THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST MAKING SENSE

THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST

MAKING SENSEOF 19™ CENTURY

NATIONALISMF.G. Stapleton

introduces the 'weathervane ideology'.

Right: The storming of theBastille. 14 July 1789, a seminal

event in the construction ofmodern nationalist Ideology.

Ncilionalism is a political forcewhich has been shaping the his-tory of Europe and the world

over the ¡ast two centuries more than theideas of Freedom and pariiamentarydemocracy, let alone communism.' Mosthistorians would agree with Peter Alter'sproposition {Nationalisvi, 1994, page I).As an ideology that emerged out of theEnlightenment and French Revolution ¡nthe end of 18tli century, nationalism'spolitical potency in contemporaneousworld affairs is reinforced daily by globaltelevision journalism as the remainingsingle cause oí inter-state contlict. Yet itsaspirations, origins, socio-politicalimpact, mass popularity and relationshipto democratic traditions have been, areand will vary from state to state andepoch to epoch, lo understand its his-torical meaning, or meanings, we needwe need to trace its course historically.

Defining the Problem

Over the past half century, three historicaischools have emerged which attempt toexplain the development of Europeannationalism. One of the earliest theoristswas the American historian CarltonHayes. He defined nationalism's evolu-tion in five separate chronological stages.They ran: Uumaniiiiriun enlightenmeni.Jacobin revolutionär)', ronuuiiic trcidiiiomil,liberal unification and finally integralchauvinistic. Hayes' fundamental idea isthat there is not one historical processcalled nationalism (singular), hut a seriesof nationalisms ¡plural) that ha\eemerged over time. In this sense, it hasbeen a popular lahel that a myriad of dif-ferent historical movements haveadorned themselves with, as a means ofobscuring alternative objectives. Thus,nationalism could be espoused by politi-

cians as far apart in ideological outlookas Mazzini and Mussolini, or Goetheand Hitler. Not surprisingly, Hayeswarns students of the need to disrobethe nationalist facade to determine theactual historical phenomenon heneath.

Marxist interpretation has not funda-mentally strayed far from the writings ofMarx, Engels anti Lenin. According tothis views, nationalism was merely thecreation of a bourgeoisie of the higheststage of capitalist competition. Here thepolitical and economic coalesce. Cavourin Italy and Bismarck in Germany tookthe romantic nostrums of an early 19thcentury intelligentsia as a perfect coverfor the unification of their states, whichwould he run lor the benefits of theelites that these men served. The newunified states would hreak d()v\n localparochial customs and impoverish workingconditions that had previously protected

HISTORY REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2008 41


THE DAILY MAILTÍII-H-DAV. Arnii. i,,

ECZEMA

Öticura

WILL LITTLE TRILBY COME?

Above: An early issue of the tabloid Daily Mail in 1896.This, and similar papers in Europe,helped to foster'nationalist integrationalism'.

the artisan class. A larger market wascreated in both countries for economicexploitation.

By 1879, however, ihe German econ-omy witnessed the limitations of unifica-tion as a means of stimulating capitalistprofits. This resulted in three intercon-nected developments. Firstly, the ehal-lenging of free-market laissez-faire. Theyear 1879 saw the emergence of tariffswhose primary objective was the eco*nomic manipulation ofthe internationalmarket. Where the Cîerman Reich led soother European empires followed. Sec*ondly, with the domestic market protect-ed globaüy. imperial expansion wasrequired to guarantee raw materials andfuture customers. Thirdly, with the rapiddevelopment of a politically motivatedproletariat, the governing bourgeoiselites required a populist mass move-ment that would shatter the natural andobvious bonds of brotherhood betweenEuropean workers and transplant artifi-cially created tribal hatreds. Thus theFrench proletariat couid be taught thattheir enemy was not the French bour-geoisie who parasitically exploited them,but English working-class men whosepoor wages, appalling housing conditionsand stunted lack of opportunity madethem effectively class brothers merelyseparated by geography and language.

This perfect diversion redirected class warto nationalist conflict.

