Ukraine Art of Limited War

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Ukraine and the Art of Limited WarLawrence FreedmanPublished online: 25 Nov 2014.

To cite this article: Lawrence Freedman (2014) Ukraine and the Art of Limited War, Survival: Global Politicsand Strategy, 56:6, 7-38, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.985432

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You Cant Always Get What You Want

Rolling Stones, Let it Bleed, 1969

In a piece published in the JuneJuly issue of Survival, I considered Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management.1 My aim was to explore the relevance of the strategic concepts of the Cold War to the unfolding drama of Ukraine, and in particular the challenge of securing essential interests without triggering a wider war. I judged the crisis to have been badly managed by Russia, not particularly well by the West, and with great difficulty by Ukraine. The consequences of the failure of crisis man-agement lay not so much in expanding the area of conflict but instead in

a sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West, and con-tinuing and unsettling violence within Ukraine. The result was that, over

subsequent months, the role of Russian forces within Ukraine became

more direct and overt, as the more irregular separatist forces were unable to cope. The conflict became less of an externally sponsored insurgency in

eastern Ukraine and more of a limited war between Ukraine and Russia. The costs were high. According to the United Nations, by 8 October

2014 the conflict had claimed 3,682 lives and wounded 8,871 in eastern

Ukraine. Some 5 million people lived in the area affected by conflict. Some

Ukraine and the Art of Limited War

Lawrence Freedman

Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies at Kings College London. His latest book is Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press, 2013). An earlier version of this article appeared on the web magazine War on the Rocks on 8 October 2014.

Survival | vol. 56 no. 6 | December 2014January 2015 | pp. 738 DOI 10.1080/00396338.2014.985432

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8 | Lawrence Freedman

427,000 had fled to neighbouring countries, while a further 402,034 were internally displaced.2

In this article I do not reprise the material on the origins of the crisis and the events up to May 2014 contained in the first article, but instead con-centrate on the later intensification of the conflict and the aftermath of the

ceasefire of 5 September. I consider what, if any, strategic lessons might be

drawn from this most recent stage in the conflict, looking in particular at the

concept of hybrid warfare.

On limited and hybrid warfareThe concept of limited war has an even longer history than that of crisis

management. It requires that belligerents choose not to fight at full capac-ity, in order that a conflict neither gains in intensity nor expands in space

and time. This is different from accepting those natural limits imposed

by resources and geography, and also from circumstances in which a strong state employs only limited forces to deal with opponents with infe-rior capabilities. Against inferior opponents complete victories can still be achieved with limited effort. To be a limited war, the limits must be

accepted by both parties.As a distinctive concept, limited war depended on a contrast with total

war, a term popularised as a result of the First World War. The Napoleonic

period saw a departure from the inherently limited conflicts of the eight-eenth century. The old routines became obsolete with the expectation that

the full resources of states would be pitted against each other in Darwinian

struggles for survival. In total war the parties would push any conflict to

its extremities. Once nuclear weapons were introduced this pointed to an

absurd and tragic result: mutual destruction. If both sides could accept that whatever was at stake was not worth an all-out confrontation, then any effort to protect interests through the use of armed force would have to be

governed by some sense of how far they were really prepared to go. The conundrums this created were first thrown into relief during the

Korean War of 195053. Although this conflict was hardly limited for the

people of Korea in either its effects or stakes, the United States neither

extended the war into China nor used nuclear weapons, and in the end

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Ukraine and the Art of Limited War | 9

accepted an outcome that could be characterised as stalemate rather than victory. A number of the new generation of civilian strategists sought to explain why this was a good rather than a bad outcome, a compromise that left one half of Korea under communist rule (where it has remained stuck) but the world intact.3

If the United States was prepared to fight only total war and lacked a

capacity for limited war, normally understood as strong regular forces, it would face a dilemma with an incremental Soviet advance. The danger was

of salami tactics, whereby each slice of the salami would appear not to be worth a major conflict, although, cumulatively, the successive slices would

eventually turn into the whole.4 Limited war capabilities therefore meant being able to respond to a challenge in the terms in which it was posed and so dare the enemy to take the risk of escalating to the next and more danger-ous level.

The word escalation entered the lexicon during the 1950s as a warning

about why wars might not stay limited. Once forces of great size and com-plexity began to clash, a conflict would become increasingly difficult to

manage. Actions might be taken because of confusion, misapprehension, panic or passion. Once fighting was under way, new issues would affect atti-tudes to the conflict. As questions of reputation, credibility and pride came

into play, the military effort might be ratcheted up to levels well beyond

those justified by the original dispute. This problem could be aggravated

by the rhetoric necessary to mobilise public opinion behind any operation. Should a threshold be reached or a deal agreed, then all this would have to be scaled down. In the end, limited war implied compromise, which would always be difficult when the enemy had been described in the darkest terms

and the stakes raised to existential levels. Escalation came to describe this tragic process. The original metaphor

derived from the moving staircase which took one to a place one might not want to go because one could not get off. The theorists of escalation,

such as Herman Kahn, resisted the idea of a loss of control. Instead, they suggested that it might be possible to find a level at which a war might be

fought which suited one sides capabilities but not the other, posing for the opponent the problem of accepting defeat or moving to yet another, more

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dangerous level. This was called escalation dominance.5 So a problem with limited war was that, despite the natural assumption of some proportional-ity between limited ends and limited means, not only might the objectives shift as a result of the fighting, but also military commitments would reflect

the logic of combat. Forces would need to be sized with reference to those of

the enemy, as well as the value of whatever was in dispute. Lastly, there would need to be some means by which limits could be

recognised, agreed and enforced. This required some sort of shared under-standings about thresholds and boundaries. There might be natural lines

set by geography or types of weaponry or targets but to serve the pur-poses of limitation they would still often need to be confirmed through forms of communication. Some dip-lomatic activity would be necessary if a conflict was to

be kept limited.With the end of the EastWest confrontation, the issue

of limited war became less pressing. The wars fought

by Western countries were inherently limited, and only rarely with another state. There were challenges related

to keeping these conflicts restricted in terms of time

taken and resources expended, but their discretionary nature meant that if the demands of a campaign exceeded the value of the objective, then an intervention could be drawn to a close.

This years developments in Ukraine revived the issue of limited war.

The confrontation morphed into an inter-state war with high stakes, and

with one side a nuclear power, but vast armies did not move against each other, capabilities were held in reserve and diplomatic communications continued throughout. NATO, of course, was not directly engaged in the

fighting, but it had to consider whether and how it might get involved. This

involved assessing Russian objectives, advising Ukraine on how to respond, and examining the implications for any conflict that might develop between

Russia and a NATO member in the future.

The Russian intervention has been described as an example of hybrid

warfare. This term gained currency after Israel was said to have been sur-prised and discomfited during the 2006 Lebanon War by the combination

The Wests response was shaped by anxiety

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of guerrilla and conventional tactics adopted by Hizbullah. It is now dis-cussed as an approach that draws upon a number of types of force from across the full spectrum, including terrorism, insurgency and regular combat, along with the extensive use of information operations. As with many similar concepts, such as asymmetric warfare, once adopted as a term of art it has tended towards a wider definition. Nor does it refer to a new

phenomenon, for there are many examples in military history of the combi-nation of regular and irregular forms of warfare.6 Recently, Frank Hoffman, in connection with Ukraine, has suggested that hybrid threats involve an adversary employing a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to

obtain their political objectives.7 This suggests a command authority that is able to choreograph the various operations to achieve the greatest synergy in pursuit of specified goals.

So, in addition to the general questions raised about limited war the

relationship of political objectives to available military means; the role of threats to escalate to higher levels of conflict according to changing political

as well as military circumstances; and the identification of a compromise

and durable political outcome that could be agreed without further escala-tion the Ukrainian case has also raised additional questions about hybrid

war. In particular, to what extent is it possible to tailor such a disparate com-bination of activities to a developing conflict while continuing to exercise

political control, and how possible is it to integrate information operations into an overall plan of campaign?

