UNCLASSIFIED AGNA Kabul Province - Kabul City Daily ... Kabul...AGNA Daily Intelligence Update for Kabul Province, Kabul City Date: Monday 01 September 2008 Prepared by: Jimmy Lemon

UNCLASSIFIED

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AGNA Daily Intelligence Update for Kabul Province, Kabul City Date: Monday 01 September 2008 Prepared by: Jimmy Lemon ArmorGroup, NA Kabul - Afghanistan 0797868706 [email protected] AGNA Assessed Route Status - Kabul Province for Monday 01 September 2008: Route Status Notes Abbey Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) IVO junction of Airport Circle. Aqua Caution Off limits to AGNA Blair Caution Blue Caution Bottle Extreme Caution Threat 24 to 30 August (+ or -) Brown Caution Off limits to AGNA Chestnut Caution Crimson Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Desperado Caution Edelweiss Caution Off limits to AGNA Ferrari Caution Off limits to AGNA Four Peaks Caution Off limits to AGNA Freedom Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Exercise caution IVO PEC Prison. Green *Caution *Ongoing SVBIED Threat Grey Caution Off limits to AGNA Horseshoe Extreme Caution Threat 24 to 30 August (+ or -) Indigo Caution Jeep Caution Off limits to AGNA Kara Caution Lincoln Caution Off limits to AGNA Maroon Caution North Caution Off limits to AGNA Orange Caution Pegasus Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Purple Caution Exercise caution IVO KAIA East Gate and IVO Route Violet. Quattro Caution Red Extreme Caution Exercise Extreme Caution IVO District 5. Red Two Caution Off limits to AGNA Retirement Caution Off limits to AGNA San Diego Caution South Caution Off limits to AGNA Sword Caution Off limits to AGNA Tomis Caution Toyota Caution Roadway is very narrow. Use only in emergencies. TV (TV Hill) Caution Upperland Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Exercise caution IVO PEC Prison. Violet Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) CP V-1 to CP V-7. All travel east of CP V-8

should be considered EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. White Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Masood Circle to Airport Circle. Wings Caution Yellow Caution Exercise caution IVO MOI HQ Traffic Circles/Gate Status Notes Abdul Haq Circle Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Route Violet CP V-1 to CP V-7 Airport Circle Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Masood Circle to Airport Circle. Masood Circle Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Masood Circle to Airport Circle. Camp Sullivan Gate Caution Drop bars and outer pedestrian gate padlocked at all times. KAIA A-POD Gate Caution USE NVCP Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Masood Circle. USE SVCP Caution SAFE AGNA personnel may utilize the Route(s) with complete freedom of movement. CAUTION AGNA personnel may utilize these routes while exercising prudent precautions. EXTREME CAUTION AGNA personnel restricted to mission essential movements only along these routes. OFF LIMITS Routes are Off Limits to AGNA personnel. No known reason for AGNA travel.

UNCLASSIFIED


Kabul Area Route Map

Route White

Route Violet

Route Toyota

Route Kara

Route Indigo

Route Quattro

Masood Circle

Route Crimson

TV Hill Area

Route Abbey

Route Blair

Route Blue

Route Green

Route Violet

Route Purple

Route Blue

Route Yellow

Route Yellow

Airport Circle

Abdul Haq Circle

Un-Named Road Behind Camp

Sullivan

Route Quattro

Route TV

Route Green

Route San Diego

Route Tomis

Crash Road

Current AGNA Assessed INS Threats IVO Kabul Province, Kabul City: Threat Probability Notes Small Arms Fire Attack LOW

(Kabul City) Low IVO Kabul City. High in Sorobi, Musayi, & Chahar Asyab Districts of Kabul Province.

Ambushes (Simple or Complex)

LOW (Kabul City)

Low IVO Kabul City. High in Sorobi, Musayi, & Chahar Asyab Districts of Kabul Province.

IED Variants HIGH Of particular concern is Route Violet, Route White and all of the major traffic circles and intersections along those routes.

Direct Attacks (Complex) HIGH Current reporting suggests targets are IRoA, although possible CF targets cannot be discounted ATT.