In the last decade the political theo-rist and historian P. Alter has offered asimplified definition of nationalist devel-opment from a post-Cold War perspec-tive. He propounds that only two typesof nationalism exist. The first is Risorgi-mento nationalism. This ideology isfounded in the German Romanticnationalist writings of men like JohannHerder, which were then manufacturedinto a political ideology hy the ItalianLibera! nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini.From this, two 1 i berational forms otnationalism emerged, 'iinifyiiio nationalismthat seeks to create a unified nation byfusing together, like a geopolitical patch-work quilt, a people bonded by language,culture, and ancestry torn apart by exter-nal foreign interference (e.g. Germanyand Italy), Secondly, there was 'secessionisttiationalistn'. Here, the movement doesnot unify but atomises an establishedmulti-ethnic dynastic empire {e.g, in Ire-land, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia.Croatia etc). Alter detects that as the19th centur)' entered its last quarter abastardised form oí 'Risorgimento nation-alism' emerged which he labels 'integralnationalism'. This counter type becomesa political agent of the extreme right.The phrase was first used hy the ultra-

conservative Frenchman CharlesMaurass in 1909. In fact the manipula-tion of this brand of nationalism can betraced back to the late 1870s when, inan ever increasingly democratic politicalatmosphere, the political right needed anew popuiist electoral cause. It is at thishistorical juncture that 'nationalismturns bad\ or in Konrad Ardenauer'schilling words, it 'emerges as the inlectedsore of Europe.

Chronological Development

My purpose below is to outline national-ism's many manifestations up to the out-break of World War I so that studentsmay test each theory in turn.

1. Classical, Medieval and EarïyModern Nationalism (500 BC-1700)

A proto-nationalism manifested itselfduring the classical period. Greek citi-zens centred loyalty on their City state orPolis. When threatened by barbarian Per-sians at Thermopylae, 300 Spartans sac-rificed their lives for Greek indepen-dence. Roman citizens pledged loyalty tothe Patria, the Republic, and finally theEmperor, In the Middle Ages loyaltiesreturned small scale. The Feudal systemcreated a social hierarchy of King, lord,freeman and serf. By the early modernperiod, feudalism had matured into adynastic nationalism. This 'Etatisme'political culture saw the emergence ofshared central institutions, monarch-directed national religion, and indige-nous cultural uniqueness.

2. The Enlightenment and the rootsof 19th Century NationalistIdeology (1750-1789)

The key figures of the Enlightenmentwere all 'Rationalists'. They wished toimpose an ordered, open and uncorrupt-ed code of civilisation on WesternEurope. Voltaire challenged the unques-tioned authority of established religionand revealed its hypocrisies and medievalsuperstitions. Rousseau promulgated thenotion of the 'popular will', that govern-ment should be based on 'popular demo-cratic choice' and therefore a people

42 SEPTEMBER 2008 HISTORY REVIEW


would be truly sovereign. Montesquieuin his Spirit of the Laws ( 1763) encour-aged a democratic structure of govern-ment based on the English model.Around the same time German culturalcommentators like Herder, Hamboldt.Hegel, Goethe and Grimm felt that theywere part of a German literary revivalthat challenged France's 200-year-olddominiilion of European culture.

3. French Revolutionary Nationalism(1789- 1815)

French revolutionary fervour desired tomake the world anew. For 20 years itdid. The storming of the Bastille chal-lenged judicial corruption. The Declara-tion oi' Rights of August 1789 defined asovereign state as the embodiment ofits collective citizens equally free beforethe law. La Fête ele ¡a Fédération {14thJuly 1790) became the First secularnaliontil holiday. Treason was definedby the term Les -natio>i not Lese-majesté. The public trial and executionof the French monarchy reminded allthat aristocratic government would beheld accountable. The Edict of Frater-nity of 1792 promised that the NationalConvention would 'export' the revolu-tion to neighbouring states. The cre-ation of the largest conscripted citizens'army since the fall of the RomanEmpire made threat reality. CarltonHayes, however, refers to revolutionarynationalism as "Jacobin nationalism . Itis clear that, fromthe beginning, popu-lar nationalism was adouble-edged sword.The nationalist

movement createdibc theory of tbeLounter-nationalistrevolutionär): Scape-goating of theregime's failures,f a c t i o n a l i s mbetween Jacobinextremists and Girondist moderates, anextensive, pernicious anti corrupt secretpolice, aggressive propaganda that ledto mobocracy instead of democracy -all these show that the regime ate itsown children. During the NapoleonicEmpire, wars of liberation mutated intowars of conquest. Imperial nationalismwas born.