On both these issues, I argue that the advantages of hybrid warfare have

been less evident than often claimed. The complex command arrangements

reduced Russian control over the developing situation on the ground, while efforts at deception were by and large ineffectual, as the Russian role

became progressively transparent. The exception to this may have been a

relative success in projecting a more menacing image than Russias actual strength warranted. This supported a limited-war strategy based on boost-ing Russias position by warning of a readiness to continue escalation. The

Wests response was shaped by an evident reluctance to escalate and anxiety about moving into a less contained conflict. In the end, however, the case

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of Ukraine confirms the mundane observation that in disputes over terri-tory, the most effective forms of control involve regular armed forces and

superior firepower, but that physical control does not ensure a functioning

economy and society.

Interpreting Putins plansUntil more is revealed about Russian decision-making during the course of this crisis, any analysis relies on inferences about Russian President Vladimir Putins objectives and calculations. This is not straightforward, because the

evidence supports a number of interpretations. The starting point is rela-tively uncontroversial: Putin viewed the break-up of the Soviet Union as a retrograde step which created opportunities for Russias adversaries that they did not hesitate to exploit. Against this backdrop, Moscow came to consider the overall political orientation of Ukraine, whether it looked to the East or the West, as a vital interest. This issue came to the fore during the

course of 2013 as Russia put pressure on Ukraine not to sign an association

agreement with the European Union, and so become the latest stage in the Wests expansion into the former Soviet space. Instead, it urged Ukraine to join the Russian-led Eurasian Union, loosely modelled on the EU. At first,

Kiev opted for the EU, only to turn instead to the Eurasian Union with the incentive of a large Russian loan. It has also been suggested by former Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski that this was combined with a threat to seize

Crimea and possibly personal blackmail, based on evidence of the organ-ised corruption of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovichs government.

Ukrainian intelligence had been aware of Russian operatives moving into Crimea earlier in the decade, with the possibility of annexation discussed from the middle of 2013, which is when the question of EU versus Eurasian

Union was moving up the agenda. According to Sikorski, Polish intelligence became aware of Russian calculations on what provinces would be prof-itable to grab. Interestingly, these were the Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk

and Odessa regions, rather than those parts of the Donbas area that came to

be controlled by the separatists.8 Yanukovichs turn to Russia triggered the revolt in Kiev, the overthrow

of the Yanukovich government and, in consequence, an apparently decisive

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Western turn in Ukrainian policy. If Moscow had formed a link between such a hostile turn in Kievs policy and the seizure of Crimea and other

Ukrainian territory, then this might explain the speed with which agitation soon began in these territories. The effort to generate a counter-revolution-ary movement failed, other than in Crimea, where Russia had the benefit of

the Sevastapol base as well as prior preparation. Initially, the Russians may have hoped to retain annexation as a threat to encourage Kiev to reconsider its position, although, given the revolutionary enthusiasm in Ukraine, con-cessions to Moscow were always unlikely. The evident popular support for

annexation within Russia meant that it was not long delayed. This was a

definitive move that would be very difficult for Moscow to reverse. It intro-duced a problem into all later attempts to achieve a political settlement. A

view quickly developed within the international community, however, that

it would be extremely difficult to force Russia to hand Crimea back, and so

the focus had to be on preventing it from taking more slices of the salami. Initially, there were a number of areas of agitation, including Odessa, but

they gained little traction.9 Eventually, Russian efforts concentrated on the

Donbas region and, in particular, the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk

Peoples Republics. Putin described these areas using the historic name of Novorossiya, expressing his astonishment that they had ever been allowed

to become part of Ukraine in 1922, a ruling he considered to be as perverse

as the transfer of Crimea and Sevastopol to Ukraine in 1956.10

While the loss of these territorial slices directly challenged Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity, unless the whole of the salami was taken, the rest of Ukraine would be left hostile to Russia and beyond its influence. This would permit its embrace by the EU, and even NATO, to

continue. This pointed to a fundamental tension in Russian objectives from

the start, between carving out a chunk of Ukraine that would be effec-tively controlled by Russia or even annexed, and gaining influence over

Ukrainian decisions to prevent moves inimical to Russian interests what used to be called Finlandisation.11

Moreover, demanding the right to veto unwanted developments in one sovereign country raised the possibility that the same right could be demanded of other countries in the Russian near abroad. Putins assertion

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of a special responsibility to protect the position of Russians unfortunate enough to live outside the borders of the Russian Federation potentially affected a number of countries. This was already the rationale behind the

frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. It could be used to challenge the

position of the Baltic states, notably Estonia,12 and even Russias notional partners in the Eurasian Union, Belarus and Kazakhstan. If it was believed

that Russia was capable of moving into a full expansionist mode, then Poland, Sweden and Finland could come into the frame. If I wanted, Putin is reported to have told Ukraines new president, Petro Poroshenko, in mid-September, in two days I could have Russian troops not only in Kiev, but also in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, and Bucharest.13

As I shall argue below, the readiness to suggest unlimited ambition and the ability to project power well beyond its borders fits in with a Russian

strategy geared to intimidation and deterrence. Yet Russias capacity is limited. It rebuilt its armed forces during recent years of economic growth, but it would struggle to cope with a multi-front campaign or a prolonged occupation of a substantial hostile population. Should any action trigger NATOs Article V commitments, Russian forces would be outnumbered

and face superior air power from the US and other allies. Its GDP is close

to that of Italy and in per capita terms is less than Polands. In no sense is Russia an economic superpower. It is a great power by virtue of its nuclear arsenal and permanent membership of the Security Council, but Britain also has these attributes, plus a stronger economy and many more allies. What

marks Russia out is a regular need to assert its power, reflecting security

problems around its periphery. Putins dreams may be irredentist, but for the moment, practicalities limit that dream. For all the talk about driving to Kiev, never mind Warsaw, Putin has not (yet) gone for broke in Ukraine.

The crisis generated by the intervention was not confined to Ukraine.

It was geared to strengthening Russias overall strategic position vis--vis NATO and the EU while encouraging others to take its interests and con-cerns more seriously. It had implications for the wider European economy and energy networks. The shooting down of a civilian airliner in July affected

many countries. Nonetheless, the geographical scope of the Russian effort

remained limited to areas bordering Russia, including Crimea.

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Tactical evolutionThe tactics adopted by Russia in Ukraine have many antecedents, but an

early 2013 speech by Valery Gerasimov, newly appointed chief of Russias

general staff, highlighted how appropriate they might be in contempo-rary conflict. Reflecting some of the Western debate on hybrid warfare, he

described how in Middle Eastern conflicts there had been a progressive

erosion of the distinctions between war and peace and between uniformed personnel and covert operatives. Wars were not declared but simply begin, so that a completely well-off and stable country could be transformed into

an arena of the most intense armed conflict in a matter of months or even

days. In these circumstances, military means became more effective when

combined with non-military means, including political, economic, informa-tion, humanitarian and other measures. These could be supplemented by

covert and thus deniable military measures, as well as offers of peace-keep-ing assistance as a means to strategic ends. New information technologies

would play an important role. As a result, frontal clashes of major military formations are gradually receding into the past. They now involve the

broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures. All of this, he said, could be supplemented by firing

up the local populace as a fifth column and by concealed armed forces.14 It was evident in Crimea that preparations had been made for this con-

tingency for some time. Here was seen the first use of professional soldiers

in uniforms without markings (the so-called little green men). They were

deployed again in numbers in April, as Russian agents acted with indig-enous separatists to seize administrative buildings and other facilities in the

