UNITED NATIONS' CHANGING ROLE IN THE POST-C … · 2008-05-22 · UNITED NATIONS' CHANGING ROLE IN THE POST-C OLD WAR ERA DİLEK LATİF ... Although the big powers gaye lip service

UNITED NATIONS' CHANGING ROLE INTHE POST-C OLD WAR ERA

DİLEK LATİF

ABSTRACT:

This artiele analyzes the changing role of the United Nations in thepost-Cold War cra. Af ter the end of the Cold War, many internal confiictsbroke out in different parts of the world. There was a dramatic demand for theUN peacekeeping operations. Thus, the UN started to challenge traditionalnorms of international politics, such as state sovereignty, non-interventioninto domestic affairs, and non-use of force in peacekeeping operations, anditself as an internationalorganization. Within this context, this paper willexamine the UN pcacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era; form erSecretary General Boutros Ghali's "An Agenda for Peacc"; case studies ofBosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Cambodia; blurring distinction betweenpeacekeeping and peace enforcement; and humanitarian intervention of theUN. The artiele also sccks to analyze structural reform proposals for the UNto respond the chaııenges it faces today. Current issues of the SccurityCouncil reform proposals and fınancing the UN will be discussed.

KEYWORDS:

United Nations; Post-Cold War Era; Peacekeeping Operations;Structural Reforms.

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ı. Introduction

THE TIJRKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

Fifty-four years ago the United Nations was bom out of thesufferings caused by the Second World War. The purpose of theOrganization, as indicated in its Charter, was to save succeedinggenerations from the seourgc of war. it aimed to correct theLeague of Nations' deficiencies, and managed to surviye sinceı945, twice as long as the League of Nations.

In conformity with the Charter of the UN, the Icadership ofthe UN in peaee and seeurity matters rests on the superpowers.However, emergenee of the Cold War and its outcome in terms ofbloc politics prevented the UN to perform its primary goal of themaintenance of peace and seeurity. In thc hostile environment ofthe Cold War, the UN could not play its role to implement theCharter provisions in many cases related to international peace andsecurity. Though the Cold War prevented the UN to functionsatisfactorily in the peace and seeurity matters, it neverthelesssueeessfully pursued its Charter goals in many other areas such asdecolonization, protection of human rights, respect forinternational law, promotion of social progress and better livingstandards for the people. In addition, to remedy the superpowerrivalry the UN made some adjustments to eope with the threats tointernational peaee and security.

Sinee the establishment of the UN, dramatic changesoceurred in the world structure. The membership of the UN hasincreased sharply from 42 states to i85 states. The Third Worldmembers of the UN, using their majority in the General Assembly(GA) tried to shift the UN agenda from political and securitymatters to economical ones. Besides, the weight of the individualstates on the world arena has ehanged, and new eountries emergedwith new role s in world affairs. In addition, the Organization, facedwith different cireumstanees and ehallenges in different periods,tried to make adjustments and sought ways to overeome them. Forexample, to get rid of the paralyzing effeet of the veto, regularlyused by the supcrpowers against each other during the Cold War,the peaeekeeping operations were invented. Likewise, the GAshared the responsibility of the Security Council (SC) againstthreats to international peaee and security under the "Uniting for

2000] UN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 25

Peace" proeedure. The aim of these innovations was to make theOrganization in a way function even in the Cold War environment.

After the fading away of the Cold War, and the disintegrationof the Soviet Union, there was a brief movement of hope and greatexpectations for the UN. It was beIieved that, at last theOrganization eould now start perfonn its original role as it wasdesigned in the Charter. At that time, collective response to theIraq's aggression against Kuwait strengthened the hopes for thefuture role of the UN in maintaining international peace andsecurity. But, the Gulf War became the last case of the traditionalkind of interstate confIicts in the post-Cold War era. On theeontrary, many intra-state disputes, kept frozen during the ColdWar, exploded. Marcover, wiıh the end of the Gulf War, the UN'snew kind of operations in the name of humanitarian interventionstarted. Consequenııy, ıhere was a dramatie demand for the UNpeacekeeping operations to respond to all kinds of eonfliets takingplace in different parts of the world. In response, the UN had toungergo a remarkable renaissance in its efforts to deal world'sproblem s sinee the end of the Cold War.

The scope of this artiele is thus to analyze the UN's changingrole in the maintenance of international peace and security in thepost-Cold War era. Wiıhin this scope, the UN coııeclive security,peacekeeping and pcace enforcement operations will be examined.Refonn proposals to adapt the UN into the changing circumstancesof the post-Cold War environment will be alsa analyzed. The mainobjective is to examine whether the UN has been successful indealing with the chaııenges to international peace and security, andin confIicl management in the post-Cold War era. This will beanalyzed boıh in tenns of conflict management and of structuralreform.

2. Historical Evolution of the United Nations

As World War i led lo the fonnalion of the League ofNations, World War II led to the establishment of the UnitedNations. The victorious powers thought after World War I that therewas a need for the League of Nations to institute a calming downperiod, so that states would not enter unwisely into destruclive wars.Similarly, the winners of World War II beIieved that astronger

26 THETUR~SHYEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

world organization was needed, one with a security council that hadthe authority to tak e binding decisions to oppose calculatedaggression and cope with other threats to peace. In each case, theaim was to develop ways and means of maintaining peace andstability after a destmctive world war.

The UN was established in 1945 and aimed to correct theLeague of Nations Covenant's deficiencies. The intentian of themajor powers in formulating the UN Charter was to remedy thefundamental weaknesses of the League such as the absence ofeffective collective security arrangements for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security, and ultimate freedom of amember state to use force to effect a senIement.

Several defıciencies in the League's compasition finallycontributed to its failure. To sum up, the Covenant restricted theright to go to war but did not outlaw it. Recourse to war remainedan optian for the states. The most important great deficiency of theLeague was the power politics of that time. Although the bigpowers gaye lip service to the idea of "Collective Security", in factthey practised balance of power. The assumption of universalmembership could not be achieved since the US never joined to theLeague. The USSR was later expelled because of its invasion ofFinland. Unanimity among all members was required for actian,but members could reject to participate and leave if they choose.Mareaver, the provisions for establishing the League were anintegral part of the Treaty of Versailles, which excluded the axispowers and led them to alienation and sabotage.

As time passed, problems of the interwar period aggravatedthese obvious weaknesses. Members of the League re-establishedalliance system s and refused to take actian against aggression. TheLeague of Nations broke down and international community wasdriven to World War II although the formal dissolution of theLeague occurred in 1946. In 1946, the League of Nationsdissolved itself; its assetsı property and same of its functions weretransferred LO the UN.!

lEveryone's United Nations, New York: Department of Public InformationPress, 1995, p. 5.

2000) UN IN THE POST-COill WAR ERA 27

However, World War-II co-operation among the AlliedPowers did not continue for a long time. After the establishment ofthe UN in 1945, the world became divided ideologically into twocamps, whose leaders the USSR and the US treated each other intotal distrust and seemed to oppose each other on every majorissue.2 The wartime bonds which brought the USSR, the US andBritain together against the German, ıtalian and Japaneseaggression broken by the achievement of victory. As a result,conflict bctween the USA and the USSR after World War IIprevented their cooperation for international peace and security,thus undermined the effectiveness of the UN.

The UN Charter's requirement for unanimity among thepermanent members of the SC indicated the realities of powerpolitics of World War LI period. However, the Soviet Unioıı'sestablishment of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe ended thebig power co-operaıion, which post-World War LI order hadpredicıed, and rising disunity made SC operations extremelyproblemalic.3

In an atternpt to understand how the UN of 1945 became thepresent UN, it is necessary to divide ils last forty-four years duringthe Cold War into stages: Stage 1(1945- i960), Stage 2 (1960-1975), Stage 3 (1975-1989).

Stage 1: 1945-1960

In this period, the Cold War tensions between US-Ied Westand the USSR-lcd East, made the most important intended changefrom the League of Nations impossible. The idea that the SCshould be directed by the great powers failed because of themistrust between the superpowers. In a world divided between tworival ideological bloes, power vacuums, economic andpsychological warfare, a major arms race, and peripheral powercontests, the UN was dominated by the US, its Western Allies, and

2Katherina Savage, The Sıory of the United Nations, New York: The BodIeyHead Ltd. ı970, p. ll.3Karen A. Mingst and Margarct P. Karens, The UN in the Post Cold WarEra, Colorada: Wcstview Press, 1995 p. 29.

28 THETURKISHYEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

Latin American followers.4 During this early Cold War period, theUS mainly use d the UN to contain the USSR.

In this environment, it was impossible to create the proposedUN machinery for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity. Since East and West did not trust each other to carry outmilitary actian on behalf of the UN, the SC activities becamestrictly limited. The Korean War was the most important example,which showed that the UN became an arena of ideological strugglebetween the two bloes. During the Korcan War, the UN movedfrom being simply a forum for diplomatic pressure andpropaganda to play a forceful role in a way not envisaged by theCharter.5

The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis was anather deviatian from theCharter, different from the Korcan War. Since British and Frenchvetoes deadlocked SC action, the GA again used the "Uniting forPeace" procedure to discuss the Crisis. The majority of the GeneralAssembly supported the idea that the British and French troopsshould be replaced by a UN force. Thus, United NationsEmergency Force (UNEF) in Suez became the first case of suchmilitary intervention of the Organization, deployed with theconsent of Egypt and Isracı' Peace-keeping operations had thusbeen invented for conflict management. It was a concept not foundin the Charter, but came into usage from the special needs of theCold War situation. Otherwise, UN would have been completclyirrelevant to the maintenance of international peace and securitybecause of the superpower competition and continvous veto.

While the Charter does not mentian pcacekeeping operations,specific measures to achieve the objectives of the Charter are setout in Chapters VI and VLi.6 Chapter VI states that the memberstates have to settle their disputes by peaceful means withoutendangering international peace, security and justice. UnderChapter VII, the SC has to determine the existence of any threat to

4Saul H. Mendlovitz and Bums H. Weston, Preferred Futuresfor the UnitedNations. New York: Transnational Publishers Ine., 1995, p. 12.5lbid., p. 70.6Qizhi He, "The Crucial Role of the UN in Maintaining Peaee and Security"in The UN At Fifty, Christian Tomusehat (ed.), Hague: Kluwer Law Int.,1995, p. 84.

