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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of: ) ) FMC Corporation ) DOCKET NO: FIFRA-03-2015-0248 1735 Market Street ) Philadelphia, PA 19103 )
) Respondent )
Complainant’s Reply to Respondent FMC Corporation’s Opposition to Complainant’s Motion for Partial Accelerated Decision as to Liability for Violations 1-12,273 of the
Complaint
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1
II. Standard of Review for Accelerated Decision: Burdens of Moving and Non-Moving Parties…………………………………………………………………2
III. Complainant is Entitled to Partial Accelerated Decision as to Liability
for Violations 1 through 12,273 of the Complaint
A. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact and Complainant is Entitled to Judgement as a Matter of Law that Respondent’s Direct Mail, Print and Website Materials Constituted “Advertisements” and that Respondent’s Conduct with Regard to Such Material Constituted “Advertising”……………………………………………………………3
B. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact and Complainant is Entitled to Judgement as a Matter of Law that Respondent Did Not Include the RUP Classification in its Direct Mail, Print and Website Materials……………………………………………………………………10
C. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact and Complainant is Entitled to Judgement as a Matter of Law that Respondent Committed 12,273 Individual Acts of Advertising…………………………………11
IV. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………16
FMC RUP Magazine advertisements…………… ………………………………..Attachment 1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
In re J. Phillip Adams, 13 E.A.D. 310 (EAB 2007) ……………………………………………...8 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)……………………………………………….2 In re Aylin, Inc., et al, 2016 EPA ALJ LEXIS 39 (ALJ, March 24, 2016)
(Order Denying Complainant’s Motion for Partial Accelerated Decision)……………….2 In re BWX Technologies, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 61 (EAB 2000)…………………………………………3 In re Carbon Injection Systems, LLC, 2016 EPA App. LEXIS 7 (EAD, Feb. 2, 2016)………...4,6 Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1991) ……………………………………………...9 In the Matter of Chase, 2012 EPA ALJ LEXIS 18 (ALJ, June 21, 2012) (Order
on Complainant’s Motion for Partial Accelerated Decision) …………………………….4 In re Chase, 2014 EPA App. LEXIS 29 (EAD, Aug. 1, 2014) …………………………………..6 In re Clarksburg Casket, 8 E.A.D. 496 (EAB 1999)……………………………………………...2 In re Green Thumb Nursery, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 782 (EAB 1997) …………………………………..2 King v. National Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 29 (6th Cir. 1995). …………………………………..4 In re Lazarus, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 318 (EAB 1997) …………………………………………………...8 In re Liphatech, Inc., Docket No.: FIFRA-05-2010-0016,
2014 EPA ALJ LEXIS 12 (ALJ, March 12, 2014)………………………………….9,12,13 In re Liphatech, Inc., 2011 EPA ALJ LEXIS 5, (ALJ, May 6, 2011) (Order on Motions
for Accelerated Decision Regarding Alleged Violations of FIFRA § 12(a)(2)(E))…..…10 In re Mayes, 12 E.A.D. 54 (EAB 2005)…………………………………………………………..6 In re Martex Farms, S.E., 13 E.A.D. 464 (EAB 2008) ………………………………………….15 Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 1997) (1st Cir. 1997)…………………..4 Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1990)………………………………………….. 9 Ways v. City of Lincoln, 206 F. Supp. 2d 978 (D. Neb. 2002)……………………………………4
FEDERAL STATUTES
7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E)…………………………………………………………………..…passim
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Fd. R. Civ.P. 56………………………………………………………………………………… 2,4
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
40 C.F.R. § 22.15………………………………………………………………………………… 8 40 C.F.R. § 22.20………………………………………………………………………………..2,3 40 C.F.R. § 22.24…………………………………………………………………………….........3 40 C.F.R. § 152.168………………………………………………………………………... passim
I. Introduction Complainant, the Director of the Land and Chemicals Division, United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Region III (“Complainant”) has met its burden for Partial Accelerated
Decision as to Respondent FMC Corporation’s (“Respondent”) liability for violations 1 through
12,273 of the Complaint. Specifically, Complainant has met its burden of production as the
moving party by citing to Respondent’s admissions in its Answer to the Complaint; other
materials in the record, including admissions and documents submitted by Respondent, and the
affidavit of Christine Convery, which show that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to
Respondent’s liability for the 12,273 violations of Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136j(a)(2)(E), alleged in the Complaint concerning Respondent’s illegal advertisements of its
restricted use pesticide (“RUP”) F9047-2 EC Insecticide, EPA Reg. No. 279-9545.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Complainant’s Motion for Partial Accelerated Decision as to
Liability for Violations 1-12,273 of the Complaint (“Complainant’s Memo”). Contrary to the
assertions in Respondent FMC Corporation’s Opposition to Complainant’s Motion for Partial
Accelerated Decision as to Liability for Violations 1-12,273 of the Complaint (“Respondent’s
Opposition”), Respondent has failed to meet its burden as the non-moving party to cite to
materials in the record or show that the materials cited by EPA do not establish the absence of a
genuine dispute with regard to any of the facts material to either party’s theory of liability under
Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), with respect to those 12,273 violations.
For the reasons set forth in Complainant’s Memo and herein, Complainant has established
that it is entitled to judgement as a matter of law and seeks an Order granting partial accelerated
decision in its favor, in full or in part, as to liability for the 12,273 violations of Section 12(a)(2)(E)
of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), alleged in the Complaint.
2
II. Standard of Review for Accelerated Decision: Burdens of Moving and Non-Moving Parties
Section IV. of Complainant’s Memo addresses the standard of review for accelerated
decision. Complainant’s Memo at 8-10. As described therein, the standard for motions for
accelerated decision under 40 C.F.R. § 22.20 of the Consolidated Rules of Procedure is similar to
the standard for motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”). Id. Consistent with Rule 56 jurisprudence, Complainant – as the moving
party - bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);
In re Clarksburg Casket, 8 E.A.D. 496, 501–502 (EAB 1999) (citing In re Green Thumb
Nursery, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 782, 793 (EAB 1997)). In order to do so, Complainant must first meet
its burden of production by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing
that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” In re Aylin, Inc., 2016 EPA ALJ
LEXIS 39, at *12-13 (Order Denying Complainant’s Motion for Partial Accelerated Decision)
(quoting FRCP(c)(1)). After Complainant has satisfied this burden of production, the burden
shifts to the Respondent – the nonmoving party - to show that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists by similarly “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. Though the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with the movant, the Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”) has noted
“neither party can meet its burden of production by resting on mere allegations, assertions, or
conclusions of evidence” and further that “parties opposing summary judgement must provide
3
more than a scintilla of evidence on a disputed factual issue to show their entitlement to a trial or
evidentiary standard of the case.” In re BWX Technologies, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 61, 75-76 (EAB
2000).