Donbas area. At first these operations were successful, in part because the

local response by Ukrainian security forces was lame. Yet, although there was evidence of intimidation by the separatists and substantial support from Russia, the rebellion struggled to establish itself because of a lack of popular backing. Referendums held in support of separatism had little cred-ibility and were not taken seriously internationally.15

After the election of President Poroshenko at the end of May, the Ukrainian military effort against the separatists was stepped up, under

the heading of an anti-terrorist operation. The separatist forces struggled

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to cope. They lacked coherence, combining local agitators, militants who

had learnt their trade in Chechnya and Georgia, and some Russian special forces. Coordination was often poor, and political leadership at times eccen-tric. Their methods alienated local people, and they used the sophisticated

equipment with which they were provided recklessly. With Ukrainian

forces becoming better organised, and prepared to deploy firepower more

ruthlessly, they gave ground. In a significant battle on 26 May government

forces, using aircraft and helicopters, took Donetsk airport. Ill-prepared

separatist fighters suffered many casualties, a number apparently as a result

of friendly fire.16

This particular episode may be one reason why Russia began sending

more advanced equipment to the separatists, including anti-aircraft

weapons and GRAD rockets. Surface-to-air missiles made the skies more

dangerous for Ukrainian military aircraft. They also caused an international

scandal when a Malaysia Airlines flight was downed on 17 July by a missile

fired from a Russian BUK system, causing the deaths of 281 passengers and

crew. The furore that followed added to Russias isolation, not helped by a

refusal to accept any responsibility. Western sanctions, first introduced after

the annexation of Crimea, were intensified. These events may also have dis-tracted the separatists attention from the defence of their positions. Slowly

but surely, Ukrainian forces pushed the rebels back to about half of their original holdings. It looked likely that they would be pushed out of first

Donetsk and then Luhansk.

At this point, a decision seems to have been taken in Moscow to get a grip on the situation. One move, which may have added to rather than

reduced Moscows problems, was to replace the leadership of the rebel-lion with Ukrainians rather than the Russian citizens who had initially

taken charge.17 In late August, Russian armed forces became involved in a much more overt way. The starting point was an argument over a so-

called humanitarian convoy to deliver assistance to the areas under siege.18 Soon, there were reports of 15,000 troops on the border, with at least 1,000

operating inside Ukraine.19 In a long battle for Ilovaisk, a town between Donetsk and the Russian border that had been retaken from separatists

on 19 August, Ukrainian troops were surrounded. As many as 300 soldiers

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may have been killed in the battle. Luhansk airport was retaken. Ukrainian

forces buckled under the new onslaught. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk observed that it was easy to deal with Russian-led guerrillas and the Russian-led terrorists. But its too difficult for us to fight against well-

trained and well-equipped Russian military.20 As ground was lost in the Donbas, the government had to suspend the anti-terrorist operation to con-centrate on defence. By now some 65% of Ukraines military equipment had

been lost, while the armour left in storage was described by Poroshenko as being as good as tins cans.21 More of Ukraine appeared to be at risk. Russia seized the border town of Novoazovsk and threatened the port of Mariupol,

and raised the possibility of a land corridor to Crimea which, with only sea links, was proving a challenge for Moscow to keep adequately supplied.

Reason for cautionDespite the growing ascendancy of Russian-backed forces, on 5 September

an agreement on a ceasefire was reached at Minsk, signed by representa-tives of Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Co-operation

in Europe (OSCE), as well as the leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk

Peoples Republics. It is evident why Poroshenko wanted a ceasefire: to

provide Ukrainian forces with a respite and to move forward with economic and political reform. Moreover, the agreement was largely based on a plan originally proposed by Poroshenko in June and offered a degree of decentral-isation of power and protection of Russian language; political and economic reconstruction in the affected areas; liberation of hostages and amnesties;

withdrawal of illegal armed formations; and a buffer zone on the border.

The September agreement gave the OSCE a substantial role in monitoring

the provisions. A further agreement of 19 September required that heavy

weaponry be pulled back 15 kilometres from the line of contact, banned

offensive operations and flights by combat aircraft over the security zone,

and called for the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries and an OSCE monitor-ing mission.22 On 24 September, NATO reported a significant, although not complete, withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. At the start of November, there were believed to be 250300 Russian soldiers still in the

country. These troops were said to be not for fighting but specialist training

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and equipping of the separatist forces. There were reports that these forces

were being reinforced with more weaponry at the time of the separatist elec-tions in early November. Russian forces on the border were down from the

18 battalions of August to some seven, still enough to unnerve Kiev.23 In principle, by accepting Ukrainian sovereignty, this agreement

favoured Kiev more than Moscow. Why then was it agreed, given the pre-vailing balance of power in the region? One explanation for Russian caution

was the added risks associated with further intervention, including getting

bogged down in an occupation against a hostile population. It was one thing to shell Ukrainian positions, and another to move in numbers against those positions; one thing to occupy territory with superior force, but another to administer and reconstruct, as the United States and its allies had learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. There were also reports of significant Russian casu-alties, ranging from the hundreds to the thousands.24 These were causing consternation in Russia, especially because of the lengths the authorities went to deny that the deaths had occurred in Ukraine or to insist that, if they did, this was because the casualties had temporarily left the army and volunteered to help the separatists.25

A second reason for caution might lie in Western economic sanctions, which were steadily ratcheted up, including after the Minsk agreement. These measures affected investment in future exploration for the oil and

gas industry. The easing of sanctions (or their potential intensification) was

linked explicitly to the implementation of the agreement. According to US Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken, there was a need to make

sure that Russian personnel and equipment leave Ukraine, that the border

is appropriately back under the control of Ukrainian forces and the Ukraine government, that its monitored appropriately, and that there are buffer

zones on both sides.26 Under other circumstances Russia might have found it possible to disregard sanctions, but the economy was already slowing down prior to the crisis and also had to cope with a significant decline in the

oil price. The sanctions therefore aggravated an already difficult situation.

Some Russian responses, notably the banning of some agricultural products from the EU, added to the costs and reduced the choices for Russian con-sumers. The prospect was one of squeezed living standards as the country

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faced a declining currency, along with recession and rising prices, espe-cially for foodstuffs.27 In addition, although Russia meets about a quarter

of Europes demand for gas,28 the pressure on revenues limited the coun-trys ability to threaten to cut supplies, and there were even some moves to resolve the vexing issue of Russian supplies to Ukraine.29

The positions held by separatists undoubtedly created a serious problem

for Ukraine. Yet the territory held at the time of the ceasefire could not

ensure that Russia would achieve its main aims. There was no land corri-dor to Crimea, and the territory controlled by the separatists was too small to make much sense as a stand-alone entity, incoherent both economically and politically, yet large enough to require a sub-stantial subsidy if it was not to collapse internally. Russia was already struggling with Crimea,30 and none of its other frozen territories were exactly eco-nomic success stories. It was unlikely that those displaced by the conflict would return while fight-ing continued. If these territories did secede, there would be continuing tension on their border with the rest of Ukraine, and so a need for high levels of military mobilisation, and a likely deteriora-tion in economic and social conditions. Industrial production had collapsed, pensions were not being paid and provisions would be necessary for the winter. Meanwhile, Ukraine would be bound to work even more closely with Western Europe. As was expected, the more pro-Russian parties fal-tered in the 27 October parliamentary elections. Of more significance, in

terms of the propaganda claim that neo-Nazis were at the heart of the new

order in Ukraine, was the weakness of the right-wing Svoboda party. The

main victors were the more moderate pro-Western parties. Of perhaps most

importance for Russia was the fact that the party of the more hawkish Prime Minister Yatsenyuk did slightly better than that of the more conciliatory

President Poroshenko.31 While some sort of deal might have made sense for Russia, whose role

was reduced after Minsk, the provisions of the agreement made little sense

to the separatists. For this reason the fighting did not actually stop as they

sought to extend their area of control, resulting in many more casualties. At

Sanctions aggravated a

difficult situation

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best this was more de-escalation than ceasefire. The separatists made little

progress, at least in two crucial areas. Against Mariupol they appeared to give up quite quickly, except for occasional shelling, because of the

entrenched position of Ukrainian forces. Against Donetsk airport assaults

were regularly rebuffed. By then, the airport had acquired a certain sym-bolism. It had been taken early on by the separatists. Its recapture in May by Ukrainian forces had been a demoralising blow. Although the actual airport was left destroyed, it remained in Ukrainian hands. This separatist

failure left many casualties and undermined claims of separatist control over the region.

