Update on Conflict and Diplomacy...COMPILED BY PAUL KAROLYI This update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting thePalestiniansandIsrael.Morethan100print

COMPILED BY PAUL KAROLYI

This update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affectingthe Palestinians and Israel. More than 100 print, wire, television, and online sources providing U.S.,Israeli, Arab, and international independent and government coverage of unfolding events aresurveyed to compile the quarterly Update. The most relevant sources are cited in JPS’s Chronologysection, which tracks events day by day. JPS Chronologies are archived on the JPS websiteat www.palestine-studies.org.

Highlights of the Quarter: With U.S. president Donald Trump’s peace initiative at a standstill, tensionsbetween Hamas and Israel nearly escalate into the fourth major armed conflict since the formal Israeliwithdrawal from Gaza in 2005. Egyptian and UN mediation efforts produce a series of cease-fires, buttensions do not subside. The Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership resists Egyptian efforts toincorporate a new Palestinian reconciliation agreement into ongoing, back-channel talks betweenIsrael and Hamas over a possible long-term cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile, attendance graduallydeclines at the weekly mass protests along Gaza’s border that began in 3/2018 under the Great Marchof Return banner. Palestinian youths in Gaza instead turn to a new form of resistance: lashingincendiary devices to kites or balloons and flying these across the border fence into southern Israel.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELICONFLICTAlthough attendance at the mass protests

known as the Great March of Return fell off asthe quarter advanced (see JPS 47 [4]), tensionscontinued to rise in Gaza. Palestinians’ use ofincendiary devices lashed to kites and balloons,which were then released across the borderfence to spark small fires in southern Israel,resulted in Israeli military strikes that broughtGaza to the brink of war for the first time sinceIsrael’s summer 2014 assault. Meanwhile, U.S.

president Donald Trump’s yet-to-be fullyunveiled peace initiative made no significantprogress, leaving the Ramallah-basedPalestinian leadership free to pursue alternativediplomatic avenues. In Washington, Trumpand his close advisors zeroed in on Gaza,simultaneously condemning Hamas andattempting to raise money for humanitarianprojects rather than rebuilding relations withthe Palestinian leadership or making clear thecontents of their long-awaited plan forPalestinian-Israeli peace.

Journal of Palestine StudiesVol. XLVIII, No. 1 (Autumn 2018), p. 157, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614. © 2018 by the Institute for PalestineStudies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of CaliforniaPress’s Reprints and Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2018.48.1.157.

Autumn 2018 || 157

Update on Conflict and Diplomacy16 MAY–15 AUGUST 2018

THE SO-CALLED TRUMP INITIATIVE

The Palestinians had all but severed relationswith the Trump administration after the U.S.president’s announcement in December 2017that the U.S. would be moving its embassy toJerusalem in recognition of the city’s status asthe “capital of Israel” and slashing aid to thePalestinian Authority (PA). Following theformal inauguration of the new U.S. embassy inJerusalem (5/14) and the Israeli army’s deadlycrackdown on the corollary mass protests inGaza (see JPS 47 [3] and [4]), relations with theU.S. deteriorated even further. Two days later,PA foreign minister Riyad al-Maliki stated(5/16) that the Palestinians were consideringtaking action in international fora, including atthe United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)and the United Nations Human Rights Council(UNHRC). He also called (5/17) on Arab statesto recall their ambassadors fromWashington inprotest. “There is no harm in Arab statescollectively recalling their ambassadors . . . forconsultations,” he said, reminding them thatthe Arab League had previously agreed tosever diplomatic ties with any country thatmoved its embassy to Jerusalem. ThePalestinians submitted (5/22) a formal requestto the International Criminal Court (ICC) toinvestigate Israel’s settlement policies in theWest Bank and East Jerusalem; filedinstruments of accession to the ChemicalWeapons Convention (5/17) and the UNConference on Trade and Development (5/24);and signed (6/6) documents of accession forthe State of Palestine to join seven otherinternational treaties and conventions,including the Second Optional Protocol to theInternational Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, which aims to abolish the death penalty.Meanwhile, the so-called Trump peace

initiative remained stalled, with elements of the

administration reportedly advocating additionalpunitive steps against the Palestinians. Inresponse to the Palestinians’ latest referral tothe ICC, a U.S. National Security Councilspokesperson said (5/23), “We are reviewingthis latest development to determine if itrequires changes to the operating status of thePalestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)office in Washington, DC.” Shortly afterward,U.S. secretary of state Rex Tillerson refused tocertify that the Palestinians were complyingwith certain congressionally mandatedconditions on U.S. aid enacted in 11/2017,triggering a punitive closure of the PLO office inWashington. While the Trump administrationallowed the office to remain open, it stipulatedthat its operations be limited to activitiesdirectly related to the Trump administration’speace initiative. Likewise, the administrationultimately allowed the office to remain openafter the Palestinians’ ICC referral on 5/22.Other elements of the Trump administration

pursued the long-awaited peace plan. Accordingto U.S. officials, the plan’s architects—senioradvisor and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushnerand Special Representative for InternationalNegotiations Jason Greenblatt—had alreadybegun briefing select allies and partners onaspects of the plan (Associated Press, 5/19).U.S. ambassador to Israel David Friedman,another key member of the Trump peace team,said (5/23) that “a lot of finalizing” washappening and that the plan would likely bereleased within the next few months, dependingon circumstances. “Ultimately, [Trump]’slooking for that win-win, where everyone says‘we’re better off,’” Friedman added.Although the scope and details of the plan

remained unclear, its outlines began to emerge.According to Yair Lapid, chair of Israel’s YeshAtid Party (5/21), the plan was for Abu Dis, aWest Bank village on the outskirts of Jerusalem,

