A Term PaperonTrends of Chinas U.S Policy in Different Regimes:Post Mao Era Perspective

Date of Submission: June 5, 2014.

Dept. of International RelationsUniversity of DhakaCourse Title: China AffairsCourse No: 510

Submitted To: Roksana KibriaProfessor

Submitted By:Tohura Moriom Misti: SK-881Sajia Shahnaz Toma: RK- 355Sirajum Israt Jahan: SK- 1118Kabita Islam: FM- 729

Table of Contents

1- Introduction..12- Data Collection Methodology..13- Literature Review.24- China-U.S Relation in Different Regimes...64.1- Deng Xiaoping Era64.2- Jiang Zemin Era114.3- Hu Jintao Era.144.4- Xi Jinping Era175- Politics Behind Chinas U.S Policy.196- Prospects of U.S- China Relation...217- Conclusion..24

Bibliography................25

Page | iii

1) Introduction:

Ties and tensions between the United States and China are like a matrix of vectors, pulling or push the relationship. The ties stem from shared economic, security, and political interests and goals. At the same time, tensions between the United States and China arise from differences in and conflicts about economic, political, and security interests and goals. In addition, vision and capabilities of leaders and domestic political conditions also from time to time become an important factor in shaping the relationship.[footnoteRef:2] In the post Mao era Chinese leaders adopted five principles of coexistence and those are: [2: Hui Wang, U.S.-CHINA: BONDS AND TENSIONS. RAND Corporation. Available at: www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph.../MR1300.ch12.pdf.]

1- Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.2- mutual non-aggression; 3- mutual non-interference in internal affairs; 4- equality and mutual benefits; and 5- peaceful co-existence.Therefore, this term paper has focused to explore the trend of relationship between China and the U.S. according to successive regime changes in China. However, this paper focuses on the post-Mao era China, since it marks remarkable changes in China-U.S. relations.

1) Methodology of the Paper:

This term paper has been prepared by using qualitative methodology since it can provide an in-depth understanding about the issue. Secondary sources such as previously conducted researches, published reports, articles, books, journals, internet resources etc. have been used for data collection.2) Literature Review:

