Toward a Government Productivity Ethic

Toward a Government Productivity EthicAuthor(s): Walter L. BalkSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1978), pp. 46-50Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/975410 .

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46 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

TOWARD A GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY ETHIC

Walter L. Balk, State University of New York at Albany

How can productivity improvement become a more sa- lient professional duty and obligation of public administrators? This paper suggests four major areas of emphasis which appear to apply to federal, state, and local levels of government. The discussion will tie back to a number of points made by our symposium authors. Mention will also be made of findings at the Graduate School of Public Af- fairs, State University of New York at Albany, where an extensive productivity research project has been under way since the early part of 1974.'

Emphasize Agency Activities

The articles in this issue by Jesse Burkhead, Patrick Hennigan, and Robert Quinn center upon the nature and origin of conceptual dilemmas and confusion. To add to their observations, I think many of our difficulties have evolved because productivity constructs and terminology are inherited from industrial assembly lines and private- sector economic theory. Transferability of business concepts to government depends upon the homogeneity of the two settings. While there are similar processes within all large organizations, external influences upon public agencies and corporations differ greatly. For example, government expansion is now perceived as catastrophic while corporate growth is still seen as essential to survival. Com- petition between business organizations is deemed necessary; but it is not acceptable between the public agencies. The great majority of private-sector organizations have more direct internal control over their development and destiny than do those in the public sector. The output of most public agencies cannot be rationalized in the same manner as can that of industry. Such contextual differ- ences help explain why it is impossible to use the word "productivity" for government in the same encompassing and aggregative way that it is used for business.2

More narrowly, however, any large work organization, public or private, can be described as a production process, thus providing a solid basis for understanding what productivity means. If the production process is defined in conventional systems terms, two fundamental control ratios appear. The first is that of output to input-or efficiency. The second is output to standards-or effectiveness. Frequently, improving productivity is a question of optimizing these ratios by keeping them in balance, one with the other. Advantages in efficiency are often gained at the expense of effectiveness, and vice versa. Consequently, at the organizational process level, the term "productivity" incorporates efficiency and effectiveness and their symbiotic relationship.3 There is nothing new about this concept, and it is a familiar one to industrial engineers. Unfortunately, most organizational productivity literature is aimed at the production of goods, but relatively little is known about controlling the production of services.

Measurement Complexities

Services are the major output of government agencies as well as an increasing portion of that of business.4 The problem with services, as compared with goods, is that they are consumed immediately upon production. Service quality cannot be assumed or controlled as a throughput constant, as in assembly lines. As a result, measurement complexities emerge, since it is impossible to count and store services as physical units of output or to cost them as in-process inventories. For reasons such as these, Harry Hatry appears to be drawn toward techniques of measuring effectiveness (or quality) at the point of consumption. In addition, most service production involves fewer rou- tine tasks than does goods production; consequently, productivity control data rarely can be used for purposes of hard, finite, "objective" evaluation. This means that management must develop the skills for gaining the coopera- tion of those being evaluated in order to determine what the numbers mean and how to devise means for improvement. 5

While the narrow, inside-agency organizational perspec- tive described above is logically consistent, obviously there are numerous technical and behavioral problems yet to be resolved. But the meaning of productivity in government is further obscured because agency outputs are also part of the over-all political decision-making process. It is at this point that the Burkhead and Hennigan discussion of the Bradford-Malt-Oates model becomes extremely signifi- cant. A key thought is that agency activities differ in sub- stance from their political consequences. Figure 1 is an ex- tension of this major point.

Drawings are tidier than real life, but Figure 1 serves to illustrate relationships between agency process and broad political process. An individual agency's activities are de- picted as contributing to a set of consequences also affected by executive offices, legislatures, judicial decisions, constituency behavior, and other agency activities. These outside influences generate expectations which also affect individual agencies, since they help shape their internal standards of performance. The figure also shows that coalitions of outside influences generate policy, which results in the allocation of resources to an individual agency. Ongoing allocations to individual agencies depend upon some perception of how well the consequences of the com- bined activities of all influences match expectations. What

Walter L. Balk is associate professor of public administration and director of the State Government Productivity Project at the Grad- uate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany. He is consultant to a number of state and local government organizations and has written Improving Government Pro- ductivity: Some Policy Perspectives (Sage, 1975).

