Transformations of Religiosity || Religious Social Capital in Europe Connections between Religiosity and Civil Society

Religious Social Capital in Europe Connections between Religiosity and Civil Society Gert Pickel and Anja Gladkich 1. Religious Social Capital as a New Form of Organized Religiosity? With Robert Putnam’s “Making Democracy Work”, first published in 1993, a lasting dis-cussion concerning the effects of social capital on democracies’ operational performance was set in motion.1 Putnam defines social capital as associations formed on a voluntary bases, so-called social networks, as well as interpersonal or social trust and his central ar-gument is that with citizens organizing into associations and social networks on a voluntary basis a form of (generalized) trust among people is generated. Putman concludes that gen-eral confidence in democratic institutions and politics benefit from this trust generated. Over time, this social trust, in turn, cultivates trust in democratic institutions and political decisions. Additionally, it can be argued that social capital not only contributes significant-ly to the creation of social integration or eases the implementation of political goals in so-ciety, but is also one of the main foundations for the development of civil societies. Conse-quently, the cultivation of social capital, on either level (networks or social trust), consti-tutes an important resource for successful democratization.2

In 2000, Putnam elaborated on his analysis of the concept of social capital in his book with the intentionally provocative title “Bowling Alone“ (2000), using the example of the United States. Putnam concluded on a rather pessimistic note that in regard to the develop-ment of social capital in modern (Western) societies a high degree of pluralization, indivi-dualization and medialization is present. While a progressing individualization in modern societies causes citizens to increasingly withdraw from the public as well as the above-mentioned networks, it is the augmented societal pluralization that destroys social struc-tures. Last but not least, increasing medialization, especially the argumented role of TV and internet for the leisure and recreation industry renders many associations redundant. Increa-singly, people are required to depend on themselves, resulting in social networks eroding, as are the opportunities to develop social trust.

Recently, with some delay, the social sciences have begun to study the relation between religion and social capital (Campbell/Putnam 2010; Smidt 2003; Roßteutscher 2009; Traunmüller 2009; Traunmüller/Freitag 2011). A comprehensible and obvious trend, for church networks and membership in religious associations create social trust and therefore ultimately social capital for society in general. After all, it was religion’s integrative power

1 The importance of social capital for society has also been discussed elsewhere, perhaps most prominently by

James Coleman (1990) and Pierre Bourdieu (1982). For this article, they will not be taken into account since both propose a different definition of social capital as compared to Putman and also approach the subject from a different perspective.

2 For this very reason, social networks are also sometimes referred to as “schools of democracy“. The people are able to learn civic virtues, which on the long run help the democracy to survive.

G. Pickel, K. Sammet (Eds.), Transformations of Religiosity, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-93326-9_5, © VS Verlag für Sozialwisenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2012

Gert Pickel and Anja Gladkich 70

that formed quite frequently the center of sociolinguistic discussions ever since sociology emerged as a discipline (Durkheim 2005 [Orig. 1922]; Parsons 1937; Bellah 1967). Since de Tocqueville (1976 [Orig. 1840]), potential relevance of religion in terms of solidarity within a political society has firmly established itself in political scientific debates. Thus, Putnam’s take on religion and its effects on communalization processes as one of the main sources of “social putty“ in society is neither novel nor unrelated to traditional sociological theories (Putnam 2000: 65-79).

What actually is remarkable, however, is the fact that it was not until recently that con-temporary debates explicitly emphasized religious or faith-based social capital at all, espe-cially when this emphasis was mostly only sporadic. Most likely, due to the fact that de-bates on the processes of secularization in modern societies have predominated since the beginning of the 20th century, religion and religious networks have played a marginal role in the analyses of social capital (which emerged in the 1990s) outside the United States. Researchers in the field of the European sociology of religion considered the decline in citizens’ commitment to (Christian) religions as a given in the Western World (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982). Due to this loss of social relevance of religion and its concomitant processes of functional differentiation, privatization and detraditionalization, or so the as-sumption goes, it is no longer necessary to inquire about the effects of religious communa-lization on social integration in modern civil societies.

Recently, authors have increasingly proclaimed a return of religions (Huntington 1996; Riesebrodt 2001), of the Gods (Graf 2004) or the religious in general. Apparently, religion remains important in modern societies. Even if the empirical evidence supporting the asser-tion of the return of religion is not very extensive, it has been acknowledged that seculari-zation (the process) is not to be equated with secularity (the state). It may be worthwhile to focus once again on processes of religious communalization and religious socialization as well as the relationship between the church and the state and its effects on social occur-rences of the religious.

These contradictory religious sociological interpretations of the present situation pro-vide a good reason to study the correlations between social capital and religiosity empiri-cally, as this may also stimulate the discussion on the relationship between religion and politics. At the same time, the analysis will lead the sociology of religion, with its strong emphasis on individualized religiosity (Luckmann 1967; see also Roy 2010), back to consi-dering the relevance of religious social groups. It should be contemplated whether religious social capital in modern societies is actually empirically relevant for the development of civil society (1). Its effects may be social in the sense of integrating the members of socie-ty3, but it may also be political in the sense of serving as “schools of democracy“ as Putnam calls it. Therefore, it is necessary to study the kinds of effects of religious social capital on civil society (2). It may serve as a mediator between social groups – i.e. it builds bridges (bridging) – or it may reinforce and integrate exclusive social groups (bonding) – which may, however, cause them to systematically distinguish between themselves and other social groups. It should also be of interest which impact the current religious trends have on the social capital in European civil societies (3). Will (additional) waves of secularization demolish civil societies or are they negligible as secular networks replace social networks? 3 This aspect refers to the classic sociological debate on the cohesion of the social order in individualizing

societies (Durkheim 2005; Parsons 1937).