Indirect Fire (Rockets) MEDIUM There has been a slight increase in the frequency of IDF (rocket) attacks IVO Kabul City 2008 versus 2007 (11 X 2008 9 X 2007 YTD). The area IVO KAIA seems to be to the most likely target of these attacks. A sudden increase in the frequency of IDF attacks cannot be discounted.

Indirect Fire (Mortars, other)

LOW (Kabul City)

IVO Kabul City. High in Sorobi, Musayi, & Chahar Asyab Districts of Kabul Province.

Surface to Air (MANPADS)

LOW

Surface to Air (Other) LOW Low IVO Kabul City. Medium outside of Kabul City. Reported Surveillance Activities

HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH along Route’s White and Violet.

Criminal Activity (Robbery, Assault, etc)

MEDIUM Criminal Activities and the MOI/ANP targeting of PSC’s.

Criminal Activity (Kidnapping)

HIGH Current and valid threat reporting.

LOW No known current threat at this time. MEDIUM Current threat reporting. Prudent precautionary measures should be taken. HIGH Current and credible threat reporting. Appropriate defensive measures must be taken. IMMINENT Ongoing attack or knowledge of an imminent attack is known.

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AGNA Priority Intelligence Requirements: 1. When and where will INS conduct surveillance on AGNA convoys or facilities? 2. When and where will INS target AGNA convoys or facilities for attack? AGNA Information Requirements: 1. Are there any ongoing activities designed to slow, stop, harass, or to attack AGNA convoys? 2. Report the description and location of any suspected mobile surveillance and/or fixed point surveillance to the AGNA TOC. 3. Report the location and description of any possible suspicious activities such as questionable construction, disabled vehicles, vehicles that appear to be abandoned, or anything else that appears to be out of the ordinary to the AGNA TOC. 4. Report the absence of civilians in any area that normally has a consistent concentration of civilians to the AGNA TOC. 5. Where are the best possible INS locations to conduct surveillance and attacks against AGNA convoys? AGNA Priority of Effort: 1. Determining INS threat actions that may be aimed at attacking AGNA convoys or facilities. 2. Predicting possible INS attack sites along AGNA convoy routes of travel. 3. Determining possible disposition, composition, strength, and capabilities of INS along AGNA convoy routes of travel and facilities. Current AGNA Intelligence Gaps: Lack of timely INS Incident reporting IVO Kabul Province, Kabul City. Lack of Intelligence cooperation and information sharing among PSC’s, CF’, ISAF, NATO, or IRoA units or agency’s. Grammatical and spelling errors on Intelligence reports. Due primarily to the “phonetic” spellings of Afghan names and locations. Lack of credible information on short and mid-term INS intentions and/or plans as it relates to Kabul City. INS/AGE/ACF MLCOA IVO Kabul Province for the next 60 – 90 Days: 1. Two or more SVBIED occupants and Female or Female “dressed” BBIED’s in order to confuse current profiling. 2. INS/AGE personnel wearing and utilizing IRoA ANA and ANP uniforms and vehicles. May also have IRoA Identification Cards. 3. Kidnapping of International Citizens, LN’s employed by CF’s, as well as wealthy Afghan Citizens. 4. High profile or spectacular type attacks against western and IRoA targets IVO Kabul City. 5. Continued utilization of IED Variants and occasional IDF (rockets) IVO Kabul City. 6. Concerted INS efforts against MSR’s. MSR’s of concern are Kabul to the Torkum, PAK Border crossing and Kabul to Kandahar. 