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TURKISH AIRLINES: TURKEY’S SOFT POWER TOOL IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
Orçun SELÇUK
Abstract
In recent years, Turkey has accelerated its efforts to further integrate with its
neighborhood in the Middle East. Several instruments have been used in order to
corroborate Turkey’s opening up to the region in political, economic and societal
levels. As one of Turkey’s soft power tools, Turkish Airlines helps the fulfillment of
Turkey’s goals in the region via facilitating trade and promoting people to people
contact. In this article, the rise of Turkey as a regional power and the increasing
activism of its national airline company are analyzed by focusing on Turkey’s bilateral
political and economic relations with the countries in the Middle East. It is
demonstrated that Turkey’s liberal visa regime and its vision for the region are
complemented by the involvement of Turkish Airlines as a soft power instrument. The
article consists of a theoretical discussion on the concept of power, the relationship
between Turkish Airlines and politics, and the involvement of Turkish Airlines in the
Middle East in line with the developments in Turkey’s foreign policy with more
emphasis given to Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Gulf countries.
Key Words: Soft Power, Middle East, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Airlines.
TÜRK HAVAYOLLARI: TÜRKİYE’NİN ORTA DOĞU’DAKİ YUMUŞAK
GÜÇ ARACI
Özet
Son yıllarda Türkiye Orta Doğu’daki komşularıyla daha fazla entegre olabilmek için
çabalarını artırdı. Şu ana kadar Türkiye’nin bölgeye siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal
açılımlarını desteklemek için birçok araç kullanıldı. Türkiye’nin yumuşak güç
araçlarından biri olan Türk Hava Yolları (THY) da ticaret ve turizm potansiyeline
olumlu katkıda bulunarak Türkiye’nin bölgedeki amaçlarını kolaylaştırıcı bir rol
oynamaktadır. Bu makalede, Türkiye’nin bölgesel güç olarak yükselişi ve eş zamanlı
olarak ulusal havayolu olan THY’nin bölgedeki artan etkinliği bölge ülkeleriyle ikili
siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler bağlamında incelenmiştir. THY’nin bir yumuşak güç aracı
olarak Türkiye’nin liberal vize politikasını ve bölge için sahip olduğu vizyonu
desteklediği makale boyunca anlatılmıştır. Makalede güç kavramı üzerine teorik bir
tartışmanın ardından THY ile siyaset arasındaki ilişki ve THY’nin Türkiye’nin dış
politikasındaki gelişmelere paralel olarak Orta Doğu’daki varlığı İran, Irak, İsrail ve
Körfez ülkeleriyle olan ikili ilişkiler üzerinden anlatılmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yumuşak Güç, Orta Doğu, Türkiye Dış Politikası, Türk Hava
Yolları.
Boğaziçi University, The Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, graduate student
176
Power
Power is a widely used concept among the social scientists. The
concept itself is a controversial one which has been fiercely debated by many
authors so far. Not surprisingly, a consensus has not been reached on how to
define power. Whether a widely-accepted definition is necessary or not, there is
a need to elaborate on power to enhance our understanding of international
politics. In this article, it is felt necessary to start with a brief theoretical
discussion considering the relevance of the broad concept (power) for our
specific topic (Turkish Airlines and Turkish foreign policy).
Although there have been many attempts to define power in the
simplest and most comprehensive way, certain ones have gained more
acceptance and circulated more compared to others. One well-known definition
of power was made by Max Weber who defined power as the “probability that
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own
will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which the probability exists.” 1 Weber’s definition emphasizes conserving and defending your own position
against the influence and the pressure of another actor. A similar definition
was made by Robert A. Dahl which reverses Weber’s logic by underlying the
ability to break the resistance of the other actor. According to him, “A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do.”2 His definition explains the actions taken by an actor in an
unwilling way just because an actor that is stronger desired so. If we apply this
definition to international politics, we can contend that the inability of a
country to change the position of another country that it openly opposes
demonstrates that it lacks the power that is required to achieve the goal. Hence,
it is assumed that the magnitude of power is relational to the actor that will
decide to comply or not.
Although Weber’s and Dahl’s definitions seem to be supported by
historical and contemporary evidence, it does not mean that they elucidate all
forms of power that we encounter at the international level. Alternative
definitions of power help us find out different perspectives depending on where
and how you look at it. For instance, identifying four different forms of power
in international politics (compulsory power, institutional power, structural
power and productive power) Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall define
power as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape
the capacities of actors to determine their own consequences and fate.”3 It is
1Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press,
1947), p.152. 2Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no.3 (1957), pp.202-203. 3 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall “Power in Global Governance,” in Power and Global
Governance, ed.Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
177
beyond the scope of this article to make a detailed analysis of the theoretical
debates among the scholars on the concept of power. For that reason, in the
upcoming sections more emphasis is given on the concept of soft power and its
implications for the case study of Turkish Airlines and Turkish foreign policy.
Soft power
The attempts to define power are not limited to the ones given above.
Several other authors have attempted to elaborate further to reinforce our
understanding of the concept. Defining power as “the ability to influence the
behavior of others to get the outcomes you want,”4 Joseph Nye coined the
concept of soft power that is widely used both in the academia and the policy-
making level. Soft power differs from military and economic might that is
traditionally seen as the only way “to get others to change their positions.”5 In
his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, it is defined as
“getting others to want the outcomes that you want”6 through cooptation rather
than coercion.7 He considers a country’s cultural assets that are attractive to the
people in other countries such as literature, art, education and popular culture;
political values that are admired, and the positive perception of its foreign
policy as the main sources of soft power.8 Nye also underlines the importance
of commerce as a way of transmitting culture through personal contacts, visits
and exchanges.9 As an example, he lists some specific qualifications that make
Japan the strongest soft power in Asia. Those include Japan ranking first in the
world in number of patents, third in international air travel, second in book and
music sales, second in high-tech exports, first in development assistance and
first in life expectancy.10
In order to actively use the soft power instruments to win the hearts and
the minds of foreign publics, Nye proposes the increasing use of public
diplomacy as an effective tool.11
To make a country’s soft power potentials
better known by the target foreign publics, public diplomacy activities should
be given more importance.12
He cites many examples of public diplomacy tools
2005), p.8. 4 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public
Affairs, 2004), p.2. 5 Ibid., p.5. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p.11. 9 Ibid., p.13. 10 Ibid., p.85. 11Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no.94 (2008), p.95. 12 Ibid., p.103.