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PRODUCTIVITY IN GOVERNMENT 47

is crucial is that a single agency's activities are only part of a broad pattern of influences that determine social consequences.

For example, a mental health agency can be held fully accountable for its direct outputs (activities) in terms of in- stitutional and outpatient therapy delivery activities along with support services (e.g., food services and laundry). It has, however, a shared responsibility for the social conse- quence of improvement of the general level of mental health (we leave aside questions of being able to develop a metric for level of mental health). The reason is that such consequences are affected by other agencies (e.g., educa- tion, social welfare), government institutions (e.g., court systems and laws), and constituency actions (e.g., parent associations). High-level policy-makers frequently infer a single cause-and-effect relationship between an individual agency's activities and the consequences the policy-makers are trying to control. This inference can be quite mislead- ing since it tends to reduce the necessary involvement of in- fluential extraagency forces to bring about broad social change.

Determination of Efficiency

What many have been straining to do is to gauge political consequences by relating them to individual agency in- puts in order to determine "efficiency." It is perhaps time to wonder if this is not taking the entire concept of productivity beyond reason. For, in addition to points already made, it is also apparent that most political expectations and consequences are arrived at by a complex, often non- rational bargaining process rather than by a reasonably predictable economic-rational decision process.6 The argu- ment leads back to Figure 1. It seems that a restricted but operational meaning for productivity, centered upon individual agency efficiency and effectiveness controls, would enable more rational communication. Figure 1 shows agency productivity data transmitted to resource-allocation policy-making coalitions. Such information would deal with an individual agency management's record in getting more yield out of previously allocated resources. Good performance must be more actively encour- aged and rewarded; but obviously agency productivity improvement cannot be the only basis for making allocation decisions.

In my opinion, narrowing the definition of productivity to that of agency performance gives the term operational and control stability. This would make consideration of political consequences, or policy accountability, a separate field on inquiry. Those who study social indicators are, in effect, trying to understand broad policy accountability. Essentially, they are interested in the match between political systems expectations and the consequences of com- bined political action.7 The result could be higher involvement and a more focused sense of responsibility on the part of extraagency influences in bringing about social improvement.

One of Quinn's major points is that theorists frequently devise approaches that do not conform to the realities nor meet the potential of management action. This seems to be

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1 978

especially so in the public sector. Two better known ex- amples of imposing prescriptive constructs generated by outsiders are those of Program Planning Budgeting Sys- tems (PPBS) and Management by Objectives (MBO). In part, the disappointing results can be attributed to the fact that both of these concepts, mainly developed in the private, goods-oriented sector, were extended into the area of political consequences. Consequently, the economic-rational decision-making style conflicted with a political bargaining decision-making style; and the former had to give.8 In addition, PPBS and MBO rationales lead to lock-step and incremental procedures.

Frequently these techniques become decision-making an- swers looking for a problem. While such prescriptive approaches have great value, they tend to be oversold as a general solution to all problems. And so we find a history of elation, intense effort, and eventual disenchantment. A similar situation can evolve with the public-sector productivity effort. For if it is seen as a technical panacea mainly in the hands of staff specialists, it could eventually turn into just another fad.

The advantage of this type of research is that it opens operating-management participation in problem resolu- tion. If agency public administrators can articulate how they associate improvement means with results (or ends) within their particular organizations, then we have an extremely valuable insight. The reason is that it helps outside advocates of generalized systematic productivity-improvement methods better compare their perceptions with the perceptions of those they are attempting to influence.

Judgment Mapping

Another penetrating study of agency managerial perceptions was made by Dillon et al.9 The researchers worked with eleven managers in a large state agency who were con- fronted with the real task of choosing from among 50 productivity-improvement alternatives. The need was brought about by mandated workforce cutbacks. A unique meth- odology, called "judgment mapping," helped explain how variables that affect choice appear to cluster in managers' minds. The researchers found that "the most obvious criteria for selecting specific productivity innovations (e.g., savings) were not related to adoption decisions." Ap- parently, as organizational uncertainty increased, the public administrators played it safe. Quite understandably they chose small, easy-to-install innovations involving minimal organizational risk.