Moscows interests were therefore not necessarily the same as the sep-aratists, although ultimately the separatists could not survive without Russian support. This explains the tensions between the two, as Russia

did not endorse full independence for or annexation of Novorussyia, but

only the compromise position that the region would stay part of Ukraine but with a significant amount of autonomy. The obvious questions were:

how much autonomy, and would regional representatives be in a position to block the eventual accession of Ukraine to the EU or vote for combina-tion with Russia? The separatists showed no interest in these issues or any

compromise along these lines. Igor Plotnitsky, head of the Luhansk Peoples Republic, observed that sooner or later, we will become part of the Russian Federation.32 His fellow signatory to the Minsk agreement, Alexander Zakharchenko of the Donetsk Peoples Republic, claimed that he was forced

to sign, and that this was an act of betrayal. One of his deputies explic-itly rejected the agreement to return control of the border to Ukraine.33 On 20 October Zakharchenko announced the ceasefire over. There were soon

demands that Ukraine cede more territory or else it would be taken by force.34 Elections were conducted separately in Donetsk and Luhansk on 2 November, in contravention of the Minsk agreement as they did not follow

Ukrainian law, and produced results that were unsurprising given the limited choice allowed.35 Poroshenko described the elections as a farce at gunpoint, and questioned whether there was much point continuing with

the Minsk agreement, ordering more troops to move to the east to prepare defences against any new separatist push.36

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Putin dared not abandon the separatists, yet he was unable to get them to meet their obligations. His unwillingness to force them to do so was one reason for the lack of progress at a meeting in Milan on 17 October involv-ing Putin, Poroshenko and EU leaders.37 For its part, Ukraine, severely weakened by the events of 2014, with its economy undermined and key

territories out of its control, had a clear interest in a negotiated solution, although there were growing elements in the country pushing for tougher action.38 The conflict encouraged nationalist sentiment in Ukraine as well as Russia. Thus, while Poroshenko accepted the need for compromise in

terms of more autonomy for the troubled regions and respect for Russian concerns, he could not abandon closer relations with the EU as a goal.

All this made it less likely that Russia would be able to meet its origi-nal objective of restraining Kievs policy in relation to the EU. Following Minsk, Russia continued to demand that Ukraine not get closer to the EU. It had some success at a trilateral EURussianUkrainian meeting on 12

September, at which the parties agreed to postpone the implementation of the EUs Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine from

November 2014 to the end of 2015.39 Russia threatened tariffs for Ukrainian

exports to Russia should implementation take place. The conciliatory stance

adopted by Kiev led to the resignation of Ukraines deputy foreign minister. Nonetheless, the line from Brussels was that the European Union will not

allow Russia to dictate conditions for the EUs relations with Ukraine. Nor

did the trilateral agreement prevent ratification of the treaty. This appar-ently surprised Moscow: the day after ratification by both the Ukrainian and

European parliaments, Putin wrote to European Commission President Jos Manuel Barroso, demanding that the treaty be changed before implemen-tation and threatening immediate and appropriate retaliatory measures against Kiev if implementation went ahead.40

Alternate realityBecause territory has been taken from Ukraine, the Russian intervention was still widely seen as successful, even though the conflict was unresolved and

Russia had yet to achieve its main objectives. Russian success was attributed

to its skilful adoption of the techniques of hybrid war. This was reflected in

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the use of a range of force types. Initially, the main requirement was suffi-cient force to take over administrative buildings and intimidate local police forces. Over time the demands increased, to the point where local agita-tors had to be supplemented with Russian fighters with combat experience,

apparently often Chechen. Eventually, regular forces had to become directly involved. Throughout there was a deceptive intent, recalling the old Soviet

concept of maskirovka (masking) or even Potemkin villages.41 The aim was to sustain the pretence that the fighting force was wholly indigenous, sup-plemented by no more than some friendly volunteers from over the border. Thus, the Washington Post editorialised:

Some have called the new approach hybrid war, a conflict waged by

commandos without insignia, armored columns slipping across the

international border at night, volleys of misleading propaganda, floods

of disinformation and sneaky invasions like the one into Crimea. In this

hybrid war, a civilian airliner was shot down by surface-to-air missiles,

but the triggerman or supplier of the missile was never identified; artillery

shells are fired but no one can say from where; Russian military material

and equipment appears suddenly in the villages and fields of eastern

Ukraine. While people are being killed, as in any war, and while Ukraine

has mustered its forces admirably to push back, this hybrid war features

an aggressor whose moves are shrouded in deception.42

Russian strategists were said to judge information operations to be important as a means of challenging the claims made by their opponents and of shoring up support at home.43 A constant challenge was mounted to the claims made by Ukrainian and Western opponents of Russian action, and a competing narrative was developed, based on the supposedly illegal and fascistic nature of the Kiev government, its sole responsibility for the existence of a conflict and for particular tragedies (such as the shooting

down of the Malaysian airliner), and the shelling of civilian areas. This was

combined with a larger narrative about the greatness, exceptional quality

and legitimate interests of Russia.44 Economic sacrifices and the risks being run in Ukraine were justified as enabling a shift away from dependence on

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trade with Western Europe to intensified links with Asia. The increasing

control over national media and Internet providers, along with intimida-tion of dissenters, made it possible to shape Russian opinion. For example, after the Committee of Soldiers Mothers in St Petersburg expressed concern

about Russian casualties in Ukraine, the Ministry of Justice declared the non-governmental organisation to be a foreign agent. Enormous efforts

were made to harass perceived opponents of Russia, including the deploy-ment of an army of trolls with a mission to contradict and abuse those taking anti-Russian positions on social media,45 and the use of Russia Today (RT), a Russian-controlled news network.46

As deception operations, these efforts were largely unsuccessful: few

were deceived. Although the starting point for Russian operations was plau-sible denial, after a while it seemed as though Moscow no longer cared.47 The claims about a lack of direct Russian involvement in the fighting became

progressively implausible and eventually incredible. Ukrainians did not rally en masse to the separatist cause. Russian positions taken in a series of awkward Security Council sessions were widely disregarded and derided, and the countrys standing fell internationally.

As much of the campaign was conducted through social media, Russian efforts were hampered by the role played by independent analysts who used

considerable forensic skills to evaluate claims being made by both sides. This

was particularly effective after the downing of the Malaysia Airlines plane.

In addition to denying that BUK surface-to-air missiles could have been in the area, Moscow attempted to suggest that the airliner had been attacked

from behind by a Ukrainian Su-25. There were obvious reasons (such as alti-tude) to doubt the story, but what was notable in this case were the captured tweets and Facebook entries from before the separatists realised what they had done; demonstrations that a BUK had been in the appropriate place; the analysis of the debris, which showed damage consistent with a BUK; and the comprehensive debunking of the Su-25 theory.48

The challenges to Russian claims made little difference in Russia. Here,

the information campaign was effective, reflected in a surge in Putins

popularity.49 The president rode a wave of nationalist sentiment, particu-larly with regard to the annexation of Crimea. While consolidating power

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in Moscow may not have been the prime objective of the campaign, Putin certainly took advantage of the situation to do so, with those worried about the economy losing out to those seeking to strengthen the state along tra-ditional lines.50 Yet a government which insists on fictional descriptions of situations can get caught out, in what Jeffrey Michaels has identified as a

discourse trap, whereby maintaining consistency with the fiction means

that it must be upheld even when the result is to push counterproductive policies.51 This had already created risks for the government. Nationalists were unnerved by possible betrayals of the separatists (a factor which may

have encouraged Putin in the more overt interven-tion), allegations which were sure to re-surface if the separate territories were in any way re-integrated into Ukraine. There were diplomatic costs as well.

