Toward Pro-Poor and Accountable Infrastructure … Kita_AIIRA Final Report... · INDONESIA INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE Toward Pro-Poor and Accountable Infrastructure Development Planning

Toward Pro-Poor and Accountable Infrastructure Development Planning

Kota Kita Local Budget Transparency Research

INDONESIA INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

Toward Pro-Poor and Accountable Infrastructure Development Planning

Kota Kita Local Budget Transparency Research

AIIRA RESEARCH REPORT

November5th2015

JohnTaylor,KotaKita

INDONESIA INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

ThisdocumenthasbeenpublishedbytheIndonesiaInfrastructureInitiative(IndII),anAustralian Government funded project designed to promote economic growth inIndonesia by enhancing the relevance, quality and quantum of infrastructureinvestment.

TheviewsexpressedinthisreportdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheAustraliaIndonesia Partnershipor theAustralianGovernment. Pleasedirect any comments orquestions to the IndII Director, tel. +62 (21) 7278-0538, fax +62 (21) 7278-0539.Website:www.indii.co.id.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report has been prepared by an Indonesian and International ResearchPartnershipcomprisingYayasanKotaKita,andAustralianNationalUniversity,engagedundertheIndonesiaInfrastructureInitiative(IndII),anAustralianAidprojectmanagedby SMEConbehalf of theAustralianGovernment, as part of theAustralia IndonesiaInfrastructure Research Awards (AIIRA) Program. The support provided by PeterMcCawley from theAustraliaNationalUniversity, TaraGrillos from theUniversity ofColorado (USA), the Government of Surakarta, and Daniel Heriberto Palencia andStephen Kennedy from Urban Launchpad, is gratefully acknowledged. The reportdraws on research conducted by Hery Kurniawan, Deni Yulika, Elvira Freditia,Muhammad Andy Anzi, Apriyatno, Mustaq Zabidi, Yusri Muhammad, Agung DwiPrasetyo, Edi Wijaya, Sejuk, Rijal Rumi Danial Haq, Ahmad Zaed, Endah Fitria, PanjiMuslim, Septy,NurEsti, Brenda Julica,Najih Fikriyah,NunukMarihastuti (SekretariatDaerah), Tulus Hidayat (BAPPEDA),Mila Yuniati, ST,MM (BAPPEDA), Rini Indriastuti,S.Si (BAPPEDA), Lalito JR Arumsari (BAPPEDA), Perdani Budiarti ST (BAPPEDA),HasanatunNisaThamrin, Fuad Jamil, RizqaHidayani andRifaiAhmad. Anyerrorsoffactorinterpretationaresolelythoseoftheauthor.

JohnTaylor

November5th2015

©IndII2015

The title to all Intellectual Property rights in or in relation to Agreement Material created during thecourseoftheActivityvestsintheOrganisationuponitscreation.TheOrganisationgrantstoDFATaworld-wide, irrevocable, royalty-free licence to use, reproduce, adapt or otherwise exploit the AgreementMaterial. The licence granted under this clause includes the right of DFAT to sub-licence any of itsemployees,agentsorcontractorstouse,reproduceorotherwiseexploittheAgreementMaterialforthepurposes of performing functions, responsibilities, activities or services for, or on behalf of, DFAT. Thisclausedoesnotaffecttheownershipof IntellectualProperty inanyPriorMaterial incorporated intotheAgreementMaterial,buttheOrganisationgrantstoDFATapermanent,irrevocable,non-exclusive,world-wide, royalty-free licence to use, reproduce, adapt and otherwise exploit such Prior Material inconjunctionwiththeAgreementMaterial.

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

ACRONYMS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I I

EXECUTIVESUMMARY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV

CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CHAPTER2: BACKGROUND.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

CHAPTER3: RESEARCHQUESTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

CHAPTER4: METHODOLOGY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CHAPTER5: DISCUSSIONONRESEARCHFINDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CHAPTER6: CONCLUSION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

ANNEXES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

ANNEXE1: SURVEYINSTRUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 ANNEXE2: INTERVIEWQUESTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 ANNEXE3: SCHEDULEOFWORKSHOP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 ANNEXE4: FOCUSGROUPDISCUSSIONPROTOCOL. . . . . . . . . . . . 41 ANNEXE5: MUS-TRACKER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 ANNEXE6: TEAMCOMPOSITION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 ANNEXE7: TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 ANNEXE8: FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 ANNEXE9: SELECTEDINTERVIEWRESPONSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

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LISTOFTABLES

Table.1a DeterminantsofLocationofKelurahanGrantProjectsbyRW

Table.1b BudgetallocationsbyRWPovertyRateQuintiles

LISTOFFIGURES

Fig.1 TheMusrenbangprocessdiagram

Fig.2 ThestagesoftheMusrenbangprocess

Fig.3 DigitizedandcompiledtheMusrenbangprocessintoadatabase

Fig.4 AKotaKitastaffmemberconductsasurveywithacommunitymember

Fig.5 AKotaKitastaffmemberconductsaninterviewwithacommunityleader

Fig.6 CommunitymemberstestouttheMus-Trackeronlineplatforminafocusgroupdiscussion

Fig.7 TheMus-Trackerwebapplicationencouragestheparticipationoftheyounger,tech-savvygeneration

Fig.8 ScreenshotstakenfromtheMusrenbangTracker,theweb-basedprojecttrackingtool

Fig.9 Percentageoffundedinfrastructureprojectsbytype

Fig.10 Thevaryingamountofghostprojects

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ACRONYMS

AusAID AustralianAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

Bappeda BadanPerencanaanPembangunanDaerah,ProvincialPlanningOffice

BLT BantuanLangsungTunai,aneighborhoodcashtransferprogram

DFAT DepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade

GIS Geographicinformationsystems

Kelurahan Neighborhood

Musrenbang TheshortformofMusyawaranPerencanaanPembangunan,aparticipatorybudgetingcyclethatoccursincities.

NGO Non-governmentalorganization

PNPM ProgramNasionalPemberdayaanMasyarakat--NationalProgramforCommunityEmpowerment

RT RumahTangga,asmalladministrativeunitofanIndonesianneighborhoodcoveringaround20-30households

RT/RW RumahTanggaandRumahWarga,aterritorialandadministrativeorderingsystemforIndonesiancities

YKK OurCityFoundation,alocalNGObasedinSolo,Indonesia

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

SincethebeginningoftheReformasiperiod,Indonesiahastakengreatstridestowardsincluding citizens in local government decision-making. The primary mechanism forcitizen participation in financial decision-making, especially for infrastructurebudgeting,istheMusrenbangprocessofproposing,votingon,andfundingsmall-scaleprojects in neighborhoods across the nation. Solo, in Central Java, has a particularlyrobustMusrenbangstructure,andservesasthecasestudyforthisresearch.

Despite the increasing prevalence of theMusrenbangmodel, there has been littleeffort to track process or outcomes. This makes it difficult for citizens and localgovernmentofficialstoassesswhethertheMusrenbangprocessisachievingitsstatedgoal of directing funding towardsprojects serving thosewith the greatest need. Theprocessisalsoveryopaque.Itisverydifficulttotrackdecisionsaboutwhichprojectstoapprove and fund, and equally difficult to access information on the actual projectsimplementedbasedonthesedecisions.

The research takesplace in Solo, a cityof approximately600,000 inhabitants,wherethe firstparticipatorybudgetingexperiencewas introduced in2000andcontinuestothis day. The city government has been supportive of theMusrenbang process andfunds are allocated annually to each neighborhood, or kelurahan, through theDanaPembangunan Kelurahan (Neighborhood Block Grant). Kota Kita, a local IndonesianNGO based in Solo, gathered data from all 51 of the city’s kelurahans about thecitizens’choicesofprojects,howtheyrankedintermsofpriority,theirbudgetamount,andwhethertheywereapprovedandexecuted(built)attheendoftheprocess.Thisinformation,over50,000datapointsinall,wasdigitizedtocreateapublicly-accessiblecitywidedatabasethatcanbestudiedtoanalyzetheperformanceoftheMusrenbangin delivering upon citizens’ democratically selected preferences. Other research wasconductedthroughsurveys,interviews,andfocusgroupdiscussions.

Among the key findings the research reveals that poverty rates do not significantlyinfluence project prioritization; thus the neediest areas of the city, where povertyconcentratesandwhichlackservices,donotreceivemorefundingthanotherareas.Infactpovertyratesactuallyhaveanoppositeeffect,inthattheareasthatreceivemostprojectsarethosewith leastpoverty.TheMusrenbang,however,doesseemoperatedemocratically,withthemostpopulousareasreceivingmoreprojects.OtherfindingsincludethediscoveryofopportunitiesforelitecaptureduringthePublicPhaseoftheprocess,inwhichcitizensdiscussandprioritizetheirneeds.Whiletheresearchcannotsay with certainty how this occurs, it is likely that insufficient turnout by poorcommunitiesisanimportantfactor.Theresearchalsofoundthatasignificantamountof theprojects that are allocated for implementationoriginateoutsideof the votingprocess;thesearereferredtoas‘ghostprojects’inthereport.

InordertobegintomonitorthethirdandfinalphaseoftheMusrenbangprocess,theExecution (implementation) Phase, Kota Kita has developed an online application

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called theMusrenbangTracker (orMus-Tracker forshort).Thisweb-tooloperatesbylinkingthecitywidedatabasetoawebbrowserthatcanbeaccessedbyanyonewithInternet,forexamplethroughhisorhersmartphoneorlaptop.Citizenscanusethistotrackindividualprojectsthattheyvotedonandmonitortheirstatus,aswellasmakecommentsabouttheseprojects.Thisallowsthepublictoparticipateinmonitoringtheimplementation of projects, and provide oversight. Early trials have garnered anenthusiastic response, and demonstrated the possibility for a younger, more tech-savvypopulationtobecomeinvolvedinneighborhooddevelopment.However,furtherpromotionanddevelopmentoftheMusrenbangTrackerislikelyrequired.

TheresearchconcludesthatreformofSolo’sMusrenbangprocess isneeded inordertoeffectivelyaddressinequalityandtheneedsofpoorareasofthecity.Thismightbeachieved throughbetter targetingof poor areas andmorewidespreadpromotionofthebudgetingprocesstomarginalizedcommunities.Anotherconclusionisthaturbandataisausefultooltoindicatewhereproblemsinsuchpoliciesoccur,aswellasgiveideasofhowtoimprove.Withaccuratedata,solutionscanbemorecarefullytargeted,for example, by identifying the need for further capacity building and monitoringoversight in aparticularunderperformingkelurahan. Finally, continuedpromotionofmonitoring tools can provide opportunities for the public to oversee theimplementationofprojectsandincreaseaccountability.

