Torts and Damages - Day 2 Digests

7/27/2019 Torts and Damages - Day 2 Digests

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FAUSTO BARREDO,petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEAALMARIO, respondents.

DOCTRINE: There is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminalnegligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or

negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that thesame negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crimeunder the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence

under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. That the employer is primarily

and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CRIMES UNDER THE PENALCODE AND THE CULPA AQUILIANA OR CUASI-DELITO UNDER THE

CIVIL CODE ARE:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of

private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,

while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the

damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are

punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,

cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence

intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal

law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of

ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic whennobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho

Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)

FACTS: BOCOBO, J.: G.R. No. L-48006 : July 8, 1942

CFI(cr:convicted) CA(p.civ: liable) SC(Affirmed)

At past 1:00 am, May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and

Navotas, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the MalateTaxicab driven by PEDRO FONTANILLA and a carretela guided byPEDRO DIMAPALIS. The carretela was overturned, 16-year-old boy

FAUSTINO GARCIA, suffered injuries from which he died two days

later.

A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI-Rizal, and hewas convicted and sentenced with prision correccional. The court in

the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate

civil action be reserved.

CA AFFIRMED the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.

The parents of the deceased (herein respondents) brought a civil

action in the CFI-Manila against FAUSTO BARREDO (sole proprietor

of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla).

CFI awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2K plus legal

interest from the date of the complaint. CA reduced the damages to

P1K with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is

undisputed that FONTANILLA 's negligence was the cause of the

mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at highspeed. As to BARREDO's responsibility, the CA found:

o There is proof that he (didnt) exercised the diligence

of a good father of a family to prevent damage: he wascareless in employing Fontanilla who had been caughtseveral times for violation of the Automobile Law and

speeding violation. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs

under the provisions of Article 1903 CC.

THEORY OF THE DEFENSE: the liability of Barredo is governed by

the RPC where liability is only subsidiary, and since there has been no

civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, Barredo cannot be held

responsible in the case.

CA: The liability sought to be imposed is not a civil obligation arising

from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), bu

an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason o

his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant o

employee.

ISSUE: May the plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against Barredomaking him primarily and directly responsible as an employer of Fontanilla?

YES.

HELD:delitos and cuasi delitos should be distinguished.

A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution unde

the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is

entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this

principle, the primary and direct responsibility of employers maybe safely anchored.

CIVIL CODE: 1089,1092-3, 1902- 4; see 2176

REVISED PENAL CODE: 100-3, 365

That while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be

broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case

nevertheless Article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions"not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the RevisedPenal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence

or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civi

Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping tha

makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study

shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts

does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a

crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra

contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce

civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised

Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra

contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

In Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as

culpa aquiliana.

QUASI-DELICTS AND THE EMPLOYER'S PRIMARY AND DIRECT

LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 1903 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code make such civil responsibilities

applicable to enterprises and establishments but with subsidiary

character. The Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903

says: "not only for personal acts and omissions, but also forthose of persons for whom another is responsible:" subordinatesand employees either for acts during their service or on the occasion

of their functions.

One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable

only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; butBY EXCEPTION, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whomthere is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this

responsibility direct or subsidiary?

o RPC distinguishes:

minors and incapacitated persons: responsibility

is direct (article 19),

others, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21);

o CC:

article 1903, the responsibility should be

understood as direct, "for the acts of those

persons for whom one should be responsible."

SPANISH CASE of 1910: Lafuente died as the result of having been

run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de

Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he

was acquitted. The widow filed a civil action against the street ca


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company, and the the lower court awarded damages. The company

appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902

and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-

existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The SC-Spain

dismissed the appeal:

o First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either

separately or with the street car company. As in the present

case: Fontanilla (driver) has not been sued in a civil action,

either alone or with his employer.

o

Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of gravecriminal negligence-- SC Spain: this did not exclude the co-

existence of fault or negligence. In the present case, the

taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if

he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the

crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil

damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily

liable for the same.

But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary

responsibility because of his own presumed negligence -

which he did not overcome - under article 1903.

Thus, there were TWO LIABILITIES OF BARREDO: first,the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi

driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,

second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer underarticle 1903.

The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,

and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they

were acting within their rights. (plaintiff choose the more

expeditious and effective method of relief).

o Third. The employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding

the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous

criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the

employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a

civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been

convicted.

SPANISH CASE of 1919: an action was brought against a railroadcompany for damages because the station agent, employed by the

company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain

articles consigned to the plaintiff.

o This case shows that the same act may come under both

the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action

of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore

could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it

was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under

article 1902 of the Civil Code. The employer and not the

employee who was being sued.

In RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO: the trial court

awarded damages to the plaintiff (laborer of the defendant) because

the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence ofwhich the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught

the plaintiff whose leg was broken.

o SC held that nowhere in our general statutes is the

employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe

appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one

'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than

criminal jurisprudence.

The civil liability was not intended to be merged in the

criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as

expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly

liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that

the injured party should seek out a third person criminally

liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to

the enforcement of the civil right.

o Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility o

an employermay be regarded as subsidiary in respect ocriminal actions against his employees only while they arein process of prosecution, OR in so far as they determinethe existence of the criminal act from which liability arises

and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in

the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election

of the injured person.

Since no criminal proceeding had been instituted out of the

accident, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affec

this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to

finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in

penal actions has survived the laws.

INTERPRETATION OF THE WORDS OF ARTICLE 1093, "fault o

negligence not punished by law"

It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his

relation to his employee who is the offenderis not to be regarded asderived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaningof articles 1902 and 1093.