2000] UN IN TIlE POST -COlD WAR ERA 29

the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and makerecommendations, or decide what measures to be taken to maintaininternational peace and security. The Secretary General DagHammarskjold, during his tenure, called conception ofpeacekeeping "Chapter VI and a Half', and peace situated itsidentity midway between dispute seulement and peaceenforcement. Thus it came to be considered as a bridge betweenthe measures stipulated in the Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.

Peacekeeping operations have come to be defined asoperations involving military personnel, but without enforcementpowers, undertaken by the UN to help to maintain or restoreinternational peace and security in areas of contlict.? The objectivein peace keeping operations is not to dereat an aggressor instead toprevent fighting, act as a bu ffer, keep order and maintain a cease-fire. Peace keeping forces cannot use force except in self-defense.They have to be neutral and impartial towards the adversaries.Funhermore, the peacekeepers must be present with the consent ofthe disputing panies, or at least the consent of one of them and thetoleration of the other.8 When consent is withdrawn, the force mustbe removed. Otherwise, sovereignty of the states would be violatedaccording to the original or as it became "traditional peacekeeping" operations.

However, the UN operation in Congo from 1960 to 1964illustrated the way in which the Cold War continued to dominate.the UN in the security field. At the same time, it showed the limitsof the peacekeeping operations. Although a unified Congo was leftafter four years of intervention, and some observers viewed this asan imponant achievement, it was clear that the UN lost its neutralityand impaniality in defusing the crisis.9

During the first stage of UN, all the UN members, especiallythe superpowers, tried to use the organization to funher theirnational interests. The USA was the most successful, because of its

7Edward Moxon Browne, A Fuıurefor Peace Keeping, New York: St MartinPress Ine., 1988, p. 2.8A. LeRoy Bennett, InternationalOrganizations Principles and Issues, NewJersey: Prentiee-Hall Ine., 1991, p. 104.9Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsyıhe and Roger A. Coate, The UN andChanging World Politics, Colorado: Westvicw Press Ine., 1994, p. 46.


dominanee in international society. The UN was eontroııedpolitieaııy and financiaııy by the US and its allies more strietly inthe first stage eompared to UN's whole history. The superpowerrivalry prevented the ereation of the intended seeurity maehineryand reminded that the UN depended on the attitude of its membersand the international elimate. But this did not prevent the UN fromplaying a useful role in some disputes and the development ofpeaeekeeping role, which sometimes helped to enhanee worldpeaee.10

Stage 2: 1960s-1970s

Two eharaeteristies stood out in these deeades. In 1960s, theUN provided assistance to deeolonization in Afriea and Asia andthe deeolonization transformed the UN into a Third Worlddominated organization, in whieh the US dominanee deelinedwhen it lost two-thirds majority in the GA. This has changed theformer balance between the GA and the Sc. In eonsequenee, theUN agenda widened and economical and developmental issues,directly related wiıh the Third World, proliferated. This helped thetwo superpowers to defuse their distrustand continue to existpeaeefully in a dctente environment.

The new third world members of the UN were not entitled topermanent membcrship in the Sc. Therefore, they focused on GAfor helping to define the UN's commitment to social progress andhigher standards of !iving. Hence, there were many yearlyeonferenees on development and related issues. Besides, the USSR,leader of the Eastern Bloc was taking the side of the Third World.

It was also during this period that, largelyas a consequeneeof deeolonization, the previously tight bipolar world loosened via anon-aligned movement headed by China, Egypt. India, Indonesia.and Yugoslavia.1 1 They tried to foree the UN to join their effortsagainst the domination of the US. the USSR or sometimes both ofthem. As the non-aligned movement grew, most of the newlyindependent states did not see the Cold War as their main problem.

10David Amsruons, Loma Loyd and John Rcdmond, From Versai/les LOMaastricht, London: Mc Millan Press, 1996, p. 87.

11Mendlovitz/Wesıon. Preferred Futures, p. 13.


They had their main own agenda, which concentrated on mainlydevelopment issues, anti-colonialism and racid discrimination.They also wanted to change the UN into a more democraticorganization. So, in this period ECOSAC (Economic and SocialCouncil) became more representative and pronovaced within theUN structure. Its members grew from 18 to 27 in 1965 and then to54 in 1973. The Security Council also expanded from II to 15 in1965.

However, efforts of the non-aligned movement were notstrong enough to prevent the Vietnam War, which took placetoward the end of this era.12 Over Vietnam, the UN was quitehelpIcss. It could not solve the conflict. Since the Soviets supportedthe Communist Vietnamese, and Americans were fighting withthem, the SC could do nothing. The GA could not do anythingadequate as well. China and North Vietnam, who were not the UNmembers at that time, ignored any recommendation it made. Thefailure of UN in the Vietnam War was another event that led toloose of faith in the UN and its future in the eye s of many people.

However, while the UN could do nothing when thesuperpowers were involved, otherwise its peacekeeping activitiescontinued to make a valuable contribution to peace with thesupport not just of the major powers but also of the third worldstates. For example, the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was sent in1964 to try to prevent fighting between Greek and TurkishCypriots and to maintain order. During its ten years of presence,UNFICYP provided humanitarian assistance, act as a bufferbetween the communiıies and tried to keep relations calm anddiffuse the iner-communa! tension.

At the second stage, international society transformed withthe emergence of third world countries. The main impact of theThird World was in shifting the UN's priorities and altering theinternational agenda by revolting colonializm, racialdiscrimination, and the North-South gap. While the GA started tobe more active the SC could stilI not play the.leading role in mostof the international disputes because of the Cold War.

l2Ibid., p. 12.

32 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

This stage was characterised with the end of US dominancein the UN because of the changes in membership. The US and itsa11ies lost the two-thirds majority, necessary for the passage ofimportant resolutions.13 Before the decolonialization, the US hadcommanded two-thirds majority in the GA easilyo However, duringthe period under consideration, she had to make compromises tothird world countries for building coalitions against the USSR.Therefore, it was in this period that the US started to reduce itscontribution to the UN budgel.

Stage 3: 1980s

By 1980s, the slump of previous decades was tuming intocrisis. There was a total frustration of hopes and disillusionmentboth among developing and developed countries as to the UN'srole in world politics. The UN was unable to play the central role inmany conflicts in this period. For example, the revolutionaryIranian government, came to power in 1979, ignored appeals fromthe SC 10 release the American diplomatic hostages. Fightingbetween China and Vietnam was still continuing. In December1979, the Cold War flared up when the USSR invaded Afghanistan.Then, Iran-Iraq war beganin September 1980, and the SC idlywatched two 'troublesome' states slaughtering each other.14

Moreover, during the 1980s, the UN's long-standing financialdifficulties became acute, which was exacerbated by the reductionof the US's contribution to its budgel.

Despite all these negative developments, there was onepositive thing, which refreshed hopes for the UN oncc again. it wasthe outcome of peaceful existence of dctente between the twosuperpowers. Starting from the mid- 1970s, relations between theUS and the USSR became friendlier. However, cordial relationsbetween them were again suspended when the USSR invadedAfghanistan. Thus, nearly all the old obstacles that prevented theUN 's actions remained. During the period there were manyinternational conflicts in the form of civil wars, guerrilla wars,armed rebeIlions that the UN could not intervene. Thus the UN was

13John G. Sıocssinger, The UN and the Superpowers, New York: RandomHouse Ine., 1965, p. 7.

14Amsrtrons/Loyd/Redmond, From Versailles LO Maastricht, p. 113.

2000) UN IN THE POST -COLD WAR ERA 33

quite helpless in Northern Ireland, against the Kurdish groups andthe mujahadeen in Iran, Peslunerga Kurds in Iraq, the guerrilla warin Malesia, the civil war in Chad, Sudan, Colombia, Salvador, andNicaragua.15

The UN was disabled to play any role in these internalconflicts because of the unwillingness of the disputants. At thesame time, the Organization did not call into question theprohibition contained in Artiele 2(7), which is the principle of non-intervention into domestic affairs. This demonstrated the UN'simpotence to adapt changing circumstances and dealt with newkind of conflicts it faces.

The most striking feature of the UN efforts to deal withthreats to international peace and security in the Iate i980s wasnewly emerging co-operation among the five permanent membersof the Sc. One indication of this was that the decisions were startedto be taken in unofficial and informal way through theconsultations of SC's permanent members. Another indication wasyoting patterns in the CounciL. Between i980 and 1985, pe rmane ntmembers voted together in 75 out of 119 resolutions, and between1986 to 1990, they voted together on 93 out of ıo3 resolutions.1 6Thus, reviva! of the SC was undcr way.

However. the most significant sign of the co-operation wasthe SC resolution of 1987 for ending Iran-Iraq war. Then, in 1988the USSR under the leadership of Gorbachev decided to solve theAfghan conflict. which had refreshed the Cold War in 1979. Mostimportant factor contributing to these developments was thechanges in the Soviet foreign policy. Under the !eadership ofMikhacı Gorbachev, the USSR improved relations with the USAand China and turned to the UN for searching a new role in theworld politics.

The end of the Cold War also made possible the removal ofone of the longest troubles the UN had faced. Two agreementswere signed to end fighting in south-western Africa. The firstagreement was signed by Cuba, Angola and South Africa. This

15Mauriee Bertrand, The UN Past, Presenl and Future, Hauge: Kluwer LawInt. Ine., 1997, p. 59.