178
that promote soft power, including Voice of America, BBC World Service and
Hollywood.13
Thus, public diplomacy and soft power cannot be conceived as
separate from each other. To shape the perceptions of the foreign publics, states
engage in such deliberate activities through certain mechanisms. The receivers
of public diplomacy campaigns and soft power instruments may not always be
conscious of their influence on themselves and their way of thinking with
regard to that specific country. It creates an embedded affiliation through latent
power penetration. In other words, soft power instruments aim to enhance the
prestige and the perception of the nation through the promotion of its name,
culture, values and foreign policy.
There are other scholars that have put an effort to critically assess and
clarify the concept of soft power. For instance, Steven Lukes points out that
Nye's conception of soft power resembles to what he called power's third
dimension that is “the power to shape, influence or determine others' beliefs
and desires, thereby securing their compliance.”14
Apparently, what Nye calls
soft power and Lukes calls power's third dimension are inherently similar to
each other with their emphasis on intangible aspects of power. According to
Guilo M. Gallarotti,
Soft power represents a form of meta-power. Meta-power describes
situations in which power relations themselves are embedded within some
greater constellation of social relations that influence those power relations and
thereby influence final outcomes that derive from the interactions among
actors. The structures of the bargaining boundaries are determined by processes
going on in the greater social relations within which they are embedded (i.e.,
endogenous rather than exogenous).15
Because of this embeddedness and indirectness, the benefits of soft
power are difficult to measure especially in the short-term.16
One of the
scholars who raised a similar concern is David W. Kearn. There are limitations
of soft power for him that originates from its “inherently fuzzy nature.”17
In
that sense, Kearn put forward soft power's “hard truths” as its reliance on a
relationship of interdependency; assumption of common goals and values; and
the presence of a hegemonic power.18
13 Ibid., pp.94-109. 14 Steven Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” Journal of International Studies
33, no.3 (2005), p.486. 15Guilio M. Gallarotti, “Soft power: what it is, why it’s important and conditions for its effective
use,” Journal of Political Power 4, no.1 (2011), p.28. 16 Ibid., p.40. 17 David W. Kearn, “The hard truths about soft power,” Journal of Political Power 4, no.1
(2011), p.71. 18 Ibid., p.81.
179
Turkish Foreign Policy and Soft Power
The theoretical debates on soft power are not limited to the works that
are mentioned in this article. More specifically, a closer look into the use of
soft power by the scholars that aim to explain Turkey's foreign policy activism
would be essential for this article. Parallel to the increasing use of soft power
all around the world, the concept is used by scholars and policy-makers that
deal with the puzzling questions of Turkish foreign policy. Those works
mention about Turkey's rising soft power capacity and the tools behind this
achievement.
It was pointed out by Tarık Oğuzlu that the de-securitization of Turkish
foreign policy and its increased credibility among the eyes of the Western and
Middle Eastern countries could be considered as new developments that
contribute to Turkey's soft power potential. In addition, he put emphasis on the
economic diplomacy of AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule and its
multilateral and cooperative foreign policy based on a win-win approach in
contrast to the traditional zero-sum game approach.19
From a similar
perspective, Meliha Benli Altunışık contends that the perception of Turkey's
political and economic transformation process during the AKP period in the
eyes of the peoples of the Middle East could be a source of soft power.
Moreover, she gives emphasis on the role of Turkey's mediation efforts as an
honest broker in order to resolve the regional conflicts as another
source of soft power.20
By working on the data on the flow of people across borders during the
Cold War, Kemal Kirişci enunciates that Turkey's liberal visa system embodies
a peace building and a soft power aspect that enabled the free movement of
people across borders that were once considered spatially distant from each
other.21
Therefore, the new geographical imagination of Turkey that manifests
itself in its liberal visa regime adds up to Turkey’s positive image. As the Chief
Advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan, İbrahim Kalın asserts that history, culture
and geography are the main tenets of Turkey's soft power potential. In order to
promote Turkey's soft power via public diplomacy as it is also suggested by
Nye, he drew attention to the roles played by many public institutions including
19 Tarık Oğuzlu,“Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of International
Affairs 61, no.1 (March 2007), pp. 81-97. 20Meliha Benli Altunışık, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle
East”, Insight Turkey 10, no.2 (2008): pp. 41-54. 21 Kemal Kirişci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of „Soft Power‟: The
Experience of Turkey Soft Power,” European Journal of Migration and Law, no.7 (2005),
pp.355-356.
180
TİKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), Kızılay
(The Turkish Red Crescent) and TRT (Turkey's state television).22
National Airlines and Soft Power
The concept of national airlines is relevant to these theoretical debates
on soft power. I argue that the responsibility of national airlines to promote the
name, prestige and foreign policy of their nations fits well to the
conceptualization of soft power. Fulfilling a political goal to promote the
foreign policy objectives makes a national airline a soft power tool. A
successful national airline has many utilities. As the airline company’s ranking
and visibility increases among the airlines all over the world, it has positive
repercussions for its home country not only in the area of politics but also in
the area of commerce. For instance, if a national airline can achieve making its
city of origin an aviation hub, it adds up to the tourism and business potential
of that city and the country.
The more people use the airports in a country to transfer to other
international flights, the more the geographical location of the country will be
perceived as central. Perhaps, the availability of high quality airline
connections to a country is an asset to enhance that country’s political and
economic potential worldwide. National airlines that help their states achieve
certain goals in the area of culture, commerce and foreign policy can be
regarded as tools of soft power. In that sense, the theoretical debates on soft
power contribute to our understanding of national airlines and their relationship
with politics.
Similar to other national airlines such as Qatar Airways and Emirates,
Turkish Airlines can be seen as a soft power tool for Turkey. Primarily, as the
flag carrier airline of Turkey, Turkish Airlines promotes its name in the skies
and all over the world in airports. Its advertising campaigns in foreign media
and sponsorship deals with movie stars, football teams, basketball players and
tournaments not only promote its own brand but also enhance Turkey’s image
and prestige in the eyes of foreign publics. The President of Turkish Airlines
Board of Directors, Hamdi Topçu acknowledges that promoting Turkish
Airlines worldwide also promotes the image of Turkey.23
The development of
Turkish Airlines into a global airline network with a high number of transfer
passengers has made İstanbul Atatürk Airport an aviation hub at the crossroads
of Europe and Asia. As a consequence of this transportation network, İstanbul
has become more attractive for business people and tourists. Aware of this
22 İbrahim Kalın, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 16, no.3 (Autumn
2011), pp. 5-23. 23Turkish Airlines, Minutes of Ordinary General Assembly Meeting 2011, Turkish Airlines
Investor Relations, p.2.