Studies of the type mentioned above are, unfortunately, rare. They are necessary, however, because it is essential to better comprehend how those intimately responsible for improvement action "see" and take productivity action. This is not to say that managerial perceptions are invariably correct, but they are a critical variable which no longer can be ignored. Improving our understanding should have a salutary impact upon the field of organizational development (O.D.). In the past, the O.D. movement has relied too heavily upon abstract normative approaches such as participation, sharing, and sensitivity. Systematic analysis of managerial perceptions should help




turn the O.D. process into a learning experience centered upon tangible aspects of productivity improvement.

Encourage Meaningful Employee Involvement

Most of the government productivity literature either ig- nores employee involvement or gives it superficial and un- realistic recognition. Little has been done to face up squarely to the paradoxes and difficulties of employee participation in productivity-improvement programs. Fred Hayes's insights are the exception rather than the rule.

One thing is certain. Disjointed, paternalistic efforts on management's part to increase "morale" and "esprit de corps," while side-stepping specific employee issues, have little effect. Gotbaum and Handman get at some of the gut problems. One of their major points is that public employees must have more confidence in the technical ability of their management. An example of an ongoing effort to involve nonmanagement in and communicate technical mat- ters is described below.

New York State recently established a joint employee/management committee to address the question of continuity of employment. A major concern is that re- trenchment as well as improvement drives are frequently made on short lead times without an adequate conceptual or control basis. This results in serious and sometimes avoidable impacts upon employees. Workers may be re- leased from Agency X while new people with similar apti- tudes are hired in Agency Y. Crash action can also end in random demotions and inadequate training for assuming new responsibilities. Such seemingly insensitive, capricious acts on the part of public administrators and political leaders do much to reduce employee commitment to productivity improvement.

Employment Forecasting

An important way to reduce the destructive impact of crash action is to do a more adequate job of workforce planning. The need is not limited to New York State. One of our surveys showed that most other major states along with the federal government are deeply concerned over bringing more rationality into agency employment forecasting, especially during these times of government reces- sion. Yet the literature we reviewed is mostly oriented toward growth and production of goods. Therefore, a model was recently devised which could help point the way toward a better understanding of the problem by employees and managers.

Figure 2 is, first, an attempt to give meaning to long- term, intermediate, and short-term planning cycles. These are then associated with shifts in numbers of employees and service level. ' 0 The policy-alert cycle is the period during which information is provided to policy-makers (e.g., legislators, executive offices, agency management) to alert them to the nature of a pending change and to enable the exploration of decision alternatives. The next cycle, sup- porting action, refers to fulfilling needs such as funding, new legislation, provision of facilities, and training. Finally, conversion action begins when the change actually

impacts employment levels or service levels. During any workforce transition, service tends to deteriorate because of confusion, employee anxieties, and unforeseen events. The shaded area in Figure 2 represents such costs as the difference between an ideal and actual service level. Also shown in the figure is that it is possible, after an initial loss of service, to wind up in a relatively more favorable ratio of delivered service to existing workforce. Minimizing conversion loss depends upon adequate change lead times, provision of support, management competence, and employee participation.

This way of conceptualizing the workforce problem has enabled us to tentatively design various patterns of workforce transition, define interagency and intergovernmental level problems, and begin to relate broad kinds of data needs for specific planning cycles. Such information, when shared with employees, should increase confidence in management's ability to reduce the undesirable impact of workforce conversions. Research continues to develop a better understanding of data requirements, information flow, and reporting formats.

Another investigation of employee involvement was made by Downey and Balk " in a study of state government suggestion systems. Their premise is that the vitality of suggestion programs is a gauge of management's capacity to respond to employee needs for creativity-often a sig- nificant aspect of job satisfaction. A comparative analysis between states showed that suggestion programs, when they exist, have relatively low yield. This led to the hypoth- esis that administrators could be threatened by good employee ideas; for traditional management theory holds that managers "think" and employees "do."

To turn to another concern, it is interesting to note how little systematic direct attention has been given by top-level policy-makers, management, and unions to locate and re- deploy the misemployed and the subemployed. (Misemployed are those performing useless tasks. Sub-em- ployed are those who have to fake out doing a day's work.) Quality of working life is a major human problem because usually individual employees have good knowledge if they are in such a situation. It should be possible to have employees themselves join in an effort to be assigned to meaningful work. But, contrary to common opinion, no one deals kindly with workers who complain about working at useless tasks or having to fake out doing a job. Those who speak up are often branded as trouble-makers; so promo- tions, or even retaining jobs, could be at stake. Their managers fear being seen as incompetent. Most supervisors hate to see the size of their organizations reduced as a result of productivity improvement because they will suffer a budget and responsibility penalty, rather than recognition. The pity of such situations is not merely economic; it strikes at the very core of a person's self worth. For there are uncounted numbers of employees not realizing their potential, living lives of quiet desperation because of a hos- tile agency environment and a lack of joint management and union initiative.

