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The Space Station and Mars

Spark Matsunaga

This article presents a plan for recon- figuring the US-international Space ,Station, which could be used to under- ;take exploration of Mars. The author believes that there is an urgent need to give a unified purpose to the US Shuttle, Space Station and space ;science activities, and that planning for an international Mars sample re- turn mission along the lines outlined ,here could start the US space prog- ramme moving again within budgetary requirements.

',Spark Matsunaga is a Democratic Senator from Hawaii in the US Senate, Washing- ton, DC, USA.

Senator Matsunaga's views were pre- sented at the recent US National Academy of Sciences Mars Conference.

The Space Station was originally put forward by N A S A as a Shuttle- serviced low-gravity staging base for interplanetary exploration with special reference to Mars. The Shuttle lost its identity, and compromised its efficien- cy and safety, by taking on numerous other scientific and commercial re- quirements.

Now our Space Station is following the same route. First it expands, then it shrinks, and always it recedes. The m o s t l i k e l y d a t e fo r a U S - international space station is 1996 or 1997, a decade from now, by which time the Soviets will probably be building hotels in orbit, while we, from the ground, sniff disdainfully at the quality of their plumbing.

But I see one ray of hope. Around 1989, Space Industries, Inc, of Hous- ton, Texas, which is run by a team of f o r m e r h igh - r ank ing N A S A en- gineers, will launch a single-module man-tended space station, called the Industrial Space Facility, or ISF, at a cost of $250-500 million, compared to upwards of $11 billion, at last count, for NASA's receding extravaganza. ISF is about the same size as a NASA Space Station module, but less elabo- rate.

I propose making ISF the core of a Commercial Space Complex, or CSC, that would include a scaled-down ver- sion of the micro-gravity research module being planned for the N A S A - international station. NASA might even contract the job to private indus- try. Europe and Japan might become involved as well. By 1992, there could

be a two- or three-module man-tended CSC in orbit, representing a mixed multigovernment and private industry investment of perhaps $2 billion.

Construction date

If that happens, a much earlier con- s t r uc t i on da t e for the N A S A - international facility would become practical, with a more sensible func- tion. We might call it the Space Exploration Complex, or SEC. It would consist initially of two, or at the most three, permanent ly manned modules. Its initial function would be to carry out the complex long-term research activities that must precede meaningful human exploration of space research in such areas as space medicine, gravitational biology and closed ecological life-support systems. Unlike the Commercial Space Com- plex, where much of the work would be proprietary, the activities of this SEC would be open in keeping with already established practice for life sciences research.

Hopefully, arrangements would be concluded for the SEC to have com- munications and docking compatibili- ties with the orbiting Soviet station or stations, to facilitate astronaut rescue in the event of emergency and to permit exchanges of research informa- tion. Safety agreements might even be worked out whereby a transport vehi- cle was always docked at one of the stations, prepared to respond to a life threatening emergency at either one.

Under the CSC-SEC format, we

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could thus have in orbit by 1992 the cores of two space station complexes, several years ahead of the currently planned US-international station - and less than half its cost. The Com- mercial Space Complex would evolve towards space industry; the Space Exploration Complex towards ex- ploration. There would be some over- lap, of course, but the distinctive character of the two installations would prevent the sort of mission confusion that has bedeviled NASA for nearly two decades. The business of NASA would henceforth consist of pathfinding activities that offer no economic return but that are essential for long-term economic development, like highways and harbours on the ground. At the same time, industry would acquire the base in space it needs to realize its potential.

The Europeans and the Japanese could also be expected to find the new ar rangement far more satisfying. Under the current rules, use of the US-international station will be deter- mined by the proportion of a partici- pant's investment, which means that the Japanese may get to use their $1-billion module 6% of the time.

The best way to redress the balance is to reduce the US investment for an initial operating capability, which we do by allocating functions to two less complicated and more flexible facili- ties that also respond to European plans for separate man-tended and permanently manned modules. Now we stop making enemies of our friends and become partners.

An addit ional bonus would be ground-floor involvement by our allies in SEC activities pointing towards human exploration. A major legiti- mate concern of the Europeans and the Japanese is some sort of US- Soviet arrangement over their heads, and that is most likely to occur for human exploration. Their initial in- volvement in an SEC would eliminate that risk. The two orbiting complexes would be Shuttle-dependent - ISF is specifically designed to be launched and serviced by Shuttle - which brings us to the $2.8-billion issue of a re- p lacement for Chal lenger . I am assuming that, either way, the burden of launching commercial and military

satellites will be shifted primarily to where it belongs-expendable launch vehicles. Still, two Space Station com- plexes, in place and growing by 1992, will require a four-orbiter fleet.

Challenger replacement It is only logical that the replacement orbiter be funded and constructed jointly by the USA, Europe and Japan - the three partners who stand to benefit equally from it - with the USA picking up about 50% of costs. The contribution by our allies would be more than compensated by the ex- panded benefits they would receive from the overall undertaking, includ- ing reduced long-term Space Station costs. Shared construction of the re- placement orbiter could be managed without risk of technology transfer for those few Shuttle components that are still state of the art, borrowing from Defense Department precedent. Our own high-performance F-16s are being assembled in Belgium by Belgian com- panies. If we can do it with F-16s, we can do it with the Shuttle.

In sum, the new arrangement would yank us away from the drawing board, which is becoming a cult in this coun- try, and into space - in half the predicted time, at half the projected cost, with greater efficiency and flex- ibility for growth.

Now, where does all this leave us as far as Mars is concerned? Very close. Funding for the two Space Stations and the replacement orbiter would be completed by 1992, just in time to accommodate a far more modest surge for the 1996 Mars sample return that is integral to this proposal.

I have been advised that, if a sample return mission is carried out on an international basis, the US contribu- tion would be limited to about $2 billion, spread over 10 years, with no more than $200 million during any peak year. With Space Station and a C h a l l e n g e r r e p l a c e m e n t a l r e a dy accommodated at a multibillion-dollar saving, US leadership in an interna- tional Mars sample return becomes a very affordable option that also serves our foreign policy interests.

The international Halley mission which the Soviets led was a huge

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success, and it has induced them to be far more aggressive in the internation- al cooperation arena, in the absence of balancing US initiatives. But we could turn that around by grasping a unique o p p o r t u n i t y to u se t h e 10th anniversary year of Viking, 1986, to call for an international Mars sample return launched in Viking's 20th anniversary year, 1996.

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Such a commitment would capture much of the drama of Apollo, at a fraction of its costs.

This proposal is inspired in large measure by a crying need to give unified purpose to our Shuttle, Space Station and space science activities, within budgetary requirements, to stop the squabbling and to start the US space programme moving.

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