16lbid., p. 83.


contained a plan for achieving the independence of Namibia, theex-German colony of south-west Africa that was seized by theSouth Africans during the First World War.17 This plan provided aUN force for guaranteeing necessary conditions for free and fairelections. The second agreement provided withdrawal of Cubantroops from Angola. By linking Namibian independence with thewithdrawal of Soviet sponsored Cuban troops in Angola, aDecember 1988 agreement to send peacekeepers to both territoriesremoved another source of Cold War tension.18

The UN made a great contribuıion for the success of theseagreements. it played an imporıant role by supplying theframework within which main part of the seulement had beennegotiated ten years before the agrcements was signed. Permanentmembers of the SC, the US and the USSR accepted to beguarantors for the implementation of the agreements. In short, asin the Afghanistan negotiations, so in the Angola/Namibia, talks,the impression was strongly conveyed that any party seeking toundermine a settlement would incur the disfavour of bothsuperpowers. This increased the confidence of each side that theother side would keep their promises and enhanced the UNcontribution to the rcsolution of conflicts.

In conclusion, the UN, like the League of Nations, haslargely failed to perform its role for the maintenance of theinternational peace and security during the Cold War. it remainedout of the most important problems and events, despite the effortsof the Secretary-Generals, diplomats of the SC and the GA. The SCdeadlocked and could not perform ils function because of theSuper Powers' veto to stop the resolutions against their nationalinterests.

Although the UN dominated by the US and its Western alliesduring the early Cold War period, this situation started to changewith the decolonization process in the i960s. This altered theprevious balance between the GA and the SC, and so transformedthe UN into a third world dominated organization. However, theUN was not able to materialize the demands from both the Firstand Third World countries. While the complaints of the developing

17G. R. Bcrridgc, Return LO the UN, London: MacMillan, 1991 p. 71.18Amsrtrons/Loyd/Rcdmond, From Versailles LO Maastricht, p. 123.

2000) UN IN THE POST-COill WAR ERA 35

countries grew due to the deterioration of the economic conditions,developed anes' dissatisfaction was inereasing as well because ofthe Third World dominatian in setting the UN agenda. Thus, ı980sstarted with the frustration of hopes and disappointrnents for theUN's future role in the world.

However, in all these different periods peacekeepingoperations of the UN were useful in confiİct managemenL Eventhough the UN in the Cold War era did not achieve the ambitiousaims of its founders to remove the seourge of war, at least it made aprogress toward that goal.19 When the SC eould not functionbecause of the super power ıivalry, it still worked to contain or endwars in many parts of the world by establishing peacekeepingoperations. Most of the se wars, whieh had a danger of esealation,stopped by this way.

Mareaver, failures to settle all confiİcts were not the fault ofthe UN, which was used by its members as a means to achieve theirgoals. In fact, the UN had been an instrument for its members,particularly for the super powers. it achieved consensus on thequestions whieh were not important or which the internationalcommunity wanted to get rid of. The major reason for the UN'sfailure was the opposition between the US and the USSR, which ledto a deadlock in the SC. However, strueture of the organization -with an undemocratic SC, heavy bureaueraey in the Seeretaıiat, andno military staff- was alsa effeetive to prevent it from being auseful instrument in solving disputes.

3. Redetining the UN's Role in Conflict Management UNArter the Cold War

In the Iate 1980s and early 1990s, the international arena sawa considerably ehanged environmenl. The dissolution of the USSRand the Soviet bloe redueed the suspicion and the hostility betweenthe two bloes, whieh represented by the two supcrpowers during theCold War. This gaye momentum to the UN's role in the field ofinternational peaee and seeurity.

19Amos Yoder, Evolution of the UN System, Washington: Taylor andFrancis Pub., 1993, p. 96.


Furthermore, the disappearance of the old hostilities createda more comfortable enyironment in the SC. There was a newwillingness among the permanent members to co-operate fordealing with the crises, and carrying out their primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity.20 With Gorbachev's initiative to end the Afghan war, anew era of co-operation began in the UN SC. The right of veto thatwas used by each side to block decisions in the past was left aside.There was substantive consultations between the US and theRussian Federation, and to reach a consensus in the decision-making process became easieL it was the time of risingexpectations for the UN. There was an iIlusion that the UN wouldbe used as an effectiye instrument for solying disputes, which wasconsolidated by the success of the UN coalition in defeatingSaddam's attack on Kuwail.

Moreoyer, there was a renewed hope among the politiciansand scholars that finally unanimity would be realized in the SC. itwas thought that, the UN was going to perform its primary role asindicated in the Charter, which is the maintenance of peace andorder in the world. At that time, the Gulf War was seen as the firsttest case to show the new willingness among the super powers toco-operate for the maintenance of the world peace and stop theaggressor states through collectiye security. In this mood UNalmost universally condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991,and imposed economic sanctions.

GulfWar

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi armed forces swept past the borderof neighboring Kuwait and quickly gained control of this tiny, oil-rich country. SC immediately demanded from Iraq to withdraw orface with force of collective response. When Iraq ignored thewamings, the UN Rcsolution 678 demanded Iraq to comply withpreYious UN resolutions asking its wiıhdrawal, and auıhorizedmember states to co-operale with Kuwait using "all necessarymeans" to restore peace to the area. Consequently, OperationDesert Storm began on 17 January and ended in March 1991.

20Qizhi He, The Crucial Role of the UN, p. 85.

2000] UN IN TIIE POST-COill WAR ERA 37

However, the military operation against Iraq did not qualifyas a "Collective Security" action for many people. Although theUS-led coalition was supposed to act on behalf of the UN, unlikethe Korean situation in the early 1950s, UN flags and symbols werenot used in the military action. As in Korea, the SC was not be ableto control the US and the coalition, and failed to perform itssupervisory role. The war's objectives far exceeded the mandatedmission to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, and the military action ofthe coalition force generated new security and legal problems.21The use of force to destroy the civilian infrastructure of Iraq,continuation of fire against Iraqi troops withdrawing from Kuwaitand breakdown of Iraq's internal order were regarded assome ofthe abuses of the US-lcd coalition. Even, there was a criticism thatthe UN hastHy started the operation as a result of the US pressurewithout exhausting all the non-military measures.

However, after the victory of the UN coalition against Iraq,the UN shared the success and increased its prestige. The US-ledmilitary action in the Gulf regarded as an example of stronger UNafter the Cold War. But it was also greeted with suspicion. Theoperation's lack of direct link to the UN made most of the

• members to have no say in the operation. For example, Germanyand Japan, who werc expected to contribute monetary rcsources forthe collective action, were excluded from important decision-making meetings, which in turn, fuelled their interest in permanentmembership in the Sc.22 Af ter all, the Gulf War left a positiveimage in the minds of people and increased demands for thedeployment of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Post Gulf War Experience

The Gulf War was also important for showing that the UN forthe first time needed to deal with the humanitarian aspects of aconflict. After Iraqi forccs withdrew from Kuwait, the UN, inresponse Iraq's pressure on the Kurdish and Shiite populationswithin its borders, undertook a humanitarian intervention andprovision of a "safe haven" for refugees. The SC condemned Iraqi

21Tarcq Ismael and Jacqucline S. Ismael, The Gulf War and New WorldOrder, New York: University Press of Florida, 1994, p. 35.

22Mingst/Karens, The UN in the Post Cold War Era, p. 89.

38 THETUIDUSHYEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

repression as a threat to international peace and security, andauthorized humanitarian organizations to offer assistance. As aresult, the US and other western states (Britain, France, Netherlands,Spain, ltaly and Germany) created refugee havens in northern Iraqfor the Kurds under Operation Provide Comfon. By this way, theUN linked humanitarian and security issues. At the same time,developing states, though they were supponing the action, worriedabout the decisions that brought UN interference in states' internalaffairs and diminishing sovereignty when the UN helped Kurdishrefugees in northem Iraq under the justification ofhumanitarianism.

/However, the Gulf War became the last case of the traditional

kind of inter state conflicts. On the contrary, many intra-statedisputes, which took the form of ethnic conflicts and civil wars,broke up in different parts of the world, in the post-Gulf Warperiod. The end of the Cold War contributed to the resurgence ofnationalism and ethnic conflicts, especially in the regions formerlyunder authoıitarian and communist regimes. It is closely linked tothe disappearance of the Cold War tensions from the East- Westrivalry that froze long-standing regional and internal conflicts aswelL. This resulted in new demands for self-determination, and anew gencration of civil wars such as in Yugoslavia, Georgia,Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Likewise, a new phcnomenon of "failedstates" in Africa emerged in international politics. More than adecade of economic decay, devastating state policies, corruption,natural disasters, and civil wars Icd to the collapse of law in Zaire,Somalia, and Rwanda.

As a consequence, there was a dramatic demand for the UNto respond to all these conflicts, and military operations of the UNincreased enormously. Since the condusion of the Gulf War, theUN has launched founeen new operations in Angola, Somalia,Mozambique, Georgia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, and South Africa.However, those operations are qualitatively and quantitativelydifferent from the earlier UN peacekceping operations during theCold War.23 New kind of connicts were within states rather thanbetween them, and problcms werearising from weak institutions,secessionism, ethnic and tıibal clashes and civil wars.

23Weiss/Forsythe/Coat, The UN and Changing World Politics, p. 74.


Such kind of conflicts led to the questioning of the long-standing principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention instates' domestic affairs. Apart from this, a new debate emergedwhether the internal conflicts of the post-Gulf period gave thesignals of the new role for the UN. All these opened up a new erain international politics and brought about novel concepts such ashumanitarian intervention and eroding sovereignty. Under theseconditions, the UN called on to deal with new kinds of annedconflicts, which could not be predicted when the UN Charter wasdrafted. Instances of cross-border attacks from national anniesaimed at annexation of anather state's territory become rare, andinterstate conflict replaced by intrastate conOict as a main threat tointernational peace and security. Raised from ethnic, economic,and nationalist desires for autanomy inside state borders, civil warhas recently became the most comman fonn of armed conflict.And the UN proved unable o cope with all this new problems.

Actual1y, the UN Charter provisians for dealing with threatsto international peace and security were designed for interstateconflicts not intrastate or civil wars. For this reason, theorganization was ill equipped to deal with conflicts within internalborders. The new kind of conflicts resulted too in a change in thescope of the peacekeeping operations. Blue Helmets started to facemany problem s such as disanning of fractions, the return ofrefugees, temporary civillian administratian, assisting humanitarianrelief, and the organization and supervision of elections.