181
potential, the Turkish government is planning to build a new airport to the
European side of İstanbul to better meet this increasing demand.
In the realm of foreign policy, Turkish Airlines supports Turkey’s
foreign policy openings that aim to establish diplomatic and commercial
relations with countries in specific geographies. The availability of Turkish
Airlines flights shortens the spatial distances between countries and facilitates
the movement of business people and tourists on both sides. In the context of
the Middle East, Turkish Airlines complements to Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu's ideal of increasing interdependence with the countries and
developing peaceful relations that value cooperation over conflict. More and
more people in the region are exposed to Turkish culture thanks to the
popularity of Turkish soap operas depicting the modern Turkish way of life.
The attraction of those soap operas results in an increasing demand among the
people of the region to visit Turkey. People’s desire to encounter the Turkish
experience by visiting the country is facilitated by the increasing number of
Turkish Airlines’ regular flights from İstanbul to the countries in the region.
Turkish Airlines as a high quality global airline represents Turkish culture and
values not only in the Middle East but also in other parts of the world. Thus, it
boosts Turkey’s potential to attract the others.
Turkish Airlines and Politics
In the civil aviation industry, without exception, political
developments, considerations and preferences always influence the policies
adopted by the managerial bodies of the airline companies. In the case of
national airlines, this influence is much more blatant. Politics, one way or
another, is one of the major factors influencing the decision-making process of
the state-affiliated airlines. Politics usually influences decisions such as route
openings and the purchase of new aircraft. Turkish Airlines as the national flag
carrier of Turkey since its establishment in 1933 has not been exempt from this
general trend.
Although the majority of its shares do not belong to the Turkish state
anymore, Turkish Airlines continues to act like a public institution especially in
the realm of foreign policy. With the latest (2006) wave of privatization, the
Turkish state possesses 49% of the shares of Turkish Airlines. On paper,
Turkish Airlines lost its status as a public entity, since the majority of its shares
are traded on the İstanbul Stock Exchange by private investors. Legally, it is
treated as a private company where the state holds a minority of its shares. In
practice, the Turkish state retains the golden share (49%) that enables it to
strongly influence the decision-making process of Turkish Airlines. The rest of
the Turkish Airlines’ shares that are traded on the İstanbul Stock Market belong
to investors of a strictly limited size. Those shareholders are unable and
182
unwilling to come together to raise their voices in the management of the
company.
This stems from the fact that the privatization of Turkish Airlines in
2006 was made in such a way that no other shareholder could challenge the
dominance of the state in the decision-making process. According to Turkish
Airlines Inc. Articles of Association Article 10c,
In order to be able to nominate candidates for the Board of Directors by
the shareholders holding Group A shares open for public, they are required to
be represented at the rate of minimum 2% of the total issued share capital of
the Incorporation during the Shareholders Assembly in which the members of
the Board of Directors will be elected. Calculation of the aforementioned rate
of 2% will be based only on the Group A shares open for public.24
Although two of the seven members of the Turkish Airlines Board of
Directors can be nominated by the private investors25
, in practice it does not
often take place due to the majority vote principle to pass a resolution. It is very
rare that the small investors are able to come together in the Shareholders
Assembly and get their representatives elected to the Board of Directors.
Because of these factors, the members of the Turkish Airlines Board of
Directors are practically appointed by the Turkish government. In addition,
Turkish Airlines is no longer audited by the Prime Ministry Inspection Board
since it lost its status as a public economic enterprise after the shares of the
state had diminished below the 50% threshold. Hence, government influence in
the management of Turkish Airlines has not disappeared but present in a
different format.
In the preface of a book prepared for the 75th anniversary of the
establishment of Turkish Airlines in 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized
the significance of Turkish Airlines for him by referring the developments in
the realm of foreign policy. He viewed Turkish Airlines as a flag carrier of
Turkey’s road to modernization and a symbol of multilateral foreign policy
serving for the purpose of a strong and prosperous Turkey.26
He stressed the
significance of the success of Turkish Airlines to contribute to the tourism
potential of Turkey. Considering that 70% of the tourists prefer air
transportation during their visits to Turkey, he emphasized the importance of
Turkish Airlines for Turkey’s growth and development.27
It should be
mentioned that the growth of the civil aviation sector in Turkey coincides with
the AKP period. A more liberal structure also enabled the development of
24 Turkish Airlines, Turkish Airlines Inc. Articles of Association, Turkish Airlines Investor
Relations, Article 10c. 25 Ibid., Article 10b. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p.21.
183
private airline companies that compete with Turkish Airlines both in domestic
and international markets. Perhaps, the growth of Turkish Airlines as a global
airline company can partly be attributed to the presence its domestic
counterparts.
A closer look at the strategies adopted by Turkish Airlines shows that
its vision is very similar to Turkey's foreign policy vision. Especially, Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's principles of rhythmic diplomacy, multi-
dimensional foreign policy, zero-problems with neighbors, order instituting
actor, international cooperation, proactive foreign policy28
coincides with
Turkish Airline's motto “globally yours.” Therefore, there is a political
background for Turkish Airlines’ aggressive expansion strategy all over the
world, increasing focus on Turkey's neighborhood and strategy that aims to
make İstanbul a global aviation hub.
Turkish Airlines in the Middle East
Turkish Airlines is a soft power tool that facilitates the achievement of
two main pillars of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East: developing
business ties through free trade agreements and increasing tourism potential
through a liberal visa regime. Turkey aims to foster economic interdependence
at the macro level and cultural interaction at the personal level as part of its
general foreign policy agenda in the region. Thus, Turkey aims to win the
hearts and the minds of the people in the Middle East to be perceived as a
regional leader in politics, economy and culture.
