QUIET ENCROACHMENT: THE DISENFRANCHISED MASSES AND A NEW FORM OF CIVIL SOCIETY

IRAN, EGYPT AND INDIA

By Jordan Cmeyla

I. Introduction

When most political scientists consider political movement or protest activity within a

country, they study modes of civilian activity that deal with formal bureaucratic infrastructure.

These movements have a clear political objective, direct bureaucratic outlets, and tend to be

associated with middle class citizenry. Democracy and development, as we all know, flourish as

middle class citizenry increases: Middle class meaning those that are believed to be educated

enough, and wealthy enough to advocate their political interests. Furthermore we expect these

civilians to advocate for the expansion of freedoms and development, through formal

bureaucratic infrastructures. Such infrastructure pertains to government provision of outlets such

as education, sanitation and transportation, Internet access, health apparatuses, and energy

reliability, among others. This “infrastructure”, for the purpose of understanding this case study,

will be referred to as our understanding of formal civil society: These formal bureaucratic outlets

are the foundations for development and the advocacy of democratic ideals. That being said, in

many underdeveloped countries and likewise in autocratic polities that lack such formalized

institutions, new modes of informal and grassroots organization have emerged. These cases

existing outside our formal construct of civil society are oft overlooked as viable investments for

international objectives. Largely involving the poor and marginalized masses, we believe their

lack of clear political objective, and their reliance on day-to-day sustenance, hinders their worth

as viable advocates of development and democracy.

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But as the cases within Iran, Egypt and India will provide, under specific circumstances

these disenfranchised masses have flourished in creating their own forms of informal

organization. Their capacity to mobilize has been accentuated in autocratic polities restricting or

corrupting the interests of the existing middle class, as well as in underdeveloped and weak

states, where the bureaucratic structure to serve their interests is inexistent.

The purpose of this paper is to refute these theories that insist upon cookie-cutter

democratization policy, and also reshape our understanding of civil society in retrospect to

alternative and informal methods of activism. There are many instances that demonstrate the

power of the masses, and furthermore make us reconsider the need for middle class citizenry to

advocate democracy and also development. The examples presented are not supposed to prove

that mass citizenries are the mode of development. But, given reconstructed policies that

specifically target the wants of such mass citizenries, where applicable, the same political

activism that we usually accredit only to the middle class can be achieved. The cases discussed,

then, are meant to provide evidence of the capacity of the poor mass citizenry’s alternative

methods of activism to challenge their governing powers, and advocate for development and

democratic values.

II. Literature Review

a. Ineffective Middle Class and Civil Society

Because autocratic polities ban or highly restrict independent groups, political academia

tends to consider these societies as having weak or unorganized civil societies. Egypt and Iran’s

press’ are both considered “not free”, by Freedom House. Independent news and entertainment

sources are largely banned if not constantly haggled by government surveillance. Iran itself has

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no private broadcasting; all media is state run under the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

(IRIB). Furthermore TV satellite dishes are banned, and prey to confiscation by authorities. (CIA

World Factbook: Country Profile: Iran). Egypt in particular is infamous for its brutal police

violence on protestors. And a new anti-protest law passed recently, banning gatherings more than

10 people without notification of authorities. But even with law abidance, policing units lack the

training to utilize gradual use of force and too quickly implement deadly force upon seemingly

peaceful protestors.

In some instances, even, the civil infrastructure is not necessarily banned, but it is under

government manipulation. Jonathan Fox and Luis Hernandez conducted inquiry into the

effectiveness of the civil society in Mexico, stable and considered democratic, yet repressive,

state. They found that although Mexican activists had the means -trade unions, peasant

organizations, and business associations- all were controlled by the government. “ Membership

is often obligatory, and the leadership is chosen from above.”(Fox & Hernandez, p 167) What

they call a method of “carrots and sticks” Mexico’s autocratic success is implemented in giving

in to demands of some, while maintaining strict repression of would be threats. The strategy suits

Mexico’s needs for civil structures that allow it to claim democracy, yet the authority remains

uncontested by means of standard civil activism. Civilians cannot utilize these, so they turn to

the alternative methods that avoid the corrupt infrastructure. 1

Another assumption that makes our perception of civil society shortsighted is that we

think middle class interests are juxtaposed with suitable economic interests that ally against

Authoritarian values. Even when studying the third world, political attention will focus on the

limited middle class existing, looking to them for blossoming democratic ideologies. But beyond

1 Hernandez, Luis, and Jonathan Fox. "Mexico's Difficult Democracy: Grassroots Movements, NGOs, and Local Government." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 17, no. 2 (1992): 165-168.