Thisresearchcanhelppromotebetterunderstandingamongstpolicymakersaboutthelimitations and potential of the Musrenbang process in addressing infrastructureneeds; itcanalso indicatehowdatacanbeusedtobetterfollowandevaluateurbanpolicies.TherecommendationscanbeusedbythecitygovernmentofSolotosupportevaluation and improvement of the current process, and to implement training andpromote new monitoring tools. Finally the development and testing of theMusrenbang Tracker tool demonstrates early interest amongst citizens and has thepotential to empower a younger demographic through the use of technology-basedtransparencymechanisms.

TowardPro-Poor,ParticipatoryandAccountableInfrastructureDevelopmentPlanning

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CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is urbanizing rapidly. The country has one of the highest growth rates inurbanpopulationinAsia,adding100millionresidentstoitscitiesfrom1970–2010.Itis projected to add another 72 million by 2030 (World Bank 2012; Oberman et al.2012). This trend is straining local governments’ ability toprovide infrastructure andservices to urban residents. At the same time, corruption, bureaucratic interference,and inefficiency hinder attempts to provide infrastructure planning andimplementationinawaythataddressescitizenneeds,especiallyofthepoorandmostvulnerable. Given these realities, how can equitable development take place indecentralizeddemocraciesthatarerapidlyurbanizing?

Directcitizenparticipationindecision-makinghasbeenheldupasameanstoimproveequity and efficiency of infrastructure development. Participatory budgeting wasintroducedinIndonesiaduringtheReformasiperiodin2000,andthecityofSurakarta(alsoknownasSolo)servedasapilotlocationfortheinitiative.In2004theIndonesianGovernment mandated the use of participatory budgeting in every city across thearchipelagothroughtheMusrenbang(shortforMusyawarahPerencanaanBangunan),or Consultation Forum for Development Planning program1. Despite its nationwidereach,there is littleevidenceavailablethattheprogramworks,andfewmechanismstomonitoritseffectivenessinsmall-scaleinfrastructuredelivery.

This report highlights two data-based interventions by Kota Kita in Surakarta’sMusrenbangprogramfrom2011to2014.First,KotaKitaconductedaseriesof focusgroupdiscussions,workshops,interviewsanddigitizationofgovernmentdocumentstocreateacomprehensivepictureoftheMusrenbangprocessinSolo.Asrevealedinthisreport the data gathering revealed a number of problems with the program’simplementation, including poor targeting by the program in needy areas,demonstratinghowdatacollectionandanalysiscanbeusedtomonitorandevaluatelocalparticipatorypolicies.

Second, Kota Kita developed theMusrenbang-Tracker (Mus-Tracker), a mobile andweb-basedapplication thatprovidesaplatform forcitizens tocommentandoverseetheimplementationofprojects,andinvitescitizenstoparticipateintrackingprogress.Giventhewideadoptionofsmartphones in Indonesia,particularlybytheyoung,theMus-Tracker aims to democratize access to theMusrenbang process and stimulateyouthparticipationinSurakarta.

Through these two initiatives, it isourhope thatKotaKitawill refocuseffortswithinthe government and civil society toward rigorous data-based approaches for themonitoring and analysis of participatory budgeting for urban infrastructure. Greater

1 The Indonesian government continues to implement participatory development programs; in 2014, the parliament passed a new Village Law (UU No.6/2014) which transfers funds directly to villages to determine themselves how to best allocate resources.

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awareness of thebenefits of usingurbandata formonitoring and analysis, of publicaccesstoinformation,andoversightbycitizens,canpromotemoreopenandinclusiveformsgovernanceandbetterinfrastructuredeliveryinIndonesia.

TheAIIRAresearchgrantprovidedtheimpetustoKotaKitatogobeyondinitialeffortsto simply provide access to urban information, to better understand what happenswhencitizendecisionsaboutlocalresourcesaretaken,and,whentheyareexecuted,whethertheyindeedrelatetocitizendemandsandneeds.

1.2ResearchConclusions

Theprimaryresearchconclusionswerethefollowing:

(i) Solo’sparticipatorybudgetingmechanismisnottargetingtheneediestareasinthecity(thosewiththehighestconcentrationofpoorpeopleandthosemostlackinginservices),butitdoeseffectivelyrespondtothedemandsofareaswherethemostpeoplelive.

(ii) Urbandataisanimportanttooltomonitorandevaluatethebudgetingprocess,andtoindicateopportunitiesforimprovingit.

(iii) TrainingsandincreasedaccountabilityforkelurahansandtheirofficialscanimprovetheperformanceoftheMusrenbangprocess.

(iv) Citizen-generatedmonitoringdataprovidesvaluableinsightsaboutwhetherprojectshavebeenexecutedbyharnessingsocialmediaandcitizeninterest.Web-basedplatformscanbecometoolstoimprovetransparencyandaccountabilityoftheprojectimplementationphaseoftheMusrenbangprocess.

1.3OutputsandOutcomes

OutputsThefollowingoutputsresultedfromtheresearch:

• TheSologovernmenthasagreedtocontinuetodigitizeneighborhooddatafromeachofthe51neighborhoods,andconsolidatethedatasetsannually.TheMayorofSoloofficiallyrecognizedthisagreementinaMemorandumofUnderstandingthatiscurrentlyawaitingasignature(November2015).

• SologovernmentstaffineverykecamatanhavebeentrainedandarenowabletodigitizeMusrenbangdata,andtousetheInternettosubmititdigitallytotheMayor’sOffice.

• Adigitalmonitoringwebplatform,whichalsooffersaccesstovitaldataaboutthecityandinfrastructureprojects,calledtheMusrenbangTrackerhasbeendeveloped.Althoughstillaprototype,thepublichasaddedover300commentsaboutexistingprojectsthroughoutthecity.Thiswebsitecanbeaccessedusingalaptoporasmartphoneat:


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http://solokotakita.org/musrenbangtracker/

• TaraGrilloshascompletedherPhDdissertationattheHarvardKennedySchoolofGovernment,severalchaptersofwhichwerededicatedtoananalysisoftheMusrenbangprocessinSoloandexplainedissuesofelitecaptureandimpact.Thisisnowpubliclyavailable2.

Outcomes

Thefollowingareexpectedoutcomesthatwillresultfromtheresearch:

• Localparticipatoryplanningprocessesareregularlyevaluated

The data generated has illuminated challenges and opportunities presented bydifferent stages of the Musrenbang process. This research will allow theGovernment of Solo to more effectively monitor the performance of theMusrenbangprocess,andto identifywhat isgoingwellandwhat isnot.Thecitygovernment will continue data digitization, collection, and analysis, will overseetheprocesswithmorerigor(duetotheexistenceofmorereliabledata),andwillalso progressively train staff about how to improve management of theparticipatoryplanningprocess.

• TheMusrenbang processwill be improved to better target poor areas andpromotetheinvolvementofthepoor

The researchwill increase the focus on the Public Phase of the process, so thatmore direct and regular promotional campaigns help raise awareness about theMusrenbangprocess,provide informationthatsupportsprioritizationofprojects,andincreasetheparticipationofpoorcommunitiesinvoting.

• Newparticipantswillenterparticipatorybudgetingprocessesandmonitorinfrastructureimplementationprocessesthemselves

Thedesignanddevelopmentoftheweb-basedmonitoringtool,theMus-Tracker,encouragesmore andmore residents, youth, and other communitymembers tobecome active in overseeing the completion of executed projects. This will helpinvigorateownershipandattendanceatdecision-makingmeetingsandprovideanopportunityforthepoortogetinvolvedinthedevelopmentoftheircommunities.

2 Grillos, T. (2015). "Poverty Targeting and Elite Capture in Participatory Planning in Indonesia." Participation, Power and Preferences in International Development (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from DASH - Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard.

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CHAPTER2: Background

2.1ThechangingcontextofcitizenparticipationinIndonesia

The decentralization that took root in Indonesia post-Reformasi has allowed localgovernments to make decision-making more participatory and accessible.Decentralizationaimedtoincreaselocalgovernmentoversightandcontroloverpolicymaking,andgivecitizensgreaterbudgetarydecision-makingpower(WorldBank2003)[Reference can be made from this footnote3] In theory, direct citizen participationleads to “better deliveryof public goods and services, bettermaintained communityassets,andamoreinformedandinvolvedcitizenrythatiscapableofundertakingself-initiateddevelopmentactivity” (MansuriandRao2004).Thisexpectationhasdirectlyshaped Indonesia’s policies in incorporating citizen participation. Yet, more than 15years after its implementation, political and economic outcomes have varied greatlyacrossthecountry’s508citiesanddistricts(Hill2014;referencecanbemadefromthisfootnote4].Decentralizationhaspavedthewayfortheemergenceofinnovativeideasandleadersfromthroughoutthecountry’sregions(Hamid5).

DecentralizationhasalsoofferedIndonesiatremendousopportunitiesto increasetheinvolvement of ordinary citizens in infrastructure delivery. Starting with the WorldBank-initiated Kecamatan Development Program (Gibson &Woolcock 2008, Barron,Diprose & Woolcock 2006, Olken 2005, etc.), the Indonesian government hasundertakenmultiple initiatives to increase citizen participation in governance issues.WhiletheKDP(anditscurrent-daysuccessor,PNPM)isoftenseenasaninfrastructuredeliverysuccessstory,itoperatesoutsideoftheformalgovernmentbudgetstructureandbypassesthelocalgovernment,ratherthanstrengtheningit.

KotaKita’sinitiativesinSurakartafocusontheMusrenbangprogram.Since2004,theprogram has been used by a number of cities and districts across the country topromote community participation and empower local communities to identify,prioritize, and implement local infrastructure projects supported by governmentfunding. Indeed,Musrenbangmeetingsfunctionastheofficialbottom-upcomponentofthecountry’sannualnationalbudgetingprocess.SincetheprogramoperateswithinIndonesia’s decentralized governance structure, improving its operation is crucial forthelong-termprospectsofcommunity-centeredinfrastructuredelivery.

3http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/LearningProgram/Decentralization/Hofman.pdf4http://aseasuk.org.uk/3/br/regional-dynamics-decentralized-indonesia5http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/10/01/in-indonesia-decentralization-and-direct-elections-two-sides-of-the-same-coin/


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2.2Researchsite

Solo is an instructive case for policy makers looking for lessons from participatorybudgetingexperiences. Solo is a thriving city inCentral Java, home to some600,000inhabitants,andwithastrongtextileandhandicraftsindustry.ItisalsothefirstcityinIndonesiatoimplementparticipatoryplanningin2002.DuringhisperiodasMayorofSolo, JokoWidodo implemented theprogramwithkeen interest. In starkcontrast tonational reputation, the city has become synonymous with clean governance.Widodo’s campaign slogan, ‘Bersih Tanpa Korupsi’ (Clean Without Corruption), hasbecomesynonymouswiththecity’sattitudetowardstransparency.

