The Unintended Consequences of Kingpin Strategies

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The unintended consequences of kingpin strategies:

kidnap rates and the Arellano-Flix Organization

Nathan Jones

Published online: 16 January 2013# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract Kingpin strategies the targeting of the top-levels of terrorist or drug

trafficking organization hierarchieshas become a centerpiece of US and Mexican

efforts to combat drug trafficking. This study addresses the unintended consequen-

ces of these strategies by assessing the impact of the arrest or deaths of Arellano

Felix Organization leaders on kidnap and homicide levels from the late 1990s to

2011. Based on the study, the arrest of important AFO lieutenants increased

kidnap rates. Arrests or the deaths of organization kingpins did not result in

increased homicides or kidnappings, if respected successors were ready to fill

leadership vacuums. When leadership succession was in question, the arrest of

kingpins did result in internecine conflict and thus increased homicide and

kidnapping rates. Following internecine conflict, kidnap and homicide rates

dropped, but not to pre-conflict levels. This is likely attributable to the use of

kidnapping and homicide as a dispute resolution mechanism in the growing Tijuana

consumer drug market.

Keywords AFO.Arellano Felix Organization.Counternarcotics.Decapitation

strikes.High value targets. Kidnapping.Kingpin.Mexican drug trafficking

organizations.Second order effects.Tijuana Cartel

Introduction

Decapitationorkingpin strategiesplay an important role in counter-narcotic and

counter-terror policy in both the United States and Mexico (Dudley 2011).

Trends Organ Crim (2013) 16:156176

DOI 10.1007/s12117-012-9185-x

N. Jones (*)

Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy, Rice Universitys James A. Baker III

Institute for Public Policy, 6100 Main Street, Rice University, Baker Hall, Suite 120, Houston,

TX 77005, USA

e-mail: [email protected]


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Decapitation strikes involve targeting for arrest the highest levels or core leadership

of terror or criminal networks. While kingpin strategies can be highly effective in

disrupting both terror and drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), they can also have

unintended consequences (Johnson 2010). In the course of in-depth archival and

interview-based research on the history of the Arellano Felix Organization (TijuanaCartel), these consequences, including increased homicide and kidnap rates, became

apparent (Jones and Cooper2011).1

This is not a polemic against the use of kingpin strategies, but rather an attempt to

understand the negative externalities associated with them. Kingpin strategies in

the fight against the Arellano Felix Organization in the early 2000s resulted in

internecine conflict that caused homicide and kidnap rates to surge by 2008 (Jones

2011b). With the destruction of one faction, which emphasized kidnapping in its

business model, kidnap rates have since declined, but remain higher than their pre-

2008 levels (Jones2011a,b).

Kingpin strategies

A kingpin strategy is the term US law enforcement uses to refer to the targeting for

arrest of the leadership of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The strategy can

also be applied to counterterrorism; referring to the strategy of targeting terrorist

leaders in an attempt to disrupt illicit networks (Dudley2011; Pachico2011). These

strategies are embodied by the

Consolidated Priority Organization Target

(CPOT)programs of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which identifies important DTOs

and their leadership (DEA 2006a, b; DEA OCDETF 2010). While these strategies

disrupt network operations, they can also disrupt them to the point of creating

internecine conflict, resulting in spikes in homicides as various factions and lieuten-

ants vie for control of illicit networks. This has become commonplace in Mexico

among the various cartels as violence surges following the arrest of important

leaders (Guerrero Gutierrez2010; Jones2011a,c). The Mexican government argues

that violence in areas where the military is present is the result of preexisting

conditions (Escalante Gonzalbo2011; Rios2011). Mexican scholars have countered

that following the removal of major DTO leaders like Arturo Beltran-Leyva, homi-

cides have surged only to return to lower levels; but not as low as the periods before

their removal (Guerrero Gutierrez2010). For supporters of these strategies, the logic

is cut off the head of the beast and the body ceases to function:

In March 2002, the Office of the Attorney General announced a comprehensive

six-part drug enforcement strategy designed to identify and target the worlds

most significant drug supply organizations and their related components. The

central element of the strategy was the development of the CPOT List, a rogues

gallery of international kingpins who were responsible for the command and

1 The author would like to thank the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, which funded 9 months

of fieldwork in Mexico; the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and the

Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, which funded preliminary research trips; and the James A.

Baker III Institute for Public Policy, where much of the editing of this project was completed.

Trends Organ Crim (2013) 16:156176 157


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controlof the most sophisticated and far reaching drug trafficking and money

laundering organizations (DEA2006a,b; DEA2010).

The above exert from the US attorney general illustrates the emphasis and dom-

inance of kingpin strategies in counternarcotics and counter-terror operations. Butwhat are the unintended consequences that policy-makers and public officials must

be aware of when utilizing these strategies? Before we can answer that question, we

must understand the existing literature on the structures of illicit networks, examine

the history and sociology of kidnapping in Tijuana, and analyze the kidnap rates in

relation to important decapitations.

