Transition to Bargaining in a Multicampus System

J . M A L C O L M W A L K E R *

Transition to Bargaining in a Multicampus System

THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGES (CSUC)- as the system was renamed in 1972-is centrally administered by a Board of Trustees and Chancellor, and includes approximately 280,000 students and 16,000 faculty on 19 campuses, each headed by a president. In 1966, before collective bargaining had been introduced into any U.S. four-year institution of higher education, a brief campaign by the American Federation of Teach- ers (AFT) revealed widespread support for collective bargaining in the CSUC. By 1969, and perhaps earlier, a majority of the faculty supported collective bargaining. This support continues, despite the failure to secure bargaining rights. By 1971, four faculty associations and the statewide Sen- ate, which had initially opposed collective bargaining, had one after the other endorsed it. In this paper, I will attempt to explain these developments, analyze current activities, and assess the prospects for victory in the representation election likely to follow passage of appropriate legislation expected in 1975.l

O Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior, California State University, San Jose. 1 This paper is based on research conducted within the Faculty Unionism Project at the

Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley. The project is funded by grants from the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation and is directed by Joseph W. Garbarino. I have benefited from interviews and other contacts with man persons in the California State University and Colleges. Their anonymity is protected here. I L v e also consulted a wide variety of internal documents and have profited from participant observation of a range of activities. The following sources provide useful anal ses of governance in the CSUC: E. Alden Dunham, CoUeges of the Forgotten Amerhna [New York: McGraw-Ha, 1989); Donald R. Gerth, James 0. Haehn, and Associates, An Invisible Giant: The California State Cokges (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971); Harold H. Haak, Collective Bargaining and Academic Gouernunce (San Diego: San Diego State College, 1968); James 0. Haehn, A Study of Trade Unionism among State College Profmsors (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation; University of California, Berkeley, 1969); James 0. Haehn, A Survey of Faculty and Administrator Atti- tudes on Collective Bar ainin (Los Angeles: CSUC, Academic Senate, 1970); Eugene c. Lee and Frank M . Bower, T f e Muticampus University (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); J. Malcolm Walker, Modeh of Academic Governance in Emergent Universities (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation; University of California, Berkeley, 1970).

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24 / J. MALCOLM WALKER

Faculty Dissatisfaction Several polls and surveys in 1966 and 19fs7 showed wide-

spread, almost majority, faculty support for collective bargaining in the CSUC.’ A careful statewide survey conducted in fall 1969 showed that 61 per cent of the faculty endorsed collective bargaining. Subsequent surveys and interviews in 1973 with faculty leaders on 16 campuses indicate that this majority support persists. Analysis of the sources of faculty dissatisfaction which underlie this early, pervasive, and continuing support indicates that the dissatisfaction cannot be reduced in the short run to an extent sufficient to produce a majority vote for “no representation” in a representation e le~t ion .~ The roots of this dissatisfaction are not to be found in any general worsening of conditions, but in: (1) the variability of conditions over time, (2) the succession of threats and irritants imposed upon the faculty, and (3) the seemingly indefinite persistence of these problems.

Variability in conditions. There have been no clear trends with respect to state budgetary allocations or annual salary increases, key indicators of general state support and of faculty welfare. Unlike other states (and even other institutions within California), there has been no “golden age,” nor a new period of financial stringency. Support budgets, including salary increases, have always been smaller than requested and highly variable from year to year. A wide range of issues, first raised a decade ago, remain unresolved, including demands for: a nine-hour teaching load, salary parity with the University of California system, abolition of the “6040 rule” (which restricts the proportion of the faculty in the higher ranks to 60 per cent), increased fringe benefits, improved grievance procedures, state funding of research, lower student-to-teacher ratios, and a variety of salary structure issues.

Threats and irritants. The succession of threats and irritants includes: a 1.8 per cent salary reduction due to an administrative error (1%5), attacks

2 Data on faculty attihides through 1969 are reported in {Haehn, A Suruey. . . . Surveys conducted on four campuses in 1971, 1972, and 1973 have been made available to the writer. See also the results of a 1972 survey of about 10 per cent of the CSUC faculty reported in Richard E. Peterson, Goals for California Higher Education ( Sacramento: California Legislature, Joint Committee on the Master Plan for Higher Education, 1973).

3 This is recognized in a long series of internal studies and reports produced since 1963 by faculty, administration, and joint groups; comments by trustees, administrators, and faculty leaders; and surveys conducted since 1M. See the sources cited above as well as A l ~ o D. Hen- derson, “San Francisco State College: A Tale of Mismanagement and Disru tion,’ in David

1973), pp. 287-302; California State Uniuersity at Long Beach ( Burlingame: California Teach- ers Aqsociation, 1972); and Marc R. Tool, The Califomb State Colleges under the Master Plun ( Los Angeles: CSUC, Academic Senate, 1966).

