Umma the Idea of a Universal Community

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UMMA: THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL COMMUNITY

Author(s): MANZOORUDDIN AHMEDReviewed work(s):Source: Islamic Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (SPRING 1975), pp. 27-54Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, IslamabadStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20846935 .

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UMMA:THE IDEAOF AUNIVERSALCOMMUNITY

MANZOORUDDIN AHMED

The Umma constitutes one of the key political concepts of the

Qur'an. In this article we propose to investigate the origin, development in itsformative

phase (prophetic period),and theoretical

implicationsof this concept. In a later section we shall also survey the efforts of

theMuslim thinkers of contemporary Islam to re-interpret the idea of

umma in the context of modern age. At the end we shall also try to

present a theoretical reconstruction of the concept of umma as the basic

concept of a genuinely Islamic political theory.

Umma and itsQur'anic Origin

The examination of the pre-Islamic usage of the term umma would

show that itwas not used in the technical sense inwhich itgradually came

to be used in the text of theQur'an for describing the newly emerging

social unity atMadlna. Itwas difficult to distinguish itfrom other Arabic

words which were current at that time, such as qawm, milla, din, tariqa,

jama'a and sha'b. It seems that in the earlier Meccan suras the word

is used synonymously with all these terms in a rather loose sense, but

gradually towards the laterMedinan period, all these terms are used in

specific technical sense, and theirmeanings can be fixed in the light of the

development of theirusage in theQur'an itself. Itmay thus be concluded

that the termumma was applied to thenewly emerging community of Islam

atMadina.

Of all the Qur'anic usages of the term umma, the expressions of

umma wdhida (a single faith), umma wasfa (midmost community) and

umma muslima (submissive community) clearly bring out the origin, ideo

logical orientation and character of the community.

TheTheory fUmma

The theoretical foundations of the umma were provided by the

Islamic theory of tawbid (monotheism). The expressions umma muslima

and umma wdhida clearly imply that islam (submission, surrender) and



28 MANZOORUDDIN AHMED

wafida (unity) are the two most important foundations of the umma and

both of these concepts are interrelated theoretically.

In order to discover the philosophical foundations of the umma, it

would be necessary for us to investigate the Islamic view of the cosmos

as the starting point for building a genuine theory of umma. According

to Islam man's life on the earth is gqverned simultaneously by two sets

of laws, namely natural laws (sunnat Allah orfifrat Allah) and moral laws

(sharVa.).The purpose of Islam is to create a moral order out of the existing

moral chaos by inviting themisguided ones to surrender themselves to thewill of God. The resultantmoral order becomes the foundation stone of

the umma. The umma represents the original collectivity of thebelievers.

The individual believers after having surrendered their wil's toGod

Almighty through a process in Iman commit themselves to obey God's

Messenger. The prophet becomes the focal point of the collective bodyof believers, and this body is called umma.

The Umma and theSocial Contract Theory

The idea of contract permeates the basic concepts of Islam. The

terms such as 'ahd (covenant), mithaq (compact) recur frequently in the

text of theQur'an and have definite socio-political connotations. Simi

larly, the terms like hay'a (oath of allegiance), and 'aqd (contract) recur

in the writings of Muslim Jurists on the constitutional law of Islam. It

will not be wrong to assert that the basic theological, legal, social, and

political concepts are founded in the idea of contract. The bay6a is the

form of contract by which the individual believer accepts the obligation

to obey the prophet ofGod. When the individuals accept the leadershipof theprophet, the umma is born. The moral order inherent in thepsychic

process of transformation of the belief system of individuals takes on a

collective form, and is concretized in the form of umma. The Arabian

tribes by accepting Islam, and by owing allegiance to prophet Muhammad

fused themselves together in the emerging umma. The prophetic contract

was really a social contract which brought about the sociological trans

formation of the tribal structure into a supratribal communal unity. The

caliphal contract was a form of governmental contract by which the umma

was politically organized into a state.

Umma and theProphetic Traditions

Whereas the divine laws provide a code of moral and behavioural



UMMA 29

norms, the sunna of theprophet represents concretization of these normsinactual life, nd thebasic source of sunna are the traditions of theProphet.

The Prophet demonstrated by his own behaviour how to preserve the psy

chological and behavioural cohesion of the umma Since the theocratic

umma of the Prophet was now transformed into a state by organizing the

central authority, therefore, the unity and cohesion of the umma was to

be endorsed by the khalifa. In thismanner, we do observe that umifia

and khilafa were integrated together as inseparable from each other. The

infallibility of the community is clearly brought out in themost famous

prophetic tradition; My umma will never agree on an error. It is on thebasis of this tradition that later thefuqahS attached much importance to

the principle of ijma' (consensus) as a fundamental source ofMuslim law.

After the death of the prophet therewere left behind two legacies of the

prophet's period, namely the umma and the Qur'an and sunna. The

concept of ijma1 of the ummay therefore, became an integral part of the

legal and political structure.

The universal character of the umma in fact distinguishes it from

other kinds of communities. The universalism of the umma is also clearlyreflected in the traditions of the prophet.

Although traditions generally deprecate tribal prejudices and

command respect for piety and religion, yet we do find many traditions

of the prophet which do approve respect for theArab race. This bringsout the underlying contradiction between universalistic ideology of Islam

and racist appeal toArab leadership of the umma. (This raises a serious

question concerning the authenticity of these traditions). It seems that

theexpansion

of the ummabeyond

thegeographical

limits of Arabia

brought it face to face with the non-Arab elements and created social

cleavages between two different sets of people.

UMMA: THE FORMATIVE PHASE

(ThePropheticPeriod)

Born in theHashimite clan of theQuraysh atMecca, Muhammad

startedreceiving

divine revelation at theage

offorty

around 610 A.D.

For about three years he continued to preach Islam secretly. Itwas onlyin 613 A.D., that he started public preaching atMecca. In the beginningno influentialMeccan Quraysh took any notice of his new message; and

he continued to enjoy the protection of his clan under the leadership of




*Abd al-Muttalflx But soon after the divine revelations directly attackedtheprevailing social, cultural and religious lifeof theMeccans, theQuraysh

leaders ofMecca realized the dangerous potentialities of the new message

of Islam which was in fact aimed at not only changing the religious beliefs

of their ancestors but also seemed to be directed at bringing about a major

social revolution in their traditional way of life.1 Therefore, the leaders

of Mecca with Abu Lahab as most prominent among them, organized

opposition and boycott of the new religion. The opposition and boycott

continued to be more stringent and hostile as the timepassed on, and made

lifeuncomfortable for theprophet and his followers. Prophet Muhammad

was not successful to evoke any widespread response to his divine message

among theQurayshites; and he was able to convert only a small number

of people from among them; and his followers generally came from the

lower rungs of the social strata of Mecca. Few individuals of eminence

likeAbu Bakr, 'Uthman, and 'Umar were exceptions. Frustrated with the

continuing hostilities of the Meccan Qurayshites, the Prophet turned his

attention towards the tribes of the neighbouring towns, but there also he

was met with opposition. Under these circumstances, prophet Muhammad

asked his followers to migrate to Abyssinia,2 and seek protection of its

Christian monarch who was sympathetic towards the new religion. This

decision of prophet Muhammad only confirms the view that prophetic

message was essentially universal in its appeal. Prophet Muhammad was

not reluctant tomove to a non-Arab environment for preaching his new

religion. This was a period of finding a territorial base for Islam.