Update on Conflict and Diplomacy

158 || Journal of Palestine Studies

to serve as the capital of a future Palestinianstate. In response to this and other rumoredelements of the plan, a senior PLO officialaccused (5/27) Trump of attempting to“liquidat[e]” Palestinian rights.U.S.-Palestinian relations deteriorated further

after Greenblatt published (6/10) an op-ed inHaaretz calling for the ouster of PLO secretary-general Saeb Erakat, the longtime Palestinianchief negotiator. “We have heard your voicefor decades and it has not achieved anythingclose to Palestinian aspirations or anythingclose to a comprehensive peace agreement,”Greenblatt wrote. “Other Palestinianperspectives might help us finally achieve acomprehensive peace agreement wherePalestinian and Israeli lives can be better.”Erakat responded the next day, dismissing theTrump administration’s peace efforts as“nothing less than dictating illegal policies andfurther violations of international law.”Amid a wave of press speculation about the

plan, the Trump administration’s peace teamembarked on a trip to the Middle East.According to a White House official, Kushnerand Greenblatt intended to “get some ideasfrom players in the region about someremaining questions” (Haaretz, 6/17). However,as their trip progressed, it became clear thatthey were pursuing a new, related goal: raising$1 billion from the Gulf States to fund Israeli-and Egyptian-administered humanitarianprojects in Gaza.Kushner and Greenblatt met with senior

officials in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,Egypt, and Israel over the course of a week inmid-6/2018. The Palestinians maintained theirboycott of the Trump administration, whiletheir allies passed along details of the talks.On 6/17, PA president Mahmoud Abbasrejected the new U.S. strategy, describing it asan attempt to split Gaza from the West Bank.

“The Palestinian leadership warns the countriesof the region against cooperating with a movewhose goal is to perpetuate the separationbetween Gaza and the West Bank and [will]lead to concessions on Jerusalem and the holysites,” he said. Erakat also accused (6/23)Kushner and Greenblatt of attempting tosideline Palestinian refugees. “They want toterminate the role of UNRWA [United NationsRelief andWorks Agency for Palestine Refugeesin the Near East] by proposing direct aid tothe countries hosting the Palestinian refugeesand sideline the UN agency,” he said. “On topof this, they are planning financial aid to theGaza Strip worth [$1 billion] for projects, alsoseparate from UNRWA and under the guise ofsolving a humanitarian crisis.”Kushner capped off the trip by giving a rare

interview to the Palestinian newspaper al-Qudson 6/24. He said he was ready to work withAbbas, but questioned the PA president’scommitment and ability to reach a peaceagreement with Israel. “He has his talkingpoints, which have not changed in the last25 years,” Kushner said. “There has been nopeace deal achieved in that time. To make a dealboth sides will have to take a leap and meetsomewhere between their stated positions.I am not sure [Abbas] has the ability to do that.”The interview was widely seen as an attempt tosidestep the Palestinian leadership and speakdirectly to the Palestinian people.The Ramallah-based Palestinian leadership

was not alone in rejecting the Trump initiative.While Kushner and Greenblatt were in theMiddle East, a delegation of Hamas officialsvisited Moscow. “Our position is that theUnited States, in particular the currentadministration, cannot behave like the exclusiveplayer in the region, essentially implementingIsrael’s policy,” a Hamas official said (6/25).The same day, Erakat indicated that the


Autumn 2018 || 159

Jordanians rejected Kushner’s offer of aid equalto the sum that UNRWA spends to supportPalestinian refugees in Jordan. “The [Trump]administration is facing a crisis after failing tomarket its peace plan to the Palestinians andArabs,” a member of the PLO ExecutiveCommittee said (6/26). “This administrationis living under an illusion if it thinks that itwould be able to find Arab or Palestiniansupport for its suspicious plan.” In addition,Kushner and Greenblatt’s efforts to raise moneyfor Gaza were reportedly unsuccessful, partlybecause of Abbas’s refusal to participate.According to the Times of Israel on 6/29,Kushner and Greenblatt had, as a result, beenforced to cancel a planned donor summit inCairo.The U.S. pivot toward Gaza came amid rising

tensions between Israel and Hamas, and wasquickly overshadowed by reports of deadlyIsraeli air strikes in Gaza and by Egyptian- andUN-led talks on a possible long-term cease-fire.While the Trump administration continued topursue its own initiative, and even began hiringstaff to help manage its impending rollout, therewere no further major developments thisquarter.

International Support for Trump’sJerusalem Policy

While the international community wasnearly unanimous in opposing the Trumpadministration’s decision to break with thedecades-old consensus and move the U.S.embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, a few countriesdecided to follow the U.S.’s lead. Guatemalaand Paraguay opened their new embassies inJerusalem on 5/16 and 5/21, respectively. On6/24, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahuannounced that Bulgaria planned to open an“honorary consulate” in Jerusalem as a “firststep” toward moving its embassy to Jerusalem.

And on 7/3, Slovakian officials said theircountry was going to open a cultural centerin Jerusalem, bolstering their diplomaticpresence in the city.In a related development, FM al-Maliki

announced (8/8) that Colombia had decidedto recognize the State of Palestine. Until then,Colombia had been the only South Americancountry not to have done so.