The acts to which these articles are applicable are those not growing

out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. BUT whererelations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from

contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subjec

to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typica

application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a

railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by theemployer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contrac

of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage

while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent ac

itself.

In MANZANARES VS. MORETA: the mother of the 9-year-old child

Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recove

damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run ove

by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The

defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminacase because his negligence causing the death of the child was

punishable by the Penal Code.

o A clear instance of the same act of negligence being a

proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its

consequent civil liability arising from a crime OR of an

entirely separate and independent civil action for fault o

negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

In BERNAL AND ENVERSO VS. HOUSE and Tacloban Electric & Ice

Plant, Ltd: Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The

contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does no

operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result

in reduction of the damages.

o Although J. V. House could have been criminally

prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only

punished but also made civilly liable because of his crimina

negligence, award of damages in an independent civ

action for fault or negligence under article 1902.

In BAHIA vs. LITONJUA AND LEYNES: the action was for damages

for the death of the plainti ff's daughter alleged to have been caused by

the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. I

appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering

gear.

o The defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the

care and diligence of a good father of a family. The


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defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of

the defective condition of the steering gear.

o ARTICLE 1903 not only establishes liability in cases of

negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease.

"shall cease when the persons mentioned therein provethat they employed all the diligence of a good father ofa family to avoid the damage."

o 2 THINGS ARE APPARENT: (1) That when an injury is

caused by the negligence of a servant or employee,

PRESUMPTION: there was negligence on the part of thematter or employer either in the selection of the servant or

employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or

both; and (2) that PRESUMPTION IS JURIS TANTUM(disputable presumption) and not juris et de jure, and

consequently, may be rebutted. If the employer shows tothe satisfaction of the court that in selection andsupervision he has exercised the care and diligence ofa good father of a family, the presumption is overcomeand he is relieve from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately

on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.

THEREFORE, the defendant's theory re his secondary liability is

rebutted by the six cases cited. HE IS PRIMARILY AND DIRECTLYRESPONSIBLE IN DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 1903, INRELATION TO ARTICLE 1902, OF THE CIVIL CODE.

Counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction

between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the

Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana

under the Civil Code.

DIFFERENCES:

o Firstly, the 365, RPC punishes not only reckless but also

simple negligence.

o Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,

proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in

a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to

make the defendant pay in damages.

o Thirdly, to hold that the only way to make defendant's

liability effective is to sue the driver and exhaust his (the

latter's) property first is cumbersome. But there is a more

expeditious way, which is based on the primary anddirect responsibility of the defendant under article 1903of the Civil Code. In construing the laws, courts haveendeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right

and justice.

The primary and direct responsibility of

employers and their presumed negligence are

principles calculated to protect society.

Workmen and employees should be carefullychosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to

the public.

It is the masters or employers who principally

reap the profits resulting from the services of

these servants and employees. It is but right that

they should guarantee the latter's careful

conduct.

According to Manresa, "It is much more

equitable and just that such responsibility should

fall upon the principal or director who could have

chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not

upon the injured person who could not exercise

such selection and who used such employee

because of his confidence in the principal o

director."

Many jurists also base this primary responsibility

of the employer on the principle orepresentation of the principal by the agentThe employer and employee become as one

personality by the merging of the person of the

employee in that of him who employs and

utilizes him. All these observations acquire apeculiar force and significance when it comes to

motor accidents, and there is need of stressing

and accentuating the responsibility of owners o

motor vehicles.

o Fourthly, a common practice to seek damages only by

virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime

forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking

articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

It is high time we pointed out to the harm done

by such practice and to restore the principle o

responsibility for fault or negligence unde

articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its ful

rigor.

This will make for the better safeguarding o

private rights because it re-establishes an

ancient and additional remedy, and for the

further reason that an independent civil action

not depending on the issues, limitations and

results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely

directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is

more likely to secure adequate and efficacious

redress.

Judgment of the CA is AFFIRMED

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity asAscendants ofAGAPITO ELCANO, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and NaturalGuardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

DOCTRINE: We here hold, in reiteration of Barredo v. Garcia, that culpaaquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by

law.

FACTS: BARREDO, J.: G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977

CFI(recovery of damages:dismissed) SC (45:reversed)

The criminal case against Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in

the CFI-QC. He was acquitted on the ground that his act was nocriminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake .When appellants filed their complaint against the defendants, they

filed an MTD.

GROUNDS:

1. The action is a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is nowRule III, of the ROC;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment/res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no COA vs the father because the latter was

relieved as guardian through emancipation by marriage.


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It was denied. But was granted on MR, hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal

of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability,

was not reversed? NO.

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code

be applied, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the

occurrence complained of, Reginald-- a minor, living with and getting

subsistence from his father, was already legally marr ied? NO.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: reiteration and further clarification of the dual character(criminal and civil) of fault or negligence as a source of obligation asestablished in Barredo vs. Garcia.

The nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito

AND mere culpa or fault: that the same given act can result in civil

liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. It

is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who

was being sued.

o Criminal case: because his negligence causing the death of

the child was punishable by the Penal Code, with its

consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an

entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or

negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

o The separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa

aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly

recognized, after such a conviction, he could have been

sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

SC applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. See Barredo case re

foundation

Deeper reflection reveals that the thrust of the pronouncements in

Barredo is not so limited, it actually extends to fault or culpa. It wasruled that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother

and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such

full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is

conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish

Civil Code."

