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SIR PETE.R HALL
CITIE,S
IN
CIVILIZATION
F R O M M I N T E R N A T I O N A L
N E W Y O R K
o
First Fromm International paperback edition 2001
Copyright @ 1998 by Sir Peter Hall
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright
Conventions. First published in hardcover in the United States by Pantheon Books,
a division of Random House, Inc., New York Originally publishedin Great Britain byWeidenfeld &Nicolson, London.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hall, Peter Geoffrey.Cities in civilization / Sir Peter Hall.
P. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88064-250-5
1. Cities and towns-History. 2. Cities and towns-Growth-History.3. Civilization. 4. City and town life. I. Title.
HT111.H345 t998 307.76'.09--427 98-24007 CIP
Printed in the United States of America
CONTE,NTS
AcknowledgementsList of Illustrations
BOOK ONE: The City as Cultural Crucible
1 Great Cities in their Golden Ages 3
2 The Fountainhead.
{!gr 50G400 sc 243 The Rediscovery of Life
' Flglglc. 1400-1500 69
4 The World as Stage,/London 1,570-1620 114
5 The City as Pleasure Principle. Vienrla 1780-1910 159
6 The Capital of Light€ Paris 1870-1910 201
7 The Invention of the Twentieth Century
r Bfrli+ 19fi-1933 2398 The Key to Creativity 279
BOOK TWO: The City as Innovative Milieu
9 The Innovative Milieu 291
10 The First Industrial Ciry. Manchester 7760-1830 310
17 The Conquest of the Oceans. Glgqow 1n0-n90 348
12 The Pioneer Technopolis* nerfiT 18'10-1930 377
13 The Mass Production of Mobility. Detrqit 189V1975 396
14 The Industrialization of Information. San Francisco/Palo Alto/Berkeley 1950-1990 4?3
Ylt
xi
vl CONTENTS
15 The State as Permanent InnoYator
. Tokyo-Kanasawa I89V1'990' r - +1,6 The Innovat ive Essence
BOOK THREE: The Marriage of Art and
Technology
17 The Invention of Mass Culture
18 The Dream Factoryo k:$des 1910-1945
19 The Soul of the Delta
. Mgphit 7948-7956
20 The Secret of the Marriage
BOOK FOUR: The Establishment of theUrban Order
21, The Challenge to the Urban Order
?2 The Imperial Capital.
P.50 sc-ao100
73 The Utilitarian City
455
483
The City of Perpetual Public'WorksP_aris 1850-1870
The Apotheosis of the ModernNg-lork 1880-19'+0
The City as FreewayLolArgeles 1900-1980
The Social Democratic UtoPiaStockholm 1945-1980
The City of Capitalism RamPantLondon 7979-1993
The Achievement of the Urban Order
503
520
553
603
6tr
627
657
706
746
803
842
888
932
943
990
1051
1135
\/ Lg!&" 782s-7900,_
25,
26o
27t
28
29
BOOK FIVE: The Union of Art, Technology,
and Organization
30 The City of the Coming Golden Age
Nofes
Bibliography
lndex
@
r_*-'*Th"e of each: to understand the precise conjunctqqg o:[.fo4gqjra!
complementary; and then, as a result, to generalize as to the degree ofcommonality these places share, and on the other hand the residual forces that
one of which had its particularage; among lasted for perhaps a century and a half,
the shortest a mere fifteen years. For those brief spans of human history, eachof these cities claimed the global limelight; though none was eyer withourserious competitors, each could fairly claim to be the great creative city of thattime.
I7e start *i(mdDthe Periclean age, the fifth century nc, when the tinyAegean polis diM-nced itself from its competitors through an explosion ofcreativity - in philosophy, science, art, architecture, lyric poetry and drama.Athens at this time was transforming itself from a yery traditional aristocraticoligarchic regime into the world's first and perhaps still most effective democ-racy: originally a democracy of small farmers, but soon in turn transformed bythe growth of trade, which made Athens the wodd's first true global city. Thewealth thus generated remained largely in public hands and was used to generateexceptional state patronage, while the ciry's reputation attracted talents fromeyery corner of a mercantile empire, huge by the standards of the day. And ir
ffinrr#o*nGe. bn"lan,V,u,nltnrt!, Brrl,L
e&*...--. _
are special to
9utTURe
r F ! " !
