Towed Versus Selfpropelled Artillery in the Period Prior to 1955 an Historical Investigation of the Argument in the United States Army

7/29/2019 Towed Versus Selfpropelled Artillery in the Period Prior to 1955 an Historical Investigation of the Argument in the U

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TOWED VERSUS SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1955:AN HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ARGUMENTIN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. ArmyCommand and General StaffCollege in partialfulfillment of the requirements of the

degreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

byA. C. BOLE, JR., Maj, USA

Fart Leavenworth, Kansas1966


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Form ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMS No. 074-0188Public roporting bUrden forthl' colleCtIon Oflnfofmallon Is M1imatOd to .....orago 1 hoUr p&l' TospoMe,lncluding the time for rllvWl'wfng In6bUctions, 6UIrchlng eldlting data f10llfoes, galhllling.tld mall'ltalnlngthe dala nelKkd, and complellng lind revlfIYMg this OOIloe11on or Informillon. S,nd comments regerd]ng this burdon esllmatG or any othllr .,pect olthls CO\lKtIon of Wormtllon, Includ1ro sug\1GSllOn$ for~ u c I t l g this b u ~ = ~ h ! n g t o n H o a d q u i l r t & r s ~ ~ ~ , O l r ~ e lor Information ~ and Reports, 1215JeffQrson Davis HlgtrNay,Suite 12l).4, ArlIflgton, VA 22202-4302, and to the otrice ofMaMOimant lind Pal'lerwGrk Reduclkln Pro 6Ct 0701188 Wuhltlllton DC 21. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leeve b1,nk) 12. REPORT DATE \3 . REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED10 Mav 1966 Maste r ' s Thesis AUGust' 1965 - Mav 19666. FUNDING NUMBERSTowed Versus Self-Propelled Artillery In The Period Prior To 1955: An HistoricalInvestigation Of The Argument In The United States Army4. TITle AND SUBTITLE

.

6. AUTHORISIBole , Alber t C., -Major,. U.S. Army

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMEIS) AND ADDRESSIESI 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER .U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege] Reynolds Ave.Fort Leavenworth, KS 660279. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAMEIS) AND ADDRESS(ESI 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

12,. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABIUTY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODEApproved fo r publ i c r e l ease ; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s unl imi ted. A

13. ABSTRACT (Mm'lmum 200 Words)Fie ld a r t I l l e r y must move r ap id ly as well as shoot accura te ly in 'order to do its j ob . Animpor tant argument as to th e b e s t way to move cannon has been, and s t i l l is , the argumento f towed ver sus se l f -p ropel l ed a r t i l l e r y . The purpose o f t h i s paper i s to chronic le andana lyze t h i s argument in the U;S. Army p r i o r to 1955. Th e analys i s shows t h a t , of themany reasons cited in the argument, only se l f - p r o p e l l ed a r t i l l e r y ' s advantage of rap idoccupatIon o f p o s i t i o n and i t s disadvantage o f heavy weight were s i g n i f i can t r easons . Thepaper conc ludes t h a t by 1955 t he re was no t a preponderance o f opin ion fo r e i t h e r modeexclusively, which was qui te proper , as there were many improvements to be made to bothforms o f a r t i l l e r y t r an sp o r t . In orde r to ob ta in these improvements by th e b es t use o ftechnology, so ld i e r s must es t ab l i s h ch a rac t e r i s t i c s des i red in mate r i e l , and requireindustry to meet those characterist ics.

.

14. SUBJECT TERMSField a r t i l l e r y ; b a t t l e f i e l d mobi l i tyWorld War I ; World War I I

16. NUMBER OF PAGES8116. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF REPORT U .NSN 164G-41 280-66110

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF THIS PAGEU19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONOF ABSTRACTU

20. UMITATION OF ABSTRACTUSlanderd Fonn 288 (Rev. 2-88)Prucrlla


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u. S. A . . ~ 1 Y C Q J W ~ D AND G&;ERAL stJFi COTtLr03('!besis Approval Page)

:1ar18 of Cand1date Albert C. Bole, Jr k!a,1or. Art1] ] er:rTiUe of 1hesis 'lbwed Versus Self-Propelled Art1" try in the Period? r iO t to 1955; An IAstorical Inwatigation ot the Argyneot in th eth1ted stItes Amr

AppXYred by: '-/ -,.... " I' l . / " i-


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(Abstract A p ~ r o v a l Page)

.n,tIe of i h e s 1 s ' - _ - - : : . T o ~ w e d ~ V e ~ r : . : s ~ u s ~ S e = l t l ; S , - ~ P r o : . a . : : : : : . ? ' ; , ; l ~ l : = . : e d : : : : : : . . . = A r ~ t i = _ = l l = = : . e : : : . ; r y t . l . . . : i : . l . n . . : t h ~ e : . -__Period Prior to 1955: An Historical Investigation or the Armnent

~ ~ : V e d by: ("'/" ._ / , - ~ _ " _:'-_.j_-t_... _,_.) _ ~ _ I _ , _4-_" ,_. _ I _ : t ' _ l _ ~__ , 3esearch and I h . ~ s Y.onitori_"

-JDate 10 '( 1 1:,t I i l:'!he oo1n1ons and conclusions exoressed herein are those ot the individualstudent aut.'lor and do not necesKrily represent the views of e:1".her theu. S. Arar:! Cocnand and General statt Q:,llege or any other gove:mnentalagency. (rt,rencts to this study should include the foregoingstatement.


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A3Sr?.ACT

Field art i l lery ~ u s t ~ o v e rapidly as well as shoot accuratelyin order to do i t s job. An i"loortant a r ~ e n t as to the best way tomove cannon ha s beer" and s t i l l 15, the argu=nent ot towed versus sel t -orooelled ar t i1.1ery. lb'l ~ u . r o o s e or this Jaoer 15 to chronicle andanalyze this a r ~ . 1 " ' I l e n t in t.'le J. S. ANry or1or to 195.5.

Qlaoter I describes the d e v e l o ~ e n t ot the !IIateriel tor :r.echanized ar t i l le ry trans'OOrt tro:"! 1916 to 1955. !hr1nc:; this ~ e r l o d therewas very l i t t l e change in t . ~ . materials and technolost( used tor t . ~ e develoJDent or ar t i l lery vehicles and cannon. As a resul t , there wasvery l i t t l e equiOOlent for the ~ r o ~ n e n t s ot either towed or sel t -?ronelled art i l lery to consider.

Canter I I recounts th e history or the ugtI ' lent r r i t s beginn 1 n ~ unt i l t . ~ e tni te d States ' entry into liorld 'liar I I . ' lb. &rg'..tnentorior to :-lorld :.lar I I divides into two ~ h a s e s : 1919-1927. and 19231941. with the creation ot t."le f i r s t U. S. Arrry &r'Jlored torces b e i n ~ th e divisor. lllring t.'te f i r s t Qhase, rapid o c c u ~ t i o n of oos1t ion wasconsidered the chief advantage ot .elt--orooell.d ar t i l le ry . and l ighterunit weight the chief a d Y a n t a ~ or towed art i l lery . 3y the end ot thesecond phase t selt-oropelled art.i l lery was considered alr.1ost exclusivelyfor &r:Ilored d1.v1sions, and towed art i l lery tor infantry divisions.

Q l ~ t e r I I I describes th e e ~ r 1 e n c . ot -l'Iorld tiar I I V1 th r e to art i l lery transoort. Ihring the Wart virtually a l l arnlored d1visionar t i l le ry was selt-oro?elled and infantry d1.vision ar t i l le ry towed. lhe

1


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2consensus was that self-!1ro')elled a r t i l ~ e r - . 1 \"'az bet ter fo!' a = - : ~ o r e c i d:..vi sions.

Chanter 17 discusses t ~ oeriod f r o ~ a r t e ~ the war "until 1955.?or the f : l0St na,rt, the ~ o 5 t . " T a r anaJ..:rses continued in the sane vein asthe e 4 ~ e r i e n c e of the war: self-uroop.lled artil lery fo r ~ 1 0 r e d d iv i -s i ~ n s and to't,red a . r t i l l e ~ . 1 for i n f a n t ~ elivisions. me :::Orea.'1 conflicte ~ p h a s i z e d advantages of self-propelled a r t i l l e ~ J in ~ r o t e c t i n e i t se l f1'=0111 grour,d attaC:'C. ' : ' ~ ' 1 e chanter ends with descr ipt ions of nSl-l conce"1tsfor s e l r - ~ r o . o e l 1 . . e d artillcr'J, based on neu technolog.

Cha?ter "/ s U _ ' 1 1 : ~ a ~ i z e s , analy"zes and concludes. ilie a r ~ - . t , e n t hadchanr;ed ver':l l i t t l e durinS the neriod covered in th is ~ a ' O e r because themateriel ~ 1 a . d cha.n:3ed verry l i t t l e . rn e analysis shows that , of the : ~ a n y reasons aited in the arGument, only s e l : r - ~ r o g e l l e d a r t i l l e ~ J ' s advantage of rapid occupation of "Oosi t ion and i ts d i s a d v a n t a ~ e of heaV"j"\-lei 6h t uere s i G t ~ i . f i c a n t reasons. ~ c h a ~ t e r concludes that b ~ , " 1955~ ~ e r e was not a pra?onderance of opinion for either t o ~ e d o selfpropelled a r t i l l e ~ exclusively, which ~ a ouite prO?9r, as there were~ a . ' Y l Y in!,rove:nents to be ma.de to both for:ns of ar t i l lery t ~ a n s : 9 o r t . Inorder to obtain these L m ~ ~ o v e ~ e n t s by tae best use of t e c ~ l o 1 0 g y , soldiers ~ ~ s t establish characteristics desired in materiel, and requireindustrJ to ~ e e t these characteristics.


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This '":la!1er -;olould not have been "!)ossible itrl thout t.he ;"eln of'llany peool .e . S ~ e c i a l a c ~ { n o ~ N l a d g e t " : l e n t and ~ r a t e f u l a o ~ r e c i a t i o ~ istendered to t ~ f o l l o w ~ n g l n d i , ~ d u a l s .

Lt Col Ro,ert ~ n r a ~ e , whose wise counsel, ~ a t i e n t under-s t a n d i n g ~ and o v e ~ a l l ~ u i d a n c e were key tn the ~ r e 9 a r a t i o n of this!Japer.

Lt Col ,!allace :i. ~ ~ u t t . i . . n : ; a.l'ld .. :aj F o r e ~ t ~ Pierce, whose detailed critiques contributed s i g n i f i c a ~ t l y to th e pauar.

J.':rs 3arton :! :IaY'.Jard, whose cOl'lscientious and capable t y ? i n ~ was i ~ ! l n o r t a . " ' l t to the c O f ~ p l e t i o n ~ the ?ap9r.