At this time, the situation at Madma, a neighbouring agriculturaltown was charged with tribal tensions between theAws and theKhazraj

tribes on one hand, and between them and the Jewish communities of thetown.3 The political conditions of this town were favourable for the

emergence some kind of central authority; and leaders ofMadma were

struggling to establish their authority. Such was the case with one Ubayy

who was manipulating to establish his kingship. However, theAws and

theKhazraj leaders were not willing to subject themselves to anymonarch.

Therefore, theywere inclined to accept prophet Muhammad as the arbitra

tor of their tribal feuds, but theywould have not accepted any one as

the king. Prophet Muhammad had been proclaiming that he was himself

an humble slave ofGod Almighty, and itwas only He who has sovereigntyover the entire Universe as its creator and nourisher. Their faith in

Muhammad was reinforced because of the belief that he was theMessen

ger of God, and basically the function of the prophet was to judge



UMMA 31

according to divine laws. Perhaps, theMedinesc might have heard fromtheir Jewish compatriots that such a prophet was expected to appear. For

these reasons, a group of people consisting of men fromKhazraj tribe,visited Mecca during annual pilgrimage, and met with the prophet, and

embraced Islam.4 The following year a larger group of men consistingof bothKhazraj andAws tribes rrived nMecca during hepilgrimage.These man exercised bay'a of loyalty on the hands of the prophet, and

embraced Islam. Prophet Muhammad attached with them Mu?'ab b.

'Umayr as their instructor in Islamic teachings. This bay'a was called

bay'at al-nisff as it did not stipulate any defensive understanding as

yet. This whole affair is described by the historians as al-Aqabat al-Ula.5

('Aqaba I). According to this bay'a thesemen undertook to follow the

basic religious tenents of Islam in their life, such as eschewing any belief

inpartnershipfAllah, theft,illing f their hildren tc. Thiswas the

first stage towards the creation of the umma of theMuslims at Madlna,

and it implied a commitment of theMadinese leaders to follow the Islamic

ideology. The next year, still larger group of men from the Aws and

Khazraj tribes came in order to follow up the earlier agreements. Thisaffair is known as al-Aqabat al-thaniya ('Aqaba II). In all seventy three

men and women from among theMadinese tribes exercised their bay'a

(allegiance) on the hands of the prophet and undertook to extend their

protection to theprophet, and his followers.6 The emphasis was on de

fensive alliance, and for thiswas reason, this called bay*at al-harb. This was

in fact a kind of defensive alliance based on the old Arabian customary

law of hilf (alliance). In such a manner, ideological unity and defensive

alliance systemwere integrated together and the way was paved for the

creation of umma atMadlna.

The third stage in the building up of the umma atMadlna was the

migration ofMuhajirun (Muslim migrants ofMecca) toMadlna as a pre

lude to the final migration of the prophet hismelf.7 The followers of

prophet Muhammad started migrating to Medina in groups, and the

prophethimselfwaited forthe divine revelation o bid himmigrate to

Madlna. Finally it came through, and he migrated toMadlna accorr>

panied by his close associateAbu Bakr leaving All inhis bed. In the

meanwhile, the Qurayshite opponents of Islam and Muhammad were

hatching plot tokillhim. However, they ouldnot do so becausehe

had already eft orMadlna.* With themigration f the eccanMuslims

and the prophet toMadlna, Islam got a new base of operation against




theMeccan Quraysh; and itwas atMadlna, the prophet Muhammad laidthe foundations of the umma.

On arriving at Madlna, prophet Muhammad turned his attention

to the problem of integrating the two different segments of theMuslims,

namely theAn?ars (Helpers) and the Muhajirun (Migrants). In order to

achieve this objective, he initiated the process ofwhat has been described

by early historians as brothering (muwakhat)*. The process of fraterni

zation involved a mutual sharing of movable and immovable properties,

wives, and other things. This was the tremendous sacrifice on the part oftheAn?arswhowerewillingto shareevery hing hatthey adwith theirbrothers in Islam who had migrated fromMecca.to This phase was in factan ideal example of living together in a state of primitive communism.

Thus prophet Muhammad created a brotherhood of Islam which provideda nucleus to grow into an umma localized inMadlna. The umma founded

on the basis of brotherhood, equality and social justice atMadlna was to

become a model.

This local community grew into a full-fledgedArab community asthe tribal anarchy was transformed into an Arab confederacy of tribes

which was ultimately destined to develop into a supra-tribal community.The local community could develop into such a widespread communityfora numberof factors i) prophetskilfullytilized theexisting ribalrules of bilfu,jiwar,i2 and mawaln* in order to forge a new tribal con

federacy which was preceded only by the earlier pre-Islamic tribal confed

eracy nown s hilf l udtil; (ii) the owerfulnstrumentf Islamic deologybased on unmitigated monotheism, discipline, and social unity; (iv)

propagation of Islam through preaching (da'wa); and (v) by waging relentless ideological war (jihad) against the recalcitrantArab tribes. At Madina

Muhammad found three different types of tribes (i) theMeccan muhajirun

(migrants); (ii) newly converted An?ars ofMadina belonging toAws and

Khazraj tribes; nd (iii) Jewish ribes. The immediate askof theprophet was tobring about integration of these elements in order to consolidate

the internal politics ofMadina, and then turn towards the hostile Meccan

Quraysh. In order to achieve this objective, prophet Muhammad pro

ceeded towork out an all round political understanding among these hete

rogeneous elements. He was able to conclude a series of 'compacts'

among these differing elements. The first 'compact' was concluded bet

ween the Muhajirun (migrants) and the Muslim Ansar. The second

compact was concluded between theMuslims and the Jews. These docu



UMMA 33

merits have been preserved by early historians, and have been subjectsof much speculations.!4 Some have interpreted it to be something like

a constitution of the new state of Madlna;15 others have considered it

simply as a treaty;16 still others have thought of it as a sort of social

contract. Whatever may be the nature of these documents, one thingseems to be quite clear that these documents were in fact logical continua

tion of the understandings which were concluded between theAnsars and

the prophet at 'Aqaba I and 'Aqaba II. Prophet decided to write down

a comprehensive document inwhich the basic clauses of agreements were

elaborated clearly for future reference. A closer examination of the

documents would indicate that the terms of agreement were not in the

nature of a constitution of a state, although theremight be some justifi

cation in thinking that at least the document was more or less in the nature

of a treatywhich did create a new tribal confederacy at Madlna in the

face of active and hostile posture ofMeccan Quraysh. The two documents

whether theywere integral parts of the same understanding or not must

be read separately in order to put a logical construction. The first (com

pact)between the

migrantsand theAnsars

(helpers)reads as follows :

In the name ofGod, theMerciful, the Compessionate. This

writing of Muhammad the prophet between the believers

and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who follow

them and are attached to them and who crusade (Jdkadff)

along with them, i7

1. They are a single community (umma) distinct from (other)

people. Here themigrants and the helpers together constituted them

selves into a single community. The expression umma wdhida** has notbeen used without reason since it is theQur'anic termwhich describes the

new community. They constituted a single community because theybelieved in one God, and His prophet, Muhammad. Thereofre, here

the term umma is used in the sense of ideologically united group of people,and in this sense theMuslims were distinct from other communities of

Madina both pagans and Jews.