Riesman and Verne A. Stadtman, eds., Academic Trarsformaciion (New Yor K : McGraw-Hill,

Symposium- Faculty Unionism in the West 1 25

on tenure (1968-1971), a mailing by the Board of Trustees of a set of letters from irate citizens (1969), censorship of art and theater shows, a proposed set of restrictions on the faculty’s “outside activities” (197%1973), certification of work performed before distribution of salary payments (1972), personnel decisions which have involved suspicions of victimization, and a series of emerging job security problems arising from the reduced growth rate of the system.

Persistence of problems. A majority of the faculty has lost confidence in the possibility of correcting these conditions within the context of the present governance ~ y s t e m . ~ The weaknesses of this governance system provided the opportunity for the AFT collective bargaining drive in 1966. These weaknesses, the AFT drive itself, and the faculty dissatisfaction with its economic and professional conditions of employment induced other faculty associations and the statewide Senate to endorse collective bargaining. These endorsements have further weakened existing approaches to governance.

The Governance System Board of Trustees and Chancellor. The CSUC has never been

an autonomous system protected from outside public and political pres- s u r e ~ . ~ Through the Donahoe Act (1961) which established the CSUC, the annual development of the line-item budget, the Governor’s power to ap- point trustees and his own role on the Board, the pre-certification and post- audit of expenditures by the State Department of Finance, political and governmental agencies determine the system’s mission, broad programs, admission standards, and a host of specific operational aspects of educational programs, work-load, salary structure, and other matters. Most Board members have perceived themselves as representatives of the public interest rather than as protectors of institutional autonomy, and still less as protectors of the faculty. In this spirit, the Board centralized the system in the sixties in order to integrate the previously semi-autonomous colleges. In its continued emphasis on order and efficiency, the Board has been actively involved in the detailed administration of the system?

4 The faculty voted its lack of confidence in the Chancellor in 1968. Seventy-three per cent of Haehn’s 1969 sample expressed dissatisfaction with the faculty’s role in systemwide governance, while only 25 per cent felt that the statewide Senate was effective. Peterson’s 1972 survey revealed wide dissatisfaction with the degree of democracy in the system and opposition to further use of accountability and efficiency measures.

5 See, especially, Lee and Bower, op. cit., and Arthur G. Coons, Crises in California Higher Education ( Los Angeles: Ward Ritchie, 1968).

6 See, especially, the comments by Board Chairmen in CSUC, Board of Trustees, Minutes May 28, 1969, pp. 2262r2.266, and May 27, 1970, pp. 24942497, and in “Centralization Is Not a Good Thing,” The Scope (CSEA), May 1973, pp. 4-5.

26 / J.MALCOLMWALKER

In the sixties, the Chancellor perceived his primary responsibilities to be integration of the colleges into a cohesive system and upgrading the quality of educational program^.^ During the faculty (and student) turmoil of 1967- 1970, he emphasized the need for order and efficiency to restore public confidence in the CSUC. To these themes has now been added that of educational innovation. The Chancellor has made clear that his primary responsibility is to the Board. He has also built a close relationship with the present Governor. The Chancellor has argued that a multicampus system requires the “management principles necessary to operate any large institution,” and he has been consistently committed to “unifying direction and supervision” of the system and to “strong administrative leadership” at all levels. The Council of Presidents is the principal systemwide governance body below the Chancellor. The final authority of the presidents at the campus level is carefully protected by the Chancellor and by the presidents themselves. Efforts to strengthen the administration are currently under way in a number of areas of major concern to the faculties: more stringent en- forcement of faculty responsibilities, central review of campus personnel decisions, training in management and personnel matters for administrators, “tightening” of personnel procedures through lengthening the probationary period, restricting promotion to those who have tenure, and excluding nontenured faculty from personnel decisions.s Department chairmen are being transformed into managers, holding 12-month appointments and responsible to higher level administrators for the administration of their departments-rather than serving as colleagues who act as spokesmen for their departments.a

S ystemwide faculty participation. During the sixties, faculty participation was implemented within this centralized, hierarchical system. This participation is widespread, but limited in significant ways. The statewide Senate, consisting of elected faculty representatives and the Chancellor as an ex

7 The Chancellor has presented his perspectives on the functions of his oftice and on CSUC governance in “Chancellor of a Multicampus System,“ in Gerth, Haehn, and Associates, op. dt., pp. 2143; “Innovation: Priority of the 70’”” in The 1,000 Mile Campus, CSUC, 1972; several issues of The Chancellor Comments; a 1971 speech to the National Commission on the Future of State Colleges and Universities, reprinted in “Chancellor Dumke on Academic Governance,” UPC Report: CoUege Governance 11, 1972. S e e also the Minutes of the Academic Senate and of the Board of Trustees, and W. Trombley, “California Chancellor Glenn S. Dumke,” Change, 111 (November, 1971), 4445. Quotations are from these sources.

8 These developments are recorded in a series of internal memoranda and budget documents. See, also, recent issues of the Annual Report to the Gooertwr and the Legislature on Personnel Matters in the CSUC, CSUC, Office of the Chancellor.