Flat versus hierarchical networks

There have been extensive debates about the value of flat versus hierarchical illicit

networks in the post 9/11 discussions of terrorism and drug trafficking. Kenney has

argued that flatter networks, with fewer layers of management, are more nimble

and adaptive than their hierarchical bureaucratic state counterparts (Arquilla

and Ronfeldt 2001; Kenney 2007a, b). Others like, Privette, have pointed to the

advantages hierarchy provided the Cosa Nostra in surviving the arrest or killing of

key leadership figures (Privette2006). But in reality, all illicit networks have varying

degrees of hierarchy and centralization as they, like governments, face the challenges

of managing the free flow of information and the security compartmentalizationprovides (Kenney 2007a). This study provides detail to this debate by specifying

when a semi-hierarchical illicit network suffered following decapitation strikes.

Increased homicide and kidnap rates are signs of internal network weakness because

they are signs of profit-starvation and internecine conflict. Thus, this study provides

lessons learnedon how decapitation strikes weaken illicit networks and when illicit

networks prove themselves resilient to these strategies.

Kidnapping in the context of Mexican drug trafficking

Kidnapping has been an intrinsic part of Mexican drug trafficking since at least the

1980s. Traffickers held members of other organizations to collateralize delivery or

payment of cocaine. Kidnapping has many variants and has taken on a more nefarious

tone in drug trafficking in Mexico since 2005. According to the former head of Anti-

Organized Crime Unit of the Mexican Federal Attorney Generals Office (SIEDO),

the Arellano Felix Organization was the first major Mexican drug trafficking organi-

zation to significantly increase its kidnapping prior to President Calderons offensive

against the cartels beginning December 2006 (Blancas 2008).

Kidnapping can serve numerous functions in drug trafficking. Kidnapping is ameans by which to (1) enforce the payment of drug transactions in the illicit

underworld, (2) enforce the payment of protection services or extortion in the illicit

world, (3) enforce extortion payments in the licit business world and, finally, (4) as a

profit-seeking enterprise in and of itself. Recently, Mexican DTOs have adopted a

tactic of kidnapping journalists for the purpose of having their videos broadcast on

158 Trends Organ Crim (2013) 16:156176


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air. This would suggest that kidnapping can also be used for political purposes; a

possible fifth function of kidnapping. This is however a new and untested phenomena

and how widespread it is remains to be seen (Malkin 2010). According to law

enforcement sources that specialize in the AFO, kidnapping may be as profitable as

drug trafficking and is motivated by the need of the network to pay the largeoverhead they have due to the number of enforcers they employ (Duncan 2009).

Kidnapping is notoriously difficult to study systematically due to a lack of accurate

data. Most kidnapping data comes from the state, but it is also estimated that 90 % of

kidnappings go unreported because Mexicos public does not trust law enforcement

institutions (Thompson2004). One telling statistic is that it is estimated that Mexican

police do not solve 98.5 % of crimes (Shirk1999,2006; Shirk and Donnelly2009).

Thus, inference becomes important in attaining a picture of kidnapping in Mexico in

specific geographic locations. What are typical stories of kidnappings? What patterns

emerge among these stories from primary sources? And what will this tell us aboutthe structure of the organization and its business model?

Tijuana kidnapping in the 1990s

In Mexico, kidnapping has long been famous as a means by which to enforce the

payment of drug transaction debts; particularly in the state of Sinaloa. This could

involve the kidnapping of the individual who owes money to a drug trafficking

organization or the capture of his family members or business partners. Sometimesvalued cartel members were held as collateral to enforcement the payment of debts

between Mexican and Colombian trafficking groups. Kidnapping expanded into a

means by which to enforce protection/extortion payments in the illicit world. How-

ever in the Tijuana area, controlled by the Arellano-Felix Organization, the practice of

kidnapping expanded into the extortion of licit businesses and as a business in and of

itself in the years preceding 2008. Most of these kidnappings were attributed to the

El Teo faction of the organization, led by Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El

Teo). Before we can discuss this spike in kidnappings, a history of the illicit net-

works use of kidnapping must be elucidated for context (Duncan2009).

The AFO was profit-starved in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Cardinal

Arch-Bishop Posadas Ocampo in 1993. AFO gunmen attempting to kill Chapo

Guzman of the rival Sinaloa Cartel had mistakenly killed the Cardinal at the Guada-

lajara airport in his white Grand Marquis (Caldwell 2007a,b). From 1993 to the late

1990s, all top-level AFO leadership were laying low, some in the United States,

some engaging in legitimate occupations in rural Mexico. In this period, they made

calculated top-down decisions to engage in kidnapping, typically as neededand for

high-profile targets. Prior to 1993, the AFO rarely engaged in kidnapping, deriving

nearly all profits from drug trafficking (Duncan 2009).

These high-profile kidnappings required intelligence on the targets habits, sur-

veillance of the target, safe-houses and the capability to hold the victim for long

periods of time. Typically, the AFO had inside-information about the target and a

corrupted official within the Mexican anti-kidnap unit. Usually, someone on the

targets security detail would make a commission from the ransom for providing

information. Thus, the intelligence often came to the AFO based upon their



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reputation for violence and their reputation for paying commissions to those who

provided intelligence (Duncan2009).

The AFO had offices where enforcers were expected to be ready to work each

morning. No advance warning would be given to those participating in a kidnapping.