Henceforth, Turkish Airlines’ aggressive expansion strategy in this
market is not independent from Turkey's foreign policy engagement in the
region. The sponsorship deals and the promotion of the Turkish Airlines brand
seem to have positively influenced the demand for Turkey’s national airline,
which also enhances Turkey's receptiveness in the region. As of October 2011,
Turkish Airlines was flying to 26 destinations in 13 countries in the Middle
East compared to 10 destinations in 9 countries in 2005. In six years, it added
four countries (Iraq, Qatar, Yemen and Oman) and 16 more cities to the list of
destinations (Table 1). More concrete examples are given in the country-
specific analysis of the tandem involvement of Turkey as an emerging regional
power and Turkish Airlines as one of its soft power assets.
28 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Türk Dış Politikası’nın İlkeleri ve Bölgesel Yapılanma,” SAM Vision
Papers, no.3 (August 2012), p.4.
184
Table 1. New Destinations Opened by Turkish Airlines since 2005 in the
Middle East
Country
City Date Country City Date
UAE
Abu
Dhabi
January
2006 Iran Mashhad March 2009
Yemen Sana'a
February
2006 Iran Shiraz March 2011
Iran Tabriz
February
2006 Iraq Arbil April 2011
Oman Muscaat March 2006 Iraq Basra May 2011
Qatar Doha March 2006 Iraq Najaf July 2011
Saudi
Arabia Medina
November
2007 Iraq
Sulaymaniya
h July 2011
Syria Aleppo May 2008 Iraq Mosul October 2011
Iraq Baghdad
October
2008
Saudi
Arabia Dammam October 2011
Data Obtained from Turkish Airlines Head Office
Turkey's involvement in the Middle East has never attracted such
attention on either the domestic or international level before. The rising
attraction of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East can be considered one of
the soft power tools of the country. Turkish foreign policy in the region aims to
make borders in the Middle East meaningless through lifting visa requirements,
developing commercial ties and integrating infrastructure.29
Considering the figures of trade and tourism, this policy has succeeded
to a certain degree. In 2001, Turkey's trade volume with the countries in the
Middle East was 5.7 billion dollars. By 2010, this number had reached 35.9
billion dollars (Table 2). Moreover, the number of citizens of Middle Eastern
countries visiting Turkey in 2001 was around 850,000, which reached
approximately 3.5 million in 2010 (Table 3). Turkey aims to create a zone of
peace and stability through free trade agreements with its Middle Eastern
neighbors and lift visa requirements to facilitate the movement of people and
goods. Indeed, Turkey is integrated into the Middle Eastern region more than
ever in terms of economic interdependence through trade, investment and
tourism. Turkey's opening up to these countries in the context of this vision in
its foreign policy is complemented by Turkey’s use of Turkish Airlines as a
soft power tool.
29 International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,” Europe
Report, no.203 (7 April 2010), p.i.
185
Table 2. Turkey's Trade with the Countries in the Middle East30
($ millions) Middle
East 2001
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Import 2811 2983 4030 5142 7391 9882 12,021 16,172 8556 14,932
Export
2
886 3100 4876 7309 9375
10,1
91 13,366 22,744 17,013 20,935
Total 5696 6083 8906 12,451 16,768
20,0
73 25,389 38,916 25,570 35,868
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match.
Data Obtained from Turkish Ministry of Economy
Table 3. Number of People Entered Turkey from Middle Eastern Countries
(in thousands)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Iran 327 432 495 632 957 866 1058 1135 1383 1885
Bahrain 2 4 4 3 4 4 6 8 9 9
UAE 3 5 7 7 9 12 13 20 22 30
Iraq 16 16 25 112
1
08 123 180 250 285 280
Israel 311 70 321 300 94 363 511 558 312 110
Qatar 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
Kuwait 5 7 8 7 11 2 13 22 27 27
Lebano
n 22 31 34 36 41 36 45 54 72 135
Syria 110 126 55 196 289 278 333 407 510 899
Saudi
Arabia 21 26 24 25 36 39 41 56 67 85
Oman 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 5 5
Jordan
2
7
3
3
3
7
4
0
4
4
4
7 1 4 88 97
Yemen 1 2 2 4 3 3 4 5 6 6
Total 850 957 1115 1366 1900 1787 2272 2602 2792 3577
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match. Data Obtained from Turkish Statistical Institute
One indication of how the growth of Turkish commercial relations had
a positive impact is the number of passengers carried by Turkish Airlines
between 2001 and 2010. In 2001, Turkish Airlines carried around 450,000
passengers in the Middle Eastern market compared to around 2 million
30 Countries in the Middle East include Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen.
186
passengers in 2010 (Table 4). There is a positive correlation between Turkey’s
trade volume with the region and the number of passengers carried by Turkish
Airlines. Therefore, the general trend is as follows: In the Middle East, the
more Turkey increases its trade potential, the more tourists come to Turkey and
the more people use Turkish Airlines to travel to and from Turkey. Aware of
this general trend, the Turkish celebrity Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ who appears in soap
operas that are very popular in the Arab world, has become the new face of
Turkish Airlines in the region.31
The combination of the attraction of Turkish
TV series and Turkish Airlines adds up to Turkey’s soft power in the region.
There is a reciprocal relationship between Turkish Airlines and Turkish
foreign policy. The CEO of Turkish Airlines, Temel Kotil, acknowledged that
Turkish Airlines benefits from the liberal visa regime of Turkey.32
Indeed, it
has become much easier for a person from a country in the Middle East to
board a Turkish Airlines flight and visit Turkey without any visa requirement.
The increase in Turkish Airlines flights also benefits Turkey in terms of
tourism income, foreign exchange earnings and the ability to attract and shape
the perception of the foreigners. However, it should be kept in mind that the
growth of Turkish Airlines in the Middle East is a fragile one. For instance, due
to the civil war in Syria, Turkish Airlines halted its flights to Damascus and
Aleppo. Further instability in the region and the possibility of the violence to
spread up to other countries may push Turkish foreign policy to a security-
based approach that will be detrimental for the interest of Turkish Airlines in
the region.
31Sabah, “THY’nin Ortadoğu’daki Yüzü Tatlıtuğ”, 3 April 2010. 32 Radikal, “THY Dış Politikadaki Gelişemelerden Memnun”, 9 Janurary 2011.
