina the Elder, Nero, Drusus,

PrR2 N/4, ttlz t 223, p:trZ t zzo.

x(57) A.D. 39 Cn. Cornellus LenËulus Gaetulicus,

prn2 c 1390.

(5S) A.D. 40 Sextus Papinius, Betilienus Bassus,

PrR2 A 594, PrR2 B 114.

x(59) A..D. 42 L. Carnlllus Scrlbonianus, PIR2 A 1140'

(60) A.D. 46 Statllius Corvinus and Gallus Asinius'

PrR2 N/4, prn2 R 1228.

(6f) A.D. 52 scrÍbonianus, PrR2 A LI47.

(62) A.D. 66 Vinicianus, PIR2 A 700 (cf. Corbulo,

PTFZ D L42.

,t(63) A.D. 69 Fall of Otho, frn2 n/A; v. Suet.

Otho passim and Tac. Hlst. I f.

,t(64) A.D. 69 Vespasían against Vlte1l1us, PTR2 F 398.

-318- i,,{

hr

* (65)

(66)

(67)

(68)

* (6e)

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

11. 2 f.f..

x(21) A.D.

* (72) A.D.

,r*2 o zz.

x (73) A.D .

v. CD75.6-B;x(74) A.D.

89

95

LL7

136

L. Antontusr Saturnínus, PIR2 A 874'

Ilavius C1emens, PIR2 E 24O-

Death of Trajan, PrR2 A 184 (Hadrian).

L. Jullus Ursus Servianus, PIR2 I 631'

Atiltus Titlanus; Príscianus, under

2Avidfus Cassius, PIR a.7402.

Didius Julíanus and the Severl,

2PIR N/4,l-93 Pescennius Niger,

Herodian 3. 2.7 ' 3-4-

193 Clodius Alblnus'

I

I

l

I't

.1,

II1

!

lI'{

Antoninus Pius, SIIA. Ant. Plus. 7' 2 - 4'

(70) A.D. L6g Death of LucÍus Verus, SM' Luc' Ver'

f

l.75

193

fl

Ë

2PIR c 1186.

I

c

I

t4

-3L9-

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BIBL IOGRAPHY ERRATUM

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SI]MMARY OF APPENDIX.

A.D. L2(?) L. Audasius, AsiníusEpícadus

Illyrían camp orderly in Palaee.

Gall1c chieftan.A.D. L4 Death of Augustus.

A.D. L4 Tiberius, the fírst monËhs.

A.D. L6 Clemens, the false candidate

A.D. L9 Death of Germanicus.

A.D. 23 Death of Drusus.

A.D. 31 Conspiracy of Sejanus.

Tiberius at the batËlefront.A.D. 37 Death of Tiberius.A.D. 38 Death of Tiberius Gemellus.

A.D. 4L Assassination of Caligula.A.D. 42 Death of Appius Silanus.A.D. 47 Plot of Cn. Noricus.

A.D. 48 Consplracy of C. Silius,Messalína.

Commoner near Claudíusr bedroom.

Two knights at theatre, sacrifíce.A.D. 54 The death of Claudius.

A.D. 55 Murder of BriËannicus.

A.D. 59 DeaËh of Agrippina.A.D. 62 Death of Octavía.

A.D. 65 Písonian Conspíracy.

A.D. 68 Downfall of Nero.

A.D. 69 Assassination of Galba.

A.D. 69 MuËlny of the praetoríans.

A.D. 79 Conspiracy of CaecinaAlienus, Eprius Marcellus.

Titus and t¡¡o paËrícíans.

A.D. 81 Death of TiËus.

A.D. 96 Assassinatíon of Domitian.

A.D. 97 Plot of Calpurníus Crassus.

A.D. 97. Mutiny of the praetorians.

A.D. 104 Trajan at the batËlefront.A.D. 118 Conspíracy of four consulars

A.D. Hadrían in Spain.

A.D. 180 Death of Marcus Aurellus.A.D. L82 Plot of Lucílla.

(38)

( 3e)

(40)

(4r¡(42¡

(43)

(44)

(4s¡

(4ø¡

(41)

(48)

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

A.D.

(4e)

(s0)

(sr¡(s2)

(s3)

(s+¡

185 Death of PerennÍs.

L86/7 MaËernus, the brigand.190 The downfall of Cleander.

Lgz Assassínation of Cornmodus.

193 Assasslnatíon of Pertínax.205 Fall of Plautían.212 AssassinaËíon of Geta.

2L7 Assassi-naÈ1on of Caracalla.2l-8 AssassinaËion of Macrinus.

222 Assassinatlon of Elagabalus.

235 Assasslnatlon of AlexanderSeverus.

30 B.C.

23122 B.C .

19 B.C.

2 B.C.

A.D. 4

A.D. 8

A.D. 66

A.D. 69

A.D. 69

A.D. 89

A.D. 95

4.D.117

A.D .136

Atillus Titianus;Antoninus Pius.

M. Aernllius Lepidus, j r.Fannius Caepio and Varro Murena,

Activity of Egnatlus Rufus.

Julia the Elder, Iullus AnËoníus,

Cornellus Cinna Magnus.

Julia the Younger, L. AemíllusPaulus.

Libo Drusus.

Agrippina the Elder, Nero, DrusuÍ

Cn. Cornelíus Lentulus Gaetulicut

Sextus Paplnlus, BetllíenusBassus.

F. Camillus Scrlbonianus.

Statílíus Corvlnus,Gallus Asíníus

Scrlbonianus.Vínicianus.Fall of Otho.

Vespaslan against Vftellius.L. Antonius Saturnícus.Flavius Clemens.

Death of Trajan.L. Jullus Ursus Servíanus.

(ss) A.D. 16

(s6) A.D. 2e

(57) A.D. 39

(s8) A.D. 40

(se) A .D. 42

(60) A .D. 46

(61) A .D. s2

Prisclanus, under

. zo¡

"7r)'.72)

:73)

17 4)

A.D .169

A.D.175

A.D.193

A.D .193

A.D.193

Death of Luclus Verus.

Avidius Cassíus.

Death of Didlus Julianus.Pescennius Niger.

Clodius Albinus.