9 This is a reversal to the nature of the chairmanship as it existed until the mid-sixties.


oficio member, and now supported with almost $250,000 of state funds, was established in 1963.l’ The Senate’s powers are delegated by the Board, and its constitution is subject to the Boards approval. The Senate is the “official voice of the faculties” with respect to systemwide policies. The Senate has the power to make recommendations, which need not be accepted by the Board or the Chancellor. The procedural aspects of the Senate’s consulta- tive role have been improved over the years (closer relationships with the Chancellor’s staff, greater access to information, and the like), and its recommendations regarding educational policy tend to be accepted, although with modifications to fit budgetary criteria. But many of the powers sought by faculty leaders for the Senate have not been achieved. The state legislature refused to grant statutory powers, the Board refused to grant the authority to legislate policy, and the Board and Chancellor have failed to treat the Senate as the sole statewide policy-recommending body. The Chancellor’s staff and the Council of Presidents have greater influence than the Senate with the Board. For a decade, Senate leaders have complained that the Sen- ate has not been adequately consulted, that its recommendations have been ignored, that it has been used as a facade, and-quite accurately-that it has lost on a series of critical issues, especially in faculty personnel matters and grievance procedures.

As required by the Brown Act (1961), the Board and Chancellor deal with the five faculty associations through a “meet and confer” process.11 Although the scope of negotiations is broad, there are no requirements for formal rec- ognition, good faith negotiations, efforts to reach agreement, or impasse resolutions. The Board and administration have carefully observed these limita- tions. Sessions occur on an ad hoc rather than regular basis, and focus on specific issues rather than on general and long-range solutions to problems. The faculty associations have viewed these meetings as rather fruitless.

10 This analysis of the statewide Senate is based mainly on the Minutes of Senate meetings; Senate Resolutions; issues of The Academic Senator (1969-), a Senate publication; and a series of internal Senate documents. See, also, John C. Livingston, “Academic Senate Under Fire,” in G. K. Smith, ed., Agony and Promise (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, i969), pp. 161-172, and Jerome Richfield, “Statewide Academic Senate: The Sound and the Fury,” in Gerth, Haehn, and Associates, op. cit., pp. 109-128.

11 Currently, the five associations are: ( 1) the CSUC Council of the California Conference of the AAUP; ( b ) the Association of California State University Professors, an independent group; (c) the California College and University Faculty Association, an affiliate of the California Higher Education Association which in turn is &hated with the California Teachers Association (CTA, a National Education Association affiliate); (d) the State University and College Aca- demic Council of the California State Employees Association, a civil service association; and (e) the United Professors of California, affiliated with the California Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO. Throughout I refer to the CSUC faculty associations as AAUP, ASCUP, CCUFA, CSEA, and UPC, and use the phrase “parent organization” when referring to organizations with which they are affiliated.


Campus faculty participation. Within the colleges, faculty participation has been implemented through various structures.12 Senates-with faculty majorities, and a varying number of administrators, students, and other staff - develop policy proposals for presidential approval and oversee elaborate committee structures. Collegial relationships have been established in departments and, to a lesser extent, in the schools. The colleges have been infused with professional values: incorporation of professional criteria into personnel procedures, the doctorate as a condition for tenure, selection of administrators with Ph.D.’s and faculty backgrounds, and greater rigor in educational programs,

These structures have some inherent disadvantages from the faculty per- spective. Since faculty powers are delegated, they can be taken away. Since the senates include nonfaculty members, they do not represent the faculty exclusively. Senior faculty have considerably greater power than those in lower ranks. In practice, campus-level relationships depend heavily on f ac- ulty cohesion and presidential behavior. The campuses vary in these respects. Many power struggles have occurred, and some campuses have been unstable for several years. In 1973, for example, serious problems existed on 10 of the 19 campuses. Unstable relationships, a succession of well-publicized campus crises with respect to specific issues, and the perceived shift toward greater administrative initiative add to the general feeling that faculty participation is vulnerable. A majority of the CSUC faculty support the campus faculty participation structures and favor their strengthening.13

Present state of faculty participation. While the Board and administration have stressed their commitment to faculty parti~ipation,’~ they have been careful to deal with faculty organizations from a position of strength and to maximize their freedom from faculty constraints in their negotiations with state legislative and executive bodies. Faculty leaders have perceived themselves as lacking adequate powers and as having to settle for compromises on unfavorable terms. This has been exacerbated by the division of faculty groups among five rival associations, the statewide Senate, and the local

12 Studies of campus-level governance in the CSUC are found in California State Uniuersity at Long Beach; W. L. Deegan, et al., Joint Participation in Decision Making (Berkeley: Univer- sity of California, Center for Research and Develo ment in Higher Education, 1970); Dunham, op. cit.; Henderson, op. cit., Robert Smith, RicharcfAxen, and De Vere Pentony, B y Any A4ean.s Necessury ( San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970); J. Malcolm Walker, “Changes in Governance at a College,” in Gerth, Haehn, and Associates, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

13 These attitudes are reported in the saurces cited in footnote 2. 14 See, especially, CSUC, Board of Trustees, Minutes, May 27, 1970, pp. 2494-2497, and

May 28, 1969, p. 2263; the Minutes of the statewide Senate; successive issues of the Annual Report to the Cooernor; and Statement Submitted by the Board of Trustees of the CSUC, before the Assembly Advisory Council on Public Employee Relations, August 10, 1972.