7. The INS will attempt to consolidate their power and influence in the immediate areas outside of Kabul City. Current and Valid Threat Warnings, Kabul Province, Kabul City: 1. PSC personnel being harassed, arrested and/or detained by the IRoA MOI/ANP. 2. Criminal activities to include robbery, murder, intimidation, and kidnappings IVO Kabul. 3. High profile, complex, or spectacular type attack(s): IRoA Government Office’s; CF, ISAF, and NATO Compounds, as well as Western Diplomatic Missions or Embassies. 4. Sporadic IDF (rockets), with most likely targets being KAIA or any CF Facility. 5. IED Variant Threats: Route’s Bottle, Green, Violet, White, Abbey (IVO Airport Circle), Crimson, and Pegasus. 6. IED Variant, SAF, Heavy Weapons, and Ambushes along Route Violet from CP V-8 to the PAK Border. 7. IED Variant, SAF, Heavy Weapons, and Ambushes along all routes south of Kabul City to the Musayi, and Chahar Asayb District’s of Kabul Province and all routes south of Kabul City to the Provinces south, southwest, and southeast of Kabul Province. 8. Various threats relating to Pol i- Charki Prison (PEC) and the surrounding areas of Pol-i Charki, to include Route Violet (IVO CP V-6 to CP V-7), as well as Route’s Upperland and Freedom. Current AGNA Organized Convoy Movement Policy: All organized AGNA convoy movements will be conducted in the “buttoned up” or “sealed” mode. At no time will the vehicle “seal” be broken unless ordered to do so by the Convoy or Assistant Convoy Commander or under such tactical circumstances that would warrant vacating the vehicle without orders to do so. When traveling in an organized AGNA convoy, all AGNA personnel will wear the required issued personal safety equipment/gear, to include helmets and protective vests. Prior to departure on any organized AGNA convoy movement it is the responsibility of all onboard AGNA Supervisors to personally check that all personnel fully understand and are in compliance with any and all AGNA convoy procedures, policy’s, SOP’s, and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Vary routes of travel as well as departure and arrival times. Do not become time and place predictable. Follow published AGNA SOP’s for ECM operations. Ensure ECM’s are turned off prior to entering sensitive areas. Current AGNA Security Recommendations: Thoroughly vet all LN employees. Do not allow personnel to become complacent. Constantly ensure the static guard force is complying with all policies and SOP’s as it relates to the proper screening of personnel and vehicles prior to allowing entrance. Know what the latest Route Status and Current Threats are before departing on any mission essential road travel. There are no “expiration dates” when it comes to reported threats in Afghanistan. Keep all credible threat reporting valid until the incident in question actually happens or there is credible evidence that the threat is no longer valid or the threat has been mitigated. Due to the recent cases of LN employees of “western” entities being identified, targeted, attacked, kidnapped, or singled out, ensure your LN employees understand the importance of practicing prudent personal protection as it relates to travel to and from their residences to their places of work and that they report any incident of possible surveillance, harassment, and/or intimidation. It is further recommended that your LN employees do not wear any distinguishing clothing or overtly display any identification cards/badges that would readily identify them as working for a “western entity” to and from work. All personnel must practice and be held accountable for OPSEC, COMPUSEC, and COMSEC.