Solo’s Musrenbang process is interesting because of a unique feature of itsimplementation: the city allocates a local grant (DPK) to each of Solo’s 51neighborhoodsannually.Theallocationofgrantmoniesisdiscussedandimplementedby citizens and the neighborhood government in consultation with the citygovernment’s agencies. TheMusrenbang program in Solo has operated for over 13years,withcontinuouseffortstoimprovethepolicy.TheMusrenbangprocessallowseach kelurahan to autonomously determine infrastructure spending in their ownneighborhoods, thereby improving the effectiveness of public investments. Sincefundingisdeterminedthroughaconsultativeprocess,itshould,atleastintheory,mapdirectlyontocitizenpreferences.

However significant challenges remain in fulfilling the potential of participatorydevelopment. Only 16% of proposals put forward by the community in 2011 wereapproved by the city government for funding. Despite the city government’s strongcommitment to this participatory budgeting processes there is substantialmismatchbetween citizen demand and actual infrastructure delivery. Moreover,Musrenbangfacilitatorshavereporteddecliningattendance inmeetingsandasenseofstagnationin the process. In this environment, youth participation is an important way torevitalizetheprogramandpromotemoreactiveinvolvement.

Furthermore the Musrenbang prioritization process occurs a full year before thekelurahan grant funding is actually distributed. As a result, there is a great deal ofconfusionastotheeffectivenessofthissystem,particularlywithrespecttothethird

TheVillageLaw

TheVillageLaw,No.6/2014waspassedbytheHouseofRepresentativesonDecember18,2013allocateshigherdevelopmentbudgetstovillages.ItisestimatedthateachvillagewillreceiveacentralandregionalgovernmenttransferofapproximatelyRp1.4billioneachyeartofulfillbasicneedssuchasinfrastructure.

The Village Law is significant because citizens will have a greater deal of autonomy inprioritizingandmanagingresources.Inordertodosobettermonitoringandaccountabilitymechanisms are needed, as well as the adoption of good practices from participatorybudgetingcases.

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stepabove.OurpreliminarydataindicatesthatthemajorityofinfrastructureprojectsthatappearonthefundingdistributionplandidnotactuallyappearintheMusrenbangprioritizationprocessatall.These“ghostprojects”representamajorgapinknowledgeaboutinfrastructuredeliveryinSolo.

Theexistenceof“ghostprojects”couldbeareflectionofelitecaptureintheprocess,wherebylocalelitesco-opttheparticipatoryprocessfortheirownends.However,theycould also reflect legitimate action on the part of the Musrenbang leadership tocontendwithchallengesbroughtaboutbythebureaucraticnatureoftheprocessandthetimedelaybetweenprioritizationofneedsandactualdeliveryoffunds.

Figure1:TheMusrenbangprocessinvolvescommunitymembersandleaders,andtakesover1yearfrominceptiontoimplementation

Ateachstage,thereareopportunitiesforfailuresorcorruptionintheprocess.Atstage1,theremaybedisproportionaterepresentationamongthosewhoactuallyattendthemeetingsandmakeproposals.Atstage2,RWleadersmayvotebasedonself-interestratherthanonanassessmentofthemostpressingneedsinthekelurahan.Atstage3,DPKleadershipmaydivergefromthelistofplannedprojectsanddistributethefundsaccording to their own interests.At stage4, fundsmaybemisallocatedor pocketedrather than being used according to the original implementation plan. Disentanglingthesedifferent stepsand identifyingpossiblediscrepanciesateach stagehasbeenamajorgoalofthisresearch.

OneoftheproblemsisthattherearefewaccountabilitymechanismsthatensurethattheMusrenbangisconductedeffectivelyatthelowestlevels(RT,RW)inSolo.Ateachlevel, theMusrenbangprocessdocumentspriorities identifiedbycitizen-participants.However,thisdocumentationisrarelyusedbecauseit isnotreadilyaccessible, isnotdigitized, and is sometimes discarded or lost after a certain period of time. Simplycollecting this information and making it accessible would constitute a majorcontribution to the understanding ofMusrenbang proceedings and their effects oninfrastructuredelivery.

YayasanKotaKita,alsoknownasKotaKita, isan IndonesianNGObased inSolo thathas been collecting and analyzing data about theMusrenbang process in Solo, since


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2010. Kota Kita’s, mission is to promote citizen engagement and participation indecision-makingabouttheircommunitiesandcities,thusacentralfocusoftheirworkistodevelopwaysforcitizenstobebeactivelyinvolvedinlocalprocessessuchastheMusrenbang.. In 2010 Kota Kita first implemented a crowd-sourced data collectionprocess that gathered socio-economic anddemographic data fromeachof the city’s2,700 RTs, resulting in a new, publically accessible citywide information system forcitizens.Thiswasdesignedspecificallytoimprovedecision-makingbyresidentsaboutprojectpriorities for theMusrenbang.ThepositiveworkingrelationshipwiththeCityGovernmentofSurakartadevelopedthroughthisprocessprovidestheopportunitytonotonlyaccesstheirdata,butalsotoinfluencepolicymakerswithregardstoneededimprovements,andintroducenewpoliciesthroughrecommendations.

Musrenbang

Musrenbangisanannualprocessduringwhichresidentsmeettogethertodiscusstheissuesfacing theircommunitiesanddecideuponpriorities for short-term improvements.Oncealist of priorities is made, it is submitted to the local government planning department,Bappeda, which will then assign resources to each neighborhood depending upon theavailablefundsandaccordingtoneed.TheMusrenbangmeetingsoccurinthecommunitycentersineveryneighborhoodduringJanuary.

Thisparticipatorybudgetingprocessmakesitpossibleforresidentstoarticulatetheirneedstolocalgovernment.TherearealsoMusrenbangprocessesatthedistrictandcitylevelsaswellasatprovincialandnationallevels.Musrenbangisabottom-upapproach,whichmeansresident voices can actively influence the city budget and how investments aremade inneighborhoods.

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CHAPTER3: ResearchQuestions

3.1ResearchApproach

Theresearchhastwophases,thefirst(fromSeptember2014-May2015)focusesonthe government’s management of Solo’s Musrenbang process, the second (May–October2015)focusesonengagingcitizenstocommentontheresultsofthisprocess.While the Musrenbang also delivers other kinds of projects, including academicscholarships and funding for social and cultural events, this research examines theinfrastructure portion of theMusrenbang process for all 51 kelurahans in Surakartafrom2011through2014.

Thetwophasesoftheresearchapproachare:

1 AnalysisoftheMusrenbangprocessinSoloAcompletecompilationanddigitizationofMusrenbangprojects(fortheyears2011-2014)thatwerevotedonintheMusrenbangconsultationprocessandthosethatwerelaterreportedasexecutedforthatsameyearoffunding,andanalysisoftheresultingdatabase.

2 Creationofacitizen-driven,web-basedtransparencytoolThecreationofaweb-basedtransparencytooltosharetheaboveinformationwiththepublicandcrowdsourceinformationabouttheactualimplementationandmaintenanceofthoseprojectsreportedtobeexecuted,aswellassubsequent,ongoinganalysisofthatcrowd-sourceddata.

It is importanttonotethatneitherphaseis intendedtobeasingle,discreteanalysis,butrathereachareconceivedofasongoing:aseachyear’sprocessoccurs,newdatawill be digitized, shared, and supplemented with crowdsourced data, and thenanalyzedasanintegralpartoftheformalevaluationofthesecityprocesses.

3.2ResearchObjectives

Ourresearchobjectivesweretoanswerthefollowingquestions

1 DocitizenprioritiesestablishedthroughtheMusrenbangprocessreflectthemostpressingneedsofthecommunity?ThisquestionwillhelpustoascertainwhethertheMusrenbangprocessishavinganimpactbyaddressingpoorandunder-servicedareasofthecitywithneededinfrastructure.Torespondwelookatdifferentanalyticallenses,suchasexaminingprojecttypology,locationvariables,andcomparingdifferentgeographicscalesofpublicservicesandneed.Wewantedtoknowwhethercitywideneeds(water,sanitation,poverty)arerelatedtotheprioritiesselectedby,andthebudgetsassignedto,kelurahansacrossthecity.Thiswillletusknowwhetherthereisamatchbetweenneedsanddemandcitywide.ByansweringthisquestionwewillbeabletoascertainwhethertheMusrenbangprocessisasuseful


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andeffectiveinrespondingtocitizenneedsasisassumed.

2 AretheprioritiesestablishedbytheMusrenbangprocessthosethatareactuallyfunded?ThisquestionseekstoascertainwhethertheMusrenbangprocessiseffectivelychannelingcitizenaspirationsandexecutingprojectsthatcitizensvotefor.TorespondwelookcarefullyateachoftheindividualstagesoftheMusrenbangprocess.Analyticallythisisachallengebecausetherearethreestepsoftheprocess:(Step1)Publicphaseproposalofprojectsandprioritization;(Step2)managerialphasefundingallocations;(Step3)actualphysicalimplementationoftheprojectsbythegroupsreceivingthefunding.

Figure2:Thereare3phasesoftheMusrenbangProcess:thePublicPhase,theManagerialPhase,andtheExecutionPhase

WehaveusedthequantitativedatasettoreviewSteps1and2,andhopetodemonstratehowourcrowd-sourceddatasetcanbeusedforStep3.WeaimtounderstandwhethertherearediscrepanciesbetweenStage1andStage2,andwhatmightcausesuchdiscrepancies.

3 AretheneedsofthecommunityeffectivelyaddressedthroughtheMusrenbang

processovertime?ThisresearchquestionevaluatestheeffectivenessoftheMusrenbangprocessovertime,askingwhethercitizendemandchangesfromyeartoyear,toseeiftherehasindeedbeenanimpactofimplementedprojects.Toanswerthiswe

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utilizethecitywidedatasetofsocio-economicdataforeachRTtoevaluatewhethertherearechangingneeds,andthuswhethertheprogramhashadanimpactoverthelast4years.Thisisusefultojudgewhethertheprocesshasmanagedtodeliverprojectstocommunitiesandprogressivelyimpactthecity.

4 Howdoessuccessvaryacrosskelurahansandwhy?WeseektoevaluateiftherearedifferencesinperformanceoftheMusrenbangprocessacrossthedifferentkelurahans.Thisisusefultounderstandifthemanagerialcapacityofthekelurahanofficialsmayplayarole,andifso,whichofficialsmaybenefitfromtrainingormonitoring,inordertoimprovetheprocessacrossallofthecity’skelurahans.

5 Docitizenperceptionsreflectouranalyticalfindings?WeseektogaugecitizenperceptionsoftheMusrenbangprocess.Thehopeisthatthisresearchwillallowustousethequalitativesurveytoseeif,intheplaceswheretherewerelargediscrepanciesbetweenthepublicandmanagerialprocesses,therewerealsohigherdegreesofdissatisfactionorreportsofcorruption.

6 Arecitizensinterestedincommentingonthestatusofprojectsusingaweb-basedtransparencytool?FinallywewouldliketoevaluatethepopularityandeaseofuseoftheMusrenbangTrackerplatformtojudgewhethercitizenswilluseittocommentandprovideuptodateoversightonthefinal‘implementation’phaseoftheMusrenbangprocess.Thiswilldemonstratewhetherthereisinterestandcapacityamongstcitizenstofurtherdevelopandusethistool.