Symposium- Faculty Unionism in the West / 29

senates. Some cooperation has been achieved through developments of joint positions and attempts to strengthen relationships between the statewide and local senates. The faculty associations have increasingly sought leverage through working with state legislators. The Senate has censured the Chan- cellor (1M8) and has fruitlessly threatened to refuse to participate in grievance processes. Senate leaders have also attempted through formal and informal approaches to improve relationships with trustees and presidents. The Senate also has increasingly “gone to Sacramento.”

All of these developments have merged into the push for collective bargaining, the threat of which has become the major source of leverage exercised by the faculty organizations. Meanwhile, efforts to develop broad agreements among Board, administration, and faculty organizations as to the allocation of authority have failed. Power struggles have gone on for a decade. Distrust has become pervasive and sustained collaboration difficult. Decision-making processes have become increasingly diffuse. Long-standing issues, some of which (grievance procedures, disciplinary procedures, salary structure) are of critical concern to the faculty, remain unresolved.

The AFT Initiative The drive for collective bargaining, begun by the AFT in

1965, has itself been a major factor in subverting the governance system. In 1965, the AFT made what was then a novel analysis of conditions in the CSUC and adopted a strategy which was to give the AFT and its successor, UPC (United Professors of California), the initiative in the competition among the faculty associations with respect to the issue of collective bargaining.15 The basic UPC argument has been that the CSUC faculty, as profes- sionals in a public bureaucracy, in order to exercise control over their work, must develop a countervailing power to that exercised by the Chancellor, the Board of Trustees, and relevant state government units. Since Board, Chancellor, and faculty have different values and objectives, adversary relationships are inherent in the system. Moreover, as senates are dependent on administrators and “meet and confer” sessions are condescending, new mechanisms are necessary to equalize power and deal with conflict. Collective bargaining, combined with political action, the UPC position holds, will produce improved faculty welfare and larger support budgets, resulting in professional excellence and creativity and high quality education,

- 15 The union’s positions have been presented in its monthly publication The UPC Aduocate,

in the predecessor publication AFT Union Report, and in a succession of pamphlets, special reports, and conference materials. Early AFT views and those of the other associations are in Issues and Answers on Collective Bargaining, CSUC, Academic Senate, 1967, and in transcripts of meetings of the Trustees’ Committee on Faculty and Staff Affairs, August 10, 1966, September 20, 1967, and October 26, 1967.


DeveZopment of AFT and UPC. The AFT strategy has been to build a strong organization at the statewide and campus levels, vigorously attack the Board, administration, and other faculty associations, act aggressively on behalf of individual faculty members and with respect to major issues, and to try to persuade the Board and Chancellor to reach agreements with the Union.

By 1969, AFT membership reached about 2,000, at a time when the full- time faculty numbered about 8,800. The next step to strengthen the organization was a merger (1970) with the Association of California State College Professors (ACSCP), which had a membership of 2,700 in 1969.16 The new organization, UPC, affiliated with the AFT, AFL-CIO. By 1972, UPC had become the largest faculty association and is now the fastest growing. UPC has the advantage of a full-time president; leadership is tough-minded, aggressive, and strongly committed to unionism. On most campuses, UPC chapters are more aggressive and visible than those of the other associations. The Union has engaged in a series of aggressive, sometimes militant actions: marches on Sacramento, picketing, a campaign for a nine-unit teaching load, teach-ins, a strike on two campuses in 1968-1969 (San Francisco and San Jose), and later strike threats. UPC is very active in grievance cases, many training specialists on the campuses, and in taking on grievance cases, many of which have been pursued in the courts (20 in 1972). Such cases have involved charges of failure to grant retention or tenure on grounds of non- possession of the doctorate, discriminatory grading based on the political views of students, doubts with respect to “professional responsibility and fit- ness,” undue absence, and a man’s ineffective performance as department chairman. In other cases, UPC has challenged the secrecy of personnel pro- ceedings and the practice of failing to give reasons for nonretention. This grievance activity shows that the Union will protect its members and defend individual faculty “rights.” Militant activities, even if not always successful, the aggressive defense of individual faculty members, and the resultant pub- licity have given UPC great visibility and an appearance of being the most active of the faculty associations.

Current UPC Tactics. Between 1966 and 1970, AFT-UPC unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Board to implement collective bargaining. The

16 Membershi data are from Haehn, A Study. . ., pp. 212, 219. ACSCP was the first casualty of the collective gargaining campaign. Its membership split over the issues of collective bargaining and local chapter autonomy. Part of the membership joined UPC. The anti-merger forces reappeared in what is now the Association of California State University Professors ( ACSUP).