The substantive clauses from 2 to 11 concern regulation of tribal

rules in relation toblood-money,

and ransomapplicable

to both theQur

aysh and theAnsars The clause 12 stipulates "A beliver does not takeas confederatehalif) theclient (mawld)of a believerwithouthis (thelatter's) consent". The following clause guarantees against internalsubversion from those elements who plot against the believers. Perhaps




here reference is to the mundfiqun (hypocrites). In Article 14, there isa general provision: "A believer does not kill a believer because of an

unbeliever, and does not help an unbeliever against a believer". The

clauses from 15 to 20 concern the new defensive arrangements againsttheMeccan Quraysh. The article 15 refers to the sanctity of neighbourly

protection (Yujir) as binding on the believers since "The security ofGod

is one", and further stipulates,'the believers are patrons (clients ormawdli)

of one another to the exclusion of (other) people". The clause 15 covers

the Jews as well in the new alliance. The provision 17 ismost crucial

because it clearly brings out the defensive character of the compact itself

insofar as it stipulates,'The peace (silm) of the believers is erne". In

article 23, it is provided that in case of difference of opinion concerning

the interpretation of the provisions, thematter is to be referred toGod

and toMuhammad.19

The latter part of the document, perhaps, constitutes a separate

treaty by itself, and in this connection, Montgomery Watt's arguments

are convincing and weighty.20 The article 25 reads as follows :?

The Jews of Eanu 'Awf are a community (umma) along with

the believers. To the Jews their religion (din) and to the

Muslims their religion.

In the above clause, again, reference ismade to umma but in a rather

different context. Firstly, here umma refers to a new grouping between

the Muslims and the Jews for defensive purposes only; secondly, the

expression umma is not qualified as was the case with the earlier provision

(article 1), and its implication cannot be ignored in interpreting it. In

other words, the believers and the Jews form a community among them

selves for certain purposes, but still they did not constitute umma wdhida

(single community). This interpretation clearly establishes that here

umma is not used in the sense of community of faith. Thirdly, later the

point has been further clarified by providing. "Jews to their religion (din)and to theMuslims their religion".21 In other words, insofar as religion

(din) is concerned, both Muslims and Jews are different from each other,

but for the purpose of common defense against external threats, they can

mutually

form themselves together into a

community.

Thus we discover

that the term umma has been used in two different senses in the two partsof the document: (i) in the earlier part it is used in the specific sense

of a religious community of the believers; and (ii) in the latter part,it is used ina general sense of a confederal community or a defensive alliance



UMMA 35

system. The latter has definitely some political implications; that is tosay forpolitical and defensive purposes, Muslims can enter into confederal,

federal, or defensive alliances with the non-Muslims, particularly the

ahl al-kitab (people of the book).

All these arrangements were made by prophet Muhammad as a

preliminary step towards an all-out effort to fight against the kuffdr (un

believers) ofMecca. 2 2God had already permitted towage holy war {Jihad)

against those unbelievers ofMecca who had forced themuhajirun including

Muhammad to leave their homes and hearths at Mecca. The Qur'andeclared:2 3

Sanction isgiven unto those who fightbecause theyhave been

wronged and Allah is indeed able to give them victory.Those have been driven from their homes unjustly only

because they said, "Our Lord isAllah"; for had itnot been

forAllah's repelling some men by means of others, cloisters

and churches and oratories and mosques, wherein the name

of Allah is mentioned, would assuredly have been pulled

down.

The sanction to wage fighting against the infidelswas a collective

(kifdya) ather han ndividual ayn) obligation fard). In otherwords itwas not compulsory for all so long as some people from the umma were

engaged injihad activity. With the beginning of jihad against theMeccan

Quraysh, we do notice a change in the nomenclature of the umma as it

was gradually expanding beyond Madlna as new tribes and new territories

were being added. All those areas which came under the sway of theIslamic umma at Madina came to be described as dar al-Isldm (Islamic

territory) and the remaining areas which were at war with the prophet

Muhammad were called dar al-harb (enemy territory) The tribes and the -

areas with which the prophet had entered into treaty relations were called

dar al-sulh (peace territory). The pattern that prophet Muhammad fol

lowed in waging war against the infidel tribes was firstly, to invite

them to accept Islam, and be equal partner in the emerging umma under

Islam, or ask them to pay regular tribute in order to secure protection

(dhimma) of the umma, or ultimately to face theMuslim mujdhids (soldiers)in the battlefield. Therefore, those who accepted Islam became naturally

part of the dar al-Isldm, those who accepted protection in lieu of a tribute

were called ahl al-dhimma (protected people) with certain privileges, and




autonomy. The remaining who refused to do either of these things were

ultimately either killed or taken prisoners ofwar.

A review of the maghdzl (historical records of prophetic wars)

would indicate that therewere two types ofwars inwhich prophet Muham

mad was engaged: (i) thosewhichwere ledbyprophet imself,nd theywere known as ghazwa; and (ii) those inwhich he himself did not parti

cipate, but were led by the commanders nominated by him from among

themigrant Quraysh, these were called saraya. Prophet Muhammad led

in all 23 ghazawdt including his victorious march toMecca.,24 and therewere 8 saraya which were led by the commanders appointed by him.25

The victory ofMecca signalled the victory of Islam in theArabian penin

sula, and itwas followed by the period of what is called by the early his

torians as the year of tribal delegations which came from all over Arabia

in order to accept Islam, and the leadership of prophet Muhammad.

Therefore, towards the death of the prophet, the umma of Madlna was

extended more or less over the whole Arabian peninsula. However,

prophet Muhammad, being conscious of the universalistic mission of

Islam did not confine his efforts to the conversion of theArab alone, but

intended to go beyond theArabian peninsula. He wrote letters and sent

his personal envoys to all theneighbouring kings of Byzantium, and sasan

ids of Persia and invited them to accept the new religion.26 He had also

planned to invade the neighbouring Palestine which was a part of the

Byzantium empire. Although most of the tribes of the peripheral regions

had formally joined the new confederacy which prophet Muhammad had

established, but hey had not integrated themselves fullywithin the umma

thatMuhammad had created atMadina. For this reason, quite a few of

these tribes afterwards revolted, and there followed thewars of Apostacy

during the rule of the firstcaliph. Some of the tribal chiefs had declared

themselves as prophets. One among them,Musaylima had written to

prophet Muhammad proposing a division of theArabian peninsula among

themselves; but was retorted back that kingdom belonged to God

Almighty.27 This incident proves the fact that theprophet had never consi

dered himself as a king or ruler in the secular sense.He was always conscious

of themission with which hewas invested byGod to restore the umma wahida

(single community) of themankind. He was neither the founder of an

Arab empire nor the builder of an Arab nation as usually argued bymany

modern Arab scholars. However, this might be true that after him

particularly during Umayyad regime the nature of the khildfa was pri

marily Arabian. In thismanner, we notice that the umma founded at



UMMA 37

Madina had gradually developed into an Arab union., and thenwas transformed into a universal empire of Islam.

UMMA AND THE MUSLIM JURISTS AND THINKERS

Expositions ofMedieval Jurists

The medieval Muslim jurists in elaborating the Islamic constitutional

laws had been mostly concerned with preserving the historical andlegal

continuity of the umma. Therefore, theyhave emphasized on sharVa and

khilafa as the essential bases of the umma. As discussed earlier, the umma

is called umma wahida because the focal point of its ideological cohesion

arises from a common belief of its adherents in the doctrine of tawhid

(oneness ofGod), and their commitment to order their individual and col

lective life in accordance with the divine laws contained in the Qur'an.

Therefore, the sharVa as a code of divine laws constitutes an important

integrating force in the umma. The obligation to implement the sharVa

necessitates the creation oforganized political authority.