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CHAPTER4: Methodology

The primary early focus of research was to understand characteristics of projectsproposed to and supported by the Musrenbang process. This was done throughextensivecollection,digitization,andquantitativeanalysisofmunicipaldata.KotaKitasupplementedthisprocesswithpollingsurveys,in-depthinterviews,workshops,focusgroups, and the development of the Mus-Tracker online system. The use of thesediversequantitative andqualitativemethods allowed for a deep and comprehensiveunderstandingofthestateofparticipatorybudgetinginSolo.

4.1DigitizingLocalGovernmentData

In the first phase of research (September 2014 – May 2015), Kota Kita collectedinformation about the outcomes of the Musrenbang process, with a particularemphasis on the infrastructure spending through the Musrenbang process. Thisinvolved the collection and digitization of the following data for each of Solo’s 51neighborhoods spanning 2011–2014. In total, Kota Kita digitized 53,846 data pointsabout3,846projectsfromtheMusrenbangprocess, includingtheir location,approvalstatus,budgetallocation,andtypology.

• OutputsfromtheMusrenbangkel(theNeighborhood-levelbudgetprioritizationprocess)forall51neighborhoods:Thesedocumentscontainthelistsofalltheproposalsagreeduponbycitizensattheneighborhoodlevel.Thelistscoverarangeofsectors:social,economy,generalaffairsandinfrastructure;ourresearchfocusedprimarilyonthelistsofinfrastructurepriorities.

• OutputsfromtheMusrenbangkot(City-levelbudgetprioritizationprocess):Apublishedlistofprojectsthathavebeenprioritizedbytheneighborhoodsandapproved,butwhichwillbeabsorbedintothedepartment-levelbudgets(thereforenotbytheneighborhoodgrantprocess)forimplementation.

• TheDanaPembangunanKelurahan(DPK)orNeighborhoodGrantforeach51kelurahansofthecity.

• TheAPBD(CityBudget):TheAPBDistheannuallocalbudgetapprovedbyParliament.SinceParliamenteffectivelyhasthelastwordindecidingwhichprojectscanbeapproved,thisdocumentallowsustoseewhichprojectsmayhavebeenprioritizedandapprovedintheMusrenbangkotbutwerenotapprovedbyParliament.

• TheMayor’sDecreeabouttheDPKImplementationPlan:Thisdecreeannouncestheamountofmoneythateachneighborhoodwillreceivethroughtheirblockgrantforlocalprojects,includinginfrastructureprojects.

• TheUrbanLandUsePlan(RencanaTataRuangWilayah,RTRW):ThisdocumentistheSolocitygovernment’surbanlanduseplan,whichdeterminestheoveralldevelopmentpatternsforthecity.

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These multiple sources of data were quantified and digitized to create a completedatabaseofMusrenbangoutcomesoverthepastfouryears.Thisquantitativedatawasthen analyzed extensively, comparing characteristics of the projects themselves, theRWs inwhichtheprojectswereslated for implementation,andthekelurahanwithinwhichthefundingallocationdecisionsweremade.

In termsofquality control themajor issuewasensuring the collectionand inputtingintothedatabaseofcleanandreliabledata.Effortsweretakentoensurethatthedataentryphasewasrigorousandasafeguardmeasurewasinstitutedusingredundancytoidentifyincorrectdataentry.Thishelpedtoensurethatthedatausedforanalysiswasreliable.

Figure3:Over50,000datapointsrepresentingdifferentstageoftheMusrenbangprocessfromeachofSolo’s51kelurahanswasdigitizedandcompiledintoadatabase

4.2Surveys/Polling

To complement the quantitative, observational data from the reporting proceduresthemselves, we also collected qualitative data, including a short-form surveyconductedinJanuary,2015.Thesurveyincluded4respondents(2maleand2female)from each of the 51 kelurahan in Solo, for a total of 204 participants. Surveyrespondents were on average 53 years old, with an age range of 20-77, and wererandomly selected from lists kept in eachRTof residentswhohadattendedat leastoneMusrenbangmeeting.

ThissurveyfocusedonresidentperceptionsoftheMusrenbangprocess,andsoughttoexplore how members of the community experienced the process and whetherexperiencesdifferedstronglyacrossneighborhoods.WefoundthatresidentsbelievedintheimportanceoftheMusrenbangprocessandinitspotentialtoimpactcommunitydevelopment, but that themajoritywereunsatisfiedwith theprocess and felt therewaslittlewaytopredictwhetherproposalstheymadewouldbefundedornot.


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Figure4:AKotaKitastaffmemberconductsasurveywithacommunitymember

4.3In-depthinterviews

Inaddition,weconducted11in-depthinterviewswithMusrenbangleadershipinorderto generate richer descriptions of the process itself. In each of Solo’s 5 kecamatan(districts),werandomlyselectedatleast2neighborhoodsfromalistofneighborhoodswith‘ghostprojects’asdiscoveredbyquantitativeanalysisdescribedin4.1.Ineachofthese neighborhoods we sought interviewees who were deeply involved inMusrenbangproceedings,including:

• FacilitatorsoftheMusrenbangatthekelurahanlevel• DPK (Kelurahan Grant) Evaluators who monitor & evaluate DPK

Implementation(theseareresidents,notgovernmentofficials)• LPMK (Neighborhood Council) members who are in charge of the overall

Musrenbangprocess,frompreparationtoplanningtoimplementation

These interviews were conducted shortly after the survey described in 4.2 wascompleted, in late January,2015. The interviewsallowedus togo intomuchgreaterdetail and develop a deeper understanding of Musrenbang proceedings. We alsospecifically sought out leaders of this process with to greater understand howdecisionsregardingprioritizationandfundingweremade.Wefoundthattherearenorigid criteria by which to prioritize projects. Additionally, while there is an initialprioritization of projects at the time of proposal, this is not binding and the actualdecisionsaboutwhichprojectstofundtakesplacenearlyayearlaterwhenthefundingarrivesatthekelurahanlevel.Leadersthenusetheirdiscretionregardingtheinclusionor exclusion of community members in this final decision making process. Thesecommunityleadersallsaidthatthe‘ghostprojects’werearesultofnewandpressing

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needs that had arisen in the year between the initialmeeting and the dispersion offunds,andwerenotevidenceofcorruption.

Figure5:AKotaKitastaffmemberconductsaninterviewwithacommunityleader

4.4Workshops

KotaKitaconductedaseriesofworkshopsinordertomaximizethebenefitthatthecommunitycouldreapfromthisproject.Weaimedtoassesscommunityneeds,givecommunitymembersaplatformtoshareideasandcritiques,andsharehowresearchandtoolscanbeused.TwoearlyworkshopsinJuneandJulyof2014introducedtheAIIRAprojectto38Musrenbangfacilitators,closelyfollowedbyapresentationinAugustintroducingtheprojecttoSolocitygovernmentofficials.

AnotherpresentationtocitygovernmentofficialsinearlyApril,2015,presentingtheresultsofresearchconducteduptothatpoint,kickedoffasecondseriesofworkshops.Thissecondsetconsistedof5workshops,oneforeachkecamatan,andtrained88MusrenbangfacilitatorsusingaprototypeoftheMus-Tracker.Thisserieswrappedupwithasimilartrainingfor49kelurahanofficials.ThroughthesepresentationsandworkshopsitbecamecleartoallinvolvedtherewerewaystheycouldbenefitfromusingtheMus-Trackersystem.Therewerealsoanumberofhelpfulsuggestionsforpotentialimprovementsandapplicationsofthetool.

4.5FocusGroups

OnSeptember29th,2015,followingthereleaseoftheMus-Trackertechnologyweconductedafocusgroupdiscussionwith6Musrenbangleaders.Thepurposeofthefocusgroupwastotest,gaugereactionsto,andsolicitfeedbacktoimprovetheMus-Trackertool.Wemadeanefforttorepresentvariouslevelsoffamiliaritywithtechnologyamongsttheparticipants:2werefamiliarwiththeinternetandsocialmedia,2werefamiliarwiththeinternetbutnotsocialmedia,and2werenotfamiliar


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witheithertheinternetorsocialmedia.ObservationoftheparticipantsandtheirfeedbackprovidedvaluableinputforimprovingboththeformandfunctionoftheMus-Trackertool.

Figure6:CommunitymemberstestouttheMus-Trackeronlineplatforminafocusgroupdiscussion

4.6Mus-Tracker

TheMusrenbang-Tracker,orMus-Tracker,isawebsitewhichincludesauser-friendlyvisualdisplayofthedata,andprovidesaforumforuser-generatedfeedbackregardingtheimplementationandmaintenanceoftheprojectsincludedintheMusrenbangdatabase.UseoftheInternet,especiallybymobilephone,isextremelywidespreadinurbanIndonesia,with73millionpeople,some29%ofthepopulationusingtheInternetin20156.Now,withtheMus-Trackerplatform,anyonewithinternetaccesscanseewhatprojectswereproposed,whichwerefunded,howmuchfundingtheyweregiven,whethertheywereimplemented,andhowmuchbudgetwasused,inanygivenneighbourhood.

Inaddition,thistoolisinteractive,andthepublicisencouragedtoprovidecommentaryaboutlistedprojects,forexamplewhethertheyhavebeenbuiltoriftheyarepoorlyconstructed,orhavebeenabandoned.Governmentofficials,communityleaders,orthosewhoproposedprojectscanrespond,makingtheMus-Trackeradynamicplatformformulti-stakeholderdiscourse.Projectsarevisiblebymaps,andcanbeoverlaidwithvariousdemographicdataanddataaboutpublicserviceprovisionandaccess.Thismeansthatthereareahugenumberofpossibilitiesforpeopleto

6The Jakarta Post, 2015,

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/10/internet-users-indonesia-reach-73-million.html#sthash.gcAcB5CX.dpuf

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examinethecontextsinwhichprojectsarefunded–youcancomparethenumberofprojectsinanRTtowhetherthereisaccesstopublicwater,ortheconcentrationofpoverty,ortheaverageageinanyneighbourhood.

TheMus-TrackerwasunveiledonOctober5th,2015,andpromotedonsocialmedia,throughstudentorganizations,anddirectlytocommunityleaders.KotaKitastaffconductedafollow-upmeetingwithfocus-groupparticipantstoshowthemtheupdatedplatform,and6individualmeetingswereheldwithdistrictleaders,atleastoneperdistrict.InitialresultsindicatethattheMus-Trackerhasbeenwell-receivedbygovernmentasausefulcivilsocietyinnovation,andhasbeenpopularwiththepublic,alreadygarneringover300commentsoncommunityprojects.WithanincreaseintheuseofmobiledevicesandtheInternettheavailabilityofinformationthroughdigitalmeansisincreasinglyimportant,especiallytoayoungerdemographic.