THE CITY AS CULTURAL CRUCIBLE
emerges that it was rhese outsiders, half inside the culture but half excluded
from it, who were the true progenitors of the Athenian miracle'
The storv contlnuaQ "ft.. "
bieak of almost exactly two thousand years' with-
fiftililil;;'ffi;here the Renaissance suddenlv broke the bonds of
-.it.""r-i".-irH€#ascover the naturalistic arts of the ancient Greeks'
Florence, like Athens, emerges as a great, Mediterranean mercantile centre' a
global city of its day, ;;;;g civic iealth and civic Patronage which provided
collective support for the "t'I, bu' also attracting people -of
talent from all
around the city; "
.oro-on f"",tlr. which helps powerfully to explain the
emergence of both Places- = -'We then move ro .f6"aii)f Elizabeth I and of the
Globe Theatre: a
mere fifty-year span' i;;fs% 61620, where a golden stream of poetry and
;;" pf,rr.d forth fro- Shakespeare and- his contemporaries. Once again, it
.*..*i rfti, *", ,tt.-*o;i;5 gtt"t--erchant city of its day' exploring the
ii-i,r" oi th. world and drawing bounty from it; once again, there was an
eruption of wealth creation arrd o-f conspicuous consumption; once again, talent
was drawn in, from OJota and CamLridge and Midlands grammar schools;
most notably of all, like both Athens .nd Florence, this was an economy and
a society in the throes of transformation, from a traditional aristocratic order
io "
n* system based on merit and enterprise' and the resulting tensions
.ffiUf::ilt#:Tj',ln: "$ffi :,..1';r, was an intriguin grv dirrerent
f f i ; ; ; ; ; , ave rydynamick indo fp lacea t "u l : l - , } . con t ra ry , i t*", tha centre of an .mpi'e and a court that became
more conservative' more
hidebound, as they ".q,rir.d
more territory and more power' In fact' over this
Iong period Vienna ;;.J two golden ages: the first came
.out of royal and
aristocratic p",rorr"g. i. the age "of
,h. .Jigh,.n'n.nt, -and it expressed itself
"l-or, exclusively in music; the second was a reaction of a few
young Viennese
"g"in$ what they saw as an ossified and worthless sociery'
and was artistic'
il;"; "nJ
,.i..rti6c. But they had one thing in common: both the musicians
of the period 17g0 to 1g20, and Jung vien oirsgo to 1910, were quintessential
"riria*r, people of talent m"ki-ng ih.i, o*n way at the fringes
of established
society, compromisinf *iif i, but"also railing against its artistic and intellectual
ii-irrrionr. And finally, in a strange way' this tolerant and rather corrupt
so€jctcsave them their heads'
fT;Jb);en 1870 and 19L0 ran parallel to the second of these Viennese
\ffi"a-y., J*oi"t"a ,o*. of th. r"-. features as the 6rst of them' Here the
outsiders were artists, ""a
^r in vienna they were drawn in from all over the
;;;;;t and indeed irom all over Europe; iust as with music' there were no
real linguistic barriers. They came bec-"use Paris was the city of painters' -the-
city where there was "., ..rtr-oos official establishment of education and of
p^, ,on^g, ,but then, iustbecausetheywerethemost ta lentedof thei rgenerat ion,they found ir,.o-p..h..rsion and even ridicule' So they had
to create their own
anti-establishment world of crit ics and dealers; but they could succeed because
the parisian bourgeoisie, or part of it, was rich enough and sophisticated enough
to appreciate their qualities and pay for their products'
T'he sixth city is i., -"ny *"yrih. mosr extraordinary of all, for its f lowerinl
/ i rV/
Great Cities in their Golden Ages zJ
as the paradigm, onewas so short and its end so tragic
might say the parody, of the creative-irp ofa sudden, all constraints
were shaken off in a frenzy of experimentation across the spectrum of the arts.