Although the UN operations since the end of Co Id War hadan advantage over their predecessors -the unanimous support ofthe SC members- they could not be successfuL. It secmed that theUN has to improve its capabilities to overcame its defıciencies inhandling these conflicts. Clcarly, the UN had to refonn itself tomeet new demands and to provide greatcr capacity in managingconflicts.

Reform Proposals for Adapting and Enhancing the UNPeacekeeping Operations

The growing demand for the UN pcacekecping operationsand the ran ge of new tasks entrusted to multinational militaryforces in recent years have presented both the UN and troop-


contributing countries with major operational and managementchallenges.24 Failure of UN missions after the Cold War led to re-exam.ination of the basic principles and practices of peacekeepingas abasis for initiating and conducting operations. Hence, the UNaccelerated its search to improve its capacity in conflict resolution.

The emergence of co-operative spirit among its permanentmembers motivated the SC meeling on 31 January 1992, for thefirst time at the level of heads of states and governments. Themembers of the Council stressed the importance of strengtheningand improving the UN to increase its effectiveness. At the end ofthe meeting, the SC adopted a declaration, which called on theSecretary General to recommend ways to improve the UN capacityfor preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace making.25

On June 1992, the Secretary General submitted to themembcr states areport presenting integrated proposals for moreeffectiye UN activities. In the report, titled as "An Agenda forPeace", Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali examined thechanging context of international relations and searched for waysto improve the Organization's capacity for international peace andsecurity. Although the document emphasized new dimensions ofsecurity and an expanded UN role in the realm of internationalpeace and security, it also reconfirmed the sovereign state as thefundamental actor of the international politics and did not go as farto challenge the principle of non-intervention.26

An Agenda for Pea ce distinguished four broad categories ofUN activities on behalf of peace: Preventive Diplomacy,Peacemaking, Peace Building and Peacekeeping. The reportattempted to develop a new strategy for maintaining peace andsecurity on these four fronts. Each of these stages was defined withvarious goals. Specific proposals were made for new UN roles andnew UN methods. B. Boutros Ghali recommended the increaseduse of confidence building and fact-finding activities as well as the

24Mats R. Berdal, 'Wither UN PeaceKeeping', Adelphi Paper 281, October1993, p. 26.

25Dimitris Bourantis and Jarrod Wicnner, The UN in the New World Order,London: MacMillan Press, 1995, p. 13.

26Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight, State Society and the UN System,Tokyo: UN University Press, 1995, p. IS.

2000] UN IN THE POST -COLD WAR ERA 41

establishment of an early-warning system for assessing possiblethreats to peaee to promote preventive diplamaey.

Preventive Diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes beforeviolenee breaks out. Main objective of the preventiye diplamaey,which was invented to overeome the ambiguity and vagueness ofthe newly appeared cantliets, is to ease tensions be fore they end ineontliet. It was supported by the member states without reservation.

Peacemaking requires use of the same diplomatic skills asthe preventive diplamaey. The aim is to reduee the intensity of theeontliet through negotiation, as a step on the path to a eease-fire.The responsibility here is to bring hostile parti es to an agreementby peaeeful means. However, those idealistic phrases may notproperIy work in praetiee. It was possible to be highly critical ofthe peaeemaking process in the former Yugoslavia, whieh in a wayset a grave preeedent by aIlowing frontiers to be ehanged by force.it should be noted that while impartiality is important inhumanitarian cfforts , it is not always eorreet in mediation effortswhere prineiples of international lawand norms mu st bemaintained.

Peace BuUding, as described in the report, requiresstrengthening the institutions to eonsolidate a sense of eonfideneeand well being between people.27 This final eategory of operationinvolves the building of all sorts of "struetures" (such as socialserviees, a judieiary and responsiye government) that strengthenpeaee and order.28 Peaee building can oeeur before or af ter aeontliet, but is eertain to be badly needed in the aftermath of war.In the aftermath of international war, post eonmet pcaee buildingmay take the form of eonerete eo-operative projeets whieh Iink twoor more eountries in a mutuaIly beneficial undertaking that can notonly eontribute to eeonomie and social development, but alsoenhanee the eonfidenee that is so fundamental to peace.

Peacekeeping transformed rapidly after the end of Cold War.Quantitatively, peaeekeeping has attained a new magnitude.

27Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277-S/241 11,[hLLp://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pI.]. 17 June 1992, p. 12.

28Eric Fawcet and Hcnna Newcombe, Uniıed Naıions Reform, Toronto:Science for Peace, 1995, p. 125.

42 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOLXXX

Qualitatively, the peacekeepers confront previously unknown issuesof policyand practice. It had to deal with novel aspects ofhumanitarian affairs and be comprehensive. After the end of theCold War, the UN was expected to authorize personnel toimplement cease-fires; demobilize regular and irregular militaryforees; inspect arms control constrains; observe troop withdrawals;train and oversee police forces; provide administrative oversight ofgovemment ministries; plan, administer and monitor elections;watch for human rights violations; provide safe havens fordisplaced persons; and protect personnel attempting to givehumanitarian assistance in war-tom areas.29 Consequently, amixture of classic peacekeeping opcrations and new enforcementtasks has emerged. Therefore, the aim of the "Agenda for Peace" inproducing the concepts of preventive diplomacy, peace makingand peace building was to support the peacekeeping operations.

it was leamed from the new kind of peacekeeping operationsof the UN that for peacekeeping to succeed like peacemaking, theparties to a conflict must have the necessary political wilL.Peacekeeping even more than peacemaking, requires the adherenceof the conflicting parties to the principle of peaceful resolution ofconflicts, in other words, to the Charter itself.30 The worldcommunity needs better-prepared forces to use as UNpeacekeeping personel in additional places, which is different fromthe traditional form. it needs a plan for a prudent extension ofoperations in the domain of enforcement under Chapter VII of theCharter. Agenda for Peace further mentioned the need for militarysupport of the new kind of operations. This opens the way toenforcement element within peacekeeping operations byabandoning the long-standing distinction between enforcementand peacekeeping.

To this list "peace enforcement" was added later to refer toenforcement measures taken by the UN to restore peacc, under theprovisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. it involves peacekeepingactivities, which do not necessarily involve the consent of all partiesconcemed. What differentiates peacekeeping from peace

29Mendlovit.z/Wcston, Preferred FUluresfor the United Nations, p. 167.30BouLroS BouLros Ghali, Report on the Work of the Organization, NewYork: Departmcnt of Public Inf., Scptembcr 1993, p. 101.

2000} UN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 43

enforcement is the level of violence and intensity of activity.31Increasingly the distinction between the two concepts has beenblurred after the end of the Cold War. Facing with the changingnature of the conflicts, where everything was in complete disorder,there was an intense use of violence among the multiple parties ofthe conflict and where there was no willingness to end the conflictsand cease-fıre agreements are not respected, the UN's Blue Helmetsobliged to use force.

Moreover, the UN SC decision to use force to makehumanitarian aid available in Somalia has provoked a great debate.The SC's practice on Somalia caused confusion between traditionalChapter VI-based peacekeeping and military enforcement basedon Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In fact, nothing is moredangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use forcewhen its existing composition, armament, logistic support anddeployment deny the capacity to do so.32 The logic ofpeacekeeping flows from political and military premises that arequite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of thelatter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeepingis intended to facilitate.

Ethnic conflicts blur the line between domestic andinternational, state and non-state actors, as well as that betweenChapter VI and VII. They have also changed the doctrine that onlyinterstate conflicts can be a threat to internatiopal peace andsecurity (Artiele 39). Such conflicts, where huge number of peopleget killed, forced to seek refuge and created a danger forneighbouring countries, has became for many peace-keepers andexpcrts a thrcat to international peace and security. They advocatedan arguement that it would be wise to inelude a new Chapter intothe Charter, dealing with the ways and forces to end similarconflicts with special operations.

Howevcr, there was a general consensus after Bosnia andSomalia that limited enforcement actions proved contradictory and

31J. Taylor Wentges, 'Forec Function and Phrase: Three Dimensions of UNPcacckccping', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 1998,p.61.

32Boutros Boutros Ghaii, Supplement LO An Agenda for Peace, N50/60-5/1995/1, [http:www.un.org/pwcb-cgi/idoc.pi]. 3 January 1995, p. 8.


ineffective and peacekeeping commanders should use force onlyas a last resort. Hence, the organization has come to realize that amix of peacekeeping and enforcement is not the answer to a lackof consent and co-operation by the parti es to the connict.Nevertheless, where the SC authorizes the use of force even tolimited extend, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the composition,equipment and logistic support of such an operation must becommensurate with the task.

In addition, in "An Agenda for Peace", the former SecretaryGeneral Boutros B. Ghali made several references to collectivesecurity. He explained that:

An opportunity has been regained to aehieve the great objcctives ofthe Charter - a UN eapable of maintaining international peaee andseeurity of seeuring justiee and human rights and of promoting, in thewords of the Charter, 'social progress and beııer standards of life inlarger freedom'. This opportunity must not be squandered. TheOrganization must never again be eripplcd as it was in the era that hasnow passed.

The Secretary General's Agenda for Peace was widelyrecognized as a starting point for serious discussion on how torevitalize the collective security system envisaged in the UN system.Since it is not possible to determine an aggressor state in thechanging nature of connict, future of the collective security isunder debate.

The idea of collective security expands the principle of "onefor all and all for one" to the global lcvel. it is the system that allstates thwart an aggressor state by joining together against it, fırstby preventing the ouLbreak of force and then by meetingaggression with forcc. However, the collective security systemcould not be realized during the Cold War, as its developersexpected. One of the primary reasons was the use of the veto byboth the US and the USSR, eaeh secking to prevent SC actionadvocated by the other. Another reason was that the world politicsof ten made it impossible to act collectively, and states chose todisobey or ignore the prohibitions and restrictions on the use offorce to pursue national intercsts. Collcctive security was not anappropriate system to operate during Cold War which was markedby East-West rivalry. Thus, in plaec of collective seeurity, the UN


developed alternate means to cope with conflicts underpeacekeeping.