Figure7:TheMus-Trackerwebapplicationencouragestheparticipationoftheyounger,tech-savvygeneration


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Figure8:ScreenshotstakenfromtheMusrenbangTracker,theweb-basedprojecttrackingtoolthatwasdeveloped. The tool allows citizens to reviewwhich projects in theirkelurahanreceived funding, thebudgetofeachproject,their locationandtheirstatus. Italsoallowsthemtocomparedataaboutthecitytohelpevaluateneed.Citizenscancommentonthestatusofeachprojectandprovideoversightontheirimplementation.<http://solokotakita.org/musrenbangtracker/>

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CHAPTER5: DiscussiononResearchFindings

5.1SummaryofFindings

1. InSolotheMusrenbangisnotworkingtotargetneediestareas,butitisrespondingtocitizendemandsandinvestinginthosewiththelargestpopulations.Thisrevealsboththepotentialofthepolicy;butalsoopportunitiestorefineitinordertoachievedistribution/equality.

2. TransparencycanbeincreasedbydevelopingtechnologytoolsthatallowcitizensmoreoversightandinvolvementinimplementationofMusrenbang-selectedprojects.

5.29KeyFindings

1. Drainageandroadsprojectsarethemostpopularinfrastructureprojects

Ananalysisofthedatabaseshowedthatdrainageandroadsprojectsarebyfarthemostpopularcategoriesofinfrastructureprojectsduringthevoting/prioritizationprocess,andtheyarealsomorelikelythanotherprojecttypestobeimplementedifvotedonandmorelikelytoappearasghostprojects.Thereisinconclusiveevidencetoexplainwhetherthevarianceinprojecttypeisduetoagreaterneedforthosekindsofprojects,orwhethertheyarepreferredforotherreasons,forexample,technicaldifficultieswithotherprojecttypes.Sincethepreferenceforvotingfordrainageandroadsisincreasingovertime,itispossiblethatthisisinpartareactiontotheirgreaterlikelihoodimplementation.

Percentageoffundedinfrastructureprojectsbytype

Figure9:Thelargemajorityoffundedprojectsfocusedonroadsanddrainageinfrastructure


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2. TheMusrenbangprocessisnotaddressingtheareasofthecitywithgreatestneed

Accordingtothedatabase,theneighbourhoodpovertyratedoesnotinfluenceprojectprioritization,onlythesizeofpopulationseemstomatter.RWswithmoreprojectsarethosewithlargerpopulations,asevidencedinTable1Awhichindicatesthatpopulationsizeistheprimarypredictoroftheprioritizationofprojects.Table1Bshowsthatpovertyactuallyhasanoppositeinfluenceonprojectprioritizationtowhatwewouldexpectiftheprocesswasusedtotargetneeds.ThuswecanconcludethattheRWswithmostpeople,andtheRWswithlowestconcentrationofpoverty,getmorefunding.Thisindicatesthatnotonlyaretheneediestareasnottargeted,butthat,infact,theneediestareasmaybetheleastlikelytoreceivefunds.

Table1Ashowsthatonlythesizeofthepopulation(percentoftotalhouseholds)seemstohavebeenasignificantdeterminantforthelocationofKelurahanGrantProjectsbyRW.

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Table1B shows that thepoverty ratedidhavea statistically significanteffectondeterminingbudgetallocations,butintheoppositedirectionfromwhatwewouldexpectifneedswerebeingtargeted.Infactinfrastructureprojectswenttothosepartsofthecitywhichhadleastpoorpeople.

3. Thereareopportunitiesforelitecapture

Throughinterviews,surveys,anddatabaseanalysis,welearnedthattheMusrenbangprocessinvolvesseveralpotentialaccesspointsforelitecapture,andthereexistsagreatdegreeofmurkinesssurroundingtheoutcomesoftheprocess.Theanalysisofthedatabaserevealsaninverserelationshipbetweeninterferencebythemanagementcommittee(measuredbytheghostvariableindicator)andelitecapture(measuredbythepercentageoffundsdirectedtonon-poorareas).Thisstronglyindicatesthat,whiletherelikelyiselitecaptureintheprocess,itdoesnotseemtooccurintheManagerialPhase.Ifwealthyelitesinfluencethedecision-makingoftheMusrenbangthenthisisdoneduringthePublicPhaseoftheprocess.Thismayoccureitherbyelites’undueinfluenceintheprioritizationprocess,orbytheiroverrepresentationduringthemeetings.ThismayalsoindicatethatthepoormaynotattendinlargeenoughnumbersforthemtoinfluencetheoutcomesoftheMusrenbang,orperhapstheyaren’twelcomeatthemeetings,sotheirpreferencesaren’trepresented.Onefirmfindingisthatthereisaneedforadditionaldatacollectioninordertofurtherclarifyinconsistenciesintheprocess.


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4. Alargenumberofprojectsarenotaresultofcitizenvoting,andoriginateoutsidetheMusrenbangprocess

Databaseanalysisrevealsthatbetween2011and2014,30%oftheprojectsthatwereimplementedhadnotbeenvotedonatall.Astheseprojectsdidnotshowuponlistsofkelurahanpriorities,wecallthem“ghostprojects”.Duringthisfour-yearperiod,only21.1%ofvotedprojectswereexecuted(builtorimplementedinsomeway)andofthoseprojectsonly40.3%wereevervotedon.

Thereareanumberofalternateexplanationsfortheexistenceof“ghostprojects”includinginconsistentreportingofprojecttitles,theneedtoimplementaprojectduetoanemergencyornaturaldisaster,andinsufficientfunds,thereforerequiringdifferentprojectstobeselected.Regardless,thankstothedatabaseweknowthatalargenumberofprojectsareapprovedandexecutedthathavenothadanycitizeninfluenceorparticipation,whichisagainsttheoriginalstatedobjectiveoftheMusrenbangprocess.

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Figure10:Thetableandmapdemonstratesthevaryingamountofghostprojects,asapercentageofthetotalnumberofprojects, acrossall 51kelurahanof the city. Foranumberof reasons there is awidevariance in the amount of ghost projects this suggesting that there is differing capacity acrossdifferentkelurahan.

5. Morethat75%ofprioritizedprojectsdonotactuallyreceivefunding.Despitecitizenparticipationintheselectionofpriorities,thedatarevealedthatahighpercentageoftheseprioritizedprojectsdonotreceivefundingatall.Thishighnumberofrejectedprojectscanbeattributedtoanumberofexplanations:(a)therewasadifferenceintheavailablebudgetandthescaleofprojectsputforward(Howeverwhenwefocusononlythetoppriorityprojectsselectedineachyear,westillfindthatmorethan60%ofthesedonotappearonthelistofexecutedprojects.Thusthedifferencecannotbesimplyattributedtoamismatchbetweenexpectedandreceivedfunding)(b)Theremayalsobesimplytoomanyprojectsonthelist,withtheMusrenbangfundingonlyabletostretchtocoverthefirstfewprojectsonthelistofprioritizedprojects.LookingagaintoTable1A,weseethatthereisadifferencebetweenthepublicandmanagerialphaseoutcomeswhichisnotdeterminedbyanyofourindicators.WhilewedonothavedataonincomeorwealthattheRWlevel(which


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couldbeusedtoruleoutthepossibilitythatprojectsaredirectedtowardswealthyelites;orwhetherthemanagementcommitteemembersliveinthoseareaswhichreceiveprojectfunds)wecansaythatproblemsintheprocessoriginatethepublicphase(thecitizenparticipationphase)notinthemanagerialphase.Thisisasignificantfindingbecauseitgoesagainstassumptionsthatproblemsareexclusivelyduetocorruptionandmismanagementbykelurahanofficialsandelites.6. TheMusrenbangprocessishelpingtoaddressneedforpublictoilets

Musrenbanginfrastructurefundingisassociatedwithanincreaseinthepercentageofthepopulationwithaccesstopublictoilets.However,wecannotyetestablishacausalrelationshipwithrespecttothatfinding.AdditionalinformationisrequiredinordertoestablishtheactualimpactoftheMusrenbangprojectsoncommunities.

7. There is significant variance across kelurahans in terms of their capacity todeliveruponcitizen-prioritizedprojects

WhenweexaminetheMusrenbangdataatthekelurahanlevel,weareabletoseewhethervariancemaybeduetopooradministrationordifferinglevelsofparticipationthatoccurintheneighborhoodparticipatoryplanningprocess.Thefirstmapshowsthedifferentincidenceof“ghostprojects”acrosskelurahans,thisindicatesthatthereissignificantvarianceallacrossthecity.Afurthermapshowsthedifferenceinthelackofpovertytargetingacrosskelurahans,whichrepresentsameasureofperformanceofthePublicPhaseoftheMusrenbangprocesstotargetthepoor.Thelastmapindicatesthedifferenceinthepercentageoftheexecutedbudgetthatbelongsto“ghostprojects”.ThisrepresentsameasureofperformanceoftheManagerialPhaseoftheprocess,reflectingitsfailuretocarryoutthecitizenprioritiesestablishedduringthePublicPhase.Theanalysisindicatesasubstantialvarianceacrosskelurahansonallofthesemeasures.Thequalitativesurveysandinterviewsalsoindicatethatthereisquiteabitvarianceintheactualproceduresusedduringthisprocessinindividualkelurahans.Together,thisindicatesanimportantareaforfutureresearch,figuringoutwhichcharacteristicsofthekelurahans(institutionaldesign,inequality,socialcohesion)aredrivingthewidedivergenceinoutcomes.Italsoindicatesthatbettertrainingandoversightatthislevelcanimproveoutcomes.

8. PeopleareenthusiasticaboutparticipationintheMusrenbang

Despiteapparentinconsistenciesinresults,surveyrespondentsreporthighdegreesofsatisfactionandtrustintheprocess,andareeitherunawareorunwillingtoadmitthat“ghostprojects”andrejectionsoccur.WesurveyedMusrenbangparticipantstoaskthemabouttheirperceptionoftheprocess,whetherpeopleareindeedsatisfiedordissatisfiedoverall.RespondentsreportedrelativelyhighlevelsofsatisfactionwiththeMusrenbangprocessandthemanagementofthegrants,andtheactualnumberof“ghostprojects”orrejectedprojectsintheirkelurahansdidnotsignificantlypredicttheirsatisfaction.Onascaleof1to5,where1meant“notatall”and5meant

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“completely,”participantsaveragedmorethan3onquestionsrelatingtosatisfactionwiththeMusrenbangprocess,andthemanagementofthegrants(aswellaswithrespecttotrustinthenationalandcitygovernment,theLMPK,thekelurahanleadershipandtheDevelopmentCommittee).Despiteanacknowledgementthatissuessuchasghostprojectsexist,respondentsseemtobesatisfied.

Thereareseveralpossibleexplanationsforthedisparitybetweenincidenceof“ghostprojects”andreportedawarenessofthem,suchasperceivedlegitimacyoftheseprojectsorlackofawarenessofthefinalfundingallocations.Thispointstotheimportanceoftheweb-basedtransparencytooltocorrectinformationasymmetries,andtoconfirmwhetherthereportedinfrastructureprojectsalreadyexistornot.