:ly ~ r . i . f e , A.1. tzi., v..Those careful p r o o . f r e a 1 i . n ~ was i:nportant, and,;-rhose su;rqort and encouragement v i ta l to this ~ a ' O e ~ .

i i i


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TABLE OF C O t - ( I ' ~ ' J T 3 Page

i i i

L.I 5'1' 0F 'fABLES v1

c."la'OterI . 1'"dE :.-:ATIZ?- 3:L 4

'l'owed Artil lery3elf-Propelled A r t i l l e ~ Gttn.llaryII. 14

The Influence of ~ l o r l d ~ ' i a r IIhe First ~ h a s e : 1919-27L ~ Second Phase: 192d-41

III. 31

'lhe Setting:.l"ne Advantages of tielf'..Propelled Artilleryl ~ : ' l e Disadvantages of Self-Propelled Arti l lery:Lne Consensus

IV. 45'lhe Post-','iorld fda!' I I l\nalysis'The Korean ConflictThe Future

V. SU'!l-iAHY, ANALY5IS, AND C O ~ C L U S I O N S 58Summar"AnalysisConclusions

BIBLIOGPJLPifi 66

iv


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LIST OF 1'A3LSSTab'.c Page1. 1941 Pri:ne ~ ' : o v e r s for 'rowed Arti l lery 62. Early :-rol t :':anufacturing Co:n?any Self-Propelled Can.'1on 73. Post- ~ ~ ' a r totol t ~ ' l a n u f a c t u r i n g Company Self-Propelled C a n ~ o n 4. Chri s t ie Self-Propelled 1 5 5 ~ ~ : ! o w i . tzer 9

Self-Pro:?e] 1d 10Smm Howitzer, :,17 . . . . 116. Comparison of dolt 1,lark ~ 1 I 1 and i:7 .59

Co:nparison of ~ ' l e s t e r v e l t tX>ard Report (1919) and 1946Artillery Conference R e ~ o ~ t 61

v


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IN rRODuCTIOHThe Problem

Ibe ~ n i s s i o n of the U. S. Army' f ie ld arti l ler 'J is to prov..t.de continuous and timely fire support. 1 1'radit ional ly, thi s mi ssion has beend.ivided into th,:,ee tasks: to move, to shoot, and to cOMmunicate. Thetask of moving cannon has p r o ~ p t a d many a r ~ e n t s as to the best form ofart i l lery2 transport. 't3ef'ore "t.l}e advent ot motor transport there '-las anargU11ent as to which was better--horses or mules? vii th the introductionof ::notor vehicles there immediately came the argUl.1ent of animals versus~ o t o r s . Almost simultaneously c a ~ e another argument: which was thebetter form of motor transport for a r t i l l e ~ - - t o w e d or self-propelled?

Ihis argument was an important one. I t has influenced theeffectiveness and tactics of both the a r ~ t l l e r y and the a ~ i t SU?ported, and affected the spending of large sums of :,oney for ar t i l lery:nateriel. '!he purpose of this paper i s to !)resent the history of theargument of towed versus self-pro?elled art i l lery in the U. S. Amy-crior to 1955. The trends of the argument throughout the period citedwill be traced to d e t e ~ n i n e the factors that affected the a r g u ~ e n t . Taeargument wil l be analyzed to evaluate the validi ty of the reasons putfor th by proponents of towed or self-propelled art i l lery. By reoounting

1u. S., ISpartment of the Army, Field Arti l lery ' ractics,FH 6-20-1 ( ~ ' l a s h i n g t o n : u. S. Government Printing Ofrice , Jul 65), p. 3.2Th.roughout the res t of this paper, the term "ar t i l lery" willrefer to f ie ld ar t i l lery .

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2the h i s t o ~ and analyzing the argument, conclusions can be drawn as tohow soldiers :r.ay best use technology for the m i L t t a ~ art .

TIle Approach'lbe a?proach i s to determine the thinking and reasoning of pro

ponents of either rom of t ransport . 30th. off icial re-po:-ts anddocuments, and toTri t ings of individuals are examined. For the l a t te r ,unofficial publications such as '!he Field Artillery Jounlal and .A1!J3.Ordnance are used extensively.. I t should be pointed out that pr ior to~ { o r l d War II , t h e ~ e Q ~ o r r i c i a l service publications were quite ~ ~ p o r -tant as a forum for e x p r e s s i n ~ current thinking concernin5 the servicethey represented.)

This paper i s organi zed into f i ve chapters. In Chapter I adescription of the materiel upon w h i c ~ 't.l}e argument was based prior to1955 i s presented. In Cha!'ter I I the history of t h argtnent of towedversus sel t -propel led arti l1.ery i s t raced .fro;:, i t s beginning a t theclose of ~ ' l o r l d "llar I unti l the {h i ted States' ~ n t l Y into ~ l o r l d \'lar I I .The experience of World War n as i t relates to the a r ~ o n t i s described in Chapter I I I . Cha!'ter IV presents the analyses of ,'[oridiJlar I I ar t i l l e ry t ransport experience, and traces the argument up to1955. In Chapter V the argument i s discussed and analyzed, and conclusions are presented.

A1though tank destroyers were both towed and self-pro!,elled and)For exa.l1ple, in 1922 the annual report of the Chief of Fj.eld!U'tillery was published 04 in '!he FieJ,d ArjJ.J.1e:t1[ Journal (Vol. XII.

L ~ O . 6 ~ o v - l ) ) c 2?J, p. 455


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were e m ~ l o y e d at times as l ight4 artillery, they will not be discussedin this pager. A thorough review of the uertinent literature revealsthat the experience with tank destroyers did not contribute signific ~ ~ t l y to the a r ~ ~ ~ e n t of towed versus self-nrooelled a r t i l l e ~ J in theU. Ci. Army.

4'rhrOughout this paper the following classitication of a T t i l l e ~ aooording to oaliber wil l be used: light--l20IYUl or l ess ; !Yledi\'Jn-greater t.."lan 120mm but not greater than 160!ftl"l; heavy--greater than 16


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CHAPrER I

!he discussion of ~ ~ argument of towed versus s e 1 f - p r o ~ e l l e d arti l ler-j in the U. S. J\r:try ~ r i o r to 1955 begins wi. th a survey of thedavelopreent of materiel for mechanized a r t i l l e ~ transport. 'his development in the U. S. A . ~ , beginning with towed art i l lery and followedby self-propelled artil le! 'Y, wil l be described in this chapter.

rowed ArtilleryThe ear l ies t !,rime lltovers for cannon were track-laying vehicles.

Commercial farm t ractors1 Here used to tow art i l lery in 1916, during thepunitiva expedi.t ion into :"Iexico. 2 In that Sa."'t19 year, a 45 horse?oweretCaterpillar" tractor was tested a t Fort Si l l , ~ c l . a h o m a . I t was used toto,., a lh 7" gun and li:nber, or a 4.7" gun CaiSSOll and. limber. 'The tota lweight, ,nth either load, \....8.5 -3} tons. J The Field Arti llar:t Doard foundth i s p r i ~ e Mover to be cheaper, easier to handle t and inore l:'!obile thanhorse tea.."lls.4 l':ractors, f r o ~ eommercial desi gns wTere used extensively

l.Th.e term "tractor" ; d l l be used to designate track-layinr:t ractor t h r o u ~ o u t this pa!:'er.2Co1 Lucian 3. :':oojy, "Hotorized Arti l lery," Amy Ordoance.Vol. I , No.1 (Jul-Aug 20), ~ 8.3Capt ~ . T i l l i a . ' f l 1 3ryden, " 1 ~ o t e s on the Recent Tractor Test at Fort

Sil l , Oklaho!na," 111e Field Artil lery Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1(Jan-Mar 16), p. 51.4 , , ~ ! o t o r TranS?ort for Heavy Field Artillery." Th.e Field Artillery Journat, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Apr-Jtm 16), p. 201.

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during vJorld "'liar I as :>rime movers for mediWl and heavy ar t i l lery .Tractors, rather than trucks, continued to be !>rime movers for towedart i l lery during the post-war "eriod. 5

In 1925 one b a t t e ~ r of 1 5 ~ ~ howitzers in Hawaii was convertedr r o ~ ~ l a tractor-dralorn to a truck-drawn batter'J. l11.e truc!tS proved to befaster and generally better than the tractors. However, art i l lery transport in Hawaii was rather specialized because a L ~ o s t all movement wasover good roads and very t i tUe cross-cou."ltry :novernent was required. 6Another battery lias equi!,ped with trucks in 1932. Arter a t r i a l of th isbattery, some li ltt and :nedium battalions were converted to truck-dralmunits. 'me trucks were of commercial design and had two-wheel drive. 7

By 1941 nearly a l l l ight and :nediurn art i l lery was truck-drawn.lbe p ~ . . . n c i p a l pl"ime movers in use were essentially of cortl1erc1al designwith the addition of front wheel drive, and had characterist ics as shownin 'I'''.b:9 1. '!'he standard prime ~ o \ , ' e r for hea.vy art i l lery wa.s a ttCatel'pillar" t ractor, also of corr.:nereial design, weighing 14:t tons and havinga maximum speed of 9.4 :nph.a

The trucks described in Table 1 larere used throughout vJorld ',far I Iand the Korean conflict. :Jear the end of the Korean confiict , tbe (i-Ie2t ton truck was r ~ l a c e d b:'r an improved 2i- to n truck, which was developed for use by the mill tary, though not as an axclusively art i l leryprime mover. Dle Dlamond T 4 ton truck was replaced by a 5 ton truck

S'lhe Field Artil lery School, Autcrnotive Instruction, (Fort Sll l ,Oklahoma: '111e Field Artillery School Reproduction Plant, 1941), p. 1.6:'!aj Francis T. Colby, "155-mm Howitzers 'lbwed by F. W. 1). [Four~ o J b e e J . . . I r ive"]Trucks in Hawaii, I t '!he Field A r t i l l e ~ ' Journal t Vol. A.VI ,No. 6 (Nov-Dec 26), pp. 588-596.

?Automotiva Instructi on , p. 1.8Ibid. , p. 355


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6at this time. nere again, the truck was designed for general m i l ~ t a r , y use.

TABLE 1

1941 PRL'-1E HOVERS FOR ItrNED ARTILLERY&Characteristics

Cargo capacity

Light Arti l lery

2t tonsbl'1edi.urn Artil lery

4 tonsclL-':tve six-wheel six-wheelWeight Sf tons 9-i tons1'otaximum speed 45 mph 40 aph

aAutomot1ye Instruction, p. 3.50.b ' lhis was the General Hotors Corporation (GhC) 2t to n truck.c1hi.s was the Dlamond T 4 ton truck

A half-track vehicle was also used as a l ight a r t i l l e ~ primemover during ~ v o r l d War I I , especially in North Africa. I t was essent ia l ly a six-wheel drive armored truck with the rear dual tandem wheelsreplaced by tracks. '!he chief advantage of th is prime mover over al l -wheeled trucks was i t s bet ter mobility in sand. I t weighed 3 tons andhad a maximum speed or 45 ~ h 9

'!he principal t ractor used during both World War n and theKorean conflict was the :14 high-speed t ractor. I t was a med:1.l%J1 ar t i l -lery prime mover, weighed 15 tons and had a max1mun speed or JO mph. 10

9Ibid. , p. 350.lOu. S., vlar Department, Standard ZWH11tary tolotor Vehicles,iH 9-2800 (vlashington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 6 Mar 43),p. 175.


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7Self-Propelled A r t 1 l 1 e ~

The f i r s t self-propelled cannon was developed in the UnitedStates in 1916. Developed by ~ ~ Holt ~ 1 a n U a c t u r i n g Company,11 i t wasa 3" anti-aircraft gun mounted on a track-laying chassis. 12 IAlring~ I J o r l d 'Ilar I , the Holt company developed f'our models or self-propelled,track-laying ar t i l lery ~ i e e e s from oorn.'11ercia1. I I C a t e ~ i l l a r " t ractors.'!heir characteristics are at Table 2.

TABLE 2E,AHLY HOL'r L - : ~ - ' ( ] ! i ' A C T U R I d G C Q ' I P ~ ' n SELF-PROPELLED C A N N O ~ a

Characterist ics ~ l a r ~ I ~ ~ a r k II Mark III i'!ark IVCaliber 81t 155m gun 240mm howitzE#riJeight 29 tons 30 tons 53 tons 36 tonsbHaximum syeed 4 m ~ 5.4 : n p ~ 4.; mph 6.5 mph~ A X t m u m elevation 45 350 60 &Jo'Xotal traverse SO 10 2 00

~ \ i : a j Levin H. Campbell, J r . , itSelf-Propelled Caterpil larArti l lery Vehicles," Journal or the lhited States Artil lerr, Vol. LIV,No.1 (Jan 21), p. 35.bHeight l i s ted i s for !.!h or two vehicles.