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their obvious limited power due to size, some political scientists suggest that interests of the

Third World’s middle class are not the same as their contemporaries elsewhere, and thus cannot

be considered the activists for democracy we expect them to be. Jill Crystal argues, in her review

of sources on the matter, that within the Third World in general the middle class is not an

“ambiguous proponent of democratic values”. Although a small middle class with private sector

association exists, they often fall prey to the autocratic regime in power.2 She says, “members

want money even more than they want political participation. If they find nondemocratic ways to

protect economic interests they can live with that.” (Crystal, p 271) Obviously autocratic regimes

will jump at the opportunity to please these elites with favorable economic policies to circumvent

the possible uprising of democratic values.

Crystal also presents Joel Migdal’s work on post-colonial political society as another

reason Middle class interests could diverge. Colonizer and colonized relationships produced an

organizational structure in which efficient bureaucratic oversight involved utilizing local leaders.

The reverberations of this system resulted in localized elites as intermediaries between the

masses and centralized government. But, the government’s central power at mercy to the

localized elite, left government authorities to deal in patrimonial relations and scare tactics,

furthering the corruption of middle class interests.3

b. Education, Urbanization & Democracy: The Chicken and Egg

2 Crystal, Jill. "Review: Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World." World Politics 46, no. 2 (1994): 262-72. Accessed February 10, 2015. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2950675?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

3 Migdal, Joel. "State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another." 2001, 291pp.

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More classic conventional wisdom on social classes and political tendency, is resonated

throughout the work of Seymour Lipset. In his book Political Man, he aligns with the theory that

lower classes have no interest in democratic value. Using education-democratization philosophy,

he suggests that where literacy is higher, polity tends to be more democratic, and vice versa.

Furthermore he enunciates the correlation of urbanization upon democratic values. These

measurements are not invalid, but in some instances, do not correlate together. Autocratic Egypt

for example has a much larger urban population size versus democratic Lebanon and Turkey, yet

its literacy is half theirs. Lipset provides a more backwards analysis on social values in the

Middle Eastern region, as to why this may be so. Countries, like Egypt, for example, that have a

highly urbanized population that are illiterate become the breeding grounds for extremist and

autocratic values that prevent interests of democracy.4 And furthermore, while these masses may

have significant liberal and leftist economic values, they do not have interest in supporting civil

liberties and the like. 5

Lipset’s analysis utilizes the findings of Daniel Lerner, who in his research with The

Bureau of Applied Social Research, through 1951-1952 surveying Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran,

Turkey, and Lebanon, found that Urbanization, Literacy, Media Participation, and Political

participation all positively affect democratic polity.6 Where Egypt, as well as a few Latin

American countries, were deviant cases, Lipset brings political instability into the matter, which

is a very good point. The problem with his rationale, in retrospect to Lerner’s variables, is that

too much emphasis is put on the origin’s of autocratic values, and thus this instability, as

4 Lipset, Seymour. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Anchor Books Edition. New York, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960. 31-45 & 97-108.

5 Lipset, pg. 92

6 Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe. The Free Press, 1960

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originating from this urbanized illiterate. He does not go into considerable detail alleviating the

chicken before the egg problem at hand. These people are products of an Autocratic government

that is instable, and therefore ineffective. So how can one argue in the case of Egypt for example

that variables Lerner used and Lipset based his argument off-media and political participation-

hindered ineffective measurements under the current autocratic polity, can be variables aligned

in unison with Literacy? More simply put, Illiteracy is a result of autocratic policy-in terms of

instability- not the origins. Just as literacy, arguably is not necessarily the orgin of democracy,

it’s a result of the better infrastructure and liberalism associated with democracy.

Furthermore in states that cannot provide a big enough formal economic sector involving

jobs and infrastructure, the mass general population prefers to conduct informal economic

activities. Attempts to increase education in retrospect to development are oft completely

ineffective when the proper jobs to offer graduates and new intellectuals, are inexistent: A

vicious cycle occurs in underdeveloped states.

c. Weak Bureaucratic Infrastructure: Lack of Efficient public service

It is basic understanding of democracy and liberalism to ascertain bureaucratic

infrastructure is important. From it spells “peace and rule of law, the mobilization of large

numbers of people into politics, lobbying, civil services, and the infrastructure to hold the

government accountable for its spending.7 Mick Moore has delved into the influence of

globalization upon the emergence of countries’ infrastructure. In Late 20th century globalization,

he says, there are states that do not partake in the positive correlation of globalization and

infrastructure. Very poor states, states without viable resources to market, and states lacking

7 Moore, Mick. "Globalisation and Power in Weak States." Third World Quarterly 32, no. 10 (2011): 1757-776. Accessed March 13, 2015. http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=359600fa-2fde-4b11-afe4-ca27b2ec4630@sessionmgr4001&vid=4&hid=4208.