It was a special case, and of course there were special reasons: the collapse of
an old imperial order on the battlefields of Europe, a failed attemPt at revolution,
a hyperinflation that ruined the middle class; and, coupled with this, perhaps
the strongest left-wing intelligentsia in the whole of Europe, cultivating strong
links with their counterparts in Moscow, the other great centre of artistic
creatiyity at that time. And, final irony, both movements were crushed by
totalitarian dictatorships, one nominally of the right, one of the left. Berlin's is
oLe of the easiest stories to tell, but finally one of the hardest to interpret.
61,]]ffi;rfi)spanning two a.,d a half millennia of human history, are all
*ffi-ffiilil belonging to the same rich cultural stream that was born in
Athens and reborn in Florence. Doubtless, there are entire other stories that
could be told of other culture streams: of the Mohammedan world from the
seventh century to the fifteenth, of the Indian subcontinent of the post-Gupta
period, above all perhaps of the five thousand years of Chinese cultural history.
Thor. tales should and doubtless will get told too' in their turn; but these will
haye to suffice for the purpose of one book, which for good or ill is the story
of Spengler's Abendland, the supposedly declining western culture.
Sipposedly declining: Spengler was wrong, for after the sunset comes the
dawn; unlike Spengler (and unlike Mumford), this is no tale of decline or
disintegration. At the end of the twentieth century - eighty years after Spengler
foretolJ the decline of the West, sixty years after Mumford saw the modern
ciry proceeding inexorably to Necropolis - neither western civilization, nor the
wesrirn ciry, shows any sign of decay. On the contrary: this book will be a
celebration of the continued vitality, the continual rebirth of creativiry in the
world's great cities; as the light wanes in one, it waxes in another; the whole
process, it seems, has no end that we know of, or can foresee. T-S-c."!dquestion, now, is Precisely how a
fraTurilfthe creative spark that rekindles the urban 6res.
ltJ
The Innovative Milieu
groWth: xllo now qtl trrcv uuurv rv -- ' "t"v
6n w. develop a theory that helps to explaiI . r - - - - L : - ^ : -
he first icertaln t
iround Gla
\ \
("
of the first iron stea
above all inTwo to
creativiryJ Does
ln
itself so st
ral crucibles, and if so whY?
y, relating
Gcation- is hard, for.a reason quite
"pp"tii" io that which pi"gy-ed us earlier: now' there is n9 l1c!
tf,tlt:I']:il
Uuitai"g blocks; there are "ll .oo many, but they do not iell. So this chapter
will be a ,ath.i long, hard technical haul: up through the academic foothills,
*ith orrly oc.asion"-i sights of the gleaming peaks. The core problem is this:
we have to visit location theory, a rather obscure sub-science, existing at the
bordedine of human geography and economics. Like many such academic
niches, it represents a t ind of iangled undergrowth, in which waves of academics
have done battle over half a century'
t
Ffihe focus now shifts to the upstart urban places, and the central
I qu.rtions are about economic development: how and why do innovative
I technologies, innovative ways of inaustrial managem
"na in *1t-9-95-
rocess otforces: the
A Tentative Conclusron
he end of this trail through the thickets of theory, we can wholeheartedlyagree with Dosi that 'there is a significant gap between the wealth of findingsby economic historians, students of technology, applied industrial economists,on the one hand, and the (more limited) conceptualization of these findings ineconomic theory, on the other'.s But we can also believe that the concept ofthe innovative milieu has powerfully helped 6ll that gap.