Hayes warnsstudents of the

need to disrobe thenationalist facadeto deternnine theactual historical

phenomenonbeneath f 9

rhe Italian

4. Romantic Nationalism during thePost Vienna Settlement (1815-

1848)

The re-establishment elites of Europeafter 1815 presaged the 'watchman era.Its chief political architect was PrinceKlemcns Metternich (foreign minister-Chancellor of the Austrian Empire in1821-48). He was instrumental in creat-ing the Congress system by which thegreat European powers of Great Britain,Russia, Austria andPrussia would usetheir diplomaticand, if necessar\'.military influence tosuppress the re-emergence of revo-lutionary activity onthe continent. Thelegislative frame-work for tbis wasenshrined in Article

6 of tbe Quadruple Alliance and theRussian-sponsored mystical HolyAlliance signed by all restored princes(except the Pope, Sultan and Britishmonarch). The Vienna Settlement canbe seen as a depressingly repressive col-lective security system. It largely main-tained the balance of power in a Europeexhausted hy a quarter of a century ofarmed conflict and socio-economicupheaval, though in fact the establish-ments' fears of popular nationalism werealways over-stated. Although much writ-ten about, tbe Romantic Movement sin-

gularly did not moveGerman nationalismone inch further.The reduction of 300German states to 30was enacted by theVienna settlement.In Northern Ger-

Prus-Zoi-

During theNapoleonic Empire,wars of liberationmutated into wars

of conquest.Imperial nationalism

was born

many, it wassian economic¡verein dynamismthat encouragedpooled sovereignty.

Romantic nationalistGiuseppe Ma/_zini had a far greaterinfluence. Mazzini's nationalist ideologywas Thought and Action'. Its programmewas to sponsor a republican Italy, pro-mote education and propaganda to cre-ate a revolutionary class, and galvanise aYoung Italy mü\ement to spread ideas toother states. Yet in practice his La Gio-

vanni Europa of 1834 and the People'sInternational Eeague of 1847 failed mis-erably to project a nationalist agenda.

If we look at the two nation-statesactually to be liberated by 1848, Bel-gium and Greece, we find that tbe influ-ence of Romantic Nationalism was atmost of peripheral importance. As A.J.P.Taylor pointed out, tbe granting of inde-pendence for Greece in 1827 and Bel-gium in 1830 was not despite theCongress System but because of it. The

Great Powers recog-nised that creating abuffer zone north ofFrance and promot-ing the emergenceof a Christian statefrom a moribundfragment of theOttoman Empirewas a perfect com-promise. Yet DanielO'Connell and

Gerzy Czartiryski failed to attain inde-pendence for Ireland or Poland. The re-emergence of either would undermineBritish global and Central Europeanmulti-ethnic imperial interests. Roman-tic nationalism found its nadir during the1848 revolutions. It bad not the money,military leverage, or even control of theforces unleashed when Paris sneezed inFebruary 1848.

5. Unification Nationalism(1848-1870)

Tbe extent to which Cavour of Pied-mont-Savoy and von Bismarck of Prussiacould exploit the ideology of RomanticNationalism has been a continual thornin tbe side of unification historians. Thisis hardly surprising. Studies have beenconstrained by the following factors.

• The fluctuating popularity of thephenomenon decade to decade

• Eack ol evidence that suggests thatall subjects/citizens were equallyaffected by nationalist fervour

• The impossibility of adjudging thepopularity of the movement at atime of large-scale illiteracy

• As democracy emerged after I860,so parties of both the right and leftattempted to harness nationalistsentiment, which confuses the over-all picture.



What is clear is that both Cavour andBismarck were highly sceptical of'utilis-ing' mass populist movements they couldnot control. The nationalist agenda con-cealed their objectives, aggrandisementof Piedmontese and Prussian royal terri-tory. They recognised fhat the new diplo-matic environment of the post-CrimeanWar era could be manipulated to theirown political ends, Ciivour and Bismarckco-opted populist nationalism, but reliedon a mixture of diplomatic bluff, oppor-tunism and warfare to attain a Piedmon-tese Italian Empire by 1870 and a Prus-sian German Empire by 1871.