'!he ~ - 1 a r k IV was dev-eloped to reduce the ni.gh unit weight of the i . 1 a r ~ ~ I I I .I t consisted of t l l0 vehicles, one mounting the howitzer and the other agasoline-driven generator. Each vehicle had an electr ic motor tor

11 Now the Caterpil lar Tractor Company.l ~ J 1 a j Levin H. Campbell, Jr . , "Self-Propelled Caterpi l lar Artillery Vahi oles , It Journal or the { h i ted sta teB ArUllery, Vol. LTV, No. 1(Jan 21), p. 31.


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8pro"9ulsion and both l ~ e r e connected toeether by an electr ic cable. Noneof these four models saw combat.

In the post- ~ ' l o r l d "liar I period. addit ional seif-propelled mountswere developed by the Holt COl':'lpany. In 1919 a l ight ar t i l lery pieoe "'asmado; an improved version was produoed in 1922. A comparison of thecharactoristics of these vehioles are shown in Table 3.

'TABU 3P O S T - ~ l . h J . ~ .t!OLT ;:MHJFAcrURItHi CaU>J\ifi SELF-PROPELLED C A N i " ~ O ~ ~

Characteristics

Caliber 7 5 gun 7.5mm or 1 0 howi. tzer\'leight St tons 6t t o n ~ :ia.ximum speed 30 mph

cTotal traverse . . . .c

a : ' ~ a j Levin R. Campbell, J r . , t 'Self-Propelled Caterpillar :Artillery Vehioles, tt p. 35.b 1he nolt ~ ' i a n u r a o t u r i n g Company, itA Few P h o t o g r a n ~ s ShowingCaterpillar Development for 1"Iilitary Purposes" (.!. 1922), ~ 11-12.c

~ i a . x i m u m elevation and touJ. traverse tor the l!a.rk ' l were' notgivan; the above reference i..rnplies that they were similar to t h o s ~ ofthe :iark VII

.An L'Tlproved and larger motmt for e1 ther the 8" howltzar oi- the155:nm gun wa.s also developed during the post-World 'Ilar I period. I tweighed 22t tons and could t ravel up to 16 mph. 1; All of these Holtmodels were developed from existing cOIl'm1erc1al-design "Caterpillar"

13'lhe Holt 2'1anuf'acturing Company, itA Few Photographs ~ o w i n g Ca.terpillar Develo?ment for Hil1tal"J Purposes," pp . 14-15.


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9t rac tors . Ihe cannon could be f ired di rectly from the !llOlD'lts, us:lngspades or outr i ggers for s tab1li ty. None had armor protection for theweapon or crew.

In 1919, a 1 5 ~ ~ gun mounted on a Christie 5 e l f - ~ r o p e l l e d mountwas tested by the Ordnance Department. lbis ~ o u n t could be convertedfrom a. vroecled vehicle to a tracked vehicle by the craw in r r o ~ 15 toJO lI linutes. Joba uwheeled or trae.l(edft capabili t ~ , . in the o?inion of !no s tgave greater f le r lb i l i ty than the "Caterpillar" mount because of thegreater highway speeds uossible in the wheeled configuration. I t characteristics a r ~ . sho...m in 'rable 4.

TA3LE 4C:fP.ISTIE SELF-P:lJPELLED 15511-1 GUlta

Characteristi.cs22 tons'leight

i laxi.mttn speed, \meeled 20 M?hlIa.xi...1lUtn speed, t racked. q m9h~ : a x i m 1 . t n elevation 35To ta l traverse 120

a"lh9 Christie Self-Propelled i ' ~ u n t , " 'Ihe Field ArtilleryJournal, Vol. IX, No. 5 (U'ov-Lac 19), pp. 603-604.I t vlas given both road and f ir ing tes ts , and passed these sat isfactor i ly . '!he test ing section recommended th is r.u>del for issue to theA:rm:y.14 In 1921, another Christie self-propelled MOunt was made for

14Aberdeen Proving Ground, Proof Department, Gun and Carr! ageJection, ftFinal rest Report or 1hree Christie ~ f u e e l e d Caterpillar Zountsfor 155m/m Gun, Hodel 1918 (Filloux) ,n (Xar 21), PP. 51-53, 95.


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1001 ther the 7 5 ! ~ " 1 or the 10.5tr:n hOlr.i.tzer. I t ha d a shield fo r al l -rf,)lmd protection of the crew and the carriage alone l-1eighed 6t tons. 1S

T h e ~ e ~ l o 1 t and Christie models were virtual ly the entire effor tin the de"lelo?ment of t r a c 1 < : - l a s i n ~ s e l f - ~ r o ! l e l l e d artilleI"J ?r ior to~ I l o ~ .-Jar I I . Both the Field Artil lery 30ard and the Ordnance Depart.TTlentconducted tes ts of this materiel in the 1920' s and 1930' s , but few dev e l o ~ ~ e n t s o i ~ p r o v e m e n t s resulted f r o ~ these tes ts . A U ~ o s t a l lco:-:cents ~ e r t a i n . i . n g to self-propelled art i l lery :>rior to I.-lorld ",jar IIware based on this materiel developed durinf;, or di.rectly after, ','iorld~ ' : a r I .

i)es?i te ap!,arent advantages in weight, cost , SL":l!Jlici ty, andease of r.laintenance of wheeled vehicles over t racked vehicles, l i t t le"1as done 't.n. th self-propelled, \meeled art i l ler 'J . In 1918 an ar t i c le inThe Field Art i l le r r Journal :,ro,osed Itauto:nobile a r t i l l e ~ J " - - c a n n o n mounted on truck chassis--in order to save weight. 16 I t was not unti l1930 ~ ' 1 a t an oxperimental mo'tmt for a 7.5mm gun on a six wheel, four-wheel driva COYil.-nercial truck \-ras tested. '!he gun could be :f'ired fro."':lthe truck "d. th the instal lat ion or outr i ggers on the truck. I t h ad~ e e d s u!> to )0 :':'lph, a maximum elevation of ~ O O , and a )60 traverse.Light steel tracks could be instal led on the rear wheels in fiva :ninutes, giving I t a cross-country !nobility equal to a tractor-drawn 7S"l::'l

51 ".iotor Carriages for Divisional Artil lery," j}le Field .ArtilleryJournal, '01. XI, iio. 4 (Ju.l-Aug 21), p. 412.16Lt Col Cha:les J. B r o ~ m e , "D'le Tendency of Design in ~ ' : O d e r n Field k-tiller-.r,u '!he Field .Artillery JOumM, Vol. VIII, Uo. 4(Oct-1J3c 18), p. 525.


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11g1.1."1. All tests, including f i r i n ~ + e s ~ s , ~ r o v e d ~ a t i ~ f a c t o ~ ! . 1 7 J~ q " ~ t e 13~ ~ " ' J e " e r , there Has no further rlevelo?::nent of this :flOunt. At the s tar tof :'Io:-ld ~ ' l a r ::r t . . " e ~ e 'oJ'as a hea.vy, eight-.rl1.eel driva ~ e l r - p ~ p e l l e d !":10unt to r ei ther the 3d gun, or 1 0 5 ~ ' l 1 howitzer under develo:')l,ent. 1:]] o t h i n ~ c ~ n e of this project, either.

~ principal self-";)!'O!>elled iJ. S. Al..rty ar t i ller"J -.reapon :'ndorld ',Iar I I was t.'1e ~ ~ "Priest ." Develo",;>ed in la te 1940 for 3rit:.shuse in ? ~ o r t . . ~ Africa as a tad( destro:"rer, the ::7 was a 10,5!,;"'1 howitzorand c a r ~ a e e mou.l1tod in an ~ I tan.l< chassis. 2O I t had ar:nor ?rotectionfor the c ~ e ' t ' " (but .. ) o ' , e r ~ e a d ~ r o t e c t i o n ) and character is t ics as sho'.min Table 5.

'i'ASL3 5

Characteristics~ ' l a i g h t 2 J tons~ ' l a . x i n U ! l l speed 2) m'?h~ l a x i I 1 U i . ~ elevation1'otal traverse

au. S., .jar D e ~ a r ~ ~ e n t , 105-mn Ho"ritzer :!otor Carriage : ~ 7 . , T ~ : 9-731E ( " ~ f a s h i n g t o n : G.'3. Gover!rnent Printing Office, 5 Jan ! ~ 3 ) , :9:'. 3, 133.

1 7 ~ ' I a v i G. ~ , . r . James, "7&:-,' Gun t :1'3 6-' n.. 1 r l . . t :1'- - - ;1&.,1 .'.1oun , .. ,o n ,.uee ".I-ue:


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12Prosress in d e v e l o ~ i n g other s e l f - : ) t ' O ~ e l l e d cannon d u r : . n ~ fforle.

~ ; a r II \,:as 510";1. ~ ~ e x t to the :':7, the .:nost successful s e l r - ~ r o ? e l l e d ~ i e c e brought into service during the lIar ~ a tho 1 5 ~ ~ n self-?ropelledgun., ,:12. I t was construeted by mounting a 1913 :nodel 1 5 5 ~ ' , l l i 1 gun21 on a22t a ~ l k c h a 5 s ~ s , o:.vei[:hed 20 tons and had a ~ ? l a x i . m \ . t 1 l speed o f 20 P l p ~ . 3"jthe end of the war, other cannon calibers had been ~ o u n t e d on t ~ chassis, inc1 1lding the 2 4 0 : n c ~ hOlTitzer and . 3 " ~ . ',ihose l a t te r wea!>O:lSsalT l i t t l e con'::lat. 23

Jelf-pro:gel1..ed ar t i l lery employed in the :Corean con.:-lict \-Tasessentially th e sarna as used in i I o ~ l d ~ ~ D . r I I . L"!1proved versions of the3tt he",d tzar and 15S11..l'J1 Gun self-1)ropellod mounts did seo c o ~ ~ b a t . 2 ~

All of th e self'-?ro;>elled cannon used during UorId ";far I I andthe : ' ~ r e a n conflict "rere to't'red w e a ~ o n s modified so that they could be:no1l.Ylted on existing tanh: ~ " l a s s i s . They had 50::19 amor protection for~ ~ crell, and lrere considerably heavier t . . ~ a n the toiled wea,on wi t . the ir~ r i n e :'1'lovers. They had l imited on-carriage trtlverse, and could not f i reh i g h - ~ ~ g l e fire unless sited on a reverse slope.

1'he post-iCorea."l COllfUct period saw the d e v e l o ~ e n t of a ne,,;.family of self-propelled wea?ons. Carriages and, in SOrle cases, tubes,were developed or especially modified for these self-propelled ~ i e c a s . Ihey l1ere l ighter , had bet ter traverse and elevat..1.on than their prodecessors.

21This ~ T a s t . ~ e s ~ n e gun as on the Holt i-lark I I (p. l . )22H d d I I.ea quarters Firs t thite ~ ' t a t e s Ar.rry, "Arti erJ InformationService, ~ ' : E r n o r a n d u m : ~ o . 4," Jun 44, ! ' . 46.2;Comparato, ~ 353.24Ibid. , ~ 232.