Dumbaugh (2009) emphasized the importance of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) touching on a wide range of areas including, among others, economic policy, security, foreign relations, and human rights. The author argued that U.S. interests with China are bound together much more closely now than even a few years ago. The author also argued that these extensive inter-linkages have made it increasingly difficult for either government to take unilateral actions without inviting far-reaching, inadvertent consequences. Lawrence (2013) discussed about the recent developments in the U.S.-China relationship by reviewing major policy issues. The author argued that recent issues of major concern for Washington include the intentions behind Chinas military modernization program, Chinas use of its paramilitary forces and military in disputes with its neighbors over territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and its continuing threat to use force to bring Taiwan under its control. Dong (2010) analyzed the U.S.-China economic relations since 1971, and explained the principal forces stimulating growth and encouraging change, and, discussed how these two economic giants fit into an interlocking Asian and world economy. Author argued that since growing economic interdependence has presented new challenges and opportunities, the long-term goal for each side would be to forge economic ties strong enough to create a stable political relationship, rather than to be held hostage by geopolitical constraints. Robert S. Ross (1989) mainly discussed about Chinas policy and initiatives regarding U.S since 1970s. He included a wide view of the reason why China had a growing interest to seek for relation with U.S and pointed out rival Sino-Soviet relation as a major cause behind it. Further he included how Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping had taken different initiatives to improve relation with U.S while China had hostile relation with Soviet Union and later how they normalize the progress of China-U.S relation while china came into a stable situation with Soviet Union. Dr Frank Frost (1997) mainly wrote about the implications and targets of Jiang Zemins visit to U.S. he included the background of U.S- China Relation before 1990s which means before the leadership period of Jiang Zemin. Further, he included the progress of U.S China Relation during Jiangs leadership and the initiatives taken by him during his U.S visit such as: bilateral policy regarding economic and trade, arms control and non-proliferation, human rights issues etc. Robert G. Sutter (1998) emphasized on the U.S policy towards China. He added how U.S always have been pressuring China on different issues and in the name of cooperation U.S have been always presuming their own interest. Profile: Jiang Zemin (2012) is a report on the implications of Jiang regarding Sino-U.S relation. It included the social stability during Jiangs period and discussed about the image of Jiang towards U.S. Further, it included a little discussion about Hu Jintao as a shadow of Jiang Zemin.After Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao became the President of the People's Republic of China.Hu administration was tried to built relations with U.S about economic and political matter. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011) said that ,the two important visit of Obama to China and Hu to USA had paramount significance specially Chinese President Hu Jintao's latest state visit to the United States bore rich fruit and opened a new chapter of cooperation between the two countries. In his talks with Obama, Hu stressed that, as heavyweight players on the world stage, China and the United States should push forward their positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship through new approaches, new moves and new spirits. The improvement of relations is normal before a Sino-U.S. presidential summit, as officials from both countries step up advance visits and review where the two sides can find common ground, says Paul Haenle (2011)."These are good things, because it opens up the aperture for communication and it gets the two sides really trying to find ways to cooperate," he added. U.S. officials have said they want to move beyond the roller-coaster nature of relations with China. China, too, has expressed interest in seeing something different. He also included that in a written interview with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post, Hu said the two countries should "remove disturbances, work for shared goals and promote continuous growth of our relations."Former Obama advisor Jeffrey Bader (2013) cites finding solutions to conflicts in third countries around the world -so-called hot spots - as an opportunity for cooperation, or conflict, between the U.S. and China. Presidents Xi Jinping, and Hu Jintao before him, and President Obama have referred to the importance of establishing a new type of great power relationship.Bader called for the U.S. and China to work together to resolve dangerous conflicts around the world and that such efforts could form the building blocks of a new type of great power relationship. Elizabeth (2013) argued that the Xi-Obama summit represents only the first step toward getting the U.S.-China bilateral relationship on more solid footing. For real progress in the relationship, there will have to be real progress across the wide range of issues that continue to bed evil the two countries. The two sides made some small progress on climate change, signing an agreement to cooperate on eliminating HFCs. The tougher issues remain, however. Cyber hacking has been relegated to the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, where issues generally experience a slow and painful death without actually ever dying. President Obama offered some optimistic remarks to the effect that the United States and China will increasingly have common cause on issues of cyber espionage as Chinas intellectual property (IP) develops. After two decades of countless American officials and analysts arguing that as soon as China develops its own IP, Beijing will better protect that of others, and President Obama should probably not hold his breath on that one. In Phoenix Weekly Paul Haenle (2014) describes Xi and his leadership team understand that in this era of globalization, achieving the Chinese dream will depend on a strong and stable U.S.-China relationship. The Obama administration, likewise, believes a stable, cooperative, and constructive relationship with China is essential to achieving Americas domestic and foreign policy objectives. The two economies, financial systems, and trade are increasingly interdependent and their interests and destinies are deeply interconnected, lending their leaders strong incentives to avoid confrontation and unhealthy competition. Sukjoon Yoon (2014) describes Xi Jinpings declaration that China should strive to become a true maritime power is redolent of a Chinese version of the Monroe doctrine or the old Middle Kingdom order. The recent issues in the East and South China seas demonstrate Chinas incremental pursuit of its ambition to be the dominant maritime power in the region.Chinese president Xi Jinpings conception of true maritime power is intertwined with several complex issues: internal factors about the legitimacy of his leadership and external factors like territorial disputes in the East and South China seas which concern sovereignty. Wen-Ti Sung (2014) argued that Xi Jinping has endeared himself to Chinas liberal commentariat through his family pedigree.Compared with Deng, Xi Jinping, too, reigns over widespread consensus within the party that corruption and inequality have reached explosive proportions. Xi, too, appears willing to consider implementing select reforms to respond to calls of the civil society, but the CCP leadership seems firm on the principle that the party alone, not any other organized actor, has to be the agent implementing them. Indeed, as in the case of XuZhiyong, the party has gradually been implementing the reforms proposed by Chinas civil society while imprisoning the very nongovernment activists championing them. Arthur R. Kroeber (2013) argued that combined with other actions from Xis first year in office - notably a surprisingly bold anti-corruption campaign - the reform program reveals Xi Jinping as a leader far more powerful and visionary than his predecessor Hu Jintao. He aims to redefine the basic functions of market and government, and in so doing establish himself as Chinas most significant leader since Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, he is moving swiftly to establish the bureaucratic machinery that will enable him to overcome resistance and achieve his aims. It remains to be seen whether Xi can deliver on these grand ambitions, and whether his prescription will really prove the cure for Chinas mounting social and economic ills. But one thing is for sure: Xi cannot be faulted for thinking too small. Ankit Panda (2014) argued that Sino-U.S. relations have maintained their delicate balance of the line between cooperation and competition during his first year. Xi successfully maintained Chinas global trade clout as of 2013, China is the largest trading partner for over 120 countries. After a stand-off with India in April 2013 in the disputed region of Aksai Chin in Kashmir, China managed to conclude a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 2013 that was advantageous for China in the sense that it preserved its status quo advantage in the region. Xi even took the unprecedented step of authorizing engagement with Taiwan last month which offered little in the way of concrete results, but set up a new communication mechanism.