Religious social capital in Europe 71

Or could voluntary religious networks benefit from the retreat of the major religions and thus be able to develop to the full? (4) What kinds of effects does the social capital debate have on the development of institutionalized religion? Could it be that the churches, sub-jected to the pressures of secularization, may actually benefit from changes in their net-works or are these networks inevitably exposed to processes of erosion? 2. Religious Social Capital and its Relevance 2.1 Religious Social Capital – what it is Considerations of religious social capital start out with one of Putnam’s assumptions (2000), which he elaborated based on his observations of the American society: religious networks play a major role in developing a country’s civil society. In addition to “secular“ social capital, religious social capital serves as one of the driving forces for social cohesion. Due to cultural religious traditions, in most societies, it constitutes a large part of the gener-al amount of social capital. As in the case of social capital in general, religious social capi-tal contributes to the creation of interpersonal trust and fulfills a function, which Emile Durkheim (2005 [Orig. 1922]) already attributed to religion, namely the integration of the members of an increasingly individualizing society.4 Thereby, religion assumes an impor-tant position in the societies’ political culture. It stabilizes the political order and, thanks to the religious social capital, it encourages political trust and political support of democracy.

Putnam (1993) understands social capital as social networks as well as interpersonal trust. The former is called structural social capital, whereas the latter is referred to as cul-tural social capital (Gabriel/Westle 2008) or generalized trust (Freitag/Franzen 2007; Frei-tag/Traunmüller 2009). While structural social capital initiates trust-building processes, cultural social capital emerges from the contacts established within the networks. It reflects in how far people trust one another even though they have not necessarily had many pre-vious encounters. This feeling results from people’s positive experiences within the social groups which result from and reinforce the norm of reciprocity. The norm is based on the premise that reciprocal actions create trust, which in turn causes people to cooperate and reinforces people’s assumption that they can expect others to cooperate in the future as well. The action oriented assumption of reciprocity distinguishes trust from norm-based legitimacy or faith: Trust needs to be reaffirmed, which happens in social groups. Trust acquired within the immediate social environment is then extended to other people (crea-tion of generalized, social trust in all others). It thus serves as a foundation for social inte-gration, and may even indicate integration itself. The most important aspects here are that social networks are voluntary and that trust can be extended from the group level to the societal level. In the long run, this even serves the democratic political system as it, too, benefits from an increase in generalized trust.

Social capital can be divided into “bonding“ and “bridging“ social capital. Bonding so-cial capital refers to social capital that serves to integrate the members of a single group; bridging social capital refers to social capital that assists in building bridges across social groups. According to Putnam, both types of social capital are basically useful for integrat- 4 For similar thoughts, see Robert Bellahs’ (1967) concept of civil religion.


ing democratic societies (Putnam/Campbell 2010). However, there is reason to doubt the integrative potential of bonding social capital. Even though it creates a group identity and cohesion within a certain social group, it is not extended to other members of society. Con-sequently, it is exclusive and thus involves considerable potential for social conflict. There-fore bridging social capital would actually be the only kind of social capital that has inte-grative potential for the entire society, as it connects members of different groups.5 Wuth-now (2002) differentiates between identity-bridging and status-bridging social capital. While a social group may be identity-bonding, it may also be status-bridging. Apparently, this frequently applies to faith based networks.

What do these differentiations imply for the analysis of religious organizations and groups? According to Sigrid Roßteutscher (2009), mainly the comparatively large religious groups rather than new religious movements, small religious associations or ’sects’ display bridging social capital since they exhibit a greater degree of socio-structural openness and address a wider range of subjects. The smaller religious groups by contrast address a rather homogenous group of members who, due to of processes of identity maintenance, distin-guish between themselves and other groups – or even society in general.6 However, it is this exclusivity that frequently appeals to religiously active persons.7 Besides the fact that ex-clusivity imposes a limit on the increase in membership numbers, this course of action does not create bridging but rather bonding social capital. The spread of these new religious movements does not substitute the integrative power of the large religious organizations – and does not contribute to integration and the stabilization of the political order. 8

These links are presented in the model in Chart 1. Structural social capital encourages trust between the members of the respective social group (ingroup cultural religious social capital) and in turn promotes trust in the respective religion and church. In order to contri-bute to the general social integration, this trust needs to be extended to adherents to other religions (interreligious trust), as well as the other members of society (social trust) (via bridging cultural religious social capital). If the cultural religious social capital is limited to the groups’ members (ingroup and bonding), it is unlikely to have a positive effect: nei-ther on integration or trust in other members of society nor, ultimately, on political sup-port.9

5 Putnam qualified his statements in 2007, while maintaining his fundamental assumption that social capital

furthers civil society in principle (also Putnam/Goss 2002 or Putnam/Campbell 2010). 6 For a definition of sects and other types of religious organizations see Robertson (1972). 7 This line of argument is derived from the religious market model. According to Iannaccone (1994), particular-

ly highly exclusive religious groups – which actually involve high social costs – have the greatest potential for increasing social capital, which also results in an increase in religious vitality in society in general. Unlike the main churches, they are relatively free of bothersome free riders who, without actually investing themselves, reap similar benefits (e.g. the promise of the salvation of their souls) as very dedicated members (e.g. frequent church visits, active engagement in the congregation). Religious goods are provided more exclusively which in turn generates greater benefits (Traunmüller/Freitag 2011: 254).

8 Even though the main churches are less active compared to smaller religious movements, they contribute more societal social capital. Roßteutscher (2009) ascribes this to assumptions derived from organizational so-ciology. She does not find any sound proof of the validity of the religious market model in her cross-national study.

9 Bellah (1967) already related characteristics of political culture and religion to one another. He applied these links to the civil religion concept.


Chart 1: Religious Social Capital, Trust and Civil Society Frame:

Church-State-Relationship

Structural religious social capital (active membership in faith based networks)

Interreligious trust

Ingroup cultural religious

social Capital

Bridging cultural religious

social capital

Social trust

Support of democracy

Individual Religiosity (subjective religiosity, Importance of religion)

Social integration

Bonding cultural religious

social capital

Frame: Cultural heritage + modernization

Source: own compilation. In addition to the above-mentioned religious communities, the individuals’ religious bonds have to be taken into account. Subjective religiosity does not necessarily have to be embed-ded in social groups (Luckmann 1967; Davie 1994). At the same time, however, subjective religiosity might also evoke a higher degree of interpersonal trust, especially, if that is in accordance with the norms of the individuals’ religion. In general, it is assumed that reli-gions provide security and contribute to people’s identity-building. Also, religion frequent-ly productively interrelates with the participation in social networks – or at least the oppor-tunities to participate provided by the churches. 2.2 The Decline of Associations and the Sociology of Religion How can these ideas be related to the theoretical approaches that are currently being de-bated in the sociology of religion? What kinds of consequences arise for the development of religion? In the United States, Putnam (2000) finds a decline in structural social capital. The decline in religious and church-affiliated networks would support the views held by the proponents of secularization theory (Bruce 2002a, 2011; Wilson 1985), who assume a close relationship between commitment to the church, religious communalization and subjective religiosity (Pollack/Pickel 2007). According to the main assumption of the secularization theory, religion is losing its social relevance in the course of modernization. If this is indeed the case, then commitment to the church, engagement in religious voluntary networks as well as subjective religiosity should be in decline, too, with an ultimately negative impact on interpersonal (and political) trust.