Symposium- Faculty Unwnimn in the West 1 31

major effort was the 1968-1969 strike at San Francisco State College.17 Dur- ing this period the AFT became enmeshed, through internal controversy and external action, in issues of student power, war and peace, and social change. Since 1970, UPC tactics have changed. The programmatic emphasis is now very much on “bread and butter” issues of faculty welfare and professional conditions of employment.ls UPC has given up on attempts to force the Board to bargain and is concentrating on securing appropriate legislation. In order to facilitate this type of action and generate support in a representation election, UPC has been strengthening its ties with the state AFL-CIO, a process which is facilitated by UPC‘s focus on bread and butter issues and by the fact that UPC is the biggest AFL-CIO affiliate among state employees. UPC has also used AFL-CIO support to enhance its own expanding political activities which have recently included sponsorship of a legislative resolution for the elimination of the 60-40 rule, legislation on various grievance procedure issues, successful efforts to halt the implementation of a new salary structure, and the marshalling of various political pressures on the Chan- cellor. The Union, again with state AFL-CIO help and building on political pressures, has been attempting, through “meet and confer” sessions with the Chancellor, to generate informal “agreements” which will enable UPC to claim credit for securing changes in grievance procedures and other mat- t e r ~ . ~ ~ These tactics have become part of the maneuvering for position with respect to a representation election expected in 1975.

Rival Faculty Associations and the Statewide Senate Positions of faculty associations. In response to the 1966 AFT

drive, CSEA, CCUFA, and AAUP adopted strong positions against collective bargaining.20 Between 1966 and 1971, these associations attempted to develop alternatives to collective bargaining, but finally shifted to a pro-bargaining position themselves. This shift resulted from the accumulating fail-

17 The material on this strike is voluminous. Among the more useful sources are Arlene K a p lan Daniels, Rachel Kahn-Hut, and Associates, Academics on the Line (San Francisco: Jossey- Bass, 1970); Henderson, op. cit.; and Smith, h e n , and Pentony, op. cit. The Minutes of the Board and the transcript of “negotiations” sessions show the d amics of the power struggle.

18 Of 15 recently stated bargaining priorities, 13 deal with sa P aries and fringe benefits, grievance procedures and due process, and conditions of rofessional employment (workload, class size, faculty control of personnel decisions, election oPdepartment chairmen, sabbatical rights). The remaining proposals cover funding of Educational Opportunity Programs and tuition. UPC also supports special funding for women’s studies programs.

19 In addition to UPC publications, see “Collective Bargaining Talks,” Son Francisco Chron- iccle, May 4, 1973, p. 27.

2oFor the views of the members of these associations, see the sources cited in footnote 15. See also Haak, op. cit.; Haehn, A Study. . .; and Louis Joughin, “Three Problems of the Cali- fornia State Colleges,” AAUP Bulletin, LIII (June, 1987), 228-235. Each of the associations issues periodicals, pamphlets, and similar documents.


ures of the existing governance system, the pressure from UPC, and the changing policies of the associations’ parent organizations.

These associations had marshalled the usual arguments against collective bargaining. Adversary relations and power struggles would result, they argued, and the strike, an unethical weapon, would be used. Internal governance structures would be destroyed, The faculty would emphasize self- interest at the expense of educational programs. Statutory benefits would be lost and the legislature antagonized. “Management” could not be defined. The associations criticized the AFT as a destructive “outside” organization, concerned more with its own power than with the well-being of the faculty and the colleges. These arguments were based on principled commitments to “shared authority,” and on hopes that the governance system could be improved and alternatives to bargaining developed. The associations were also unprepared for the AFT drive and the growing faculty support for collective bargaining. No association could defeat the AFT, especially after the ACSCP shifted to a pro-bargaining position.

The associations opposed all efforts to persuade the Board to implement collective bargaining and resisted AFT militancy. As an alternative to collective bargaining, the AAUP, in line with national policy, advocated a stronger local senate role in both educational and economic matters. CCUFA advocated a negotiating council approach, similar to that which CTA had secured in the community colleges and public schools in which senate representatives would hold a majority of the seats, an approach which would have protected minority associations such as CCUFA. In line with the traditional emphasis of its parent organization, CSEA advocated a statutory approach to benefits and personnel matters and a stronger internal role for the senates in educational matters.

These positions were not based on realistic analyses of either power relationships in the CSUC or of faculty attitudes. They also reflected more the policies of parent organizations than the realities of the CSUC situation.21 In particular, proposals to channel representation through the statewide Senate depended on the willingness of the five associations to subordinate themselves to the Senate and the willingness of the Senate to accept such an approach. These were not realistic expectations.

The Senate position. Between 1967 and 1969, the Senate shifted from neutrality to endorsement of collective bargaining.22 This shift had several ____

21 For a recent review of changes in national NEA and AAUP positions on collective bargaining, see Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. Van Eyck, CoIZectiue Bargaining Comes to the Cam- p s (Washington: American Council on Education, 1973), pp. 115-131.