Yet the post-unification euphoria wasshort-lived. Liberal nationalism playedlittle part in the moulding of the newItalian or German nation-states. A singlecapital, new national anthem, single flag,unified currency, nationalised transportsystem, improved industrial and agricul-tural efficiency - these could not dis-guise the reality that Piedmontese andPrussian triumphal aggrandisement hadbeen the real victors in 1870 and 1871.

6. Integral Chauvinistic Nationalismin the Age of Mass Politics ( 1870-1914)

a) Pan-European Integralist NationalismThe final development of nationalismbefore the outbreak of World War 1 hastwo separate but often inter-connected

political ideological types, 'integralist'nationalism was promoted and sub-sidised by all European governments forthe same reasons. The last quarter of the19th century would bring a period ofunrivalled international peace and pros-perity to Western Europe. Tradeboomed, and access to cheaper transat-lantic grain made famine a popularmemory, whilst diversionary new imperi-alism removed international rivalry' fromEurope to Far-away Africa. The governingclasses should have felt relatively secure.However, this was also the age ofincreasing mass democracy, militantlyconfident trade unionism, urbanisation,embryonic socialism and emerging secu-larism. Both landed aristocracy and thenew industrial bourgeoisie had a vestedinterest in halting the slow diminution oftheir monopolisation of power. Govern-ments believed that a major part of thesolution was regaining control of thenewly emerging petite bourgeoisie andartisan class. Splintering proletarian loy-alty would make them easier to neu-tralise. Thus different states at variousjunctures promoted 'nationalist intergral-ism\ They did this by several means.

First, hy Introducing compulsory pri-mary education, first in Germany in1873, then in Italy in 1877, Belgium, theNetherlands and Scandinavia in 1879,then in Britain in 1880 and France in1888. School curricula emphasised duty.deference to order, collegiality, respect

Above: This German cartoon, printedshortly after the outbreak of war in1914. depicted Europe as a jungle ofcompeting foes.

for class division, loyalty to the State, theuniqueness of the national character andthe notion of race as the dominant worldforce. Language became politicised.Prussian German was the norm, Englishwas imposed on Celtic neighbours, Flo-rentine Roman dialect hecame the stan-dard in Italy, and Austrian German andMagyar were soon the only official lan-guage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Second, between 1870 and the 1914(with Britain the singular exception),European powers introduced variousforms of national conscription to protectthe nation-state. National symbolismbecame almost a monomania during thisperiod. National anthems, national holi-days and the flying of national nags frompublic buildings became synonymous withpolitical theatre. Cities hecame 'monu-mentopias'. Cheap mass-production ofphotographic imagery meant national idol-atorisaton hecame universally accessible.

Third, Governmental sponsored wel-fare provision was pioneered hy Bismar-ck in 1883-1885. Other powers emulat-ed his innovation. In Britain 'One NationToryism'in the 1870s, Cladstonian liber-alism and finally New Liheralismadvanced social welfare. Giollitianreforms in Italy hetween 1900 and 1911

44 SEPTEMBER 2008 HISTOKÏ REVIEW


echoed this and French secular radicalspromoted public welfare and healthreforms between 1896 and 1905. Pater-nalist reform immunised against socialism.

Fourth, the popular press was con-trolled. The mass media during this peri-od largely consisted of the newspapers.The established elites had popular liter-ary representation by I860. In Britain'fhe Times and the Telegraph, in FranceLe Matin, in Germany NeuesteNachrichten and in Italy Messugerio werethe mouthpieces between which thegoverning classes spoke to each other.With an increasingly literate population,the establishment needed a compliantand right-of-centre popular or tabloidpress. In 1896, the Daily Mail was pub-lished to direct the masses. By 191Ü, inFrance le Petit Journal, Italy Avaníí andGermany der Berliner Morgenpost wouldaim at the same reading population. By1914, these papers had circulalions run-ning between 800,000 and I million inurban areas. Their populist campaignscould influence the electoral success ofgovernments and popularity of legisla-tion, making or marring ministerialcareers. They would be particularly cru-cial in heightening the tension betweenTriple Alliance and the Triple Ententebetween 1904 and 1914.