However, the assumptions supported by secularization theory regarding the develop-ment of individual religiosity (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982; Bruce 2002a; Pollack 2003,


2009) had been the subject of a heated debate among religious sociologists. The religious individualization theory, for example, holds that citizens may turn away from the official model of the church while remaining subjectively religious – rendering religion invisible on the societal level (Luckmann 1967; Davie 2000, 2002a; for a critical view see Pol-lack/Pickel 2007).10 In light of this general debate, it is hardly surprising that the (short) discussion between sociologists of religion on the “decline of associations thesis“ (Bruce 2002b; Davie 2002b) mainly focused on the relationship between membership in religious social networks and subjective religiosity. The main point of dispute was in how far subjec-tive religiosity has been affected by the evident decline in the social forms of religion. With regard to the question of the “decline of associations“, Bruce (2002b: 323-326) concludes that religious social networks are also eroding. Other than Putnam though, Bruce explains this development not necessarily with the general decline in social participation and organi-zation but rather as a result of the process of secularization. If the communal basis of reli-gion, i.e. membership and engagement, eroded, individual types of religious vitality would also be affected, or so, Bruce states. This does not imply that the social networks will en-tirely disappear. Instead, they will change their form and will change from religious to secular networks in the course of the process of functional differentiation.11

In line with the religious individualization theory, Grace Davie (2002b: 332) draws a different conclusion: The decline in voluntary networks in the religious sector is the epito-mized result of the disintegration of civil society in modern societies – just as Putnam de-scribes in his work. This particularly affects the religious networks associated with the main Christian churches in Europe.12 However, small voluntary networks supersede church at-tendance, which used to predominate, as well as church-related and organized forms of communalization. This, in addition to the greater detachment from organized groups and associations, indicates both the separation of individualized religiosity and organized reli-gion as well as a change in the types of religious organizations into more liberal and smaller movements.

Both approaches assume the de-institutionalization of Christian religiosity and the de-cline of commitment to the church in Europe. Most of the available empirical evidence on Western Europe seems to support this thesis (for further information see Bruce 2002a; Norris/Inglehart 2004; Pickel 2009; Pollack 2009). The Eastern European situation, howev-er, seems to be more complex due to the temporal overlap of mutually interacting develop-ment trends. The abolition of political repressions and the concomitant ideological conse-quences bring about religious revitalization processes that are countered by secularization tendencies which result from catch-up modernization. All the while both trends are mod-erated by cultural identity-building processes which often arise from the close relationship between religion and the nation. Even so, de-institutionalization is evident in Eastern Eu-rope, too. In addition, data on the development of subjective religiosity in Europe indicate secularization rather than a revitalization or return of religion or a change to individualized invisible religion.13 10 The religious individualization thesis is based on the premise that religiosity is an anthropological constant of

human existence. 11 The latter will then function as societal integrators, i.e. a functional equivalent, so to speak. Society will only

disintegrate when these networks break up as well, which is what Putnam (2000) hypothesizes. 12 Bruce’s and Davie’s debate focuses on empirical evidence from Great Britain. 13 See also the article by G. Pickel in this book.


Chart 2: Theories of Sociology of Religion and the ”Decline of Associations“ Debate

Secularization thesis

Individualization thesis Market model of religion

Authors B. Wilson, S. Bruce, P. Norris, D. Pollack

Th. Luckmann, G. Davie

R. Stark, L. Iannaccone, R. Finke

Axiom A fundamental contrast between religion and modernity leads to a decline in the social

importance of religion

The religious orientations of the individuals are

constant, only the commitment to specific churches varies – and

mostly decreases.

There is a constant societal demand for

religion, but religious vitality depends on the supply provided by the

religious market Relevant theory Modernization

theory Individualization theory + privatization (of religion)

Supply-oriented rational choice (market theory)

Main hypothesis Religions lose their social significance and position

as regards the interpretation of the world

Loss of relevance of the institutionalized religion; continuing relevance of

personal religiosity

Supply on the religious market determines religious vitality

(pluralisation as best) Consequences for the ”decline of associations“

thesis

Decline of faith based networks with a general

decline of social networks or a transformation in

secular social networks

Decline of religious and secular social networks as result of individualization

Rise of religious networks under the

conditions of a declining state-regulation

Forecast for the religious

development

Further decrease of all forms of religious

bindings and orientations (depending on countries’ state of modernization)

Constant private religiosity and rise of new

forms movements, combined with a further decline of commitment

to churches

Development of religious vitality depending from the state of regulation

(and pluralization) of the religious market

Source: own compilation. The third current approach in the sociology of religion, the so-called religious market mod-el (Finke/Stark 2006; Iannaccone 1994; Stark/Finke 2000), stands in clear opposition to the other two theories. Concerning social capital it assumes a relationship between religious vitality14 as well as people’s engagement in religious social networks on the one hand and the interaction between church and state on the other hand. Basically, it supposes: The closer the relationship between church and state, and the greater the regulations of the reli-gious market, the lower the willingness of the believers to become involved in religious networks (see Traunmüller/Freitag 2011: 258). When church and state closely interact, it is to be assumed that the state and the churches already fulfill a number of tasks in society. Consequently, voluntary networks are not extensively needed. Especially the state’s finan-cial support discourages people from becoming active themselves.