Targeting the Palestinian Martyrs’ Fund

After the United States passed a new lawlast quarter conditioning aid to the West Bankand Gaza on the PA ending the distributionof stipends to Palestinians imprisoned, injured,or killed as a result of confrontations withIsraeli soldiers or civilians (see JPS 47 [4]),the Israeli Knesset followed suit this quarter.On 7/2, 87 members of the Knesset voted infavor of legislation requiring the governmentto withhold from its monthly transfers of taxrevenues to the PA an amount equal to 1/12thof the sum that the PA paid out to what thebill described as “terrorists” in the previousyear. “The PA has transformed itself into anenterprise that employs murderers,” said MKAvi Dichter (Likud), explaining his supportfor the bill. “It is very easy to be accepted intothis business. All you have to do is murderIsraelis, get arrested or be killed, and you’vebeen accepted for the job.”The Palestinian backlash was swift and

unanimous. On 7/3, a PA spokesperson said thenew law crossed a “red line” and constituted a“declaration of war against the Palestinianpeople, their fighters, prisoners, and martyrs.”Erakat added (7/3) that the PA was consideringa reduction in political, economic, and securityrelations with Israel in response.Simultaneously, the PA was under increasing

pressure from the international community toend the stipends program. On 7/2, Australian



FM Julie Bishop announced the suspension ofAustralian aid, citing concerns that the moneywas being used for programs that “Australiawould never support.” As a result, 10 millionAustralian dollars (approximately $7.4 million)were redirected to the UN’s Humanitarian Fundfor the Palestinian Territories. “Any assistanceprovided . . . to those convicted of politicallymotivated violence is an affront to Australianvalues, and undermines the prospect ofmeaningful peace between Israel and thePalestinians,” Bishop said (7/2). Later thatsame week, the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayomreported (7/5) that the EU had initiateddiscussions with the PA about the stipendsprogram. The newspaper quoted an EUstatement as saying, “The payment system forPalestinian prisoners, former prisoners, andtheir families is part of the EU’s politicaldialogue with the PA being carried out at thehighest levels.”Despite the aid cuts and mounting pressure,

Abbas reiterated throughout the quarter thathe had no plans to end the stipends program.“We will not allow anyone to interfere with themoney that Israel is against us paying to thefamilies of martyrs and prisoners,” he told agroup of Fatah leaders on 7/8.

PERSECUTING THE PALESTINIANMINORITY AND OTHER OPPONENTS

Letting the Trump administration’s peaceefforts run their course, Netanyahu and hisright-wing government advanced a years-longcampaign to undermine the Palestinianminority in Israel as well as other political rivals,including the Boycott, Divestment andSanctions (BDS) movement.A significant advance in that campaign

happened on 7/19 when the Knesset passed theNation-State Bill into law, codifying the right ofself-determination in Israel as “unique to the

Jewish people.” The law also enshrined thenotion of unlimited settlement andexpansionism, declaring “the development ofJewish settlement” a national value, which thestate would “encourage and promote.” Itdowngraded Arabic from an official languageto one with a “special status,” and encouragedthe development of Jewish-only communities(previous drafts of the bill mandated suchdevelopment), effectively relegating Palestiniancitizens of Israel to second-class status as amatter of constitutional law. Netanyahu hailedthe Nation-State Law as “a defining momentin the annals of Zionism and the history of thestate of Israel. . . . [One hundred twenty-two]years after Theodor Herzl, the father of modernpolitical Zionism, published his vision, we’veenshrined into the law the basic principle of ourexistence” (7/19). During final debates beforethe vote, Palestinian and other non-ZionistMKs criticized the proposal, prompting speakerYuli Edelstein to have them removed from theplenum. PLO Executive Committee memberHanan Ashrawi described (7/19) the new lawas giving “license to apartheid, discrimination,ethnic cleansing, and sectarianism.” Publicprotests continued throughout the quarter,particularly on 7/30, when thousands of Jewishand Palestinian citizens of Israel attended amass Arabic language lesson in the streets ofTel Aviv.However, the most significant challenge to

the new Nation-State Law came from Israel’sDruze community. Comprising approximately2 percent of Israel’s population, the Druzeviewed the new law as an affront to theirdecades of loyalty and contributions to Israelisecurity. (According to a Pew Research Centerstudy in 2015, approximately 60 percent ofmale Druze citizens of Israel said they wereserving or had served in the Israeli army.)“Israel is the best country in the world for the


Autumn 2018 || 161

Druze. It’s best to be Druze here, but the[Nation-State] Law turns us into second-classcitizens,” said former MK Shachiv Shnaan(al-Monitor, 7/29).The Druze community’s negative response to

the new law surprised at least one senior cabinetmember, Education Minister Naftali Bennett(Jewish Home), who said (7/25) that he onlyrealized the potential offense to the Druzecommunity after the bill had passed into law.Responding to Druze protestations, FinanceMinister Moshe Kahlon said (7/26) that the lawhad been approved “hastily” and needed to befixed. Netanyahu met with leaders of the Druzecommunity on 7/26 and established acommittee to address their concerns. After thecommittee put forth (8/1) an initial proposalfor follow-up legislation codifying the status ofIsrael’s Druze community, tens of thousandsof Druze and Jewish Israelis gathered in TelAviv for another major protest. Netanyahuconvened the committee again on 8/6. “Weworked on the Nation-State Law for eightyears,” he told them. “I’m not saying that we’llwork on this for eight years, but it won’t beeight days either.” Another mass protest tookplace in Tel Aviv a few days later (8/11), asnumerous legal challenges were filed against theNation-State Law, but there were no furthermajor developments by the close of the quarter.The Nation-State Law was not the only

discriminatory legislation passed this quarter.With 43 votes in favor and 24 against, theKnesset also passed the so-called Breaking theSilence Law on 7/16, allowing Bennett to blocknongovernmental organizations (NGOs),notably the anti-occupation group Breaking theSilence, from presenting lectures and organizingactivities in Israeli schools. It also requiredNGOs receiving more than half their fundingfrom foreign sources to disclose that factpublicly.