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land, fall into this category. Ascertaining that strong states emerge from internal revenue, he

stresses that some states, lacking the land to produce significant public good revenue, especially

in overly urbanized countries, rely on “elite political revenues” or revenue from the elites who

have some political power (our privatized middle class) but use it to assure the state enacts policy

that ensures their profit, not restrict it in lieu of liberalism.8 Moore argues, “Globalization has put

power in weak states into the hands of elites who often have strong incentives and extensive

opportunities to harvest elite political revenues, and lack motives to nurture or build the

institutions that might promote sources of general tax revenue. “ (Moore, 1772)

What’s more threatening to states already lacking the purveyors of infrastructure, is the

disincentive that international aid (direct and indirect) provides to obtain internal tax revenues.

Similar along the lines to Huntington’s position on rentier-state theory, democracy is hindered by

states taking in great export wealth (oil states) and providing a somewhat welfare relationship to

their people.9 With the state paying for schooling, retirement, etc, who needs to mobilize for a

better standard of living? And already receiving enough wealth, tax infrastructure isn’t a policy

concern. In his analysis of state formation in Europe, Charles Tilly, emphasized that what caused

citizens in Europe to demand representation was their states attempting to over-tax them.10 In the

rentier state, and furthermore in states not implementing a taxation bureaucratic structure,

Autocratic polities have more chance to survive.

Oil especially involves elite ownership that seeks to ensure their profits. Michael L.

Ross’s article “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” stresses the rentier-effect of oil wealth diligently.

8 Moore, p1764

9 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. pp31-32

10 Tilly, Charles. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton University Press, 1975.

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Although the states within this case study are not on the same level as Saudi Arabia, for example,

they do have significant proportions of oil exports. Iran, obviously high on the list, exports are

about 79% crude oil, Egypt’s, 21 % crude and gas petroleum, and India’s 20% refined

petroleum. Interestingly Ross’s article discusses how oil encourages elitism over other goods in

which more labor is required. 11Exporting crude oil, versus refining it, involves more labor, and it

will be interesting to compare the elitist political interest in Iran to India.

The patrimonial tendencies of oil and rentier states are obviously to the extreme, but

many socio-political scientists argue that these tendencies are found socially and economically in

much of the third-world as well. Roth in his article, “Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and

Empire-building in the New States”, stresses that in most underdeveloped countries merit based

authority is overruled by what he calls, “personal rulership’”. In which client-clientele

relationships based on material gain determines power structures.12 But beyond this social

tendency Third World countries suffer an even further economic infliction as Robin Theobald

explains in his article on patrimonialism. He says, “Third World states tend to be caught in a

vicious cycle of underdevelopment: their ability to appropriate resources is severely hampered by

administrative weaknesses; but these weaknesses are, in turn, perpetuated by their restricted

ability to appropriate resources.” Going back to the importance of taxation, third world countries

find it difficult to tax large and poor populations, so the wealthier remain patrons. These patrons

then can avoid taxes themselves under favorable policy in exchange for their loyalty to the

11 Ross, Michael. Does Oil Hinder Democracy?. World Politics. (April 2001). pp 331-332.

12 Roth, Guenther. "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-bulding in the New States." World Politics vol. 20 (1968): 194-206.

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regime in power. It’s a cyclical problem that makes the formation of government bureaucracy

and infrastructure difficult.13

d. “Insurrectionist Movements” vs. “Social Movements”

One of the purveyors of alternative political activism theory, Asef Bayat, lists the

differences and benefits of unorganized movement in his article contrasting Iranian and Egyptian

Islamist movements, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution”. He

ascertains that there are two types of popular discontent. “The first type, protest or

insurrectionary movements, …aims solely to negate the existing order; they may or may not be

able to build an alternative structure. The second, social movements, aim to alter the dominant

arrangements but also attempt to establish alternative institutions and value systems before a

total change.” (Bayat, 139) These, he says tend to be informally organized and rely heavily on

mass participation. They also only utilize or construct informal institutions and non-institutions:

“Alternative electoral systems in autonomous unions, syndicates, neighborhoods and

associations for the excluded groups are a few of their institutional manifestations. Furthermore,

alternative religious and cultural organizations---Schools, holidays, charities, political parties as

well as those dealing with music, art, customs, and even laws---are set up to serve as a moral

community in which excluded people can feel at home.” (Bayat, 141) These institutions coexist

with the dominant order, whether due to sheer impossibility of disposing of them, or simply

because they are not perceived as a threat. Because of this coexistence they, unlike direct

revolutionary seeking movements, are able to resist the immediate backlash of the dominant

power, and last for more prolonged periods of time. Encouraging entire societal and ideological

13 Theobald, Robin. "Patrimonialism." World Politics 43, no. 4 (1982): P 558. Accessed March 16, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010334.