The Consolidated Rules of Practice further provide:
If an accelerated decision . . . is rendered on less than all issues or claims in the proceeding, the Presiding Officer shall determine what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts remain controverted. The partial accelerated decision . . . shall specify the facts which appear substantially uncontroverted, and the issues and claims upon which the hearing will proceed.” 40 C.F.R. § 22.20(b)(2).
Under 40 C.F.R. § 22.24(b) of the Consolidated Rules of Procedure, “[e]ach matter of
controversy shall be decided by the presiding Officer upon a preponderance of the evidence.”
40 C.F.R. § 22.24(b).
III. Complainant is Entitled to Partial Accelerated Decision as to Liability for Violations 1 through 12,273 of the Complaint
A. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact and Complainant is Entitled to
Judgement as a Matter of Law that Respondent’s Direct Mail, Print and Website Materials Constituted “Advertisements” and that Respondent’s Conduct with Regard to Such Material Constituted “Advertising”
Section V.B. of Complainant’s Memo sets forth the facts that underly Complainant’s position
that Respondent’s direct mail, print and website materials constitute “advertisements” under 40
C.F.R. § 152.168, and that Respondent’s conduct in regard to such materials constituted
“advertising” under Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E). Complainant’s
Memo at 11-13. Such facts include legally binding admissions in Respondent’s Answer,
admissions and supporting documentation provided by Respondent outside the pleadings, and
information obtained through EPA’s investigation. Complainant’s Memo at 11-13. Respondent
has raised no genuine issue with respect to any of these underlying facts.
4
Complainant submits that the undisputed facts in the record are sufficient for the
determination of whether Respondent’s direct mail, print and website materials are regulated
“advertisements” and that proposed testimony suggested by Respondent is neither required nor
appropriate. EPA’s 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 advertising regulations were promulgated in their
current form in May 4, 1988 and contain no definition of the term “advertisement.” 53 Fed. Reg.
15986 (May 4, 1988). In cases such as this where there is no governing legal definition of a
particular term, the EAB has held that such term should be readily defined based on its
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” and often relies on dictionaries in interpreting
regulatory language. In re Chase, 2014 EPA App. LEXIS 29, at *24 (EAD, Aug. 1,
2014)(quoting In re Mayes, 12 E.A.D. 54, 86 (EAB 2005) (uses various dictionary definitions for
guidance to define the term “annual”)); In re Carbon Injection Sys., LLC, 2016 EPA App.
LEXIS 7, 47-48 (EAD, Feb. 2, 2016). Though there are many sources to choose from1,
Complainant submits that Respondent’s direct mail, print and website materials at issue in this
case fall under common dictionary definitions of “advertisements”, and more importantly when
analyzed more closely are clearly of a nature that were intended to be regulated under 40 C.F.R.
§ 152.168. Because neither “advertisement” nor “advertise” are terms of art or complex
1 See e.g., “Advertisement” is defined as: “1. the act or process of advertising; 2. a public notice, especially one published in the press or broadcast over the air” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/advertisement); “[a] notice or announcement in a public medium promoting a product, service, or event or publicizing a job vacancy” (http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/advertisement); “a paid notice that tells people about a product or service” (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/advertisement).
5
scientific terms, Respondent’s intention to call its expert witness Mr. George Orme to offer
testimony as to what these terms mean is inappropriate. Respondent’s Opposition at 5-6; Orme
Declaration at ¶7; See In re: Carbon Injection Systems, LLC, 2016 EPA App. LEXIS 7, at *45
(E.A.D. Feb. 2, 2016)(finding that “the ALJ erred by relying on an industry expert’s testimony
concerning the common, ordinary meaning of the regulatory term “energy” given the general
presumption against expert testimony on legal questions in judicial proceedings”); Nieves-
Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 1997); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 206 F. Supp.
2d 978, 991 (D. Neb. 2002) aff'd, 331 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “expert testimony
that purports to explain the legal meaning of a term is forbidden * * *, but testimony defining a
term of art [in an ordinance] as it is used within a given field may be allowed”).
Further, while Respondent’s Opposition argues for “a case-by-case inquiry based on factual
evidence outside of the evidence included in the pre-hearing submissions,” it fails to identify the
additional factual evidence it would seek to introduce. Respondent’s Opposition at 7-8.
Accordingly, Respondent has not met its burden to show that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists as a party opposing a motion for summary judgement “may not raise an issue of fact by
merely referring to the proposed testimony of possible witnesses. . . . An affidavit stating what
the attorney believes or intends to prove at trial is insufficient to comply with the burden placed
on a party opposing a motion for summary judgment under [FRCP] 56.” In the Matter of Chase,
2012 EPA ALJ LEXIS 18, at *53-54 (ALJ, June 21, 2012) (Order on Complainant’s Motion for
Partial Accelerated Decision) (quoting King v. National Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 33-34 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
Complainant’s “ad-hoc” analysis in Section V.C. of Complainant’s Memo of Respondent’s
direct mail, print and website materials shows, by the preponderance of the evidence, that each of
6
these materials constitute “advertisements” under 40 C.F.R. § 152.168, and that Respondent’s
conduct in regard to such materials constituted “advertising” under Section 12(a)(2)(E) of
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E). Complainant’s Memo at 15-25. Certainly, not all
communications from pesticide registrants conveyed by brochure, pamphlet, broadcast media or
other form specified 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 are regulated “advertisements” (e.g., SEC-required
communications and Material Data Safety Sheets (MSDS)). Respondent’s Opposition at 6;
Orme Declaration at ¶7. The fact that the direct mail, print and website materials at issue in this
case were each in a form specified in 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 was but one of several bases, in
addition to an analysis of their content, context, and use, supporting Complainant’s position that
they constitute regulated “advertisements”. Complainant’s Memo at 15-25.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, no factual inquiry must be made as to whether the direct
mailers were “offered to purchasers.” Respondent’s Opposition at 7. Respondent has admitted
in its Answer that it “caused direct mailer(s) about F9047-2 EC Insecticide, EPA Reg. No. 279-9545
to be sent to individuals associated with various agricultural farms (“farm/grower consumers”) in
March 2012,” and that it “caused direct mailer(s) about F9047-2 EC Insecticide, EPA Reg. No. 279-
9545 to be sent to individuals associated with retailers in Respondent’s product distribution chain
(“retail purchasers”) in March 2012.” Complaint and Answer at ¶¶ 22 and 32. As there can be no
question that farm/grower consumers or retail purchasers are potential purchasers (versus
stockholders, first responders, etc.), this issue has been determined conclusively and requires no
further evidence. Additionally, as previously noted in these proceedings, 40 C.F.R. 152.168(b) is
an inclusive – not exclusive – list, and therefore not all “regulated” advertisements are explicitly
listed. See Complainant’s Rebuttal PHE at 3.