3) U.S.-China relations during Different Regimes:

Since 1970s, China has been focusing to improve its relation with U.S for different reasons. With the changing regimes in the post Mao era Chinas U.S policy has shifted a lot to a more cooperative point. This part will show the improvement and nature of U.S- China relations in different regimes in post Mao ruling period.4.1) Deng Xiaopings EraAfter Deng Xiaoping consolidated his leadership in 1978, bilateral relationship between US and China was dramatically transformed. The decade of the 1980s has been characterized as a golden era in US-China relations.[footnoteRef:3] [3: Richard H. Solomon, President Nixon and The Week that Changed the World: The Challenge of Managing US-China Relations.(2012). P 4. Available at: www.usip.org/sites/.../china/Managing_US-China_Relations-Remarks.pdf]

Normalization of Relations:The breakthrough that was needed to foster US-China relations came as a result of changes in Chinese policy during the late 1970s. On the American side, with the view of establishing contacts, President Carter sent Secretary of States Cyrus Vance to China on an exploratory mission from August 21 to 25, 1977. He received unenthusiastic reception, and met with Foreign minister Huang Hua, Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping, and Chairman HuaGuofeng. The Chinese made it clear that Taiwan is their internal issue, and, rejected U.S. proposal to establish liaison office in Taipei. However, the Chinese regarded that visit as a step backward in their relationship. After this, the U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski visited China during May 20-22, 1978 with the purpose of making progress towards full normalization of relations with China. He was welcomed very warmly, and he commented that the United States shared Chinas resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony. He again and again expressed that resisting Soviet Union was a common interest of China and America. Dengs efforts in the process of normalization were extraordinary. He met U.S. ambassador Leonard Woodcock and discussed about the joint communiqu through which the two parties agreed to disagree. Ultimately the two countries formally established full diplomatic relations on 1st January 1979, and United States also abrogated official relations with Taiwan. For, United States it was highly profitable to establish relations with 900 million Chinese, along with the 17 millions of Taiwanese since they pledged to maintain economic and cultural relation with Taiwan. From the Chinese side, Chairman Hua declared that they would not let the Taiwan issue stand in the way of normalization. Deng felt Chinese urgency of getting American recognition. He felt that normalization could give him the success that had eluded Mao and Zhou, facilitate his visit to the U.S., increase trade, and make American science, technology, capital and credit available to the Chinese. On one hand, Deng was well aware of the fact that China lacked the naval capacity to attack Taiwan; on the other hand, he preferred to realize Four Modernizations.[footnoteRef:4] [4: Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order,(second edition), (Oxford University Press: 1990), pp 57-65.]

Dengs visit to the United States:Deng Xiaoping went to Washington, D.C., on January 28, 1979 for a nine-day official visit. It was the first such visit to America of a senior Chinese leader, and since Deng was undoubtedly the most powerful leader of China (although ranked third on the official protocol list), the U.S. gave him more lavish and majestic reception than usual. Carter praised this visit as an occasion of reconciliation, while Deng got scope for indirectly expressing his detest for Soviet Union. Deng attended dinner with hundreds of corporate executives, members of congress, and other prominent Americans, visited Kennedy Center Opera House, Ford Assembly Plant, The Hughes Tool Company, and Johnson Space Center and saw the efficiency of American business operations. His skillful showmanship-shaking hands, hugging, kissing, beaming, laughing, and teasing-commended him to the American public, persuading them that in a Cowboy Hat even a Communist was difficult to hate. He signed three agreement with America on science and technology, cultural exchange, and, consular relations.[footnoteRef:5] [5: Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order,(second edition), (Oxford University Press: 1990), pp 70-74.]

Improving Economic Relations with the U.S.:With full diplomatic relations established, the United States and Chinese governments set out to clear the remaining legislative and administrative hurdles to move trade relations forward. In 1978, a wide range of developments encouraged the full normalization of trade relations. These were: a bilateral trade agreement; the opening of the first American law firm (Coudert Brothers of New York City) in mainland China since 1950; US assistance with Chinese hydroelectric power development, consumer goods manufacturing, and petroleum production and transportation; export-import bank credits; approval for expanded arms sales to China; a Chinese commitment to exporting scarce strategic materials; most importantly, a trade agreement conferring Most Favored Nation (MFN) status on China that exempted Chinese exports to the United States from the high tariff rates stipulated by the Smoot-Hawley Act of June 1930.Tables 1 and 2, assembled from US and Chinese sources respectively, present data from 1977 to 1990 of renewed commercial activity between the two countries.Table 1: Sino-American Trade, 1977-1980 (US Figures)YearUSImportsfromPRCUSExportsto PRCTotalBilateralTradeUSTradeBalancePer centof TotalUS TradePer cent ofTotal PRCTrade

1977200.7171.3 372.1-29.40.12.5

1978324.0820.71,144.6496.70.3 5.4

1979592.31,724.02,316.31,131.70.6 7.9

19801,058.33,754.44,812.72,696.11.012.7

19811,865.33,602.75,468.01,737.41.112.7

19822,283.72,912.15,195.8628.41.112.7

19832,244.12,176.14,420.2-68.00.910.2

19843,064.83,004.06,068.8-60.81.111.8

19853,861.73,851.77,713.4-9.91.410.9

19864,770.93,105.47,876.3-1,665.51.310.5

19876,293.53,488.49,781.8-2,805.11.411.8

19888,512.25,022.913,535.1-3,489.31.713.2

198911,988.55,807.417,795.9-6,181.12.116.1

199015,223.94,807.320,031.2-10,416.62.217.6

Note: In millions of current US dollars (in the American system, 1 billion = 1,000 million, 1 trillion = 1,000 billion).Source: Dong Wang , Chinas Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective, in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 39. No. 3.(2010). P. 174 & 179. ISSN: 1868-4874.