It is to be noted that the NCC, which was enacted after the Garcia

doctrine, no longer uses the term not punishable by law," thereby

making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes actswhich are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,whether voluntary or matter. ARTICLE 1162, simply says,"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the

provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and

by special laws." Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under

the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from thecivil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But

the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same actor omission of the defendant.

CODE COMMISSION: Criminal negligence is a violation of the

criminal law, while civil negligence is "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always its own foundation and

individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Therefore, acquittal

from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable

doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action , not forcivil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a

quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double

recovery.",

Article 2177 should not be construed literally: construction tha

upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that

killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the

same.

The preliminary chapter on human relations of the NCC establishes

the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts

criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) FROM the civresponsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the RPC, and

in a sense, the Rule Rule 111 ROC, contemplate also the same

separability. It is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and

justice, and more in harmony with modern progress." Article 2176covers both acts "not punishable by law" and acts criminal incharacter, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a

criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found

guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, i

he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both

scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigge

award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

The extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule 111, refers

exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the RPCwhereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict

only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in

the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened o

has not been committed by the accused.

Therefore, the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has no

extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence THAT ACQUITTAL ISNOT A BAR TO THE INSTANT ACTION AGAINST HIM.

SECOND ISSUE: re the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on

the possible civil liability of his father. That Atty. Hill is already free from

responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation

of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397

emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is

however, also clear that pursuant to article 399, EMANCIPATION BY

MARRIAGE OF THE MINOR IS NOT REALLY FULL OR ABSOLUTE

Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shal

terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the

minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he

cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property withou

the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be

sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother o

guardian."

** FC 228(3); 234;236

Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable

not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons

for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by

the minor children who live in their company."

In the instant case, Reginald, although married, was living with his

father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence

in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient toand dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

According to Manresa, under Article 2180, the obligation of the

parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent themfrom causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, theimplication of Article 399, is that such emancipation does not carry

with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give

rise to judicial litigation. And SURELY, killing someone else invitesjudicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child doesnot relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a


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minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and

alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by

their minor married child without their consent.

Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the

emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it isevident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability

of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is REVERSED and the trial court is

ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.

::AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is

blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus

expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception

of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." See

article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that " the infant tortfeasor is liable in a

civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same

extent as an adult."

CANDIDA VIRATA, et. al,petitioners, vs.VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMOBORILLA and CFI-CAVITE, respondents.

DOCTRINE: It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties maychoose between an action under the RPC or of quasi-delict under Article

2176 of the NCC. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.

FACTS:FERNANDEZ, J.: G.R. No. L-46179 Jan. 31, 1978

CFI(MTD: granted) SC(45:civ case reinstated)

Arsenio Virata died (September 24, 1975) when the passenger

jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla (registered in the name OfVictoriaOchoa) bumped the former while walking along Taft Avenue. Borilla is

the employer of Ochoa.

A criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence was

instituted against Borilla in the CFI- Rizal. At the hearing, Atty. Julio

Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a

separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal

liability. Then, Atty. Francisco filed a motion to withdraw the

reservation. He then actively participated in the trial and presented

evidence on the damages.

The heirs of Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate

civil action; The heirs commenced Civil Case in the CFI-Cavite fordamages based on quasi-delict against the driver Borilla and the

registered owner Ochoa.

The defendants filed an MTD, ground: that there is another action

(Criminal Case) pending between the same parties for the same

cause.

September 8, 1976, CFI- Rizal in the Criminal Case acquitted the

accused Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by accident.

January 31, 1977, CFI-Cavite granted the MTD.

ISSUE: May the heirs of Virata prosecute an action for the damages basedon q.delict against Borilla and Ochoa?YES.

HELD: The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the samenegligent act. Before the Criminal Case was decided, they manifested that

they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and

driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of thedriver, Borilla, of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution of

the Civil Case for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of theobligation sought to be enforced in the Civil Case is quasi-delict, not an ac

or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law aretwo different sources of obligation.

For the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, they have only to

establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby SETASIDE, and Civil Case is REINSTATED and REMANDED .

CHARMINA B. BANAL,petitioner, vs.HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR.,Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 andROSARIO CLAUDIO

respondents.

DOCTRINE: While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishableby law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime bu

because it caused damage to another.

What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty

of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by

reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whethe

or not the same be punishable by law.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY will give rise to CIVIL LIABILITY only if the same

felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the

direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently

the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for

to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is

punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to

another. (See Sangco).

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so providesindemnification of the offended party may be had on account of thedamage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of thewrongful act of another.

Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, Thepayee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money forwhich the worthless check was issued. Having been caused thedamage, she is entitled to recompense.

FACTS: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: G.R. No. 78911-25 Dec 11, 1987

RTC(rejected the appearance of the pvt prosec, MR denied)

SC(65:granted)

15 separate informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against

respondent Claudio before the RTC-QC, originally assigned to Branch

84 whose presiding judge inhibited himself when respondent Claudio

filed a petition for recuse (May 19,1986).

The cases were assigned to Branch 105which was presided over by

Judge Johnico G. Serquina, which would later be replaced by JudgeTomas V. Tadeo, Jr.

Claudio was finally arraigned (November 20, 1986); she pleaded noguilty to the charges. Pre-trial was then set (January 8, 1987).

During the Pre-Trial, the respondent court rejected the appearance o

the private prosecutor (Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos) on the ground that thecharge is for the violation of BP. 22 which does not provide for any

civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime agains

property but public order."

The petitioner filed an MR of the order. Respondent Claudio filed he

opposition to the MR.