When an interlocutor insists on an alternative reality it becomes hard to engage or to trust, making diplo-matic intercourse more difficult. This was one reason

for the poor relations between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Putin.

There was, however, one important sense in which the Russian prop-aganda effort was successful. This was in creating a sense of danger that

probably had an effect, albeit one that is hard to measure, in deterring the

West from supporting Ukraine as much as it might otherwise have done. This effort involved rhetorical threats, such as regular reminders of Russias

nuclear strength. Russias partners, Putin was reported saying in August as his forces were moving into Ukraine, should understand its best not to mess with us. He added a reminder that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.52 Exaggerated claims were made about the speed with which Russian nuclear forces could be modernised and replaced.53 There were suggestions of a new Russian doctrine that would re-establish NATO

as Russias primary threat and effectively set Russias defence policy toward

combating it.54 There were also staged incidents, such as the kidnapping of an Estonian officer and regular violations of Western airspace.55 By way of contrast to Russian bluster and braggadocio, Western commentary often accepted the foundations of this self-promotion at face value instead of

Propaganda created a sense of danger

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mounting a challenge. Russian boldness was often compared unfavoura-bly with the feebleness of Western support.56 While the hawks exaggerated Russian power, the doves showed sympathy for its stance, accepting that the origins of the crisis lay in Western expansionism rather than Ukrainian self-determination.57

The price Russia paid for the deterrence value of this additional menace

was a restructuring of the European security debate. More attention began

to be paid by NATO to tangible forms of reassurance to the Baltic states,

while neutrals such as Sweden and Finland got closer to the alliance. NATO

adopted a Readiness Action Plan to establish military bases in Eastern Europe and a rapid-response force to protect its members from Russian incursions. It also committed financial and material support to Ukraine

and promised to hold regular military exercises on its territory. If nothing else, NATO was provided with an answer to the question of what it needed

to worry about as it left Afghanistan. Energy-security issues were also on the agenda. There were claims that, in response, Russia would reduce its

dependence on Western markets by looking to Asia.58 But China was largely taking advantage of Russian weakness to achieve attractive deals on oil sup-plies, while Japan had also imposed sanctions.59 Over time, Russia would need to re-engage with the EU. The Russian foreign minister even floated

the idea of a new reset with the United States.60

In the run-up to NATOs Wales summit of early September 2014, which

took place at the same time as the ceasefire negotiations in Minsk, US President

Barack Obamas proposition that there could not be a military solution to the

Ukraine crisis was adopted as something of a mantra.61 The effect was to signal to both domestic audiences and Ukraine that NATO members were not going

to get militarily involved. Although Poroshenko had made an urgent appeal when he spoke to the US Congress in September for more military support, the limited $53m package he was offered, including radar, vehicles and body

armour, stopped short of providing weapons or other lethal aid. Despite pres-sure from Congress and within government, the White House was anxious to avoid a proxy war with Moscow.62 Combined with heavy combat losses, this may well have convinced Poroshenko not to continue to push back militarily against Russia and the separatists, and to accept a ceasefire.

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This mantra about there being no military solution was true, but also

missed the point. Wars are political struggles and therefore any solution will be marked by a political settlement. The military situation on the

ground, however, will hardly be irrelevant. Thus, Russias more forceful

intervention meant that when areas of control were supposedly frozen

under the Minsk agreement they were far more advantageous to the sepa-ratists than they would have been just a couple of weeks earlier. It did not, however, ensure a political solution that met Russias objectives. Limited wars can only conclude if both sides accept a new reality as preferable to the risks involved in trying to achieve an even better reality. There must be

a degree of compromise. Both must convince themselves that they can live with the outcome. After Minsk, Western capitals began to take the view that the worst of the crisis was over. This was too complacent. This limited war

had not been transformed into a frozen conflict along the lines of those in

Moldova and Georgia. The situation remained unstable. Russia had damaged, but not defeated,

Ukraine. By sticking to economic rather than military sanctions, NATO and

the EU had damaged, but not defeated, Russia. The crisis was not over,

because the future of Ukraine remained uncertain. This was largely because

the separatists could not accept the political logic of the Minsk agreement, which meant in practice that they would have to agree that they could not actually stay separate. Even if Russia held on to Crimea, recognised de facto if not de jure, Putin was left with the dilemma of accusations of betrayal if Donetsk and Luhansk were re-integrated into Ukraine and of loss of influence

over Ukraine if they were effectively to become part of Russia. The logic of the

situation was that the separatists would be sustained, and even push further into Ukraine, but without regular Russian units taking too prominent a role.

This indicates an important problem with hybrid warfare. Definitions

which assume unified political control overlook the most challenging aspect

of trying to bring together irregular forces, representing one set of politi-cal interests, and regular forces, representing another. It can be challenging enough to meld together different units of the same army for example,

special forces and infantry battalions but even more difficult where the

forces coming together not only have different military tasks and methods

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but also distinct command structures and diverging political interests. Even among the militia groups in Donetsk and Luhansk there were differences.

As conditions became harsher within those areas these differences were

likely to grow. Lines were already becoming blurred between politics and criminality.63 At the same time, Ukrainian forces had also seen awkward combinations of militias and regular forces.64

Russia sustained a weak position and boosted its bargaining position by conveying a readiness to escalate. This was a constant of Russian rheto-ric, including reference, on occasion, to nuclear capabilities. From the start there were menacing deployments of Russian forces along the border. The

menace was validated to a degree by the invasion of Ukrainian territory. The threat of escalation certainly had an effect

on Ukrainian calculations, reinforced by Kievs awareness of its own limited ability to escalate. While the Russian threats were not quite Potemkin

villages (in that they had real substance), they were still exaggerated. Similarly, rather than com-plain about sanctions Russians decried them as being against international rules, but of little consequence. This dismissal of sanctions, as with claims

that Russia could march with ease to Kiev, or turn off gas supplies without

a thought for the consequences, or pivot to China, could be challenged on

the basis of the underlying economic realities of its position. The gloomy

prognostications by many Western commentators about how Putin was determined to take on all neighbouring states in some ways boosted this aspect of Russian strategy, making the country appear more powerful than was actually the case.

Putins power play in Ukraine was impulsive and improvised, without any clear sense of the desired end state. In a wide-ranging speech in October

at Sochi, which was largely devoted to explaining how the US had been engaged in a foolish quest to dominate the world by breaking all interna-tional rules, Putin offered no long-term vision for Ukraine. He re-asserted

the case for self-determination for Crimea, but also claimed to support Ukraines territorial integrity and to be ready to make every effort to

ensure the implementation of the Minsk agreements. He also blamed the

Putin offered no long-term vision

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Ukrainian authorities for the violence, warned against using force to resolve the deadlock and told them to understand that there is no sense in holding on to some village or other this is pointless. Yet by the time of this speech the separatists had denounced the Minsk agreements. Putin was stuck with boosting them both militarily and politically, perhaps hoping that Kiev would eventually accept that it must negotiate on their terms.65 It would serve neither Ukraine nor Russia if Donetsk and Luhansk fell into disrepair

and disarray, adrift in some separatist limbo, but it was not clear that either had the capacity to provide a viable future. The separatists would not allow

these territories to be re-integrated into Ukraine, while Russia could not afford to annex them. Militarily, Russia could help the separatists expand

their area of control and use this to coerce and unsettle Ukraine. Politically

and economically, it had few good options.There was therefore still a risk of serious escalation. The Minsk agree-

ment was not being implemented. The border between the separatist areas

and Russia was left open and unmonitored, while those with Ukraine lacked any particular geographical or political logic that might allow them to be frozen and the fighting to be contained. The military clashes could

become more intense. While the economic situation might push Moscow to look for a deal, the sense of continuing crisis and the nationalism it engen-dered played to Putins domestic political agenda. But, if the conflict was

not resolved, economic sanctions would become embedded and there was a chance that Washington would have to reconsider its refusal to supply Ukraine with lethal equipment.