A lieutenant of the organization would arrive at the office on the morning of akidnap operation and give minimal instructions to enforcers participating in the

kidnapping. Generally, these were instructions on what to wear, what arms to carry,

and what type of vehicle to drive. This is an example of information compartmen-

talization through procedures within the organization. It is also an example of the

need for security coming into conflict with the need for information flows within an

illicit network. The AFO failed in some of their attempts to kidnap high profile targets

during this period, likely due to the compartmentalization of information. It also

likely survived this period intact without large numbers of major arrests because of its

compartmentalization (Duncan2009).

The new kidnap wave (mid-2000s)

The early 2000s was a period in which the AFO was considered one of the most

profitable DTOs in Mexico. It was at this time that it suffered major arrests and the

events of September 11th resulted in increased US border enforcement. This made

drugs more difficult to traffic across the border and forced some elements of the

organization to diversify their activities into retail drug sales and kidnappings. In theearly to mid-2000s, an AFO lieutenant, El Cris, began kidnapping more individuals

for smaller and smaller ransoms. In 2004, he was arrested but his brother El Teo

continued the practice with his enforcer cells. This would lead to one of the most

important splits within the AFO (Marosi2008a,c; Ojeda2008; Reza Gonzalez2011;

Zeta2010a,2007).

Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental (El Teo) relied heavily on kidnapping as a

revenue source. It should be noted that it is universally recognized that El Teo

engaged in a much larger use of kidnapping than other factions as per media sources,

and interviews with journalists, local citizens, and law enforcement in Mexico and the

United States (Marosi2008a).

The kidnapping operations were not sophisticated, though they did include a large

number of people, cell phones, and safe-houses. Most of the people operating these

kidnap cells were mugrosos young teenagers doing the dirty work of the cartel.

There was very little previously collected intelligence on the targets and they were

typically not held for very long period; usually 4 to 5 days. The victims were often

killed. The advantage to the strategy of using mugrosos is that an illicit network

relying on them is highly resilient because they can be constantly recruited and

replaced, due to a large number of highly impoverished young people in Mexico

(Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011).

Holding the victims for short periods allowed an increase in the number of

kidnappings that could be undertaken. Once the El Teo faction began kidnapping

professionals and petit bourgeoisie, e.g. taco stand owners, doctors, and engineers,

they were kidnapping for much smaller amounts, usually $5,00010,000 US dollars.

This dramatically increased the number of people who could be kidnapped and the



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number of people in Tijuana who had been touched by the phenomena. The psycho-

logical impact upon the victims was devastating. Female victims were raped repeat-

edly and would never be the same.The sense of security of all of the victims was

shattered (Anonymous Tijuana resident2009; Duncan2009; Ramos2011).

Determining the patterns of kidnappings in Tijuana in the 2000s was very difficult.Initially, it seemed likely that extortion moving from the illicit to the licit worlds targeted

certain industries where the line between the licit and illicit blurred, e.g. an auto-shop

can also be used as achop-shopby breaking down stolen cars and selling their parts.

Anecdotally, there did appear to be a pattern to the businesses which were targeted,

which included many auto-shops. However, based on interviews of Tijuana residents

and business-owners, the apparent patterns came about very differently.

According to multiple Tijuana citizens and confirmed by anonymous government

officials, kidnap victims, usually business-owners, would be abducted and held for

ransom. They often negotiated their own ransom and were asked for exorbitantamounts. The victim would offer a lower amount which they could produce. The

kidnapping cell would accept the lower amount on the provision that the victim

provide ten names of people who could pay the same amount. In this fashion, the

kidnappings occurred along the lines of social networks, e.g. an auto-mechanic

knows other auto-mechanics and those of similar socio-economic status. Eventually,

kidnappings entered the professionally educated class including doctors, engineers,

and lawyers and triggered a societal backlash (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2010;

Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011).

To avoid being kidnapped, an illicit or licit business owner was usually given anopportunity to pay cuota(tax) regularly (the tax is also sometimes referred to aspiso

orplaza). Again, anecdotally, the pattern appeared to be that the business-owner had a

protectorwhom he could contact to arrange payments. Sometimes payments would

become dramatically larger when for example the boss has a birthday coming

(Anonymous Tijuana businessman2011). If a business-owner wanted to shut down

his business, he had to arrange a final payment; usually larger than his regular

payments. This was not uncommon in the period in which the Fernando Sanchez

Arellano El Ingeniero faction and the El Teo faction of the AFO were in

internecine conflict from 2008 to 2010. One business owner lamented being told

by police that it was not a good time to be in business,fatalistically acknowledging

that they could not keep the business safe (Anonymous Tijuana business leader

2011). Business people payingcuota,or extortion tax, were also given an opportunity

to provide ten names of people that would not be kidnapped based on this arrange-

ment. This usually included immediate family and employees. There were also

anecdotal accounts of kidnap victims being asked for lists of names of other potential

kidnap victims (Anonymous Tijuana business leader2011).

After the experience of narco-juniors in the 1990s, Tijuana society wanted a

separation between polite society and the criminal under-world; although there

were some who may have blurred the line. The Rhon family and other Tijuana elites

are reported to have functioned as the money-laundering side of the illicit criminal

world in Tijuana, though this has never been proven (Bergman2000). The criminal

world was allowed to function and was largely ignored provided thatpolite society,

the elites of the licit world, went unmolested (Anonymous Tijuana business leader

2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident2010).