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1)3uru:'lary

Tnere were two signif icant a s ~ e c t s concerning the develoOMent ofmechanized ar t i l lery materiel in the U. S. 1\.-:;':.>" 9rior to 1955. First ,there was ver-.f 1 it t le change in the ma.terials and t e c h n o l o ~ used forthe develop:':'1ent of art i l lery vehicles and cannon. I t le1'as not unti lafter 1955 that l ighter lr.etals, such as !ugh-strenrrth s teel alloys anda..ltt:unum, and :nora powerful, but l ighter , enf;ines, more eff ic ientt ranwissions and turrets were ap!,lied to the art i l lery vehicles. 'lliesetechnolo&tcal advanoes gave the argUlnent of towed versus self-:?ro"9clladart i l lery a new c C i . ~ ~

Second, and closely al l ied with the f i r s t aspect, there war.really v e ~ J l i t t l e materiel for the ~ : r o p o n e n t s of towed or self-propelled a r t i l l e ~ J to consider. 'this dearth of artillery t ~ a n s p o r t equtpment gave a saTJleness to the reasons ci ted in the ar5"Ument of selfpropelled versus towed art i l lery trom the beginning or the argument to19.55.


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CHAPTEk I I

' f " ~ E ARGl1:E:'Il' PRI02 TO .lORLD 'liAR II

The Influence of !.forld i lar IflorId ~ v a . r I t in i t s classical stat ic form ot trench w a r f a r e ~

beca.'lle an artillelj ' lnan'S war, and ended with ar t i l l e ry r e c o ~ i z e d a!;the n:ung of 3att les." In a 1917 direotive to the Fre:'lch Ar:ny, G e n ~ r a l Petain gave instructions tha.t attacks in the future "rare to be : n o u n ~ a d uecono::nicUly with infantry, and with the maxi=nU!n of ar t i l lery ."l '!Msttmax:Lv:'lUIr." was 8?i tomized by the 1918 offense at St !-11hiel, where over1,400 cannon were =nassed to support an offensive on a 1.6 mile front. 2Artillery bombardment was considered key to the success of any operat ion. Yet, deS"f)ite the d e g e n d e ~ a e on ari,iller'J, there l-rerc n')tabledefictencies in artiller-.r perfomance--particularly ,dt.h respect toa r t i l l e ~ tra.nsport.

Firs t , and })erha'Os the most serious of these deficiencies, wasth e inabili ty or the arti l lery to kee9 up with the a s s a u l t i . n . ~ infantr'J.The very ground which the ar t i l l e ry had pulverized in order to b r e a ~ ~ the enemy trenches, was, because or th e bombardment, impassable to thefo!'Wa.rd d i s p l a c e ~ ! l e n t of the cannon. 'Ibis facet of ar t i l lery mobility

1Ri.chard ~ ' ~ : . 'viatt, Dare Call i t Treasoll ( ~ ~ E J W York: 3ilr.on andSchuster, Inc., 1963), ~ 211.2Frank E. Com:parato, Age or Great G u n ~ (Sarrisburg, Pennsylvania.: '!he StaclC"901e Co., 1965), p. 53.

14


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15was tenned t a c t i c ~ , n o b i l i ~ . ~ a c o n d , \dth ~ ~ s u ~ ~ l y of a ~ t i l l ~ r y !lever fulf:i.llin..; the need, i t l,-ras i ~ . 1 0 0 : , t a . . Y l t t-:> J'10Ve ar t i l l e ry l.L'1i tsra-;>i dly f r o ~ ~ one ';>art of the front to another. ~ e c a u s e of "0':)01" roadnets and the s l o ~ - 1 foms of a . ~ t i l l e ! " ' f trans,?ort avai lable, the artiJ.le!"f..ras .lot able to l ~ a k e these :7!oves very Hell. l'h.is facet of ar t i 11t3r:ltrans?ort ~ ' T a s t c ~ e d ~ t e r r i . c .:!lQPility:. Third, t-"e poor response ofanLnal trarlsl)ort to the t ! ' e ~ ' ! ' l e n d . : > u s der.".ands ?laced u?on i t , d e r . : o n ~ t r a t e d the n e e ~ fo r different ~ o t i v e ~ o w e r . Additionally, the introduction ofthe t a . ~ < : to warfarf"' gave r i se to speculation as to the future use oft a . ~ s in \>1ar, and the ar t i l l e ry required to 5U'.?!Jort i t . lhese were thoexperiences of the w a tha t were to influence t h i ~ ~ i n g on a r t i l l e ~ y tranS?Ol..t during the lu l l between the \lars.

In 191d, the A " 1 f ~ r i c a . Y } i:ppditionar;y- Force (ASF) in :ra."lce c o ~ -vaned a board of officers (the ~ - i e r o .Doard) to st"J.ctr the ex?eriencegained by the ar t i l lery of the ~ and to sub;nit r a o o . ~ ~ e n d a t i o n s pasedon i t s study. :leaded. by Brig Gen J\ndre"r ]aro, Jr. , t . ~ e board concludedt..1.at general a r T ~ p ' !"eserve ar t i l lery , COr?S art i l ler:r , and divisionart i l1erj ' hO'witzers (1t55mm) should be tracto:r-drawn. 3 I t also r e c \ J ~ ~ e n d e d ~ ~ a t th9 ( ~ ~ a t e r t e l (standard c ~ b e r for division l igh tar t i l l e ry ) be "notorized by t ractor, n if a sui table lbnEfl can be found. 1I4

Additionally, the report stated: c t t . . ~ e boare. believes tha t verJgreat exoendi tures for the p ~ o s e of tully developing a tractor-drawn

)General iieadquarters, A'Tlerican Ex:pedi t ionary Forces, Office ofthe Chief of fA.!'tiller"J, "Proceedings of the Board of :Jfi'icers t9 ~ 113, 1:). 23.

~ o i d .


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16or t ~ a . c t l ) r - c a r r i e d Q.talics rnineJ a r t i l l e ~ , ..rould be f'ull:.,. J.lstified.

uS : ' ~ a j o r ''Jenera! :!i.nds, Chief of Field .tu"'til ler 'J , concurred Hi t th is be l ie f and urged that e ~ e r i m e ~ t 5 along ~ ~ e s e l ines c ~ o u l d be"'9ushed wi. th the greatest energy. ,,6 :'he hero doard' s r e c o ~ n . : . ~ e n d a t i o ~ - ..5pertainins to a r t i l l e ~ , t r a . n s ~ o r t were ~ r i : n a r i l y f r o ~ the view of ani:nuversus Moton zed. trans,?ol't. 3ut in 9X"Oressing i t s bel ie f concerningtractor-dra'!1n .2 t t ractor- cc-ried. artil ler.?, the board ~ a i s e d the quest ion of \.mat ~ c j . . r \ 4 of :notorized ar t i l lery t ransoort th e J. 3. J'..:r::.jr shouldhave.

F o l l o w i n ~ c l ~ s e l v V1e r:ero 30ard Report ca"':le t.'1a ~ ' ; e 5 t e r v e l t P . e ~ o r t 7 in 1919. :feaded by Brig ~ ; , ~ i l l i & - n I . liestervelt. this ~ o / . r d was convened by the ~ , . ; a r D e ' O a ~ t : : - : l e n t t'J stuctr and n.a..l(e r e ~ e n d a t ~ o : l s for ar t i l lery r r ~ a t e r l . e l for the f ield army.8 I t s re?or t served as aguideline for d e v e l o p ~ e n t and discussion of arti l ler/ ~ a t e r i e l throughout ~ ' 1 . e ? e ~ i o d !Jrior to ':lorld -'jlar : I . r'nis report was also r-eferred toby so:ne post- .K>rld ~ ' ; a r I I re:JOrts.

The ':lestervel t i ~ ' P o r t quickly and al::i.ost s \ . l : " t " ' 1 a r i ~ considerecimechan:\.cal t r a n s ~ o r t th3 only suita.ble type for a r t i l l e ~ , . 9 ilit-'1respect to self-propelled art i l lerf , the report stated that "whilethere i s ~ r e a t pro=rl.se fo r such, those at , resent in existence a"'\d under

5Ibid. , p. 25.60rioe, ~ p . f or Field Artil lery, "1st L'1dors8:'!lent to tile ~ i e r o

Board P.e!>ort, It 27 L:ar 19, para. 12.7Also referred to as the Caliber Board Re?Qrt.a ~ 5 ., ~ T a . r Departl11ent, tt A study of the ~ a m e n t , Calibers an d:ypes of Jater ie l . ~ : i . n d s and ?royortion of Ammunition, and :-iethods of

T r a n s ~ o r t or the Artil lery to be Assigned to a Field Army," 5 ~ l a y 19.9Ibid. , p. 33.


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17t es t u e , for the r.:ost ~ a r t , excessively he&.vy.1I10 I t cons:.dered t ~ strategic ~ o b i l i t y of s e l f - ~ r o n e l l e d a r t i l 1 e ~ ~ l i ~ i t e d ; the ?ieceswould have to be t r a n s ~ o r t e d by trucks, unloaded near t ~ ?osit ion areas,al'ld 6I,lploy their good tact ical ~ n o b i l i t y to occuoy posi t ions. 11 Self? r o ~ e l l e d a r t i l l e ~ ' s abi l i ty to OCCU?y ~ o 5 i t i o n s ra?idly was consideredan important advantage:

rna 155!T!. G. P. F. 12 f j u - ~ self-?ropel led :110unt also ?resentsi ~ 1 . l n e d i a t e p:lssibili t i e s , especially when ~ - l e realize that to f i l ~ e , the vehicle si:-tlply has to C O ~ i l e to rest, ~ ' i . t ~ the ?ower ?lantr ~ ~ n ~ , ~ m e r e a s , U?on i t s present wheeled carr iage, several h o ~ s are n o r m a l l ~ y requtred to prepare t i ~ e t ir ing ~ p l a c e m e n t s . l )

~ ' l i th respect to arti l lery tranS?ort overall, the ":lestervel tBoard concluded tha t a p:'&ctical plan fo r notorizing ar t i l l e ry ~ . ; a s t.ohave both toued and self-?ro!>elled l i e ~ t ar t i l l e ry , tOl-red and se l f -~ ) r o ~ ) e l l e d rnediu:n ar t i l lery , and tOl,red heavy artillerrJ. All tolled ar t i l -lery "tra.s to be tractor-dra"A11"l. Dlvision ar t i l lery '\o1as to be towed.T r u c ~ < s were to be used for a.'1JJllunition and SU?ply' t ransport , an d theb a t t e ~ " deta-i.! section. '!he sel-:?ropelled ?5-"!Ua gun was to be trucktransported for s t ra tegic mobility.14 'The -,'lestervelt ' P . e ~ o r t r:arked thestart of the a r ~ x n e n t in the J. 3. A n r ~ of self-propel led 7ersus towedartiller-j". '!'he report favored neither , but did point out a d v ~ ' 1 t a g e s andlDnitations of self-?ropel led artil ler,y over t o ~ m d art i l lerr .

lhe Firs t Phase: 1 9 1 9 - ~ 'l'he f i r s t ~ h a s e in the argument baiora ~ ' 1 o r l d -,{ar I I started "lith10Ib O d~ . pp. 51-52. 11Ib id . , p. 52.12G P. F.: Great Power [designed by CaptairIJ ~ l l o u x 1 ~ ' ; e s t e r v e l t P.eport, !ol. 52 . 14Ibid. , p. 56.


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13the ' ~ ; e s t e r v e l t Ra!>ort and ended in 1927. In 1929, th e 7J. ;".). beganto e x p e ~ n e n t ~ d t h armored forces; this gave a different bent to thea r ~ e n t or self-propelled versus towed arti l lery.

In 1920, 'Lbe Field Artil lery Journal ?rinted an ar t ic le onar t iUer-J t ransport which included a discussion of the ~ e r i . ts of to\oredversus 591f-propel1ed artil let"J. Concerning 1i01 t ar t i l l e ry , the authorl i s ted , as did th,8 ~ ; e s t e r v e l t R e ~ o r t , self-propelled ar t i l le ry ' s advan-tage of being able to occupy and displace from positions ra?idly.Addi t ionally, he lis"".ed the advantages of smaller cargo space (for r a i lor boat shi!JL,cnt), loss road space, and sh i l l ty to f i re throughout36015 for self-propelled ar t i l ler ,y. The author considered the h ~ l ~ weight or self-pl' ' ')pelled lrleapons a di sadvantage, as did the tlestervel tR e ~ o r t . Self-propelled weapons' greater size would make them more di f -f icul t to camouflage than t o ~ d weapons. He cited two disadvantagesarising fro::! the cannon being r.'lounted on i t s , r ime mover. Fi r s t t i f theprime mover uere disabled by ei ther enemy action or mechanioal brea.'