7
Respondent misconstrues Complainant’s view as to the significance of FMC’s responses to
EPA’s Request for Information letters. Unlike admissions in Respondent’s Answer to the
Complaint - which are legally binding, the information provided by FMC in its answers to EPA’s
Information Request letters are viewed as evidence to be considered and weighed by the trier of
fact, akin to party admissions. As shown in Section C. of Complainant’s Memo, FMC’s initial
identification of its direct mail, print and website materials as being responsive to EPA’s request
for “promotional and advertising materials” is just one of several bases, including an analysis of
the content, use and form of each of the materials themselves, that support Complainant’s
argument that such materials constitute “advertisements” under 40 C.F.R. § 152.1682.
Complainant’s Memo at 15-25.
Respondent implies that FMC may not have been clear as to the purpose of EPA’s
Information Request Letters or as to the scope of “promotional and advertising” information
requested at the time of its responses. Respondent’s Opposition at 9. Complainant notes,
however, that at no time did FMC ask EPA for clarification on either of these issues, nor did it
provide caveats in any of its responses to reflect such uncertainty. See Cx25, and CX27. Even
after receiving EPA’s May 7, 2014 “Show Cause” letter advising FMC of suspected violations of
Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), FMC failed to revise its previous July
18, 2013 response and used the following language to describe its direct mail and print materials
in a July 15, 2014 response:
2 In fact, several of the materials identified by FMC as being responsive to EPA’s request for “promotional and advertising materials” which also did not include the RUP classification were not included in the Complaint. See Convery Declaration at 3, fn 1.
8
a. F100-22694-01_Stallion_DM-Vs3-X1A.pdf was a print advertisement that was mailed to growers in March 2012;
b. F100-22694-02_Stallion_DM-Retailers-X1A.pdf was a print advertisement that was mailed to retailers in March 2012;
c. F100-22333-1_Stallion_PrintAd_ProgressiveForageGrower-X1A.pdf was a print advertisement that appeared in the April, May and June 2012 editions of Progressive Forage Grower magazine; and
d. F100-22333-1_Stallion_PrintAd_Sunflower-X1A.pdf was a print advertisement that appeared in the March and April 2012 editions of The Sunflower magazine.
Convery Declaration at ¶¶ 8 and 10; CX25 at EPA 0681- EPA 0682; CX27 at EPA 0755-EPA 0756; See also Convery Declaration at ¶ 14; CX29 (describing direct mailers as “advertisements” in its July 21, 2015 response).
This conduct suggests that Respondent did not believe at the time that it ‘cast too broad of a
net’ in responding to EPA’s Information Request letters, and Complainant wholly rejects
Respondent’s contentions that it should have instead “unilaterally defined EPA’s terms and
fought production” or that it is being unfairly “punished” for cooperating with EPA’s compliance
investigation – rather than for its own violative conduct. Respondent’s Opposition at 10-11.
Respondent’s defenses do not bar entry of a judgement for Complainant. Respondent’s
Opposition raises for the first time affirmative defenses on due process/First Amendment/fair
notice grounds in regard to EPA’s failure to define the terms “advertisement” and “advertising.”
Respondent’s Opposition at 11-13. Respondent’s defense(s) were not timely raised and should
be denied on procedural grounds. As the Consolidated Rule of Practice require Respondent in
its Answer to state “[t]he circumstances or arguments which are alleged to constitute the grounds
of any defense,” Respondent waived such defenses by failing to raise them in its Answer or Pre-
Hearing Exchange, or to move to amend its Answer to include them. 40 C.F.R. § 22.15(b). J.
Phillip Adams, 13 E.A.D. 310, 326 n. 19 (EAB 2007) (“Although the Federal Rules do not
themselves clearly address the question of waiver, the courts have found that because the rules
are clear in terms of when defenses must be asserted, courts have the authority to treat untimely
9
defenses as waived.”); In re Lazarus, Inc., 7 E.A.D. 318, 331 (EAB 1997) (“The general rule is
that failure to include an [affirmative] defense in the answer constitutes a waiver of that defense”
(citing Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 863 (3d Cir. 1991) and Simon v. United States, 891
F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990))).
Respondent’s due process/First Amendment/fair notice defenses should fail on substantive
grounds as well. EPA’s 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 advertising regulations have been promulgated in
their current form since May 4, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 15986 (May 4, 1988). Though the
regulations do not include a definition of “advertisement,” the term itself is a not a technical term
or a term of art and its general meaning and ubiquitous manifestations are so widely understood
and recognized that Respondent should have been easily able to understand the conduct that was
prohibited, particularly with respect to its direct mailers and magazine print ads (i.e., violations
1-12,271 of the Complaint). To the extent Respondent had any uncertainty about the
applicability of EPA’s 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 regulation as to its advertising activities, it had over
25 years to inquire and seek clarification from the Agency. Indeed, Respondent was put on
further notice of EPA’s interpretation of “advertisements” and “advertising” on May 14, 2010
(i.e., well before the first advertising violation alleged in the Complaint), the date on which EPA
filed a complaint against Liphatech, Inc., for similar advertising violations of Section 12(a)(2)(E)
of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E). See In re Liphatech, Inc., Docket No.: FIFRA-05-2010-
0016, 2014 EPA ALJ LEXIS 12 (ALJ, March 12, 2014).
Moreover, Respondent’s “adequate notice” argument is specious and belied by its own
history. Respondent’s Opposition at 12-13. A review of the materials submitted as part of
FMC’s July 18, 2013 response, as well as publically accessible advertisements for other FMC
RUPs, show that FMC clearly considered the very same type of direct mail and print
10
“communications” as those at issue in violations 1-12,271 of the Complaint to be regulated
“advertisements”3.
B. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact and Complainant is Entitled to Judgement as a Matter of Law Finding that Respondent Did Not Include the RUP Classification in its Direct Mail, Print and Website Materials
Respondent’s Opposition raises no issues of fact concerning whether its direct mail, print and
website materials included the required RUP classification. Respondent essentially reprises and
expands the legal argument included in its prehearing exchange that it constructively complied
with 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 . . . because all its “communications contained ‘a statement of’ the
restricted use classification by referring the reader to the product label.” Respondent’s
Opposition at 14. See also Respondent’s PHE at 19. As previously argued by Complainant,
this argument is without merit and should be dismissed on the same grounds as the Chief
Administrative Law Judge did in the Liphatech case. In re Liphatech, Inc., Docket No.: FIFRA-
05-2010-0016, 2011 EPA ALJ LEXIS 5, at *27-31 (ALJ, May 6, 2011) (Order on Motions for
Accelerated Decision Regarding Alleged Violations of FIFRA § 12(A)(2)(E)), See
Complainant’s Memo at 27-29; Complainant’s Rebuttal PHE at 4-5. Respondent argues that
Complainant’s reliance on this case is misplaced because some of the advertisements at issue
3 See e.g., CX25 at EPA 0697 and EPA 0699 (2013 print ads, “Stallion is a restricted use pesticide” along left-hand side of page); EPA 0706-EPA 0707 and EPA 0708-EPA 0709 (2013 direct mailers, “Stallion is a restricted use pesticide” on back side along bottom). See also http://mydigimag.rrd.com/publication/?i=141748 (January 2013 issue of Citrus and Vegetable Magazine, page 24, “Mustang, Chariot, and Gladiator are restricted use pesticides” along right-hand side of page); http://mydigimag.rrd.com/publication/?i=200828 (March 2014 issue of Citrus and Vegetable Magazine, page 5, “Mustang is a restricted use pesticide” along right-hand side of page); http://www.progressiveforage.com/digital_edition/2013/02/ (February 1, 2013 issue of Progressive Forage Grower magazine, page 12, “Stallion is a restricted use pesticide” along left-hand side of page); http://soygrowers.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/americansoybean_fall2013_fnl_web.pdf (Fall 2013 issue of American Soybean, page 2, “Hero Insecticide and Capture LFR are restricted use pesticides” along bottom of page). Note: for convenience, print copies from these websites are attached (Attachment 1).
11
were radio broadcasts in which the audio references to the label (on which was included the RUP
statement) were “fleeting.” Respondent’s Opposition at 14. However, Complainant notes that
the regulatory required language is virtually identical for printed materials as for broadcast
advertising:
The requirement may be satisfied for printed material by inclusion of the statement “Restricted Use Pesticide,” or the terms of restriction, prominently in the advertisement. The requirement may be satisfied with respect to broadcast or telephone advertising by inclusion of the spoken words “Restricted use pesticide [sic],” or a statement of the terms of restriction. 40 C.F.R. § 152.168(c) (emph. added).
Therefore the Liphatech analysis is clearly applicable to the instant facts despite the
different advertising media at issue. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that Respondent did
constructively comply by “cross-referencing,” Complainant contends that the miniscule font size
of its “cross-reference” is analogous to the “fleeting” references in Liphatech’s radio
advertisements.
C. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact and Complainant is Entitled to Judgement as a Matter of Law Finding that Respondent Committed 12,273 Individual Acts of Advertising
Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, there is no dispute as to the material facts for
determining the number of violations of Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E),
alleged in the Complaint. Section V.F. of Complainant’s Memo sets forth facts in the record
showing that Respondent caused the following acts of advertising: 9,645 direct mailers sent to
individual farm/grower consumers, 2,622 direct mailers sent to individual retail purchasers, ads
printed in three (3) issues of Progressive Forage Grower magazine, an advertisement printed in
a single issue of The Sunflower magazine, a testimonial sell sheet posted on Respondent’s
website on the product’s webpage, and an article posted on the PRWeb online news distribution
and publicity website. Complainant’s Memo at 31-37. These are the facts that are material to
12
Complainant’s legal position as to the number of advertising violations, and Respondent has
raised no genuine issue with respect to any of these facts.
Alternatively, Respondent posits based on these same undisputed facts (assuming advertising
is proved) that there are only four violations: “one violation for FMC’s decision to cause the
Stomp Plate to be included in periodicals, one violation for FMC’s decision to cause the Stomp
Plate to be included in the direct mailer, and two violations associated with FMC’s decision to
cause the two website communications to be posted.” Respondent’s Opposition at 4. Other than
to assert that all of its direct mail and magazine advertisements “involve[d] a single design
“plate” . . . that displayed a horseshoe imprint on soil and stated “stomp more” insects (the
“Stomp Plate”),” Respondent provides no statutory basis or argument for its legal position on the
number of violations. Respondent’s Opposition at 1.
Section V.E. of Complainant’s Memo describes how FIFRA’s statutory provisions, purpose
and recent case law4 indicate that the ‘unit of violation’ under Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7
U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), ought to be based on each individual act of advertising. Complainant’s
Memo at 29-30. Not only does Respondent’s position miss the mark as to the relevant act that
determines the unit of violation Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), which is
to advertise, it is wholly inconsistent with the consumer protection goals of FIFRA’s advertising
provisions as it would permit 12,267 individual acts of violative advertising through direct mail –
4 In a similar case involving violative radio and magazine advertisements, the Respondent proposed basing the “unit of violation” under Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), on the number of different radio stations and publications that contained or aired the advertisement (i.e., 10), the failure to include RUP language in advertising generally (i.e., 1), the number of versions of violative radio and print ads (i.e., 6), the number of States the violative advertisements were broadcast or distributed (i.e., 6), and the medium the advertisement was run (i.e., 2) but the Chief Administrative Law Judge found “no indication in the statutory language that unlawful advertisements should be grouped on anything less than a per advertisement basis.” Liphatech, 2014 EPA ALJ LEXIS at *220.
13
each failing to state the pesticide product’s RUP classification and thus communicate the risks
and limitations inherent with its purchase and use to potential purchasers – to be penalized as a single
decision5. Though Complainant disagrees with Respondent’s creative construction as to the
number advertising violations, the facts on which this number of violations is based are not in
dispute.