For its part, Ukraine was left struggling with a dire economic situation, aggravated by the costs of war, stuck with a demanding and unresolved military conflict, and divided internally, with a disaffected minority still

looking more to the east than the west. It would be dependent on the EU for regular financial support. Not much of a start had been made on dealing

with problems of chronic corruption and incompetence left over from the old regime. If Ukraine could not be strengthened economically, politically and militarily, which would require substantial contributions from the

West, the situation could return to the one before 2014, when it was hard to

imagine the country ever being in a fit state to join the EU.66

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1 Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, JuneJuly 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2014-4667/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-june-july-2014-3d8b/56-3-02-freedman-6162.

2 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ukraine: Situation Report No. 15 as of 10 October 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-situation-report-no-15-10-october-2014. These numbers include 298 casualties from Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. They depend on reports from official sources and medical establishments and are likely to be underestimates. Another report attributes civilian deaths to indiscriminate shelling of residential areas by both pro-Russian separat-ists and the Ukrainian armed forces. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 16 September 2014, p. 3, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHR_sixth_report_on_Ukraine.pdf.

3 See, for example, Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

4 This term was first coined in the late 1940s by the Hungarian communist leader Matyas Rakosi to explain the political process by which the Soviet Union gained control of Eastern Europe. The communists first organ-ised anti-fascist governments that would then shut down the parties to the right of them one by one, cutting them off like slices of salami, until only the end-piece of the Communist Party was left. It was therefore about the progressive exclusion of oppo-nents. Later in the Cold War the term tended to be used to refer to progres-sive but incremental victories. There is, however, one continuity here with the current Ukrainian crisis in the liberal use of the fascist label to dele-gitimise all other parties.

5 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965).

6 Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 52, 2009, pp. 349. For historical

The first stage of this crisis demonstrated poor crisis management. The

second stage proved that in a struggle over territory, superior force makes a difference. However, without popular support, along with economic and

administrative capacity, Russia would struggle to transform seized territory

into a viable political entity. After many months of effort, Russia had achieved

limited gains, but at high cost. The situation had yet to stabilise. In limited war

you dont always get what you want. Nor do you get much satisfaction.

Notes

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examples see Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (eds), Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

7 Frank Hoffman, On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats, War on the Rocks, 28 July 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-war-fare-vs-hybrid-threats/.

8 This is according to an interview with former Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. Ben Judah, Putins Coup: How the Russian Leader Used the Ukraine Crisis to Consolidate his Dictatorship, Politico Magazine, 19 October 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/vladimir-putins-coup-112025.html#ixzz3Gh3SNyUQ.

9 Odessa was of obvious importance as a regional capital. On 2 May there was a tragic incident in the city. After violent clashes between pro-Russian demonstrators and pro-unity support-ers, the separatists were overwhelmed and retreated to a trade-union build-ing, which was set on fire, possibly as a result of petrol bombs originally used by those inside the building. Thirty-two people died as a result. The incident aggravated already tense relations in southeastern Ukraine.

10 Novorossiya was originally a far larger area than that currently occu-pied by the separatists. It included what had been Ottoman territory conquered by Catherine the Great, including Odessa.

11 This was another term associated with the Cold War. It referred to the

post-war deal with the Soviet Union whereby Finland was able to adopt a democratic system and a market econ-omy in return for remaining friendly to the Soviet Union in its foreign policy. It became a term of abuse, ini-tially in Germany, employed against those who seemed to be ready to give Moscow a veto over foreign policy in return for a quiet life. Richard Milne, Finlandisation Makes a Polarising Comeback in Finland, Financial Times, 24 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cbb17c76-435c-11e4-be3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube.

12 Anna Dolgov, Russia Sees Need to Protect Russian Speakers in NATO Baltic States, Moscow Times, 16 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-sees-need-to-protect-russian-speakers-in-nato-baltic-states/507188.html.

13 Justin Huggler, Putin Privately Threatened to Invade Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, Daily Telegraph, 19 September 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11106195/Putin-privately-threatened-to-invade-Poland-Romania-and-the-Baltic-states.html.

14 This was a speech of late January 2013 to the annual general meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences on The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the Defense of the Country in Correspondence with the New Statute about the General Staff Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation. See Sam Jones, Ukraine: Russias New Art

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of War, Financial Times, 28 August 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube; and Paul Goble, Putins Actions in Ukraine Following Script by Russian General Staff a Year Ago, Interpreter, 20 June 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/putins-actions-in-ukraine-following-script-by-russian-general-staff-a-year-ago/.

15 The referendums were held on 11 May 2014. They took place after Putin had asked that they be post-poned. It was claimed that 2,252,867 had voted in favour of self-rule, with 256,040 against, on a turnout of nearly 75%. The 89% yes vote was in line with what had apparently been suggested in an intercepted call with the organisers and a Russian politician, but out of line with recent opinion polling in the region. See Ukraine Rebels Hold Referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk, BBC, 11 May 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27360146; SBU Audio Links Donetsk Republic to Russian Involvement, Ukrainian Policy, http://ukrainianpolicy.com/sbu-audio-links-donetsk-republic-to-russian-involvement/.

16 For a vivid account see Mumin Shakirovs interview with Artur Gasparyan, an Armenian fighting for the separatists: I was a Separatist Fighter in Ukraine, Guardian, 15 July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/separatist-fighter-russia-east-ern-ukraine-interview. According to Gasparyan, only some 20% of the separatist militia were Ukrainian.

17 Andrew E. Kramer, Plenty of Room at the Top of Ukraines Fading

Rebellion, New York Times, 19 August 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/world/europe/plenty-of-room-at-the-top-of-ukraines-fading-rebellion.html.

18 One allegation was that a purpose of the convoy was to extract from Ukraine material from defence plants necessary for Russian defence produc-tion. See Reuben Johnson, Russian Aid Convoy Committed Wide-scale Looting, Says Ukraine, IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 27 August 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/42444/russian-aid-convoy-committed-wide-scale-looting-says-ukraine.

19 Adrian Croft, More Than 1,000 Russian Troops Operating in Ukraine: NATO, Reuters, 28 August 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/us-ukraine-cri-sis-nato-idUSKBN0GS1D220140828. The prime minister of the Donetsk Peoples Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, reported before Russian troops engaged fully that 1,200 fighters had trained in Russia for four months, had crossed into Ukraine and were ready to fight, sup-ported by 30 tanks and 120 armoured vehicles. He later retracted this statement. (Roman Olearchyk and Courtney Weaver, Separatist Leader Boasts of Fresh Tanks and Trained Troops from Russia, Financial Times, 16 August 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/10867312-2560-11e4-af2c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3IBpHHde8.) He told Russian media in late August that among the 3,0004,000 Russian citizens fighting with the separat-ists were fighting serving soldiers, who would rather take their vacation

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not on a beach but with us, among brothers. Serving Russian Soldiers On Leave Fighting Ukrainian Troops Alongside Rebels, Pro-Russian Separatist Leader Says, Telegraph, 28 August 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/11060559/Serving-Russian-soldiers-on-leave-fighting-Ukrainian-troops-alongside-rebels-pro-Russian-separatist-leader-says.html.

20 Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on Ukraines Challenges, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2014, http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/conversation-arseniy-yatsenyuk/p33512?cid.