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19that self-9ropelled ar t i l l e rJ transported by trucks ( s i r r ~ l a r to thes ~ , s t e z r . !,ro,osed by the :1estervelt Report) could be used as reinforcinga.rtiller:l . ~ a?pears tha t the considerat ion of strategic !!:obili tyoutHeighed t ac t ica l !:'lobility advantages in th is conclusion. 'me authorf u r t h ~ r concluded that h e a ~ J s e l f - ~ r o p e l l e d artillery was not ~ r a c t i c a l

18because of the great w e i ~ t inherent to this weapon.In 1Lr'w Ordnance in the same year (1920), Col Lucian J . ::O)qy

l i s ted as a d v a n t a ~ e s of self-?ro!>elled art i l ler ' J , r a ~ i d i ty in gain.";into nosi t ion and occ'tpying less road space on the march. For tOlrJedar t i l lery ' , he l i s ted the a.dvantages of less vehicle ~ e c i a l i z a t i o n (theantithesis of the "inflexible ~ r i : T l e mover" disadvantr.:;o) and tha t . t-had been tested in war. 19 The next year (1921), ~ l o n e l :':oody gave anaddit iona! advantage f'or self '-?ropellad arti l ler: l : 3600 f ie ld of f i reby turnin 6 the entire :nount. 20 : ~ also l i s ted an additional advantageof towed ar t i l lery , i t s l i .1hter \mit w e i g h t . ~ 1

In a ~ r i z e - ~ n n i n g ar t ic le for the Journal or the United StatesArtil lery t i tIed tt S e l f ' - ? r o ~ ) e l l e d Track-Laying Arti l lery, tt l":aj - ; i l l i a . ~ T.Carpente!' recal led the significance of tact ical :nobility :!on l ; o r l d , ~ a r I .

13i,':a,j ,J'ebster A. C a ~ r o n , rlOrdnance ..lotor 2.quip..'11ent for Artillery T:-ans!,ort, II The Field J\r t i l lery Joumal, Vol. ~ . ~ , Ijo. 5(Sep-Oct 20), pp. 455-4-37.19Co1 Lucian 3. : ' ~ o o ~ , n : ' ~ o t o r i . z e d Art i l le ry ," Army Ordnance,Vol. I , ~ o 1 (Jul-Aug 20), pp. 8-14.20Light ar t i l lery was a t this time ?r1ncipally aL"!1ed by direct

f i re techniques. -rhus displacement from aind.ng stakes (used in indirect f i re) was not a consideration in Colonel iooqy's l is t ing of this~ an advantage.

21 Col Lucian 3. : ' : o o ~ , 'r:-:otorized Combat ~ ' r a n S ? O r t , II Ordnance, Vol. :1:, :';0. 6 c-lay-Jun 21) t p. 303.


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20ne went on to state:

The greatest a r t i l l e ~ product of the late war ~ a ~ ~ 3elfP r o ~ e l l e d jun Hount, of the track laying t;roe, though it played noactive part in the war. I t is certain that in the next ~ r e a t war,a l l other conditions being equal t the v i c t o ~ J on land \.,111 re s twi th c..'-le side which can fi rs t bring into action a preponderence ofar t i l lery having the nobil l ty to be obtained only with this tY';)El of~ u carriaga. 22

Co:lparinG t r a c t o ~ d r a ' t m towed ar t i l lery with self-pro,el led art i l lery ' the l is ted as advantaE:"es of the la t ter , abi l i ty to fire t h r o u ~ o u t 3600and to o c c ~ y ?osit ions ra?idly, and less c a r ~ o and road S?HCe required. J . ~ l e s e had been cite0 before. Additionally, he l i s ted greater speed and!'lobili ty, both tac t ica l end strategic , the :nore stable gun :lOunt, lessfuel cons\J:"l?tion t and less Cral-l personnel. And, unlike other "'ri.-ters , !1e thought self'-pro'f.)elled wea1?Ons l-Tould be easier to c a . . " n o u f l a ~ e . 23f!1.e disadvantages he l is ted were tlprime :"'lover out--cannon O\lt," higheruni t weight of s e l f - ~ r o ! > e l l e d :"lounts J and Ifinfle:xible ?rin:.e ~ o v e r . tI:"..a.jor ~ M e n t e r thought the las t d i s a d v a n t a ~ e of l i t t l e consequence. 24

~ ' i a j o r Ce.!'?enter !lredicted tha t in th.e next 'tolar t a n . ~ s "Hould leadthe infantr 'J , whic.'-1 'trould ?robably be :"lotorized, and tha t tan..:Cs wouldmeet r.lore resista. 'lca than in -.iorld \'Tar I . A r t i l l e ~ J would have toaCCOr:1?Bn:' t a n . ~ s to cO::lbat tanks, machine nests , anti-tank ~ u n s , 3..'I'}dl igh t ar t i l lery . This ~ a . n k - a c c o : n p a n y i n g ar t i l lery would be " P r i . : ! l a r i . l ~ l adirect f i re ,,,reapon. 25 I t i s not u,o clear :1'0:'1 his art icle hoW' thistJ!>e of a . ! ' t i l l e ~ , would di f fe r from thg t a n ~ ~ s t h e ~ s e l v e s . 1he ar t ic le

22.:a j . 1 i l l i a . ~ of. C a ~ n t e r , It Self-Pro-pelled Track-Lay-lng Art5.llery': ?8.!'t I , t ' Journal of the thi ted states Arti l lery, Vol. i.IV, l ~ o . 4( A ~ r 21), p. 321.

23Ibid. , Part I I , ~ l o l . UV, l ~ o . 5 C ~ S \ Y 21), :J. 450.24rbid. t P"9. 4..50-451. 25Ibid., pp. 451-452.


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i s hOl-rover, a;,;onfj t.he f i r s t to discuss artillel".v "Tit!'"' ~ e ~ ; ' n e c t toarllored forces.

In his annual re'Oort for 1922, t . ~ e Chief of Field / ~ t i l l e r : ' reported that , ~ . r . i . . th reSl:)6ct to ar t i l lery transoort J there \olE.S a widedifference of ooini.on as to whether ellvisj 0\1 a r t i l l e ~ " she uld be horseor tractor-drawn. 26

In 1923, the Ordn.a.l1ca De-partr;lent invr 1 t i ~ a t e d c r o ~ s-cou."ltryvehicles \m:.ch co1.lld serve a ll ar.ns in forNard echelons ir . the f ield .3ased on i t s test,'. the f . . o ~ a r t m e n t l isted the follo'wing as d i s a . d v a n t a ~ e sof s e l f - ~ r o ? e l l e d tl"al1s!Jort cO::'l'Oared to towed loads, t o 1 h i C ~ 1 could b ~ t ra i lers as Hell as cannon: 27

- - less eff ic ient because tmred artillel'Y could he :noved 'Iiith lesshorsc")ower--less ~ o b i l i t y , both tactical and s t r a t e ~ c , because of the Greateruni t w e ~ _ ght- -" inf lexible prir:l9 :"1over"--"!=>ri:'le :,ovar out-- C:L"IDon out"--more di f f icu l t to canoufla 0e- -s ta te of the art not develo?ed enougn--too eX!Jonsive.

Tne D e ? a r t : ~ e n t reco!::1lended that al l self--pro?elled vehicles be e l i ~ j , -nated at this time. 23

26"Annual Report of tho Chief of Field Arti11er;y' for Fiscal1922,11 ' ~ Field .Artillery JOH:'tl)al, Vol. ~ ' ~ I , Ho. 6 (i'!ov-Dac 22),"0 . 472.

27r ha.ve ' 9 a . r a ~ h r a . s e d the eli sadvantages a.ctually ci ted to ref lec t their pertinence to a r t i l l e ~ t ransport .

2 a l l ~ J n i v e r s a . l Cross Country Cargo Vehioles," 1he F i ~ l d Arti l leryJournal, Vol. XIII, ~ ! o . :3 (:ll\Y-Jun 23), ~ ~ 250-255


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22' ~ sa:i..e :,rea:- (1923), the Field Artillery ' ~ x > a r d conducted t ~ s t s

over a s ix ! ~ ~ o ! 1 t h ,?eriod to deter-".ine the t ac t ica l u s e f ' u l n e ~ ; s of se1.f~ r o ? e l l e d mounts for l isht d::.v:.sion a r t i : u . e ~ , r cO='l"9ared to ~ L o r s e - ortractor-drawn ar t i l l e ry . The boa.rd tested both the ciolt CC'ld c.."lristiel ight self-oropelled weapons, and r e c o ~ " t " 1 e n d e d that t r o ! ' ~ on ti19n be dis-c:>ntinued. I t based th is r e c o ~ r . r n e n d a t i o n on reasons cited hefore:pri:;le :-:lover out--cannon out," heavJ uni t w e i ~ ; h t , and d i f f ~ . c u l t y in!lrovidinr; cover an d conceal:nent. . .aintenancc ,,:as also connidert d npro:>lan, because s e l f - ~ r o " g e l l e d arti l lerrj ' could not oe f i ~ } d while .rort:was b e i n ~ g e r ~ O ~ e Q on the v e h i c u l ~ c o ~ ~ o n e n t s . 3ut, in ~ h b O Q ~ j ' s vievI, the !:ost da"TU1ing indictl1ent against self-,?I'O!Jelled Q:--ti ~ ~ e r y . ~ l a s the tmrel iabil ity of i t s vehicular cO;":l?onents. 29 lbe boaro considered~ o ' r s e s to be :nora re l iable , and more r.!ooile, both tact ical ly and st ra-tebical ly, and i i ' l general, fa.vored a.."li!:'!al transport over ~ l e c h a n i c a ~ tra.'1.sport.30

E'1.e ~ l i e : f of Field A r t i l l e ~ . r , in his annual r e ~ o r t for 192;"reco!TI:"1ended tha t division ar t i l lery be horse-drawn, not ~ o t o r i z e d . ; 1

3 u n . . " ! l a r ; L . - - D . l r i Y l ~ the f i r s t ,hase of the argument of towed versus self-propelled a r t i l l e ~ . l , there ,,,as a.."'1other, concurrent argurr.ent:horse-dra\om a.rtillery versus : n ~ t o r i z e d a r t i l l e t ~ ) " ' . r ~ l a t t e r argu:nont(as ,rell as most other contern:norar:r arg1r1snts about f ie ld arti l lery ')

29The board also considered that vehicles in genel'al requiredmore maintenance and sk i l l than horses.3OlIHorses, '1'ractors and Self-Propelled ~ ' : O ' l m t $ , " lwne FieldArtiller,! Journal, Vol. i:III , i:o. 6 (Hov-Dec 23), ? ~ 472-492.3 1 1 t A n . ~ u a l P.e"Oort of the Chief of Field Artillery," The F i e ~ Arti l lery Journal, Vol. XIV. No. 2 ( ~ ' ~ a r - A ; > r 24), !>. J17.


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-oertained to eli v i s i o ~ l l ieht ar t i ller-J. ~ ~ o s t of the a r g U ! n ~ l n t s !,e!'tainin3 to "t,o;red versus self-pro?cl led artillo1'"j Here sta.t.ed in ternsof a d v ~ ~ t a ~ e s ~ ~ dissdvantazes of s e l r - p r o ~ e l l e d artilleFJ, ratherthan advantages of self- , rooelled ar t i l ler '1 anel advantages of tOrlec.arti:!.lery. In most eases it can be inferred th l l t disadvarktages of self -pro:!,elled arti l lor 'J 't-rere t concurrently, advantages of towed ar t i l l e ry .