Table 2: Sino-American Trade, 1977-1980 (Chinese Figures)YearPRC Exports toUSPRC Importsfrom USTotal BilateralTrade

China TradeBalance

1977179.63 114.62294.2565.01

1978270.60 721.10991.70-450.50

1979595.01 1,856.592,451.60-1,261.58

1980981.06 3,830.214,811.27-2,849.15

19811,505.794,382.535,888.32-2,876.74

19821,619.253,716.755,336.00-2,097.50

19831,720.172,321.674,041.84-601.50

19842,299.713,663.385,963.09-1,363.67

19852,651.604,373.367,024.96-1,721.76

19862,466.433,527.095,993.25-1,060.66

19872,962.663,809.366,772.02-846.70

19883,209.965,651.938,261.89-2,441.97

19894,410.007,860.0012,270.00-3,450.00

19906,580.005,190.0011,770.00-1,390.00

Note: In millions of current US dollars (in the American system, 1 billion = 1,000 million, 1 trillion = 1,000 billion).Source: Dong Wang , Chinas Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective, in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 39. No. 3.(2010). P. 174 & 179. ISSN: 1868-4874.

From the late 1970s, when China embarked on the Four Modernizations[footnoteRef:6]raw materials such as iron and steel formed the bulk of Chinas imports[footnoteRef:7]. Throughout the 1980s, the normalization of political relations and Chinas blossoming economic reforms paved the way for acceleration in the exchange of goods, values, ideas, personnel, and technology. Nevertheless, by 1984 the US had become Chinas third-largest trading partner.In the 1980s, the commodities traded between the two countries were complementary rather than competitive. One noteworthy change facilitating US-China economic relations was the steady liberalizing of controls over American exports of advanced technology. In 1980, such exports to China were reassigned from category Y (the Warsaw Treaty countries) to category P (new US trading partners), and then, in May 1983 under the Reagan administration, to category V (American allies). A three-tiered system of export licenses further simplified the licensing process, placing 75% of export license applications in a green zone under the sole control of the US Department of Commerce. After Hong Kong and Macau, the United States was the largest investor in China, with about $3 billion in assets by 1985.However, after the Tiananmen political storm and dramatic changes in the Soviet bloc in 1989, Deng Xiaoping called for a cautious, non-confrontational approach toward the United States, which is widely known in China as the posture of taoguangyanghui, or keeping a low profile. To a large measure, this approach was premised on the fact-and the assessment-that Chinas power and international status were far weaker than those of America, and that the global balance at that moment tilted toward Western political systems, values, and capitalism.[footnoteRef:8] [6: Four modernization includes modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military.] [7: In 1977, China spent 22% of its foreign exchange on iron and steel, followed by foodstuffs (17%), chemicals (12%), transport equipment (9%), and textile fibers (7%). In 1978 the US sold China cereals, raw textile fibers and waste, machinery, fertilizers, and vegetable oils and fats, while the chief items exported by China were feathers, cotton Chinas Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective, in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 39. No. 3. (2010). ISSN: 1868-4874. Available at: journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/files/journals/3/.../307-311-1-PB.pdf] [8: Dong Wang , Chinas Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective, in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 39. No. 3. (2010). ISSN: 1868-4874. Available at: journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/files/journals/3/.../307-311-1-PB.pdf]

Cultural, Educational, Scientific and Technological Relations:In the summer of 1978, Deng shocked a visiting American delegation by proposing that China send hundreds of students to the US. Following this, the two parties signed significant cooperative agreements, including the Understanding on Agricultural Exchange, the Understanding on Cooperation in Space Technology, and the Agreement on the Exchange of Students and Scholars.[footnoteRef:9] Deng said, when our thousands of Chinese students abroad return home, you will see how China will transform itself. Numerous Chinese students, visiting scholars, professional and official delegations visited the United States each month. During this time, a large and growing number of cultural exchange activities undertaken at all levels gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each others cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. [9: Jin Xiaoming, The China-U.S. Relationship in Science and Technology. 2013. P 3. Available at: china-us.uoregon.edu/.../China-US%20relationship%20in%20Science%2]

Strategic and Military Relations:As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated by Deng Xiaoping, U.S. dialogue with China broadened to cover a wide range of issues, including global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions, including arms control, UN and other multilateral organization affairs, and international narcotics matters.During this period, both the United States and China recognized that, in the words of the former US Consul General in Hong Kong, we are not each others adversary, that we share important common security interests globally, and in Asia, and that our cooperation is crucial to peace and stability in East Asia. However, the expanding relationship was threatened in 1981 by Chinese objections to the level of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 to resolve Chinese questions about Americas unofficial relations with Taiwan. After 8 months of negotiations, in the U.S.-China joint communiqu of August 17, 1982, the United States stated its intention to reduce gradually the level of arms sales to Taiwan, and the Chinese described as a fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. During this period both militaries were hyper-focused on the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union and engaged in security cooperation mostly in the form of selling the U.S. weapons systems and defense technologies to China. Apart from this, U.S.-China security cooperation had mainly been of a political nature, and mostly been the purview of U.S. and Chinese civilian officials and diplomats, not generals and admirals.[footnoteRef:10] [10: David Finkelstein, U.S.-China Relations & National Security The Military Dimensions, inChina-US Focus. April 1, 2011. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/u-s-china-relations-national-security-the-military-dimensions/. Accessed on 15 May, 2014.]