This assumption ties in with the main premise of the religious market model: Religious competition in a free and non-state-regulated market encourages religious vitality. Under

14 Religious vitality includes all observable types of expression of individual religiosity in society. Due to the

action oriented approach, it is hardly surprising that it mainly focuses on people’s religious practices and be-havioral patterns.


the condition of a maximum amount of competition on the religious market, religious con-sumers (who seek differentiated products in individualizing societies) are more likely to find religious products that suit them. These products are in constant demand according to the market model (Stark/Bainbridge 1987). If this is the case, then religious vitality increas-es in society, as the heterogeneous community of individuals is met with heterogeneous products tailored to their needs by highly motivated providers. Therefore, religious vitality and religious networks should be extensive in free non-state-regulated markets, whereas a close relationship between church and state should lead to a lower degree of religious hete-rogeneity and thus result in lower levels of religious vitality.

This line of argument bids farewell to the idea that only a negative relationship between church and state (as in the case of the repression of the churches in Socialist times) has a disadvantageous effect on the social relevance of religion in society. Following this point of view, harmonious church state relationships actually impede religious vitality. Especially the state’s provision of financial subsidies and organizational resources to the churches, which is frequently considered as unfairly beneficial, is thought to hinder the voluntary engagement of its members. This idea is diametrically opposed to the assumptions put for-ward by secularization theory which considers government support as crucial in establish-ing the conditions for associated voluntary networks.

3. Data and Methods Due to the fact that social capital as a concept is located both on the individual as well as on the macro level, it seems appropriate to carry out both comparative, cross-country analyses as well as individual-level analyses. The following sections strive to provide answers to the research questions raised above. The analyses are based on data from the European Values Studies (1999, 2008) as well as the World Values Surveys (2005-2008) as they allow us to conduct the combined analyses the best. Basic statistical data and international comparative data sets were added to these data sets for the macro-level analyses. This includes socio-economic indicators (Human development Report) and information about the relationship between state and religion (see state and religion-dataset, Fox 2008). The scope of analysis is limited to Europe – otherwise, the study might suffer from selection bias due to a non-systematic case selection.15

Social capital is measured on two levels. Firstly, Membership in religious networks (structural religious social capital) is recorded based on the respondents’ self-ascription. It thus differs from church membership. Active engagement in these networks is considered separately. Secondly, social or interpersonal trust serves to measure cultural social capital. This indicator was already developed in political culture research (Almond/Verba 1963: 267). According to Putnam, it indicates generalized trust. Due to the fact that it is not possi-ble to distinguish between bonding and bridging social capital when considering the en-gagement in voluntary networks, it will be considered as an indicator of bridging social

15 This problem arises due to the uneven availability of information on the distribution of social capital in a

global comparative perspective. The available macro-level analyses frequently suffer from selection bias due to the results in the North American countries (Iannaccone 1991). Conclusions drawn with respect to a cultu-rally homogeneous region (“most similar systems design“) are less susceptible to selection bias.


capital. The World Values Surveys 2005-2008 provides new items which allow the distinc-tion of social trust depending on the respective radius of trust. The main idea is to distin-guish social trust in terms of ingroup and outgroup trust (Delhey/Newton/Welzel 2011). This differentiation is also useful in order to discriminate between bridging and bonding social capital, as a small radius describes the bonding element of trust whereas the outgroup radius refers to the bridging element. It is not until a considerable amount of trust in out-groups has evolved that we can speak of bridging social capital. Conveniently, the survey also includes specific items that pertain to the trust in the members of other religious groups. This interreligious trust allows a better assessment of bridging religious cultural social capital16 as well as conclusions regarding the socio-cultural integration on the interre-ligious level.

4. Religious or Faith Based Social Capital in Europe First, it is useful to gain an overview of the extent of religious social capital. Since the re-levance of religious social capital’s can only be assessed correctly when contrasting it with the available secular social capital, we will present both types of social capital in the fol-lowing charts. Concerning structural social capital, we distinguish between membership in networks and active membership in these voluntary structures. This is important, as Putnam (2000) attributes particular relevance to the active engagement when evaluating the effects of social capital and discerns it as the true driving force behind the subsequent socio-political effectiveness of social capital.

The distribution of both indicators is similar across the countries (Chart 3 and Chart 4), even though, in general, active engagement is, of course, lower than formal membership. On the one hand, religious voluntary networks exist all across Europe. They are not as important compared to the secular networks as in the United States (according to Putnam, over 50 percent of all networks are religious in the U.S.). However, the extent to which they contribute to network-like social capital is far from irrelevant, as they usually represent well over one fifth of all social networks.

On the other hand, there are obvious regional differences. There is a distinct difference between Western and Eastern Europe: so far, the young democracies in Eastern Europe could build up only a limited amount of social capital – seculars as well as religious. These finding support the assumptions of social capital theory (Putnam/Campbell 2010; Lam 2006), value change and modernization theory (Inglehart 1990, 2000; Inglehart/Welzel 2005). Societies, which are better off socio-economically, are expected to display higher social capital than less affluent societies. The difference results from the fact that those citizens relieved of material hardships simply have more time and space to engage them-selves (Inglehart 1990: 34-38.). Unlike in the affluent societies, they no longer need to ensure their mere survival and their own material needs to such a great extent.

16 Unfortunately, items measuring the opposite of interreligious social capital, i.e. trust in the members of one’s

own religious community, are not available. However, we can assume that it lines up with personal trust rather than outgroup trust.


Chart 3: Distribution of Structural Social Capital in Europe – Memberships

Source: EVS 2008, own calculations in percent.17 It could also be shown with individual-level data, that citizens with higher incomes are much more likely do engage in voluntary networks than people, who need to secure their daily livelihood (Pollack 2009: 159). After the major political changes in Eastern Europe, the people were faced with manifest problems in their daily lives, particularly with respect to their socio-economic security. Some of these problems have remained until today. De-spite the fact that parts of the region have caught up remarkably in terms of economic per-formance, the gap between Western and Eastern Europe remains considerable. This under- 17 Results with the EVS 1999 show in general a similar distribution between the countries compared with 2008

(Pickel/Gladkich 2011).