187
Table 4. Passengers Carried by Turkish Airlines in the Middle East (in
thousands)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
201033
Total
Bahrain 10 11 10 10 11 11 21 44 56 58 241
Iran 54 76 78 87 91 104 132 200 314 326
1
462
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 53 62 120
Israel 194 177 183 187 210 215 291 348 331 297 2434
Jordan 39 45 43 56 63 66 93 115 151 146 818
Kuwait 19 18 19 25 29 33 38 43 53 65 341
Lebanon 23 26 23 25 28 24 47 75 143 141 555
Oman 0 0 0 0 0 8 22 21 25 33 108
Qatar 10 11 9 10 10 18 28 40 61 58 255
Saudi
Arabia 56 88 95 102 115 108 112 214 250 304 1443
Syria 19 31 32 40 45 58 70 157 220 242 915
UAE 34 44 58 66 88 107 121 237 245 238 1237
Yemen 0 0 0 0 0 9 18 24 27 24 102
Total 460 528 552 610
6
92 763 997 1525 1931 1995
10,03
3
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match.
Data Obtained from Turkish Prime Ministry Public Diplomacy Office
Turkish Airlines and Turkish Foreign Policy in Iran
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Turkey and Iran have
represented rival political systems. Therefore, the regimes in Ankara and
Tehran have abstained from pursuing close relations with each other. Mutual
distrust has been one of the main factors shaping the perceptions of “the other”
in Turkey and Iran. Especially in the 1990s, each side accused the other of
supporting dissident movements, Kurdish separatists and Islamist.34
However,
this started to change with the realization of a convergence in their common
economic interests and their opposition to any territorial break up of Iraq that
might lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the north.35
According to Mohammed Ayoob, “Turkish and Iranian interests converge more
332010 figures do not include December. 34 Robert Olson, “Turkey-Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Question,”
Third World Quarterly 21, no.5 (2000), p.889. 35William Hale, “Turkey and the Middle East in the New Era,” Insight Turkey 11, no.3 (2009),
pp.153-154.
188
than they diverge and there is a great realization of this fact in both Ankara and
Tehran now than there was 10 years ago.”36
For Turkey, Iran is a very important market for Turkish products with a
population that is comparable in size to that of Turkey. In addition, Turkey runs
a large trade deficit with Iran due to its energy imports.37
Hence, developing
commercial ties by increasing the volume of exports to Iran could help Turkey
balance its trade deficit. There is also an existing visa-free travel agreement
between the two countries that was introduced in 1964.38
Thanks to this, the
free movement of people on both sides has already been achieved. What is
needed is the political will to encourage and open the path for further
developing business and tourism ties. In this context, Turkish Airlines through
its regular flights contributes positively to the commercial and tourism potential
between Turkey and Iran, a goal which is set by both countries. In addition to
the existing Tehran route, Turkish Airlines has recently launched new flight
destinations in Iran in order to facilitate the movement of people and goods on
both sides. Since 2005, Turkish Airlines started to operate scheduled flights to
Tabriz (February 2006), Mashhad (March 2009) and Shiraz (March 2011)
(Table 1).
As of 2010, Turkey's exports to Iran reached three billion dollars. At
the same time, Turkey's imports from Iran were around seven billion dollars.
The total trade volume between the two countries was 10 billion dollars in
2010 with the potential to increase further (Table 5). This potential can be
fulfilled as more Turkish business people travel to Iran and Iranian business
people travel to Turkey.
Table 5. Turkey's Trade with Iran ( $ millions)
Iran 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Import 840 921 1861 1962 3470 5627 6615 8200 3406 7645
Export 361 334 534 813 913
1
067 1441
2
030 2025 3044
Total 1200 1255 2394 2775 4383 6694 8057
10,22
9 5431 10,689 Data Obtained from Turkish Ministry of Economy
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match.
36 Mohammed Ayoob, “Beyond the Domestic Wave: A Turko-Persian Future?” Middle East
Policy 18, no.2 (Summer 2011), p.118. 37 Kemal Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies of Turkey and the EU in the
Mediterranean,” in Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Power (Washington DC: The German
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010), p.29. 38 Kemal Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies of Turkey and the EU in the
Mediterranean,” p.29.
189
The tourism dimension also requires mention. Although the upward
trend in the number of Iranian tourists entering Turkey cannot be attributed to
the engagement of Turkish Airlines alone, its role should not be
underestimated. The number of tourists entering Turkey from Iran is the
highest among the Middle Eastern countries considering its geographical
proximity and size of its population (Table 3).
According to a paper written by Kirişci, Tocci and Walker,
The visa-free policy has also enabled large numbers of regime
opponents to flee the country and enjoy temporary protection in Turkey before
settling elsewhere in the West. Turkey is one of the few countries that the
Iranian middle-class can visit freely and in which they can enjoy the benefits of
a liberal economy and society.39
Turkey offering a more liberal and open society can be considered an
additional source of Turkey's soft power in the eyes of the Iranian population.
Moreover, Turkish Airlines acts as a soft power tool to present itself as the
modern airline company of a country that is attractive to Iranians. The fact that
Turkish Airlines flies to four destinations in Iran can also be used as a counter-
argument for those who claim that Turkey is leading a Sunni bloc in the Middle
East. Despite this, Turkish Airlines might be adversely affected by the conflict
of interest between Turkey and Iran in accordance with the new developments
in the region.
Turkish Airlines and Turkish Foreign Policy in Iraq
Traditionally, Turkey's relations with Iraq have been dominated by
security considerations. Economic relations have remained on a limited level.
However, Turkey has always been affected by the internal developments in its
neighbor Iraq. For instance, in the 1990s, Northern Iraq was a safe haven for
the PKK, which is considered to be a grave security threat to the territorial
integrity of Turkey. Thus, the escalation of terrorist attacks and the presence of
a Kurdish population in Northern Iraq were seen in terms of security in the
context of Turkey's policies towards Iraq.
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the post-Saddam order have
changed the balance of power among the ethnic and religious groups in the
country. The Turkish parliament's refusal to allow American troops to use
Turkish soil to open a second front in 2003 perhaps reduced Turkey's say in
the future of Iraq. Currently, Turkey's policy in Iraq is to preserve the territorial
39 Kemal Kirişci et al., A Neighborhood Rediscovered: Turkey's Transatlantic Value in the
Middle East (Washington DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010), p.22.
190
integrity of the country and the prevention of sectarian divide in order to
prevent a further destabilization that might create an independent Kurdistan.