4.2) Jiang Zemins Era:Jiang Zemin, born on 17 August 1926, was a principal leader of china-General secretary of the CPC (1989-2002), President of Peoples Republic of China (1993-2003) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989-2004). Jiang was a facilitator, whose precedence in power was to maintain social stability, continue gradual economic reforms and thus ensure the Communist Party presence in power.[footnoteRef:11] [11: Profile: Jiang Zemin, 2012, BBC News China, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20038774]

Jiang gave top priority to U.S.-China relations. During his regime, U.S handed over Hong Kong to China in 1997. Relations between these countries were at its ease during Jiangs period. Former US ambassador to Beijing James Lilley said that Jiang was known as the Flowerpot by the people of Shanghai: Lots of decoration, no action.[footnoteRef:12] Well, it turns out he is a good consensus builder, hes a good manipulator, Mr Lilley added[footnoteRef:13]. [12: ibid] [13: ibid]

Jiang Zemins Visit to U.SDuring Jiangs ruling period, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited China in 1999 and Jiang made a nine-day visit to U.S in November 1997at the invitation of President Clinton. An official Chinese buying mission, concurrent with Jiangs visit, announced the purchase of over $4 billion of U.S goods, mostly Boeing aircraft[footnoteRef:14]. During President Jiangs visit to the United States, both sides concluded a number of agreements on increasing exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in the fields of trade, environmental protection, energy, science and technology, law, education and culture and on increasing military-to-military exchanges[footnoteRef:15]. President Jiangs state visit to the United States met these goals between China and the United States: enhancing understanding, expanding common ground, developing cooperation and creating a common future[footnoteRef:16]. [14: Robert G. Sutter, U.S Policy Toward China, Rowman and Littlefield, England, 1998. Available at: http://books.google.com.bd/books?chinas+US+policy+during+jiang+zemin] [15: President Jiang Zemin visited the United States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18030.shtml] [16: ibid]

Jiang also seemed very interested in keeping peaceful relation with U.S for which he only put up some harsh dialogue instead of taking any hard action while NATO bombed in Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Jiang also seemed very interested in keeping peaceful relation with U.S for which he only put up some harsh dialogue instead of taking any hard action while NATO bombed in Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Jiang also seemed very interested in keeping peaceful relation with U.S for which he only put up some harsh dialogue instead of taking any hard action while NATO bombed in Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.Jiang introduced the Socialist Market Economy that combines socialist economy and market economy.

Market economic system is led by U.S policy. To include U.S policy in Chinese economic policy is a symbol of preferring U.S-China Relation. Jiang Zemin protected the ideology of Chinese Communist party and at the same time adopted capitalism in Chinese economic system. China-US relations over the past two decades can be described as a sort of tributary system, with China constituting one of the main pillars of the United States well-functioning capitalist system[footnoteRef:17]. [17: Alan Wheatley, The Power of Currencies and Currencies of Power, Routhledge, 2013, pg:118]

4.3) Hu Jintaos Era :Hu Jintao is the former supreme leader of China between 2002 and 2012. He served as the General Secretary of the Communist Party (2002-2012), President of the People's Republic (2003-2013) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (2004-2012). Hu Jintaos Political Philosophy:Political observers indicate that Hu has distinguished himself from his predecessor in both domestic and foreign policy. Hu's political philosophy during his leadership is summarized by three mottoes1. Harmonious Socialist Society, domestically.2. Peaceful Development, internationally, 3. Scientific Development Concept.These incorporated investment, ecological and social issues, and perceives a requirement for careful and steady political reforms. Hu Jintao foreign policy is more western oriented; especially he gave much importance to build up relations with USA than previous leaders.Barack Obamas Visit to China:In 2010 , President Obamas visit to China came amid high expectations for a strong bilateral and comprehensive partnership between the United States and China, but in the year since that visit Sino-American relations have been extremely strainedthe worst in at least a decade. Throughout the visit, the Chinese government was obsessed with controlling the presidents time and agenda, lest he say or do something that might embarrass the Chinese regime[footnoteRef:18]. The Chinese side was minimizing any chances of President Obama directly reaching the Chinese people in person or via his vaunted oratorical skills[footnoteRef:19]. [18: Brookings ,Stabilizing Unstable U.S.-China Relations? Prospects for the Hu Jintao Visit, Jan 2011.] [19: ibid]