0 20 40 60 80 100

Western EuropeAustria

BelgiumCyprus

DenmarkFinlandFrance

Germany WestGreeceIreland

LuxembourgMalta

NetherlandsPortugal

SpainSwitzerland

Northern IrelandEastern Europe

AlbaniaBosnia Herzegovina

BulgariaBelarus

Czech RepublicEstoniaGeorgia

Germany EastHungary

LatviaLithuaniaMoldavia

PolandRomania

Russian FederationSerbia

Slovak RepublicSloveniaUkraine

Member in anynetwork

Member inreligious network


mines the willingness to engage voluntarily (and without remuneration) which results in a low development of civil society and structural social capital. In short, it is likely that it is primarily the effects of socio-economic modernization that cause the observable differences between the West and the East. Chart 4: Distribution of Structural Social Capital in Europe – Active Engagement

Source: EVS 2008, own calculations in percent. We also find that voluntary networks develop particularly well in Protestant societies. It remains yet to be seen how far this is indeed initiated by better measures by the protestant church that enhance network structures (Roßteutscher 2009; 2011) or whether it results from the fact that socio-economic modernization is usually more advanced in Protestant countries. However, it would not be surprisingly, if culturally and religiously produced

0 10 20 30 40 50


BelgiumCyprus



LuxembourgMalta

NetherlandsPortugal

SpainSwitzerland



BulgariaBelarus


Germany EastHungary


PolandRomania



Work in any network

Work in religiousnetwork


belief-based and behavioral patterns establish certain paths which are then superimposed by certain aspects of modernization (Norris/Inglehart 2004; Pickel 2009).

Cultural religious capital (Chart 5) in the sense of social trust as well as trust in the churches is more evenly distributed across the countries. At first sight, it seems as if the distributions of the two indicators do not follow a clear pattern. However, this would imply that Putnam’s assumption regarding the relationship between structural and cultural social capital may not hold true. This may imply issues regarding the operationalization of cultur-al social capital, especially the religious cultural social capital. The trust in churches does not reflect the identification with the belief system or the religious groups on a lower level of organization at all. Considering the trust in the members of other religious groups might be a better indicator. Chart. 5: Cultural Social Capital in Europe

Source: EVS 2008, own calculations in percent.

0 20 40 60 80 100


BelgiumCyprus



LuxembourgMalta

NetherlandsPortugal

SpainSwitzerland



BulgariaBelarus


Germany EastHungary


PolandRomania



Social trust

Trust inChurch


According to Delhey/Newton/Welzel (2011), the other religious groups are outgroups.18 The fact that this concerns the field of social diversity which is related to differences in ethnic social groups (Putnam/Campbell 2010) is reflected by the largely similar distribution of trust in members of other nationalities (Chart 6). Both cases pertain to well-defined out-groups. What is even more interesting to note are the differences in interreligious trust between these countries. In part, these differences are considerable. Among the available cases, Turkey, Slovenia, and Moldova exhibit the lowest levels of trust in members of other religious groups, whereas Sweden, Great Britain, France, and Finland display the highest levels of trust. Apparently, on average, the foundations of trust are slightly more pro-nounced in the Western industrialized countries than in Eastern Europe. However, even these countries differ. Therefore, the frequencies permit the conclusion that the develop-ment of interreligious trust most likely depends on a whole set of factors. Chart 6: Interreligious Trust and Trust in People with a Different Nationality

Trust in people with other Religiosity

Trust in people with other nationality

Trust in people with other Religiosity

Trust in people with other nationality

West Germany 46 45 Poland 50 46 Italy 41 44 East Germany 38 38 Spain 47 49 Slovenia 28 29

Finland 77 71 Bulgaria 44 44 Sweden 84 91 Romania 31 29

Switzerland 71 75 Ukraine 39 44 Cyprus 33 33 Moldova 26 36

United Kingdom 80 79 Serbia 46 49 The Netherlands 46 44 Russia 37 40

France 78 78 U.S. 81 77 Turkey 28 27 Australia 74 76

New Zeeland 46 44 Source: own calculations WVS 2005-2008 in percent. But it appears, that it is mainly modernization as well as the religious-cultural heritage of the respective country that seem to create situational conditions on the macro-level encour-age the production of structural and cultural religious social capital. Modernization (and also more social contacts) seems to reduce distrust against other social groups. However, further empirical clarifications are required. At first glance, we cannot rule out the validity of the “crowding out“ hypothesis (Traunmüller/Freitag 2011: 258-259), which states that social participation will occur once the state has largely ceased to regulate it. Apart from trust in the churches, Western and Eastern Europe are very different with respect to all of the examined indicators of social capital. There are numerous indications that the bemoaned lack of civil society in Eastern Europe is closely related to the local socio-economic condi-tions. Due to the measurement issues, it is not possible to draw any sound conclusions with respect to cultural religious social capital. It is thus necessary to put further thought into better means of measuring the concept. 18 Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2011: 15) verify this classification in dimensional analyses. It is not surprising to

see that people do not trust religious groups as much as they trust their neighbors, family or personal acquain-tances.


5. Religious Social Capital and Civil Society Let us start the chapter with the question if observable religious social capital is socially relevant. A pooled analysis of all European countries reveals a relationship between social trust and religious networks. However, this relationship mostly applies to Western Europe only. There is a just weak relationship in Eastern Europe. The faith based networks also seem to have a positive effect on their members’ attitude toward the members of other religions and thus contribute to interreligious integration. However, this also is the case in Western Europe only. This finding is remarkable, especially since religious convictions are negatively related to interreligious trust. In other words: the more religious a person, the higher their skepticism of members of other religions in Western Europe. Only an active engagement in religious networks seems to encourage tolerance of other religions. Put-nam’s assumption that trust acquired within the immediate social environment is extended to unfamiliar groups of persons seems to be accurate. There is a strong relationship both in Western and in Eastern Europe (Chart 7). When considering the relationship between reli-gious networks and social trust at the individual level within the single countries, we most-ly find positive relationships, with the exception of Greece. Chart 7: Correlation on the (pooled) Individual Level between Indicators of Social Trust

and Religious Social Capital

Western Europe

Ingroup trust

Social trust

Faith based networks

Subjective religiosity

Interreligious trust .36 .36 .21 -.10 Ingroup trust .25 .13 .09 Social trust .26 .11 Faith based networks .12