After the cross border military operation in 2008, Turkey started to
develop its relations with all parties in Iraq, but more specifically with the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).40
From 2008-2009 onwards,
corresponding with the inauguration of Barack Obama as the new American
president, Turkey has developed its relations with Iraq. Thus, abandoning the
traditional security-only approach, the Turkish government has transformed its
relations with the KRG.41
Especially, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit
to Arbil in October 2009, with a delegation of around 70 officials and business
people including the trade minister Zafer Çağlayan, is considered to have been
contribution to the normalization of Turkey's relations with the KRG.42
Turkey's improvement of relations with the KRG was also praised by the
European Commission in Turkey's 2009 Progress Report.43
In this context, Turkish Airlines restarted scheduled flights to Baghdad
in October 2008 (Table 5), a route which had stopped operating for 17 years
due to the First Gulf War and its aftermath.44
According to a report published
by the International Crisis Group, “As of September 2009, 500 Turkish
companies had invested in Iraq, and Turkey as a country was among the top ten
foreign investors.”45
Table 6. Turkey's Trade with Iraq ( $ millions)46
Iraq 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Import 0 0 84 468 459 376 645 1321 952 1355
Export 0 0 718 1821 2750 2589 2845 3917 5124 6036
Total 0 0 802 2288 3209 965 490 5238 6076 7391
Data Obtained from Turkish Ministry of Economy
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match.
Turkey's volume of bilateral trade with Iraq reached 7 billion dollars by
2010 despite the global financial crisis that affected Turkey's bilateral trade
40Serhat Erkmen,“Türkiye-Irak İlişkileri,” Ortadoğu Analiz 1, no.4 (April 2009), p.6. 41 Kemal Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies of Turkey and the EU in the
Mediterranean,” p.28. 42 Ufuk Ulutaş, “Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009: A Year of Pro-activity,” Insight Turkey 12,
no.1 (2010), p.4. 43 European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2009 (Brussels: European Union, 2009), p.30. 44 Mesut Özcan, “From Distance to Engagement: Turkish Policy towards the Middle East, Iraq
and Iraqi Kurds,” Insight Turkey 13, no.2 (2011), p.85. 45 International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,” p. 10. 46 There is no data for 2001 and 2002.
191
with many countries negatively. Especially, in 2010 Turkish exports were
around 6 billion dollars, giving it a trade surplus with Iraq (Table 6). The
number of Iraqi tourists entering Turkey is also on the rise (Table 3). Turkish
nationals need visas to enter Iraq (Table 7), Iraqi nationals also need visa to
enter Turkey from land border but can get the visa at the airport easily if they
use air transportation (Table 8). If the visa requirements are lifted reciprocally,
that may increase the rate of people-to-people contact. Turkish Airlines in the
future can also play the role to expand commercial relations as well as
reciprocal tourism revenues. Another factor that can contribute to the people-
to-people contact is the reopening in February 2010 of the Istanbul-Baghdad
railway line that was built before the World War One.47
All these actions taken
by or with the encouragement of the Turkish government have had an impact
on developing relations on both the government and society level.
Table 7. Visa Requirements for Turkish Citizens
Bahrain Exempt Lebanon Exempt
UAE Needs Visa Oman Border Visa
Iraq Needs Visa Syria Exempt
Iran Exempt Saudi Arabia Needs Visa
Israel Needs Visa Jordan Exempt
Qatar Needs Visa48
Yemen Needs Visa
Kuwait Needs Visa - Data Obtained from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Table 8. Visa Requirements for Entering Turkey
Bahrain Border Visa Lebanon Exempt
UAE Border Visa Oman Border Visa
Iraq49
Border Visa Syria Exempt
Iran Exempt Saudi Arabia Border Visa
Israel Exempt Jordan Exempt
Qatar Border Visa Yemen Needs Visa
Kuwait Border Visa
Data Obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
47Kadri Kaan Renda, “Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence,”
Insight Turkey 13, no.1 (2011), p.101. 48 Visa granted at the airport for Turkish citizens fulfilling some financial requirements. 49 Border visa granted at airport but for land crossings visa is required.
192
Turkish Airlines has increased its presence by starting to operate five
new flight destinations in the country in addition to the capital. Especially the
start of the Arbil flights has been given wide coverage in the Turkish and Iraqi
media. It was initially the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who mentioned
Turkish Airlines’ plan to fly to Arbil in a bilateral meeting with the KRG leader
Mesud Barzani in June 2010 as a part of a common strategy in energy, trade
and transportation between the two countries.50
Within ten months, Turkish
Airlines launched its first flight to Arbil, the base of the KRG (Table 1).
This role is also praised by the President of Turkish-Iraqi Friendship
Council, which stated that Turkish Airlines' involvement in Arbil had
contributed to business people’s commercial activities in Iraq.51
It also should
be noted that Atlasjet Airlines, which is another airline company in Turkey,
started flying to Arbil as well as Suleymaniyah before Turkish Airlines.52
Pegasus Airlines, which is a private airline company in Turkey, started to
operate flights to Arbil by October 2011.53
Even though they also facilitate the
movement of people between the two countries, since they do not have any
kind of affiliation with the state, it is not possible to call them foreign policy
tools similar to Turkish Airlines. One thing that the involvement of all airline
companies in this market demonstrates is that there is also the demand side
behind the growth of airline companies in Iraq that has become possible in the
context of Turkey's developing relations with Iraq.
In addition to the new Arbil route, in 2011, Turkish Airlines added
Basra, Najaf, Mosul and Suleymaniyah to the list of cities to which it flies. The
political meaning behind these four destinations is to express Turkey's desire to
engage with all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. It is not hard to guess the
political bargaining behind these decisions to start flying to new routes. Each
route opening has a symbolic meaning. As Arbil represents the political power
of Barzani, so does Suleymaniyah represents his archrival Talabani. Another
instance is Najaf which is considered to be the center of Shi'a political power.