This visit was an example of summit diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.[footnoteRef:20] No other opportunities were provided for President Obama to meet the Chinese people during the visit. No gatherings with human rights activists or legal counselors were allowed, and no visits to NGOs, plants, or organizations were planned. There was not by any means the common discourse to the American Council of Trade. The joint presidential public interview at last ended up being a media briefing at which correspondents were not permitted to make inquiries .Even the one daily paper meeting allowed for President Obama was controlled in distribution. [20: ibid]

So we can see that the visit of Obama to China did not fulfill the expectations of world community.Hu Jintaos Visit to U.S:After Barack Obamas visit, president Hu Jintao visited U.S in 2011, which left a great significance on Chinese foreign policy. During his trip, Hu emphasized the Chinese and U.S. peoples cherished great interests and friendly feelings toward each other, adding boosting people-to-people exchanges, especially youth-to-youth exchanges, was of key importance to the development of bilateral ties.[footnoteRef:21] President Hu interacted widely with Americans from various circles. He attended a welcome luncheon held by U.S. friendly organizations and delivered an important speech, which was warmly applauded by the audience. [21: China.org.cn,Hu's visit opens new chapter of China-U.S. cooperation, Jan 23,2011.Available at http://www.china.org.cn/world/Hu_visit_us2011/2011-01/23/content_21799311.htm]

Hu clarified China's strategies of further creating China-U.S ties, and repeated China would adhere to the street of tranquil improvement. The Chinese president held candid and in-profundity chats with Barack Obama, and numerous other senior political figures, and arrived at essential accord on two-sided relations and an assembly of significant local and worldwide undertakings.The cooperation between China and U.S during this visit: During the tightly scheduled trip, which saw Hu attend nearly 20 events in Washington and Chicago within 68 hours, the Chinese leader also reached out to the U.S. public, conveying China's resolution to advance China-U.S. ties, highlighting China's commitment to peaceful development and presenting China's image of peace, development, opening-up and progress.[footnoteRef:22] [22: ibid]

The two sides had harvested rich fruit from their extensive cooperation, retained effective communication and coordination on major regional and global issues, brought tangible benefits to the two peoples, and made great contributions to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.[footnoteRef:23] [23: Sky.news.hd, Hu Jintao's Legacy: Critics Lament Lost Years, may,2014Available at http://news.sky.com/story/1008527/hu-jintaos-legacy-critics-lament-lost-years]

In the new era, China and the United States shared expanding common interests, shouldered increasing common responsibilities, and enjoyed a greater prospect of bilateral cooperation. They agreed as heavyweight players on the world stage, China and the United States should push forward their positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship through new approaches, new moves and new spirits. The two sides inked more than 10 agreements, memoranda of understanding and letters of intent. Companies from the two countries also yielded rich cooperative fruits, which covered trade, investment, technology, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, energy, environment, high-speed rail, and smart grids.[footnoteRef:24] [24: ibid]

It is said that Hu's visit projected the course for development of China-U.S. ties in the future, boosted China-U.S. strategic mutual trust, promoted bilateral practical cooperation in various fields, expanded bilateral humanistic exchanges, strengthened bilateral local-level governmental cooperation and increased bilateral communication and coordination on major international and regional affairs.Since China and the United States established formal diplomatic relations 32 years ago, this is the first time when China-U.S. relationship had maintained sound development. It surely would further move forward the positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship, and open a new chapter for bilateral cooperation of partners.

4.4) Xi Jinpings Era:Xi was formally elected president of the Peoples Republic of China on March 14 2013 and has since then accomplished much in terms of domestic and foreign policy.Sino-U.S. relations have maintained their delicate balance of the line between cooperation and competition during his first year. Xi successfully maintained Chinas global trade clout as of 2013, China is the largest trading partner for over 120 countries[footnoteRef:25]. [25: Ankit Panda, Xi Jinping's One Year Performance Review, TheDiplomat, March O5, 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/xi-jinpings-one-year-performance-review/]

Xi and his leadership team understand that in this era of globalization, achieving the Chinese dream will depend on a strong and stable U.S.-China relationship. The Obama administration, likewise, believes a stable, cooperative, and constructive relationship with China is essential to achieving Americas domestic and foreign policy objectives. The two economies, financial systems, and trade are increasingly interdependent and their interests and destinies are deeply interconnected, lending their leaders strong incentives to avoid confrontation and unhealthy competition.[footnoteRef:26] [26: Summarized: Paul Haenle, What Does a New Type of Great-Power Relations Mean for the United States and China?,Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Phoenix Weekly, January 15, 2014. Available at http://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/01/15/us-china-relations-2013-new-model-of-major-power-relations-in-theory-and-in-practice/gyjm]