Eastern Europe

Interreligious trust .32 .18 .n.s. -.02 Ingroup trust .17 .05 .10 Social trust .04 .04 Faith based networks .18

Source: own calculation, WVS 2005-2008 (individual level); interreligious trust = trust in members of other religions; ingroup trust = trust in persons you know personally; social trust = „Generally speaking, most people can be trusted“; faith based networks = membership in a faith based network, religiosity = self-ascription subjec-tive religiosity; p<.05; only significant correlations. In accordance with the theory, membership and/or engagement in religious networks in-creases trust in others, hence creating cultural social capital for society at large. This rela-tionship can be determined both in Western and Eastern European countries. However, there are countries where this relationship does not exist on the individual level. Therefore,


these findings need to be interpreted with caution. This may also explain the comparatively weak relationship we found in Eastern Europe as a whole (Chart 7).

Other calculations show, that there are no comparable correlations between trust in the churches and social trust (see Pickel/Gladkich 2011). This may be regarded as another indication of the limited representation of cultural religious social capital by the indicator “trust in the churches“ or point to the independence of the two types of cultural social capi-tal. Maybe the issue lies with the indicator “social trust“ as a measure of cultural social capital. There are several results that raise also reasonable doubts with respect to the rela-tionship between political trust and cultural social capital (Newton 1999; Westle/Gabriel 2008).

Chart 8: Religious Social Capital and Political Support at the Micro Level

Legitimacy democracy

Satisfaction democracy

Political networks

Political Trust

Political Participation

structural religious social capital

+ + ++ + +

cultural religious social capital

Trust in church n.s. ++ n.s. +++ --

Interreligious trust ++ ++ n.s. ++ ++

Subjective religiosity n.s. + n.s. ++ --

Source: EVS 1999/2000, 2008; WVS 2005-2008, pooled analysis, own calculations. Pearsons r: +, ++, +++ low, middle, strong positive correlation, - , --, --- low, middle, strong negative correlation, n.s. = not significant. In this respect, it is hardly surprising that in chart 8 we find a positive effect of structural religious social capital on all of the indicators of political support (see Pickel/Pickel 2006), while at the same time, there are only a few effects of cultural religious social capital meas-ured as trust in the churches.19 The indicator “interreligious trust” provides much stronger results: Those who trust more in members of other religions are usually more deeply in-volved in politics in democracies as well. Whether this reflects a carryover making social networks “schools of democracy” or whether it is just that people who are inclined to en-gage themselves at all will do so in many spheres anyway, cannot be determined at this point.

Generally, these results indicate that religious voluntary networks contribute to the sup-port of democratic systems – which by itself seems to sustain Putnam’s theses. However, the relationships are merely moderately strong, which orders to remail cautious. Referring to the sociology of religion, our introductory thoughts pointed out religion’s importance with regard to the integration of society. This is particularly crucial as Putnam attributes different effects to bridging and bonding social capital. The indicator of interreligious trust,

19 The exception is the correlation between trust in church and trust in other institutions. This might be an effect

of the measurement in the same scale in the questionnaire.


which capture(s) the social distance, already indicate(s) a possible relation. When testing in how far the availability of social capital affects the attitude toward different social groups as neighbors (i.e. a measure of living tolerance; Chart 9), structural and cultural religious social capital have different effects. Members of religious social networks are usually cha-racterized by greater tolerance toward other social groups. Apparently the manner of com-municating in these networks has a positive effect on the attitude toward others, even if they do not belong to one’s primary group.

Of course, it might not be the networks that cause these effects. Instead, it could be that the people who join networks have an innately higher willingness to integrate themselves in society.20 They decided to take the step of becoming a member or engaging in the networks which in itself points to a high degree of initial motivation. This is substantiated by the fact that persons with a higher formal education participate far above average in secular and religious networks. Nevertheless, it should not be underestimated that these groups contri-bute to their members’ tolerant attitude and that the members reciprocally reaffirm this common mindset. Chart 9: Religious Social Capital and Social Integration

Source: EVS 2008 (pooled), own calculations. Chart displays significant bivariate correlations (Pearson’s r); social integration = acceptance of different social groups as neighbors (different statements are transferred to an one-dimensional scale, tested with reliability-analyses and factor-analyses).

20 This problem, to identify what is the hen and what the egg, seems to be not possible to solve at the moment.

0,0590,074

0,027

0,139

0,10,114

0,15

0,1

0,05

0

0,05

0,1

religious networks member in religious network

active engagement in religious network trust in church

religion is important for my life religious person


However, this finding does not pertain to the comparatively large number of persons who, according to our definition, exhibit faith based cultural capital. They display a skeptical or even deprecating attitude toward the social reference groups (and probably particularly towards other religious groups) more frequently than the average person. The faith they share as well as the trust they place in their own church prove to be criteria for distancing themselves from (or sometimes even excluding) other groups. In Putnam’s terminology, this type of social capital is clearly “bonding“. Particularly those persons, who consider themselves to be religious, construct their (religious) identity by drawing a clear line be-tween themselves and other social and religious groups.

This is the case all across Europe. The type of religious identification played an impor-tant role with regard to the integration of the members of those societies – which existed in many European countries for centuries – that were frequently relatively homogeneous with respect to religion despite all of the socio-structural changes during the past century (at least if the denominational differences themselves did not give rise to conflicts).

However, within modern societies, that have increasingly pluralized over the past dec-ades (see Hero/Krech/Zander 2007; Lichterman et. al. 2005; Pickel 2011; Putnam/Campbell 2010; Wuthnow 2007), it is precisely this “bonding“ social capital which could evoke fu-ture social conflicts, as the various self-contained identities clash within the religiously plural societies.21 Debates about minarets, the introduction of religious education for deno-minations other than the traditional Christian as well as Turkey’s accession to the European Union indicate the problematic nature of this issue within the public realm. But not the networks if active religious people are the problem: As shown in Chart 9, structural reli-gious social capital seems to promote interreligious trust. Structural religious social capital is thus translated into cultural religious social capital in a positive sense. Religious volunta-ry networks promote bridging social capital, whereas passive membership in churches entails bonding social capital. 6. Religion, Religious Networks, and Modernization What does the outlook on the development of religion in European societies imply for the spread of religious social capital and which societal determinants are of relevance in this respect?