The new route is expected to increase the flow of tourists and Shi'a pilgrims to
the city, home to the shrine of Imam Ali, Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and a
figure regarded by Shi'a Muslims as the first Imam.54
Basra, which is the
50 Sabah, “THY’den Erbil’e Sefer”, 3 June 2010. 51 Turkey-Iraq Friendship Association, 4 October 2010, “Türk Hava Yolları Erbil Ofisini
Ziyaret,” Accessed on 24 March 2012, Available [online] at:<http://tidd.org.tr/eng/Events/17-
turk-hava-yollari-erbil-ofisini-ziyaret> 52 Global Aviator, “Turkish Airlines Launches Flight to Iraq,” Accessed on 24 March 2012,
Available [online] at:<http://www.globalaviator.co.za/Countries/stories/turkishairlines.htm> 53Zaman, “Pegasus Erbil’e Uçmaya Başlayacak”, 11 October 2011. 54 Iraq Business News,“First Direct Flight from Istanbul to Najaf,” Accessed on 24 March 2012,
Available [online] at:<http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/07/06/first-direct-flight-from-
193
second largest city in Iraq, is also a major port city that has economic potential
value for Turkey's trade with Iraq.
Overall, the momentum change in Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq
has fostered Turkish Airlines as a tool in this context. It facilitates the
movement of people and goods to contribute to the achievement of Turkish
foreign policy. At the same time, as an airline company, it benefits from the
Iraqi market and increases its share in the Middle East civil aviation market.
However, it should also be noted that this growth is very much dependent on
the course of bilateral relations and the internal dynamics. Although business
people on both sides of the border objected a security-based approach55
, Turkey
has resolved neither the Kurdish issue nor the PKK problem yet. A possible
escalation of violence in Turkey's territories with regard to those issues bares
the potential to have a negative impact on Turkey's relations with Iraq.
Furthermore, the future of Iraq's territorial integrity remains an important issue
that has the potential to shake the dynamics in the bilateral relations. One needs
to be cautious rather than too optimistic before talking about a rosy picture yet.
On the other hand, if Turkey and Iraq resolve those issues, political, economic
and cultural potential between the countries will expand. It will also influence
the strategies adopted by Turkish Airlines.
Turkish Airlines and Turkish Foreign Policy in Israel
Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of
Israel.56
The fact that both countries were the allies of the United States in the
Middle East was the main determinant of the relations between Turkey and
Israel during the Cold War. Surrounded by hostile Arab neighbors, Israel
viewed Turkey's friendship as an asset in the region. However, those two
countries could not develop close relations due to the Arab-Israeli conflict until
the Oslo Process in the 1990s. Since the Oslo Process, two countries have
worked closely in the areas of commerce and military cooperation. Turkey's
threat perception from its neighbors Greece, Syria and the PKK pushed it
towards an alliance with Israel in order to counterbalance those actors. 57
However, as Turkey has improved its relations with Greece, Syria and the
leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999, alliance with Israel for
Turkey lost its relative significance compared to the 1990s. Despite this change
in the political conjuncture, Turkey and Israel have pursued good relations as
the two functioning democracies and developing economies in the Middle East.
istanbul-to-najaf/> 55 Özcan, p.86. 56 Dov Waxman, “Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly 22, no.1 (Winter 1999), p.30.
57 Malik Muftu, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 52, no.1 (Winter 1998), p.35.
194
In line with these close contacts, commercial relations and people-to-people
contact have been regarded as two important aspects of the relations between
the two countries.
The relations entered an era of continuous decline after Israel's military
operation in Gaza in December 2008. A series of events including the Turkish
prime minister's harsh criticism of Israel at the Davos World Economic Forum
and the so called “sofa crisis”58
further deteriorated the relations. Israel's
military operation in May 2010 against a flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to
Gaza and the death of nine Turkish activists in international waters caused the
relations to reach a nadir. Since Turkey's three conditions (an official apology
by Israel for the killings, compensation for the victims, and lifting the Gaza
blockade) to normalize the relations have not been met by the Israeli side, the
relations remain at a considerably low level.
Although Turkey has taken some steps to degrade the level of its
relations with Israel, including recalling its ambassador and suspension of
military agreements, nothing has been done to abrogate the free trade
agreement.59
In addition, the visa-free travel for Israeli citizens was not
questioned.60
Those two steps illustrate that Turkey still prioritizes commercial
relations, tourism and personal contact with Israeli people in a way to facilitate
the improvement of relations in the political arena. Indeed, Turkey's business
relations with Israel seem to be developing in spite of the tensions in the
political realm.61
Table 9. Turkey’s Trade with Israel (million $)
Israel 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Import 529 544 459 714 805 782 1082 1448 1075 1360
Export 805 861 1083 1315 1467 1529 1658 1935 1528 2080
Total 1335 1406 1542 2029 2272 2311 2740 3383 2603 3440
Data Obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Economy
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match.
At first glance, it might seem that Turkish Airlines as the only airline
company operating in İstanbul-Tel Aviv route62
could have been negatively
58 International Crisis Group, “Turkey's Crisis over Israel and Iran,” Europe Report , no.208 (8
September 2010), p.3. 59 Kemal Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies of Turkey and the EU in the
Mediterranean,” p.34. 60 Ibid. 61 New York Times, “Despite Raid, Mostly Business as Usual for Israel and Turkey”, 2 July 2010. 62 By June 2012, Pegasus Airlines started to fly between İstanbul and Tel Aviv as the second
Turkish airline company in this route. It is interesting that a Turkish company could get the slot
195
affected by all these tensions. Especially considering the decline in the number
of Israeli tourists visiting Turkey since 2009, one might expect that the demand
for Turkish Airlines would have shrunk. Contrary to this assumption, it rather
has been the charter flights between Tel Aviv and Antalya63
that have been
affected negatively from the rising tension between the two countries.64
According to the CEO of Turkish Airlines, Temel Kotil, regular scheduled
flights continue without interruption since Turkish Airlines not only carries
Turkish passengers from İstanbul to Tel Aviv, but also transfer passengers from
other destinations such as New York-İstanbul-Tel Aviv route, which is used by
80 to 100 passengers on every New York-İstanbul Turkish Airlines flight.65
Turkish Airlines in the Gulf Countries66
Turkey's relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf traditionally
have been limited both politically and economically until recently. The sub-
region has been out of Turkey's direct sphere of influence mainly for
geographical reasons. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, which is significant
for the Muslim population in Turkey for religious reasons, Turkey's interest in
the sub-region has been to a limited extent. However, the rise of the AKP in
Turkey, which has Islamic roots, has provided new opportunities to improve
the relations with the Gulf countries.