The respondent court denied petitioner's MR, Hence, this petition

questioning the orders of the respondent Court.


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FOR RESPONDENTS: BP. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing

worthless checks as an offense against public order. Thus, it is the

State and the public that are the principal complainants, hence, no

civil indemnity is provided for by BP. 22 for which a private party or

prosecutor may intervene.

FOR PETITIONER: "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable."

Thus, indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of

whether or not BP 22 so provides.

ISSUE: Did the RTC act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of itsjurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor?YES.

HELD: Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is thefundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also

civilly liable" (Art. 100, RPC). That when a person commits a crime heoffends two entities namely (1) the society/ or the State whose law he hadviolated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right,honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by

the same punishable act or omission.

MISCONCEPTION: civil liability actually arises from the crime (when, in the

ultimate analysis, it does not.)

Article 20, NCC: Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently

causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of

the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Bagtas v.

Director of Prisons). EVERY CRIME gives rise to a penal or criminal action

for the punishment of the guilty party, AND also to civil action for the

restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for thelosses. (US v. Bernardo).

Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who

suffered the offenses committed against her. The petitioner too is entitled to

relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was

assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property

or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.

In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez, SC held that "The effects of a worthless check

transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in thetransaction and touch the interests of the community at large ." YET, SC too

recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when it stated

that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or theholder, but also an injury to the public."

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of BP 22 to

leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by

excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which

in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil

suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the

face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant

drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to

provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of the Criminal Cases is

justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of

the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the

Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987).

A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,

burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the

final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.

Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before

the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly

unwarranted.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is

ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of

petitioner

EULOGIO OCCENA,petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PresidingJudge, Branch X of the RTC -Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and CRISTINA VEGAFRIA, respondents.

DOCTRINE: Petitioner may appeal from the decision on the civil aspecwhich is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely

taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.

What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to

repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act

or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not

punishable by law.

Article 2219 (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages incase of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law

establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to

recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and

reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive o

exemplary damages.

FACTS: FERNAN, C.J.: G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990

MCTC(convicted) RTC(appealed the civ aspect:denied) SC(42:

granted)

PetitionerEulogio Occena instituted before MCTC- Sibalom, Antique

a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private

respondent Cristina Vegafria for uttering: "Gago ikaw nga BarangayCaptain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated

mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant

Judas" and other words of similar import which caused great and

irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.

Private respondent/ accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued

Petitioner did not reserve his right to file a separate civil action for

damages.

MCTC convicted the Private respondent of Slight Oral Defamation and

was sentenced to pay a fine of P50. No damages were awarded to

petitioner as the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances

of the case do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the decision to RTC; petition

was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner now appeals to SC by way of a petition for review on

certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to

Article 100 of the RPC and Article 2219 of the NCC providing thamoral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form

of defamation.

PETITIONER submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on

the cases ofRoa vs. de la Cruz, and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oi

Co., et al. In Roa, the decision of the trial court had become fina

before Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instan

case, the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason

of the timely appeal, and no civil action for damages has been

instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause

Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and

one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the

acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civi

aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance

with Section 1, Rule 111, of the ROC.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT argues that the decision of the trial court

carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitione

chose to actively intervene in the criminal action withou


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reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, heassumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damageshe cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

1. Was the decision of the MCTC constitutes the final adjudication on

the merits of private respondent's civil liability? NO.

2. Is petitioner entitled to an award of damages arising from the

remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to

be defamatory?YES.

HELD:

#1: The decision of the MCTC as affirmed by the RTC cannot beconsidered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent

because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal

filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said

case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which hasbecome final.

In People vs. Coloma: from a judgment convicting the accused, 2

appeals may be taken. FIRST, the accused may seek a review ofsaid judgment (both civil and criminal actions); while the complainantmay appeal with respect only to the civil action (because the lowercourt has refused to award damages or because the award made is

unsatisfactory to him). The right of either party to appeal in theevent of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon theother. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively intervening inthe criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the

decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate.

#2: Determine first the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civilobligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 RPC

in relation toArticle 2177on quasi-delict.

A person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that

from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character. In

treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others, no civil liabilityarises on the part of the offender either because there are nodamages to be compensated or there is no private person injured

by the crime.

In the case at bar, the RTC ruling that no civil liability arising from the

felonious act of the accused is erroneous. As a GENERAL RULE, a

person who is found to be criminally liable offends (2) entities. (No civil

liability if: 1 no offended party, or 2 no damage was caused to a

private person). Here, theres an offended party whose main

contention is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory

words and statements uttered by private respondent.

It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed

to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable

motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the

style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions which are

not present in the case at bar.

Calling petitioner so and so is sufficient to cause him embarrassment

and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and

anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. Having

misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings is not conclusive

upon the SC.

SC rules that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a

barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages (P5K and a

further sum of P5K as exemplary damages).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

ALFREDO P. PACISandCLEOPATRA D. PACIS,petitioners, vs.JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, respondent.

DOCTRINE: Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matterunder Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on apersons own negligence.

Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a

business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a highedegree of care.

FACTS: CARPIO, J. : G.R. No. 169467 : February 25, 2010

RTC(Pacis) CA(reversed) SC(45:sets aside~CA,Pacis)

Petitioners Alfredo and Cleopatra D. Pacis filed (17 January 1995

with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondenMorales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr., a17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the TopGun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Respondent isthe owner of the gun store.

Alfred, then 17 years old and a 1st year student at the BCF taking up

BSCS, died (January 19, 1991) due to a gunshot wound in the head

which he sustained while he was at the Gun Store.