22 On the role of the Senate, see its Minutes and Resolutions, and the following Senate docu-

Symposium- Faculty Unionimn in the West / 33

causes. One was the Senate’s conclusion that present consultation practices were inadequate. Since Senate representatives were in effect continuously involved in negotiations with the Board, Chancellor, and presidents, such negotiations could be improved under formal collective bargaining, which in any event seemed inevitable. As the faculty associations endorsed collective bargaining, it became clear that the Senate would have to take an active role to protect itself. The Senate has yet to decide what its role should be, but has generated two proposals: (1) that the Senate appear on the ballot in a representation election, and (2) that it sponsor a new organization to run in an election. The first approach would require approval by the Board of consti- tutional changes and independent funding, and would-as the Board and Legislature have made clear-threaten the Senate’s role in educational policy matters. The second approach would have to be implemented over the opposition of the faculty associations and without any evidence that a majority of the faculty would support such a new organization. The Senate has also developed a set of collective bargaining criteria which include the possible selection of a council of allied organizations as a sole bargaining agent and the preservation of an “effective role’’-not yet defined-for the Senate. In effect, the Senate is keeping its options open and estabfishing the conditions under which it would remain neutral or join an alliance. The final decision will probably be postponed as long as possible. Since almost one-third of the senators are UPC members, any decision except neutrality will undoubtedly split the Senate.

Barriers to Collective Bargaining Before reviewing the present positions and tactics of the four

non-UPC associations, we need to briefly examine the reasons why collective bargaining has not been implemented in the CSUC and when such implementation can be expected. The Trustees, strongly supported by the Chancel- lor, have refused to accept collective bargaining so long as no law requires &em to do Attitude surveys and the behavior of the faculty when presented with opportunities to show militancy indicate that the faculty has been unwilling to force the issue. The divided faculty associations and Sen- ate have also been unable to do so. ments: Report of the Special Task Force Committee on More Effective Representation of the CSUC Faculty, May 14, 1971; Subcommittee on Collective Negotiations, Models for Collectiue Negotiation, March 2, 1972, and Is Collective Bargaining Coming to the CSC?, March 2, 1972; Senate Positions on Elements of Collective Negotiations, October 6, 1972.

23 The Trustees have argued that such action would be illegal and that under collective bargaining the present widespread faculty participation would be threatened, a monolithic bargaining structure would replace existing open, flexible representation rocesses, and professional wel-

transcripts cited in footnote 15. fare and educational programs would suffer. See Statement SU g mitted by the Board and the


Collective bargaining will be implemented when an appropriate state law is passed. Faculty associations do not have enough political power to secure such a law. They are dependent on their parent organizations, which did not support the same bills until 1972. A bill covering all of education, including colleges and universities, was vetoed by the Governor in 1973. State employee organizations are acting on the seemingly sound assumption that a law will be passed in 1975 under a new Governor. A victory for “no representation” in a representation election held during the next few years is most unlikely. I have already indicated that the sources of faculty dissatisfaction cannot be sigdicantly changed in the short run, nor can a majority commitment to the present governance system be developed. The pressures of organizational rivalry and the dynamics of a representation campaign will sustain the commitments to bargaining on the part of the faculty organizations. There will be no significant faculty group capable of successfully con- ducting an anti-bargaining campaign, nor could the Board and administration expect to do so.

Toward a Representation Election United action by the four m - U P C assocktions. Collective

bargaining is now the dominant objective of all the faculty organizations and preparation for a representation election their principal activity. In 1971, the four non-UPC associations began to explore the possibilities for united action. Their leaders were aware that no one association could defeat the UPC, which continues to hold the initiative on the bargaining issue. They have watched their counterparts in some other states be defeated by AFT affiliates. These conditions have been enough to overcome the historical barriers to unity, which itself had never seemed unduly urgent in the past. Representatives of the four associations developed in 1973 a proposal for a Council of Faculty Associations (CFA).% The proposal attempts to protect the existence of each association and the interests of their parent organizations and to provide CFA with enough scope for initiative to conduct a representation campaign and to act as an exclusive bargaining agent, while avoiding the appearance of creating yet another faculty association. The proposal provides for individual dual membership in CFA and in one of the four participating associations; representatives in governing bodies from general CFA membership and from the participating associations; collection of dues by the associations, with remittance to CFA; and commitments on the part of CFA not to engage in activities-such as insurance programs-which

24 This analysis of the CFA and the four associations is based on internal documents and on the publications of the associations.

Symposium -Faculty Unionism in the West f 35 would undermine the associations. This is more than a simple coalition, yet less than a merger. I t is intended that the four associations adopt the proposal by June 1974. Meanwhile the associations are reducing their attacks on each other, holding joint meetings on the campuses, developing joint positions, and preparing for joint membership campaigns. As a broad-scale effort in- volving four faculty associations, beginning at least two years before a representation election, and designed to win such an election, this is the first effort of its kind in higher education. The main issues now are whether this coalition is viable and, if so, whether it can defeat the UPC.