For thisreason,the jurists have generally believed that the institution of the khilafa was a

canonical rather than rational necessity. Thus these jurists have estab

lished logical connections between the concepts of umma, sharVa, and

imama.2* According to them, umma without sharVa would be suspendedin a state of legal vacuum. Therefore, in order to preserve the legal fabric

of the umma, itwas necessary to establish imam whose primary respon

sibilitywas to enforce the sharVa. Rosenthal rightlyobserves, "the caliphatewas the symbol of the unity of the umma, whose preservation was

an ineluctable necessity?infact

the foremost duty of the theologianjurists".29

Al-MawardI, the classic exponent of the ideal theory of the khilafa

emphasized the indivisible, universal, and divine character of the umma by

maintaining that the institution of khilafa was a canonical rather than

merely rational necessity, and that there could not be more than one

khalifa at the same time, and also that the establishment of the khilafa in

all ages was mandatory on the basis of the ijmat.** Similar position was

taken by most of the Ash'arijurists

likeal-Baghdadi,

AbuYa'la,

and

Abu Yusuf. For all these SunnI jurists, the communal unity of the umma

was ultimately dependent upon the political unity. The idea of anarchyfor them was an anethema, and for this simple reason theywere willingto compromise with the political realities of their own times in order to




maintainthemythof legal ndpoliticalunity. Theywould legitimizeheinstitution of sultanate, despotism and even tyranny. Al-MawardI was

confronted with such a situation as during his times the focus had shifted

from the khalifa to the amir as the centre of secular authority, and there

fore, he justified the exercise of authority by the amir so long as he recognized the de jure sovereignty of the khalifa*1

During the age of al-Ghazall, the authority of the Khalifa was

either ceremonial or at best nominal, and the sultan had emerged as politi

cally dominant factor within the umma. Therefore, in order tomaintainthemyth of the unity of umma, he was obliged to rationalize themyth of

the khildfa as a symbol of the unity of the umma and at the same time,to justify secular monarchy of his masters. In order to achieve this, he

developed a theory of division of functions according towhich the basic

functions of the khalifa could be performed by his wazfrs and amirs.32

Similarly Ibn Jama'a had to rationalize on the one hand the usurpationof power, and on the other the self-investiture of a military adventurer

as the imam**. In so doing all these jurists used legal devices to cover

up the political reality the distintegration of the umma.

Ibn-Taymiyya dispensed with the idea of the khildfa altogether,and maintained the necessity of enforcing the sharVa. For him any specificform of khildfa was not relevant so long as therewas an authority to en

force the sharVa** He emphasized on the concept of ta'dwun (coopera

tion) between the ruler (imam) and the ahlal-shawka (thewielders of

power) who were composed of the 'ulama9 (scholars) and umara! (state

functionaries), and dominant classes.35 However, he was also concerned

with the problem of preserving legal unity and political cohesion without

attaching much significance to the classical form of khildfa as expounded

by al-Mawardi.

Ibn Khald^n recognized clearly khildfa and mulk as two separate

political forms of government He advocated mulk kaqiqi as the second

best form of government after the khildfa. Therefore, for Ibn Khaldun,the transformation of the 'khildfa into mulk does not necessarily disruptthe cohesion of the umma by his theory of 'asabiyya. Therefore he

emphasizes 'asabiyya as an independent natural factor of communal cohesion,and relates this theorywith his theory ofmulk as an independent form of

government. Ibn Khaldun shifts the focus altogether from the khalifabased on the rule of sharVa to themulk based on the political laws of the



UMMA 39

monarchy (siyasa); and inhis view, the legal unity of the umma continuedto flourish despite such a transformation.36

The relationship between political integration and social processes

are much more clearly reflected in the thinking of Shah Waliullah of Delhi.

In his volume entitledHujjat Allah al-Baligha*7 he develops a theory of

social evolution, and links up his sociological theory of the umma with

that of the khilafa which he expounds in another volume, Izala Like

Plato and Aristotle and following al-Farabi, Shah Waliullah believed in

the natural instinct of man to live in some form of association. Hetraced the social life ofman through four important stages of elvolution

(i) theprimitive tageof life 2) civilized tageof lifewhenmorality ndsocial bonds are created; (3) when the social relations become complex,and conflicts of interests arise, then people themselves proceed to appointa ruler whose task is to settle their disputes with justice and to preserve

the social cohesionfora good life; nd finally 4) themutual jealousiesand conflicts among these rulers result inwars, and at this stage, a khalifa

emerges. The khalifa unites these smaller states into one super-state

under his inalienable and lasting authority. Shah Waliullah calls this stagethe great Caliphate (khildfat-i-kubra).39 Then Shah Waliullah proceededto establish in his other work that the institution of khilafa was one of the

fundamental tenets of Islam.40 Thus the concepts ofKhilafa and umma

were completely fused together by Shah Waliullah, so that both became

identical with each other,

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF UMMA

UMMA AND THE KHILAFA

The concepts of umma, sharVa and khilafa were so much inter

twined together within the framework of the traditional Muslim political

theory as outlined above that itwas difficult to isolate the one from the

other. This had also resulted in a curious concatenation of religion and

politics in Islam. The separation of capliphate from sultanate and, sub

sequently, abolition of caliphate itselfby Turkey under the revolutionary

leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came as a rude shock throughout

the length and breadth of theMuslim world. The historical continuity

of the umma abruptly came to an end. The idea of the political unity

of the umma, however, continued to haunt theminds of the traditionallyoriented Muslim elites.




Turkey in taking such a drastic decision, was the first to launch

herself as a modern national state. Turkey abolished sultanate, and

transferred sovereignty toGrand National Assembly as the trustee of the

Turkish nation. By abolishing caliphate she forsook leadership of the

umma and decided to adopt nationalism as an instrument ofmodernization

and development. However, in so doing, Turkey felt justified, and in

the communique issued by the Grand National Assembly proclaiming

separation of caliphate from sultanate, argued at great length in defense

of their decision in Islamicterminology.

Therefore this document can

be regarded as the firstof itskind in enunciating a modern interpretationof the traditional Muslim political theory.41

The authors of this document raised two undamental questions for

investigation: (i) Is the umma or the khalifa who is entitled to exercise the

rights of political sovereignty? and (ii) is itpossible that the umma can ex

ercise this authority through a popularly elected parliament?42 Both

questions were natural corrollaries of the decision ,that they had taken

in respect to political reconstruction of Turkey that theyhad asserted the

doctrine of the national sovereignty of the Turkish people, and acceptedthe modern western concept of constitutional democracy.

The authors defined the authority of Khilafa as wilaya 'dmma

(general authority) following traditional jurists like Ibn Humam, and

Taftazanl. However, they argued that the caliph isnot entitled to exercise

absolute authority as according to the unanimous opinions of the Sunn!

jursits, the khalifa derived his authority from the Muslim nation as a

mandate. Threfore, his authority was limitedby the terms of the contract

between him and the nation. His authority is further limited by therule of sharVa and the Qur'anic injunction to consult eminent men of the

community The absolute power exercised by the sultan, padishah, and

shahinshdh was based on usurpation and brute force and therefore was

against Islam. Since the general authority of the caliph is conferred on

him in the name of theMuslim community (umma) it therefore, legally

belongs to all members of the nation. The authors of the report, thus,

justified abolition of sultanate as itwas contrary to the spirit of Islam,and rationalized assumption of national sovereignty by theTurkish nation.