Respondent accuses Complainant of “inexplicably ignor[ing] facts already in the record
about returned and duplicative direct mailers.” Respondent’s Opposition at 4. Complainant
asserts that these facts have been thoroughly considered and simply found to be irrelevant to its
legal position as to the number of advertising violations for purposes of liability, which is based
on the number of individual acts of advertising (i.e., the number of instances Respondent caused
a direct mailer to be sent to an individual farm/grower consumer (i.e., 9,645) or an individual
retail purchaser (i.e., 2,622)). Complainant’s Memo at 31-35. Though Complainant maintains
that liability attached at the time each direct mailer was sent, it notes that the direct mailers
Respondent represents as being “returned” (as reflected in Rx061, and referenced in Rx076) have
been specifically excluded for purposes of penalty. Complainant’s Rebuttal PHE at 10.
Respondent represents that “after removing mailers that were sent to one or more individuals
associated with the same agricultural farm and returned direct mailers,” there were 6,379
intended agricultural farm recipients; and that “after removing direct mailers that were sent to
one or more individuals associated with the same retailer as well as returned direct mailers,”
5 In addressing this very issue, the Chief Administrative Law Judge in Liphatech noted “[i]f this tribunal were to find that each advertisement did not constitute a separate violation of FIFRA section 12(a)(2)(E), that interpretation would not deter a party who unlawfully advertises a registered pesticide once from continuing to publish or broadcast the unlawful advertisement as many times as it desires because the penalty would remain the same.” Liphatech, 2014 EPA ALJ LEXIS at *251
14
there were 346 intended retailer recipients, and refers to the removed mailers as “duplicates6.”
Respondent’s Opposition at 4-5. After completing this exercise, however, Respondent provides
no statutory basis or legal argument for using only this subset of violative mailers to determine
the number of advertising violations and thus also appears to “ignore” these facts about returned
and duplicative direct mailers. Complainant submits that to the extent this subset of violative
mailers have any relevance, it would be for purposes of penalty only, not liability.
As Complainant does not dispute Respondent’s factual representations described above, there
is no need to call its expert witness Mr. George Orme “to offer testimony on the reduction in
numbers due to the returned and duplicate mailers.” Respondent’s Opposition at 5; Orme
Declaration at ¶8. Likewise, there is no need for this Court to consider Respondent’s expert’s
proposed testimony “about the other factors that typically are taken into account, such as mail
that is not delivered, mail that is not read, and the different ways that mail is read or potentially
6 As noted in its Rebuttal Prehearing Exchange, Complainant finds Respondent’s use of the term “duplicates” to be both erroneous and misleading. See Rebuttal PHE at 2. Respondent identifies as “duplicates” mailers sent to all individuals, beyond the first individual, that are associated with the same agricultural farm or the same retailer (i.e., the names of the individuals whose names have been shaded in grey or yellow on the “Retailer List” in Tab A and “Grower List” in Tab C” in RX061.) In counting only the mailer sent to the first individual associated with a grower or retailer regardless of how many mailers were actually sent, Respondent is essentially counting the number of growers and retailers. By way of example, Respondent would identify as duplicates and remove the three (3) direct mailers sent to: Moe Smith associated with Red Grower Farm, Jack Doe associated with Red Grower Farm, and Alice Doe associated with Green Retailer in the table below notwithstanding the fact that direct mailers that failing to state the pesticide product’s RUP classification were sent to all six (6) potential purchasers:
COMPANY_NAME FIRST_NAME LAST_NAME 1 Red Grower Farm Many Jones 2 Red Grower Farm Moe Smith 3 Red Grower Farm Jack Doe 4 Blue Retailer Bob Smith 5 Green Retailer Ted Jones 6 Green Retailer Alice Doe
15
used” as such testimony does not bear on any genuine issue of material fact under either party’s
theory of liability7. Respondent’s Opposition at 5; Orme Declaration at ¶8.
Though Respondent asserts that the number of violations alleged by EPA is “internally
inconsistent, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious,” Sections V.E. and F. of Complainant’s
Memo clearly show that the number of violations alleged in the Complaint is consistent with
applicable law and policies, and directly corresponds with the evidence. Respondent’s
Opposition at 3; Complainant’s Memo at 29-37. It is well settled that the number of violation
with which an agency chooses to charge a Respondent in a particular matter is within its
prosecutorial discretion. See Martex Farms, S.E., 13 E.A.D. 464, 488 (EAB 2008) (citing B&R
Oil Co., 8 E.A.D. 39, 51 (EAB 1998) (‘[C]ourts have traditionally accorded governments a wide
berth of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether, and against who, to undertake enforcement
action.”)) Here, Complainant exercised prosecutorial discretion in alleging the number of
violations for the magazine advertisements based on the particular issues of Progressive Forage
Grower and The Sunflower magazines and not the individual copies of each issue that were
likely circulated to subscribers8. Despite any perceived “internal inconsistencies” by
Respondent, the number of violations alleged in the Complaint for Respondent’s direct mailers
advertisements is consistent with applicable law and policies; directly corresponds with the
7 As discussed in Section V. F. of Complainant’s Memo, Complainant maintains that liability under Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), attached at the time each direct mailer was sent (i.e., the time it committed the unlawful act). Complainant’s Memo at 31-37. Though arguably possibly relevant for purposes of penalty, expert testimony as to the rate direct mail is generally delivered, read or used is not probative to the determination of liability, and hence, irrelevant to Complainant’s Motion. 8 According to https://lists.nextmark.com/market;jsessionid=1B3716C365F97DEB13FD6FF969EF4F1A? page=order/online/ datacard&id=308822, Progressive Forage Grower magazine has over 37,000 subscribers, consisting of farmers, hay and silage producers, alfalfa growers, and mid-level managers that plant, manage, and harvest a variety of grasses, silage, and hay products for livestock feed. According to https://www.sunflowernsa.com/ magazine/Advertising/, The Sunflower magazine goes to over 20,000 readers, 92% of which are sunflower growers.
16
evidence, taking into account the volume, breadth and uniquely direct and personalized nature of
the direct mailer advertisements; and is within Complainant’s prosecutorial discretion.