Aristedes Matibagand Jason Herbolario were with Alfred at the time

of the shooting. They were sales agents and the caretakers of the gun

store at that particular time.

The bullet was fired from a gun brought in by a customer (Cal. 22

Rimfire Magnum). It was left by Morales in a drawer of a table located

inside the gun store.

Defendant was in Manila at the time. Jarnague, the regular caretaker

was also not around. Jarnague entrusted the keys to Matibag and

Herbolario which included the key to the drawer where the gun was

kept.

Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun and placed it on top

of the table. Pacis was attracted by the sight of the gun got hold of the

same. Matibag asked Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed but it

went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag who was

acquitted of the charge because of the exempting circumstance oaccident under Art. 12 (4) of the RPC.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners (Spouses Pacis) ordering the

defendant to pay plaintiffs (P30K as indemnity for the death; P29K as

actual damages for the hospitalization and burial expenses, P100K as

compensatory damages; P100K as moral damages; P50K a

attorneys fees.

That Respondent is civilly liable under Article 2180 in relation toArticle 2176 NCC. The accidental shooting of Alfred which causedhis death was PARTLY DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF

RESPONDENTS EMPLOYEE Matibag and Herbolario even if they

were only paid on a commission basis.

Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by

Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, UNLESS

respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good father

of a family to prevent the damage. Respondent failed to observe the

required diligence when he left the key to the drawer containing the

loaded defective gun without instructing his employees to be careful in

handling the loaded gun.


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Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial courts

Decision and absolved respondent from civil liabilityunder Article2180 NCC.

That respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no

employer-employee relationship between respondent and Matibag;

therefore, the latter was was not under the control of respondentwith respect to the means and methods in the performance of hiswork. There can be no employer-employee relationship where theelement of control is absent. Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does

not apply in this case and respondent cannot be held liable.

That even if respondent is considered an employer of Matibag, still no

negligence can be attributed to respondent illustrated in Picart vs.

Smith: THE TEST OF NEGLIGENCE is this:

o x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to

whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person

injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about

to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to

refrain from that course or take precaution against its

mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes

negligence. x x x.

Respondent maintains that he is not guilty of negligence and lack of

due care as he did not fail to observe the diligence of a good father of

a family. (that he kept the firearm in one of his table drawers, which he

locked and such is already an indication that he took the necessary

diligence and care that the said gun would not be accessible to

anyone).

Petitioners filed an MR which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:1. Did CA err in reversing the RTC decision?YES.2. Isthe Respondent civilly liable?YES.

HELD:

Under Article 1161 NCC, petitioners may enforce their claim for

damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under

Article 100 of the RPC OR they may opt to file an independent civil

action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, petitionersopted to file an independent civil action for damages against

respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners

based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the

Civil Code.

Under PNP Circular No. 9 (Policy on Firearms and Ammunition

Dealership/Repair), a person who is in the business of purchasing and

selling of firearms must maintain basic security and safety

requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate

Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable

about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded

weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to

others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in hisstore are not loaded.

Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for

repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was

not loaded.

o FIRST: the defective gun should have been stored in a

vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair,

respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded

to prevent any untoward accident. For failing to insurethat the gun was not loaded, respondent himself wasnegligent. Also, it was not shown if respondent had aLicense to Repair.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence

required of a good father of a family.

WHEREFORE, SC GRANTs the petition. It SETS ASIDE the Decision

of the CA; RTC ruling reinstated.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L.JAVELLANA,petitioner, vs. ITONG AMISTAD,respondent.

DOCTRINE: If the civil liability arises from other sources than thecommission of the offense, such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its

enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action as expressly provided in

Article 29 NCC, which may be disposed of as a mere preponderance o

evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such asprescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for amotion to dismiss may be availed of. (pp vs Herrera)

An appeal from that decision would reopen the question of defendant's civi

liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civiliability must be based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant(art. 100, RPC), any review or re-examination of the question of civiliability would perforce require a new determination of defendant'scriminal liability. But another trial upon defendant's criminal responsibilitycannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the peace

court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is

not authorized by law.

However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal isreasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil actionmay be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent ofand not based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance oevidence would then be required.

FACTS:DE CASTRO, J.: G.R. No. L-34666 Oct. 30, 1981

An information was filed against ITONG AMISTAD of the crime o

Estafa (316.2, RPC).

It was alleged that he sold (January 30, 1965) to Ben Palispis an

unsegregated portion of 42K sqm of a parcel of land in Baguio City

Then to Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42K sqm of the same parcel oland;

Despite knowing fully well that on February 10, 1962, he had entered

into an agreement with MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey 10Ksqm from the subject parcel of land for P10K. Amistad already

received P5K.

CFI acquitted the accused holding that 1) "the case is civil in nature"

and 2) "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond

reasonable doubt."

From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant appealed to the CA

the civil liability of the accused. CA dismissed the appeal saying thaa judgment of acquittal should be disallowed; the offended party

cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted (People vs. Herrera)Besides, the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action

independently of the criminal action. MR was denied.

Petitioner cites Section 2, Rules 122, Section 3 of Rule 111, and

Article 29, NCC. From the aforequoted provisions, remedy of appeal is

expressly granted to her inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery

of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action

ISSUE: From a decision of acquittal, may the complainant in a criminaaction for estafa appeal the civil aspect of the case? NO.

HELD:


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Article 29 NCC requires the institution of a separate action by the filing

of the proper complaint giving the accused an opportunity to file an

appropriate responsive pleading (answer, MTD). In a criminal action,notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is

impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accusedis not afforded the same remedy . The obvious reason is that thecivil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solelydependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from theoffense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain

admission as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of

arraignment.