Also this quarter, the Jerusalem DistrictCourt blocked (5/23) the deportation of OmarShakir, director of Human Rights Watch’sIsrael/Palestine office, and the Israeli authoritiesdenied a slew of other high-profile activistsfrom entering the country, several of them U.S.citizens (see Chronology). According to an8/15 report by the Israeli public broadcastingcorporation, Kan, the Shin Bet denied 250people entry in the first eight months of 2018.The majority of them were “Muslims, or werein the process of becoming Muslims,” claimedKan, and therefore deemed security risks. In arelated development, Israeli border securityforces detained and interrogated U.S. journalistPeter Beinart during a security screening atBen Gurion Airport. “Israel, like America, isgetting uglier,” the liberal Zionist author wrote(8/13) in a widely shared account of theincident. With Beinart’s case drawing the Israelipublic’s attention to the issue, Netanyahuweighed in personally, claiming that Beinart’sdetention had been an “administrative mistake.”

THE BRINK OF WAR

After years of suffering ever-deterioratingliving conditions, the Palestinians in Gazarose up last quarter in a mass protest movementthey named the Great March of Return (seeJPS 47 [4]). The protests along Gaza’s borderfence aimed to secure Palestinian refugees’right of return to their homes in historicPalestine. The protests gathered momentumas the quarter advanced, culminating in amass demonstration on 5/14 that capturedthe world’s attention. Throughout the quarter,the Israeli army violently dispersed thedemonstrators using sharpshooters (snipers)to kill or maim protesters; by the end of thequarter, some 106 unarmed protesters (58 on5/14 alone) had been killed, includingparamedics, local journalists, women, and



children, and thousands more were injured,many of them severely (see JPS interview withon-the-ground surgeon, Dr. Ghassan Abu Sitta,JPS 47 [4]). As tensions mounted, with Israeland Hamas exchanging accusations, severalexchanges of cross-border fire brought the twocloser to sustained armed conflict than at anytime since Israel’s assault on Gaza in thesummer of 2014 (see JPS 44 [1] and [2]).As the quarter opened on 5/16, new regional

and international diplomatic efforts to restorecalm were also under way. Haaretz reported(5/16) that Egyptian and Qatari officials hadmade overtures to both Israel and Hamas in aneffort to defuse the violence. The Egyptians,who had worked to broker a cease-fire lastquarter, were reportedly willing to makesignificant concessions this quarter in order tosee that aim accomplished. The Haaretz reportindicated that the Egyptian authorities hadoffered to keep the Rafah border crossing openfor 10 days per month, a significant increaseover the 2 to 3 days per month during thefirst half of 2018 (see “Movement and Access”below). According to further reports on 5/16and 5/18, Hamas agreed to curtail the size of theprotests along Gaza’s border fence on 5/18 inexchange for certain blockade-easing measures,including more frequent openings of the Rafahborder crossing. “That doesn’t mean we won’tuse armed resistance,” Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’stop official in Gaza, said (5/16). “If Israel goesoverboard and spills lots of blood, we will beforced to respond accordingly.”Meanwhile, the Egyptians, Qataris, and an

undisclosed Western country had their sightsset on a loftier goal: a long-term cease-fireagreement that would address issues beyond thecross-border violence, including returning theremains of 2 Israeli soldiers held by Hamas,along with Israeli civilians allegedly being heldin Gaza. According to Israeli diplomatic

sources, the Egyptians were also hoping toadvance the stalled Palestinian reconciliationprocess, organize economic relief measures,and dismantle Hamas’s military wing. TheQataris, for their part, were reportedlyinterested in bringing internationalorganizations into the process. Those samesources indicated that UN special coordinatorNickolay Mladenov hoped to organize a newregional forum to administer long-term aidprograms for Gaza (Haaretz, 5/18).It was unclear in the first week of the

quarter exactly how close the two sides wereto reaching an agreement, nor were the specificsof their discussions known. Israel wasreportedly demanding an end to all Palestinianrocket fire and tunnel construction, cessationof allegedly threatening advances on the borderfence, and the return of all Israelis being heldin Gaza, living and dead, while Hamas wasangling for a years-long cease-fire, an end tothe blockade of Gaza, and major infrastructureprojects to help rebuild the Gazan economy.On 5/17, Hamas issued a statement claimingthat Israel had rejected an offer for a possibleprisoner swap. “All of our efforts have beenrejected by the Israeli occupation and itsleadership is not ready to conclude a deal,”the statement read. The Israeli “coordinator forthe return of Israelis,” former Shabak officialYaron Blum, denied (5/17) this claim. TheTimes of Israel quoted him as saying, “Hamas isinvited to immediately turn to the mediatorknown to it in order to get the process moving.”With the talks at an impasse, tensions along

the border increased. After a group ofPalestinians crossed the border fence and rolleda flaming tire toward a military patrol on 5/26,Israeli forces bombed Hamas and IslamicJihad in Palestine (PIJ) sites across Gaza on 5/26and 5/27, killing 3 Palestinians and causingmajor damage. When 2 more Palestinians


Autumn 2018 || 163

crossed the border fence reportedly armedwith knives, bolt cutters, and flammablematerials on 5/28, Israeli forces struck again,targeting Hamas sites in Bayt Lahiya; 1Palestinian was killed. The armed groups inGaza then launched 28 rockets and otherprojectiles into Israel on 5/29 in the biggestbarrage since Israel’s assault on Gaza in thesummer of 2014. With images circulating onIsraeli social media of rocket damage in theyard of an Israeli kindergarten in Eshkol, theIsraeli Air Force (IAF) conducted anotherwave of air strikes across Gaza, causing majordamage. When the armed groups in Gazaresponded again, 1 Israeli civilian was injuredand the IAF significantly expanded the scopeof its attacks, targeting at least 30 Hamas andPIJ sites across Gaza, destroying a tunnel thatstretched approximately 900 meters intoIsraeli territory, and causing dozens of injuries.“Today at midday, we massively and powerfullyattacked terrorist infrastructure, including anadditional tunnel, across the Gaza Strip,”Israeli DM Avigdor Lieberman said of theattack (5/29). “Hamas and [PIJ] have alreadypaid a heavy price.”