CFA-style us. UPC-style collective bargaining. The CFA associations char- acterize themselves as “internal” to the CSUC system and committed to a “nonindustrial” approach to collective bargaining. They attack UPC for its commitment to “outside” organizations (AFT and the AFL-CIO) and to “in- dustrial” bargaining, while claiming that UPC will destroy existing faculty governance mechanisms, reduce educational standards, and act with destructive militancy. The principal stated purpose of CFA is to use collective bargaining to protect internal faculty self-governance mechanisms and professional standards and responsibilities. This posture reflects the traditional commitments of the associations, especially the AAUP, to the senate and committee structures which embody peer decision making. This position will be attractive to those faculty members-perhaps a majority of the total faculty-who are committed to these structures. But the CFA associations have not yet shown precisely how this objective is to be achieved, and there are differences on this issue within the associations. While the leaders of the CFA associations are more committed to internal governance structures and to “peer group” (i.e., often “senior faculty”) decision making than are UPC leaders, UPC has always argued that it would guarantee real powers-as distinct from administratively delegated powers-through the negotiated contract. UPC’s position is that these powers would be confined to educational policy. UPC has recently become more open to ideas regarding the role of the senates. The UPC president has claimed that his organization clearly recognizes that universities require their own models of collective bargaining, and UPC scheduled a conference in fall 1973 to ‘‘produce a new model to fit the unique needs of higher education.” However, the CFA associations, having long supported internal governance structures, retain the initiative on this issue. Criticism of UPC’s union affiliations will be successful to the extent that it plays on the status concerns of some faculty and recalls the past disruptions caused by the old AFT. Yet the stronger the “anti-labor” position of the CFA associations, the easier it is for UPC to gen-


erate support from AFT and the state AFL-CIO. The argument that CSEA, CCUFA, and AAUP are “independent” while UPC is not may be convincing only to faculty members who are already committed to this notion. The real issue is likely to turn on which group can show that its parent and affiliate organizations will provide the faculty with the greatest support in negotiating contracts. UPC is increasingly emphasizing its AFL-CIO affiliation as an asset. The rival associations are increasingly using the tactic of stressing the advantage of affiliation with their own parent organizations.

Leaders of the CFA associations stress their commitment to “constructive, responsible” behavior and tend to be more skeptical about the potential for faculty militancy under collective bargaining than does UPC. The lack of faculty militancy in the past indicates that a nonmilitant posture may be ap- pealing to a majority of faculty members. Past tactical “errors”-in the 1968- 1969 strike, identification with radical causes and with the student revolt- have permanently alienated some faculty from UPC. Yet this deep hostility may not be widespread, especially among newer faculty. It seems reasonable to expect that by 1975 a substantial proportion of the faculty will be pre- pared to vote for the association which appears to have the best potential to negotiate a good agreement. UPC is attacking the leaders of the CFA associations on the grounds that they are late converts to collective bargaining, do not wholeheartedly support it, and cannot be expected to bargain effec- tively. UPC leadership believes that it dominates the field and that its aggressive behavior will facilitate continued membership growth and an election vote much greater than its actual membership.

Tactics of the CFA associations. The CFA associations have been imple- menting changes designed to improve their positions in the campaign. Both CCUFA and CSEA are reorganizing their structures in order to provide greater scope for leadership initiative. Both are expanding, so far with some success, their organizational and fiscal autonomy within the context of their parent organizations. The associations are making renewed efforts to strengthen their local chapters. Political action, in conjunction with the parent organizations, is being stepped up. More detailed programs are being developed. The associations, especially CCUFA, are taking more aggressive postures on such issues as grievances and are showing signs of generating more aggressive, tough-minded leadership with an understanding of power relationships and the capability of both generating imaginative appeals to the faculty and of maintaining sustained attacks on UPC over the collective bargaining issue.

The individual associations and CFA itself face a number of problems,


the resolutions of which are problematical. Tensions will develop as CFA develops specific proposals regarding the content of collective bargaining. There are differences with respect to the precise relationship between the bargaining agent and the senates and the balance between faculty participation and leadership initiative in bargaining processes. AAUP and ACSUP must belong to a coalition; neither has the membership, money, or influence in state politics to win a representation election and negotiate a contract. CCUFA and CSEA, and especially their parent organizations, retain a real option of acting alone. In large part, the viability of CFA depends on the ability of CCUFA and CSEA leaders to persuade their parent organizations to support them and to support CFA. The money, staff, and political influence of CTA and the parent CSEA are essential to any effort to defeat UPC. The guarantee of this support has not yet been given and the price not yet announced. CFA may be destroyed from above through a broad unity agreement between NEA and AFT, or between CTA and AFT at the state level. Such moves will be strongly opposed by the CCUFA leadership. However, it is too early to predict the future of CFA.