UNCLASSIFIED


Current AGNA Security Assessment for Kabul Province, Kabul City: The security situation in Sorobi, Musayi, and Chahar Asayb District’s of Kabul Province is assessed as VOLATILE. Expected INS activities in these Districts could include but are not limited to all forms of IED variants, IDF, DF, SAFIRE, simple or complex ambushes/attacks, kidnapping’s, intimidation, or other INS related criminal activities. The security situation in Paghman, Khaki Jabar, Bagrami, and Deh Sabz District’s of Kabul Province is assessed as UNSTABLE. Expected INS activities in these Districts could include but are not limited to IED variants (primarily SVBIED, RCIED’s, and BBIED’s), IDF (rockets), kidnapping’s, intimidation, or other INS related criminal activities. The security situation in Guldra, Istalif, Kalakan, Mir Bocha Kot, Qarabagh, and Shakadara District’s of Kabul Province is assessed as CALM. Little or no INS activities or threats have been noted or reported in these Districts of Kabul Province. However, if traveling to these Districts of Kabul Province all prudent security precautions should be taken. A lack of reporting does not necessarily constitute a lack of INS activity or planning. The security situation in Kabul District and Kabul City of Kabul Province is assessed as UNSTABLE. Expected INS activities in Kabul City could include but is not limited to IED variants (primarily SVBIED and BBIED’s), the occasional high profile spectacular attack, IDF attacks (rockets), kidnappings, intimidation, or other INS related criminal activities. All road movements to the immediate east, south, and southwest of Kabul City should be considered EXTREMELY DANGROUS and should involve meticulous pre-trip planning and coordination. Areas of particular concern within Kabul District - Kabul City include District’s 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 12. Places of particular concern within Kabul District - Kabul City include all Foreign Embassy’s, IRoA Ministry’s, Kabul International Airport, all venues that cater to westerners, and/or all CF/ISAF Facilities. Routes of particular concern within Kabul District - Kabul City include Route’s Abbey, Bottle, Crimson, Orange, Violet, Freedom, Pegasus, Upperland, and White. IRoA MOI/ANP corruption remains rampant, widespread, and unchecked throughout Kabul Province and should be regarded as a potential threat to all PSC’s, Cash in Transit Operations, NGO’s, and Private Companies operating in Kabul Province in general and Kabul City in particular. Numerous reports of personnel wearing ANP uniforms and operating ANP vehicles involved in various criminal enterprises including but not limited to, robbery and murder. Current AGNA Off Base MWR Policy: *NORMAL (with the below exception) * All Off Duty Personnel restricted to Camp Sullivan 0500 – 0700 and from 1700 until the evening convoy returns. NORMAL MWR off Base travel is authorized that is consistent with the current AGNA MWR policy. RESTRICTED MWR off base travel restricted to certain venues. CURTAILED All AGNA personnel restricted to Camp Sullivan AGNA Compiled Current Vehicle BOLO List for Kabul Province (Last 30 Days): Make Model License # Prov. of Reg. Color Date Threat/Notes Daewoo Damas mini-van 13827 or 14827 IRoA Gov’t White 30 Aug Surveillance RTE Violet Toyota Corolla 5647 UNK UNK 28 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices Toyota Corolla *7253 or 7255 UNK Red 27 Aug SVBIED Toyota Corolla *2251 IRoA Gov’t White 24 Aug SVBIED The license plate numbers reported for the above 2 vehicles are very similar. Could be one in the same vehicle with varying descriptions. Toyota Corolla 445 Herat White 23 Aug SVBIED Threat Toyota Surf w/red

“stickers or decals” on windows.

UNK UNK Black 21 Aug SVBIED RTE Violet

UNK “Ambulance” UNK or None UNK or None UNK 19 Aug VBIED District 5 Toyota Corolla UNK end’s in 97 UNK White 19 Aug VBIED District 5 Toyota Corolla 2696 UNK Silver or Gray 19 Aug SVBIED *possibly wearing

ANA uniforms Toyota Corolla 64827 UNK White 18 Aug Susp. Activity RTE Abbey Toyota Corolla w/roof

rack 4497 Kabul White 18 Aug SVBIED

Toyota Surf 13775 Kabul Gray 17 Aug SVBIED Toyota Hilux UNK UNK Blue w/white top 13 Aug SVBIED Datsun Pickup Truck 17287 UNK Blue 08 Aug SVBIED RTE Violet Toyota Corolla 3158 Kabul Green 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices Toyota Corolla 76532 or 76522 Kabul White or Black 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices Toyota Corolla 69687 or 62687

or 63687 Kabul Green or White 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices

Toyota Corolla 7448 Kabul Red 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices

UNCLASSIFIED


Kabul Significant Events – Previous 2 Months

ComplexIEDIED F/CIDF/RKTSAF

Last Update: 31 Aug 2008

RCIED 8‐03

RKT 7‐26

CPX 8‐04

RKT 7‐18

BBIED 7‐22

UKIED 8‐01

VBIED 7‐07RCIED 7‐30

IED F/C 8‐08


VBIED 8‐11

RKT 8‐14

IED 8‐16

RKT 8‐19

RKT 8‐19

IED 7‐11

IDF 8‐17

RKT 8‐21

RKT 8‐30


ComplexIEDIED F/CIDF/RKTSAF

Last Update: 31 Aug 2008

RCIED 8‐03

RKT 7‐26

CPX 8‐04

RKT 7‐18

BBIED 7‐22

UKIED 8‐01

VBIED 7‐07RCIED 7‐30

IED F/C 8‐08


VBIED 8‐11

RKT 8‐14

IED 8‐16

RKT 8‐19

RKT 8‐19

IED 6‐21

IED 4‐26

IED 5‐05

IED 5‐05

IED 5‐11

IED 3‐13

IED 5‐17

IED 5‐08

SAF 4‐14

SAF 3‐25

RKT 5‐15

IED 4‐27

IED 5‐29

IED 6‐23IED 7‐11

IDF 8‐17

IDF 6‐05

IED 4‐07

IED 5‐15

IED 4‐22

RKT 8‐21

RKT 8‐30

UNCLASSIFIED


RKT 01‐02‐08

RKT 08‐21‐08

RKT 05‐15‐08

IDF 04‐27‐08

RKT 07‐18‐08

RKT 07‐26‐08

RKT 08‐14‐08

RKT 08‐17‐08

RKT 10‐13‐07

IDF 06‐13‐07

RKT 12‐17‐07

RKT 11‐13‐07

RKT 08‐11‐07

IDF 12‐06‐07

RKT 07‐17‐07

RKT 07‐07‐07

RKT 10‐03‐07

RKT 08‐17‐07

RKT 06‐26‐07

RKT 04‐28‐07

RKT 05‐11‐07

RKT 08‐24‐07

Key2007 (14) 2008 (11)Last Update: 31 Aug 2008

Kabul Rocket / IDF Attacks 2007‐2008

RKT 08‐19‐08

RKT 08‐30‐08

Weather Forecast – Kabul Province

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday

Weather:

Description: Sunny. Hot. Sunny. Hot. Sunny. Hot. Sunny. Pleasantly warm.

High level clouds. Pleasantly warm.

Morning clouds. Pleasantly warm.

Morning clouds. Pleasantly warm.

Low temperature: 59 °F 62 °F 62 °F 61 °F 57 °F 59 °F 52 °F High temperature: 92 °F 93 °F 93 °F 91 °F 80 °F 82 °F 83 °F Comfort level: 87 °F 88 °F 88 °F 87 °F 79 °F 80 °F 80 °F Wind Speed: 3 mph 7 mph 11 mph 7 mph 6 mph 4 mph 6 mph Wind Direction: Humidity: 12% 7% 8% 11% 26% 45% 44% UV Index: 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) Chance of Rain: 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 30% 30% Amount Rain: - - - - - - -

Weather provided by CustomWeather, copyright 2007

Relevant Quote or Thought of the Day: “It is easier to find a score of men wise enough to discover the truth than to find one intrepid enough, in the face of opposition, to stand up for it”. A.A. Hodge Afghan Proverb of the Day: “A tree doesn’t move unless there is wind”. Meaning: Where there is smoke there is fire, or every effect has a cause.

UNCLASSIFIED


Current or Newly Released Information – Kabul Province: UPCOMING: USE WARDEN MESSAGE CONCERNING INS OPTEMPO, Kabul Province, Kabul City. The U.S. Embassy wishes to inform American citizens in Afghanistan that insurgent activity is expected to rise in September. The U.S. Embassy continues to monitor the security environment for Kabul and all regions throughout Afghanistan. There is an elevated reporting tempo of general threats for Kabul, and the immediate outlying areas. Insurgents, criminals and terrorists remain intent on targeting U.S. and coalition facilities throughout the country, not distinguishing between military and civilian personnel. As we approach the beginning of the Islamic Holy month of Ramadan which begins on/about September 2nd, and the upcoming anniversary of the attacks on September 11th in the U.S., American citizens and Westerners are reminded to exercise extreme vigilance when travelling in Afghanistan. Americans who find themselves in cases of extreme emergency in Afghanistan may contact the Embassy receptionist via 0700-10-8001 or the Consular Section via mobile at 0700-20-1908. We take this opportunity to remind the community to review their safety precautions. Updated information may be obtained by contacting the American Embassy in Kabul at [email protected] or by calling the Consular Section at 0700-10-8499. For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet web site at http://travel.state.gov where the Worldwide Caution, and the Travel Warning and Country Specific Information for Afghanistan can be found. Up-to-date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the United States and Canada or, for callers outside the United States and Canada, a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

01 September 0645L, LN PROTEST, Kabul Province, Kabul City, District 9, IVO intersection of Route Violet CP V-4 and Route Bottle/Wings. An estimated 400 to 500 LN’s gathered IVO the above location in protest over what they said was the murder of four civilians, including two baby boys, in an early morning raid by “international troops”. LN’s are also reporting 3 LN’s were arrested. The US-led coalition denied any involvement in the attack and others, including ANP are claiming this was strictly an ANSF operation. NFI