The First Cease-Fire

The rocket fire and air strikes continued untilaround midnight on 5/29 (see Chronology),when Egyptian diplomats reportedly brokered alimited cease-fire. “The factions [will] committo the agreement as long as Israel does,” saidsenior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya. Israeliofficials indicated that their government wasnot party to any agreement, but that they wouldfollow Hamas’s lead on a cease-fire. “I believethere are indirect understandings with Hamasto end this current round,” said Minister ofEnergy Yuval Steinitz on the morning of 5/30.“There is an intention to close this round.”Israel’s security cabinet convened to discuss the

escalation later in the day, and reportedlysupported Netanyahu and Lieberman’shandling of the exchange, despite calls fromright-wing ministers for Israel to re-occupyGaza.The Israeli army, which was already pushing

for the government to loosen restrictions onGaza, again urged the cabinet to take steps toavert further escalation. “The [Israeli] politicalleadership has to decide with whom to makesuch arrangements, but in terms of Hamas’situation in the Gaza Strip, now is definitely agood time to try to reach agreements that willenable [Gazans] to have a better life and bringa long period of quiet,” said one senior officeron 5/31. Intermittent exchanges of low-levelcross-border violence and reports of progress inthe indirect talks on a long-term cease-firecontinued over the next two weeks as the Israeligovernment deliberated over possiblehumanitarian measures. The cabinet convenedon 6/6 and reportedly discussed an option fora new Gaza reconstruction plan put forth byMladenov. They met again on 6/10 to discussproposals to permit more Gazans to work inIsrael and increase imports and exports fromGaza. Lieberman reportedly supported someof the proposals, but before the 6/10 meetinghe told the press that he was not persuaded bythe argument that humanitarian aid in Gazawould undermine Hamas. On 6/12, he statedthat he would only support aid programs inGaza if Hamas was “kick[ed] out” and theremains of the 2 Israeli soldiers and civilianswere returned. “In recent days people havebeen talking about humanitarian steps,”Bennett added after the security cabinetmeeting on 6/10. “We need to remember thatour sons, both bodies of soldiers and Israelicitizens, are held there.”In the absence of new Israeli humanitarian

efforts or progress on the diplomatic track,



cross-border violence intensified throughout6/2018, when a new Palestinian tactic began toshift the cross-border dynamics. Rocket andother projectile attacks had, for years, been themain form of resistance employed by thevarious armed groups in Gaza. Most wereQassam rockets, made from steel tubes fueledwith sugar and potassium nitrate, incapableof precision targeting and prone to malfunction.Early in 2018, Palestinians in Gaza startedlaunching a new type of projectile into Israel:kites and balloons carrying incendiary devicescapable of sparking small fires. As the GreatMarch of Return ramped up throughout3–5/2018, protesters increasingly used thesedevices in their demonstrations. By 6/2018,Gazans were flying them into southern Israelon a near-daily basis, causing minor fires andin some cases destroying or damaging Israelicrops.Dramatic images of minor fire damage spread

on Israeli social media, and on 6/3, the Israeligovernment started rolling out a response.Netanyahu ordered (6/3) his deputies towithhold an amount equal to that needed tocompensate farmers whose crops were affectedfrom the monthly transfers of tax revenues tothe PA (according to Israel’s Tax Authority,the fires had caused approximately $1.4 millionin damage since 3/2018). “We should be clearthat we are not prepared to accept the kitesbecoming normality,” Lieberman said at ameeting of his Yisrael Beytenu Party on 6/4.Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan upped(6/5) the ante, arguing that the Israeli armyshould assassinate any Hamas official whocondones the kite and balloon attacks. “Inlight of the fact that Hamas is the one allowingthe shooting and the sending of the kites, weneed to return to preventative assassinations.”Israel’s reaction galvanized those in Gaza

who saw the kite and balloon attacks as a means

of achieving their goals. A new armed groupcalling themselves the Sons of Zouari pledged(6/14) to fly 5,000 incendiary devices intosouthern Israel on 6/15, to mark the Muslimholiday of Eid al-Fitr. They claimed that theirattacks would be able to reach as far as40 kilometers beyond Gaza’s border fence.The attacks on 6/15 were ultimately far less

damaging than the Sons of Zouari promised.However, the perceived threat from theincendiary devices prompted the Israeli armyto significantly ratchet up the violence.Although the army claimed to be refrainingfrom directly targeting individual perpetrators,Israeli forces increasingly fired warning shotsand targeted property belonging to kitelaunchers in mid-6/2018. For four straight days(6/13–17), Israeli drones dropped bombs onalleged Palestinian sites of kite and balloonassembly. The strikes caused major damage,destroyed 1 vehicle entirely, and moderatelyinjured 2 Palestinians. With criticism mountingfrom the Israeli opposition and the public,Israel’s security cabinet was divided on how toproceed. In a meeting on 6/17, Erdan andBennett reportedly pushed for the army totarget perpetrators directly, while Liebermanand Netanyahu, wary of an escalation, backedthe current course of action.The situation escalated further in the wake

of the security cabinet’s meeting. In responseto the serial launch of incendiary kites andballoons on 6/17, the IAF conducted air strikeson 9 Hamas sites across Gaza on 6/18. Armedgroups then launched 3 rockets toward Israel(1 fell short of the border fence, the other2 landed in open areas). The IAF conductedanother 3 waves of air strikes on Hamas siteson 6/19, causing major damage. Hamas andother armed groups then escalated theirresponse, firing approximately 45 rockets andother projectiles into Israel overnight on 6/20.