The results on the macro level speak for themselves although they are surprising when considering Putnam’s hypotheses. Not only is (structural) religious social capital22 related to social trust, it also increases with the countries’ level of modernization. Ergo, it changes contrary to the assumptions stated in the secularization theory. According to the theory, modernization is the main cause of processes of secularization and the loss of social relev-ance of religion. However, this only seems to be the case with respect to the commitment to the churches, and, to a lesser degree, with regard to subjective religiosity. The evident ero- 21 In Europe, corresponding assumptions about social homogeneity were already breached in several instances in

the last decade. Nevertheless, the problems associated with “bonding“ social capital have grown worse in the European welfare states which have been characterized by increasing immigration.

22 Due to the measurement issues associated with cultural religious social capital measured in terms of trust in the churches and the complete lack of significant relations on the macro level presented here, the results per-taining to the indicator are neither presented nor discussed (see also Pickel/Gladkich 2011).


sion of the bonding power of religion does not cause society to disintegrate, at least not with regard to civil society. The people more and more become active, build up a civil society – and integration in their community. But the community itself gets a new form, less vertical and more horizontal in decision making. And this processes, also strike the religious organizations.

On the contrary, modernization – ergo secularization – increases the levels of tolerance within society and has a beneficial effect on the development and spread of bridging social and religious networks (Chart 10 and Chart 11). First, social welfare, as a result of moder-nization, opens the possibilities for social engagement. It is not further necessary for larger groups of the society to concentrate on existential needs (Norris/Inglehart 2004). Second, rationalization and democratic ideas of freedom of religion advance a higher trust in people with other religious denomination or belief. Therefore it seems to be not so false, to think, that modernization reduces ethnocentrism and xenophobia.23 Chart 10: Social Capital and Societal Differences

Social trust

Religious networks

Social networks

Interreligious trust

Social Integration

Social trust +++ +++ + +++ Modernization a) +++ ++ ++++ ++++ +++ Secularization n.s. + + ++ + Church-state b) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. Protestantismc) ++++ + + ++ + Religious Pluralization

+ + (+) (+) +

Social Integration

+++ ++ +++ +

Source: own calculation at the macro level; modernization: HDI; church-state: state regulation (Fox: Religion and State Project); Religious pluralization = religious pluralization measured by the Herfindahl-index on CIA-world-factbook data; Church-state-relations are from Fox (2004, 2008); Social integration = index of the openness to neighbors out of different social groups. Pearsons r: +, ++, +++, ++++ weak, medium, stable or strong positive correlation, -, --, ---, ---- weak, medium, stable or strong negative correlation, n.s. not significant.

Remarks: a) Modernization’s effects are stable even when controlling for confounding variables. In the regression

analyses (which take into account the denominations, church attendance and the church-state relation-ship), it proves to be the strongest predictor.

b) In the regression analyses, the indicators measuring the church-state relationship (in a number of dif-ferent model variations) also did not have a significant effect.

c) With respect to the religious networks variable, the denomination had the strongest effect in the regres-sions.

23 Results with other studies support this thesis (Pickel 2011).


The church-state relationship, emphasized by the market model, plays only a subordinate role. Based on Jonathan Fox’s (2008) 24 general index of religious regulations, there are no significant correlations with any of the indicators of religious social capital in Europe. The situation appears a bit different with respect to the degree of religious pluralization. Here, there are some correlations on the macro level. Increasing contacts with members of other religious groups seem to have a rather positive effect on cultural social capital. This is any-thing but self-evident. The contrary assumption – i.e. the idea that the increase in the num-ber of members of other religions and cultures particularly increases the sense of threat in a country and thus undermines trust – is as plausible as the contact hypothesis, which hopes of a positive effect of the contacts (Allport 1954). Chart 11: Interreligious Trust and Socioeconomic Modernization

Source: own calculation at the macro level.

24 Jonathan Fox collects the indicators measuring religious regulation on an annual basis. Currently, the data are

available from ca. 1990 onwards. The dataset is published in SPSS format on the “Religion and State“ website (http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/downloads.html). The composite variable “general regulation index“ com-bines Fox’s measure of prohibitions, discrimination, regulation of, state support of and legislation on religion (or specific religions).


Overall, those factors related to civil society and modernization theory rather than political and institutional conditions contribute to integration. Modern societies are becoming more tolerant and have well-developed civil societies, in the sense of voluntary organizations, – and this is fairly independent of the church-state relationship (provided that it is not charac-terized by major repressions of the churches by the state). Thus we are confronted with two paradoxes: On the one hand, there are indications of a secularization of the religious in Europe. On the other hand, social capital does not seem to generally erode in the course of modernization – at least not in Europe. There is actually a higher level of religious social capital in socio-economically modernized societies. This fundamentally contradicts one of Putnam’s main assumptions of the decline of social capital in (individualization-inducing) modern times, which he established with respect to the United States.25 Considering the major “bonding“ effect of cultural religious social capital, when judging its effects, one could go so far as to say that democratic civil societies are actually benefiting from the process of secularization. After all, the main socially integrative value patterns continue to exist even in secular societies, although they are stripped of their religious core. At the same time, (the) religious groups’ tendency to distinguish between themselves and others is moderated as secularization increases.

Secularization proves to be an integrative process in heterogeneous societies as it un-dermines the cultural groups’ tendency to exclude others. It does not affect bridging (reli-gious) structural social capital but rather disintegrates divisive “bonding“ social capital. This configuration is becoming increasingly common as modernization proceeds. The so-cial form of religion seems to be on the decline in Europe, but religious social networks stay. One question remains pertinent especially from the viewpoint of the churches: in how far do the daily activities of the networks justify the fact, that we continue to describe the networks as religious (or “faith based“)? Is it not rather the case that these social groups provide beneficial services for society even though they are no longer recognizable as spe-cifically religious?26

Thanks to these services, the members earn good reputation, however, the services are hardly related to the members’ religious background. Sometimes, they even disappear from the list of daily business of these social groups. According to Bruce (2002b), secular net-works supplant religious networks and the religious networks themselves become “quasi secular“. “Faith based social capital“ is therefore subject to change of its very content and the networks are gradually loosing their religious air. The churches are then faced with the question of whether these networks, which bridge the gap to secular society, abet the im-manent secularization or whether they are actually a necessary and (in the long run) a revi-talizing link to society?