IV. Conclusion
Respondent has not satisfied its burden under the Consolidated Rules of Practice to defeat
Complainant’s fully supported Motion for Partial Accelerated Decision because it failed to
identify any facts that are in dispute – or substantially controverted – regarding the violations of
Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), alleged in the Complaint.
As explained in Complainant’s Memo and herein, the facts are undisputed as to the
elements Complainant must prove as part of its prima facie case for the alleged advertising
violations. There is no factual dispute – only a legal dispute – whether Respondent’s direct
mail, print, and website materials constitute “advertisements” within the meaning of Section
12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), and 40 C.F.R. § 152.168. Similarly, there is no
factual dispute that each of Respondent’s direct mail, print, and website material failed to bear
“Restricted Use Pesticide” or a statement of the terms of restriction, only a legal dispute as to
whether such materials otherwise complied with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 152.168 and
Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E).
There is also no factual dispute as to the number of individual acts of advertising – even
as to the direct mailers, which are based on Respondent’s own statements and documentation.
As matter of law, this Court should find that Respondent violated Section 12(a)(2)(E) of FIFRA,
7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(E), by illegally “advertising” its restricted use pesticide F9047-2 EC
Insecticide EPA Reg. No. 279-9545 on 12,273 occasions. To the extent any consideration is
given to the number of so-called “duplicate” or returned mailers, it should be deferred to the
penalty phase of this matter as such facts do not in any way bear on liability.
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2012 U.S. forage statistics
Legend
3,900
3,000
698
45
475
190
20
$74,717
18Oklahoma
5,073 +88.7%
4
3
30
26
28
-33.3%
State ranking-
all forage production
All forage production
(in thousands of tons)
Percentage
increase/decrease
in forage production
2011-2012
State ranking-
alfalfa yield
State ranking-
alfalfa acres
Percentage
increase/decrease of
alfalfa new plantings
2011 hay receipts as a
percentage of state’s
total farm receipts
State ranking-
other hay yield
State ranking-
silage yieldAlfalfa yield
(in thousands of tons)
Alfalfa acres
(in thousands of acres)
Alfalfa new plantings
(in thousands of acres)
2011 hay receipts
annual total
(in thousands of dollars)
Other hay yield
(in thousands of tons)
Other hay acres
(in thousands of acres)
Silage acres
(in thousands of acres)
Top 3 ag commodities
Silage yield
(in thousands of tons)
State ranking-
other hay acres
State ranking-
silage acres
Source: Crop Production 2012 Summary Report, USDA, NASS
Statistical ties are represented by the same numerical ranking.
Apples, Dairy, Wheat
Greenhouse, Hay, Potatoes
1,026
380
1,750
70
1,960
400
70
$375,305
20Washington
4,898 -15.7%
25
29
20
235%
12
1627.3%
Greenhouse, Cattle/calves, Dairy
1,364
620
864
32
1,710
380
58
$348,745
23Oregon
3,938 -5.8%
Alaska
22,000 total hay acres were
harvested in 2012, up 15.8%
from 2011. 27,000 tons of hay
were produced in 2012, up
22.7% from 2010.
2011 hay receipts annual
total (in thousands of dollars)
totaled $3,600, 11% of total
farm receipts.
19
21
27
322%
15
18+16.0%
Dairy, Almonds, Grapes
2,160
600
11,263
425
6,555
950
130
$1,318,827
2California
20,338 -24.6%
9
23
2
73%
1
6-3.7%
Cattle/calves, Hay, Dairy
280
175
156
6
1,056
240
20
$149,541
37Nevada
1,492 -9.0%
38
36
41
4322%
19
24-16.7%
Dairy, Cattle/calves, Potatoes
600
300
5,940
220
4,160
1,040
140
$555,781
7Idaho11,720 -5.7%
30
33
6
118%
2
5
Dairy, Cattle/calves, Hay
336
160
1,232
56
2,050
500
55
$248,178
25Utah3,618 -12.3%
37
38
23
242%
11
13-21.4%
Dairy, Lettuce, Cattle/calves
216
45
1,204
43
2,100
250
65
$244,930
27Arizona
3,520 +21.2%
41
46
24
286%
10
23+18.2%
Cattle/calves, Dairy, Pecans
255
85
2,000
80
1,100
200
30
$159,968
28New Mexico
3,399 +4.9%
40
42
17
224%
18
25+36.4%
Cattle/calves, Corn, Dairy
1,136
710
3,200
160
2,625
750
70
$380,262
13Colorado
6,961 +6.7%
23
18
13
175%
4
9
Cattle/calves, Hay, Hogs
560
400
770
35
1,330
475
40
$147,966
29Wyoming
2,660 -8.3%
32
27
29
3011%
17
14+25.0%
-26.3%
Wheat, Cattle/calves, Hay
1,120
700
840
42
3,000
1,500
85
$270,704
19Montana
4,960 -22.4%
24
19
28
298%
3
2+6.3%
Wheat, Soybeans, Corn
1,350
900
1,350
100
1,806
1,290
53
$67,123
21North Dakota
4,506 -39.7%
20
13
22
19.9%
14
3-1.9%
Corn, Cattle/calves, Soybeans
1,500
1,250
4,800
600
2,590
1,850
100
$165,500
8South Dakota
8,963 -25.4%
17
9
8
22%
5
1
Corn, Soybeans, Hogs
1,530
900
6,650
350