In People vs. Herrera: The decision of the justice of the peace court

which acquitted the defendant of the charge and DID NOT MAKE ANY

PRONOUNCEMENT HOLDING THE DEFENDANT CIVILLY LIABLE

PUT AN END TO THE CASE, not only by freeing the defendant from

criminal responsibility BUT ALSO BY REJECTING ALL LIABILITY

FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE ALLEGED CRIME of

malicious mischief. The offended parties not having reserved theirright to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision ofacquittal covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of thecase under Rule 107.l.a.

Petitioner may not complaint of being denied due process for

disallowing her appeal since she can institute a separate civil action if

her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or

one arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil

liability, but certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner

had already been acquitted.

CA Resolution appealed from is AFFIRMED, and the instantpetition is DISMISSED.

EDGAR JARANTILLA,petitioner, vs. CA and JOSE KUAN SING,respondents.

DOCTRINE: The same act or omission (in this case, the negligentsideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the

part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi

delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime

or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be

enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the

Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both

types of liability.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused

ONLY when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil

liability might arise did not exist. (People vs. Rogelio Ligon). The ruling is

based on Article 29 NCC.

The failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or

unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation

of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate

action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil

liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

FACTS:REGALADO, J.: G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

Private respondent Jose Kuan Singwas side-swiped by a VW Beetle

driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the

direction of the provincial capitol (July 7, 1971) in lznart Street, Iloilo

City. Private respondent sustained physical injuries as a

consequence.

Petitioner was charged before CFI-Iloilo for serious physical injuries

thru reckless imprudence. Private respondent did not reserve hisright to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in theprosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor.

Petitionerwas acquitted based "on reasonable doubt".

Subsequently (October 30, 1974), private respondent filed a Civ

Case against the petitioner which involved the same subject matte

and act complained of in the Criminal Case. Petitioner alleged as

special and affirmative defenses: no cause of action and barred by the

prior judgment.

o Petitioner filed an MTD but was denied.

o Petitioner filed with SC a petition for certiorari (cpm:65), bu

was dismissed for lack of merit. MR was also denied.

CFI ruled in favor of the private respondent ordering the petitioner topay the former: P 6.9K for hospitalization, medicines and so forth; P2K

for other actual expenses; P25K for moral damages, P5K fo

attorney's fees, and costs.

CA affirmed the decision (July 29, 1987) of the lower court bu

reduced the award for moral damages to P18K. MR was denied.

ISSUE: May the private respondent, without reserving the civil actionarising from the act complained of, file a separate action for civil liability?

YES. (petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubtand no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal

** collateral issue: law of the case, R65 not applicable

HELD:

Private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution o

the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudentia

milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonabledoubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability othe accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamusto compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of

acquittal.

Article 29 enunciates the rule that a civil action for damages is no

precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same crimina

act or omission. The allegations of the herein complaint supports and

is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner

Thus, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a

separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not ba

him from filing such separate civil action for damages.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is DENIED and the decision of the

respondent CA is AFFIRMED.

HUN HYUNG PARK,petitioner, v. EUNG WON CHOI, respondent.

DOCTRINE: Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reservesthe right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the

criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. Thefirst is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are

the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a crimina

action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the

criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the

delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the

defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoidmultiplicity of suits.

The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect

of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case

is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the

civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.

In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The

extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civi

action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only

preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the

liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused


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does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused

was acquitted.

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if

there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or

omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

FACTS:C-MORALES, J.: G.R. No. 165496 : Feb 12, 2007

Respondent Choiwas charged (August 31, 2000) for violation of BP

22 for issuing a PNB check in the amount of P1.8M which was

dishonored: insufficient funds.

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for

Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence, asserting that the

prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor,

hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency

of funds did not arise.

MeTC-Makati granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The

prosecution's MR was denied.

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC contending

that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil

aspect.

RTC granted the appeal and ordered respondent to pay P1.8M withlegal interest. Upon respondent's MR, RTC set aside its decision andordered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings,so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on

the civil aspect of the case." Petitioner's MR was denied, case waselevated to the CA which dismissed his petition.

o The verification and certification of non-forum shopping

was not fully complied.

o The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain

pleadings and other material portions of the record, (i.e.,

motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, etc).

o The Decision of the RTC attached to the petition is

uncertified and illegible mere machine copy of the original.

o Petitioners failed to implead the People as party-

respondent in the petition.

ISSUE: Did CA err in dismissing the petition? NO.

HELD:

RE VERIFICATION: Rule 7.4: A pleading required to be verified which

contains a verification based on "information and belief," OR upon

"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be

treated as an unsigned pleading.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or

under both. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source

qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the

concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient.

The range of permutation is not left to the pleader's liking, but is

dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations which may

warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal

knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.

Verification is not an empty ritualFor what is at stake is the matter of

verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that

the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are

true and correct and not merely speculative. To sustain petitioner's

explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple

preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness

of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing

enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations.

RE COPIES OF CERTAIN PLEADINGS AND OTHER MATERIAL

PORTIONS:

The materiality of those documents ( i.e., Motion for Leave to File

Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition

thereto, and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case

is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which he isappealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account

of the same Demurrer.

The Rules require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly

legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders

of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court.

Petitioner fell short in his compliance with Rule 42, the mandatory

tenor of which is discernible and is well settled.

RE FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE PEOPLE: is of no moment, as petitioner is

appealing only the civil aspect of the case.

MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is

immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appea

the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double

jeopardy.

Either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspec

of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused.

RE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT:

The whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the

evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have

waived the right to present evidence.

RE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED WITH LEAVE OF COURT:

The accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies

the demurrer. A court may not deny the demurrer as to the

criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to thecivil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficiento prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the sameevidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability bymere preponderance of evidence.

The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries

with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding thathe act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did noexist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of thecase must perforce continue.

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the

case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civi

liability may arise did not exist. Respondent did not assail the RTC

order of remand thereby recognizing that there is basis for a remand.

o Respondent defense: he merely borrowed P1.5M with the

remainder representing the interest, and that he already

made a partial payment. Petitioner counters: the payments

made by respondent pertained to other transactions. Given

these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the

case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to

ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.

Petitioner's citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. The governing

law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civi

Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory

pleading that gives rise to the suit.


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SC upholds respondent's right to present evidence as reserved by his

filing of leave of court to file the demurrer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The case is REMANDED to

MeTC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO NAVOA, etal, defendants-appellants.

DOCTRINE: Only [his] criminal liability is extinguished by [his] death but the

civil liability remains.

FACTS:MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: G.R. No. L-67966, July 31, 1984

Accused-appellants Mario Navoa, et. al were found by the CFI-

Bataan guilty of the crime of murder penalized under Article 248, RPC.

They were ordered to indemnify jointly and solidarity the heirs of the

victimTomas Izon, for P20K.

The 3 accused appealed to IAC which affirmed the findings of the

Trial Court but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. IAC certified

the case and elevated the entire records to SC for review.

SC affirms the judgment of conviction imposed, indemnity was raised

to P30K.

RESOLUTION: G.R. No. L-67966 September 28, 1984

The accused filed an MR of the July 31 Decision.

ISSUE:

Is the finding of the IAC supported by the evidence on record? YES.

Did Navoa's death (properly manifested before the IAC) been

accorded proper legal consideration? NO.

HELD:

#1: The IACs conclusion is based on a careful and judicious review of the

entire record and the testimonies during the hearing. The unrebuttedtestimony ofSaguinza is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction as it

established not only conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation, but

even the very motive of defendants-appellants in perpetrating the crime.

#2: Mario Navoa, died (June 14, 1984) due to a cerebro-vascular attack.

The counsel for the accused manifested the fact on June 20, 1984 unaware

that IAC had already certified the case to SC, which, in turn, promulgated its

Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of Navoa's death. The judgment of

conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him. However, the plea

for extinguishment of the deceased's civil and criminal liability is without

merit.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL BADEO,

et al, defendants-appellants.

DOCTRINE: As to the personal penalties: Article 89, RPC provides thatcriminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict; andas to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished ONLY when thedeath of the offender occurs before final judgment."

Subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an

appellant is extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. In such

case, the heirs of the deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the

criminal case and his estate shall answer for his civil liability.

FACTS:FERNAN, C.J.: G.R. No. 72990, Nov. 21, 1991

At around 6pm of March 21, 1981. Cresenciano Germanes was

walking ahead of the sole prosecution eyewitness ( Iega Abreo). Nea

the house of Esperidion Badeo, 4 men attacked Cresenciano. She

saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back with a bolo

Rogelio Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with another long bolo also

at the back. Bonifacio Tangpus followed with a stab at the right portion

of Cresenciano's stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked

Cresenciano's back. Noticing that Cresenciano was still alive, Rogelio

came back and "finished him off."

Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred tha

he did so in self-defense. That he picked up the fallen pistol oCresenciano and later surrendered it to the barangay captain who

corroborated Manuel's claim.

Esperidion Badeo had an alibi. That he was then in the mountain in

Saransang making a kaingin on the land owned by Estelita Tangpus

Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo executed a joint affidavit denying

participation in the killing Cresenciano.

RTC-Leyte found the Manuel and Esperidion Badeo guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of Murder ~ RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify

the heirs of Cresenciano P30K. Manuel and Esperidion appealed to

SC.

August 10, 1990, Esperidion died (cardio-respiratory arrest secondary

to pulmonary tuberculosis). No final judgment had as yet beenrendered, in the resolution (August 21, 1991) the case againsEsperidion was dismissed, entry of judgment was made on August 22

1991.

The Solicitor General filed an MR alleging that while the crimina

liability of appellant Esperidion had been extinguished by his death

pursuant to Article 89, RPC, his civil liability arising from the crimina

offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231 and 1161, NCC in

relation to Article 112, RPC; As provided for in Section 17, Rule 3

ROC, upon proper notice, the legal representatives of the deceased

appellant should appear as substitute parties herein insofar as the

deceased's civil liability for the crime is concerned.

ISSUE: Has the civil liability of Espiridion been extinguished upon hisdeath?YES.

HELD:

In People vs. Satorre, in a separate opinion in the resolution by

Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino distinguished the term

"pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine andcosts as distinguished from "pecuniary liability" (responsabilidadespecunarias) in Article 38 which include reparation and indemnity.

*** The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be

appreciated in favor of Manuel.

Anent Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, we find that there is no basis

for its imposition in view of the absence of a clear showing that he

committed the crime imputed to him. Esperidion could not have been

at the scene of the crime because the kaingin area where he had

been staying was a good five-hour hike away through a trail.

Court may believe one part of a testimony and disbelieve anothe

part.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED insofar

as appellant Manuel Badeo is concerned. The resolution is

RECONSIDERED insofar as it considers as extinguished Esperidion

Badeo's civil liability. However, finding that Esperidion Badeo should

be acquitted as he did not commit the crime imputed to him, no civi

liability is hereby imposed on him .