The tentative conclusion, to be tested in Book Two, is that the innoyativemilieu has been an all-pervasive principle throughout the history of capitalistdevelopment, since the first industrial revolution in England; but that it haschanged its nature. In the first, heroic era of capitalism, as Schumperer longago emphasized, innovation was a spontaneous process in which technical andorganizational challenges were met with a series of brilliant intuitions andadaptations. Organized science played a very shadowy and indirect role;rnnovauon came tcontacts between ual engineer-craftsmen played a critical part. It wassmall wonder, in this period, that the Marshallian industrial district providedthe all-important matrix within which ideas circulated and norions were
stage'C-a
fine-tuned and improved.
century Gla indeed also Berlin
The Innouatiue Milieu
Atlantic
nturv Lancashire and earl
above
them. It was driven into
nlngs,
corporate era caDrtal lst deveermanY and the Uni s
I scient c advance and alsointo corporate research laboratories with clear
rates the transrtron
weaPonry n companies whose raison d'€tre
w
i88os a
n
ever morenal l
during, ,ar
lnnovatlon
vances rnsclen
6iifrns ot the way thE principle
of flexible specialization, as abundant examples like Silicon Valley and the
Third Italy or the Japanese kanban (just-in-time) system amply demonstrate.
But the three stages of evolution are nonetheless a crucial conceptual organizing'prinfiple, afowing us r t o a
mllleu. r ne Para ment the great Tokyo'ffi;6ti.t complex which was precluded from defence work, illustrate this
he first, is the quintessential cify first ustrialThat revolution, it
and a new systemately; at
new mac liinsformed an existing domestic system of production, which
,. had grown up oyer two or more centuries and had achieved an amazing levely of sophistication. Key individuals within this system, and on its fringes,
transformed it; they were powerfully assisted by some unique features of this
city and of its region, including a strong tradition of precision engllg4lgjl4
^" Nonconformis;ultu d
ln rurn tffese generated the first true innovative milieu in economic history, amilieu that in its internal structure and dynamics uncannily resembles Silicon
,etween 1820 and 1890, resembles Manchester
Va: thelcon
t 1 - . r - - -idly surpnsrng. Here too there were_latlve
ine. andrhe irott lljg but they could havewere: q€sity
because ilocal narrow seas. then
@causeof theco l lapseof i t so ld t rad ingbaseaf te r theAmerican revolution, and also b.."lttt
" g.qup of lo."l
engineers formed in effect an innovative milieu of their own, breaking away
@
ase of the warfare stateessentially stemming from the Cold War in the 1950s,
eYef moreuniversities and in
ETHE CITY AS INNOVATIVE MILIEU
froni their parents on a model that - again - presaged the rwentieth-century
innovative milieu.The third story' partly similar but also
diff?rent:here is the scene for the 6rst
neteenth century was-:-_ralher Inslgnlncant
state, its -War
rtmentthus creat one of Eurown rs to set up in business
the deveand for war
r6fr-
andh for economic d
T?ilmphantly al pioneer; thus
-t the 1890s Berlin was t of its day. Of an kind, to be sure:sg-;a-l tlr-ough these began to spawn
308
in one important resPect
time. Berlin in the early
\$-0
, \?XYT
[66Giifo..tian experience half a century later -
nonetheless the Berlin experience resemblesthll4! rival in tiq&flSitjes. for the
lt was oomr
e
but there Ford invented its mass
because one entrepreneur' rn Pa
ere was a
one of the most likely.
evew
if an coust ts to set
ital, from nouveaux-riches bucc4neer
have
here, who after'{qdd-g's first Science
3n
byawa rom
i lon-
\2 l
ffiovation was internJllzed in the ized research
t o a s r world, of the
is that it represented
fii-in American economic historY: invent the motor car
ancl m()rctical pointrit did not-rction for
cn
?6iss market. Thati : - .