Economic motives also have played an important part in this policy
change. Turkey's need for new markets and foreign capital has accelerated the
efforts to further develop the relations.67
Indeed, the fact that the Gulf countries
are mostly oil rich increases the potential of trade and investment. Turkey's
growing and dynamic economy has also been regarded as a positive factor
which increases the Arab capital inflow to Turkey. From 2001 to 2010,
bilateral trade between Turkey and six Gulf countries quadrupled. It reached its
peak in 2008 with 16.6 billion dollars, but had a decline of 50% due to the
global financial crisis (Table 10). In addition to the economic reasons, Turkey
aligns itself with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to topple the Assad regime in Syria
which is a considerably new development. In the near future, we may witness
Turkey's increasing cooperation with the countries of the Gulf region with
regard to the issues in the Middle East.
from the Israeli civil aviation authorities when there is a political crisis between the countries.
There is no Israeli company that operates in this route. 63 One of the largest cities in Turkey that is a holiday destination for Israelis as well as the
citizens of other countries. 64 Hürriyet, “İsrail Türkiye charter uçuşları iptal”, 14 September 2011. 65 Airkule, 14 September 2011, “İsrail Krizi THY'yi Etkiledi mi?” Accessed on 24 March 2012,
Available [online] at:<http://www.airkule.com/default.asp?page=haber&id=10031> 66 Gulf Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. 67 Birol Başkan, “Turkey-GCC: Is There a Future?” Insight Turkey 13, no.1 (2011), p.163.
196
Table 10. Turkey's Trade with Gulf Countries68
($ millions)
Data Obtained from the Turkish Ministry of Economy
Note: Numbers are rounded. Sums may not match.
The role played by Turkish Airlines in the Gulf is appreciated by
Turkish state officials. For instance, the president of Turkey, Abdullah Gül,
emphasizes how Turkish Airlines’ inauguration of a new flight route to Muscat
shortened the distances and increased interaction between Turkey and Oman.69
In addition to this role, a specific task has traditionally been assigned to the
national airline by the Turkish state to carry the Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and
Medina in Saudi Arabia. For instance, in 2010, 100,000 people were carried by
Turkish Airlines for this specific purpose alone.
Another factor that increases the significance of the Gulf for Turkish
Airlines is the existence of its regional competitor airlines. As Turkish Airlines
aims to make İstanbul an aviation hub, Emirates has the same purpose for
Dubai. It is also true for Etihad, Gulf and Qatar Airways, aiming to increase
their share in the world aviation market, to make their places of origin aviation
hubs (Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Doha) in addition to representing their states by
carrying their flags worldwide. Qatar Airways, for example, represents a
micro-state like Qatar by flying airplanes with the country’s name into airports
around the world and the word Qatar appearing in its advertising.70
The strategies adopted by Turkish Airlines for promoting its own
brand, which at the same time promotes the image of Turkey, are similar to the
strategies adopted by the airlines of the Gulf.
To make a comparison, as a part of promoting its own brand, Turkish
Airlines sponsors sports teams, players and events such as FC Barcelona,
68 Gulf Countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. 69 Turkish Presidency, “Cumhurbaşkanı Gül Omanlı Bakanları Kabul Etti,” Accessed on 24
March 2012, Available [online] at: <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/49018/cumhurbaskani-
gul-omanli-bakanlari-kabul-etti.html> 70 J. E. Peterson, “Qatar and the World: Branding for a Microstate,” Middle East Journal 60, no.4
(Autumn 2006), p.747.
Gulf
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Import 939 951 1123 1478 2209 2774 3174 4360 2665 3638
Export 1036 1215 1677 2297 3012 3636 5568 12268 5390 6409
Total 1974 2165 2802 3776 5222 6410 8742 16628 8056 10049
197
Manchester United FC, Kobe Bryant, Caroline Wozniacki and Turkish Airlines
Euroleague71
; Emirates sponsors Arsenal FC, AC Milan, Emirates Cup, Rugby
World Cup.72
Another parallel with Emirates is the role played by the both in
humanitarian relief. Recently, Turkish Airlines has involved in humanitarian
relief in Somalia, Japan and Libya. Compared to Turkish Airlines, which
operates on an ad hoc basis, Emirates is more institutionalized with its Emirates
Foundation specifically for the purpose of humanitarian, philanthropic aid and
services for children in need.73
As Turkish Airlines’ involvement in such areas
contributes to the image of Turkey worldwide as a soft power tool, so does
Emirates’ involvement for Dubai and the United Arab Emirates.
Conclusion
Although majority of its shares do not belong to the Turkish state
anymore, Turkish Airlines is used as a foreign policy tool due to the golden
share that the state retains. As one of Turkey’s soft power tools, Turkish
Airlines helps Turkey’s capacity to attract. Despite the fact that soft power is a
difficult term to measure, the strategies adopted by Turkish Airlines as a
national airline contribute to Turkey’s soft power potential. It promotes
Turkey’s name and flag all over the world and makes İstanbul a central
location through air transportation. In the case of the Middle East, Turkish
Airlines facilitates the goal of Turkish foreign policy that aims to establish a
region of peace and stability through a liberal visa regime and free trade
agreements. The route openings of Turkish Airlines in the Middle East
positively contribute to Turkey’s trade potential with the countries in the
region. As the number of passengers carried by Turkish Airlines increases,
more people from the Middle East visit Turkey and more Turkish citizens visit
the countries in the Middle East. In the medium run, this will positively
contribute to the perception of Arabs and Iranians in Turkey and vice versa. In
sum, Turkish Airlines makes Turkish foreign policy in the region to be more
receptive and credible. In an indirect way, it gets others what Turkey desires as
a soft power tool. Unless Turkey abandons its policy that emphasizes regional
cooperation in favor of a more security-based approach in the near future,
Turkish Airlines will continue to be an important instrument parallel to the
vision of its foreign policy.
71 Turkish Airlines, “Sponsorships,” Accessed on 24 March 2012, Available [online] at:
<http://www.turkishairlines.com/en-TR/sponsorships/index.aspx> 72 Emirates Airlines, “Sponsorships,” Accessed on 24 March 2012, Available [online]
at:<http://www.emirates.com/english/about/sponsorships/sponsorships.aspx> 73 Emirates Airlines, “The Emirates Airline Foundation,” Accessed on 24 March 2012, Available
[online] at: <http://www.emiratesairlinefoundation.org/english/index.aspx>
198
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