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Kidnappings of those who were uninvolved in illegitimate activities and owners of

middle-class businesses, were shocking to Tijuana society. Doctors installed panic-

rooms in their offices and threatened to refuse to treat police officers and the public,

until the kidnappings of doctors ended (Anonymous family member of Tijuana doctor

2009; Marosi2008b). The abduction of Dr. Guzman the general surgeon of a leadingTijuana hospital, was a turning point:

Guzmans abduction came amid a plague of crime targeting the citys medical

community. About 20 doctors have been kidnapped and dozens have received

calls demanding as much as $50,000, according to the citys medical associa-

tions (Marosi2008b).

In response to the kidnappings, civil society groups representing doctors mobilized

and threatened a strike. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Guzman was released (Marosi 2008b).Kidnapping was at the center of the split between the El Teoand the Fernando

Sanchez Arellano El Ingeniero factions in April of 2008. The El Ingeniero

faction believed the Teo cells were calentando la plaza, that is heating up the

turf,with too many kidnappings and drawing negative attention which could hurt the

drug trafficking business. El Teo believed El Ingeniero was a weak leader who had

inherited leadership from his uncles; a spoiled child not from the Tijuana streets and

unworthy of leadership in the organization. He also needed the profits kidnapping

brought his faction, while El Ingeniero needed a calm plaza to traffic drugs and

operate money laundering front-businesses. Neither El Teo nor El Ingeniero waspresent for the violent April 2008 gun-battle on the streets of Tijuana that marked

their split (Fox News2009; Marosi2008c).

Most Tijuana citizens attributed kidnappings to the El Teo faction of the

Arellano Felix Organization. This is consistent with media reports which suggested

that El Teo had a network of kidnapping houses and kidnap cells throughout Tijuana

(Anonymous Tijuana businessman2011; Anonymous Tijuana resident2009; Marosi

2008a). He also had a higher propensity for violence and the public use of

violence. He employed El Pozolero who used acid to dissolve the bodies of cartel

victims. El Teo is rumored to have had a drug-use problem though this is uncon-

firmed (cristalor methamphetamine). This, in addition to his youthful and inexperi-

enced leadership, could have contributed to higher levels of violence (Marosi 2008a).

El Teo had many advantages in the internecine conflict with El Ingeniero. First, he

and his brothers were Tijuana natives. They had grown up within the city and had

operated as enforcers there for most of their lives. It is reported that El Teo and his

brother began their illicit careers in human-smuggling, guiding undocumented aliens

across the border on foot. Second, El Teo was able to establish a 6-month alliance

with the Sinaloa cartel led by Chapo Guzman and Mayo Zambada. Widely consid-

ered the most powerful cartel in Mexico, this alliance provided El Teo with the drug

connections he lacked. The Sinaloa cartel had already taken control of Mexicali by2004, facilitating this alliance. Third, El Teo had extensive contacts within the local

police force (Anonymous Tijuana resident 2009). Fourth, El Teos use of public

violence was very high (Carroll 2010; Ellingwood 2009; Jones 2011a; Marosi

2008c). He was known for leaving the decapitated heads of victims on top of vats

of acid where their bodies were dissolved. This, in effect, defeated the purpose of



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having aPozolero to hide the carnage, but had a strong psychological impact upon

rival cartels and the local population (de Mauleon 2009; Dudley 2010; Marosi

2008a). He was known for having many local police on his payroll but also for

killing police that did not cooperate with him.2 Such violence was a double-edgedsword for this faction. It terrorized and cowed the population into submission, but

also led to a societal backlash (Kenney 2007a) Fig.1.

Figure2shows average registered monthly kidnappings in Tijuana for the years

from January 2006 to September 2011 and makes the relationship between interne-

cine illicit network conflict and kidnapping clear (SSP 2012). Before 2008, the

average number of monthly kidnappings was 2.5 and 1.17 in 2006 and 2007,

repectively. It spiked dramatically in 2008 to 7.67 and 2009 to 7.92, coinciding with

the AFOs internecine conflict. The average number of monthly kidnappings in 2010

was 5.67, lower than the internecine conflict period, but still higher than previousyears. By 2011, average monthly kidnapping were down to 4.33 (data through

September 2011) (SSP 2012). There are multiple explanations for this new higher

rate of kidnapping following the AFOs internecine conflict (Jones2011c).

The first has to do with the data. Following the Calderon administrations waron

organized crime, local governments received federal money if their area was identi-

fied as prone to organized crime violence. Thus, the issue may be that local and state

2 Before El Teos arrest in January 2010, I visited Tijuana in 2009 and noticed that municipal police always

travelled in groups of two trucks, with at least two men each sitting in the truck bed with automatic

weapons. Motorcycle police, that typically enforce traffic violations individually, rode in groups of three.

Seven months after Teos January 2010 arrest, Police appeared calmer and rode in their trucks with one

partner in the cab with them and no one in the truck bed. This is evidence of the impact that Teos arrest had

on the Tijuana psyche. It has calmed municipal police by reducing the daily threat of police assassination

(Anonymous Tijuana resident2009).