an obsesslon that tnev
,r..i e*isted and was determined to fill it. But here the conditions were
peculiarly propitious, as it turned out: tlere were strong t
portation eneineqdns, which tutored For? and many others who assisted him;
ffiara Valley at the southern
Bay, then still virtually undeveloped orchard land'
and therefore geographically the least likely of any of these six places- Here,
palo Alto *", ih. home of itanford University, a relatively new and innovative
^ T;rT. F;; those, in the unique conditions of the Cold 'War,
de-&ii-aordinary
cascade of innovation in solid-state electronics,
a plocess of swarming of new hrms as talented lnolv
t coll
needs of the farmerq
a model of i
-tnZI
The Innouatiue Milieu
of new hardware and software
r t- n A€tt6ouiln g- Ka n agawa prefectu re, f o rm the app ropri a te
deliberatelY veloped at that point by the
ilf,in " f.a rt, ounng worlcl war lI,
iElThe practice of sub-
.ontr".ti.tg parts and processes to smaller local 6rms, which were deliberately
,..ou."g.d to improve their technical proficiency and innovative capacfy by
the larger firm. It celg13ledg rxqeordi
as rhese firms pffissed up the learning curve, from the sin-rplest -eleqtricalifr fiotndtelevision-,toextreme!1_qqphisl! j
Sn and cameras and caquestlon, is sv-system is yet truly
t
in the Americannetworki, one
because on them the fate of cities, regions, and entires. And the answer is not yet certain; the iury is st
of Manchester and Glasgow show,
cities that falter in the innovative rocess soon stu
ies. Leaders m ofre generatlon soon De na new competltors,
ffiA from behind; and unless t either develop new ways of
I6
,k6-and disappear into industrial oblivion' Continued on to
nearly all these stories end that unhappy way: Manchestet
-9!asgo$+F9if are shadows of their torr-ner industrial selves, thoul-two h"ve-found new livet as centres of advanced services and touri
lost its industrial Dre-eminence at the End of World War I
rst now tof close on iEnrury, the second fol tgt t 7Ior that reason arone,Teh stories are exc-pdonally worth telling and theirlessons worth distilling, which will form a main theme for Chapter 16, summingup at the end of Book Two.
@
Two American Cities: Hollywood and Memphis
The unique character of the American achievement - th1 ::ti:'t"
of mass
culture through p'iu"" tnttrprise - is extremely important in understanding
the two stories tota in g;k Th"t' rt i' no "ttideni
that innovation in both
cases came no, onty'oi, ,i ,rr. united States, but also out of the
private
sector, located i^ n-.ri."n cities. Here, new entrePreneurs
- quintessential
schumpeterian New ;;;:-*;r" forced jn effect to find ways to create
a new
industry. In both t""" 't"'' *ttt totplt" t"itiattt' The -en'lelreneurs
who
created Hollywood ;;;-l-.rt without. exception I..:n,.
t-itglllt:^T-1
nearly all were J.*iril',,"*l,'no "..1a.", that they made their way into movres
from tradition.t Jt*i'n''inJu't'it' tf'"' t"""i for whims of fashion'
such' as
clothing. For there, ;;;;tt;;duction had to be allied to constant creatrvrty'
The parallel itat"'y"tr'"J'ily t"""a *"1 ii" Pan Allev' the new
popular
*tztqmhrstc \(mAis Mudia')
r r t l THE MARRIAGE OF ART AND TECHNOLOGY ' . "
m r r c i e i . i " " r . . , t L , ^ . A - . , ^ t ^ - ^ ) t - - r r 1music indusrry rhar developed for the sare of sheer music in the rggOs, uu, h::?-iTl1l-moved
inro recorded.music. And there, too, both th. produ... r ! y r v u u l c l Sand rhe arrists were overwhelmingly Jewish.
].n:-",*n rh:.n.y enrerrainment corforations grew at dizzy speed to command
semi-monopolies (oligopolies, in the economists' jargon) both within the UnitedStates and worldwide, the odd fact was th"t t l,. i ..;";; i '"..h.typ"r n.*firms: owned and controlred by rhe men who had'foundeJri.-, *rri-sicalyand often inefficientlv run, owing rittre to the emergin; ;;.;;;; of Americanmanagement science. There were few Alfred Sloans in Hlily*t"d. And, facedwith the challenge of television in the 1950s, the srudios air"pp."*a from theAmerican scene almost as quickly as rhey h"d "pp."r.;.- i;#;"-es surviveon the credirs, but the organizarion of the indusrii i t
""* ".rf irff.r.n,.
