NPC v. CAFacts:

At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.

Issues:

(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous event

(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents

(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

Held:

(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God or  force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability.

(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. CAG.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998

Facts:

On October 11, 1989, powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of Southeastern College’s building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents Dimaano’s house.

Private respondent alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others’ houses.

An ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. The fourth floor of subject school building was declared as a “structural hazard.”

Lower court awarded damages. CA affirmed but reduced damages.

Issue:

WON the damage of the PR’s house resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off was due to fortuitous event? NO

Held:

Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye through is not always reflective of the real cause behind.

Petitioners obtained a permit from the city building official before the construction of its building. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy is prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building. When part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling, the city engineer gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original design. It subsequently authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect.

Petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice president’s narration. Besides, no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling.”

Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling” was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’ house.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 79688 253 SCRA 10 FEBRUARY 1, 1996

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building on is his and his

ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad faith belongs to the one asserting it.

Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, herein petitioner a parcel of

land at Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. The property was designated as Lot 9, Phase II. In 1975,

herein respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the said subject lot from the former purchaser. Eldred later

discovered that the property he purchased had improvements introduced therein by respondent Wilson

Kee.

Kee on the other hand bought on installments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres

Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI) which is the exclusive real estate agent of the petitioner. Under the contract Kee

was allowed to take possession of the property even before full payment of the price. CTTEI through an

employee, Zenaida Octaviano accompanied Kee’s wife Donabelle to inspect Lot No. 8. Octaviano

however mistakenly pointed towards Lot 9. Hence spouses Kee had their residence, an auto repair shop,

a store and other improvements constructed on the wrong lot.

Upon discovery of the blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement but

they failed. Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Jardinico filed a

complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of

Bacolod City. Kee filed a third-party complaint against herein petitioner and CTTEI.

The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the contract with

Kee has rescinded for Kee’s failure to pay installments. Kee no longer had any right over the subject

property and must pay rentals for its use. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City ruled that

petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent. It argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith.

Even if assuming that he was in good faith, he was no longer so and must pay rentals from the time that

he was given notice to vacate the lot. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith as

he was unaware of the mix-up when he constructed the improvements. It was in fact due to the

negligence and wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal the herein petitioner. It further

ruled that the award of rental was without basis.

Pending the resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a deed

of sale, wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the said deed a provision stating that regardless of the outcome

of the decision, such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall be considered dismissed and without

effect. The appellate court was not informed of this deal.

Issue: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property erroneously

delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good faith?

Held: Yes. Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has the burden of

proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for the violation of the contract with

CTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad faith and as a sufficient ground to negate the

presumption of good faith. Jardinico is presently only allowed to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Good faith is based on the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of

any flaw or defect in is title. Since at the time when Kee constructed his improvements on Lot 8, he was

not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him. Petitioner further contends that Kee was

negligent as a provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment stated that the vendee must have

personally examined the property and shall bear on his own the consequential expenses in the changes

that may happen thereon. The court held that such provision cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the

vendee’s right to recover damages resulting from petitioner’s negligence. Such interpretation of the waiver

is contrary to law and public policy and cannot be allowed. Petitioner cannot claim and excuse itself from

liability by claiming that it was not directly involved in the delivery of the property. The principal must be

responsible for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was the sole real

estate representative of the petitioner when the delivery was made. Wilson Kee is therefore declared a

builder in good faith. Petitioner and respondent CTTEI are declared solidarily liable for damages due to

negligence. The award of rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.

Phoenix Construction v. IACFacts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited.  So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

Gatchalian v. DelimFacts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. The

passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent’s spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.

Issues:

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver(2) Whether the respondent was negligent(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and

weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of

P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O NTINGA, J.:

Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:

That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

Contrary to law.[3]

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows:

Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.0093-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.0093-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00

93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.0093-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.0093-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.0093-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5]

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account [7]shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.[8] The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.[9] To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7)Informations subject of the instant case.[10]

For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge.[11]

Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense.[12] Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:

CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]

In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.[15]

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds.It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[16]

Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]

In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals [18]  wherein this Court declared

that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order.[19]

Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:

A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.

B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.

C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.

D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS  IN THE ACCOUNT.

E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]

We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.

Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. [22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of

law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[23]

In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.

However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly.

Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below, rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.

The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.[24]

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. [25] It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb.[26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.[27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. [28] It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.[29]

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition

the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. [30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem. [31] Besides, apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.

Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.

We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.[32]

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated

or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. [33] Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. [34] In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.

The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.

Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case[35] for damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.

As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration[38] or for value.[39] In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.

A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.[40]

In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.

Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41] tells us that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.

At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.[43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. [44] As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,[45] what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.  The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds.[46] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]

Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.

The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]

In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.

Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.

In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for value. Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.

Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith.Administrative Circular 12-2000, [50] adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.