~ e r e a p ~ e a r s to have been 1eneral a ~ o c ~ o n t that s e l f - p r o ~ e l l e d art i l lery ~ - J ' a s the best configuration fo r occupying ~ o s i t ions rapidly.'J.tJ.g was considered the 9ri:'Ile advantage at this ti.l1e. O?inion s e e : ~ s tobe div:..ded as to whether or not self-propelled ar t i l l e ry was b e t t E ' ~ thantowed ar t i l lery 1-d.th res!,ect to tac t ieal r-lobility. 3 e l f - p r o ! , e l l e ( ~ : art i l le r} was not rated highly f r o ~ the standpoint of s t ra teg ic ~ , l o b i l i t y . 3ut, recalling t."1at at t.l.is t i ! ; ~ e tolred art i l lery was tractor-dra....m,th is l a s t n a . ~ e d 1eficiency rright a p ~ l y to both f o ~ s of !:'".echanized arti.:l:lery t:-ansool"t. To achieve a.dequate strategic mobility, b:>th se l f -propelled, tOI-red, and horse-c1:'a\oTn 8. l .t i l l e r J would have to oe transportedto the h a t t l e r r o ~ t by t 2 : ' u c : ~ .

Of 't.'le technic,ql advantages of self-progelled arti .l ler.r, i t sab i l i ty to :!"ire throughout 360 by s.'lif'ting the entire mount was al.'ilostuniversally propo\D'l.ded. '!his advantage must be viel-red in the l i gh t ofthe preponderance of direc t fire ~ . m n e ~ for l i gh t a r t i l l e ~ a t ~ ~ ~ s time. 1be heaV"J unit weight or selt-p:-opelled mO\mts was 't.."le cilia.:' disadvantage. '.ieight affected their strategic and taetical mobility byl i t.i.ng the i r bridge crossing capabi l i ty. The uniting of the cannonto the prL"":1.e :nover raised two other reasons as disadvantagos of se l f -propelled artiller-J: "prime mover out-- cannon out" and "inf'lexib1e

II~ r J . " n e nover.


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24: ~ e i t h e r the Jero Board or ~ ~ e s t e r v e l t 30ard r e ~ o r t f ; , nor t ~

;.,Titers in ~ u l i t a r y publications ci ted considered to any orient the:':lechanical lirnitat ions of s e l f - ~ r o ~ e l l e d ar t i l le ry . :lor did any of theabove do r.luch test ing of equi!,):r..ent. Both the r e ~ o r t s fro::l the Ord"18..'1ceI J e p a ~ t : J . e n t and the Field Artillor: ' 30ard were based on tef;ts and ~ ) o t h or these organizations considered r.lee..1.anical l i :nitat ions qu i t e i : n . ~ ) O r -tant reasonf for not ado!1tin3 s o l f - ! l r o ~ e l l e d ar t i l lery a.t th is t i , e .I t would ap?ear t ~ a t the state of the art wa.s not sufficlE.ntly developedto produce reliable s e l f - ~ r o ~ e l l e d arti l lery.

Litt le cu.!sideration "Ias given during this 'Phase to arti:L'i1ery) with an.'1ored forces. tlor lias the truck evaluated as a means of 1


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25Ibis f:ect.)nd r a c t ~ r was to '9revent ~ u c h materiel of any 501 t f r o ~ bein3developed for the Ju-my, and to ca.use Army planners to c o n ~ : i d 9 r :naterielfor equi"9!>ing the i1.rY!y in tams of s t r i c t a.l1sterit:;.

Arti l lery for the Hechani zed Force 1-laS pri:narily traotor-dra.wnl ight ar t i l lery , wi.th t:-ucks to transport both cannon and ~ r i . ' i l e ~ ( ~ v e r s

I

on lon8 l"Qad ~ n a r c h e s to enhance strategic ~ o b i l i t y . Additionally. theliolt l ight self-!,ropelled m o u r ~ t s , bui l t seven years before, wereused.)3, 34

~ ~ s e l f - ~ r o p e l l e d ar t i l l e rJ ~ ~ t h the ~ i e c ~ a n i z e d Force did not,el"for:n to o ~ . . r e l l . kl observer r e ~ o r t e d that the pieces were not ~ a s te n o u ~ " , were unreliable, an d ~ e q u i r e d too ~ u c h t i : l ' ~ e for t i r ing "9rl.pa.!'at ions. ~ o ~ a n y of these deficiencies were caused by the state of thear t , or how ~ ~ ~ y "lare caused by the sta te of the e q u i ~ ~ e n t , cannot bedeterm.ned. rne observer recor.unended tha t l i l h t ar t i l lery with the~ " : e c h a n i z e d ?orce be truC:c-dratm, sinoe t rac tors "rere too s:Low, and thetransport of tractor-drawn s e ~ t i o n s was not v e s a t i s r a c t o ~ J . J 5

But another a r t i l l e ~ a n thought d i r f e r e n t ~ . ! . h o ~ g h admittingthe exist inz s e l f - ~ r o p e l l e d artillery uas not adequate J !.!a.j :?ane E.D e ? ~ I10yle stated:

Self-pro?elled ar t i l l e rJ i s considered absolutely necessar'; t a~ T 1 e c h a n i z e d force. To bui:ld a tank suff iciently large to r cC"ryingl ight a..'ld nedilrtl guns and hO'tdtzers cal ls for the "Land Battleshi!l,ttslo't-l-moving and a :?lost vulnerable target . I t has no place in our;:echanized Force. Self-pro-pelled arti l ler 'J ca n be fas t moviY1g andpresent a s=nall ta rget and must be close a t hand to support the

J:3IbJ:.g.J4r...t Col P. De Glassford, tiThe ~ \ ! e c h a n i z e d Force. Facts and' lheories," The Field Artil lery Journal, '/01. XVIII, i ~ o . 6 (Nov-ll9c 28),

~ p 6 2 ~ 6 3 0 . 35Ibid


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26advance of the l i G ~ and r.ledi ttr.. tws. 36

:ie ",rent on to l i s t advantages of s e l f - ~ r o ? e l l e d artiIlel '"J: itcould occupy posi t ions r a ~ i d l y and required smaller C r ~ - I 5 . ~ ' : a j o r .-:oylei:-tolied that ~ o protection for the crews might be in tegra l ,nth ~ s e l f ~ r o ~ e l l e d ar t i l lery . '.'his ~ T a s , ?erha!,s, the f i r s t indication thata r . ~ : o r -r>rotection was an advantage of s e l f - p r o ~ e l l e d ar t i l l e ry ; l a te r ,the tart:ls tlar;1!Jred a r t i l l e ~ " " 8."'1d "self-pro";,)911ed artiller"J" '-Tare tobeCOt1e al.!:lost synonymous. As disadvantages, he l i s ted the alr.l0st ";'bynow) tradi t i ~ n a . l "'Or:Lna :aover out--cannon out.. and "inflexible !Jr-l:..en:overu ~ 1 a r a . c t e r i s t i c s . _Tajor rloyle fur ther ?ointed out that c i v i ~ i a n vehicles could not be L"'!lpressed as self-propelled mounts; purely r.-.ilitarof vehicles nust be used. 37 1'his l as t point was l i s ted ~ e r n a o s inl ight of t ~ ' 1 e ~ ted sta tes ' d i f ' f 1 c u l t ~ l in 'Oroduc1ng ar:ns during ({orld..:a r I .

"l'he use of cor:unereial v e h i c ~ e s in - ; > r o d ' ~ c t i o n was consideredfrom a diff: lrent tack by another a r t i l l e ~ a n . ::;rit ing in The FieldArt i l le r r JO'lma! in 1929, ":'iaj L. R. Cole stated: ttjost serious[liTflitationJ of al l i s t.'1e fact that it [selr-prooelled ar t i l le ry] i san exclusively :n.ili tar-/, design and does not fit in lolith arlJ" co:nercialneed, hence only a. l imited number of manufacturers \r.i.ll be prepared top ~ d ' U c e it in emerge!lcies. u33 ae l i s ted as additional d i s a d v a n t a g ~ s , self-?ro:?elled ar t i l l e ry ' s hea"'J "leight, difficul ty of ooncealJ!lant", and

36:iaj ~ ~ n e Z. In?.. iioyle t u ~ : e c h a n i z a t i o n , n 'l'he Field J ~ 1 1 1 e r y Journal, Vol. i ~ V I I I , 1-:0. :3 C ~ a y - J u n 23), p. 243.37Ibid . , ? 244.33::a j l.. : ~ Cole, ttAlI-Puroose Arti l ler . l "rraction,Ume FieldArtiller-r Journal t Vol. : ; a : ~ , ~ : o . 6 ( ~ I o v - D-c 29) t -p. 647.


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----------------------------------

27

na cited the necessity for t ' J . . . . ~ n ~ the e!'ltire ~ l o u n t to traverse ane.that the , ieces 1..0:::-e co :mlicated and enens i vee 39 ~ ~ o ' t ' A v e r , . ~ a j o ! ' Colec ~ n s i d e r e d a t r a c ~ c - l a ~ l i n '"'; cavabili ty key to :>ri:lle ~ o v e ~ s , and -::>ro,?o:l."1dad a s o l ~ t i o n of uhoeled ,,ehicles convertib!.e t::> tracked vehicles(a s the C:Lristie vehicles).40

In 1930, Jeneral .:;jur.nTlel"'all. the Chief of ; j taff , !'ecalled tl'ieneed for a r t i l l e r ~ , p to accompany the infantry in t ~ as saul t in , i o l ~ d ,;ar I . ite fe l t that there was s t i l l a real need for an a C C C t ~ ! l P a n y i r . gun, and t ~ a t it si",1". tid be sel f-pro?elled. He did not think there wasyet a sui table desi g:'l for th is wea'')O:1. It would have t have good tact ical mooillty , and :rrlst have ere-il !J1"otectio!1. F \ u ' t . ~ e r t he s tated thatself-pro::Jellecl art i l ler:r 't-l8S uindispe'1sable for a ::leche.n.ized force. n' ~ t e sit1dfica::1.tly, he t:ent on to state that the ~ l e c h a n i z e d forces e 1 f - p r o ~ e l l e d a r t i l l e r ~ i s h o ~ d oe em?loyed in bat teries. 41 L tc thisti;lle, art i l lery ln th ~ ~ e c h a n i z e d [ar:nore


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23As the second dec a.do af ter ,':0 r ld ; ~ a l " I \lore on, the t r " . l c ~ : r 3 -

placed th e t ractor for toned 3,1'tillerJ. 'lone trucks were fcwter and:nora rel iable t.han the t rac tors , , , : h i c . ~ were basicall;.,r of ~ ~ o ) " ' l d ',",ar t:design. Less and less was heard about self-oro:)elled arti l : .er'7 v:hichi'Tas s t i l l of ,lorld .iar : design and manufacture. :n 1935, tne Field.Artillery 3cilool stated tnat the trend t O ~ v a r d a r t i l lery \ ~ l o t ( ) r i z a t i o n was marked by" the use of truc.l


38/81

29u. ,::). Arr:lY, and in art i l ler : r to su?port t . h ~ . In 1941, th.e newly fomed2d A.n-r.orec! ilivision was el1?loyed in :::aneuvers in '!'ennessee. A r t i l l e I J ~ wi th the elivision wa.s ?5T:r:;} gu:."lS tOHed by half-trao:


39/81

30entire :10unt, vTas no longer an advantage beca.use satisfactory indirtlctf ire ?rocedures had been d e v e l o ~ e d for l ight ar t i l lery . In fact , th e~ a l l on-carriage traverse of self-propelled ?ieces of this time ~ . . J ' a s adisadvantage. 47 vt.'lor disadvantages of self-oropelled a..wt:5.11ery wereci ted in both phases: f1pri.r.le mover out--cannon out," heavy unit w e i ~ h t (nolo1 increased \'11 th ar:n.or) t and diff icul ty of conceaLnent. D..1rin thesecond phase, mechanical l imitations and 9 r o b l e . ~ s of maintonance weredisadvantages tha t oame to the tore. I t a p ~ o a r s that t h r,l&ny disadvantages of s e l f - ~ r o ! , e l l e d art"ll lery contributed to th.e argument fortotred artilleI".I.