Fig. 1 Kidnappings in Tijuana as reported by the SSP (2012) Baja California



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governments have been incentivized to keep better or inflate counts of violent crimes

(Ilescas2011).

A second explanation has to do with the remnants of the El Teo faction. Not

every member of the illicit network has been arrested or killed following this period.

Some were annexed by the Sinaloa Cartel in a highly compartmentalized fashion

(Borderland Beat2010; Zeta2011). Others were killed or rejoined the Cartel Arellano

Felix. Still others likely continue to free-lance as kidnap cells without paying taxes or

tribute to a larger trafficking network. Finally, the environment of legal impunity created

likely encouraged newcomers and amateur cells (Jones2011b; Zeta2010a,b,c,2011).

AFO spin-off kidnap cellsLos Palillos

Kidnapping can also serve to assist in the cannibalization process of the illicit

network. The case ofLos Palillos or the toothpicksis illustrative. The kidnap cell

leadership had a personal conflict with AFO leadership. They relocated their oper-

ations to the United States to kidnap wealthy members of the AFO residing in the

United States. They utilized their knowledge of those involved in the network to

spin-off into their own group, which could profit from the exploitation of their

knowledge. They were eventually captured by authorities that were notified by the

wife of a victim in the United States.Los Palilloscould be considered an example of

spillover violence from Mexico into the United States. It should be noted that this

spillover violence is typically directed toward members of the illicit network

Fig. 2 Average monthly kidnappings Tijuana as reported by SSP (2012)



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themselves. The Los Palillos story is also an example of self-cannibalization of

compartmentalized illicit networks. In the words of one cross-border taskforce

member, these guys make their own enemies (Duncan 2009). The need for

security, results in a compartmentalization of an illicit network into cells, which

are loyal to each other, but not necessarily to the larger network (Kenney2007a).

Kidnapping in Tijuana post AFO conflict

Following the AFO internecine conflict, kidnapping in Tijuana also appears

linked to narcomenudeo or retail drug trafficking. Kidnapping is used to

enforce payment on drug trafficking debts among those involved in selling

drugs locally in Tijuana. A recent case is illustrative. A mother and son were

kidnapped in an urban area in Tijuana. According to a Baja California statekidnap unit representative, they were both involved in local drug trafficking and

distribution (Jones 2011b). Drug consumption has been on the rise in Mexico

due to a number of factors including the emergence of methamphetamine as an

inexpensive synthetically produced drug, the hardening of the US border, and a

deliberate strategy by MDTOs to diversify their consumer markets beyond the

US consumer (Jones 2011b).

The relationship between

decapitation strikes

and the kidnap rate in BajaCalifornia

I attempt here to establish a relationship between the removal by arrest or killing of

key AFO leaders and the kidnapping rate in Baja California by analyzing the ICESI

kidnap data for Baja California and SSP state and local data, in the context of

disruptive events within the AFO and based upon what position within the hierarchy

they occupy. The general argument is that when the AFO is profit-starved,

enforcers raise funds by engaging in more kidnapping. This argument was identi-

fied in interviews of law enforcement officers who had, in turn, learned about the

phenomenon from interrogations of Arellano Felix Organization members and during

wiretapped conversations (Duncan2009).

The removal of high-ranking AFO leaders with critical business ties can increase

the networks propensity for kidnapping. In addition to demonstrating the importance

of those with business connections in the organization to the kidnap rate and total

kidnappings, the analysis revealed that charismatic enforcement-oriented leaders

provided control over enforcer cells and their removal also accelerated kidnappings.

Using the logic of John Stuart Mill for establishing causation, proper time-order,

correlation, and a causal mechanism are needed to demonstrate a link between

internal AFO events and changes in the number of kidnappings in Baja California

(Mill2009).

Figure3shows the number of kidnappings in Baja California from 1997 to 2009

as reported by Instituto Ciudano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (ICESI) with

important AFO decapitations marked. Baja California data provides a better basis

of analysis over a longer time-span than solely Tijuana kidnap data for numerous



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reasons. First, it includes Tijuana. Second, the AFO plaza or territory at different

points in this epoch included Rosarito, Ensenada, and, at different points, Tecate and

Mexicali

all of which are included in Baja California. Third, ICESI aggregate datais more accessible (ICESI2010).

All of these statistics should be considered suspect due to underreporting, probably

by a factor of 10. Historically, in Mexico there has been a lack of trust in local and

state police many of which are feared to be involved in kidnapping. Also, threats to

victims and their families may result in underreporting by victims.3 Nonetheless, this

graph demonstrates data and trends that fit with the qualitative history of the AFO, the

accounts of local citizens, and the relationship of profit-starvation to increased

kidnappings.

The arrest in 1997 of Kitty Pez, a key AFO lieutenant and leader of a narco-

junior cell in Tijuana, had a detrimental effect on the AFO. It led directly to Jesus

Blancornelas, editor ofZeta Magazine, publishing stories on the AFO which David

Barron Corona, an important enforcer lieutenant and connection to the Logan Street

gang and La Eme prison gang, decided to kill him for. In the attempt, Corona was

killed by ricochet fire and died. The loss of these two important figures could explain

the spike in kidnappings in the area in the following year. Kitty Pez had married an

important Tijuana businessmans daughter. He had important business connections

and profitable narco-juniors working for him (Caldwell 2007a,b).