The end of the Cold War gaye way to a new spirit of co-operation in the UN's SC. Collectiye response to the Iraq during theGulf connict strengthened the optimistic views of the organization.However, the Gulf War became the last example of interstateconflict. Since the Gulf War, the UN faced with many internalcannicts. The mechanism of the UN, the norms and the rules of theCharter provided the framework for actian against Iraq. However,different circumstances in the internal wars, where determining anaggressor state was impossible, caused to question the relevance ofthe conceptions of the collectiye security. The collectiye securitysystem lacks norms and rules for involvement in interstate crises.The unpredictable challenges posed by the new international orderrequire both new norms and more effective means for managingthe new kind of cannicts.

Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace alsa recommendedthe establishment of a rapid deployment "peace enforcement units"on a permanent basis under the command of the SecretaryGeneral.

To sum up, the UN indicated concem for addressing thenewly emerging issues, but many questions remained unanswered.The "Agenda for Peace" report by the Secretary General BoutrosGhali addressed several strategies that were both old and new.Peacekeeping, a traditional activity for the UN, received theoreticalreinforcement from enhanced proposals for peace making andpreventive diplamaey. Even with these approaches, however, thereport adopted much of the state centric image that accompaniedthe formatian of the UN. By failing to recognize the fact that thestates were not anymore the sole participants in the intentionalsystem of peace and war, the report missed the opportunity toaddress the new options. In addition, it failed to develop theconcept of "preventive diplamaey" in ways that offer adequatepromise for serving the critical early wamin~ functions necessaryfor UN effectiveness. Beside, cstablishment of permanent UNforces were not acceptable for the member states because theyafraid of that one day these forces may be used against them orbeyand their control. Theyalsa showcd the same unwillingness inpaying their shares to the UN budgel.


The Agenda for Peace report, however, has sparkedsignificant debate on important and relevant issues. Unless memberstates come to understand the changes in the nature of theinternational system and of the types of the participants active inthe system, they will continue to respond with irrelevant remediesto increasingly serious international diseases.

Although the UN after the Cold War expeeted to perfonn itsrole as indicated in the Charter, it eould not be sueeessful. Effortsof the Seeretary Gencrals, SC and the GA resolutions, evencomprehensive reports sueh as An Agenda for Peace, which aimedtu adopt the UN 's mechanism to the ehanging cireumstances, couldnot save it from failing. Most of the proposed solutions to copewith internal wars in the post-Cold War era could not produee theexpected outeomes. Even though the UN playcd a role in many ofthese wars, it still faeed ehallenges from different angles.

We will focus below on five major conflicts after Cold Warthat presented specfic challenges to the UN to clarify the UN'ssuccesses and faitures, changing coneeptions. and the new tasks thatit have to perfonn: Yugoslavia, Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda, Haitiand Cambodia. The first three of the se conflicts in Yugoslavia,Somalia and Brundi/Rwanda exemplifies changing conditions forenforcement and humanitarian intervention. The other twoeonflicts in Haiti and Cambodia illustrate other features of thesenew peacekeeping operations, which are peace building andeleetion monitoring. The UN's interventian was relatively moresuccessful in establishing a stable government in Haiti andCambodia than the first three operations.

4. Case Studies

The Way in Forrner Yugoslavia

The UN involvement in Yugoslavia began with the SCResolution, which adopted a general and complete embargo on alldeliveıies of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.33 The

33Gcoff Simons, UN Malaise: Power, Problems and Realpolilik. New York:St. Martin Press, 1995, p. 82.

2000) UN IN Tl: •..POST-COill WAR ERA 47

issues raised in Yugoslavia go to the heart of the nature ofinternational order and international law in the post-Cold War era,touehing questions of self-determination, individual and grouprights, and the exereise of limits of sovereignty. Thus, the UNhesitated whether to intervene or not for a while. Then, SecurityCouncil aeeepted the SC proposals for a peaeekeeping operationand the UN proteetion foree (UNPROFOR) established in 1992.

Throughout the eonfliet the impression grew that the UN waslargcly impotent. Divisions among the SC's members ereatedunproduetive means to resolve the eonfliet. Despite SCauthorization, the rcluetanee of governments and their militaries touse foree more extensively demonstrated the limitations of theUN's enforeement role, exeept in eases where strong nationalinterests are at stake, as in the Gulf War. Therefore, afterYugoslavian tragedy, it was seen that international eommunity wasreluetant to intervcnc into eonfliets, whieh were not threateningglobal stability. Many people wcre killed for ethnie reasons. Whilethe UN resolutions were ignored, its peaeckeepers were attaekedand there was a general laek of support for UN efforts by the USand others. On the other hand, the UN efforts such as eeonomiesanetions and peaeekeeping at least prevented the eonfliet fromspreading to its neighbours, and the humanitarian assistanee wasuseful to some extent that providcd the framework for the finalpeaee-negotiations and agrccment.

Somalia

In 199 i and i992 civil order eoIlapsed in Somalia whenwarring dans took controlover parts of the eountry.34 Deaths,searcity of food and famine aeeompanied the fighting and forecdthousands of pcople to seck emergcney humanitarian assistance. AsmaIl mission formed by Pakistani troops was sent to Somalia(UNISOM i) to proteet humanitarian relief workers. Then, SCResolution 794 authorized a large US lcd military-humanitarianintervention (Unified Task Forec on Somalta, or UNITAF, also

34For more information look at Michael G. Schechter, "The UN in theAftermath of Somalia", in Edwin M. Smith (ed.), The UN in a New WorldOrder, California: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies,1994.


known as Operation Restore Hope) to secure ports and airfields.protect relief shipments and workers. and assist humanitarian rcliefefforts. However, the mission's scope was ambivalent. The US didnot intend to commit its forces for a long period and the objectivewas limited to humanitarian issues. When the UNISOM i failed tosafeguard the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNISOM II wentin 1993 and realized a large-scale humaniıarian work. Nevertheless,the useful job done by the UN was countered with the loss ofimpartiality by it in supporting the elimination of General Aidid.Departure from neutrality led LO the negative image of UNoperation and gaye impetus to the slrife. By the time. the situationdeterioraıed and the UN 's soldiers faced with force. Therefore. inCctober 1994, while the parti es in Somalia showed unwillingness toreconcile with eaeh other, it was fclı that Somalis lost their chanceand then the force withdrawn in January 1995. Soon afterward,General Aidid was killed and fighting among clans again spoiledstability in Somalia.

The Soma1ia operation was nol similar to the proceedingones. il took plaee in a stale where there was no order, nogovernmenı authority, and so the concept of sovereignty lost itsmeaning. During the operation, UN violated one of its principles;states in conOicıs should request UN ıo intervene. il also showedinslitulional weaknesses and impoıcncc of the kadership of the UNin cascs wherc the mainıenance of impartiality is difficult.

Burundi and Rwanda

Internal and cross-border conOiet broke out in Rwanda inOctober 1990, wiıh sporadic I1ghting belween the anned forces ofthe Hutu-lcd government of Rwanda and the Tutsi-led RwandanPatrioıic Front (RPF) operating from Uganda.35 In 1993. theRwandan government and lhe RPF reachcd a eease-l1re agreement.Later, they ealled on the SC to install UN military observers to theircommon border for prevenling military use and transport ofmilitary equipmenı on the borders. In 1993, SC established the UNObserver Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).

35Basic Facts About the UN, New York: Deparunent of Public InformationPress. 1995, p. 46.

2000] UN IN THE POST -COW WAR ERA 49

Then, UN representativcs tried to he Ip in negotiations for anew government and a cease-fire. The peace was concludedsucccssfuIIy, however, the local massacres did not end. After manypeople have been kiIIed and millions of Rwandan refugecs escapedto neighbouring countries, the SC decided to set up anotherinternational force; the UNAMIR (the UN Assistance Mission forRwanda), for the implementation of the peace agreement.UNAMIR concentrated on arranging a cease-fıre, but it was notsuccessful and kiIIings continued. Thus, the SC considered thesituation in Rwanda as a threat to international peace and security,and imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda. Then, the Councilauthorized, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, a temporarymultinational humanitarian operation. The civil war ended afterRPF forces took control in Rwanda; they decIared a cease-fıre anda transitional government was estabIished for fıve years.

As UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali expressed in hisspeeches, the UN operation in Rwanda was not only ended with afaiIure for UN, but alsa for the international community. it becameincreasingly cIear that even the new UN initiative, the relativelymodest proposal that the perpetrators of genocide should bebrought to justice, was doamed to failure because of lack ofresources, incompetence, and the indifference operation ofpowerful states.36 That disaster indicated impotence of UN in caseof human suffering, when the strategic interests of hegemonicpowers are not salient.

In Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, there was no pcace to keepand even no wiIIingness in making peace. The UN found itseIffacing with post-Cold war chaIIenges of very different kind, withno peace to keep and humanitarian concerns raising demands forintervention with no clear guidcIines on how to proceed. In thisenvironment, the principles of consent, impartiaIity, and non-use offorce except self-defense, which were the basic guideIines fortraditional peace keeping operations, seemed inappropriate. Allthree were civil war situations. The expcrience of UN forces in eachof these theatres highlighted critical issues conceming thecontemporary practice of peacekecping in internal connicts.

36Simons, UN Malaise, p. 101.