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change, that once achieved will be able to foster a new governmental order at a slower pace, but

more effective in the long-term goal of stability. 14

Another arguable benefit of social movements is what David S. Meyer and Nancy

Whittier call “Social Movement Spillover”. Unlike insurrectionary movements that utilize ‘with

us or not with us’ protest activities,15 social movements have the ability to influence and

encourage other social movements. The spillover affect has the potential to induce faster and

vaster mass participation. 16Furthermore, it is not naïve to assume that with specific articulation

(in points of interaction between two movements within informal institutions) strategy can be

made to further democratic leaning values or what not, by assimilating other groups.

Some theorists though, unlike what Bayat argues, only prescribe worth to social

movements that do have a political aim, vague, maybe, but withstanding. One might argue that

because the informal social factors described by Bayat coexist contentedly within the framework

of the current power, they do not pose a threat to dominant ideology. Reinhard Benedix, In

Nation-Building and Citizenship, describes early civil unrest in England as having clear, if not

political objective.17 Marx too has discussed the uprisings of the disenfranchised within

developing Europe of a working and peasant class against their immediate oppressors, the elite,

and their economic monopolies. 18 The difference is that these actors had clear enemies, and thus

14 Bayat, Asef. "Revolution Without Movement, Movement Without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt." Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, no. 1 (1998): 136-42.

15 Bayat calls the exclusionary effect of protests in insurrectionary movements, the ‘with us or not with us’ attitude in his book Life as Politics.

16 Meyer, David, and Nancy Whittier. "Social Movement Spillover." Social Problems 41, no. 2 (1994): 227-98.

17 Benedix, Reinhard. "Transformations of Western Societies." In Nation-Building and Citizenship, 61-71. John Wiley & Sons,1964.

18 Marx, Karl. "The Communist Manifesto." 1848.

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clear objective. The masses wanted their stakes in the emergence of the modern, and economic

state system, and acted to secure their future in it. By comparison the disenfranchised masses

Bayat describes have no foreseeable political future. They are at their states’ wits end: a new

political and social order, unlike what was sweeping across the continent in Marx’s time, is not

directly being pursued.

e. Quiet Encroachment of the Mass Population

The phenomenon that is the mass population’s alternative civil society, can be summed

up in a definition of what Bayat calls, “Quiet Encroachment”. This is the “silent, protracted, and

pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in a quest for survival

and improvement of their lives.” What makes quiet encroachment a revolutionary apparatus for

political dissent is that one, it is not costly to the actors, but to the state and the rich. Secondly, it

is not merely resistance, it is offensive: The actors extend their space by winning new positions

that encroach upon the state. “This kind of activism challenges many fundamental state

prerogatives, including the meaning of “order,” control of public space, and the meaning of

“urban.” But the most immediate consequence is the redistribution of social goods in the form of

the (unlawful and direct) acquisition of collective consumption (land, shelter, piped water,

electricity), public space (street pavements, intersections, street parking places), and

opportunities (favorable business conditions, locations, and labels).” (Bayat, pp 90). 19

A large component of quiet encroachment is the informal economic sector. Many third

world and developing countries across the globe have been affected by development policy that

19 I draw main points here from, Bayat, Asef. "The Poor and the Perpetual Pursuit of Life Changes." In Life as Politics How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009. From Bayat, Asef. Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Chap. 1. and from his article: “Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the ‘Informal People’.” Third World Quarterly. 18 no. 1 (1997): 53-72. Academic Search Complete. Web. Accessed Jan 2015.

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encourages and results in urbanized centers, with fast growing populations. These rural-urban

migrations for many early demographers, was predicted to cause an excesses labor supply in city

centers. Forced out of the limited formal market, the new migrants were considered

“marginalized” peoples, struggling to make ends meet.20 Yet in lieu of these assumptions,

academia all over the world were giving claim to seemingly “marginalized” peoples making

huge encroachments upon their economic centers. Anthropologist, Keith Hart, was employed by

the International labor Office to study urban markets in Ghana in the 70s. His findings were

conclusive in that there was a formal sector- in which salaried persons- would fall as well as a

completely informal sector that encompassed self-employed entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs,

although avant garde, were making gains comparable to those working in the formal sector. 21

Street vending, illegal alternative transportation, not to mention all the economic gains to be

earned in the illegal housing sector, are all part of an informal economy consisting of networks

and organization profiting at the expense of the formal economy and also the regime.

An alternative analysis of why informal sectors could have emerged has not to do with

arguing that migrants became entrepreneurial because of the amount of excess labor, but that

they did so because they were barred from the formal sector by legal barriers. In his book The

Other Path, Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto, argues that in the Latin American

mercantilist model, elites already controlling urban markets, feeling threatened by the potential

competition of these migrators, barred participation in the formal sector.22 This fearful-

20 Portes, Alejandro, and Richard Schauffler. "Competing Perspectives on the Latin American Informal Sector.". Population and Development Review 19, no. 1 (1993): 39-40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938384.