Autumn 2018 || 165

“We are committed to a formula of a strike forevery strike,” read a joint Hamas and PIJstatement on the morning of 6/20. “We willnot allow the enemy to dictate a new formula.”As the cross-border attacks continued, Erdansaid there was a “good chance” that the Israeliarmy would launch an “operation” in Gaza to“create durable deterrence,” referring to thepossibility of a major Israeli assault on Gazaon the scale of Operation Cast Lead in 2008–9and Operation Protective Edge in 2014.With cross-border violence increasing in

frequency and severity in late 6/2018 and early7/2018, a spate of reports emerged on progressbeing made in the indirect Hamas-Israel talks.On 6/21, al-Akhbar reported that Hamas wasprepared to make a “comprehensive” dealthat would include the return of the remains ofthe 2 Israeli soldiers and the Israeli civiliansallegedly being held in Gaza in exchange forthe establishment of a seaport and airport inGaza. A week later, Asharq Al Awsat reported(6/30) the opposite, stating that Hamas wasrejecting any proposal that would trade aid orinfrastructure projects for the return of Israelicivilians and soldiers’ remains. Instead, Hamaswas reportedly interested in a prisoner swap.Israel, for its part, was conditioning any large-scale humanitarian relief projects on the returnof the civilians and soldiers’ remains. “As longas Hamas continues to run Gaza as it doeswith only one purpose—the destruction of theState of Israel and attacking its citizens—andholds the bodies of our soldiers who didn’treturn from battle, Gaza won’t be rehabilitated,”Israeli president Reuven Rivlin said (7/2).The Israelis then took a step in the other

direction. “We will crack down immediately onthe Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip,”Netanyahu announced in a meeting with Likudleaders on 7/9. “In a significant move, we willtoday shut down the Kerem Shalom [border]

crossing.” Netanyahu explained that food,medicine, and other specially approvedhumanitarian goods would still be allowed tocross into Gaza, but all other imports andexports would be barred. He also announced areduction in the fishing zone off Gaza’s coast,from nine to six nautical miles. Both Netanyahuand Lieberman framed the new restrictions asexplicit responses to the incendiary kites andballoons, and alluded to possible additionalrestrictions if such “attacks” continued. AHamas spokesperson called (7/9) therestrictions a “new crime against humanity,”and a PIJ spokesperson called (7/9) them a“declaration of war.” Two days later, theMinistry of Agriculture in Gaza announced aban on fruit imports from Israel in an effortto pressure Israel into reopening Kerem Shalom(fruit imports from Israel totaled approximately200 tons per day prior to this decision,according to a 7/11 report from Ma’an NewsAgency).Israel’s new restrictions did nothing to deter

armed groups in Gaza. Incendiary kites andballoons continued being launched throughoutthe week of 7/9, and attendance spiked at theGreat March of Return protests that particularFriday (7/13), drawing the Israeli army’s typicalresponse; 1 Palestinian was killed and morethan 200 were injured. Amid the crackdown,a small explosive was thrown at Israeli soldiers,lightly injuring an officer. The Israeli armythen retaliated with strikes on 2 Hamas tunnelsand a training site, causing extensive damageand kicking off a deadly exchange of violencethat lasted through the night and into theevening on 7/14; 2 Palestinians were killed andat least 15 were injured. “We knew this day, theevents of the last 24 hours, would come inrecent weeks, and we prepared for itaccordingly,” an Israeli army spokespersonsaid (7/14). “We’ll increase the force of the



attack for as long as it takes, and we will useother tools when necessary.”

The Second Cease-Fire

Before the violence could escalate further, theEgyptians again brokered a cease-fire, althoughthere were some disagreements about what itentailed. Some Israeli sources said (7/15) itstipulated that Hamas and PIJ would curb theincendiary kite and balloon launches. Hamasofficials stated (7/15) that the agreement onlycovered rockets and mortars, not the kites andballoons. Later, Netanyahu clarified (7/15),“I heard it being said that Israel has agreed toa cease-fire that would allow the continuationof terrorism by incendiary kites and balloons;this is incorrect. We are not prepared to acceptany attacks against us and we will respondappropriately.” Gaza was on the “brink of war,”according toMladenov (7/15). “We are one stepaway from another confrontation. Everybodyneeds to take a step back,” he added.But low-level violence on Gaza’s border

continued, and Lieberman stoked tensionsfurther by announcing (7/16) a suspension offuel and gas exports to power-starved Gazaand a further reduction of the fishing zone offthe coast to three nautical miles. “Israel’svindictive steps reflect the magnitude of theinjustice and of the crimes being committed inthe Gaza Strip,” Hamas responded (7/16).“There will be severe consequences and Israelwill have to take responsibility.”Further complicating matters, the Egyptian

authorities announced a temporary closure ofthe Rafah border crossing on 7/16, citing atechnical malfunction. The next day, theIsraeli press reported that the Egyptians hadrecently called on Hamas to end the launchof incendiary kites and balloons, promptingspeculation about the veracity of the technicalmalfunction story. According to Egyptian and

Palestinian sources on 7/17, Hamas was readyto accept a cease-fire agreement that includedan end to the kite and balloon attacks inexchange for Israel lifting the new restrictionson the Kerem Shalom crossing.The Israeli government had no interest in

such a deal, however, and reportedly conveyedan ultimatum to Hamas via intermediaries:either end the kite and balloon attacks by 7/20or the Israeli army will invade. While Hamaswas willing to act to curb the attacks, accordingto reports on 7/18, they were not in a positionto put a stop to all of them. “We receive ordersfrom no one and our peaceful resistance willcontinue until our demands are met and thesiege over Gaza is lifted,” the Sons of Zouari saidin a 7/18 statement. “The worse the siegebecomes, the larger the number of fires, andthe greater the distances [spanned].”Violence escalated again on 7/19. After

reports of incendiary kites landing in southernIsrael in the morning, an Israeli drone bombeda site near Rafah, killing 1 Hamas fighter andinjuring 3 other Palestinians. The next day,amid Great March of Return protests, Hamassnipers shot and killed an Israeli soldier fromacross the border fence. Israeli forces thencarried out extensive air strikes and artilleryshelling on 68 targets across Gaza, killing 4more Palestinians. The strikes “eliminatedabout 60 buildings and infrastructures andrevoked significant military and commandand control capabilities,” according to anIsraeli army spokesperson.