21 Lucian Kim, Ukraines Slow Descent into Madness, Slate, 23 October 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/10/petro_poroshenko_is_facing_rebels_and_growing_discontent_can_the_ukrainian.html.

22 Ukraine Deal with Pro-Russian Rebels at Minsk Talks, BBC, 20 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29290246.

23 Ukraine Crisis: Nato Sees Significant Russian Troop Pullback, BBC, 24 September 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29342463; Adrian Croft, Russia Still Has Troops in Ukraine, NATO Says, Reuters, 24 October 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/uk-ukraine-cri-sis-nato-idUKKCN0ID0V120141024; Michael R. Gordon and Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Continues to Train and Equip Ukraine Rebels, NATO

Official Says, New York Times, 3 November 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/world/europe/donestk-luhansk-ukraine-vote-zakharchenko-plotnitsky.html.

24 Ukraine Says 2,000 Russian Servicemen Killed in Ukraine Conflict, Reuters, 5 September 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/05/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-casualties-idUKKBN0H00VY20140905. This seems too high. There are, for obvi-ous reasons, no authoritative Russian figures.

25 Terrence McCoy, What Does Russia Tell the Mothers of Soldiers Killed in Ukraine? Not Much, Washington Post, 29 August 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/29/what-does-russia-tell-the-mothers-of-soldiers-killed-in-ukraine-not-much/.

26 Russian Sanctions Could Be Eased Soon if Ukraine Progress Made: U.S. Adviser, Reuters, 10 October 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/10/uk-ukraine-crisis-blinken-idUKKCN0HZ1NF20141010. The link with Crimea was less clear.

27 Russia Risks Recession After Economic Sanctions Over Ukraine Crisis, International Business Times, 26 September 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-risks-recession-after-economic-sanctions-over-ukraine-crisis-1695692; Paul Roderick Gregory, Western Sanctions And Rising Debts Are Already Strangling the Russian Economy, Forbes, 28 August 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/08/28/

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western-sanctions-and-rising-debts-are-already-strangling-the-russian-economy/.

28 For data on the dependence of individual European countries on Russian energy, see this New York Times chart, updated on 2 September 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/21/world/europe/how-much-europe-depends-on-rus-sian-energy.html?_r=1.

29 The EU brokered a temporary deal between Russia and Ukraine at the end of October 2014. Edward C. Chow, RussiaUkraine Gas Deal Another Last-Minute Special, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2014, http://csis.org/publication/russia-ukraine-gas-deal-another-last-minute-special.

30 Crimea Seeks Billions From Moscow to Aid Investment Projects, Moscow Times, 15 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/advertorials/business/Crimea-Seeks-Billions-From-Moscow-to-Aid-Investment-Projects/.

31 Ukraines Election: Good Voters, Not Such Good Guys, Economist, 1 November 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21629375-poll-results-were-promising-future-ukraine-dauntingly-difficult-good-voters?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1b-c9821ebe173f4f0f060a07. It is notable that turnout was lower in the east compared with the west (only 32% in the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas).

32 Fight Club, Economist, 11 October 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21623767-after-war-was-not-

war-ceasefire-not-ceasefire-fight-club.33 Roland Oliphant, Ukraine Peace Plan

Blow As Rebels Reject Donetsk and Luhansk Autonomy Deal, Telegraph, 17 October 2014, http://www.tele-graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11169790/Ukraine-peace-plan-blow-as-rebels-reject-Donetsk-and-Luhansk-autonomy-deal.html. Zakharchenko observed on 18 October that we can no longer live in one state with Ukraine. Most likely, we will stay unrecognized. One [sic] the one hand, this seems bad. On the other hand, it is very good for the economy. Being unrecognized means more money. This means no interna-tional obligations. Donetsk Peoples Republic Likely to Remain Formally Unrecognized: DPR Prime Minister, RIA Novosti, 18 October 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20141018/194260010/Donetsk-Peoples-Republic-Likely-to-Remain-Formally-Unrecognized.html.

34 Donetsk Forces Plan to Retake Slaviansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, RIA Novosti, 23 October 2014, http://en.ria.ru/world/20141023/194479030/Donetsk-Forces-Plan-to-Retake-Slaviansk-Kramatorsk-Mariupol.html.

35 This was confirmed by the OSCE, which was supposedly charged with monitoring the implementa-tion of the Minsk agreement. (See OSCE, So-called Elections Not In Line With Minsk Protocol, Says OSCE Chair, Calling for Enhanced Efforts and Dialogue to Implement all Commitments, 31 October 2014, http://www.osce.org/cio/126242.) But the OSCE did not monitor the elections. Under the aegis of some-thing mischievously described as

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the Association of Security and Cooperation in Europe, a number of extremist politicians (from right and left) validated the election. Before they took place, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had declared the results important for legitimizing the author-ity of the separatist governments, and promised to recognize their results. David M. Herszenhorn and Andrew Roth, Russia Backs Plan by Ukraine Separatists for an Early Election, New York Times, 20 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/world/europe/vote-set-by-ukraine-separat-ists-wins-russias-support.html?_r=0.

36 Ukraine Crisis: President Poroshenkos Threat After Rebel Polls, BBC, 4 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29891556.

37 Lizzy Davies, Vladimir Putin Under Pressure to Denounce Rival Elections in Ukraine, Guardian, 17 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/17/vladimir-putin-elec-tions-ukraine-eu-leaders-minsk-peace.

38 A poll carried out in September 2014 by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) showed that Ukrainians remained evenly divided on whether a military (40%) or a nego-tiated solution (41%) was preferable. Ukraines Election: Springboard for Change?, IISS Strategic Comments, 13 October 2014, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/sections/2014-a6f5/ukraine--39-s-elec-tion--springboard-for-change-98fc.

39 Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EUUkraine AA/DCFTA, Brussels, 12 September 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-

release_STATEMENT-14-276_en.htm.40 Peter Spiegel, Putin Demands

Reopening of EU Trade Pact with Ukraine, Financial Times, 25 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4de51ae-44ca-11e4-9a5a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube.

41 In 1787, when Empress Catherine II visited Crimea after a devastating war, the regions governor, Grigory Potemkin, sought to create an errone-ous impression of a vibrant settlement. This was achieved by fabricating vil-lages on the banks of the Dnieper, populated by Potemkins men. These would exist for only as long as it took for the empresss barge to pass by; they would then be dismantled to be reconstructed further down the river. While this story may well be apocry-phal, its essence has been a feature of Russian practice, even during the Cold War, to hide weakness by seeking to create an impression of strength.

42 Editorial: Russias New Tactics of War Shouldnt Fool Anyone, Washington Post, 27 August 2014, http://www.abreakingnews.com/politics/editorial-russias-new-tactics-of-war-shouldnt-fool-anyone-h215531.html.

43 Timothy Snyder, To Understand Putin, Read Orwell, Politico Magazine, 3 September 2014, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/to-understand-putin-read-orwell-110551.html#ixzz3CRAeoF4D.

44 As Peter Pomerantsev put it, Nobody who lives in that part of the world today ever thought of themselves as living in Novorossiya and bearing allegiance to it at least until several months ago. Now, Novorossiya is being imagined into

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being: Russian media are show-ing maps of its geography, while Kremlin-backed politicians are writing its history into school text-books. Peter Pomerantsev, Russia and the Menace of Unreality: How Vladimir Putin is Revolutionizing Information Warfare, Atlantic, 9 September 2014, http://www.theatlan-tic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-putin-revolutionizing-informa-tion-warfare/379880/2/.

45 Max Seddon, Documents Show How Russias Troll Army Hit America, BuzzFeed News, 2 June 2014, http://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america#20lrfq1.

46 The defection of some of RTs reporters to the West, and the absurd nature of some of its claims, did little for its cred-ibility (although it is important to note that in some parts of Europe, Russian media sources are widely used).