2,465
850
200
$149,201
6Minnesota
12,325 -12.3%
16
13
5
8.8%
6
7+11.1%
Corn, Hogs, Soybeans
697
410
4,875
325
11Iowa8,339 +1.6%
28
7
.3%
9
+35.3%Dairy, Corn, Cattle/calves
600
400
14,210
980
2,415
1,050
390
$74,902
1Wisconsin
24,045 -16.9%
30
27
1
110%
7
4
Dairy, Corn, Soybeans
465
310
3,600
240
1,386
660
95
$69,117
14Michigan
6,837 -31.7%
35
32
12
10.9%
16
11+5.6%
-9.3%
Broilers, Cattle/calves, Turkeys
976
610
240
15
52
20
2
$27,889
40West Virginia
1,268 -17.2%
26
22
39
37.6%
33
32-50.0%
Greenhouse, Blueberries, Horses/mules
194
88
104
8
66
17
3
$7,332
45New Jersey
364 -0.5%
42
41
43
42.7%
31
33+50.0%
Greenhouse, Dairy, Aquaculture
97
51
440
22
21
7
1
$5,737
43Connecticut
558 +18.0%
45
44
35
361%
37
38
0%Dairy, Corn, Greenhouse
1,725
1,150
8,075
475
902
410
110
$72,984
4New York
12,959 -9.5%
14
11
3
41%
23
15+29.4%
+100%
0%
Potatoes, Dairy, Aquaculture
192
120
400
25
14
10
2
$9,276
42Maine
606 -12.9%
43
40
36
351%
40
35
Dairy, Cattle/calves, Maple products
270
150
1,539
81
53
35
6
$12,368
30Vermont
2,380 -8.8%
39
39
21
213%
32
30
Dairy, Greenhouse, Apples
89
47
260
13
10
5
1
$4,589
46New Hampshire
359 -8.4%
46
45
37
392%
41
41
0%
Dairy, Corn, Cattle/calves
1,938
1,020
7,920
440
1,040
400
90
$113,687
5Pennsylvania
12,464 +3.9%
11
12
4
61%
20
16+28.6%
Greenhouse, Cranberries, Dairy
120
60
247
13
22
9
1
$6,884
44Massachusetts
389 +5.1%
44
43
38
391%
35
37
0%Corn, Soybeans, Dairy
1,350
750
3,200
200
980
350
65
$89,102
16Ohio6,040 +3.8%
20
16
13
141%
22
19
Greenhouse, Dairy, Aquaculture
13
7
20
1
2
1
0
$824
48Rhode Island
35 -30.0%
48
48
48
48.4%
42
42
0%
Broilers, Greenhouse, Corn
385
175
1,045
55
129
30
5
$30,130
36Maryland
1,559 +1.0%
36
36
26
251%
30
31
Broilers, Corn, Soybeans
26
10
85
5
16
6
2
$2,242
47Delaware
127 +4.1%
47
47
44
45.2%
39
40Broilers, Hogs, Turkeys
1,638
655
510
30
22
7
1
$48,219
32North Carolina
2,170 -7.1%
15
20
34
33.5%
35
38
0%
Corn, Soybeans, Hogs
50
250
1,980
220
990
330
44
$38,511
24Illinois
3,714 -19.4%
34
34
18
11.2%
21
20
Broilers, Soybeans, Corn
1,950
750
140
10
0
0
0
$20,783
33Mississippi
2,090 +10.4%
10
16
42
41.4%
43
43
0%
0%
Cattle/calves, Soybeans, Broilers
3,500
1,750
540
45
51
15
2
$83,457
22Tennessee
4,091 -11.5%
5
7
33
261%
34
34
Broilers, Turkeys, Greenhouse
550
250
225
15
0
0
0
$11,412
41South Carolina
775 -2.9%
33
34
40
372%
43
43
0%
Horses, Broilers, Corn
4,400
2,200
1,125
90
522
180
27
$135,694
15Kentucky
6,047 -8.4%
3
4
25
203%
25
+8.0%
27
Greenhouse, Oranges, Tomatoes
736
320
660
33
0
0
0
$28,580
38Florida
1,396 +19.9%
27
31
31
31.3%
43
43
0%
Broilers, Cattle/calves, Chicken eggs
2,236
860
72
6
0
0
0
$26,455
31Alabama
2,308 +17.5%
8
15
46
43.5%
43
43
0%
Broilers, Cattle/calves, Dairy
2,684
1,220
2,550
150
349
85
10
$108,352
17Virginia
5,583 +6.4%
6
10
15
184%
29
29-28.6%
+44.4%+76.0%
Soybeans, Corn, Cattle/calves
4,760
3,400
1,760
220
494
260
30
$129,864
12Missouri
7,074 -3.0%
2
2
19
111%
26
22
0%
Corn, Soybeans, Hogs
665
350
2,125
170
812
280
40
$65,715
26Indiana
3,602 -16.3%
29
30
16
16.6%
24
21
Broilers, Soybeans, Rice
1,728
1,440
21
3
20
10
1
$56,722
35Arkansas
1,769 -22.1%
13
8
47
47.7%
38
35
Cane for sugar, Corn, Soybeans
1,242
460
75
5
0
0
0
$23,820
39Louisiana
1,317 +40.3%
22
25
45
45.7%
43
43
0%
Cattle/calves, Corn, Soybeans
1,800
1,800
4,400
550
2,272
770
120
$140,570
9Nebraska
8,668 -2.0%
12
6
9
3.6%
8
8
Cattle/calves, Corn, Wheat
2,520
2,100
4,050
450
1,820
650
80
$164,939
10Kansas
8,422 -2.7%
7
5
1%
13
-5.9%
0%
Cattle/calves, Hogs, Broilers
3,900
3,000
698
45
475
190
20
$74,717
18Oklahoma
5,073 +88.7%
4
3
30
268%
28
26-33.3%
Cattle/calves, Cotton, Dairy
9,000
5,000
3,610
190
490
100
10
$253,563
3Texas13,112 +74.7%
1
1
11
1515%
27
28
Broilers, Cotton, Chicken eggs
1,450
580
630
30
0
0
0
$56,016
34Georgia
2,080 -7.5%
18
24
32
33.7%
43
43
0%
29,123
18,225
48,127
3,104
37,099
11,535
1,146
$5,066,709
West region totals
116,248 -6.5% 38,706
20,743
65,323
4,275
14,950
5,757
1,243
$1,585,847
East region totals
134,670 -8.8%
67,829
38,968
113,450
7,379
52,049
17,292
2,389
$6,652,556
National totals
250,918 -7.8%
Alfalfa
17,292
Other hay
38,968
Silage
7,379
Greenchop
2,770
Combined total
66,409
Total U.S. forage acres
Combined total
250,918Alfalfa3.0 tons/acre
52,049
Other hay
1.7 tons/acre
67,829
Silage15.4 tons/acre
113,450 Greenchop
6.4 tons/acre
17,590
Total U.S. tons harvested
in thousands of acres
in thousands of tons
Cattle/calves, Hogs, Broilers8%
26
AMBRACOAmerican Brazilian Company
0%
-16.7%
2,117
730
115
$75,983
1026
9
1210
5-60.4%
Corn, Cattle/calves, Soybeans
Cattle/calves, Dairy, Corn
Corn, Soybeans, Broilers
PolyExcel, LLCCommitted to Excellence!
+7.7%
-23.1%
+14.3%
+100%
2012 U.S. forage statistics inside!
Find your free copy of this 6-page, pull-out forage stats poster in the center of this issue.
