CAUGHT ON THE HOP:THE

YOM KIPPUR WARElizabeth Stephens examines how thirty-five years ago this month the surpriseinvasion of Israel by Egypt and its allies started the process that led to Camp David.

The impact of the Yom Kippiir Warthat erupted on October 6th,1973, far outweighed its relatively

short duration of twenty days of heavyfighting. It severely tested the détentehetween the United States and the Sovi-et Union as the superpowers sought todefend the interests of their Middle Eastclients: Israe! on the American side,Egypt and Syria on the Soviet side. Theresult was the most dangerous momentol the Cold War since the Cuhan Mis-sile Crisis in 1962. American supportproved critical to the survival of Israel atthis seminal moment as the US-Israelspecial relationship, begun in 1967, wasconsolidated. The conflict is alsoremembered for triggering the first ener-

gy shock as Arab oil producers unleashedthe oil weapon to punish the UnitedStates and its allies for their support ofIsrael. Finally, it set off a chain of eventsthat culminated in the 1978 CampDavid Accords, the landmark peacetreaty hetween Egypt and Israel.

Israel's victory against the Arabs in1967 had been swift and absolute, trans-forming the geographical contours of lheMiddle East. Israel's territorial gainstripled the country's land area and dra-matically reduced its vulnerability toArah attack. Egypt lost the Gaza Stripand Sinai, Syria the Golan Heights andJordan, the West Bank and EastJerusalem. In less than a week Israel hadestablished itseU firmly as the regional

military superpower and secured consid-erable diplomatic and military supportfrom the United States.

The fundamental cause of the YomKippur War was the diplomatic impassethai followed the Six-Day War. At theKhartoum summit ofAugust 1967 theArahs issued their 'three noes: no peace,no recognition and no negotiation withIsrael. This played into Israeli bands andwhen Colda Meir became Israel s firstFemale prime minister in 1969 she obdu-rately refused to countenance withdraw-al from the Occupied Territories. TheMuslims', she proclaimed, 'can fight andlose, tben come back and fight again.But Israel can only lose once.' She wasacutely aware that Israeli survival

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depended ultimately on Amcriciin sup-port. The United Nations SecurityCouncil Resolution 242 (passed onNovember 22nd. 1967, with US sup-port), called for Israel's return to its pre-1967 borders, but also for respect for thesovereignty of every state in the area.Israel m¿ide its willingness to negotiatedependent on Arab recognition, whilethe Arabs made the return of the occu-pied lands a prerequisite for talks.

Jerusalem's intransigence, in responseU) the Khartoum Resolution, was com-pounded by tbe conviction, shared bytbe CIA, that the Arabs were incapableof successfully challenging Israelisupremacy. An Israeli joke had MosheDayan, Meir's minister of defence andarchitect of the 1967 plan of battle,bemoaning the laek of action: 'Howabout invading anotber Arab country?'asks a colleague. 'Wbat would we do intbe afternoon?' responds Dayan. Suchcomplacency was reinforced by the con-struclion of tbe Bar-Lev Line, an inter-locking series of sand-based earthworkson tbe east bank of tbe Suez Canalwbich consumed $500 million in 1971.Tbougbt to be virtually impregnable bytbe IDF (Israel Defence Forces), byOctober 1973 it was tbinly defended.Tbe Israelis also assumed that any sur-prise Arab attack, wberever it came,could be repulsed by their air force,wbich bad proved so devastating in tbeSix-Day War.

Into tbis equation came Anwar Sadat,who succeeded Gamal Nasser as Egyp-tian president when the latter died sud-denly in September 1970. Sadat was nottaken seriously by either Washington orJerusalem, being regarded as a transientleader who made empty threats that werenever acted upon. In 1972 Sadat's sabre-rattling saw bim promise 'to sacrifice onemillion Egyptian soldiers, whicb was pal-pably absurd. Yet sucb contempt alsoextended to his intimation made tbe pre-vious year tbat, if Israel acted on Resolu-tion 242, Egypt was ready for peace.Sadat turned to Washington in an effortto break the stalemate.

The key figures in the White Housewere President Ricbard Nixon and1 lenry Kissinger, National Security Advi-sor in Nixon's first term (1969-7_í) andSecretary of State in bis second ( 1973-74). Kissinger had Nixon's ear, witbsome dubbing bim 'president of foreign

Opposite; war on two fronts: Israeli troops onthe Golan Heights come under Syrian artillery fire.