Membership figures. The unity moves of the CFA associations, their new postures, their moderate image and identification with internal governance mechanisms, and their growing sophistication regarding collective bargaining have now put the anti-UPC forces in the position to seize the initiative with respect to the bargaining issue. From the membership data shown in

TABLE 1 CSUC FACULTY ASSOCIATIONS : PAYROLL DEDUCTION MEMBERSHIP

(JUNE 1972 AND MAY 1973) AND APPROXIMATE TOTAL MEP~BERSHIP (SUMMER 1972)

Payroll deduction membership Approximate total membership June 1972 May 1973 Summer 1973

ACSUP 608 811 820 AAUP 109 187 1,400 CCUFA 2,283 2,360 2,420 CSEA 3,- 3,660 3,860 UPC 2,957 3,376 3,7700

SOURCE: Payroll deduction data are on record in the State Controller’s office. Approximate total membership is based on payroll deduction data and information provided by the respective associations.

Table 1, one might conclude that a CFA coalition would have little difficulty defeating UPC. Allowing for overlap, the CFA associations have a total membership of about 7,500. While this lead is a major advantage, its signif- icance with respect to a representation election may be reduced by a number of considerations. ACSUP, CCUFA, and CSEA have a significant number of “insurance” members, and the four CFA associations include members who

38 / J.MALCOLMWALKER

are opposed to collective bargaining or who will be apathetic enough not to vote in an election. The more aggressive the CFA associations become, the more they will alienate their “conservative” members. UPC is growing faster than the other associations and few of its members can be expected to ab- stain or vote against UPC in an election. Perhaps the most significant factor will be the definition of the bargaining unit. Even if the unit includes only full-time faculty and closely related groups, senior faculty (approximately 6,500) will be outnumbered by junior faculty, librarians, and counselors (approximately 8,500). UPC has been very aggressive in supporting special demands in behalf of the latter groups-full accevs to grievance procedures, shorter tenure periods, differential salary increases, tenure to be granted if the faculty member “has substantially met the departmental standards,” and similar proposals. UPC programs are generally more egalitarian than those of the CFA associations. The CFA associations will be in worse trouble should the bargaining unit include some part-time faculty. The CFA associations have been much less active than UPC in pressing the demands of the “relatively deprived” groups, although CCUFA has recently become active in this respect. For CFA to place enhancement of the powers of the senates -dominated by senior faculty-and promotion of “professional standards” through “peer” (i.e,, senior faculty) decision making at the core of their collective bargaining effort may turn out to be a disastrous tactic. That CFA intends to exclude part-timers from membership will compound the problem.

Some Implications and Further Research I have argued that the movement toward collective bargain-

ing is not reversible in the short run. The roots of faculty dissatisfaction rest in conditions that have proved difficult to change. The governance system is unstable in the sense that once a law is passed, collective bargaining will be integrated into the governance ~ystem.’~ After a decade of power struggles, a balance of power acceptable to all groups cannot be achieved within the context of the existing governance system. The incessant union pressure, rivalries among the faculty organizations, and the problems of the Chancel- lor and his staff (responsible under the law and by delegation from the Board for centralized coordination and initiative, overburdened with work, and

25 It should be noted that the analysis developed in this paper has been rooted in structural, not personal, factors, Further, the stated and implied criteria of effectiveness have been limited to such factors as the persistence of problems of concern to the faculty, the extent to which the structure of faculty-administration relationships is regarded as legitimate, the extent of power struggles, and so on. No attention has been given to broader criteria having to do with the educational mission and programs of the CSUC. Some major successes in the area of mass education have been achieved despite the problems of governance.

Symposium- Faculty Unionism in the West / 39

subjected to inexorable pressures from the state government) have created a situation in which effective conflict resolution cannot be achieved.

The dynamics of organizational rivalry have taken over. Although the victor cannot yet be predicted, it has been possible to identify those factors that are critical for the outcome of a representation election. The CSUC situation provides an unusual opportunity for a longitudinal analysis of the emergence of collective bargaining for higher education faculty. Forces leading to the implementation of collective bargaining will be monitored and the impact of bargaining predicted and then assessed.2s

26 I will argue elsewhere that the CSUC experience suggests that the so-called “traditional” or “shared authority” model of governance has little relevance to the analysis of governance in multicampus universities. Nor can governance be simply characterized as “authoritarian.” It follows that the impact of collective bargaining cannot be assessed in terms of “shared authority vs. collective bargaining” or “authoritarianism vs. collective bargaining.” More sophisticated models are necessary for “before and after” comparisons. Power, codict, and negotiations processes should be the core element in such models. Using such approaches, it should be possible to predict key aspects of the impact of collective bargaining in the CSUC. See J, Malcolm Walker, Shred Authority and “Nonindustrinr Bargaining in Multi-campus Systems (Berkeley: Uni- versity of California, Instiute of Business and Economic Research, working paper, 1974).

Documents

Transition to Bargaining in a Multicampus System