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ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES,INC.,petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DOCTRINE: Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to thevicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has

committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from

delict.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles

102 and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which

they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial

court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.Nonetheless, before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced,

adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed theemployers of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind

of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge

of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been

satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of these conditions may be

done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal

and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose,

with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the

execution of the judgment.

FACTS:BRION, J.: G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010

At around 2pm, April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving a

Philtranco Bus along Daang Maharlika Highway Sta. Margarita,

Samar when its rear left side HIT the front left portion of a Sarao jeep

coming from the opposite direction. Cresencio Pinohermoso, the

jeeps driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose

Mabansag, a bystander. The jeep turned turtle (3) times before finally

stopping at about 25 meters from the point of impact. 2 of thejeeps passengers were instantly killed, while the other passengers

sustained serious physical injuries.

The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple

serious physical injuries and damage to property thru recklessimprudence before the RTC-Calbayog City. The RTC found (May 21,2001) Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence

resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage

to property, and sentenced of arresto menor. The RTC ordered

Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay P50K as death

indemnity to the heirs of Armando; P50K as death indemnity to theheirs of Mabansag; and P90K as actual damages to the private

complainants.

The petitioners appealed to CA which affirmed the RTC decision in

toto. It ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and

precaution in driving the bus. Various eyewitnesses testified that the

bus was traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it

evaded a pushcart that was on the side of the road. That he failed to

slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the

jeep coming from the opposite direction half a kilometer away. That

Philtranco failed to prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good

father of the family to prevent the accident.

The petitioners filed with SC a petition for review on certiorari, but was

denied. Hence, this MR.

The petitioners also insist that the jeeps driver had the last clear

chance to avoid the collision.

ISSUE: Was there a basis to hold Philtranco jointly and severally liable withCalang since it was not a party in the criminal case? YES~ SUBSIDIARYLIABILITY.

HELD:

LIABILITY OF CALANG: No reason to overturn the lower courts finding on

Calangs culpability.

LIABILITY OF PHILTRANCO: The RTC and the CA both erred in holding

Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang.

Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of

action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA

erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang

based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180, NCC.

If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102, RPC

states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and

proprietors of establishments. The foregoing subsidiary liability applies

to employers according to Article 103.

WHEREFORE, SC PARTLY GRANTS the present motion. The CA

decision that affirmed in toto the RTC decision with the

MODIFICATION that Philtrancos liability should only be subsidiary.

SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R. FRANCO,petitioners, vs. IAC, ANTONIO REYES, MRS. SUSAN CHUAYand

LOLITA LUGUERespondents.

DOCTRINE: Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability othe employer under the RPC and the employer's primary liability under the

NCC which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from adelict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon

whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based

Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is

imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's

criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved

If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be

predicated under Article 103.

On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability

is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable fo

tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the

former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the

selection and supervision of his employees.

The conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non

for the employer's subsidiary liability.

While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief

if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, he cannot ask

for modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he

has also appealed.

FACTS:FERNAN, C.J.: G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989

At about 7:30pm of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the

northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left to avoid hitting aparked truck in Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming

Isuzu Mini Bus being driven by Magdaleno Lugue. The 2 vehiclescollided.

Dragged 15m from the point of impact, the mini bus landed right sidedown facing south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck. The

collision resulted in the deaths of the (2) drivers, Yuro and Lugue

and (2) passengers of the mini bus.

The registered owner of the Mini Bus, and the wives of those who died

filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence before the

CFI-Pampanga against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco, the owners and

operators of the Franco Transportation Company.

Defendants affirmative defense: that as owners and operators, they

exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all thei

employees, including the deceased Yuro.


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The trial court rejected that defense: the act of the Franco Bus driver

was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation

arising from Article 103, RPC and not from Article 2180. It said: "Thisis a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises, and

not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like a

good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of his

truck is no defense to avoid civil liability."

On appeal, IAC agreed that defendants-appellants' driver was guilty of

reckless or criminal imprudence; the civil obligation of theappellants arises from Article 103 of the RPC resulting in the

subsidiary liability of the appellants.

Petitioners filed an MR but the same was denied. Hence, the instant

petition.

Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the

Amended Complaint, private respondents unequivocally claim that

the former as the employers of the driver of the Franco Bus are jointly

and severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them,

which makes the Civil Case an action predicated upon a quasi-delict under the Civil Codesubject to the defense that the employerexercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection

and supervision of their employees.

ISSUES:

Was the action for recovery of damages instituted by private

respondents predicated upon crime or quasi-delict? Q.DELICT

May IAC properly increase the award of damages in favor of the

private respondents (Chuay and Lugue) who did not appeal said

court's decision? NO.

HELD: Subsidiary liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the RPCwhile primary liability is governed by Articles 2176-77, 2180.

Here, no criminal action was instituted because the party supposed to

be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents

died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand onconsidering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's

primary liability. Logically, this remedy is not possible.

RE DEFENSE : due diligence of a good father of a family .

The appellants were not able to establish the defense of a good father

of a family in the supervision of their bus driver. The evidence

presented is purely self-serving. No independent evidence was

presented as to the alleged supervision of appellants' bus drivers,

especially with regard to driving habits and reaction to actual traffic

conditions. The only kind of supervision given the drivers referred to

the running time between the terminal points of the line. The

appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-Laoag line,

have only 2 inspectors whose

Documents

Torts and Damages - Day 2 Digests