However they confused between the concepts of nation and umma. Byno strecth of imagination the universal umma of Islam could be equatedwith theTurkish nation.4 3

The authors also raised the question: Does religion make it obli



UMMA 41

gatory to invest the general mandate in one and the same person underthe title of Caliph, or can itbe invested in an Assembly of the duly elected

representatives of the umma (community)? In answering this question,

they could not findmuch support in the juristic literature, therefore, theyhad to rely on rational arguments. The jurists generally consider the

institution of the khilafa a canonical necessity because the community

(umma) cannot be left in a state of choas and disorder. The khilafa was

a form of government which was devised by the ijma' (consensus) of the

community (umma) after the death of theprophet. Now the question was

whether the collective reason (ijma6) of the umma can devise any other

system of government which can insure themaintenance of law and order

in the affairs of the community, without prejudice to the rights of the

citizens The jurists did not think of a democratic alternative as theywere familiar only with the institution of kingship during themedieval

age. However it seems that the authors might have sought support for

their argument with reference to Ibn Taymiyya who as stated earlier, in

developing his theory of sharVa statewas able to dispense with thekhilafa.

He had raised a similarquestion:

whether theQur'an

had fixedany specificnumber of theKhulafd'l His answer was in negative, and in his view,

the Qur'anic term, ulVl-amr (those in authority) actually referred to the

'ulama' and the umara\ and therefore, the khilafa was based on the idea

of the cooperation (ta'dwun) between different classes of the umma. Ibn

Taymiyya, however could not think of the possibility of an elected parlia

ment, but he comes nearest to such an idea. The creation of the Grand

National Assembly was looked upon by theMuslims all over theworld as

an innovation of the highest order, and evoked a great controversy con

cerning the institution of khilafa.

The Turkish innovation was vehemently criticized in Islamic termi

nologybyRashld Rida, a disciple f ShaykhMuhammad 'Abduh inhis

work entitled: al-Khilafa wa'al -Imamat al-'UzmaA4 Rida wrote this

work in defense of the traditional theory of the khilafa. However, in the

process of defending the traditional theory, he reconstructed the theory

in the modern context without doing much violence to the spirit of the

institution. He emphasized on the principles of shurd, ijma' and ijtihad

for reorganizing the institution of the khilafa. His scheme was to reestablish khilafa as the religious organization of the umma.45 For him

also, theunity and universality of the umma could be preserved only within

the frame work of a universal khilafa. However, it seems that he did



42 MANZOORUDDINAHMED

not rule out the possibility of a federal or confederal structure of the

khildfa.

The earlier hesis f theGNA was defended y 'All 'Abdal-Raziqin his pamphlet, al-Isldm wa Usul-al I}ukm.** Raziq boldly refuted the

traditional theory of the khildfa, and maintained that neither it was

sanctioned by the Qur'an, nor by reason, therefore, the institution of

khildfa was not binding on the umma. He argued that the prophetMuhammad had founded a religious community not a state at Madina.

The leadership of the community by prophet in secular matters was onlyincidental to his apostolic mission. Raziq's thesis provoked the shuyukh

(scholars) of thegreat Azhar seminary; and he was denounced and expelledfrom the seminary for his heretical views. Thus Raziq became the

champion of modern secularist thought in theArab world.

The abolitionof khildfafrustratedhe IndianMuslims who hadbeen agitating for the restoration of the Ottoman Caliphate. During

this agitation, scholars like Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad turned their

attention towards restating the traditional theory of the khildfa. Azad

expounded with great erudition the theory of the Muslim umma and

defended the institution of khildfa as the necessity without which the

cohesion of the Jama'a could not be preserved.47 His position was more

or less like that of Rashld Rida inEgypt.

In India, perhaps, Mawlawi Barkat Allah of Bhopal was the only

person who had defended the Turkish decision to separate sultanate from

khildfat, abolish sultanate, transfer itspowers to a popularly elected Grand

National Assembly, and maintain khildfa as a symbol of religious unity

of the umma. He interpreted khildfa as a purely religious institution, and

pleaded to retain it as such.48 Later, Iqbal also defended Turkish

ijtihdd.*'

Thus we observe that the emerging bipolarity of thought mainlycentred around the problem of relationship between the khildfa and the

umma, and needed theoretical adjustments. This was achieved by 'Abd al

Razzaq al-?anhuriinhis thesis entitled: Le

Califat. His

problemwas to

reconcile the theory of modern national state with the traditional theoryof khildfa. Therefore, he proposed that the khildfa could be reorganizedon the model of the 'League of Nations" in which modern Muslim

states would be equal partners.5*



UMMA 43

Umma and theNation

In tracing the genesis of the umma inmodern times, we discover

that itwas seriously challenged by the growing impact ofwestern politicalculture. By the end of the nineteenth century,most of theMuslim lands

had come under the colonial rule of theEuropean powers. The Ottoman

empire, and Iran retained nominal independence, but remained constantlyunder foreign pressure. The thrust of European colonialism completely

disrupted the traditional foundations of the Islamic Umma. The rule of

sharVa was gradually substituted by European legal codes, and finallykhilafa gave way to the emerging national states. During the last two

world wars and thereafter, the political map of the Islamic world has

completely changed, and presently we have a large number of Muslim

states. The introduction of western education in these countries has

produced a new class of westernized eliteswho have been the champions of

modernization, reform and nationalist movements. However, they find

themselves in the grip of a conflictwith the traditional religious elites who

are opposed to themodernizing policies. The westernized elites themselves

are divided in the choice of ideologies for the national reconstruction,

nationalism, democracy, socialism and communism. Now we shall discuss

how they have proceeded to resolve the conflicts between their traditional

values and themodern ideology of nationalism.

The impact of European colonialism has generated a momentum

towards nationalism as a prevasive force inmost of theMuslim countries.

But the upsurge of nationalism has brought Muslim intellectuals into

direct conflict with their long cherished traditional concept of Islamic

universalism. The question is ifnationalism could be reconciled with theidea of the political unity of the umma as symbolized by the institution of

khilafal In attempting to bring $bout a reconciliation three different

conceptions of the nationalism were developed: (i) Islamic nationalism;

(ii) territorial nationalism (wataniyya) centring around the idea of the

father and: (iii) integral nationalism (qawmiyya) based on common langu

age, traditions, history and race.

Islamic Nationalism

The advocates of Islamic nationalism equate the idea of Islamic

umma with that of Muslim nation. For them "nation" of Islam was

founded on faith rather than on any other integrating principle such as

territory, language, or racial consideration. Following closely the argu




ments of the earlier traditional jurists and Muslim thinkers discussed earlier

inthis rticle, hey elieve n the rinciple f the oliticalunity f theummaand hence have been the champions of what came to be called Pan-Islam

ism. Jamaluddin Afghani,52 a great champion of the Pan-Islamic move

ment, maintained that the institution of the khilafa should be reactivated

as an instrument for galvanizing the Islamic umma in the modern age.

Being a practical reformer rather than merely a theoretician, Afghani

thought that the Ottomans were in a position to provide the necessary

leadershipto the rest of the world of Islam because

they

were

independent,and had the necessary power. Therefore, he came to champion the

cause of Pan-Islamism which was initiated by Sultan 'Abd al-Hamld II

as a cornerstone of Ottoman policy.

Jamaluddin Afghani at the same time also realized that itwas not

enough to operate at the level of preserving thepolitical unity of the umma

within the framework of the khilafa, but itwas a'so necessary that those

parts of the umma which were under foreign rule should assert themselves

against

their colonial masters and attain national liberation Thus Afghani

provided stimulus to national liberation movements in different parts of

the umma. However, nationalism in this narrow sense was only a means

to the end, but itwas not the end by itself. This movement however,

did create basis for territorial nationalism in India and Egypt. Following

Afghani's programme of action, many Muslim intellectuals did not find

itdifficult to reconcile Pan-Islamism with territorial nationalism.