3,900
3,000
698
45
475
190
20
$74,717
18Oklahoma5,073 +88.7%
4
3
30
26
28
-33.3%
State ranking- all forage production
All forage production(in thousands of tons)
Percentage increase/decrease in forage production 2011-2012
State ranking- alfalfa yield
State ranking-alfalfa acres
Percentage increase/decrease of alfalfa new plantings
2011 hay receipts as a percentage of state’s
total farm receipts
State ranking-other hay yield
State ranking-silage yield
Alfalfa yield (in thousands of tons)
Alfalfa acres(in thousands of acres)
Alfalfa new plantings(in thousands of acres)
2011 hay receipts annual total
(in thousands of dollars)
Other hay yield(in thousands of tons)
Other hay acres(in thousands of acres)
Silage acres(in thousands of acres)
Top 3 ag commodities
Silage yield(in thousands of tons)
State ranking-other hay acres
State ranking-silage acres
Cattle/calves, Hogs, Broilers
8%
26
night and left the hay tinder-box dry. One of the growers who understood alfalfa hay arrived on the scene early one morning to fi nd that his custom harvesting crew had baled all night in too-dry conditions. He fi red them on the spot. “But we have to bale every night to keep up,” was the excuse. Th e grower countered that they had just turned early-cut, high-test dairy alfalfa into junk feeder hay.
Th ere are times custom operators are available who will do a quality harvesting job, and there are times they are not. Th is is a consideration to make when looking at the purchase
of haying machinery. Th is is a heartbreaker for someone just getting into the hay-growing business. If custom operators are not willing to take the time to make your hay top-quality, there is another option. Th at is to sell it either standing or in the windrow. Th is option usually is less lucrative than having a whole stack of super-premium hay to sell, but you do not take the risk of too-dry baling conditions or of a rainstorm reducing the quality of your hay. In most areas, this option is available either with or without a “rain” clause. Rain insurance is also available, at least in central
Washington State. Th is cuts down on the sales of Tums and Rolaids during the hay-making time of the year.
In “aiming for the moon” as to hay quality, it helps to understand what the markets are for premium hay of the kind you grow. Th is can be a moving target, and it can be a case of “in the eye of the beholder.” If the top-dollar hay in your area goes to a dairy, a feed store, an exporter or to a feedlot, ask those people what they want. It may surprise you to learn that with corn and soybean prices going up, feedlot operators will gladly pay more for hay higher in protein than
hay that is just a roughage fi ller. To hit a target, you need to know where the target is and its distance from you.
Every person I have ever known who is involved in any way with buying hay will take the time to answer one question from any hay grower. Th at question is, “What do I need to do to make my hay worth more money?” Th en listen to the answers, don’t make excuses, don’t get mad and try not to argue too much.
My answers to the above question over the years have been some of these:
• “Your hay needs to be more uniform. In the same stack, you have premium and feeder hay and everything in between.”
• “When you think your hay is ready to bale, go fi shing for a day or two instead. You are baling it with too much stem moisture.”
• “You need to cut it by the maturity of the plant and not by the number of days since the last cutting. If the weather is 105 degrees and windy, the alfalfa will mature faster than in cool weather.”
• “You need to watch the dew moisture closer at baling so you get the leaves inside the bale – and even better, all still attached to the stem. If the stems are dry, you can bale at a higher total moisture than if you are trying to bale with stem moisture.”
• “You need to improve your stack yards or hay barns. Elevate the base of the stack area and cover it with coarse drain rock. Th at will keep most of the bottom bales dry most of the time. Hay trucks need to be able to get in and out of your hay storage area most of the year.”
I fully realize that neither you nor I can control the weather. I fully realize there are times when you must bale too wet or too dry. I hope you don’t ever need to bale too wet and too dry at the same time; if you do, fi re insurance would be a better buy than rain insurance. Th ere is a reason why the “5 percent” hay is only that small a percentage of all production. I have a gut feeling that if more growers understood what it took to make the “5 percent” hay, there could easily be more of it. FG
Aim for the moon, cont’d from page 9
I have a gut feeling that if more growers understood what it took to make the ‘5 percent’ hay, there could easily be more of it.
FG WESTERN MAIN
Always read and follow label directions. Stallion is a restricted use pesticide. Stallion is not for use on horses. FM
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ing’s future is a service mark of FM
C Corporation. ©2013 FM
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10 Progressive Forage Grower Issue 2 • February 1, 2013
1 Fall 2013 I American Soybean I
Vol.1, No.2
FALL 2013
THE ROAD TO RECOVERYInfrastructure
Upgrades Needed for Competitiveness
SUCCESSION PLANNINGMaking Ownership
Transition Easier
SOY CHAMPIONSenate Agriculture
Committee Chair Debbie Stabenow
SOY FORWARDEPA Administrator
Gina McCarthy
2 I American Soybean I Fall 2013
For more information about the FMC portfolio of products, visit your local FMC Star Retailer or visit FMCcrop.com.
BETTER PROFITS FROM BETTER PRODUCTS
Always read and follow label directions. Hero Insecticide and Capture LFR are restricted use pesticides. Authority, Aim EC, Capture LFR and Hero are not registered for sale or use in California. FMC, Marvel, Authority, Cadet, Aim, Hero, Capture and LFR are trademarks and Investing in farming’s future is a service mark of FMC Corporation. ©2013 FMC Corporation. All rights reserved. F100-032712 10/13
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UNITED ST A TES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTATOR
In the Matter of:
FMC Corporation,
Respondent.
) ) ) ) )
Docket No.: FIFRA-03-2015-0248
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the date below, copies of COMPLAINANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT FMC CORPORATION'S OPPOSITION TO COMPLAIANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL ACCELERATED DECISION AS TO LIABILITY FOR VIOLA TIO NS 1 THROUGH 12,273 OF THE COMPLAINT were served upon the persons listed in the manner indicated.
Original and one copy via the OALJ E-filing System
Sybil Anderson, Headquarters Hearing Clerk
One copy via the OALJ E-filing System
Christine Coughlin, Administrative Law Judge
One copy via UPS Next Day Air
Kathryn E. Szmuszkovicz Daniel B. Schulson Beveridge & Diamond PC 1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, DC 20005-3311
S£1' 1 6 2016
Date �� Senior Assistant Regional Counsel U.S. EPA, Region III