9. Early trials suggest that there is interest in using theMusrenbang Tracker app,especiallywithyoungpeople.

Finally,thefocusgroupdiscussionandinitialfield-testingoftheMusrenbangTrackerplatformindicatesthatpeopleareinterestedinandcapableofusingit.Youngpeopleinparticular,whoareadeptatusingsmartphonesandlaptops,haveusedtheapptocommentonMusrenbangprojects.TheyrespondedpositivelytothefactthatanybodywithanInternetconnectioncanaccessinformationabouttheMusrenbangprocess.Theywereenthusiasticthatayounggenerationoflocalactivistsandcommunity-mindedpeoplecanbemoreinvolvedincommunitydevelopmentduetotheirfamiliaritywiththeInternetandsocialmedia(theMus-TrackerisaccessedthroughFacebook).Thisrepresentsapotentialshift,astheoversightoflocalissueshasgenerallybeendominatedbyanoldergenerationofresidents.However,participantsofthefocusgroupvoicedconcernsaboutthedifficultyofaccessingthedataintheSmartphoneformat,andnotedthattheprototypedesignwasnottotheirliking.Onthewhole,participantsrespondedpositivelytotheMus-Tracker.


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CHAPTER6: Conclusion

1. ReformingtheMusrenbangprocess,andaddingtargetingandpromotionstrategies,isneededforittoeffectivelyaddressinequalityandpoorareasofthecity.InitscurrentformattheMusrenbang,whichisademocratic,direct-votingsystem,promotesaself-interestedresponsefromresidents,whoacttoimprovetheirownneighborhoodsratherthanprioritizetheconditionsoftheworseoff.Peoplearethusvotingaccordingtowhatgeneratesthegreatestimpact(inthatitwillbenefitthelargestnumberofpeople),ratherthanaccordingtothegreatestneed(inwhichitwouldbenefitthepeoplewhoneeditthemost).WhilethepolicydoeseffectivelypromotedemocraticengagementofcitizenswiththeircityBappeda’sstatedgoalfortheprogramistoensurethatgovernmentresourcesareaddressingtheurbanareasofgreatestneed.Thepolicythusfallsshortofthisgoal.Apurelydemocraticbudgetingprocessisinsufficienttoaddressinequalityandpoverty.Policyadjustmentsareneeded,bothintheManagerialPhase,aswellasthePublicPhase.IntheManagerialPhasemoreoversightandmonitoringisneeded(thisprocessisnowbeginningthankstothedigitizationofdatainitiatedbythisresearch)butcontinueddigitizationandanalysisofdatawillbeimportant,aswellasadditionaltrainingforkelurahanofficials.ItisalsocriticaltofocusontheelitecaptureoccurringinthePublicPhase,likelyduetoanunderrepresentationofthepoorinthemeetings.Thus,effortsneedtobemadetosupportraisingawareness,providingmoreinformationtothosewhofeelexcludedfromtheprocess,andperhapstheintroductionoftechnicalfixes,likeaweightingsystem,toensurethatpoorareashaveahigherprobabilityofreceivingneededprojects.

PolicyRecommendationsforlocalgovernment:

• ReformtheprocessbycreatingaweightingmechanismthatfavorsRTsandRWswhichlackessentialservicesandarepoorerthanthecityaverage.

• IntensifyeffortstoraiseawarenessabouttheMusrenbangprocessandproduceinformationalmaterialthatisclearandaccessible.

• PromotebetterfacilitationoftheMusrenbangprocessthroughimprovedtrainingandincentivestopromoteenhancedunderstandingoftheprocessbyallcitizens.

• Indicatethroughrevisedguidelinesthatfewerprojectsshouldbeselected,therebyraisingtheprobabilitythatprioritizedprojectswillbeimplemented.

2. Dataisausefultooltoindicatewhereproblemsoccurandgiveideasofhowto

improve.Throughanalyzingthedatawediscoveredthattheprocessisnotworkingaccordingtoplan;thisdemonstratesthatdatacanrevealwheretheprocessisweakestandwhereimprovementscanbemade.InitiallyweassumedwewouldfindcorruptionintheManagerialPhase,andwhilewecannotrulethatout,itseemsthatthe

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problemsstartearlier,inthePublicPhase,becausefewpoorpeopleactuallyparticipate.Inordertominimize“ghostprojects,”andimprovethemanagementandeffectivenessoftheMusrenbangprocess,itisimportanttodigitizekelurahandataandconsolidateitintoacitywidedataset.ThiswillcontinuethecurrenttrendtowardstightermanagementoftheMusrenbangfundsanddisincentivizethosewhoseektotakeadvantageoftheprocess.In order to accurately monitor corruption in the Management Phase, a fewadditional data pointswouldbehelpful, including: incomeorwealth data brokendownbyRW(quitedistinctfromthecurrentlyavailablepovertyrate);trackingthehomeRT/RWofmembersofthemanagementcommittee(tocheckwhethertheirown RTs are disproportionately benefitting); and data directly associated withissues brought up in qualitative interviews (for example, the kelurahans whichexperienced emergency situations or natural disasters, such as floods, in a givenyear).

PolicyRecommendationsforlocalgovernment:

• ContinuetodigitizeMusrenbangdataandconsolidateitformonitoringandanalysis.

• Makedigitizeddatamorepublicallyavailabletoenhancetransparency.• Collectmoreprecisedatatocrosscheckforcorruption.

3. Trainingsandincreasedaccountabilityforkelurahansandtheirofficialscan

improvetheperformanceoftheMusrenbangprocess.Giventhedifferencebetweencitizen-prioritizedlistsandbudgetingoutcomesinthePublicPhase,andthevariationsin“ghostprojects”betweendifferentkelurahans,clearlysomekelurahansperformbetterthanothersduringthePublicandManagerialPhases.Theexactsourceofdiscrepanciesisunclear,butproblemsduringtheManagerialPhasecanbeweededoutwithgoodtraining,asystematicapproachtouncoveringcorruption,andbetteroversight.PolicyRecommendationsforlocalgovernment:• Usethedataanalysistoidentifylowperformingkelurahansandtargetspecial

trainingsatimprovinginternalsystemssuchasdocumentationandmanagementofthePublicPhase.

• Developandimplementtrainingmodulesforupgradingtheskillsofkelurahangovernmentofficials.


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4. ContinuedpromotionofcitizenmonitoringtoolscanprovideopportunitiesforthepublictooverseetheImplementationPhaseThisresearchgranthashelpeddevelopanearlyprototypeofaweb-basedmonitoringtooltobeusedbythepublic.ThistoolcanprovidegreateroversightoftheImplementationPhase,whichiscurrentlytheleast-trackedphaseandperhapsoffersthegreatestopportunityforcorruption(duetothechancesofillicitprocurementandpoorqualityconstruction).WhiletheMus-Trackerplatformisstillinitsinfancy,usershaveexpressedenthusiasmaboutit.Theseusershavealsobeenyoungerandmoretechnologysavvy,suggestingthatayoungergenerationofcitizenshasgreateraccesstotheMusrenbangprocessthantheyhaveinthepast.Review of theMusrenbang process reveals that overall it is opaque and poorlyunderstood;citizeninvolvementseemslimitedtoanoldergenerationofresidents,withinsufficientparticipationofthepoor.ItmaybepossibletoreformandimprovetheMusrenbangprocess bymakingmore data available to both the governmentand the public, and creating new, portable, and accessiblemeans of involvementandoversight.InorderfortheMusrenbangprocesstotrulybeparticipatoryitmustbelongtothecitizenry.Thisownershipisincompletewithoutfullaccesstodatathatallows citizens to follow up on projects and see what has become of theirparticipationinthebudgetingproceedings.PolicyRecommendationsforlocalgovernment:• ContinuetopromotetheuseoftheMus-Tracker,andworkrefineanddevelop

itincollaborationwithusers.• Encouragedialogueanddiscussionbetweencitizensandkelurahan

governmentofficialsaboutaddressingneedsandimprovingtheeffectivenessoftheMusrenbangprocess.

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33

ANNEXES

ANNEXE1: SurveyInstrument

AIIRAPerceptionSurvey

Respondent :_____________________________

CellphoneNumber :_____________________________

Day/Date :_____________________________

Background&Demographic1. Gender :male/female

Age_________Kelurahan______RW____RT_______Ethnicity_______

2. Areyouamemberofanygroups,organizationsorassociations?____________

3. Ifyes,whatkindorganizationdoyoujoin?________________MusrenbangParticipation4. HaveyoueverbeenparticipateinMusrenbang?

a. Yesb. No

5. WhatyeardidyoufirstparticipateinMusrenbang?_____________

6. Howmanytimehaveyouparticipated?______________________

7. InMusrenbang,whatlevelhaveyouparticipated?(canchoosemorethan

one)a. RTb. RWc. Kelurahan(neighborhood)d. Kecamatan(subdistrict)e. City

8. IfinRTlevel,whatisyourroleinMusrenbang?

a. Residentb. BoardofRTc. CBO/CSORepresentatived. NeverParticipated

34 TowardPro-Poor,Participatoryand

AccountableInfrastructureDevelopmentPlanning

9. IfinRWlevel,whatisyourroleinMusrenbang?a. RTdelegateb. BoardofRTc. BoardofRWd. CBO/CSORepresentativee. Neverparticipated

10. IfinKelurahan(neighborhood)level,whatisyourroleinMusrenbang?a. RT/RWdelegateb. BoardofRT/RWc. BoardofLPMKd. LKMPNPMe. CBO/CSORepresentativef. Religiousleaderg. Communityleaderh. Private/businesssectori. Neverparticipated

11. IfinKecamatan(subdistrict)level,whatisyourroleinMusrenbang?

a. MusrebangKelurahanDelegate/representativeb. BoardofLPMKc. CBO/CSORepresentatived. LKMPNPMForume. Religiousleaderf. Communityleaderg. Private/businesssectorh. Neverparticipated

12. IfinCitylevel,whatisyourroleinMusrenbang?a. FGDSKPD(FGDineachgovernmentagency)

delegate/representativeb. MusrenbangKecamatanDelegatesc. Academiciand. BoardofLPMKe. CBO/CSORepresentativef. Religiousleaderg. Communityleaderh. Private/businesssectori. Neverparticipated

13. Haveyoueverproposedaproject?

a. Yesb. No


35

14. Didtheprojectyouproposedgetfunded?a. Yesb. No

15. Ifyeswhyorwhynot?____________16. HaveyoueverparticipatedinthePNPMprioritizationprocess?

a. Yesb. No

17. HowoftendoyouparticipateinPNPM?__________________________

a. Neverb. Rarelyc. Sometimesd. Often

MusrenbangEvaluation18. Whatdoyouseeasthegreatestneedfacingyourkelurahan?