47 In response to the capture of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, the official line was that they were there by accident. Captured Russian Troops in Ukraine by Accident, BBC News, 26 August 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28934213.

48 Before the crash was announced, separatist leader Igor Girkin claimed we just downed a plane, an AN-26 We have issued warnings not to fly in our airspace. Ukraine Separatist Social Media Site Claims Plane Downing, Radio Free Europe, 17 July 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-separatist-leader-boasts-downing-plane/25460930.html. (A Ukrainian AN-26 transport had been shot down by a Russian

surface-to-air missile on 26 July.) Shortly afterwards, Ukrainian intel-ligence released a radio intercept of conversations between separatists, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw. On 9 September 2014, the Dutch Safety Board released its report on the down-ing of the airliner. The report ruled out technical failure, and cited evi-dence that the aircraft was penetrated by a large number of high-energy objects which originated from outside the fuselage. The report con-cluded that the aircraft broke up in mid-air; before this happened, there were no communications from the pilot or crew to suggest that there were any problems with the flight. All this accorded with a sudden and catastrophic event, consistent with the jet being destroyed by an advanced surface-to-air missile such as a BUK. See Dutch Safety Board, Preliminary Report: Crash Involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 Flight MH17, Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014, September 2014, http://www.onder-zoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/701/b3923acad0ceprem-rapport-mh-17-en-interactief.pdf. German intelligence was said to have concluded that the aircraft was shot down by separatists. See Deadly Ukraine Crash: German Intelligence Claims Pro-Russian Separatists Downed MH17, Spiegel Online International, 19 October 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-intelligence-blames-pro-russian-separatists-for-mh17-downing-a-997972.html#spRedirectedFrom=www&referrrer=http://t.co/2DhGqtZE4J.

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49 Thomas Sherlock, Putins Public Opinion Challenge, National Interest, 21 August 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/putins-public-opinion-challenge-11113. Polls showed high support for Putin at 87%, but also wariness about a prolonged conflict in Ukraine and concern about economic prospects. His approval rating rose to 86 percent in September from 65 per-cent in January, according to pollster Levada Center, which surveyed 1,600 people across Russia over four days.

50 Judah, Putins Coup. 51 Jeffrey Michaels, Shock and Flawed: The

Discourse Trap from the War on Terror to the Surge (London: Palgrave, 2013).

52 Tom Parfitt, Ukraine Crisis: Putins Nuclear Threats are a Struggle for Pride and Status, Telegraph, 29 August 2014, http://www.tele-graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11064978/Ukraine-crisis-Putins-nuclear-threats-are-a-struggle-for-pride-and-status.html.

53 Alexander Goltis, Russias Nuclear Euphoria Ignores Reality, Moscow Times, 6 October 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/advertorials/opinion/Russia-s-Nuclear-Euphoria-Ignores-Reality/.

54 One issue was whether the new doctrine would discuss pre-emptive nuclear strikes. Matthew Bodner, Russia Hardens Military Thinking as NATO Fizzes Over Ukraine, Moscow Times, 7 September 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-hardens-military-thinking-as-nato-fizzes-over-ukraine/506570.html.

55 Mark Galeotti, Estonian Kidnap Is Russias Latest Provocation, Moscow Times, 11 September 2014, http://www.

themoscowtimes.com/advertorials/opinion/Estonian-Kidnap-Is-Russia-s-Latest-Provocation/. See also Ott Ummelas and Bryan Bradley, Lithuania Says Russia Seized Ship as Baltic Tensions Grow, Bloomberg, 19 September 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-19/lithuania-says-russia-seized-ship-as-baltic-tensions-grow.html; Nato Reports Rise in Russia Military Flights Over Europe, BBC, 29 October 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29825890. NATO reported that it had intercepted Russian aircraft more than 100 times so far this year three times more than it did last year.

56 Elizabeth Pond, The End of Deterrence? Ukraine Is At the Mercy of Moscow Now, the West is Watching Helplessly, IP Journal, 23 September 2014, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/eye-europe/end-deterrence.

57 John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the Wests Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, SeptemberOctober 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault. See replies by Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich in the NovemberDecember issue (Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul-ste-phen-sestanovich-john-j-mearsheimer/faulty-powers.)

58 According to Sergey Karaganov, Western strategy misunderstood the extent to which the struggle was about stopping others expanding their sphere of control into territories

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they believe are vital to Russias sur-vival, and also the extent to which Russia is far stronger, and the west far weaker, than many imagine. Western Delusions Triggered This Conflict and Russians Will Not Yield, Financial Times, 14 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/05770494-3a93-11e4-bd08-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube.

59 On May 21, Mr Putin suddenly reversed a decade of resistance and caved in to Chinese demands for a lower gas price, accepting $350 per thousand cubic metres. That is 42 per cent less than the price Lithuania pays so low that it risks depressing natural gas prices throughout the Far East, including for future Russian sales to Japan. MatthewBryza, Call Putins Bluff He Will Not Cut off Europes Gas, Financial Times, 1 September 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c03b931a-31c6-11e4-a19b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GsEd4ube. On Chinese caution when it comes to doing deals with Russia, see Jack Farchy and Kathrin Hille, Chinese Lenders Grow Wary of Russian Embrace, Financial Times, 13 October 2014. The $25 billion prepayment for gas agreed in May was still said by Gazprom to be hanging in the bal-ance as of mid-October.

60 Russia Says Relations with US Need New Reset, Hurriyet Daily News, 28 September 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-says-relations-with-us-need-new-reset.aspx?pageID=238&nid=72262.

61 Speaking in Estonia on 3 September, President Obama said: Since ulti-mately theres no military solution to

this crisis, we will continue to sup-port President Poroshenkos efforts to achieve peace because, like all independent nations, Ukraine must be free to decide its own destiny. Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia, Tallinn, Estonia, 3 September 2014, http://www.white-house.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia. While supporting sanctions, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Germany will certainly not deliver weapons, as this would give the impression that this is a conflict that can be solved militar-ily. Andrew Higgins and Neil MacFarquhar, Ukraine President Says Europes Security Depends on Stopping Russia, New York Times, 30 August 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/europe/russia-pushing-ukraine-conflict-to-point-of-no-return-eu-leader-says.html.

62 Philip Shishkin and Jeffrey Sparshott, Ukraine to Get More U.S. Aid, but Not Weapons, Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-leader-calls-for-more-western-military-aid-1411055160.

63 Mark Galeotti, Crime and Crimea: Criminals As Allies and Agents, RFE/RL, 3 November 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/crimea-crime-crimi-nals-as-agents-allies/26671923.html.

64 An example here is the paramilitary Azov Battalion, which is linked to the Right Sector in Ukraine and was involved in the defence of Mariupol. Alec Luhn, Preparing for War with Ukraines Fascist Defenders of Freedom, Foreign Policy, 30 August 2014, Http://www.foreign-

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policy.com/articles/2014/08/30/Preparing_For_War_With_Ukraine_S_Fascist_Defenders_Of_Freedom.

65 Speech by President Vladimir Putin, Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, 24 October 2014, http://eng.Kremlin.ru/news/23137. On economic sanctions he stated: We know how these decisions were taken and who was applying the pressure. But let me stress that Russia is not going to get all worked up, get offended or come begging at anyones door.

66 On the importance of strengthening Ukraine, including with further cash injections, see George Soros,

Wake Up, Europe, New York Review of Books, 20 November 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/wake-up-europe/. See also Steven Mufson, Ukraines Economy Choking Under Russian Pressure but Western Help is Scarce, Washington Post, 15 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ukraines- economy-choking-under-russian-pressure-but-western-help-is-scarce/2014/10/15/d983dbfc-4fc6-11e4-babe-e91da079cb8a_story.html.

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