21 Hart, Keith. "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana." Journal of Modern African Studies 11 (1973): 61-89.

22 De Soto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Informal Revolution. New York, New York: Harper and Row, 1981.

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commercialized-elite resonates with Crystal’s argument mentioned before; a small economically

privatized middle class will not push for economic liberalization or democratic values that give

more power to potential competitors.

III. Research Conclusion and Research Design

To conclude upon the research provided, conditions under autocratic polities; their

oppressive nature and their ability to win over the small-privatized middle class (found in third

world countries) with favorable economic policy, has, along with weak state power, rendered

standard modes of civil society ineffective. Without state interest in investing in bureaucratic

institutions -the underpinnings of democratic organization -firstly, on account of their more

autocratic policies, secondly, on account of a corrupted elite/middle class with patrimonial

tendencies, the trickle down approach to increasing middle class will prove very problematic.

That is why it is important to look to the liberal economic, but informal, infrastructure of the

urbanized masses.

In this case study I will be analyzing the urban centers in which quiet encroachment has

become a major socio-political phenomenon: Egypt, Iran, and India. Firstly I will conduct an

analysis on the relationships between poverty, population, stability, polity, and bureaucracy on a

global basis. Secondly, I will discuss in detail why these specific countries positions within that

analysis will be the reasons for their quiet encroachment capacities. Lastly, I will cover instances

of quiet encroachment within their urban centers, which are resultant of their positions within the

analysis.

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All three countries were colonized at some point in the last century (notably all to Great

Britain) so they will have post-colonial repercussions. All three are underdeveloped,

bureaucratically and economically. In addition to large population sizes, they all have large

portions of those living in poverty. Iran and Egypt will have similar cultural tendencies, as well

as governments of autocratic leaning. India will be contrasted with them in that it is a relatively

free country and its population size is considerably larger. This study, thus, aims to present the

mass disenfranchised citizenry both in Egypt and Iran as lucrative investments for international

interests to organize from the bottom up in rallying democratic values against an autocratic

regime, and against their countries’ corrupted elites and slewed middle classes.

IV. Theory and Hypotheses

a. Hypotheses: The Implications of Polity, Political Stability, Poverty, and

“Capable” Population Size on Formal Civil Society

Because quiet encroachment is a case-by-case and entirely informal phenomenon, it is

difficult to measure in non-qualitative forms. So, to strengthen this analysis, we will instead look

as to why, and under what circumstances, do alternative civil societies arise. The dependent

variable that will be used in this examination is a numerical value provided by the Failed State

Index which ranks a country’s internal pressures from the lack of public infrastructure and

services, including public safety, sanitation, and access to basic utilities. (cite) In other words:

the weakness of a country’s formal bureaucratic infrastructure.

Our first independent variable will be a country’s polity level derived from Monty Marshall

and Benjamin Cole’s Polity IV Project: -10 being most Autocratic and +10 most democratic. The

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second independent variable is percent population size of those in between the ages 15 and 64.

This variable, what we will call “capable” population size, is used to isolate most-likely civil

actors. The third variable is a percent population living under a $1.25 a day based on percent

Purchasing Power Parity within that country. The last independent variable is political stability,

which reflects on perceptions within a country that the government will be destabilized by

unconstitutional or violent means. (Worldwide Government Indicators). A linear regression will

be run to determine these variables significance on the existence of formal bureaucracy, and a

correlation coefficients test will be run, presented by a multivariable scatter plot, to test the

independent relationships between all variables. It must be noted that considerably these

variables all inter-correlate. To prevent theoretic redundancy, it is important to understand that

these variables cross-correlated, will implicate specifically where our cases make an exemption

to general political theory. Thus; the inter-correlations are not meant to prove what causes what,

exactly, just that they occur simultaneously. See Figure 1 for linear regression analysis; see

Figure 2 for correlation coefficients and graph 1, for inter-variable relationships.