The second- story is even more striking. For it ieils ,t. ,rori or ,n. birth ofmodern popular music in the 1950s, "n-.u.n,
at reast as momentous as thebirth of Hollywood. And it emerged out of ,*o -ori ;,k;i; sources: twostrains of pure folk music, coming out of deep curturat ,ooir,- '.".n cherishedand developed by a poor and unrerrered ethnic group, in one of th. .no* remoreand poverty-stricken regions of the united st"t.r,' *hi.h finaliy fused in apopular enterrainment industry. And the srrikingli
"no-"to*-'point is thateach of these strains exisred, for at reast harf ; ;.;r;;;;;ry recognized
and barely tolerated, as minoriry cultures far outside ,t. a-.ri."n culturalmainsrream. Their fusior was accomplished by a few ^"u..i.k ,ntrepreneurs,most of them native sons of the region, some others from New york, who ineffecr took on the mainsrream e,it.rtainment establishment - and, after aferoc ious batr le , vanquished i r .
Because borh indusrries rvere new ones, created by new people bottom-up, itwas perhaps no wonder that they deveroped in new ir"..r. Ti;; *.r. of courseurban places; it was to cit ies that artistic talent f lowed, as it hi arways fowed;and, given that the revolution in each case was partly technical, only a citywould have the wherewithar. Bur, iust rike most oith. uprr"r;;;., consideredin Book Two, these were borderrand cities, out of the ma'instream of their time.Indeed, in both cases the industry was origina[y establish.J ir, ,r,. urtimateAmerican merropolis, Ney york City; but in the first case it moved out, andin the second was vanquished by th. new competit ion.
of the two srories, the first is the odder. Lts Angeres in 1910, I ike alr thetechnologically innovative cit ies of Book Two, was"a borderland prace; buteven more so than they had been. The others ail had some sort of ievelopedindustrial or ar least proto-industriar tradition; Los Angeres did not realry haveany. And it was a very long way from the th.n J.nt.. "r
,r,. Americanproductive system. It was relativery undeveloped in .o-prri*n with sanFrancisco' 400 miles to the north, which had "
head ,r"., on i i through theaccidents of the gold rush and the firsr transcontinentar rairroad. It did nothave anything obvious going for it at ail, save for "
u.nig,,. i l ."r. "na
prentyof land. And it was certainly not unique in those. As we shalr see, ir was noteven the place where the fledgring industry began. So one could say that there*1.."n elemenr of pure serendipity, pur. iu.k.-nut nor quit..- - -
The other case was more rogicar. Memphis in Tennessee was the prace where
The Inuention of Mass Culture
rwo great folk-cultural traditions came together: the Afro-American blues of
the Mississippi Delta region to the south, and the white country music of the
Appalachian hill country to the east. Each of these traditions flourished also in
other places: the blues in Kansas City and, above all, in Chicago; country music
in Nashvil le and a score of smaller places. But in no other place was it so
staristically likely that the two streams would meld to produce something
different. Further, Memphis from its earliest days had the reputation of a wild
city, a place where almost anything could be allowed to happen. It was perhaps
the one place in the old American South, even before the civil liberties movement
transformed the region, where black and white cultures could cross-fertilize in
this waY.So, finally, there is an intriguing paradox: the real powerhouse, where the
mass-media culture of the twentieth century was born, was New York City;yet two of its greatest manifestations, the movie-television complex and the
creation of popular music, happened in far-distant cities. The reasons are very
different in the two cases: in the 6rst they are obscure, and the Hollywood
complex remained closely tied financially to its original New York base; in the
second, upstart provincial entrepreneurs in effect vanquished a New York
industry that had become tired, conservative and smugly complacent. The two
stories tell us a great deal about the nature of the marriage of art and technology
in the twentieth century, and they contain powerful suggestions for the way itwill happen in the twenty-first.