50

Haiti

THETUR~SHYEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

Before 1990, Haiti's history was full of military dictatorships.For a short period in 1990 there was a democratically electedgovernment under President Aristide. Later in that year militaryrulers took power and expelled Aristide and the other offidals. TheSC condemned the new rulers and imposed an embargo except fornecessary food and medicine. When conditions in the countryworsened many people escaped from the country. Consequently,the SC Resolution 940 condemned Haiti for violating humanrights.37 Then the SC authorized mcmber states to form a UNmultinational force with the authority to use aLLnecessary meansfor ending the military Icadership. Thus the Council took adifferent step in Haiti in treating an internal political erime as athreat to international peaee and security. By the help of the USthat wanted to avoid the Haitian refugees influx, a multinationalUN force was formed and threatened to invade. Then, the UNco ali tion composed mostly of the US troops occupied Haiti. Soonafterward, President Aristide rCLurned to Haiti and the UN decidedto leave a peacekeeping group to keep order until the governmentcame back to power. In 1995, elections were held and PresidentAristide won. Democratieally hold elcctions, supervised by the UN,at the end of the confliet in Haiti created a posİLive impressionabout the UN role in solving an internal dispute. Furthermore, theUN mandate in Haiti assisted to the new government to sustain asecure and stable environment in the country. This case wasanother example, whieh shows changes in the UN scope andinterest.

Cambodia

After the end of the Victnam war, the military government ofCambodia was overthrown and a repressive regime establi~hed. Thenew regime challenged Vietnam in border clashes, and Vietnamresponded by invading and establishing a puppet government inCombodia. The new government was supported by the Sovietswhile China helped the opposition forees. After abitter civilconflict followed by a decade of oceupation by Soviet backedVietnam, the oceupying forces were withdrawn at the end of the

3'7Yoder, Evo/ution of the UN System, p. 95.


Cold War. In Oetober 1991, agreements for a comprehensivepolitical seulement of the Cambodia were signed in Paris. Co-operation between the US and the USSR motivated China andVietnam for supporting a cease-fıre in Cambodia.

Then, the UN provided a peacekeeping mıssıon forCambodia (UNT AC) to implement the agreement and ensure aneutral political environment before the general eleetions. It alsobrought together different and complex tasks such as supervisingcease-fıre, disarming the forees, and the resettiement of refuges incooperation with the UNHCR. In Septembcr 1993, the Seeretary-General declared that the UNTAC role in Cambodia ended with theinstallation of a new eonstitution and government based on the willof the people expressed through the May 1993 eleetions.Peacekeepers withdrew and a smaIl group of them stayed forobserving and monitoıing the peacc.

The UN peaeekeeping operations in Haiti and Cambodiacontributed to the stabilization of peace in both countries. In bothcases, there were authoritarian regimes and the missions succeededin running fair elections. The UN provided complex tasks in the seconflicts such as promotion and protection of human rights,organization and giying technical assistance in elections, andrepatriation of refugees. As a general evaluation, in Haiti andCambodia peacekeeping and peace making completed moresuccessfuIly than in Bosnia and Somalia. The UN supervisedelections led to drafLing of new constitutions and the establishmentof democratic governments by ending long lasting stıives.

Beyond the serious questions that have bcen raised about theability of the UN to exercise effecLİve command and central ofoperations that move beyond peacekeeping, the UN confrontsenormous challenges in adjusting to newly perceived relations,power and influence. AIthough some may doubt it, the UN isresponding as effectively as possible to current conflicts andhumanitaıian crises. A more important question involves whetherthose rcsponses wiIl constitute effcctive resolutions of theunderlying causes of conflict.

The UN found itself facing with very different kinds of post-Cold war challenges. It had to cope with the conflicts where therewas no peace to keep and where humanitarian emergencies made

52 THETUR~SHYEARBOOK [YOL. XXX

the UN intervention unavoidable. The principles of sovereignty,non-intervention into domestic affairs, consent, non-use of forcebecame inappropriate under these circumstances. For example, inthe case of SomaHa where there was not a legitimate governmentthe concept of sovercignty bccame meaningless, and the desperatehumanitarian situation in Bosnia proved humanitarian interventianineviLable. Under the Hght of these deve1opments. all the traditionalnorms of the international relations required reassessment.

5. Post-Cold War Challenges: Eroding Sovereignty, Non-Intervention, and Humanitarian Intervention

Eroding National Sovereigııty

Changes in World poliLics since the end of the Cold War hasled to the questioning of the concept of "sovereignty". Statesovereignty retains its validiLyas a defining principle ofinternaLional society and goveming rule in international relations,but the concept has evolved.38 Real sovereignty means thatnational governments control outcomes nationaııy andinternationally. However, in internal wars, where there is not anylegitimate government to control events, the principle looses itsmeaning. The problem s inside Rwanda, SomaHa, Bosnia, Haiti andCambodia, though internal problem s strictly speaking. wereredefined as internal concerns, subject to action by the UN.Therefore, the principle of state sovereignty was defeated by theinereasing demand for the effecLive treatment of internal conflictsby UN.

As former Seeretary General Boutros Ghali has noted: "Thetime of absolute and exclusive sovereignLy has passed; its theorywas never matched by reality. it is the task of leaders of statestoday to understood this and fınd a balanee between the needs ofgood internaLional governanee and the requirements of an evermore interdependent world".39 As people and states became moreinıereonneeıed and interdependent, demands increased forinternational management at the expense of state sovercignty.

38"An inıerview with the UN Sccretary General Kofi A. Annan", TheFletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1997.

39Gha\i, An Agendafor Peace, p. 3.


WhiIe respeet for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of thestate remains central, it is undeniable that the eenturies old doetrineof absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer exists as it waseonsidered in the theory.

Non-lntervention

Consent of the parties for interventian was inevitable fortraditional peaeekeepers. But opinions are ehanging on bothpolitieal and lcgal neeessity of eonsent of parties. We have latelyseen number of examples of interventian into the domestie affairsof states beyand the eonsent of governments. Intervention isinereasingly pcreeived as legitimate to halt the violenee in eiviI warsthat have broken out sinee the end of the Cold War.

The dynamies of ethnie and religious eonfliets as we haveseen in Bosnia. Somalia, and Rwanda arc very differcnt from theinterstate eonniets, whieh the UN had involved during the ColdWar. In previous eonfliets reasons of the eonniet and the partieswere more clearly defined. and when they agrced to a eease-fire,the UN Blue Helmets knew how to operatc. However, in ethniceonflicts, reasons of the eonflicts and parties are more eomplex anddiffıeult to identify. In many of these cases, there has not been anylegitimate govemment to obtain consent, nar any effective cease-fire and clear-cut front lines. In such an unstable and anarchicenvironment. the reliability of saerosanet principle of consensus isvery much reduced as an operational basis for peaeekeeping.40

The experience of the UN in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda,Somalia and Haiti clearly demonstrated that within the context ofintra-state and ethnic conflicts, strict adherenee to the normativeprinciples of consent. impartiality and non-use of force except inself defense substantially reduees the operational effıeieney of apeacekeeping force. The most important eonclusion that we candrove from these examples is that Article 2(7) Le., -non-

40Charles W. Kegley Jr., Grcgory A. Raymond and Margaret G. Hermann."The Rise and Fall of LheNon-inLervenLionNorm: Some Correlates andPoliLİcalConsequcnces". The Fleıcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 22.•No. ı,Wintcr/Spring ı998, p. 89.


intervention to domestic affairs- became almost meaningless in thepost Cold War era.

Humanitarian lntervention

The challenge to the non-intervention norm is also motivatedby humanitarian concerns about the inereasing violence and pa inin the chaotic environment of the international conflicts.Humanitarian emergencies, by causing the mass exodus of people -refugees escaping to neighboring countries- may constitute threatsto international peace and security, or aggravate existing threats;conversely, disturbances of peace may give rise to humanitariancrises.41

Today. humanitarian assistance has bccome. an integral partof establishing peace and security in various trouble spots in a waythat was never the case before. It aims to not only providing accessto the suffering peopk, but also building bridges bctween parties inconflict. The basess of this assistance must be humanity. neutralityand impartiality.

The provision of assistance to the victims of war is a difficulttask since one party or the other invariably sees humanitarianassistance as a form of extemal intervention. At the same time. asinternal wars came to dominate the statistics of warfare. and theinternational community sceks to copc with its rcsponsibilitiesunder humanitarian law in these assistance. national sovereignty.and military involvement become intermingled in a complcxway.42 Combining aid with enforcement on the other hand. raisessensitive issues that caıı into question the role of humanitarianorganizations and the desirability of intervention.

AlLhough the UN broke up aıı the previous normativeprinciples such as non-intervention and national sovereignty, andintervened to several civil wars in the name of humanitarian

41Jan Allison. "Humanitarian Emergencies and the UN". InternationalAffairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1994, p. 22.

42Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Makom Dando, Peaeekeeping PeaeeMaking Towards Effeetive Intervention in Post-Cold War Confliets.London: MacMiHan Press, 1998, p. 49

,

2000) UN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 55

assistance, protection of human rights or preventing them to spreadneighboring countries and threatening international peace andsecurity, the UN could not be successful entirely. The credibility ofthe UN seriously damaged in former Yugoslavia, Somalia andRwanda. It failed to rescue people from desperate circumstanees.At the end, suspicion aroused about the impartiality of thepeacekeepers, and the UN's legitimacy has weakened.

Beside the loss of confidenee in the UN as a seeurityorganization, the UN is also experieneing the deepest financialcrisis in its history. Many of the SC's decisions on eonflictresolution lack either the legal and political strength to make themresPected, or the means to implement them in an effective way.43Arter a brief post-Cold War honeymoon, the UN has onee againsuffered from the inability to enforce its decisions in criticalsituations, this time without the excuse of the obstacles created bythe Cold War.

The UN has failed in most of its operations arter the ColdWar, because of the lack of suffieient equipment, resourees, andmachinery to deal wiıh new kind of conflicts. Existing proceduresmake it difficult to mobilize peacekeeping contingents and tomove the m swifLIy to operational arcas. it is obvious that UNoperations in peaeekeeping field have to be re-organized.

6. Organizational Reforms

Reeent developments in the international arena have madethe UN reforms inevitable. The UN leadership realized that theOrganization needs institutional, managerial, and especiallyorganizational reforms to transform itself into a more effectiyeinstrument of international community. Strengthening the role,capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN is necessary torealize the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as torespond needs of its member states in this era of ehallenge andexpectation.