V. Data Analysis

i. H1 Polity and Bureaucracy

Conceptually, we are very familiar with the fact that polity and bureaucratic

infrastructure correlate. Autocratic states ban, restrict, or control the formal bureaucratic

institutions to protect their hold on power. Likewise we expect democratic states to possess

vaster bureaucratic institutions. Polity, correspondingly, correlates with most of the other

independent variables: More democratic, larger population size of civil actors; and more

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democratic, more political stability. But, poverty and polity, do not directly correlate, they do

interact through these sister variables. Polity will play a particularly explanatory position in

determining where, and why our individual cases coincide as well as contrast, especially in

regards to Egypt and Iran.

ii. H2 Poverty and Bureaucracy

A country with a larger poverty-stricken population congruently associates with its

possession of efficient bureaucratic infrastructure: The poorer, the less efficient. Much like the

other variables, this is based on many parallel factors. Autocratic states statistically rule over

poorer populations, meaning weaker bureaucracy. And in contrast, democratic states statistically

will have wealthier populations, and stronger, more efficient bureaucracies.

iii. H3 “Capable” Population and Bureaucracy

As discussed prior, “Capable” population refers to the actors that are most likely to

engage in civil society. Populations between the age 15 and 64, will, being the larger working

population, be more concerned with economic issues, regarding unemployment, workers rights,

and fair pay. Likewise, they are the most formidable social advocates for sanitation

transportation, and educational concerns, and community activists in retrospect to children and

senior citizens. “Capable” population size, although having a slight weaker significance than the

other variables, does correlate with bureaucratic infrastructure: the larger the “capable”

population size, the stronger the bureaucratic infrastructure.

iv. H4 Stability and Bureaucracy

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Lastly, political stability and bureaucratic infrastructure similarly correlate. The more

stable a regime, the more likely it has an efficient bureaucratic infrastructure. Citizens- and

alternative political parties- are content that they can effectively play a part in state political and

social issues, and are less likely to usurp or violently oust the ruling regime. Arguably because

polity also correlates with stability, we will expect autocratic states, that are instable, to have

weak bureaucracies.

b. Theoretical Discrepancies: Egypt, Iran, and India

By running the linear regression analysis and cross-correlation analysis on the

circumstances in which quiet encroachment emerges-at the offset of weak formal bureaucratic

infrastructure, we can now determine wherein our case studies uphold the theories put forth by

our hypotheses, where they diverge, and specifically which independent variables most influence

their weak formal bureaucratic infrastructures. Two themes of discrepancy were found in the

cases of Egypt, Iran, and India in regards to their independent variables regarding bureaucracy.

See Table 1 for hypothesis clarification.

i. The Large Population Problem

The first is the problem of a large overall population. The polity hypothesis for India; that

we would expect India to have a strong bureaucracy because it is highly democratic, was proven

irrelevant. India’s bureaucracy rank was significantly weaker than that of Egypt and Iran, who

expectedly had weak infrastructures being autocratic polities. While there can be a few perhaps

partial influences as to why this is, the most obvious problematic component of India’s situation

is its massive population size. In comparison to Egypt and Iran, who each dock in at about 80-

85million inhabitants, India’s population is about fifteen times that size at over a billion people.

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Implementing an effective bureaucratic infrastructure to serve a population this size under one

government is extremely difficult to do.

Likewise, India’s proportion of poor population affects this bureaucratic weakness.

Supporting the poverty hypothesis, ***and in lieu of population size of over a billion, it is no

surprise that poverty coexist to cause bureaucratic weakness. **The poverty theory with Egypt

and Iran did not concur: Egypt and Iran, both had very low percentages of population living in

poverty, yet they still have significantly weak bureaucratic infrastructures. This is an example

where some independent variables appear to take precedence over others: The polity theory, or

autocracy, had a greater effect than poverty on the strength of bureaucracy for these countries.

ii. The Autocratic Polity Problem

Egypt and Iran, do not support the “capable” population theory on account of having

autocratic polities and weak bureaucracies in addition to having large populations of people in

between the ages of 15-64. Moreover Iran’s “capable” population size is almost ten-percent more

than Egypt’s, and is significantly more autocratic, which displays the discrepancy further. Based

on the theoretical hypothesis we would expect Iran and Egypt to both have small “capable”

populations to coincide with their weak bureaucratic infrastructures. The discrepancy here

exhibits one of the main concepts presented in this paper. The large “capable” population size of

these countries that are governed under autocratic policies that provide little to no formal civil

society outlets, have no choice but to resort to alternative and informal means of civil action.

VI. Alternative Civil Society

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a. Egypt

Unlike what many had expected and had hoped for from post-Arab Spring Egypt and

from the democratically elected regime of Mohamed Morsi, within the past two years Egypt has

lost two points on their polity score. In June 2013, Morsi was ousted by a member of his own

cabinet, Minister of Defense and Military Production, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Although, arguably

Morsi was displaced on the pretense of his and his party’s, The Muslim Brotherhood, seemingly

undemocratic policymaking. Regardless the political turmoil has rendered Egypt politically

instable, and consequently its bureaucratic infrastructure is very weak.