5 r 9
@
J modern tales, because after 1800 did cities becomen
was one consprcuous exceptlon centunesro, the subject of Chapter 22. lt was city to reach approximately onemillion people, and it did so on the basis of exceedingly simple technology: inparticular, the Romans made no maior advance in transportation technology,
which would have allowed their citizens to spread out more comfortably, sothat their capital was quite extraordinarily compressed and overcrowded.
Nevertheless, achieved triumphs in water supply and to some extent in, quite extraordinary in this one.w
which 6rst equalled and then greatlya whole range of novel problems,
some physical, some social. The chapter deals with four: policing, crinle, water
and servers, an{ housing. What was remarkable about London was not merely
thiili developed answers, however belated and however inappropriate; it was
that they were animated by a philosophy quite different from the public works
tradition that underpinned ancient Romc or contemPorary Paris, one which
was direcdy derived from philosophical utilitarianism. Calculation and economy
and the minimalist state were the order of the day, as by an odd twist of history
they have again become in Britain. And in the course of applying the principles,
nineteenth-century London camc up with solutions that sometimes seem strik-
ingl@risons or workfare.nd Haussmann represents a sharp reversion to thelic works, which again can be seen to echo in
different case again. It was the
Jackson has called it: it was also
IIt
French public life to this day. Haussmann not only rebuilt Paris, as everyone '
knows; he also sewered it and-ryatered it and doubl.!-t$-:&gJhereby allowing I
it to ".co-mila
rry ,G oflrowth ifi;[d;fr;;hytical collapse thathad seemed to threaten it. But he did so by an extraordinary system of publiqfinancing, in efiect repres.ntiTf,eJ6curiry of future rises in land values, which eventually must prove untenable.So it proved: though the city survived the crisis after his deparnrre, it broughtnearly a century of local government paralysis, from which only de Gaulle was
growing at extraordinary speed as a result of the migration of almost destitute
feopl.'frorn."r,.rn "nd
ro,rthern Europe, which ailied with the city's islandg/
geography to create a housing problem of the first order' The answer ro New
York's problem, as to that of London and Paris and Berlin,.was effective urban
h would allow people to seek new homes at the metropolitan
was the first city in the world to begin to adapt to the automobile age, but in
doing so it engaged in a fuirdamental debate about its future which would have
as a new city on the far side of the continent,gt@f urban self-promotion or boosterism, whichconfronted the question of its own development through an equally momentouspublic debate, and answered it decisively in a radical way: it would not seek to
,, I @,/
6zo THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE URBAN ORDER
emulate traditional cities like New York byits system of public
transPortation, but on th.e
Iwas a small northern European capital of ain the 1950s and ---tt.i""tfy,
that it would seelcto follow a path
of socio-economic uite differenta le wa
ffieticians, it was based on
nclngenha
capitalism would be encouraged to become
:;T:#T"fiffi ;}nil;;lii.;:;"purationweretobeprote":1:l'-::*ffi il:;i:ffi ffi ;;;;;ilit'-ddJ,'*"{1:1P'.11:',:f ::i::?,T:;:'J;;:;.*;;F;-;ii;""10::t'll'-ll:*IlLl"'?:T:'":'"*:rilffi"ffi;";il;rril the principles of zustain"bte urban 9:::t-"1,1.:::ffi; ffi ffi ,l" ;fi
';;,ie *.Y \ lo *:: n:"'d'11' ":,T, ::'": ::*:;;ft:TJil;"' il;;ili;J, "'a n'i'!':' dld th; c'".T '::'1r^:"f'^:'-T.':::jffi;;;;;;;;.;ieiess, in_the 1ee0s Swedes still
cline to their unique .
system, which most oTlf,Efiltill believe is supertor';;'Jffi-uTd-tItn with the London of the 1980s'
fffiffi'il;; il d;;r"' 28. Thatcher came into office with a /ffi;*il;;;theirSwedish-sryleuai.ii"thewelfarestate,V'jf,T:'il:r][.;;;
but one result was a collapse of the urban order on the
;;.;; of Brit"ir,, of " lind never seen in the twentieth cenrury. Her environmert
on socla
rema
minister Michael H*.ii,n* " remarkable politician whose ideology was quite
different from hers, seized the moment to tondutt a-tt-"g-ggg1.1n+lltqurbeq*,.g.n
"E tait;g*, "f
which was in
T;Aork D"AFas next to the Crty 9f Lond6n. -lilonsisted-
tGnilallY in ,.'de'e'ttd' into a temPle of
t/
6nance capitalism th"i *orrtd rival the city itself; but the.attempt led^to the
bankruptcy or rr,. ..nol a.u.iop.. and to a severe loss of public confidence.