________________________

19. HaveprojectsfundedthroughtheKelurahangrantmadeanimpactinthecommunity?

a. Yesb. No

20. Ifyes,canyougiveanexample?___________________________

21. Ifno,whynot?______________________________

22. Arethereeverprojectsthatareprioritizedintheconsultationprocessthat

donotendupgettingfunding?a. Yesb. No

23. Ifyes,whydotheynotreceivefunding?

_______________________________

24. Howoftendoesthishappen?a. Neverb. Rarelyc. Sometimesd. Often

25. AreprojectseverfundedbytheKelurahangrantthatdidnotcomefrom

thecommunityprioritizationprocess?a. Yesb. No



26. Howoftendoesthishappen?

a. Neverb. Rarelyc. Sometimesd. Often

27. Wheredotheycomefrom?___________________________________

28. HowsatisfiedareyouwiththeMusrenbangprocessingeneral?

a. Notatallb. Alittlebitc. Somewhatd. MostlySatisfiede. CompletelySatisfied

29. HowsatisfiedareyouwithmanagementoftheKelurahanGrant?


30. HowsatisfiedareyouwithPNPM?


31. HaveyouheardofYayasanKotaKita?

a. Yesb. No

32. Haveyoueverusedthemini-atlasinthisKelurahan?

a. Yesb. No

Trust&Efficacy33. HowmuchdoyoutrusttheLPMK?

a. Notatallb. Alittlebitc. Somewhatd. Mostlye. Completely


37

34. Howmuchdoyoutrustthenationalgovernment?


35. HowmuchdoyoutrustCityGovernment


36. HowmuchdoyoutrustKelurahan(Neighborhood)Governmenta. Notatallb. Alittlebitc. Somewhatd. Mostlye. Completely

37. HowmuchdoyoutrustPanitiaPembangunanKelurahan(Committeeof

GrantImplementation)a. Notatallb. Alittlebitc. Somewhatd. Mostlye. Completely

Howmuchdoyouagreewiththefollowingstatements?38. Iconsidermyselfwellqualifiedtoparticipateindecision-makinginthe

community.a. StronglyDisagreeb. Disagreec. NeitherAgreenorDisagreed. Agreee. StronglyAgree

39. IfeelthatIcoulddoasgoodajobinaleadershippositioninthis

communityasmostotherpeople.a. StronglyDisagreeb. Disagreec. NeitherAgreenorDisagreed. Agreee. StronglyAgree



40. Wecanresolvecrisesinthisneighborhoodwithoutanynegativeaftereffects

a. StronglyDisagreeb. Disagreec. NeitherAgreenorDisagreed. Agreee. StronglyAgree

41. Ourcommunitycanworktogethertoimproveconditionsinthe

community.a. StronglyDisagreeb. Disagreec. NeitherAgreenorDisagreed. Agreee. StronglyAgree

42. Wecanpersuadethegovernmenttoprovidebetterservicestopeoplein

thiscommunity.a. StronglyDisagreeb. Disagreec. NeitherAgreenorDisagreed. Agreee. StronglyAgree

43. ComparedwithbeforeyoubeganparticipatingintheMusrenbangprocess,

areyoumorelikelytodoanyofthefollowing?a. Contactapublicofficialb. Votec. Considerworkinginpoliticsd. Volunteerforcommunityprojectse. Joinacommunitygroupf. Other_______________

44. AsaresultofparticipatingintheMusrenbangprocess,doyouthinkthat

youhave:a. Learnedmoreabouthowgovernmentworksb. Gainednewskillsc. Becomemoreconfidentinyourownabilitiesd. Gottentoknowthepeopleinyourcommunitybettere. SeenrealchangesinthecommunityasaresultofKelGrant

projectsf. Other________________


39

ANNEXE2: InterviewQuestions

OPEN-ENDEDQUALITATIVEQUESTIONS

DanaPembangunanKelurahan(DPK)

NameofRespondent :

Gender :

Kelurahan :

Role :

DateofInterview :

1. Inthisneighborhoodwhatcriteriadopeopleuseinprioritizingtheprojects?(Forexample,dotheyconsiderthepoorestRTasmostdeserving,ordotheyconsiderprojectsthatwillbenefitthemostpeopleasmoreimportant?Dotheychoosethebiggestneedfacingtheneighborhoodasawhole,ordotheychoosewhatpeoplearemostpassionateabout?)

2. WhenKelurahanearngrantmoney,howtheydecidewhichprojectthatcanbefunded?Howtheydistribute/allocategrant?

3. WhydocertainprojectsgetproposedtoPNPMvsMusrenbang?Howdoyoudecidewhichgotowhich?

4. Ifghostprojectsappear,wheredotheycomefrom?(Bringalistofghostprojectsfromlastyear?Askthisdiplomatically,aswedidinourbriefinterviewsthissummer–Whathappensifprojectshavealreadybeenfundedandthereismoneyleftover,howdotheydecidewheretoputtheadditionalfunds?)



ANNEXE3: ScheduleofWorkshop

The following official workshops and meetings took place with government andcommunitypartners.


41

ANNEXE4: FocusGroupDiscussionProtocol

Participants

• RebekaRully(Danukusuman,DPKEvaluator)

• KettyRistini(Kemlayan,MusrenbangFacilitator)

• AlexTaufiq(Serengan,LPMKLeader)

• NanangKaswadi(Tipes,MusrenbangFacilitator)

• Suyanto(Timuran,LPMKLeader)

• BudiRaharjo(Kratonan,DPKImplementationCommittee)

Protocol

• Kota Kita provide PC for participant to use for accessing the tools

(musrenbangtracker)

• Kota Kita train participant how to explore the tools (musrenbangtracker) :

content,feature,etc

• KotaKitatrainparticipanthowtotracktheprojectandmakeacommentinany

project

• Participantpracticingthewhattheyhavelearn,trackingatleast10projectand

insametimemakeacomment

KeyQuestions:

·Afterusingthemusrebangtrackertool,whatareyouopinion?

·Whatdoyouthinkaboutthecontentofmusrenbangtracker?

·Whatdoyoutthinkaboutthefeatureofmusrenbangtracker?

·Isthedisplay/appearance/interfaceofwebsiteconvenient?Why?

·Isthetool/websiteeasytouse?Why?



ANNEXE5: Mus-Tracker

ScreenshotsoftheMus-Trackeronlineplatforminaction


43

ANNEXE6: TeamComposition

Theresearchpartnershipismadeupofteammembersfromfroudifferentinstitutions:Yayasan Kota Kita (based in Solo), Pater McCawley (Australian National University,Australia),TaraGrillos(HarvardUniversity,UnitedStates),andUrbanLaunchpad(SanFrancisco,UnitedStates).

Thetasksforeachteammemberweredistributedinthefollowingmanner:

JohnTaylor:ProjectleaderandDirectorofYayasanKotaKita.JohnTaylormanagedtheinteractions between the different team members, coordinating data collection,planningmeetings and conference calls, andmanaging the pipeline of activities anddeliverables.

PeterMcCawley:Mentorandseniorresearchpartner.PeterMcCawleyservedtoguidetheresearchandprovidedvaluablementorshipinputstotheteamalongthecourseofthe research period. Given his busy schedule he was unable to visit Solo but wasconstantlyengagedindiscussingresearchfindings.

TaraGrillos:Principalresearcher.TaraGrillosisaPhDcandidateatHarvardUniversityin the United States. She travelled to Solo twice to support the research, conductinterviews and present the concept and preliminary findings to the Solo CityGovernment.WhilebackatHarvardUniversitysheconductedrigorousanalysisonthedataandcommunicatedregularlyviaSkypewithJohnTaylortodiscussfindingsandfillknowledgegaps.

Urban Launchpad: Digital database andwebsite developers. Urban Launchpad are astart-up companywho focus on developing innovativeways to organize and displayurban information. Urban Launchpad became involved in the initial design of thedatabase format, then worked on the design and development of the websiteinterface, and the integration of social media and a comments function into thewebsite.

Yayasan Kota Kita: Research coordination, community outreach, government liasonandfinancialmanagement.ThelocalIndonesianNGOYayasanKotaKitasupportedtheimplementation of the research through extensive data collection and projectcategorization, data entry into the database, as well as community outreach andconcept development. The latter required continuous engagement with the city’scoordinatingplanningagency (Bappeda), theDepartmentofPublicWorks, aswell asdistrictandneighbourhoodgovernment.



ANNEXE7: Tables

Table2:BalanceTableComparingRejectedvsGhostProjects(2011-2014)

Table1:DeterminantsofLocationofVotedProjects_________________________________________________________________________________ RW’sPercentofVoted RW’sPercentofVoted ProjectsinKelurahanBudgetinKelurahan (2011-2014) (2011-2014)_________________________________________________________________________________ PovertyRate -0.002 -0.005 (0.00) (0.01)PercentLandTitle -0.001 -0.011*** (0.00) (0.00)PercentWaterAccess -0.001 0.008** (0.00) (0.00)PercentPrivateWells 0.001 0.005 (0.00) (0.00)PercentofTotalHHs 4.245*** 6.408*** (0.75) (1.33)constant -2.686*** -2.950*** (0.18) (0.31) Observations 595 595________________________________________________________________________

Standarderrorsinparentheses*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

RejectedProjects GhostProjects T-test

Mean SD Mean SD p-valuePovertyRate 0.139685 10.09646 -0.390793 10.87395 0.32PercentLandTitles 2.143854 12.1608 -4.098677 15.71809 0.00 *

PercentWaterAccess 0.297615 16.20502 0.494241 16.35916 0.41PercentPrivateWells 0.913281 18.20298 0.21526 16.46868 0.24PercentPrivateToilets 0.361552 14.19508 0.731969 14.65801 0.32PercentofHouseholds 0.083535 0.0806604 0.092286 0.0806796 0.02 *

PercentofCitizens 0.083941 0.0811583 0.092766 0.0809985 0.02 *PercentfromSubcategory:

Chi-

AR 0.71

0.21

SquaredDR 36.37

45.61

Pr=0.000

IC 0.11

0.21 JA 28.13

30.96

LS 0.53

0.21 SA 5.83

3.56

SM 1.17

0.21 SR 27.17

19.04


45

Table3:BalanceTableComparingRejectedvsExecutedProjects(2011-2014)

Table4:LogitModelofExecutionforVotedProjects(2011-2014)

Standarderrorsinparentheses:*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Executed

PRIORITY -0.020***

(0.00)

PLANNED_BUDGET 0.00

(0.00)

DrainageProject 0.676***

(-0.15)

RoadProject 0.567***

(-0.15)

YEAR 0.013

(-0.05)

PovertyRate 0.007

(-0.01)

PercentLandTitles 0.010*

(0.00)

PercentWaterAccess 0.001

(0.00)

PercentPrivateWells -0.006

(0.00)

PercentofHouseholds 0.643

(-1.88)

constant -26.753

(-99.85)

Observations 2645

Rejected Executed T-test

Mean SD Mean SD p-value

PovertyRate -0.1397 10.0965 -0.4481 10.8566 0.25

PercentLandTitles -2.1439 12.1608 -1.6136 11.2648 0.16

PercentWaterAccess 0.29761 16.205 1.97807 16.0471 0.01 *

PercentPrivateWells 0.91328 18.203 -0.1607 18.3589 0.10PercentPrivateToilets 0.36155 14.1951 1.60134 19.5713 0.04 *