David Barron Corona was an important enforcer lieutenant commanding loyalty

within the AFO and likely control over many other soldiers recruited from his

3 Voluntary and anonymous surveys conducted regularly throughout Mexico might help to provide a more

accurate picture of the kidnapping problem than reports based on statistics provided by law enforcement

institutions that lack the faith of the populace. Indeed, websites like www.notecalles.org.mx appear to

attempt to address this issue in this fashion by allowing Mexican citizens to self-report crime anonymously

(No Te Calles - No+Inseguridad2010).

Fig. 3 Kidnappings and kidnap rates per 100,000 Baja California (ICESI2012)

http://www.notecalles.org.mx/http://www.notecalles.org.mx/


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Logan Street Gang andLa Emeprison gang. The loss of these two figures represented

the loss of profits and control over enforcers within the organization. According to

law enforcement interviews, with lower profits and the same number of enforcers to

be paid, the organization found alternative sources of profit. Kidnapping for ransom

was one of those alternatives according to California Department of Justice Investi-gator Steve Duncan, a member of the AFO taskforce (Duncan2009).

Without Corona, there may not have been sufficient control over low-level soldiers

to prevent the rise in kidnappings in 1998. The year 1999, however, sees a drop in

kidnappings, which suggests that the AFO may have reasserted control over the

organization to minimize kidnappings, which draw negative attention to the drug

trafficking business.

The arrest of Jesus ChuyLabra Aviles, chief financial adviser to the organization

and Ismael Higuera Guerrero, formerly the operational head of the organization for

Tijuana while Benjamin and Ramon were laying low in the 1990s, saw a slightincrease in the number of kidnappings in Tijuana in 2000 (Duncan2009).

The most interesting finding of the analysis is the most counterintuitive. The loss

of the most important figures in the organization saw no increase in the number of

kidnappings, but rather a slight decrease. Benjamin Arellano Felix was the strategic

head of the organization and his brother Ramon was the chief enforcer. They were

arrested and killed, respectively, in short order in March 2002. This lack of a surge in

kidnappings following their removal can be attributed to the control maintained by

their brother El Tigrillo who was very experienced by 2002 and was able to maintain

firm control over the organization. This suggests Privettes view that hierarchyprovides advantages in terms of clear lines of succession that allow criminal organ-

izations to continue to function efficiently is accurate (Privette 2006).

Another possible factor may have been the funneling of profits upward. If Ramon

and Benjamin, at the top of the AFO, were owed a great deal of payments from below

as a form of internal taxation, the removal of these figures and replacement with El

Tigrillo may have reduced the payments owed to the peak of the AFO by consoli-

dating two payments into one. It should be noted that these are plausible but

speculative explanations.

The greatest spike in kidnappings is attributable to a split in the organization, a

direct result of the removal of El Tigrillo and later El Doctor from leadership

positions in the AFO. This allowed El Teo to fragment the organization into interne-

cine conflict and focus his business model on kidnapping, in part, because he had

little access to drug profits. The drop in kidnappings in 2009, though they remained at

a higher level than previous years, could be attributed to the truce established between

the two factions as they reinforced their organizations after high levels of violence in

2009. Part of that truce may have included the reduction of kidnappings to reduce

societal backlash. This interpretation is consistent with media and law enforcement

reports at the time (Zeta2011; Marosi2008a,c,2009). See the Fig.4, below, for an

illustration of monthly kidnap, homicide, and extortion cases with the arrest and

killing of key AFO figures noted. The data was entered by hand into a spreadsheet

from PDF files from the Baja California Secretary of Security Website (SSP 2012).

Once kidnapping is widespread, as it became in 2008 (as depicted in Fig. 4), it is

likely to remain high. There are, and will continue to be, many kidnap cells operating

without access to drug trafficking profits in Tijuana. They will continue until they are



13/21

arrested or killed. This is likely to occur even if kidnap cells do not have permission

from cartel leaders that have been weakened by internecine conflict. Many kidnap-

ping cells may be operating as free-lance cells, with no permission to kidnap from

larger trafficking networks and no affiliation with them. This may explain manyrecent arrests of kidnapping cells. Larger trafficking organizations with superior

intelligence may provide this intelligence to police to remove these cells and garner

support from the population, as insurgencies do (Brands 2009).4

The relationship between the removal of cartel figures and the number of kidnap-

pings appears to be caused by a combination of (1) the importance of figure being

removed, (2) his ability to produce profits, and (3) his ability to exert control over

enforcers for the organization. Interestingly, it is not the removal of top figures that

increases the number of kidnappings (if successors are in place) nor is it the countless

number of low-level enforcers who are arrested daily. Rather, it is the removal of mid-level lieutenants that appeared to most increase kidnappings. This finding is logical

given the important operational role these lieutenants play in compartmentalized drug

trafficking organizations (Kenney2007a).