The genesis of Turkish nationalism can be traced back to the early

Young Ottoman movement53 for the establishment of a constitutional

government, restoration of sharVa and reformed administration and

khilafa. The Young Ottomans were a generation of Turks who were

simultaneously influenced by two contradictory forces; eighteenth century

European liberalism and their dedication to Islamic va ues. They were

anxious to bring about a synthesis between Islamic values and the new

western liberal concepts and institutions. This trend is clearly reflected

in the writings of Namik Kemal and Zia Gokalp.54 Namik Kemal

firmly elieved in theuniversal character of Islam asmirrored in itspoliticalstructure and legal code. Therefore, he advocated a progressive khilafa,constitutional government, as a check against an absolute sultan. But

at the same time he was deeply attached with the idea of the fatherland

(watari). Thus he had the problem of reconciling Islamic universalism

with his Ottoman patriotism.



UMMA 45

Zia Gokalp 55 another Young Ottoman tried to resolve this tensionbetween Islamic ideal and the political reality within the framework of

his sociological theory of nationalism. He recognized that within the

society there subsisted three different sets of authority around which deve

lop three different social units. The unit bound by religion is an ummet

(umma); the one under political authority is a state; and the cultural mores

produce a nation.5 6 The khilafat as a symbol of the unity of ummet

focussed on the Islamic internationalism; theOttoman statewith a demo

cratic foundation represented the other social unit; and finally the third

social unit emerges in the form of a Turkish nation.57 However, itmaybe observed that Zia Gokalp also could not reconcile the Islamic univer

salism with the Turkish nationalism. What we observe here is that

gradually the focus is shifting from Islamic universalism towards secular

Turkish nationalism which latter under the Young Turks, and Ataturk

transformed early patriotic Islamic Ottomanism into a modern secular

nationalism inTurkey.

The impact of western political culture also generated nationalist

upsurge among the Arab peoples as well. In the process of definingwhatcame to be described as Arab nationalism, the Arab intellectuals were

confronted with a similar crisis as did the early Turkish nationalists. Theyhad to reconcile the idea of Arab nationalism with that of Islamic uni

versalism. The Arab intellectual .withstrong fundamentalist orientations

remained attached to the idea of theuniversal Islamic umma. Muhammad

al-Ghazzall,58 writing his famous work entitled: Min huna na'lam in

refutation ofKhalid Muhammad Khalid's5* Min huna nahdcC emphasized

the universalistic nature of Islam, and condemned vehemently modern

nationalism as a deadly enemy of Islam. He advocated Islam rather thannationalist government and attacked the cult of modern secularism. He

pleaded for a return to the classical purity of Islam based on the rule of the

sharVa. Thus he was a champion of Islamic nationalism which he des

cribed as jinsiyya 'amma, and according tohim the spiritof Islamic Nation

alism declined gradually with the emergence of particular nationalism (al

qawmiyyat al-khassa). Al-Ghazzalfs views were those of the Ikhwan

al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood).60

Hasan a^-Banna,6* as the chief exponent of the ideology ofMuslimBrotherhood greatly emphasized Islamic nationalism insofar as he enlarged

the idea of fatherland, and spoke of the Islamic fatherland. He advocated

the organization of Muslim nations on the model of the Arab League.




Therefore, he was not opposed to local nationalism (Egyptian). Whichwas a step towards the realization of their political goals. Similarly, he

attached importance to the cause of theArab unitywhich would ultimately

lead to pan-Islamism.

Muhammad 'Abd Allah al-Samman6* was opposed to the idea

of the Arab League, and advocated instead the creation of an Islamic

League of Muslim states. Within the framework of such a league he

proposed to resolve the conflict between Islamic universalism and local

nationalisms.63 Similar solution was proposed by al-?anhuri earlier.

Islamic nationalism finds expression through thewritings of Shaykh

Taql-al-dm al-Nabhani,64 the founder of the Liberation Party (al-IJizb

ul-Tahrir). He is thoroughly opposed to the creed of Arab nationalism

because inhis view itwas against theuniversalistic spiritof the Islamic state.

He pleaded for the establishment of an Islamic state. But his party has

not been able tomake any headway as it has been banned in Jordan and

elsewhere.

Islamic nationalism made a strong impact on the minds of theIndian Muslims before thepartition of the sub-continent between Pakistan

and Bharat. The roots of Islamic nationalism can be traced back to the

writings of Shah Waliullah, as discussed earlier, and later to Jamaluddm

Afghan!. In the twentieth century, Islamic nationalism found a strong

advocate in Sir Muhammad Iqbal the poet-philosopher of Modern Islam

in India. He focussed on the theory of self (khudi) as key to the regenera

tion of Islam in themodern age. But he related his theory of self with

that of Islamic millat*5 He believed that millat was founded on religion

rather than on the idea of the fatherland. For him the spiritual universalism of Islam based on the concept of tawhid (monothesim) was totally

opposed to the cult of nationalism both territorial (wafaniyyat) as well as

integral (qawmiyyat). However, a strong segment of the religious elites

chiefly centred inDeoband School,66 did not subscribe to his view. In

theiropposition to theBritish rule, theywere willing to associate themselves

with the Indian National Congress in order to seek emancipation from

the foreign rule. Like their counterparts in the Arab world, they did

not find any contradiction between Islam and nationalism. Quite early

there arose a controversy between Iqbal and Mawlana Husayn Ahmad

Madanl, thepresident of JamHyyat al-Ulamd-e-Hind on this vary question.

In a pamphlet, entitled Islam awr muttahida qawmiyyat, theMawlana

expounded his view on nationalism. He maintained that nations are



UMMA 47

createdby their atherland,nd not by religion.* However, thisthesiswas refuted by Iqbal who asserted that Islam does not approve of territorial

foundations of nationalism. ThusIqbaPs emphasis on Islamic nationalism6*

paved theway for the emergence of Pakistan movement. The Muslim

leadership as represented by the Muslim League developed the two

nations theory in order to counteract the Congress demand for a united

India based on a common Indian nationality. Although, the two nations

theorywas couched in the terminology ofmodern political science in order

to assert for Indian Muslims the right of self-determination, yet Islam

was the foundation of their claims for a separate nationhood, and conse

quently separate statehood.65 For this reason, after the partition of the

sub-continent between Muslim Pakistan, and Hindu India, during the

course of constitution making inPakistan, the religious elites led by Maw

lana Abul A'la MawdudI demanded an Islamic state based on theprinciples

of the Qur'an and the Sunna.70 The new state was declared to be an

Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and a new formula of divine overeignty

was inserted in the preamble of the constitution as a compromise between

the Islamists and the liberal-reformist leaders. The recognition that

sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty cuts at

the very root of the idea of national or state sovereignty.7i The authors

of the constitution adopted the concept of the sharVa state as a model for

Pakistan. In order to assert universal implications of Islamic ideal state,

the constitution further provided that the new state would promote as a

matter of policy strengthening of the bonds of unity among Muslim

states.72 In this manner, the obvious contradiction between universal

character of the Islamic ideal state and the territorialityof the new state,

wasresolved. However,

it isdoubtful if the Islamic bond alone can sustain

the sense of political unity amid the growing pressures of regionalism,

and local particularism.

Local Nationalism

With the stablishmentf the epublicofTurkey, urkishnational

ism led by Ataturk won the day.73 For the first time, Turkey severed

her relations with the rest of theMuslim world by abolishing the age-long

institution of thekhilafa. Thus it renounced its committments to Islamic

universalism. Therefore, Turkey launched her new career as a modern

nationalist state on European model. Secondly Turkey separated religion

from politics by declaring secularism as the official creed of the new state.