It seems fair to say that the amount of invective against agency "bureaucrats" has increased greatly over the past few years. Business, the public, legislators, and even execu-




PRODUCTIVITY IN GOVERNMENT 49

tive officers join in the attack. "The bureaucracy" is seen as not accountable, pitiless, prone to meddle, incapable of change, inefficient, and ineffective. Career people are, of course, saddened and demoralized, for it is but a short step from disliking bureaucracies to perceiving "bureaucrats" as inherently lazy, heartless, and stupid. Agency administrators, when under public attack for their productivity shortcomings, react surprisingly like those in large corporations. "Outsiders really don't understand us," They say. "No one ever talks about what's going well and the things we do right. We are all tied up by silly regula- tions which are thrust upon us by others. Wild-eyed jour- nalists and consumer advocates go off half-cocked and only tell part of the story." At the same time-very much like people in business-most public administrators are deeply concerned about the problems and failures of their organizations and recognize that there is a good deal of merit in much of the painful criticism they are experienc- ing.

I become bothered over passionate onslaughts upon government agencies-not because of their occasional inaccu- racy or lack of temperance, for there is frequently more than a grain of truth in what is said-but rather because the attacks take on a certain ritualistic fervor which does little to correct basic problems. In many ways the critics of public bureaucracies act like medicine men in tribal socie- ties. They seek to drive out the demons of low productivity and lack of public accountability by shouting them away. This seems especially so with business people. Few have the sophisticated insights provided by Scott Fosler. The problem is that those on the receiving end answer in an equally ritualistic manner. Or they remain silent.

Outside Influences on Productivity

What is required is a more thoughtful and constructive external approach to motivating agency improvement. The importance of outside influences upon agency productivity has been illustrated by Governor Lucy and Ray Ryan. Un- fortunately, most legislative and political executive leaders have not been quick to make changes that would support productivity advances. These changes include investing money to save money (e.g., training, equipment), revising civil-service legislation, devising ways to reward high productivity performance, and encouraging systematic agency productivity reporting. One reason for this situation is that concern with the productivity issue means painstaking involvement in a topic with limited political glamour as well as a number of inherent dilemmas. Crane et al., in the only in-depth study of environmental influences upon agency productivity, observe that there are numerous paradoxes in the politics of productivity.

The central thrust of productivity improvement is clar- ification of long-term goals and specification of performance while ". . . political considerations are narrow and short range. Almost every program is a focus of conflicting interests to which elected officials and bureaucrats respond. "' 2

Most public-constituency groups directly interested in government productivity improvement (and they are


indeed few) still seem to feel that a dash of business know- how along with increased energy and good will on the part of public administrators will carry the day. The real problem, however, is to increase knowledge about and interest in the complexity of improvement so as to more effectively harness public opinion. Nancy Hayward, George Kuper and Don Kull provide valuable leads. Perhaps the most in- fluential point for public pressure is directly upon legislative and executive leadership, so that an over-all concern with productivity improvement becomes politically re- warding. Once political leadership becomes more commit- ted in specific ways to improvement, then it will make the necessary changes within its own house. To create a nur- turing environment for productivity improvement, it seems appropriate for taxpayers to consider themselves as share- holders in government. They deserve evidence of good management practice such as agencies defining their output activities and reporting efficiency and effectiveness trends. This should lead to more valid public accountability wherein agency heads openly set productivity goals and report accomplishment.

Productivity accountability is painful, more often than not, since it encompasses the risk of predicting outcomes and limits spontaneous choice. Employees, when asked to undergo the difficulties and risk of improvement, are extremely sensitive to the behavior of top-level policy- makers. Symbolic acts that spell out waste and lack of accountability to those one is trying to influence, invariably will reduce motivation. For example, there is a crippling inconsistency when legislators dramatically raise their sala- ries while telling employees to "hold the line." It is difficult to convince agency people that productivity improvement is a serious objective when jobs are filled by less than competent politically appointed employees. Fre- quently, such actions are not very expensive in budgetary terms; but they tend to be demoralizing and thus reduce motivation because of their perceived inequality.