Thus, the relationship between the cartel figure removed through arrest or death

and kidnapping is parabollically related to his importance in the organization; the

more in the middle a figure is, the more his arrest will increase kidnappings. The

exception to this rule is when a top level leader is removed and his successors lack

4

This argument posits that certain factions of the organization became profit-starved while others may havecontinued to thrive. The profit-starved factions began to focus on the taxation of territory and the expansion

into high impactcrime like kidnapping and extortion. This was especially true in the internecine conflict

period where the enforcers of the Teo faction attempted to take control of the territory and network. Thus,

the argument is not dependent upon a commensurate reduction in drug trafficking, which might be

measured or correlated with a reduction in confiscated drugs at the border. Rather drug confiscations at

the border would represent an irrelevant variable because another portion of the illicit network continued to

traffic.

Fig. 4 Homicides, kidnappings and extortion cases in Tijuana (SSP2012)



14/21

sufficient legitimacy within the organization to prevent internal conflict from profit-

starved lieutenants in need of new revenue streams. Also, the presence of kidnap cells

with no access to drug trafficking profits will keep kidnapping at a higher level until

they are removed from the system, which may be a long and daunting process

(Duncan2009).It is important to rule out the possibility that these surges in kidnappings are not

attributable to other causes. One alternative hypothesis is that the surges in kidnap-

ping in Tijuana were not attributable to what was happening inside the AFO, but

resulted from broader economic trends. The Mexican peso collapse of 1994 was a

severe economic dislocation that might have had a delayed impact upon kidnap rates

in Mexico; potentially explaining increases in petty crime and kidnappings for profit

in 1998. However, as Fig. 5 illustrates, Tijuanas kidnap rate surges cannot be

explained by national kidnap rates; thus ruling out the economic dislocation alterna-

tive hypothesis.During the internecine conflict between El Teo and El Ingeniero, the Sinaloa Cartel

established a presence and cells inside Tijuana. Some suggest that the arrest of El Teo

was arranged by the Sinaloa cartel (his one time ally) to reduce violence in the

Tijuana corridor, though this is not verifiable. Remembering its violent split with the

Beltran-Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa Cartel kept its Tijuana affiliates operating

autonomously and in competition with each other (Zeta2011). Based upon reduced

violence levels, arrests, statements from the arrested and interviews of Tijuana

businessmen, the Sinaloa Cartel appears to have achieved some sort of arrangement

with the remaining elements of the AFO to minimize violence; despite their longhistory of animosity (Jones2011d).

Notably absent from this discussion is the role of the state security institutions

including the military and municipal police in the reduction of kidnapping. These

Fig. 5 National and Baja California kidnap rates (ICESI2011)



15/21

institutions played a role in reducing kidanapping, but did so in the context of

assisting in the elimination of the El Teo faction. In this sense, the successes of the

state had less to do with an improved capacity to address kidnapping and more to do

with swaying the results of the internecine conflict in favor of groups that did not

engage in the activity (Jones2012b). Thus, even though the state security apparatusplayed a role in reducing kidnappings, it was in the context of illicit network

internecine conflict dynamics, the level of analysis used here.

Through early 2012 the AFO and the Sinaloa cartel maintain a presence in Tijuana.

Despite the presence of two large illicit networks, Tijuana has lower levels of

violence than the internecine conflict era. This suggests that the two illicit networks

are not in open conflict with each other and have achieved some sort of truce. The

November 2011 arrest of Juan Francisco Sillas Rocha a key enforcer lieutenant for El

Ingeniero and his statements to police appear to confirm the truce assessment and also

suggest that the AFO is stronger than many believe (Jones2011d). The extemely lowlevels of kidnappings in early 2012 further suggest that kidnapping is a crime illicit

networks in Tijuana strongly discourage (Jones 2011d,2012a).

Conclusions

Kingpin strategies can effectively disrupt and fragment an illicit network, whether it be

insurgent or profit-seeking. However, the consequences of that disruption can be dire for

the society in which these illicit networks are embedded. Consequences may includeincreased kidnap, extortion, and homicide rates. Homicide rates increase as members of

the network struggle to fill the leadership vacuums left by the removal of leadership

figures. When there are clear successors, this does not occur until a network is decapitated

to the point that it has no clear succession. Hierarchy thus can have advantages for illicit

networks in addition to increasing their vulnerabilities (Kenney 2007a; Privette2006).

An identifiable hierarchy becomes more susceptible to decapitation strike, but can

prevent internal succession struggles when the network loses leadership figures.

Kidnap rates generally change when cells within a network are profit-starved.

Sometimes this is the result of a lack of trafficking connectionsbe they source or

distribution connectionswhich would allow them to become highly profitable drug

traffickers (Duncan2009; Kenney2007a).

Decapitation or kingpin strategies may be most disruptive to kidnap rates when key

lieutenants who provide control over low level enforcers, or lieutenants who generate

profits for the network, are removed. For example, the arrest of Kitty Pez and the death

of David Barron Corona appear to have resulted in the increase in kidnapping the next

year according 1998 ICESI data which shows a significant spike in kidnappings. Thus,

the removal of lieutenants who serve as key managers and control the periphery of the

network for the core may be more important for understanding kidnap spikes than the

removal of strategic leadership (Kenney2007a) (seeAppendix).

The removal of the strategic leadership appears to be most important when there is

a lack of legitimate succession depth as the analysis of SSP data demonstrated.