This question needs to be addressed in detail elsewhere. What is obvious is that civil so-ciety benefits from modernization – and secularization.

25 Comparisons over time also show increasing participation in religious networks in most Western European

countries. However, due to problems with the data, these results should be taken with a grain of salt. 26 This includes the idea of „selfsecularization”.


7. Religious Social Capital as a New Type of Religious Organization? Based on these analyses, what can we conclude about the relevance of religious social capi-tal for modern European societies? The results of our analyses are ambivalent with regard to the associations between political trust and religious social capital. Religious social capi-tal has an effect on indicators of political support. There is a strong relationship between political trust and trust in the churches. However, this is due to the fact that, methodologi-cally, both indicators refer to “institutional trust“. In addition, the correlation indicates a rather uncritical attitude which hardly promotes civil society. There is a weaker relationship between political trust and structural religious social capital as well as interreligious trust. But at least there is a relationship between the indicators. Overall, these results exceed the results obtained in similar analyses of the effects of “secular“ social capital (Frei-tag/Traunmüller 2011; Newton 1999; Field 2008). At least they suggest a moderate trans-formation of social capital into political support.

Concerning the integration of society, the effects of religious social capital are very pro-found. Religious social capital in the sense of networks is clearly bridging and encourages tolerance towards other religious groups. This is also reflected by increasing levels of inter-religious trust, that reveal the networks’ bridging function. However, cultural religious social capital also occurs as bonding social capital. The individual believers’ adherence to both their (respective) religion in general as well as the church in particular integrates the members of the reference groups while excluding alternative social and religious groups. Consequently, this kind of cultural religious social capital, which is typical of the rather passive membership in the main Christian churches in Europe, exclusively serves to pro-mote the process of identifying with the members of the respective groups. Therefore, in Putnam’s terminology, it is bonding social capital. This effect applies to the large group of believers who do not actively participate in networks. Conversely, members who engage themselves more or less actively in religious networks in the churches’ environment have a far more open mindset towards other groups compared to the passive members of religious communities.

These findings have implications for political communities: it is very likely that cultural religious social capital, which is associated with traditional religious bonds, promotes con-flicts in pluralizing or even multi-cultural societies, while the individual religious networks manage to build bridges to members of other religious groups at the same time. According-ly, active religious networks provide access to the (meanwhile) secular environment and therefore take on a crucial mediating role between the churches and society. 27 These rela-tionships lead us to the development of the religious as well as social capital: modernization proves to be beneficial for the development of bridging social capital, as presented in ana-lyses both on the micro-level as well as the macro level. It clears the way for increasing levels of tolerance towards alternative social and religious groups. This finding permits an additional conclusion: secularization in Europe on the one hand weakens the social relev-ance of religion and thus enfeebles the integration of members within their groups in socie-ty. On the other hand, it undermines the groups’ tendency to exclude others on religious grounds. 27 Thus, they are the only opportunity the Christian churches have to reach potential members, as there are

hardly any other opportunities to engage them in a conversation.


As a further secularization is more likely to occur than a (re)vitalization of religion in Europe (which will decrease cultural religious capital) the structure of religious social capi-tal is likely to change as well. In the course of secularization, religious networks will not necessarily disintegrate, however, they will become more secular in certain respects: they will increasingly form identities based on their main social fields of activity instead of their religious orientation. This is due to the fact that they receive citizens’ positive evaluations mainly because of the kinds of social services they provide for society and thus earn good reputation in the secular sector, while citizens are more skeptical of their religious compo-nent. At the same time, the main Christian churches remain a vital component of an impor-tant part of civil society for they continue to provide organizational structures which facili-tate voluntary work in many instances (Lichterman et. al. 2005; Roßteutscher 2009). How-ever, if this is the case indeed, it should be called into question whether these networks should be rated as religious social capital at all. Maybe said networks are not merely for-mally associated with the churches – but as stripped of their religious core as other social service providers.28

Apart from the finding that the cultural mode of religion continues to have considerable integrative power on large parts of society, the results show the Christian churches’ oppor-tunities and limits of today. On the one hand, the majority of their members remain skeptic-al or even disapprove of a greater rapprochement with and tolerance of other religious or-ganizations, while on the other hand, the religious networks associated with the churches’ function as a bridge to secular society while facing the threat of immanent secularization (Berger 1967; Dobbelaere 2002). In order to sustain the churches in this kind of environ-ment, it is sensible to use the existing and developing networks to show that the Christian faith is interrelated with the well received deeds of these (more or less religious-secular) networks. Obviously, should the churches fail to make use of these religious-secular net-works as an opportunity to reach out for a broader audience, they will have to get used to the idea, that an increasingly isolated position will be established permanently and that their membership numbers will continue to dwindle. 8. References Alexander, Marcus (2007): Determinants of Social Capital: New evidence on religion, Diversity and

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Westle, Bettina/Gabriel, Oscar W. (2008): Sozialkapital. Eine Einführung. Baden-Baden. Wilson, Bryan R. (1982): Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford. Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika/Karstein, Uta/Schmidt-Lux, Thomas (2009): Forcierte Säkularität. Religiöser

Wandel und Generationendynamik im Osten Deutschlands. Frankfurt. Wuthnow, Robert (2002): Religious Involvement and Status-Bridging Social Capital. Journal for the

Scientific Study of Religion 41/4: 669-684.


Wuthnow, Robert (2003): Overcoming Status Distinctions? Religious Involvement, Social Class, Race, and Ethnicity in Friendship Patterns. Sociology of Religion 64/4: 423-442.

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Wuthnow, Robert (2007): America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity. Princeton.

Documents

Transformations of Religiosity || Religious Social Capital in Europe Connections between Religiosity and Civil Society