Above and below: Time magazine was sure thatAnwar Sadat and Golda Meir held the keys to

breaking the Middle East deadlock, but theNixon administration could not get Israel to

agree to talks with Egypt.

affairs', A Cerman emigre wbo fled Nazipersecution in 1938, Kissinger was anadvocate of Realpolitik - rutbless prag-matism as tbe basis of national policy.Neither Nixon nor Kissinger was keenon staking American prestige on a Mid-dle East peace settlement tbey wereconvinced was unattainable. Yet Nixonbelieved, as a Republican president, tbathe needed to find a solution to the con-flict in bis second term. He feared acompletely pro-Israel Democrat succes-sor would give the Soviets a cbance toreinforce tbeir influence among tbe

Arabs. Tbroughout 1972. bowever,Nixon's overriding concerns were negoti-ating the bistoric SALT (Strategic ArmsLimitation Treaty) agreement witbMoscow, ending tbe Vietnam War andbis re-election campaign. Consequently,be was not prepared to risk political cap-ital on brokering peace between Israeland Egypt. Sadat's sudden and unexpect-ed expulsion of most Soviet advisersfrom Egypt in July 1972 reduced Nixon'ssense of urgency about doing anytbing.

In Marcb 1973. when Meir visitedWashington, Nixon and Kissinger tried todevise ways and means of drawing Israelinto talks witb Egypt, tbus breaking thedeadlock. Tbe previous montb sbe hadrebuffed Sadat's latest peace initiative.As Kissinger perceived, 'tbe longer tberewas no cbange in the status quo tbemore Israel would be confirmed in tbepossession of tbe Occupied Territories'.Altbough Sadat repeatedly warned Wash-ington that the status quo would pnn'okeanother war wbicb could hring a renewedSoviet military presence in Egypt,Kissinger remained convinced tbat hewas bluffing- As be reflected in bis mem-oirs, our definition of rationality did nottake seriously tbe notion of starting anunwinnable war to restore self-respect".

The diplomatic option closed. Sadatnow set in motion plans for war. Opera-tion Badr, Recognizing tbat he needed apartner. President Hafez al-Assad ofSyria was brought on board to confrontIsrael witb a twT)-front war. Where Sadatwanted war to kick-start the peace pro-cess, Assad ~ bis armed forces re-equipped by Moscow - sought to recov-er the Golan Heights from Israel. Todeceive Israeli intelligence, large-scalemilitary exercises were staged by Egyptduring 1973, twice provoking Israelimobilization. Tbe fact tbat two tbirds oftbe Israeli army were reservists bad atremendous dislocating impact on thecivilian economy which the Israeli lead-ership now became anxious to avoid.Tbe seeming rift witb Moscow alsoplayed into Sadat's hands. Wbile tbeKremlin remained unwilling to providefigbter-bombers, from late 1972 it fur-nished an array of deadly defensivearmaments including SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) and the Sagger anti-tankguided missile. Israeli intelligence over-looked tbe potential for these defensiveweapons to aid offensive operations.

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THE VOM KIPPUR WAR

gambling instead that war would onlycome once Egypt acquired the offensivecapability provided by fighter-bombers.

When Egypt and Syria launched anoverwhelming surprise attack that beganon Vom Kippur (October 6th, 197.Í),the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.Isriicl was utterly unprepared. Octoberalso coincided with Ramadan, themonth of fasting in the Mushm calen-dar, providing yd another justification tothe Israeli analysis of why the Arabswould not want to fight, lust before hos-tilities, the Egyptian Army held exercis-es on its side of the Canal. At theeleventh hour, after repeated warnings.Israeli intelligence finally realized thiswas not an exercise. On the morning ofthe 6th. Meir convened an emergencycabinet meeting to weigh the options.The IDF chief of staff, Lieutenant-Gen-erül David Hlazar, urged Meir to sanc-tion a repeat of the pre-emptive airstrikes that had destroyed the EgyptianAir Force on the ground during the firstmorning of the Six-Day War. For hispart, Dayan could not bring himseif tobelieve that Egypt and Syria were ahoutto strike the tirst blow. On this occasion,tbe message coming out of Washingtonwas not to pre-empt and Meir elected tocome down on the side of Dayan antlthe Americans.