Eventually, if sufficient state or rival network pressure is applied, the line of succes-

sion is exhausted and internal struggles raise violence in terms of homicide and

kidnap rates, as the need to establish new revenue streams arises for enforcer-heavy



16/21

networks (Duncan 2009; Privette 2006). A similar pattern is apparent in the split

between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. The split was structurally preconditioned on

the arrest and later extradition of leader Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in

2007. While actual fighting between the two did not occur until 2010, the conflict

would not have been possible had Cardenas not been extradited from his Mexicanprison cell, resulting in the Zetas declaring independence in 2007 (Insight Crime

2010). The Los Zetas business model emphasizes kidnapping and extortion more

than that of the long-time traffickers of the Gulf Cartel. Just as decapitations of the

AFO resulted in more kidnapping by one faction of the AFO, a Gulf Cartel decap-

itation led to an increase in kidnappings by Los Zetas. Thus, this analysis appears to

have broader applicability; especially in the Mexican context.

This analysis has provided important insights into the unintended consequences of

kingpin strategies that law enforcement and counter-terror agencies should consider

when arresting or killing leadership figures of various levels and social networkpositions. It adds specificity to debates about the advantages offlatversus hierarchical

network resilience (Arquilla and Ronfeldt2001). More studies of a wider variety and

number of illicit networks could help to glean further lessons from the relationship

between decapitation strikes and increased kidnap and homicide rates in the regions

wherein illicit networks function. Studies of this kind could help to increase understand-

ing of the unintended consequences of kingpin strategies and how to prepare for them.

Acknowledgments I would like to take this opportunity to thank my dissertation committee members

Professors Caesar Sereseres, Etel Solingen, Kamal Sadiq and Louis Desipio. I would also like to thankSteve Duncan of the California Department of Justice for opening important doors for me in the course of

my research on the AFO. Finally, I would like to thank the Institute Global Conflict and Cooperation

(IGCC), the UC Irvine Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) and the UC Irvine

Department of Political Science for funding various phases of research on which this analysis is based.

Appendix

Data

ICESI annual kidnap data

1997 28 1

1998 72 3

1999 23 1

2000 47 2

2001 25 1

2002 22 12003 20 1

2004 9 0

2005 9 0

2006 38 1

2007 20 1



17/21

2008 115 4

2009 103 3

2010 79 2

2011 64

ICESI Baja/National Kidnap Rates

Year Kidnap Rate Baja California Kidnap Rate National

1997 1 1

1998 3 1

1999 1 1

2000 2 12001 1 1

2002 1 0

2003 1 0

2004 0 0

2005 0 0

2006 1 1

2007 1 0

2008 4 1

2009 3 1.1

2010 2 1.1

Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP) data on homicides, kidnappings and extortion

cases in Tijuana.

Homicides - Tijuana Kidnappings Tijuana Extortions in Tijuana

2006-1-January 25 3 10

2006-2 -February 27 3 5

2006-3-march 20 1 4

2006-4-april 26 3 5

2006-5-may 27 4 10

2006-6-june 28 1 23

2006-7-july 25 5 17

2006-8-august 29 3 21

2006-9-September 32 0 23

2006-10-october 26 3 20

2006-11-november 23 1 7

2006-12-December 26 3 19

2007-1-January 22 0 13

2007-2 -February 27 0 19

2007-3-march 24 2 12

2007-4-april 25 2 5



18/21

2007-5-may 22 1 7

2007-6-june 32 0 7

2007-7-july 22 4 7

2007-8-august 27 1 7

2007-9-September 24 0 11

2007-10-october 23 1 6

2007-11-november 38 2 8

2007-12-December 24 1 6

2008-1-January 30 11 5

2008-2 -February 33 11 7

2008-3-march 48 10 11

2008-4-april 42 10 10

2008-5-may 21 5 17

2008-6-june 33 3 29

2008-7-july 28 5 14

2008-8-august 29 5 4

2008-9-September 32 7 11

2008-10-october 87 7 23

2008-11-november 123 16 19

2008-12-December 71 2 17

2009-1-January 56 7 14

2009-2 -February 36 9 14

2009-3-march 47 12 21

2009-4-april 38 7 9

2009-5-may 43 15 9

2009-6-june 31 3 9

2009-7-july 41 3 9

2009-8-august 51 5 18

2009-9-September 45 5 26

2009-10-october 32 5 17

2009-11-november 38 12 22

2009-12-December 98 12 18

2010-1-January 99 9 19

2010-2 -February 51 3 19

2010-3-march 57 4 23

2010-4-april 54 5 25

2010-5-may 50 6 25

2010-6-june 44 6 22

2010-7-july 52 6 202010-8-august 45 9 16

2010-9-September 58 5 21

2010-10-october 50 3 14

2010-11-november 69 7 13

2010-12-December 59 5 15



19/21

2011-1-January 51 4 18

2011-2-February 27 11 13

2011-3-March 45 4 9

2011-4-April 28 4 16

2011-5-May 42 4 6

2011-6-June 41 5 8

2011-7-July 35 1 14

2011-8-August 38 0 11

2011-9-September 33 6 14

Oct-11 28 4 12

Nov-11 24 1 11

Dec-11 26 1 19

Jan-12 39 1 19

Feb-12 22 0 26

Mar-12 24 1 16

Apr-12 26 0 12

May-12 27 1 14

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Documents

The Unintended Consequences of Kingpin Strategies