The Sunnylands Summit:The Sunnylands summit cast some sunshine on the U.S.-China relationship. The Xi-Obama summit represents only the first step toward getting the U.S.-China bilateral relationship on more solid footing. For real progress in the relationship, there will have to be real progress across the wide range of issues that continue to bedevil the two countries. The two sides made: Some small progress on climate change by signing an agreement to cooperate on eliminating HFCs. President Obama offered some optimistic remarks to the effect that the United States and China will increasingly have common cause on issues of cyber espionage as Chinas intellectual property (IP) develops. President Obama treated President Xi with respect; however, he resisted Chinese efforts to elevate the U.S.-China relationship beyond that of the United States relations with its allies. While President Obama acknowledged that the two countries needed to have a new model of cooperation, he carefully avoided the Chinese phraseology of a new model of major country relationships.[footnoteRef:27] [27: Summarized: Elizabeth Economy, Barack Obama and Xi Jinpings summit shifted the state of US-China relationsThe Atlantic, June 11, 2013, available at http://qz.com/93274/barack-obama-and-xi-jinpings-summit-shifted-the-state-of-us-china-relations/]

The informal setting of the meeting offered a chance for the two leaders to begin building rapport, setting a tone for improved relations, and gaining a better understanding of each others domestic, bilateral, and global visions. At Sunnylands, Xi again put forward the idea of forging a new type of major country relationship between the U.S. and China and Obama responded positively to Xis proposal, explaining that the United States is willing to build a new model of cooperation with China based on mutual benefit and respect. The Obama administration was indicating that it was more interested in understanding what specific actions the two countries could take to enhance cooperation, reduce differences, and ultimately achieve the theoretical model proposed by China. The U.S. was signaling it wants to explore this new concept with China, but only if the Chinese side agrees it can lead to greater cooperation.The need to find tangible ways to work together constructively on global challenges was evident at Sunnylands. Obama and Xi concluded their discussions with an announcement to enhance cooperation on combating nuclear proliferation by continuing to apply pressure on Pyongyang, and to work together to combat climate change by discussing ways to reduce emissions of hydrofluorocarbons.

4) The Politics behind Chinas US Policy:China had opened relations with U. S. for strategic reasons[footnoteRef:28]. Sino-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet relations also shaped Chinas response towards the U.S. Chinas domestic politics also has a decisive influence on Chinas U.S policy[footnoteRef:29]. [28: Robert S. Ross, From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and Chinas US Policy, The China Quarterly, No. 118 (June 1989)] [29: ibid]

It has been argued that in the 1970s Chinas opening to the US was only possible after Lin Biao had been defeated as a powerful force in Chinese politics.[footnoteRef:30] Lacking the unchallenged authority they possess in the domestic political area, in foreign policy Chinese leaders are less free to pursue personal policy preferences, facing the necessity of responding to International security threats.[footnoteRef:31] Thus the major turning points in Chinese security policy, including Beijings post-1949 pro-soviet alignment and its later rapprochement with the US, reflected strategic imperatives resulting from fundamental changes in Chinas international environment.[footnoteRef:32]During periods of heightened Sino-Soviet tensions, Beijing has often tried to minimize US-China dispute over Taiwan. Stable US-China relations contributed to Chinas effort to deter Soviet adventurism.[footnoteRef:33] [30: John w. Garver, Chinas Decision for Rapprochment with the United States, 1968-1971 (Bpoulder, Col:Westview Press, 1982), pp. 134-37] [31: Robert S. Ross, 1989. op. cit] [32: ibid] [33: Robert S. Ross, International bargaining and domestic politics: US-China relations since 1972, World Politics, Vol. xxxviii, no. 2 (January 1986)]

Motives behind the Chinese people migrating to U.S during Dengs period was to meet their critical need at the initial stage of its reform and opening process to obtain foreign technology, and an opportunity to learn from the best in the world and narrow the gap between their scientific and technological level and that of Western countries.However, Chinas indigenous innovation policies represent a serious slip-up along this path. The policies do not threaten U.S. technological leadership in the end, but they do threaten to impose substantial costs on U.S. businesses.China has captured the whole world with its products by joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has become the worlds fastest-growing major economy and the worlds largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods. It became the worlds second-largest economy, after the United States, by both nominal GDP and purchasing power parity (PPP).[footnoteRef:34]Furthermore, China has surpassed the United States as their number one trading partner.[footnoteRef:35] [34: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/there_no_stopping_china_0H8GJaMgzHCYenL038Yh2N] [35: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32882.pdf]

The rise of China made the United States and its allies more cautious about launching military attacks against others in this region. However, China designed and improved its defense policy in such manner that it has no effective constraint on US military behavior in a short term, but in the long term Chinas rise will play a positive role in creating a balanced international system.

Following the path of economic system that showed by U.S China has captured the world market in such a way that US could not do it yet. China now leads in the production of not just low-end manufactured consumer goods, but also some high-tech devices, many of which were developed in the United States.Therefore, China in one sense is using U.S to improve its own position in the world system. Some argue that soon China will overtake U.S and become the next hegemonic power while other argue that China to be a hegemonic power is yet far to achieve.