The Third Cease-Fire

For the third time in as many months, theEgyptians brokered a limited cease-fire late atnight on 7/20, this time with Mladenov’s help.Again, there were disputes about what theagreement covered. A senior Hamas official said(7/20) that it provided for a “cessation of all


Autumn 2018 || 167

forms of military escalation,” except theincendiary kites and balloons. While no Israeliofficial confirmed that the Israeli governmentwas party to an agreement, an Israeli officialsaid (7/21) that Hamas had offered to stop the“fire terror” and the “terror at the fence” inexchange for an end to the air strikes. “Hamassuffered a serious blow yesterday, and requesteda cease-fire via Egypt, while promising to stopthe arson terror and terror at the border fence,”the official said. “If Hamas violates the trucethey will pay an even heavier price.”After a period of relative calm, the Israeli

authorities partially reopened (7/24) the KeremShalom crossing to allow fuel and gas to enterGaza, lifting the additional restrictionLieberman had announced on 7/16. Israel’sDefense Ministry released a statementexplaining that some restrictions were beingkept in place because Hamas “has not put acomplete end to terrorism, but is trying tomaintain a low level of incendiary balloonlaunches and friction on the border fence.”Rocket, mortar, kite, and balloon attacks, aswell as retaliatory Israeli strikes, continued ata low level over the next two weeks, however,and Lieberman again issued (8/2) an orderblocking the entry of fuel and gas into Gaza.Late 7/2018 and early 8/2018 saw another

flurry of reports of progress in indirect talks ona possible long-term cease-fire deal. “Egypt andthe UN are putting immense pressure on allsides,” a senior Israeli diplomat said. “This is anunprecedented initiative, but it is still too earlyto say whether it will succeed. A lot is at stake.”Sufficient progress was apparently made thatNetanyahu cancelled (8/2) a planned trip toColombia. The next day, al-Akhbar reporteddetails of the framework under discussion forthe first time. The product of two weeks ofindirect talks in Cairo, the deal reportedlycomprised three stages: First, Israel would ease

restrictions on the Kerem Shalom crossing andEgypt would commit to permanently openingthe Rafah border crossing in exchange for afull cease-fire, including a halt to the launch ofincendiary kites and balloons by Palestinians.Second, Israel would increase the electricitysupply and lift additional restrictions on theexport of certain goods to Gaza. Third, the UNwould implement a package of humanitarianprojects in Gaza, including the establishmentof a seaport and airport in northeast Egypt toserve Palestinians in nearby Gaza. Accordingto reports on 8/3 and 8/6, Hamas’s leadersagreed to at least the first stage of the deal.The Israeli security cabinet made no decisionone way or the other in its meeting on 8/5.The ministers reportedly gave little credenceto the proposed three-stage plan beyond aninitial cease-fire.As Egyptian, Qatari, UN, Israeli, and Hamas

officials worked through the details of a possibleagreement, Israeli artillery shelled (8/7) aHamas facility near Jabaliya refugee camp,killing 2 Hamas fighters and injuring 6 more.The Israeli army initially claimed that one oftheir posts along the border fence had comeunder fire from Gaza, but later admitted thatthey mistook a military drill for an attack.Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh appearedoptimistic about the prospects of a deal as aHamas delegation departed Cairo earlier thatday, but after the deadly Israeli attack at theborder fence, Hamas put out a statement sayingthat “resistance forces” could not agree to thedeal Israel was seeking to dictate and that Israelshould expect retaliation.Over the next 48 hours, the IAF conducted

air strikes on at least 150 sites across Gaza,killing 3 Palestinians, including a pregnantmother, and injuring at least 12. Armed groupsin Gaza launched approximately 200 rocketsand other projectiles into southern Israel;



9 Israelis and 1 Thai worker were injured.Despite the calls for calm from the internationalcommunity, the violence escalated until thelate afternoon on 8/9. Around noon, a coalitionof Palestinian factions in Gaza unilaterallydeclared that they considered the latestescalation over. However, after unidentifiedpersons fired a rocket into Israel two hours later,the IAF bombed and completely destroyedthe five-story Said al-Mishal Cultural Centerin Gaza City, injuring 18 Palestinians.