At the onset of hostilities - in whatbecame known as The Crossing -80,000 Egyptian troops negotiated theCanal in small craft. Explosives and highpressure water cannons were used tobreach the Bar-Lev Line. Egyptian

Above: Israel's counter-attack: armouredpersonnel carriers in the Sinai Desert rolling

back the over-extended Egyptian army.

Below: Henry Kissinger moved from beingNational Security Advisor to the State Departmentless than three weeks before the invasion.With

the President mired in Watergate, Kissingereffectively made US policy during the crisis.

Below: the Bar-Lev Line which Israeli generalsthought impregnable.

forces then penetrated fifteen miles intotbe Sinai. Many Israeli combat aircraftfell victim to the radar-guided SAMswhile Israeli tanks were knocked out hythe sophisticated Soviet-supplied anti-tank weaponr)'. It was a similar story onthe Golan Heights. Reeling under thetwin assaults, Israel was forced to aban-don its doctrine of fast-moving attackswith armoured columns hacked hy dev-astating air power and instead to fight astatic defence.

Twenty-four hours into the war, asArah armies advanced, it looked as ifIsrael might he brought to its knees. Sotraumatic was the experience that onOctober 8th Meir reportedly orderedthirteen tactical nticlear weapons read-ied as a last resort if the tide could notbe turned. In her heart, though, shelooked to Washington for salvation.

The US response to the crisis wasthreefold. The highest priority was givento preserving detente and averting adirect confrontation between the super-powers. Second, and to Israel's chagrin.Nixon and Kissinger tried to ensure thatneither Israel nor Egypt secured an out-right victory. If tbe conflict produced astandoff it could pave the way for fruitfulpeace negotiations, just as Sadat hoped,and possibly lure Egypt out of tbe Sovietcamp. Third, in the midst of the Water-gate crisis, diplomatic manoeuvres mightdraw the public's attention away fromcriticism of Nixon.

Between October 6th and 9thKissinger became the principal officialoverseeing diplomatic exchanges withtbe Israelis and Soviets about the war. In

46 OCTOBER 2008 HISTORY TODAY

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

n tsraeli soldier on watch over Syria from the Gofan Heights in rate Oaober.

the early hours of October 9th the Israeliamhassador, acting on Meir's instruc-tions, pressed Kissinger for significantarms supplies as Israel desperately need-ed to replenish its arsenal, Kissinger con-suited Secretary of Defense JamesSehlesinger, who warned a major rear-mament of Israel was liable to provokean Arab oil boycott. As a result, no firmdecision was taken. With Nixon mired inthe Watergate scandal, Meir was awarethat Kissinger was calling the shots. Sbesought to circumvent him, contactingNixon directly and reminding him thatshe had vetoed a pre-emptive air strikethat would have saved many Israeli lives.

The situation was more complex thanihis. Nixon and Kissinger sought thewithdrawal of Israel from the Occupiedterritories, hut not as a consequence ofa major Arab victory - one that wouldmake the Arah states even less willing tonegotiate a lasting peaee. Furthermore,on October lOtb, with tbe Egyptians andSyrians still holding their own. theWhite House suspected the SovietUnion of stalling on supporting a UNceasefire resolution. An Israeli defeatwould be likely to inercase Moseow'sinfluence in the Middle East. Watergate,

US fear of an oil emhargo and Nixon'sstake in detente may bave encouragedthe Soviets to overplay their hand.

^ ' Sehlesinger warned amajor rearmament of Israel

was liable to provoke anArab oil boycott y ^

Nixon's critical decision to launch amassive military rcsupply operation toIsrael in the second week of tho warcame in response to tbe failure of UNceasefire initiatives, the Soviet arms air-lilt to Egypt and Syria and his need tobolster bis faltering hacking amongdomestic supporters of Israel. It was thelogistical aspect of implementing thepresident's decision tbat was problemat-ic. Since October 15th, El AI planes,their markings concealed, had been col-lecting armaments from depots in Vir-ginia but the (¡uantities were insufficientto replace Israeli losses. On October19th, after insurance companies refusedto cover Israeli chartered aircraft flyinginto a war zone, it was decided to use US

C-5s to transport equipment to Israel,The proviso from the White House wasthat the take-offs and landings shouldtake place under cover of darkness.