All the reformshichwere initiatedyMustafaKamal Ataturkwere in




fact directed towards the modernization and westernization of Turkey,and under nationalist inspirations, movement ofTurkification of language,art and culturewas put into effect. Turkish nationalism, therefore, impliedtwo things: (i) suspension of sharVa, khilafa, and umma and (ii) outright

rejection of Pan-Turanian nationalism. Asia Minor was the national

home of theTurks, and the new leaders decided to rebu ld their national

lifewithin that region.

Although Arab world has come under the influence of a movement

towards Pan-Arabism, yet even today Arab statesmaintain their sovereignties; and theyare divided among themselves concerning thegoals, methods,and forms of Pan-Arab unity. The Pan-Arabism has outgrown the earlier

form of particularistic nationalisms. Local nationalism appeared first

in Egypt as early as the exploits ofMuhammad 'AH. Egyptian national

ism had remained a strong force until recently. Further impetus was

provided to Egyptian nationalism by the reformmovement of 'Abduh.

The foremost advocate of Egyptian nationalism was Mustafa Kamil74

who linked up Islam with his love for the fatherland and the nation.

According to him Islam was not opposed to one's love for his country,rather itconsiders itas one of the first nd most sacred duties. In focussinghis attention on Egyptian nationalism, he endeavoured to involve both

theMuslim population as well as Christian Copts and Jews of Egypt.For the same reason Mustafa Kamil advocated a state based on Islamic

principles, but not on Islamic law as that non-Muslim minorities could

be associated with the government as equal partners rather than as second

class citizens.

Apart from local nationalism which prevail in theMuslim worldas a strong force there are equally strong forces ofwhat is called regionalnationalism. There are geographically distinct regions such as theMagh

reb, theNile Valley with Egypt and the Sudan, the Fertile Crescent and

theArabian peninsula.75 It is not difficult to discover the political forces

which have endeavoured to forge political union on such a regional basis.

Integral Nationalism

Arab nationalism appeared in theArabian provinces of the Otto

man empire as a reaction against the centralizing policies of theOttoman

state and also against the rising Turkish nationalism.76 After the aboli

tion of the khilafa it increased in intensity as a force against western im

perialism. In its earlier phases, itwas directed towards evolving autono



UMMA 49

mous Arab provinces within a loose confederal or federal union with theOttoman state, and as such itwas closely associated with the movement

of constitutional reforms in theOttoman empire. Later the same move

ment developed into a political movement for creating an Arab Leagueon a confederal basis.

Arab nationalism has also been closely linked with Islam. The

exponents of Arab nationalism gradually transformed the idea of Islamic

umma into an Arab umma. In exploring the Arab foundations of the

emergence ofthe Islamic

Umma, they discoveredthat

Islam in its originwas meant for theArabs; an Arabian prophet, Arabic as the language of

the Qur'an and the Quraysh descent as a condition for the khalifa of

Islam. The Arab historians found that the character of the Islamic umma

had remained basically Arabian during the successive periods ofMuslim

history?the classical Islam., and the medieval period of the Umayyads

and theAbbasids. In thismanner, the growing nationalism assimilated

Islamic foundations of the umma. Such a transformation can easily be

discerned in the writings of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibl and 'Abd al

Rahman al-Bazzaz.77 Thus the exponents of Arab nationalism nationalized Islam as a component ofArabism, and built up a grand theory of

Arab nationalism based on language, history, culture and religion.

However, we also observe that Arab nationalism as developed

originally at least in theory by the Christian Arabs tended to be secular

in its content. Many Muslim intellectuals came under its influence. The

outspoken champions of secular Arab nationalism reject outright the

Islamic foundations and advocate adoption of nationalism (qawmiyya

and wataniyya) as a creed and ideology. In this connection referencemay

be made to Sam! Shawkat, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid.7*

Conclusions

In tracing the origins of the concept of the umma in the light of the

Qur'an, the traditions the early historical records, and thewritings of the

Muslim jurists, we discovered that he umma was fundamentally a reli

gious community based on a common faith in the oneness ofGod, divine

guidance through God's prophet Muhammad, and divine laws (sharVa).

Prophet Muhammad had laid the foundations of the umma at Madina

which ultimately grew into a vast Islamic empire. However, prophet

Muhammad did not aim at creating either an Islamic state or an empire

since he did never regard himself as a king or a ruler. His authority was

accepted basically because of his prophetic role.




The umma established by the prophet Muhammad was universalin its scope and purpose because Islam is addressed to all mankind, and

not to theArabs alone. The Islamic ideology itselfwas claimed to be one

and the same ever since the beginning of human life on the earth. Islam

reaffirmsthe unity and universality of Islamic beliefs as revealed to

previous prophets.

The umma being founded on a universal belief system is non-terri

torial insofar as it is aimed to restoring the ideological unity of mankind

(umma wahida). Being non-territorial, the umma naturally cannot beequated with the territorial concepts of modern state and nationality.

Historically the unity of the umma was preserved through the insti

tution of the khilafa which was devised by the ijmd' of theCompanions of

the Prophet after his death at Madfna. We have already examined the

theory and practice of the khilafa and concluded that neither this institu

tion was based in theQur'anic text nor on prophetic traditions. But the

institution was sanctified as a canonical obligation by the Muslim juristslest the

community relapsedinto

anarchy. Moreover,the fact remains

that the umma was prior to thekhilafa, and therefore, existed independentlyof any political unity. Therefore, the umma exists as a reality so long as

the body of believers individually and collectively across the length and

breadth of the Muslim world are resolved to preserve their ideological

unity based on tawhtd oneness ofGod), and a common divine law (sharVa).The political unity of the umma in one or the other formmight be desir

able, but it is not an essential condition for its continued existence. The

collective reason of the umma is absolutely free to devise new forms of

political unityin accordance with themodern

practice,and

theyare not

bound to restore the classical khilafa.

NOTES

1. IbnHisham narrates thestorythattheQuraysh ofMecca made an offer fwealth,status, and even kingship to the Prophet, and Prophet refused and observed, "I

desire neither wealth, nor status nor kingship, but God has sent me to you as a

prophet." This anecdote clearly brings out the fact that Muhammad was not think

ing in terms f founding n Arab empireor a state rightfromthebeginning to

the nd. This anecdote should be read in onjunctionwith theonewhich happenedtowardsthe ndof the ropheticcareerofMuhammad accordingtowhichMusayle

mah (thefalseprophet)had offered rophet ina lettera proposal fordividingArablands among themselves. However, Prophet's answer was

"The earth belongs to



UMMA 51

Allih andHe may give itto nyone mongHis salveswhomHe desires," IbnHisham,al-Sirat atNabawiyya (Cairo, 1961),pp. 568-69.

2. Ibid., p. 119?123.

3. For a detailed analytical study, eeWatt,Muhammad AtMedina (Oxford, 1962),

chapter V, pp. 151?191.

4. Op. cit., pp. 166-167.

5. Hisham, pp. 167?170.

6. Ibid., pp. 171?179.

7. Ibid., pp. 180?182.

8. Ibid., pp. 183?202.

9. Ibid., pp. 204-205.

10. Ibid.

11. Hilf, theArab tribesused to enter into treaties n order to forma confederacyformutual defense; sucha treaty f alliancewas called hilf.

12. Jiwar, literally eans protection?according to tribal laws,weaker tribes ituated

in theneighbourhood of a strongertribeused to seek itsprotection, therefore,itmeans

*neighbourly protection.'