The business community traditionally has urged action and supported government in its efforts to improve productivity. Public agencies have followed the business-management lead with some outstanding success. But at times those in the private sector have urged wholesale installa- tion of business practices without recognizing the differ- ences and problems already discussed. Consequently, governors and mayors have a history of forming business- expert committees which rapidly disintegrate. Consultants experienced in business methods, are retained to install ideas incompatible to government-agency reality; and money is wasted. The problem could be that business is largely on the transmitting end. It would be good to see a more reinforcing, cooperative spirit evolve between public agencies and business management in order to exchange productivity information. Some of the innovative work mentioned above concerned with classifying and defining output measures, workforce planning, and managerial perceptions should be of great interest to business, especially to those in service industries. Perhaps a more relaxed yet more purposeful relationship would help agencies innovate ways of reducing reporting and other governmental ad- ministrative constraints upon business. All of this is to say




that there are many common organizational management concerns in the public and private sectors. People of insight within government are surely anxious to exchange concepts and techniques-but not as second-class citizens.

Summary

In a way, this entire symposium has been in search of a government-productivity ethic. While many major points have been covered, we make no claims for comprehensive coverage of the progress over the past five years. Too much has happened to summarize adequately all volume of activities at all levels of government. This in itself is a sign of encouraging movement.

But the pervasive malaise expressed by most of our authors cannot be denied. Very fundamental changes have yet to occur to be able to say that the public-sector productivity movement is alive and well. Constituencies have to become more informed and exert more focused pressures. Political leaders must make important decisions and allo- cate more of their time and attention in order to support agency improvements.

Finally, it seems critical for managers and employees in government to develop a solid productivity ethic. They can spearhead the technical improvement of agency activities. They can improve their decision-making capabilities and encourage more meaningful employee participation. Fi- nally, they can more aggressively influence politicians and constituencies to make agency change more possible, be- nign, and permanent. Public administrators have a fundamental choice. They will either lead the way or be dragged into the new, uneasy era of government parsimony and creative conservation. The next five years should indicate what that choice will be.

Notes 1. Most research and publications referred to in this article by

Balk, Crane et al.; Downey, Dillon et al.; and Quinn were

generated as part of the Graduate School of Public Affairs Productivity Research Project for State Government. The effort was supported over the period 3/15/74 through 1/31/77 by the Ford Foundation.

2. Walter L. Balk, Improving Government Productivity: Some Policy Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975); see Chapter 1.

3. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 4. For an interesting discussion of the service sector of the econ-

omy and its management, see Theodore Leavitt, "Manage- ment and the Post Industrial Society," The Public Interest (Summer, 1976).

5. See Balk, op. cit., Chapter 3. 6. See Eli Ginsberg, "The Pluralistic Economy of the U.S.,"

Scientific American, Volume 235 (December 1976), pp. 25- 29, for a perceptive comparison of the private and not-for- profit sectors of the economy.

7. See M. Schneider, "The Quality of Life and Social Indicators Research," Public Administration Review (May/June 1976).

8. See L. Stephen, "From PPBS to PAR," State Government (Summer 1972), and Rose, "Implementation and Evapora- tion: The Record of MBO," Public Administration Review (January/February 1977).

9. R. Dillon, M. Dillon, and M. Sewall, "Measuring Decision Makers' Perceptions of Innovation in an Organizational Set- ting." Their concepts are somewhat similar to Osgood and Tannenbaum's "semantic space" (The Measurement of Meaning, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957). The manuscript has been submitted to Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.

10. "Service level" encompases the quality and cost of services provided; therefore, it is a type of productivity indicator. The concept is theoretical, and development of an index depends upon further investigation.

11. Edward Downey and Walter L. Balk, Employee Innovation and Government Productivity (Chicago, International Per- sonnel Management Association, 1976).

12. Edgar Crane, Bernard Lentz, and Jay Shafritz, State Govern- ment Productivity: The Environment for Improvement (New York: Praeger, 1976).

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1978



Documents

Toward a Government Productivity Ethic