It was at this juncture th;U Nixon'sattempts to maintain the image of Ameri-ca as an 'honest broker' between Israel,tbe Arabs and the Soviets unravelled. Forrefuelling purposes tbe C-5 aircraft wereflown to Israel via Lajes Field, tbe Por-tuguese air force hase in the Azores.Howe\'er, adverse weather conditionsdelayed their departure, with many arriv-ing in Israel at dawn and not in the deadof night. Visual proof of the huge US re-supply operation delighted the Israelipublic and the media, but tbe surround-ing publicity unleashed the wrath of theCiulf States in the form of an oil emhargo,

Belore the war Sadat recognized thevalue of being able to exert some pres-sure on Wasbington through a thirdparty. On August 23rd. 1973, Sadat hadsecretly met King Faisal of Saudi Arabiaand convinced the head of the world'slargest oil-producing state to use the oilweapon in a future Arab-Israeli conflict.Since 1967 the US bad become a net oilimporter. As a consequence, bargainingpower shifted from tbe US oil compa-

HisTORY TODAY OCTOBER 2008 47

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

nies in favour of the producing nations,thus giving Sadat's strategy a realisticchance of success.

Saudi Arabia was a crucial swing pro-ducer within the Organization olPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)and the Organization of Arab PetroleumExporting Countries (OAPEC). Withthe tide of the war starting to turn inIsrael's favour, tbe Saudis were preparedto use the termination of oil supplies asa form of leverage against the West. OnOctoher Ijitb Ni.xon received an omi-nous letter from the cbiiirmcn of the oilmajors Mobil, Exxon, Chevron and Texa-co, warning of Faisal's dismay with thecourse of events.

Three days later, the New York Timesreported that Faisal had demanded thatthe White Mouse terminate arms sup-plies to Israel and that Israel withdraw toits pre-1967 borders; otherwise US-Saudi relations would hecome 'luke-warm'. Next day, the 17th, when a posi-tive response was not forthcoming.OAPEC announced that it would cut 'oilproduction hy 10 per cent and S per centa month thereafter" until Israel withdrewfrom the Occupied Territories. Two dayslater, after Nixon's official request toCongress for an appropriation of $2.2hillion to cover the cost of the ¿lirlift,Faisal imposed an embargo on oil ship-ments to tbe US, a policy soon replicat-ed hy other Arah oil producers.

The coordinated efforts of OAPECdid not have as profound an effect onWhite House policy as Sadat had envis-aged. The administration prioritized rela-

Above: an Israeli convoy under attack as itadvances into Syria.

Below: an Egyptian prisoner of war andtriumphant Israeli soldiers after establishing a

bridgehead on the west side of the Suez Canal.

tions vvith Moseow and the survival olIsrael, not the rising cost of oil.

Belween Octoher 6th ¿md ISJth thesuperpowers furnished the combatantswith aircraft, artiller\' and other weapon-ry. This competition ultimatcly favouredthe Israelis who, recovered Irom thetrauma of the opening week, focusedfirst on defeating the Syrian forces near-ing towns in Cialilee. Between Octoherlltb and 14th the IDF pushed lheenemy from lhe Golan Fieights and backinto Svria. Damascus asked Cairo to

relieve the pressure. Brushing aside theprotests of senior commanders. Sadatordered Egyptian forces forward. OnOctober ! 4th, now out of range of theirSAMs, they were decimated by Israeliaircraft and armour, losing around 200tanks. The following day tbe IDF begana sustained counter-attack, exploitingthe point where the flanks of the Egyp-tian Second and Third Armies met.

By tbe second week of tbe war. withIsrael in the ascendancy, the SovietUnion gave support to a cease-fire. Nowit was the American position thathecame more ambivalent. On October20th. as Kissinger flew to Moscow,tNixon informed President Leonid Bre .h-nev, the Soviet leader, that the Secretaryof State had full authority to negotiateon his hehalf. Kissinger was outragedthat Nixon had deprived him of the abili-ty to stall. He had intended to tell theSoviets that he would have to consultthe President before agreeing to theterms of a cease-fire. Such a delay wouldhave enahled Kissinger to buy theIsraelis more time to consolidate theirposition on the battlefield and for him tofind a way to exclude the Soviets fromthe negotiations. Yet a telephone conver-sation with Joseph Siseo. Assistant Sec-retary at the State Department, restoredKissingers confidence in his own author-ity. Nixon was so preoccupied withWatergate and his own self-preservationthat he did not have time to think aboutthe Middle East, tbus enahling Kissingerto ignore bis instructions.