Egypt’s urban residents make up around 41 % of its population and about 18 million

people live in Cairo alone. “Greater Cairo contains over 111 spontaneous settlements

(ashwaiyyat) housing more than 6 million people who have subdivided land and put up shelters

unlawfully. Throughout the country, 344 square kilometers of land has come under occupation or

illegal construction, mainly by low-income groups. Some 84 percent of all housing units from

1970 and 1981 were informally built. The capital for construction comes mainly from the

informal credit associations (gama’iyyat) located in neighborhoods. Many rent the homes

unlawfully to other poor families. The prospective tenant provides the “key money,” which he

borrows from a credit association, to a plot holder, who then uses it to build but rents it tot the

provider of the key money. The plot holder becomes a homeowner, and the tenant finds a place

to live. Both break the law that allows only one year’s advance on rent.”

The illegal credit system in Egypt makes up a large portion of its informal economic

sector. In additions, street venders, operating networks of convenient street front booths or stores

(dukan), prove a major problem for regime authorities. Hundreds lining each street the vendors

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circumvent punishment from sheer numbers. Their profits are largely illegally tax-free. As we

discussed in the literature section this informal economic sector has the potential to make great

funds at the hands of the elite and government. The store owners are quick to scatter when the

authorities make their rounds, but almost immediately return after the authorities move on to the

next street. This unrelenting persistence, combined with large numbers of actors across the city is

what makes a governmental crack down difficult. With no other jobs to offer, the formal

economy is forced to accept these practices as norms, or wind up with millions of unemployed

and homeless.

In addition many street vendors have complex networks between capital owners and

amongst each other. In which patrimonial relations along with corrupt dealings, storeowners

receive their goods to sell from formal economy participants. In the beach city of Dahab, located

on the small reef lined southern coast of the Sinai peninsula, about 30 or fewer stores make shop.

The owners, each connected with a group of others in small conglomerate-like relationships, link

prices up with one another to prevent any other one-store from taking all the potential buyers

with cheaper prices. For tourists seeking to weed out the cheapest price on a good, of which

every store generally has the same of, the Egyptian vendors can be quite stubborn. The goods

they sell are sold in a fixed-price fashion because all the goods generally originate from

“factories” or the informal and illegal slums and neighborhoods which mass produce things like

jewelry boxes, figurines, and “handmade” papaya papers. To be resold in “original” shops. 23

With a 15% tourism contribution to GDP, tourism-related informal economy has the potential to

greatly tilt the informal-formal balance in Egypt. Not to mention street vendors ability to

formulate group effort in order to regulate profit demonstrates their capacity to organize.

23 These insights were gained from my own personal inquiries amongst store owners in Egypt.

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b. Iran

Iran’s autocratic nature is undeniably a cause of informal resistance; furthermore the

strict and conservative nature of their religious regime has pushed liberalists into the limelight.

In Iran particularly social non-movements of the youth have shown prominent challenge to

regime authority. Ritualistic resistance in the form of hidden concert venues, making parties out

of religious holidays, pre-marital sexuality, and violating laws of dress is commonplace.

Shattering the Islamists’ image of dutiful religious individuals, they usurped the regimes aura of

control. Their extensive networks are entirely informal and unorganized yet they still manage to

make a joke out of their authorities. (Bayat, pg 121-125)

“Immediately after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, many poor families took over

hundreds of vacant homes and half-finished apartment blocks, refurbishing them as their own

properties and establishing apartment councils to manage them collectively. In the meantime,

land takeovers and illegal construction accelerated. With the help of local and outside mobilizers,

squatters got together and demanded electricity and running water; when they were refused or

encountered delays, they acquired them illegally. They established roads, opened clinics and

stores, constructed mosques and libraries, and organized refuse collections. They further set up

associations and community networks and participated in local consumer cooperatives.” (Bayat

pg 74)

c. India

India, although a relatively more stable, and significantly democratic state, suffers from

internal religious conflict between Hindus and Muslim populations. Also the peculiar nature with

which India was liberalized has caused a secular political aura to formulate in retrospect to the

Cmeyla, 21

anti-colonial nationalism it spurred from. The struggle between the two dominant religious

enables the state to function secularly for effective rule.24 Regardless its successful electorally

placed regimes, and democratic nature has rendered it the opposite of the polity hypothesis (H1).

Thus its weak bureaucratic nature is largely due to its immense population living in poverty size

(H2). For India, many methods of alternative civil society deal with the informal economic

sector. Likewise illegal housing and slums, as well as illegal street vending provide major

platforms for actors.

In India in particular we experience more interaction between government actors and its

mass poor citizenry. India is infamous for its bureaucratic functioning that revolves around

bribes and corrupt government officials. Furthermore, India’s attempts to formalize the illegal

economic activities have appeared to simply enlarge them. In one particular interesting case

study by Nisha Taneja and Sanjib Pohit, the Bilateral and free/preferential trade agreements

(FTA/PTA) that require strict rules of origin, have resulted in only intensifying illegal export and

import across the Indian-Nepali border. 25 Because the mass size of the poverty stricken, Indian

officials find difficulty in quelling their illegal and informal activities. Unfortunately many

corrupt officials seek to profit from providing important governmental services to those willing

to pay, offsetting the balance of middle class and lower class further in regards to access to

public goods and services.