The questio" 6""U;;;i;.a uy ,t. l-ondon saga is whether regenerarion through
property d.u.top*.ni l"n .u., bc adequatef bor "lro, disrurbingly, whether it
i, ttt, ,it. only lind of regeneration there is'
so there are.recurrenr,-h.-., running through these stories, and it comes as
something of a shock to see that victorian governments sought to privatize
provision but did ;;;;*.f f11,. or that pub:lic-priuate partnership was alive
and well in the p";;;i the'1850s "r,d th. New York of the 1900s, or that
California forsook its conservarive financial principles whenever it saw that
;;li; ;;".y could aid profitable private development. ?erhaps there is nothing
new under the sun. But technology evolves, increasing the limits of the possible;
however,socia lcomplexi ryalsoi" t t t " " "andwi th i t theproblemsofresolv ingsocial tensior. Gr;; ;;in"..ing solutions are all
very well, and none better
illustrates them rhan several of these ,rori"r, but ^ soci.ty that builds splendid
aqueducts "nd
,.*.,,, and then leaves its 1.,, fo.tun"te citizens to a diet of
bread and circuses, is a sociery doomed io .u.n,urt bloody destrucrion. .kff)er
Great Cities in their Golden Ages z1
as rhe paradigm, onewas so short and its end so tragic
might say the parody, of the creativiE a sudden, all constrainrswere shaken off in a frenzy of experimenlation across the spectrum of the arts.It was a special case, and of course there were special reasons: the collapse ofan old imperial order on the battlefields of Europe, a failed attemPt at revolution,a hyperinflation thar ruined the middle class; and, coupled with this, perhaps
thc strongest left-wing intelligentsia in the whole of Europe, cultivating stronglinks with their counterparts in Moscow, the other great centre of artisticcreativit)' at that dme. And, final irony, both movements were crushed by
totalitarian dictatorships, onc nominally of the right, one of the left' Berlin's is
one of the easiest stories to tell, but finally one of the hardest to interPret.|-(ft
"". ;l* citr spanning two and a half millennia of human history, are all
wffiffiii-belongini ro rhe same rich cultural strcam that was born in
Athens and reborn in Florence. Doubtlcss, there are entire other stories that
could be told of other culture sreams: of the Mohammedan world from the
ssvenlh celltury to the fifteenth, of the Indian subcontinent of the post-GuPta
period, above all perhaps of the five thousand years of Chinese cultural history.
Thor" tales should and doubtless will get told too' in their turn; but these will
have to suffice for the purpose of one book, which for good or ill is the story
of Spengler's Abendland, thc supposedly decliqing western culture'
Sipposedty declining: Spengler was wrong, for after the sunset comes the
dawn; unlike Spengler (and unlike Mumford), this is no tale of declinc or
disintegration. At the end of the twentieth century - eighty years after Spengler
foretold the decline of the West, sixty years after Mumford saw the modern
city procceding inexorably to Necropolis - neither westcrn civilization, nor the
wes;rn city, shows any sign of decay. On thc conrrary: this book will be a
celebration of the continued vitality, the continual rebirth of creativity in the
world's great cities; as the light wanes in one, it waxes in another; the whole| . r - t - , , - t - . , - - - f ^ - - - ^ ' r ' L ^ ^ - - t - ^ l
process, it seems, has no end that we know of, or can forescc. Ther , . . , , r r ' f
question, nowthe creative spa that rekindles the urban fires.