13. Mawdli, plural ofmawla, any outsider (not belonging to the tribeby kinship)could become amember of thetribe, f e could attachhimselfwith someone inthetribe s his client. This* mplied mode of naturalizationof aliens into the tribe.

14. Op cit.,Hisham, pp. 201?204; see itsEnglish translation nWatt,MuhammadAtMedina, pp. 221?225.

15. Rosenthal (E. I. J.)calls it tatuteofMedina, seehisPolitical Thoughtin edievalIslam, (Cambridge, 1958),p. 25.

16. Ahmad, Ilyas,Social Contractand the slamicState (Allahabad, 1960) and by the

same author, Sovereignty: Islamic and Modern (Karachi, 1965) see also Dr. Hassan

Saab, The Arab Federalists of the OttomanEmpire,

p. 24?27.

17. Watt, Op. cit., p. 221.

18. IbnHisham, p. 201.

19. Watt, pp. 201?223.

20. Ibid., pp. 227-228.

21. Ibid.,p. 223; IbnHisham, p. 203.

22. IbnHisham, p. 179,refers o the irst evelation njoiningtheprophetMuhammadtowage fighting.

23' Al-Qufan, Sura al-Anfdl, :61 ; see also Sura aUHaj) 22 :39.

24. Based on Hish&m's accounts.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 573. Envoys were also sent to thekings ofAbyssinia, Egypt and other

neighbouringkingdoms.




27. Ibid., pp. 568-569.

28. Gibb, Studis. ..9see his article"

Some Considerations on the unniTheory of the

Caliphate," p. 141.

29. Rosenthal, E. I. J., Islam in theModern National State, p. 14.

30. Gibb, Studis..., see"

Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate," pp. 162?164.

31. Ibid.

32. Rosenthal, E. I. J., Political Thought, pp. 39?41.

33. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

34. Ibid., p.52.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. ShahWaliulULh,Hujiat-Allah-uLBdltgha, Cairo: Matb'a al-Khayriya,A.H. 1322)itsUrdu translationbyKhalil Ahmad SambhaH entitled,Aydt-Allah-i-Kdmila,(Lahore, 1897).

38. ShahWaliullah, Izdlat-al-Khlfd' anKhilafat al-Khulafd\translated nd annotated

byMawlawi 'Abd al-ShakOr, Lucknow; n.d. Bareilly, 1326,A.H.).

39. Ahmed, Manzooruddin, Pakistan.. .Islamic State, pp. 48?50.

40. Ibid., p. 51.

41. Revue duMonde Musulmane, LIX (1925),pp. 5?81. The text f thecommuniqueis reproduced in theFrench translation; itwas translated ntoArabic byAbdul

Ghani Sahi, entitled:AUKhilafawa Saltanat al-umma (Cairo, 1925).

42. Op. cit., Ahmed, Manzooruddin, p. 58.

43. Ibid., p. 60.

44. Ri<Ja, Rashid, Al-Khildfah aw aUImamah al 'Uzmd see its French translaiion with

Introduction by Laoust, Henri, Le Calif at dans le doctrine de Rashtd Ridd:

45. Op. cit., Ahmed, Manzooruddin, pp. 61-62; see also Rosenthal, Islam in theModern

National State, pp. 66?85;

46. Ibid., Ahmed, Manzooruddin, pp. 63?65; See Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 85?102.

47. Azad, Abul Kalam, Masala'-e-khildfat, (Lahore, Reprinted n.d.).

48. Barkatullah,M., Khilafet (London, 1924); see* brief discussion of his views in

Ahmed, Manzooruddin, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

49. Op. cit., Ahmed, Manzooruddin, pp. 60-61.

50. Sanhuory, Abd al-Razzaq, Le Califat (Lyon, 1926).

51. Op. cit., Ahmed, Manzooruddin, pp. 65-66.

52. Keddie, Niki, Jamaluddtn fghani, is a finepiece of researchbased on newlydis

covered materials; see Sharif al~Mujahid Master's thesis (unpublished) Jamaluddin

al Afghani (submitted t Islamic Institute,McGill University; 1954), see also hisarticle

"Islam and Dualism," Islamic Review, February, 1957.

Mardin, Serif.,The Genesis ofYoungOttomanThought Princeton,1962).



UMMA 53

53. Heyd, U., FoundationsofTurkishNationalism,London, 1950 see also Lewis, Bernard,The EmergenceofModern Turkey (London, 1961); and his TheMiddle East

and theWest (London, 1964); Smith,W. Cantwell, Islam inModern History (Princeton, 1957); see also for a good summary discussion, Rosenthal, E.I.J., Islam in

the odern National State (Cambridge, 1965).

54. Rosenthal, E.I.J. Islam in theModern National State., pp. 29?51.

55. Zia, Gokalp, TurkishNationalism and WesternCivilization, (Ed.) byN. Berkes

(London, 1959); see also Heyd FoundationsofTurkishNationalism.

56. Rosenthal, Op. cit., p. 51.

57. Ibid., pp. 57?61.

58. Muhammad al Ghazzali, Our Beginning in Wisdom. Trans, I.R. el-Taruqi,

Washington, 1953.

59. Khalid, Muhammad Khalid. From Here we start, trans. I.R. el-Faruqi, Washington,1953.

60. Rosenthal, Op. cit., pp. 106?111.

61. Ibid., pp. 116?118.

62. As-Samman, Muhammad Abdullah. The Principles of Islamic Government, Frams,

Sylvia Haim inWL, n.s.v. 1958.

63. Rosenthal, Op. cit., p. 115?116.

64. Tiiitsch,Hams, E. Facets ofArab Nationalism (Detroit,Wayne StateUniversity

Press, 1965),pp. 62.

65. Ahmed, Manzooruddin, Pakistan, The Emerging Islamic State, pp. 86?88.

66. Faruqi, Zia-ul Hasan, Deoband and theDemandforPakistan (McGillThesis, 1959).

67. Ahmed,Manzooruddin, "The Political Role of the Ulama' in the ndo-Pakistan

sub-continent", Islamic Studies, Vol-VI No. 4 (December, 1967) pp.331-332.

68. Ibid., pp. 332.

69. Ahmed, Manzooruddin, Pakistan.. .Islamic State, p. 83.

70. For a detailed discussion see Ahmed, Manzooruddin, op. cit., see also Binder, L.,

ReligionandPolitics in akistan, (Berkeley,1958);Asad,Muhammad, ThePrinciple

of State and Government n Islam (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1961);MawdOdi,

Sayyid Abul A ia, The Islamic Law and Constitution; Rosenthal, op. cit., Islam-,

Section I, Chapter 8,pp. 181?381; forthe viewsof the 4ulama\ eeAhmed,Man

zooruddin,"

The Political Role of the' Ulama' in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent"

IslamicStudies,Vol. VI, No. 4,December 1967, slamabad, pp. 325?354; see also

Smith,W. C, Pakistan as an IslamicState, (Lahore, Sh.Muhammed Ashraf, 1957);see also by the same author, Islam inModern History, (H.J., Princeton University

Press, 1957).

71. Ahmed, Manzooruddin "Islamic Aspects of the New Constitutions of Pakistan",

in IslamicStudies,Karachi, 1963pp. 250-251.

72. Ibid., p. 213.




3

73. Op. cit., Rosenthal, pp. 310?315,

74. Ibid., pp. 118?120.

75. Tuitsch, Hans, E.,Facets of Arab Nationalism, pp. 124?128.

76. Dr. Hassan Saab, TheArabFederalists of theOttomanEmpire,pp. 213?225.

77. Op. cit., Rosenthal, pp. 121?123.

78. Ibid.

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