24 Kesavan, Mukul. "India's Embattled Secularism." The Wilson Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003): 1-2. Accessed April 1, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40260706.

25 Pohit, Sanjib, and Nisha Taneja. "India's Informal Trade with Nepal." Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 25 (2001): 2263-269. Accessed April 1, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410778

Cmeyla, 22

VII. Conclusion

The urbanized mass citizenry and their capacity to exert considerable energy into

demanding the goods, means, and sustenance they need in their day to day survival, have not

been portrayed as a successful purveyors of democratic interest. Contrary to public belief about

the poor and their disinterest in politics, these individuals do have interest in liberal policies, if

not more so than their self-interested middle class counterparts. By funneling money into top

down approaches to encouraging democratic value, international interests are worsening their

odds by investing in corrupted or even non-existent formal civil societies. In certain countries

where the bureaucratic structure is extremely weak for reasons of autocratic polity or mass

population size, the top down approach, whether it be by education expenditures, or other

middle-class size increasing policy, does not successfully transform societal value and

interests.

Social non-movements, on account of their non-political nature, are more successful in

instances where immediate movements would be squashed by the autocratic regime in place.

By organizing these informal factors, or providing better informal infrastructure (networks

placed on informal actors like mosques and neighborhood communities), international interests

could better control and rally these actors in ways that will not immediately show threat to the

regime in power. Yet they will have mass social repercussions that will usurp the leading

ideology.

Furthermore the problem with a weak bureaucratic infrastructure in any polity incites

difficulty in top-down developmental approaches. Educational spending within a country

Cmeyla, 23

rattled with poverty and the lack of employment opportunities is somewhat redundant: a

vicious cycle occurs in which the costs of going to school are not outweighed by the benefits.

While the cases provided here are extreme cases indeed, they still accentuate potential

international interest in organizing the unorganized to tackle difficult polities in an effective

and underhanded manner. Egypt and Iran definitely fall into this category of interest. India, on

the other hand could benefit from restructuring our idea of formal infrastructures, and finding a

way to organize informal actors that would suit developmental interests.

This case study could have benefited from a wider analysis of autocratic polity and quiet

encroachment to determine if the regional and cultural tendencies of the Middle Eastern region

have a greater effect than presumed on the masses ability to work together. Likewise it would

have been beneficial to include a quantitative variable to test the hypotheses of middle class

interests and their political ideologies. On the other hand it is important to stress that the

hypotheses presented are based on a worldwide analysis of data. Our cases are the outliers to

the general relationship of the variables. By showing this analysis first, we were able to

successfully analyze why our countries were exceptions to the general theories we analyzed.

In the future it is hoped that international interests will seek to mobilize informal actors

from the ground up to encourage more successful regime and ideological change. Also

utilizing policies oriented to suit the mass poverty stricken mass-not the elitist middle class-

will have more successful developmental results in countries that immediately lack effective

bureaucratic infrastructure. The bottom up approach could be a faster method to encourage

democratic values, and international players should look into crafting informally based civil

apparatuses.

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VIII. Appendix I

Table 1

IX. Appendix II

Figure 1: Linear Regression

Coefficientsa

Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig. 95.0% Confidence Interval for B

B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound

1 (Constant) 12.431 1.295 9.597 .000 9.861 15.002

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pop1564 -.106 .019 -.412 -5.449 .000 -.144 -.067

pop1day .028 .005 .390 5.219 .000 .017 .039

polity -.041 .016 -.122 -2.522 .013 -.073 -.009

polstabil -.496 .111 -.223 -4.452 .000 -.717 -.275Dependent variable: fsipubserv

Table 2: Correlation coefficients

Graph 1

Correlations

fsipubserv pop1564 pop1day polity polstabil

Pearson Correlation fsipubserv 1.000 -.810 .794 -.333 -.488

pop1564 -.810 1.000 -.791 .187 .297

pop1day .794 -.791 1.000 -.157 -.265

polity -.333 .187 -.157 1.000 .322

polstabil -.488 .297 -.265 .322 1.000

Sig. (1-tailed) fsipubserv . .000 .000 .000 .000

pop1564 .000 . .000 .029 .001

pop1day .000 .000 . .055 .003

polity .000 .029 .055 . .000

polstabil .000 .001 .003 .000 .

N fsipubserv 104 104 104 104 104

pop1564 104 104 104 104 104

pop1day 104 104 104 104 104

polity 104 104 104 104 104

polstabil 104 104 104 104 104

Cmeyla, 26

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