Left Intentionally Blank

UNCLASSIFIED


OPSEC REMINDER:

Kabul Province Map (with Districts) and surrounding area’s of interest:

UNCLASSIFIED


Glossary of commonly used acronyms and abbreviations:

AA&E – Arms Ammunition AND Explosives ACF – Anti-Coalition Forces AGE – Anti-Government Elements AKA – Also Known As ANA – Afghan National Army ANAP – Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANP – Afghan National Police ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces ASR – Alternate Supply Route AP – Anti Personnel AQ – Al Qaeda AT – Anti Tank BAF – Bagram Air Field BBIED- Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device BDA – Battle Damage Assessment BFT – Blue Force Tracker BOLO – Be On The Lookout BP – Border Police CAS – Close Air Support CASEVAC - Casualty Evacuation CF – Coalition Forces CI – Counter Intelligence CN – Counter Narcotics COA – Course of Action COIN OPS – Counter Insurgency Operations COMPUSEC – Computer Security COMSEC – Communications Security CP – Check Point CPX – Complex attack DF – Direct Fire DIAG – Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups Program ECM – Electronic Counter Measures EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile FNU – First Name Unknown EDD – Explosive Detection Dog EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal FOB – Forward Operating Base FW – Fixed Wing GOA – Government of Afghanistan HCN – Host Country National HIG – Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin HIK - Hizb-i-Islami Khalis HQN - Haqqani Network HUMINT – Human Intelligence HVT – High Value Target IA – Intelligence Analyst IAG – Illegally Armed Group

IAW - In Accordance With IDF – Indirect Fire IED – Improvised Explosive Device IMF – International Military Forces IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan INS – Insurgents IOT – In order to IRAM – Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar IRC- International Red Cross IRoA – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ISAF – International Security Assistance Force ISI – Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence IVO – In Vicinity Of KAIA – Kabul International Airport KAIA A-POD – Kabul International Airport (ISAF Side) KIA – Killed in Action LN – Local National LEL - Lashkar-e-Islami LeT - Lashkar-e-Toiba LNU – Last name unknown MANPAD – Man Portable Air Defense System MBIED – Motorcycle Borne Improvised Explosive Device MEDEVAC - Medical Evacuation MI – Military Intelligence MIA – Missing in Action MLCOA – Most likely Course of Action MOD – Afghanistan Ministry of Defense MOE – Afghanistan Ministry of Education MOF – Afghanistan Ministry of Finance MOFA – Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOI – Afghanistan Ministry of Interior MSR – Main Supply Route NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS – Afghanistan National Security Directorate NFI – No further information NFIATT – No Further Information At This Time NGO – Non-Governmental Agency

NPCC – National Police Command Center NSTR – Nothing Significant to Report OPSEC – Operational Security OSINT – Open Source Intelligence PAK - Pakistan PEC Prison - Pol- i Charki Prison POA – President of Afghanistan POI – Point of impact POO – Point of origin PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team PSC – Private Security Company PSD –Protective Security Detail RC – Regional Command ROE- Rules of Engagement RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade RW – Rotary Wing SAF – Small Arms Fire SAFIRE - Surface to Air Fire SAM – Surface to Air Missile SBF - Support by Fire SD – Surveillance Detection SF – Security Forces Shura – Afghan local council of elders SIGINT – Signal Intelligence SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne Explosive Device TB – Taliban TCN – Third Country National TCP – Traffic Control Point TNSM - Lashkar-e-Islami TIC – Troops in contact TOC - Tactical Operations Center TOO – Target of Opportunity TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UI – Unidentified UN – United Nations UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refuges USAID – United States Agency for International Development USE – United States Embassy UXO – Unexploded Ordnance VBIED – Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device VCP – Vehicle Check Point WIA – Wounded in Action

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UNCLASSIFIED AGNA Kabul Province - Kabul City Daily ... Kabul...AGNA Daily Intelligence Update for Kabul Province, Kabul City Date: Monday 01 September 2008 Prepared by: Jimmy Lemon