PercentofHouseholds 0.08353 0.08066 0.08432 0.07301 0.41

PercentofCitizens 0.08394 0.08116 0.08498 0.07404 0.39

PercentfromSubcategory: 0.71

0.28

Chi-

AR 36.37

46.83

Squared

DR 0.11

0

Pr=0.00

IC 28.13

31.59

JA 0.53

0.14

LS 5.83

2.12

SA 1.17

0.85

SM 27.15

18.19

SR 23.17

0.16



Table5a:NumberofKelGrantProjectsandChangeinNeedsDataatRWLevel

Change %SchoolAccess

Change %PDAM

ChangePovertyRate

Change%LandTitles

Change %PublicToilets

Change %PrivateToilets

#executed 0.292 -0.818 0.271 -1.445 2.020* -2.44

(-0.4) (-1.25) (-1.04) (-1.54) (-1.01) (-1.52)

constant -0.867* 0.151 8.963 0.744 16.398** -5.293

(-0.43) (-5.34) (-5.02) (-1.21) (-6.17) (-5.77)

Observations 443 443 443 443 443 443

_____________________________________________________________________________

Standarderrorsinparentheses

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

Table5b:PercentofKelGrantFundingandChangeinNeedsDataatRWLevel

Change %SchoolAccess

Change %PDAM

ChangePovertyRate

Change %LandTitles

Change %PublicToilets

Change %PrivateToilets

RW’s Percent ofExecutedBudget -0.901 -5.943 0.167 -2.452 12.380** -2.453

(-1.63) (-4.86) (-3.44) (-6.43) (-4.06) (-6.21)

constant -0.53 0.415 9.133 0.062 16.072** -6.685

(-0.42) (-5.26) (-5.01) (-0.99) (-5.69) (-5.78)

Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437

_____________________________________________________________________________

Standarderrorsinparentheses

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001


47

Table6:PredictorsofGhostandRejectedProjectsatKelurahanLevel

Standard

errors

inparentheses

*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001

AcrossYears2011-2014 Year2014

PercentGhostProjects

PercentRejectedProject

PercentGhostProjects

PercentRejectedProjects

Year -0.183 0.024

-0.14 -0.11

InfrastructureSpending(%) 1.614 0.736 5.28 -1.076

-1.41 -1.06 -2.94 -3.42

Area 0.004 0.001 -0.021 -0.015

0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01

Density 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.005

-0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01

YKKWebsiteUsage 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.004*

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

EthnicDiversity 0.019 -0.124 0.552 -1.015

-0.29 -0.22 -0.63 -0.64

MusrenbangParticipation 0.142 0.416 0.989 2.066*

-0.36 -0.29 -0.64 -0.87

ExistingInfrastructure -0.225 -0.740* -1.041 -1.714

-0.4 -0.32 -0.89 -0.94

CivilSocietyPresence -0.372 -0.349 -1.261 -1.961**

-0.29 -0.22 -0.65 -0.67

IncomeInequality 1.439*** 0.957** 3.009*** 3.795***

-0.42 -0.3 -0.84 -0.85

PovertyRate -0.005 0.069* -0.178 -0.004

-0.04 -0.03 -0.1 -0.08

PercentLandTitling 0.001 0.011 -0.02 0.013

-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02

TotalCitizens 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

PercentWaterAccess 0.004 0.002 0.038 0.029

-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03

constant 364.192 -49.349 -3.43 -4.378

-273.24 -215.59 -4.17 -4.36

Observations 185 196 48 51



Table7:BalanceTableComparingKelurahanGrant&PNPM

KelGrant(Executed) PNPM T-test

mean sd mean sd p-value

PovertyRate

-0.0694071 7.326213 0.880601 7.422631 0.00 *

PercentLandTitles -15.72266 17.95086 -18.023 20.20769 0.00 *

PercentWaterAccess 1.505267 17.5739 -1.63789 16.20376 0.00 *

PercentPrivateWells 0.6188745 14.42161 -1.27483 14.82409 0.00 *

PercentPrivateToilets -0.0136791 17.63636 0.454836 17.75471 0.28

PercentofHouseholds 0.0900635 0.0760267 0.126861 0.088337 0.00 *


49

ANNEXE8: Figures

Figure1:SectoralDistributionofKelurahanGrantVotedProjects

Figure2:RejectedandGhostProjectsbyYear

Figure3:PercentExecutionofNumberOnePriorityProjects

YEAR TOTALVOTED %REJECTED TOTALEXECUTED %GHOSTS2011 838 81.03 333 52.252012 767 78.36 289 42.562013 903 77.85 304 34.212014 860 78.60 261 29.50



Figure4:KelurahansbyPercentageofExecutedProjectsthatareGhosts

Figure5:PercentageofGhostProjectsbyIncomeInequality

Figure6:ProjectTypeDistributionforKelGrantvsPNPM

0-9% 10-19% 20-29% 30-39%KEPATIHANKULONKEDUNGLUMBUPUNGGAWANBANYUANYARSUMBERJAJARTEGALHARJO

KAUMANKERTENMANAHANTIMURANMANGKUBUMENPAJANG

SETABELANTIPESSONDAKANPENUMPINGSANGKRAHNUSUKANBALUWARTI

GANDEKANSEMANGGIDANUKUSUMANKESTALANJOYOTAKANSERENGANKADIPIRO

40-59% 60-69% 70-89% 90-100%

GILINGANJEBRESSRIWEDARIPUCANGSAWITMOJOSONGOKAMPUNGBARUPURWODININGRATAN

KEMLAYANLAWEYANKETELANKEPATIHANWETANPASARKLIWONPANULARAN

SEWUKEPRABONJAYENGANBUMI

JOYOSURANJAGALANSUDIROPRAJANKRATONANGAJAHANKARANGASEMPURWOSARI

0.2

.4.6

Gho

st P

roje

cts

(as

perc

enta

ge o

f exe

cute

d)

Medium High


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ANNEXE9: SelectedInterviewResponses

Interviewcommentsregarding‘ghostprojects’citeavarietyofpossibleexplanations:inconsistency in project titling, emergencies and natural disasters, due to the re-allocationoffundingtootherneeds,orduetotechnicaldifficulties.

InconsistentProjectTitles:

“I guess if therearedifferencesbetween theMusrenbangproposals and theDPKBudgetPlanitsbecauseofdifferentprojectnamesortitles.”

–Male,Kratonan

“If therearedifferencesbetween the resultof theMusrenbangand theDPKBudgetPlan,it’snotbecausethereareghostprojectsbutusuallybecauseyoumighthavethesameprojectbutunderadifferenttitleorname.”

-Male,KepatihanWetan

Emergencies:

“Yes, there is a possibility where project might appear when there wasemergency or force majeur. For example, when the Kelud volcano erupted,someofthecommunity’sdrainagewasclogged.SothecommunitydecidedtousetheDPKmoneytoresolvethatproblem.“

–Female,Kemlayan

“Ghost projects usually appear in the DPK Budget Plan if there are urgentproblemsthatneedtoberesolved,suchasnaturaldisasters,andpublichealthepidemicsofdisease.ThisdecisionshouldbeconsultedwithalltheKelurahanstakeholdersandapprovedbyBappedaandSekda”

-Male,Sewu

Reallocationoffundingtootherneeds

“They are not ghost project actually, they’re just due to the reallocation, orreadjustment, of the project. For example, there was a case recently of aproposed road improvement in one of our RWs;when themoney came,weknew that the roadwas no longer broken, sowe re-allocated the project toanother need, with the acknowledgment from the evaluation team andBappeda.”

–Male,Mansur



“ThelevelofvoluntaryininfrastructureprojectsinKadipiroisstillhigh,manyinfrastructure problemswere solved by the community funding, rather thanwaitingforDPKorPNPM.”

–Female,Kadipiro

TechnicalDifficulties

“Wesometimehavetocancelsomeprojectsduetotechnicalornon-technicalproblems.Forexamplewithdrainageunderhouses,wehavelimitationstogointohousesandmakeimprovements.”–Female,Kemlayan“TherewasanexampleofdeletingprojectinKadipiroin2010,theconstructionof a building… but when it was about to be built, the land status wasquestioned. Finally it we found out that it belonged to an individual. So theprojectcouldnotproceed. Butwenotedtheminutesofthemeeting[wherewedecideduponthecancelation]andreportedtoBappeda.”-Female,Kadipiro

Interviewquotesalsoindicatethatthereisasubstantialdivergencebetweenhowtheprioritizationandimplementationphasesareactuallyconductedandbywhom:

“AyearaftertheMusrenbangwhentheKelurahanearnsthegrantmoney,PPK(thecommitteeforDPKImplementation)willmaketheDPKBudgetPlanbasedon the DPK project proposal (they were selected a year before the fundingcomes, during the Musrenbang). PPK has to follow the decision ofMusrenbang,andsonochangecanbemadeontheirowndecision.”-Female,Kadipiro

“Ayear laterwhen theKelurahanearngrantmoney,PPK (committeeofDPKimplementation)will invitetheNeighborhoodFacilitator,theChairmanoftheMusrenbang Plenum, and the Chairman of theMusrenbang commission tomeet and discuss the composition of theDPK Budget Plan. Theywill choosewhichproject thatcanbe fundedand included in theDPKBudgetPlan.Theywill omit unnecessary projects, such as sound systems, and uniformprocurement, from the DPK Budget Plan. For infrastructure and economicproposalthePPKwillvisitthesitetochecktheactualconditions.”

-Male,KepatihanWetan


53

“We never eliminate proposals that come from communities, all becomeMusrenbangresults.Whenthemoneycomes,thenwewillmaketheprioritiesbased on actual analysis; butwe keep the list in our bank of proposals. Theindicator of prioritization is based on consensus, I think the discussion ofcommunityrepresentativesjustifiesthat.”-Female,Kemlayan

Interviewsalsoindicatethat,generallyspeaking,projectsareproposedtoPNPMortotheKelurahanGrantdependingonthesizeofthebudget.

“Sotherulesofthegameisthatiftheprojectislessthan10million[Rupiah]itwillgotoDPK,butiftheprojectsaremorethan10million[Rupiah]theywillgoto PNPM. Other proposals more than 50milliion [Rupiah] we will advise theapplicanttoproceedtothecity-scaleMusrenbangfundedbytheCityBudget.”

–Female,Kadipiro

“WesharewithPNPMbasedonthetypeofprojects,weagreedthathousingprojects (house / neighborhood improvement) go to PNPM, but smallinfrastructure such as drainage, toilets and pavement should be for theMusrenbang.”

–Female,Kemlayan



Documents

Toward Pro-Poor and Accountable Infrastructure … Kita_AIIRA Final Report... · INDONESIA INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE Toward Pro-Poor and Accountable Infrastructure Development Planning