On October 22nd the superpowersbrokered UN Security Council Resolu-tion 338. It provided the legal basis forending the war, calling for a cease-fire tohe in place within twelve hours, imple-mentation of Resolution 242 'in all itsparts' and negotiations between the par-ties. Tbis marked the first occasion theSoviets had endorsed direct negotiationshetween the Arabs and Israel withoutconditions or qualifications. Meir, whowas not consulted, was offended by thisfait accompli, though she had littleoption but to comply.

Nevertheless, Meir was determinedlo gain the maximum strategic advantagehefore the final curtain came down onthe conflict. Given the entanglement ofthe Egyptian and Israeli armies, thetemptation was too great for the Israelisto resist. After a final push in the Sinai

48 OcroBER 2008 HISTORY TODAY

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expelled the Egyptians, Meir gave theorder to cross the Canal. The IDF wassoon threatening to cut off the retreating40.000 soldiers of Sadat's Third Army.Kissinger was incensed because be badassured the Soviets that Israel wouldrespect tbe latest cease-fire. Both super-powers were monitoring the fightingthrough satellite surveillance photogra-phy. Brezhnev, for tbe first time duringthe Nixon presidency, used the hotlineto request presidential intervention.Soviet and American credibility was atstake. As Kissinger cautioned tbe Israeliamhassador: 'Tbere were limits beyondwbich we could not go, with all ourfriendship for Israel, and one of themwas to make the leader of another super-power look like an idiot.'

Israe!, after breaching a second UNceasefire, took tbe US to the brink ofdirect confrontation with the SovietUnion, Brezhnev threatened unilateralmilitary intervention if Washingtonfound it 'impossible to act jointly'. Themessage came through when Ni.xon,'overwhelmed by his persecution', asKissinger described bis mental state, wasin hed. Kissinger elected not to wake tbePresident but to convene National Secu-rity officials to formulate a response.After a three hour White House meet-ing, ending at 2am, it was agreed tomove US forces to DefCon 3. tbe high-est state of peacetime preparedness. Ona psychological level, the impact wasimmense. Washington bad signalled itswillingness to go to war with Moscow topreserve both Israel and its position inthe Middle East. The alert had thedesired effect as the KremHn hacked off.Yuri Andropov, KGB chief, encapsulatedtbe Soviet attitude: 'We shall nol unleashtbe Third World War.'

The military alert was also successful-ly employed to force Israeli cooperation.As Meir came under increasing pressurefrom Washington to leave tbe trappedIig\''ptians unharmed, witb great pragma-tism she acquiesced. She understood herobligation to safeguard Israel's rekition-ship with 'the only real friend we have¿md a ver\' powerful one'. As sheacknowledged, 'the trouble with friendsis not what they can do for you, but whatthey prevent you from doing for yourself.'

On Octoher 25th the UN SecurityC^ouncil passed Resolution 340, callingfor an itnmediate cease-fire, a return to

Above: Israelitanks cross theSuez Canal,watched byGeneral MosheDayan, left.

Below: EgyptianSoviet-madeanti-aircraftmissiiescaptured onthe west bankof the Canalawaitingtransport toIsrael after thecease-fire,

HISTORY TODAY OCTOBER 200B 49

THE YOM KÍPPUR WAR

Above: President Sadat inspecting an Israeli guard of honour at Ben Gurion airport on his way backto Cairo after addressing the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem. November 1977.

tbe October 22nd lines and tbe imple-mentation of Resolution 3JÍ8. This timethe ceasefire held and tbe war was final-ly brougbt to a close. The associated oilembargo on tbe US was lifted in Marcb1974. Kissinger moved to centre stage tokick-start a peace process. At a newsconference the morning after the alert,he presented his position: 'The eondi-tions that produced the war were clearlyintolerable to tbe Arab nations, and ... ina process of negotiations it will be neces-sary to make substantial concessions.'llie following day he convinced Israel topermit tbe resupply of the Third Army,thereby preventing a decisive victoryfor Israel and delivering the militarystalemate for wbicb be bad workedthrougbout tbe war, A grateful Sadattook due note.