43Adam Robers and Benedicı Kingsboury, UN in ıhe Divided World, NewYork: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993, p. 82


The Seeretary-Generals' of the UN undertook the leadershipfor renewing the organization and fonned a "program for refannil.Beside Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace, the present SeeretaryGeneral Kofi Annan initiated "two traek" refonn programme forstrengthening the Organization. Traek One reforms are aboutmanagerial refonns within the Seeretary General's authority, whiehcan be taken immediately, such as the budget, staff andadministration of the UN.44 First traek refonns made up of tenprovisions. These were mainly about the institutional changes toenable the Organization to better earry out its mandates in aninereasingly eomplex world. In addition to the managerial andinstitutional reforms, the Seeretary General in the first traekredueed the i998- i999 budgets for the first time in absolute ternıs.He believed the current refonn efforts eould not aehieve optimalresults unless the Organization's finanees are put in order.

The need to put the organization on asound financialfooting is an essential part and a prerequisite to improve the UN'sabilities in the future and to aeeomplish success in proposedrefonns. Member states should provide this by paying their fullcontribution on time without any precondition. One of the mostimportant problem s confronting the UN today is coming fromhere. Although the member eountries have a eontractual obligationto pay in the Charter, the UN has no effective enforeement tool foreompelling them to pay.

Yet, non-payment of assessments is a serious problem for aviability of the UN. There is continuing damage to the credibilityof the SC and of the Organization as a whole when the Counciladopts decisions that cannot be carried out because the necessarytroops are not forthcoming. The heavy demand for UNpeaeekeeping arter Cold War has deteriorated the financialproblems of the UN. In the mid-1980s the UN budget crises cameto agenda when the US Congress passed lcgislation designed to eutUS contributions. After the Cold War, beside the financialdifficu1Lies, inercasing peacekeeping expenditures brought theorganization to the bridge of bankruptey. The purpose of theproposals on UN financing is to provide stability and pragmaticeonsisteney in UN operations that based on a steady and

44Kofi Annan, Seereıary General Deıails Bold Two-Track Reform Plan,lhttp://www.un.org/rcform/sginit/bgnoıc.hım], 17 March 1997, p. 1.

2000J UN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 57

predictable flow of resources for peacekeeping and the range ofother activities.

The issues of the Track Two rcforms are more fundamentaland can be decided only by the member states. It involues a long-term program of reform, and contains complementary measuresthat reside within the jurisdiction of member states, including thestructure and functioning of the Organization. One of them isabout the reform of the SC to improve the UN's role ininternational peace and security aner Cold War.

Security Council Reform Proposals

Charter of the UN gives the SC pıimary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and secuıity (Artiele 24/1).With the ending of the Cold War, the SC has acquired, to a largeextend, the role, which was envisaged for it by the architects of theCharter. It is the most powerful organ of the UN. Therefore, theneed to reform the UN to strengthen its role in international pea ceand secuıity naturally focused on the SC. Discussions have mainlyfocused on size, composition and the decision-making in the SC,including the ıight of veto.

Many of the criticism of the SC have been about thepermanent members of the Council and veto power. There weredoubts about preserving, half a century later, the special position ofthe states, which were allies in World War II. The victors of the WW-II, as pcrmanent members, have veto power over substantive issues.The 1963 augmentation of mem bership from eleyen to fıfteen didnot alter the status of the five pcrmanent members.

Since mid-1960s, UN membership has increased with thedecolonization and power relationship have changed in theorganization. France and Grcat Britain are no longer considered asgreat powers for many people. However, Japan and Germany havegained power by their amount of contribution to the budget of theUN. Midd1c powers are not satisfied with their position either.

In ref1ecting the power of the alIies that defeated Germanyand Japan in 1945 when the UN was foundcd, it is true that, theCouncil does not adequatcly represents the composition of the UN


membcrs. There are numerous proposals for reform of the SC, withmost UN member states having their preferred list of new membersand gradations of power. Neverthcless, expanding the SC seemslike one of the more reasonable ways to improve the representativecharacter and thus the legitimacy of the world organization in theeyes of its 185 members and their people.45 The democraticdefects of the Council can be addressed by slightly expanding theSC to reflect current political and economic realities, by re-orienting considerations in selecting members, and by diminishingthe role of the veto power exercised by the permanent members.

Two main sources of pressure for Council reform, fromstates in both the industrialized and the developing worlds,emerged in the early 1990s. Both Japan and Germany, who arenowamong the top four contributors to the UN budget, would !iketo fınd a place among the permanent members of the CounciL.Japan currently contributes more than 12 percent of the budget,while Germany's annual assessed contribution to the UN isconsiderably larger than either that of France and Britain.46 Thus,Japan and Germany have sought permanent seats to reflect theireconomic powers, supported by the industrialized world especiallyby the U.S. In June 1993, pursuant to GA Resolution 47/62 of IIDecember 1992, the US informed the Secretary General that it"supports permancnt mcmbership for Japan and Gcrmany", that itwas "also prepared to consider carefully how the Council might befurther expanded to include a modest number of additional seats",and that other means of involving non-members of the Councilshould be explored.47

There is however a resistance from the developing world tothe proposals giying two more Northem states the same status asthe present fıve. But they have less opportunities to impose theiropinions, as a result of greater co-operation among permanentmembers after the Cold War. Besides, there is a disagreementamong them over the form for enlargement. Same deveioping

45pau\ Kennedyand Bruce Russet, "Reforming the UN" , Foreign Affairs,Vol. 74, No. 5, September/October 1995, p. 60.

46K. P Sakscna, Reforming the UN, The Challenge of Relevance, NewDelhi: Sage Publications, 1993, p. 182.

47Adam Robcrs, Benedict Kingsboury, Presiding Over a Divided World, NewYork: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995, p. 53.

2000) UN IN THE POST -COLD WAR ERA 59

countries, specially the larger aspirant permanent members, haveargued that additional Southem permanent se ats are vital if theinner circle of existing permanent members is to be influential.48Many smaIl and medium-sized states have challenged thelegitimacy of pcrmanent seats and veto, rather than lrying to add totheir numbers. Instead additional non-pcrmanent seats are sought,with some advocating changes in elections to allow for shared,rotating or de facto permanent seats.49 Most developing countriestake a pragmatic approach, evaluating the benctit of propasals forpermanent and non-permanent expansion.

One of the alternative approaches refers to a criteria that thepermanent members together sould include at least half of theworld's population, economic productivity, military strength, andcontributions to the UN budget. This could be achieved üygranting seats automatically LO the world's eight most populouscountries (China, India, the US, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Japan andPakistan, in descending order) and to its eight most productiveeconomies (the US, Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, the UK,and Canada, in descending order).50 According to this projectbecause three countries (the US, Russia, and Japan) are in bothgroups, this could leave seven or eight other (non-permanent) seatsto be elccted from among all UN members, assuming an enlargedCouncil of twenty or twenty-one. All of the existing permanentmembers are in at kast one of the two propose d groups forpermanent seats. Therefore, there is no need to leave their seats forthis project. But none of the seats under this formula would beabsolutely permanent. if the GNP of the ninth place countrysurpasses the GNP of the country in eighth place over a period ofyears, it would automatically take a pe rmanent seat.

Weakness of this scheme lie in the fact that pcople in Africaand the Middle East, divided into less populace states, lackautomatic representation of their regions. As a result, anotherformula developed; any of the five continental regions nototherwise represented in the permanent seats should beautomatically represented through a seat reserved for the under-

48Sam Daws, 'Seeking Seats, Votes, and Vetoes', The World Today, Vol.53, No. 10, Getober ı997, p. 256.

49Ibid., p. 256.50Mendlovit7/Weston, Preferred Fu/ures, p. ı75.


represented region from among the elected seats. This reserved seatcould be filled through an electoral process, may be with the mostpopulous and influential states, such as Nigeria, South Africa, andEgypt being repeatedly re-elected or selected on a rotating basis.Various proposals like these have been put forward regarding theexpansion and the composition of the SC in the proceeding years.

From the developed world point of view, the pcrmanent fıvehave strongly resisted attempts to question their membcrship andassociated rights. In the context of the German candidacy for apermanent place, a European Union seat is sometimes proposed toaddress Germany's daim to replace both France and the UK. Butthey strongly resist giying up their veto rights. At this stage, there isno chance to change the exisling permanent members of theCouncil, because they would not vote for their own abolition.

To sum up the ongoing discussion, wc can say that whileJapan and Germany are obvious industrialized world candidates fornew permanent seats, the choice of candidates from Africa, Asiaand Latin America is le ss clear. The main devcloping worldcandidates appear as India and Indonesia for Asia; Egypt, SouthAfrica and Nigeria for Africa; and Brazil for Latin America.However, India's candidature has been opposed by Pakistan,Brazil's by the Spanish speaking neighboring states, and Nigeria bya number of states objecting mainly because of the undemocraticnature of the present regime. It is also expected that developingworld would not support permanent membership for Japan andGermany without comparable seats for the South.

Regarding Turkey's views on the enlargement of the SC, shesuggests the increase of non-permanent membership to 20 byadding 10 new non-permanent members. The new members to theSC should be represented wiıh a rotalion system, and a list ofcountries that can replace the new 10 members should be prcpared.Otherwise new constituency groups could be established for theelection of the 20 non-permanent membcrs of the Sc. Formingnew constituency groups according to the geographical positionsof the countries is likely LO improve the unjust distribution of non-permanent membership. Turkey believes that the addition of newnon-permanent members will increase the representative capacityof the CounciL. Another important point is that countries, whichhave more responsibility and weight for the establishment of

2000] UN IN THE POST -COill WAR ERA 61

protection of international peace and security, should serve morefrequently and regularly on the basis of a rotation system. Ofcourse the fact that Turkey, which is an important regional powerconstituting a bridge between Europe, Euro-Asia and Middle East,has not gained any representation since i96 i,seems to be directingthe Turkish authorities to evaluate the matter in this way.51

The Vefo Power

The permanent members' veto is a powerful symboL. it hasbeen frequently thought that the veto power of the privilegedpermanent five is undemocratic. While the veto is surely notdemocratic, it is the price to keep the big players in the game,where there is no game without them.