b) The Evolution of Right-Wing PopulistNationalism.Governments of all political credos, fromauthoritarian paternalism to liberalreformist, were employing these general'integralist' ideas. At the same time, aspecific nationalist party ideology andright-wing political agenda emerged andachieved representation in some legisla-tures. In Britain, significantly, many ofthe ideas would be ahsorbed into 'Salis-bury Imperial Conservatism'. In Ger-many, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy andRussia separate parties emerged to pro-mote this new populist cause. Althoughthese men could vary in their policydetails, key features of what some histo-rians call •proto-taseist' political partiesdid seem to be emerging under the ban-ner of radical nationalism before 1914.The primacy of the nation over the indi-vidual, a romantic attachment to tradi-tional pre-urban industrial values, thesuperiority of the national race with itsinternational destiny, an obsession withinternal enemies (especially the Jews).the rejection of liberalism, socialism and

democracy as divisive ideologies, a pro-tectionist economic viewpoint, the cru-cial need for large and well subsidisedarmed forc-es (in Britain, the Navy) andfinally the proof of national health andvirility hy inculcating and sustaining anexpansionist foreign policy - all thesehad a common political currency.

It is perhaps too great a leap to see theFirst World War as simply a breathingspace that halted the metamorphosis of19th century nationalism into 20th centu-ry Fascism. Society in 1918 had heentransformed trom ante-bellum norms.Versailles resulted in self-determination,economic instability, centrally enforcedmass democracy for under-prepared pop-ulations, a témale franchise and continu-ing friction over national minorities.Moreover there was now a radical com-munist state in Russia, enthusiastic tospread its ideology to Western Europe. Allthese factors would contribute to theemergence of a variety of fascist partieswhose political, social and foreign policyobjectives were significantly at variancewith their 19th-century predecessors.

Assessment

E.H. Carr has said that all useful nation-alism had occurred by 1870. After thatthe issue and sub-division of Europeanempires, he they Russian. Ottoman orAustro-Hungarian, actually made inter-national conflict more likely not less. In1870, nationalism was a tool of the elitesto take control of the masses. But thetabloid-fed mohocracy on the streets ofLondon, St. Petershurg. Paris, Berlin,Vienna and Belgrade in August 1914,suggests that nationalism became even-tually a stick with which to prod a rathertentative and unsure political elite into awar that would destroy the very fahric ofthe society which the ideology had beenmeant to solder together.

As early as 1862 the Catholic histori-an Lord Acton prophetically commented,

Nationalism neither aims at liber-t)' nor prosperity, hoth of which itsacrifices to the imperative neces-sity of making a nation the mouldand measure of the state. Nation-alism thus does not liberate themind and spirit - it imprisonsthem. Its course may he markedby material as well as moral ruin.

Here was a warning for the 20th centurythat pointed the way to two world wars,national genocide and the creation of anuclear homh that could ultimatelydestroy global civilisation. For studentsresearching the peace of Europe since1945 and its close association with theprosperity, social equality and increasingmeritocracy that has characterised theevolution ot" the European Union in aprocess where nationalism and sovereign-ty have been partially shared, Acton'swords remain profoundly haunting. Inshort, from the moment the nationalistidea! escaped from the salons of 18thcentury aristocratic debate and becamean ideology of mass manipulation, so itspolitically negative potentiality hecameapparent. Nationalism was not an ideolo-gy that turned bad. From its politicalinception, it has reinvented itself at dif-ferent times in a variety of states. Theviolence of the Jacobin nationalist childrejected by 1815 would become a recidi-xast ideological felon hy 1914.

Issues to Debate* What actuaiiy is nationaiism?* How did nationalism mutate

during the course of the 19thCentury?

* Did nationaiism'turn bad' orwas its negative and destructivepotentiaiity aiways apparentfrom its ideoiogicai inception?

F G Stapleton is Head of History at CardinalGriffin RC High School. He completed this workduring a Teacher Fellowship at Jesus College,Oxford, in July 2007.

I- II r I li c r R V a cl i n g

B.c. Shafer, Foces of Noiionalism: New

Reo/ilJes and Old Myttis (Harvest Books,

New York, 1974)

R Alter, Nationalism (Edward Arnold, 2nd

edition, 1994)

A.D. Smith. Theories ofNatíonalism

(Duckworch 1971)

A. Heywood, PoUOcal Ideologies:At] Introduction

(Palgruve Macmillan. 3rd edition, 20Q3)

T. Baycroft. Nationalism in Europe

/ 799-/945 {CUR 1998)

H Schulze, States, Notions ond Notiona/ism;

From the Middle Ages to the Present

ackwell. 1996)


Documents

THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST MAKING SENSE