The effects of tbe Yom Kippur Warecboed tbroughout tbe Middle East andacross tbe worid. A quadrupling of oilprices to $12 a barrel by 1974 reflectedthe strength of tbe Arab producers' pun-isbment strategy. In tbe American case,imports derived from Arab sourcesplunged from 1.2 million barrels a day tojust 19,000 barrels. Petrol rationing,speed restrictions and Project Indepen-dence, a plan to make tbe US energyindependent, were tbe result. The firstoil sbock brougbt tbe "Long Boom', tbeera of commercial growth dating from1950, to a juddering end.

In Israel, the war became known as'tbe Earthquake'. The public clamour for

answers over wbat went wrong led Meirto establisb tbe Agranat Commission tolook into tbe conduct ol tbe war. Itsinterim report exonerated Meir andDayan of any intelligence and opera-tional failures but recommended tbe dis-missal of Lieutenant-General Elazar andEli Zeira. tbe bead of military intelli-gence. The political fallout did not stoptbere. Disgruntled reservists, appalled bytbe bea\7 loss of life, demanded Dayan'sresignation, wbicb came tbe followingmonth, and then began targeting Meirwbo resigned shortly tbereaftcr, on April11th, 1974, forever haunted by tbetbougbt that she sbould have authorizedpre-emptive air strikes. In tbat event,Kissinger subsequently remarked, Israelwould not have received 'even a nail'from Wasbington.

Although Nixon, with Kissinger'shiessing, tried to claim tbe kudos formanaging the crisis, it did not save hispresidency and he resigned in disgracein August 1974 to avert impeachment.The ultimate loser was Moscow. Tbemomentum in tbe peace talks tbalensued carried Sadat into alignmentwitb Wasbington, tbe superpower beconsidered able to deliver Israel to tbenegotiating tahle. Kissinger engaged in'shuttle diplomacy", flying between theinterested capitals. Under Nixon's suc-cessor. Gerald Ford, be put into actionthe 'step-by-step' diplomatic strategy heconsidered would deliver a peace agree-ment between Egyjît and Israel.

In November 1977 Sadat travelled toJerusalem to address tbe Knesset. Tbisencouraged the Democrat PresidentJimmy Garter to put bis personal prestigebebind reaebing an Egyptian-Israeli set-tlement. Tbe outcome of tbe CampDavid negotiations, involving Sadat andtbe Israeli leader Menachem Begin inSeptember 1978, was tbe signing of apeace agreement the following year,removing tbe largest and most populousArah state from the anti-Israel Arab align-ment. Israel returned tbe entire SinaiPeninsula to Egypt; in return, Egypt rec-ognized Israel. The agreement trans-formed Egypt into the second largestrecipient of US foreign aid, after Israel.

Before October 1973, Wasbingtonbad continually restated its commitmentlo Israel's security but tbis rested on lit-tle more tban words, Wben words need-ed to be backed by aetion, as tbey did inMay 1967 and tbe first week of October1973, American policy-makers respond-ed by arguing, agonizing and weigbingibeir moral commitment to Israel againsta range of diplomatic and strategicobjectives. Congressional approval of a$2.2 billion commitment to Israel, in tbemidst of tbe Yom Kippur War, finallyended tbis debate. /\merica was now sig-nalling to tbe world that it stood hehindIsrael's survival and security regardless oftbe consequences, a position it basmaintained ever since.

Elizabeth Stephens is aVisiting Lecturer inAmerican and Canadian Studies at theUniversity of Birmingham.

I h V I" R C il tl i n U

Walter Boyne, The Yom Kippur War and theAirlift that Saved Israel (St Martin's Griffins,2003); Elinor Burkett, Goldo Meir, the IronLady of the Middle Eost {Gibson Square.2008); Robert Daiiek, Nixon and Kissinger:Partners in Power (Penguin Books. 2007);Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of TwoMajor Crises (Simon & Schuster. 2003); SaadEl Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (AmericanMidwest Research, 2003); EiizabethStephens. US Policy towords IsraeliThe Role ofPolitical Culture in Defining the 'SpecialRelationship' (Sussex Academic Press, 2006).

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