5) Prospects of U.S-China Relations:

One Chinese saying about the country's ties with the U.S. goes like this: the U.S. and China are too dependent on one another for their relationship to be terribly bad, but they are too different from one another for their relationship to ever be very good.[footnoteRef:36] [36: Time,Will Obama and Hu Jintao Find Middle Ground?, Jan. 18, 2011.]

Maritime issue:The current Chinese President Xi Jinping is more committed to a long-term maritime strategy than his predecessors[footnoteRef:37]. His motive is to upgrade naval capabilities to counter the US pivot to Asia and back up its civil maritime law enforcement[footnoteRef:38]. Certainly the current maritime policies being pursued by China are intended as a warning, especially to the US, not to intervene in Chinese affairs in any part of the East and South China seas[footnoteRef:39]. Xi also expects US influence in the region to continue to weaken[footnoteRef:40]. [37: Sukjoon Yoon, Xi Jinpings Monroe Doctrine: Rebuilding The Middle Kingdom Order?,The Eurasia Review, March, 29, 2014. Available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/29052014-xi-jinpings-monroe-doctrine-rebuilding-middle-kingdom-order-analysis] [38: ibid] [39: ibid] [40: ibid]

Taiwan Issue:Taiwans strategic importance for controlling the sea lanes in East Asia, it is hard to imagine the US, as well as Japan, allowing China to control that large island. In fact, Taiwan is likely to be an important player in the anti-China balancing coalition, which is sure to infuriate China and fuel the security competition between Beijing and Washington.[footnoteRef:41]China is never going to compromise on Taiwan issue in any case. [41: John Measheimer, The Australian November 18, 2005.]

Economic issue:If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of Chinas neighbors, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the US to contain Chinas power.China-US ties are likely to become more equal, balanced and competitive- a far cry from today, when, arguably, china in effect pays tribute to the US in the form of a cheap Yuan in exchange for stability and prosperity in a US-dominated political and economic system[footnoteRef:42]. [42: Ibid pg:122]

According to Di Dongsheng in The Renminbis Rise and Chinese Politics at least three scenarios can be envisaged against these contexts:First, a bipolar economic order may emerge in which China and the US competes for supremacy.Second, a multi polar system can appear in which the global economy is much more balanced and no country can run up hegemony.Third is that China fails to build a strong economy and retreats to being poor and dependent.China would benefit economically from addressing Americas key critiques of Chinese policy[footnoteRef:43]. [43: Robert E. Rubin, 2013, The U.S-China Mutual Prosperity, available at: RobertE.RubinTheU.S.-ChinaPathtoMutualProsperityCouncilonForeignRelations.htm]

The greatest U.S. threat to Chinas future would be American economic failure, and the greatest economic threat to the United States from China would be Chinese failure. Conversely, each country would benefit economically from the others success.Other issues:In 2013, Chinese cyber hacking of American commercial and military secrets, regional territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea, Beijings recent announcement of a new Air Defense Identification Zone etc. these new means of challenges hold the potential for confrontation between their militaries if they do not renew their military-to-military efforts to increase transparency and cooperation.However, it is clear from the historical record how American policy-makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The US does not tolerate peer competitors. As has been demonstrated in the 20th century, U.S is determined to remain the worlds only hegemonic power. Therefore, the US can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the US is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.China has undergone dramatic economic, political, social and cultural transformations. The process of Chinas rise is not yet complete and will continue into the foreseeable future. That means China is still not a threat to U.S and United States still does not recognize China as a threat. It is only the media that is showing Chinas emergence as a rising super power. Otherwise, China still has a long way to go to enjoy a hegemonic power role.

6) Conclusion:

Chinas U.S policy has been gradually shifting towards more improvement and cooperation is likely to continue between them even by Chinas next regimes. Nevertheless, considering china as a friend may not be probable by U.S because of Chinas rapid development. Cooperation between them is possible but some limit in their bilateral cooperation is also likely to continue. Chinas dramatic rise in economic power and international influence has presented Beijing and Washington with the challenge of how to manage relations between a rising power and a status quo power, amid increasing bilateral interdependence, tension, and strategic distrust[footnoteRef:44]. However, the U.S. and China need to start actively cooperating on global challenges where they have mutual interests. In the past, countries used to focus on bilateral issues. Today, however, the major challenges and opportunities for the U.S.-China relationship will come in working together to address critical global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, energy and food security, terrorism, climate change, Middle East instability, cyber security, and global financial reform and recovery. [footnoteRef:45] The U.S. and China could also work together to eradicate a major childhood disease or epidemic. They can show the world the power for good that the U.S.-China relationship can bring. [44: Elizabeth Economy, (2013), op. cit] [45: Summarized: Jeffrey Bader, John C. Whitehead, A new Type of Great Power Relationship? ,Insight, june2013 available at http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/amchamportal/InfoVault_Library/2013/Insight-A-New-Type-of-Great-Power-Relationship.pdf]

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