47Indirect f ire procedures required the exact alizrunent ofcannon with respect to aiming stakes. Tuming of the ent i re self-propelled mOlmt to r large defiect10n shirts made realignment of theaiming stakes necessary--a time consuming procedure. nus ?rocedurewas not generally required for the com})arable case (shirt ing t ra i l s ) intowed artillel'"J.


40/81

'fne 3attinrrI t was ' 1 ~ i n t e d out .in C h a ~ t e r I I that with the b e ~ n . ~ n ~ s of

t.he u. ~ J I . ! ' ~ r ' S ar::'!')rod forces, the a1";:"tr:lant of toweci versus 5e1:....? r o ~ ) e l l e d a r t i l ~ . . : r r J oeca":1e an a r , ~ u n c n t of " T ~ c h o!' these t ~ ~ o f o ~ n : > ofar t i l le ry t : ' a ~ s n o r t ~ ; l a s be t te r fo r ar."lorod forces, :-ather than 1-f.l-lcn

I I c o ~ t i n u e d on t:rl.s t a c ~ to the a ! ' E ~ T ' l a n t . Al thou::h ;'ni'tiall:J" not a l ar::l0rec. divisions we!'e e o : . t i . ~ " J 9 d yd. t ~ self-!lro:Jelled l-TeapOns, "":Jy th e endof the \-Tar a l l had s e : : ' f - n r o ~ e l l e d a r t i l l e r ~ , . . . 'lbere a0gear to {lave been. : ' e 1 ~ instances of s e l f - ~ : r ' : : > o e l l c d a r t i l l e r ~ l bein1 lsed in direct s U ~ 2 J o r t of infa.'1try d ivls ions durin'S : iorld ~ J j a r I I . 1':-0 self-nrocelled ar t i l le rybat tal ions su'):"orted an i n r a n t ~ J elivision .\.n the !:ormanr i n v a s i ~ n , 1~ o r e d division a r t i l l e ~ ! \1aS used a t t.i.-nes in suP?ort of inrant :...Y' d i-visions, and the 4th Infantrrf llivlsion ; \r t i l ler;r had self-l1!'C\JelladCantlOn fo r a t i : ~ l e . 2 dow8ver, fo!" the :.10st :;lart, ar t i l l e ry with infantryd iv i s ion s ,las to"red.

l Lt Col ?aul P. r . i ~ t l e y , a t a l . , U ~ e r a t i o n s of ; . . r r : . ~ r e d ~ i e l d Artillery 3attalions: A F.esearch ?s'Oort" (Fort [.nox, : ~ a n t u c ~ < y : 'iliaArmored 3chool, 1949-195')), -p_ 25_ .21eadquarters ~ J n i t e d States Forces, ~ u r o ~ e a n 'fheater ~ Ooerat ions, u:leport of the General Board: .study of the Organization,

S q u i ~ m e n t a."ld 'actical $ 1 ? l o ~ e n t of the Infantr'.f Division (.!_ 1)46),i ~ p e n d i x 15, p. 10.

31


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32Thore a ~ ) ' O e a : = - s to have been l i t t l e se:!..f-?l"':>'Oelled ar-:illarr.: used

in the iJacific theaters of o'Jerations. IherEI ilere no a r . ' ~ o r o d elivis ionsa . s s i : ~ n e d there. J Of the 67 divlsiO!lS tha t StL\v C ' : > : ~ 1 0 a t in t ~ t ~ ZurooeiLl1o ~ : a d i terral'1ean meaters of O!)erations. 16 Here ar:r.ored divisions.'"I"nus it ';"'205 in ~ u r o ? e (and ~ ~ o r t h Africa) w h e ~ " e s e l f - ? r o ~ e l l ' ) d art i l - e ~

-rTas ~ r i l 7 1 a r i l y ~ r l . t h ar:nored divisions, Hillen \fere 3. con!=)ideraole ~ o r t i o n Iof the C. :j. i ~ 5 co:1bat OOt-Ter in tl'lat 'Jart of the \OTo4,..ld . 1'uo .-.0,'le15

of self-ryropelled cannon nredo:-r:inated: t : ' 1 ~ s e l f - ' O r o ~ e l l e d 105-:1r.1 hOt:i tzar , ~ : 7 , and the self-?ro1elle,1 1 5 5 ~ : ~ " t : . . r t , . ~ 1 2 . 5 Althouga the i a l f ~ trac.1.< was used as a l)rime : - ; ~ o v a ~ for t o ~ \ ~ d ar t i l l e ry (?art icularly :.::jorth Africa.), the princi:.:>al nrime ,"'lovers for' to..reci arti l ler.r w e ~ e the2 ~ to n t r u c ~ { for l i eh t arti:J.er-J, the J ton truck for "lled.iU'":l 8.!'tillery,and the h e a ~ J t ractor f o h e a ~ ! a r t i L l e ~ v .

me argu:lent of towed versus self-::>ropelled artillE!r'.i, as itre la ted to the eX!;)erience of ',iorld .iar I ! J t-las vrl t . respect to the advantages and d i s a d v ~ ~ t a 5 e s of s e l f - ~ r o ~ e l l e d a r t i l l e ~ r in ~ o r e d divisions. l ~ e r e s e e ~ s to have been l i t t le consideration of self~ r o : ; > e l l e d artill.er:r for other ty?9 d i v i s i o n ~ .

'?:lis cha?ter ~ d l l address i t se l f to considerine t h l ~ exoerionceof the ' far as i t :-elates to t.."le advanta.:;es and disadvantag-as of sel f --oro-oelled ar t i l l e ry d e v e l o ~ e d during the are;U"!'lent ?rior to ~ d o r l d ',.lar II .

----'3Qoj,bat :utvisions of 'n"orld Har I I (:'lashin:;ton: Ar-nJ 1':U"1es,

~ 1945), pp. 1-95.4rbid.5For brevi.ty t these tl,"O ! 'ieces wil l be referred to as the ~ : and ~ ~ 1 2 , respectively. throur..;hout t.1rl.s chapter.


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33The Advantaces of S e l f - P r o ~ e l l e d f ~ t i l l o ~ l

J a ~ i d occuoation of p o s i ~ . - - F r o ~ the v e ~ J b e ~ ~ ~ ~ i n ~ of thea r g u ~ e n t , t r ~ s seemed a v O ~ J i ~ p o r t a n t advanta3e. ? n ~ e s t e r v e l t J o a ~ c i ted rapid o c c u ~ a t i o n of nosi t ion as i ~ , ? O r t a n t ; and afterw.3.rds t a l ' \ ~ s t eveyrtoJ o?inion on s e l f - ? r o ~ e l l e d nrtiller'"j, u ~ e t h e r :>ro or c)n, considered i ta." ir.:?ortant advantage. Col Ii. J ! - a . . ~ a n , 4th Armored JivisionArtiller:t Co=nm.ander, conside:-ed ra!,id occupation of ~ s tiO:1S ver-J i;n!,orta.'1t in the : u ' ~ u : n e n t f o sel f-?ro!,elled art i l lery. 6 Lt Col ~ : u g h : . ~ . Exton, an : ~ bat ta li.on c O : : l ~ a n d e r in both :!orth Africa an d =:uroge t fE'l this pieces bet ter _:1 thi.s ~ e s p e c t than towed ~ i e c e 5 . ;-iowever, ~ didInot consider it to be as i;'Mortant as the be:'ta r t ac t i c a l . ~ ~ ~ b i l i ty ofsel--r.>ronalled ar t i l l e ry . 7 Col . ' ~ . I . ~ ~ U l ' t z , 1 4 t . . ~ A.l"r.lored DivisionArtil lery C o : ~ 1 l T l a n d e r , also considered s e l f - ~ l " ' ) p e l l e d artille-r 'J q u i c k , ~ in occu9y:i..ng post t ions, but tllat this llas not as significant as the

oarmor protection of self-!=>ro?elled artiller"J....J Col Frederic J. Jrown,3d A . . . ~ o r e d Division Artiller 'J Cor.nnander, w r i t i n ~ about the ~ ' ~ 1 2 riM3rily to the ::7), thoUf;!1.t t . ~ e bet tertact ical mobility of the :-112 more i ~ m > o r t a n t t . ~ a n rapid occupation ofposit ion. 9

i ~ one seemed to think self-propelled ar t i l le ry was slower thantowed artil ler:-; in occupying :!,ositions; however, this advantage did not

I"Col .':. K. !{ur"tz, "Self-Propelled vs. rowed Art i l l a rJ , ,iU1r.lUn i tion, 'f (3d iJ. S. Ann:y Artil lery Conference, 1945), p. 16.

7Lt Col iIug.."l ~ 1 . Ebcton, 'Fran liorocco to Serlin," ':r.l8 FieldA r t . i l l e ~ JOU!'l1al, Vol .xxxViII, I ~ o . J (i'-1ay-Jun 4-3), p. 10.].

g ~ ~ u r t Z t ?p. 13-16.9Col Frederic J . 9 r o ~ , m , "S!learhead Artil lery: Ille 3tor'J o ~ the

3d .Armored Division Artil lery," '!he Field Artil lery Journal, Vol. : ~ G V I , No.9 (Sap 46), p. 506.


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a ? ~ e a r as innortant in the e ) ~ e r i e n c e of the t-lar. 111e ~ a . . 1 1 ~ ~ ti.-aes sel fpl"opelled cannon Here used for assault fire 10 (especially the ~ ' : 1 2 ) indicates that in this onploY"lent at leas t , ra:nid occupati()n of nesi t ionwas a signif icant advantage ') f selt-propellE,d ar t i l lery . 11 12

~ \ r . m o r p r o t e c t i o n . - - A r ; ~ o r ~ r o t e e t i o n had been considered L ~ o r -tant in the second phase1) of the Ar6W1ent bet"-teen the wars. Coloneli\urtz (CO, 14th A . . ~ o r e d .atvision Artiller-J) thought . i t qui r,8 i:nport.ant;14 Colonel &eton (CO, :17 battalio!l) , an advantage. 15 Col Carl I .liutton, cO:"r'lander of an ~ : battal ion and l a te r , 2d Armored DivisionArtillery Coman ! ' , l iked the armor protection of the .:7 because o..r i t svalue in fire f ights with infantry and tanks. 16 But r e ~ o r - : . s fror.. ~ ~ e e ~ a 2 bp.ttalions stated that ~ o ~ r o t e c t i o n \oTas not too L'1l'!Jortant. 171he X12' s , being roamum ar t i l lery, \ . f9r9 generally further to the rearthan the ~ 7 ' s ; ~ ~ w e v e r , they did fire ~ ~ assault f i re missions. J ~ o r

10As sault f ire in ar t i l lery i s extrc3'1lely accurate, short rangedestruction t i re a t point targets (Dictionary 9 \hi ted St.!tes Army:'cerms, .A.a. 320-5 liitwlU.ngton: U. S. Joverrnnent Printing Office, Apr 6f),? 49.) One piece of medium or heavy art i l lery i s usually employed foreach target . Because or the short range (the target i s wit.hin sieht ofthe cannon), cannon t i r ing assault t i re missions quito often soon comeunder small anns and intense cotU'lterbattery t i r e .