The veto privileges of five states neverthcless provokecontention, and it is widcly perceived as having held the UN backfrom fulfilling its functions during the Cold War. Yet, the veto hasmerits as well as faults; it helped to get and keep the major powerswithin the UN framework when they would otherwise have eithernot joined in the fırst place or else deserted it; it may saved the UNfrom damaging conflicts with its major members; it has contributedto a sense of responsibility and ahabit of careful consultationamong the permanent five; and it reduces the risk of acutediscrepancies between power politics and the law of the UNCharter. 52 In shon, the veto can be viewed as one of several factors,which have made for the superiority of UN's decision-makingprocedures over those of its predecessor, the League of Nations,and over many other regional organizations.

The issue of veto remains a sticking point in the reformproposals. Some countries believe that the new permanentmembers should possess equal rights -as does the means ofdetermining who should be the new members. At the same timegranting a veto to new permanent members proved unacceptable tomany countries, whilc others argued that withholding the veto for

51A Publication by the Turkish Foreign Ministry.52Stephen Schlesinger, 'Can the UN Reform', World Policy Journal, Fall1997, p. 49.

62 THETUroGSHYEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

the se new members would create a new category of membershipstill inferior in power and in standing to the original permanentfjve.53 Some countries wished to address the issue of the perceived"reverse" veto under which any of the permanent fıve could preventthe modification of certain open-ended sanctions regime bythreatening to veto any proposed changes.

After the end of the Cold War. growing co-opcration in thepeacekeeping and peace enforcement operations led to thequestioning of the necessity of veto. For many pcople. in a worldwhere co-operation was possible. and national troop contributionsto UN military operations is voluntary, the reasons bchind the vetot-:came lcss obvious, and giying this right to new members gettingharder to justify.

Since inereasing the number of permanent members with theveto faces opposition and abolition of veto is unlikely, there areproposals to restrict the veto for existing and new permanentmembers. These include limiting the range of areas in which theveto can be used, allowing its use only when an item affects apermanent member's "supreme national interests", instituting asystem of weighted yoting that would allow the Council to overridea veto, and inereasing the total number of negative votes needed toveto a resolution.54 One of the proposals, for example, argued thatthe new permanent members sould not have the right to veto, aright that a majority of countries hope would eventually becomeobsoIete. In addition, the proposal urged the original permanentmembers to limit the use of veto to Chapter VII of the Charter,which deals with the Council's enforcement powers.

7. Condusion

The UN has entered into a process of transformation with theend of the Cold War. A new hope arose that the UN system couldbe renewed to function properIy. Furthermore, co-operation in theSC to stop Iraq's aggression against Kuwait reinforeed the hopcsfor the UN's future role. A widespread optimism among the

530avid M. Malonc,' The UN Sccurily Council in 1.hePost Cold War World:1987-97', Securily Dia/ogue, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1997, p. 402.

54Weiss/Forsy1.hc/COalC, The UN and Changing World Politics, p. 94.


seholars, the politicians, the media and in the publie appeared for arevitalized UN at the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, a sense of euphoria sUITounded the UN. Thus, theSC ealled on the Seeretary-General Ghali to prepare a programmeof reform on ways of strengthening and making the UN moreefficient within the framework of the Charter. The SeeretaryGeneral in his" An Agenda for Peace" defined novel eoneepts suchas preventive diplamaey, peaeemaking and post-eonfliet peaeebuilding to support UN's peaeekeeping operations. However, thenew kind of internal eonfIiets that exploded soan after the end ofthe Cold War showed that "An Agenda for Peace" failed to touehon the ehallenging eoneepts of non-intervention and statesovereignty.

The years after the end of the Cold War witnessed theoutbreak of many internal wars in different parts of the world as inthe former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia and Somalia. TheGulf War beeame the last ease of the traditional interstate wars. Inthe eontemporary world, the nature of eonfliet have been ehangingand the UN ealled on to deal with these new kinds of armedeonfIiets whieh eould not be predieted when the UN Charter wasdrafted. Sinee the Charter was designed for interstate eonfliets andthe Organization was not equipped to deal with eonfliets withininternal borders, the UN eould not be sueeessful in overcomingthese eonfliets, as it was expceted.

While handIing these eonfIiets, the UN had to breaktraditional pıinciples and norms such as non-use of foree inpeacekeeping operations, non-intervention into domestic affairsand state sovereignty. Further, the SC authorized to undertakeenforeement actian to ereate conditions for humanitarian reliefoperations, and defense of the UN personncı in Bosnia, Somalia.and Rwanda. This blurred the dislinclion between the peaeekeepingand peaee enforeement operations of the UN. Although thisarrangement improved the UN's effieieney, it alsa created anegative impact on the Organization's credibiliıy.

Sinee the end of the Cold War, while the old patterns ofinteraction have broken down or changed signifieantly, newpatterns have not yet crystallized. Prior ways to solve the problem sare not sufficient any more, and theyare under ehallenge, but the

64 THETUR~SHYEARBOOK (VOL. XXX

new one s have not yet emerged. Although the member states aredissatisfıed with the past experiences of the UN, they have not yetobtained the necessary political wiU for a new UN to manage worldpolitics arter the Cold War.

Under these circumstances, it seems clear that the UN wasdesigned for a world that is over now. The spirit that created theUN to prevent the repetitian of anather world war is not alivetoday. Hence, the UN is ill-equipped to respond adequately to thecrises of present. As a result, the UN needs reforms to perform itsfunction as it was designed in lhe Charler. Wiıhout reform, it willlack boıh ıhe credibiliıy and capaciıy to meet the challenges of thec:Jntemporary world.

Sıill, the ability of ıhe UN to meet adequately the demands ofpresem and fulure world condiıions dcpcnds on the policies of ilsmembcr states. The UN can only do what the membcr states wish itto do. As an intcr-governmcntal organizaıion, ilS reform s heavilydepcnds on the mcmbcr sıaıes, especially to the more powerfulones. Thus, the sol e remaining superpower US policies for political,military and financial reasons would mainly determine the mainparameıers of the UN's fuıure operaıions. Wc have seen in cases ofSomalia, Haili and Yugoslavia ıhat the US support for UNpeacekeeping is wOrlhwhile. In addiıion, NATO's co-operation withthe UN for providing necessary military power was useful inBosnia. Since Chapter eight of the UN Charler allows it to co-operate with the regional organizaıions, there was no problem inthis co-operation. However, NATO is a collective defenseorganization and its logic is different from the UN's pcacekeepingoperations. Thus, problems occurred in the Bosnian operationswith NATO. However, the UN and NATO would need to co-operate in future opcraıions as well, simply because UN needsNATO's equipment and rcsourccs while NATO needs to attend UNpeacekeeping operations in ordcr to jusıify its existençe andrelevance arter the dissoluıion of lhe Soviet Union.

However, as the conl1icts grew worldwide, the troop-contributing countries, even lhe US, are becoming increasinglyreluctant lo commiı personncı lo UN operations. The failure of UNin Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda had a negalive impact on theirwillingness, too. Clearly, il is extremcly difficulı for anygovernmenı to jusıify why its own nationals should die in conflicts

2000) UN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 65

that the public does not understand and where a compellingpolitical interest cannot be demonstrated. Therefore, it is importantto materialize the discussed proposals of An Agenda for Peace,about preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding andbudgetary issues to keep aliye the UN operations in future. Itbecame visible to put more UN resources into preventive strategies,and to find newand improved sources for funding UN's peace andsecurity activities.

Neverthcless, non e of the reform proposals should be donein an incrementa) fashion in response to immediate emergendes orpersistent and often misguided public criticism of the organization.Instead, it must reOect a long-term plan aimed at giying the UN theability, when and if the political will exists, to respond quickly tofuture requests for peacekeeping involvement. An Agenda forPeace is a good first step lOwards dealing with the newenvironment in the hrea of peace and security by using thepotential enshrined in the Charter to a greater extent than before.The priority given to prevenLiye diplomacy and other preventiveapproaches in the Secretary General's "Supplement to An Agendafor Peacc", and the recogni tion of the need to draw cleardistinctions between differcm types of responses, especiallybetween peace keeping and enforcement, is welcome suggestions aswell.

Moreover, there was a general agreement among the memberstates, in the light of the mistakes of the UN in internal wars, thatbasic principles of peacekeeping which are; the consent of theparties, impartiality and non-use of force except in sclf defense,should be obsorved in future. Especially Third World countriesstressed that UN peacekeeping operations should adhere strictly tothe principles and purposes of the Charter, in particular theprincipİes of respect for sovercign equality and territorial integrityof states and non-interfcrcnce in their internal affairs.55

Furthermore, reforming the UN to expand its role ininternational politics brought the SC on the agenda as well. Sincethe Charter of the UN gives the Council a primary responsibility

55Abdcrahman S. Abdcrahman, Comprehensive Review of ıhe WholeQuesıion on Peacekeeping Operaıions,. N50/230, gophcr.un.org, 22 June1995, p. 4.


for the maintenance of international peace and security, its reformregarded as unavoidable. Reform proposals, to put the SC at thecenter of future international peace and security matters, focuseson the size, composition and the decision making of the CounciL.Although the member states of the UN reached a consensus thatthe number of both permanent and non-permanent members ofthe SC should be inercascd, and the privilege of veto power shouldbe abolished to have a more democratic and better functioningCouncil. there was lack of consensus about how to proceed with thereforms. However, if the UN desires to be an important instrumentof international politics, it is essential to fınd ways to reform theCounciL.

At this point, the UN should strive continuously to improveits capabilities according to new circumstances and changes in theworld agenda. Its future success depends on creating new ways toovercome prospective crises. The changed face of connict tadayrequires us to be perceptive. adaptive. creative, and courageous, andto address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causesof cannict, which all too often lie in the absence of economicopportunities and social inequaliıies.

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