11:readquarters First United States Army, " A r t i l l e ~ Information3ervice, : ' ~ e m o r a n d \ t T l No.4" (Jun 4 l ~ ) , p. 46.12rIeadquarters Firs t United States .A.my, "J\rtiller-J InformationService, :Iemorandun : ~ o . '111 (Dec 44), p!>. 16-22.1J'lhe terns It socond 'Ohase" and tIf i r s t -chase" refer to the t ~ - t o phases of the arglrnent prior ' to r,-lorld -iiar I I developed in C'napter 11

(pp. 17, 24) 1l+.,. t 13 1St:\.- 3h.ur Z , '0 . ~ t o n , ;:>. 10' .16Co1 Carl I . Hutton, ttAn Armored Field Arti l lery CoITk'1lander inthe European 'Theater" (Fort SlU, Cklahoma, 1951), ? 251.17uArti l lery Information 3ervice, ~ r e . ' i l o r a n d u m No.7 ," '9. 93 .


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35protection obviously added to the uei ght of the ~ i e c e s ; t . ~ e r e seeMS tohave been l i t t l e evaluation as to whether the ?rotection w ~ ~ r o r t h theweight.

: : ~ b i l i t y . - - : - : a n y of the argt1r.lents orior to , ; ~ r l d ,iar ~ made ac a r e r ~ u distinction between ta.ctical a."ld strategic !T.obili ty . r h i ~ ; dist inction vTas not generally tr.ade wi th r e s ~ e c t to ar t i l l e r J t ~ a n s ~ r t in~ ' I o r l d ~ ; a r ~ I ~ : o b i l i t y in :-lc"rld ~ l a r I I meant cross-countz-:r ~ . o b i l : . t y and can be equated for the : i lOst par t to the ear l i e r te rn, t ac t ica l nobi l i ty . Lt Le\-rl. ... ::t. 3correr, writing about his ~ ' : 1 2 battal ion ins U ? ~ o r t of the 3d Armored 'Qi.vision, reported that the superior mobi.li tyof self-propelled medium a r . t i l l e ~ I was ver.y Lnportant. In t ~ b r e ~ { o u t across : ~ o r t h e m France, }--4i.s battal ion was the o n ~ " artiller-j" heavierthan 105r.1m howitzers15 that could kee? up with the lI.3pearhead Di.vision. u1 )The 1st :;. 3. A r r : ' ~ t !'aporting on th:-ee ~ ~ 1 2 battalions ( i n c l u d i n ~ ::.J..e'..ltenant 3correr's), stated: "TIle ? r ~ ~ a ~ a d v ~ ~ t a g e of s e l f - ~ r o p e l l e d

,,20artillezo:)" l ies in i t s t ac t ica l mobiLi.ty. Lt Col J. 0-1.:':c?heeters, co:nr.lander of an ~ ' ~ 7 battal ion, re:.>orted tha t hi s piecescould go almost everywher'e. 21 Colonel Ebctcn (CO, 1 ~ 7 battalion) considerad the excellent nobil l ty of the -,:7 the outstandi.ne: characteris t i c

18 . t ~ t l 1 1 e r y organic to armored d:iv i sions in 'dorld ','Iar I I wasthree :':7 battal ions. aeavier art i l ler 'J v T a ~ attached. Infantry d iv i-sions ha.d three 10,5r.m and one 15,5m.'i'l holdtzer battal ions organic. '19L t :Atwis ?-. .3coi'f'er, "An i:12 Battalion in Combat," J.t'le FieldArti l lelX Journal, Vol. l..XlV, ] 0 . 1 (Jan 45), ?p. 29-)1.20UArtillery Information 3ervice, ~ ' ~ e m o r a n d u m : ~ o . '1," p. 93.21 J'J'f!!j' Ground Forces Board, "Intervieus on . , : ~ o r e d Cor:na."dActiv i t ies with Orficers of the 1s t Az!nored DLvision: I taly,

aovember 16-29, 1943, II p. 33.


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of s e l f - o r o ~ e l l e d a r t i l l e ~ . 2 2 h.ough there see::lS to be general a ~ r e e ~ e n t t . ~ a t the .,.12 had

su?erior :!lobiilty to comoarable tOlled cal ibers , not a l l thoul;ht the :.7'tTas s u ~ e r i o r to t i ~ e t?wed 1 0 5 n ~ howitzer. Colonel .:..urtz ( ~ ; o , 1 1 ~ t h J L ~ o ~ e d ~ v i s i o n A r t i ~ l e ~ : ) ~ ~ o u s ~ t the -.7 had s o ~ e :,obility a d v ~ ~ t a g e , but qualif ied th is vdth his observation tha t t!le truck was bette! ' tha."lthe . ~ in ~ u d . 23 Indicating, perha:;>5 , the s tate of the a rt a t thet i ~ e , Colonel . ~ u r ~ z uointed out that nei ther to\'1ed nor s e l ~ - n r o o e l l e d ar t i l l e ry could ; ~ g o t i a t e a l l types of terrain . 24 ilie 1s t u. .;:it A r : : ~ : r .had this to say' about the , ~ 7

'mile i t has been proved Q.n :1orth .Africa and ItaJ.i) t:1at the !:'lotorcarriage ! ~ - 7 nossesses abil'tty to negotiate r o u ~ h ter! ' .rln, i t ha.sbeen found tha t truck drawn a ~ t i l l e ~ J has been able to negotiatesuccessfullj" any terrain required 'Jf the 1rt of a:n-ohibious assaults EJ'ld executedover beaches of a sandy nature. 25 L

The 1 0 t . ~ ne ld Arti l lery .3attalion, r e ~ o r t i n g on ouerations in 3ic i lyalso considered the .. ~ 7 s excellent for la11ding ooerations, but af te rthe landing, "white ele":)hants. fI 'he towed 105' s , it ~ 9 1 t , were jus t as:"'lobile a.s the ~ " : 7 ' s . 26

.3urely no c O l n . ~ a n d e r would argue tha t good ":'lobility was not i ~ " " : -portant fo r a r t i l l e ~ r . 3ut i t a ~ p e a r s ~ ~ a t not a l l s e l f - n r o ~ e l l e d wea'Oons were uni'V'ersallY acclai:lled in ..Jorld ~ y a r II as having suoeriol"I ~ o b i l i ty than that of towed art i l ler ' J .

2 2 : : \ ' ~ 23;( t 13 24-,., . d..ton, ~ 10'.1. ..ur z , ~ . . ~

25Headquarters Firs t ~ t e d States J ~ "Art i l lery Info:nnationService, .'lemorandurn 2 ~ o . 1" (.!. Jan 44) J p. 1J.

26Eeadquarters 10th Field Art i l le ry .2attal ion, " J . ~ o t e s ane .:.as-sons of the Sici l ian Cam9aignf' (29 Jul 4 ) t p. 1.


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370thel" advantages.--Colonel ~ t o n (C'], .:7 battalion) considered

the ca?abl:'..ity of t ~ ~ " : 7 to c a r r ~ 1 a''1.'11uni t ion "''i th it an a d v ~ m t a ; ~ e , but:"lot 8,S i:i1?ortant an a d v a . n t a ~ e as l1'lobili ty or ar:'P.o!' " ' ) ~ t e c t i c l n . 27~ " ) l o n e l .:urtz l i s ted as a d i s a d v a n t a ~ ' e of towed ar t i l lery ' the a c c ~ ' l . l a -t ion .,r ilud and/or ice on the cannon 'When towed in bad \oreat:Ler. ~ e l f -?ro'oelled cannon did not have t ~ i s oroble':1, :' e observed. 23

'The . : > i s a d v a . . l ' } t a ~ e s of . : ) e l f - ? r o ~ e l l e d JU-tillery~ e a v ' { vleight.-- :('hi5 \.;as considered the ;sreatest d i S ~ l d v a n t a ~ e in

tne f i r s t 'Ohase 0_ ~ h a . r ~ e n t -;)rior to ,'iorld ....:ar I I , a.-.,d :l siglifica. '1tdisadva."taE;e in the second " " ~ H ~ 5 e . Colonels I ' ~ u r t z and EXton consider.l,dit ilia g r e a ~ a s t disadvantage of self-oro.:lelled artiller.:., .29,)O In asummary of ar t i l lery co:nbat 9X";)erience, t . ~ e Field Artil lery ;'Jchool re?orted tnat to't.md art i l lery had be t t e r H q i ~ h t distributiotl..:n IneheaV'j weight of the ~ ' : 1 2 created ~ r o b l e . ~ s in crossing b r i d ~ e s . J 2 I ta?oears tha t heavy w e i ~ t , ~ e se, was not as : n u ~ ~ ~ a disadvantage 3Swas ~ ~ o u ~ h t e a r ~ i e r . I t ' ~ ! ' o b a b l y did have an effect on ~ o b i l i t y , n o ever.

I t ? r i ~ e :""loveLQ.ut--cannon out. u_-'1'his disadvantage t-Tas i..'ll:JOrt.antin bota ~ h a s e s of the a r g ~ ~ e n t pr ior to j ~ r l d ~ a I I ; however, ~ ~ e r e ---------------------------_._---

2'7i,t Col ~ : i " J . ~ h ,'. Exton, 'tFrom ~ ' : o r o c c o to 3erlin," me ?i.eldArtillerY Jou.rn511, Vol. X J ~ X ' I l I I , : ~ o . 4 (Jul-Ang 43), "0 . 13:;. . . J ( u r ~ z h 1.1, , . 14 2 9 ~ .

30 .~ t o n , Vol. AXXViII, ~ o 4, p. 10d.31.rl1e Field Artil lery Sc.l-}ool, "3ecret Information .3u.1mar-j !':urnbel" One" (Fort ..3111, Oklaho:na, Feb 44), ~ 129. ('This re90rt has beendeclassif ied).3 ~ k ' t i l l e r y Information Service, ~ : e m o r a n d u z n ]0. 4,t ~ 46 .


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]i3'toJ'as surprisingly l i tU e mention of th.is as a disadvantage during tiorlddorld I I . :'iaj C. a. P..evie, who commanded a ~ a t t a l i o n equipped at f i rs tv.i th tOl-Ied 105' s , and laota r loTith ~ ; f 7 ' s , considered uprime ~ ~ ve r out-ca.'1non outll a significant disadvantage. 33

'1't


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39contr-.l.buted to the ~ ~ e a t e r n"..!r.ber of ~ a i n t e n a . . . l ' l c e ! ) ~ o b l e . v ; ' 1 s of self-uropalled art i l lery. ,self-oro,elled ar t i l l e ry ' s disadvantage of f?;reate:':1aintenance ::>roblens was e ~ 1 ~ h a s i z e d in the second :,hase of t.he arst..t:nqntnrior to i i o ~ l d ~ ' j a l ' I I . .:ajor Revie (CO, t O ~ l 1 e d 1 0 5 ~ : n ho\ritzor, la ter,:7, battalion) considered maL"ltenance p r o b l e ~ s as a serious disadvantage.~ l reported that h i s :':7' s needed r ~ one to t l [O days of maintenancefo r every 500 rules t ravaIled. J? ine 1st U. 3. ~ ' r e ~ o r t i n g abo:!':..:.7' s , pointed out increased ~ a i n t e n a n c e as a disadvantage of self-Jr ')naIled cannon; 33 ) did the f ie ld ArtillezrJ ~ i c h o o l in i t s Sllr. 't'n&r'j 0 far t i l l e ry act ivi t ies in COi"llbat.39 :Jut not a l l considered ita dis&dfan

Documents

Towed Versus Selfpropelled Artillery in the Period Prior to 1955 an Historical Investigation of the Argument in the United States Army