The Fourth Cease-Fire

Following the destruction of the culturalcenter in Gaza City, the Egyptians brokered yetanother cease-fire, and tentative calm returned.The Israelis again denied committing to anyagreement, but an Israeli official said (8/10)that “quiet will be met with quiet.”Amid reportsthat Egyptian authorities had warned Hamas’sleaders that the Israelis were seriouslyconsidering targeted assassinations if theviolence in Gaza did not abate, the Israeliarmy deployed (8/9) reinforcements andpositioned additional Iron Dome missiledefense batteries along the border fence.“We are [taking stock] after another night ofescalation, and at this stage, we don’t see itending,” an Israeli army officer said (8/9).Furthermore, both Netanyahu (8/12) andLieberman (8/13) alluded to the possibility ofa wide-scale assault on Gaza. “As of now, wehave destroyed hundreds of Hamas militarytargets, and in each round the IDF exacts anadditional heavy price,” Netanyahu told theweekly cabinet meeting on 8/12. “I will notreveal here our operational plans, [but] theyare ready.”A period of relative calm, punctuated by

the launch of a couple of incendiary kites andballoons, followed the 8/9 cease-fire. Then,on 8/14, Lieberman announced that all the

recently imposed restrictions on the KeremShalom crossing would be lifted on 8/15,barring any unexpected escalation. After a quietnight, the Israeli authorities reopened thecrossing, allowing 700 trucks carrying food,building supplies, animal feed, fuel, gas, hygieneproducts, and more into Gaza on 8/15. Theyalso expanded the fishing zone off the coast tosix or nine nautical miles, depending on thearea. Israel’s security cabinet convened on theafternoon of 8/15 to discuss the details of along-term cease-fire deal as well. It was laterreported that they had agreed to one inprinciple in a meeting on 8/12, and that ithad gone into effect after the 8/15 meeting.Based on the same principles as the agreementthat put an end to Israel’s 2014 OperationProtective Edge assault on Gaza, the agreementwas identical to the first stage of the three-stage deal al-Akhbar reported on 8/3: Israelwould lift restrictions on the Kerem Shalomcrossing and expand the fishing zone inexchange for a cessation of all hostilities.As the quarter came to a close, questions

remained about the durability of the cease-fireagreement. For one, the issue of the Israelisoldiers’ remains and the Israeli civiliansallegedly being held in Gaza remainedunresolved. “There will be no real arrangementwith Hamas without the return of our sonsand citizens home and the promise of long-termquiet,” one Israeli political source told Haaretzon 5/15. Furthermore, both Bennett and hisfellow Jewish Home party member JusticeMinister Ayelet Shaked publicly opposed theagreement, presenting a major challenge frominside Netanyahu’s right-wing ruling coalition.Finally, Abbas remained opposed to the entireconcept of a long-term cease-fire agreementbetween Israel and Hamas and resistant toEgyptian efforts to involve him. “Anyagreement that excludes the PA from the


Autumn 2018 || 169

decision-making mechanism will be veryfragile, because it won’t gain the PA’scooperation, and that is liable to thwart anyprogress,” said a Hamas official (Haaretz, 8/15).

OCCUPATION DATA AND TRENDSThe Israeli crackdown on the Great March

of Return and the ensuing escalation incross-border violence in Gaza caused a largenumber of Palestinian casualties this quarter.That notwithstanding, the overall number ofPalestinians killed as a result of Israeli actionsdecreased compared to last quarter, when themass protests were at their peak: 66 Palestinianswere killed, down from 140 the previousquarter. The comprehensive death toll sincethe beginning of the Second Intifada in 9/2000reached 11,213 Palestinians by quarter’s end(including 65 Palestinian citizens of Israel and19 cross-border “infiltrators”); 1,280 Israelis(including at least 253 settlers and 444 IDFsoldiers and other security personnel); and73 foreign nationals (including 2 British suicidebombers). These numbers include individualswho died in non-combat-related incidents iftheir death directly resulted from Israel’soccupation or the ongoing conflict (forexample: ailing Palestinians who died becausethey were denied access to medical care andPalestinians killed in smuggling tunnelaccidents).

OVERVIEW OF THE VIOLENCE

With the vast majority of the violenceoccurring in Gaza, the number of Palestinianskilled as a result of Israeli actions in theWest Bank and East Jerusalem was down fora second quarter in a row. Six Palestinians werekilled in the West Bank and Jerusalem thisquarter: 4 succumbed to injuries inflicted by

the Israeli army during arrest raids or clashes(5/23, 6/7, 7/8, and 7/23), and 2 were killedafter allegedly ramming vehicles into orstabbing Israelis (6/2 and 7/6). The numberof Palestinians injured as a result of Israeliactions in the West Bank and East Jerusalemdecreased considerably as well. According tothe UN’s Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 291Palestinians were injured between 5/22 and8/13, down from 2,572 last quarter.Attendance at the weekly Great March of

Return protests in the Gaza Strip droppedthroughout the quarter, leading to relativelyfewer casualties from the Great March ofReturn protests. Israeli soldiers killed 59Palestinians in Gaza, down from 132 lastquarter: 37 were fatally injured when theIsraeli army opened fire on unarmedprotesters during the weekly demonstrations,bringing the death toll stemming from theGreat March of Return to 145; 16 were killedin Israeli air strikes or shelling during theIAF escalation in the second half of thequarter; 5 were killed allegedly attemptingto cross the border fence into Israel (5/28,6/4 [2], 6/18, and 7/2); and 1 died at the Erezborder crossing after the Israeli authoritiesrepeatedly denied him a permit to travel toJerusalem for medical treatment (6/19). Thenumber of Palestinians injured in Gazaalso dropped substantially. According toOCHA, 3,702 Palestinians were injuredbetween 5/22 and 8/13, down from 10,403last quarter.The Israeli authorities punitively limited the

expanse of the fishing zone off Gaza’s coastfrom 7/9 to 8/15, and the number of instancesof Israeli naval forces harassing Palestinianfishermen decreased. They opened fire on orotherwise confronted fishermen on 55 separateoccasions, down from 65 last quarter.



Over the course of these incidents, 10 fishermenwere arrested (5/23 [2], 6/23 [3], and 8/12 [5]).In a related development this quarter,Palestinian activists in Gaza organized threeseparate flotillas to sail from ports in Gaza ina symbolic challenge to the Israeli blockade(5/29, 7/10, and 8/11). The organizers calledon the Israeli authorities to allow the shipsthrough so that dozens of ailing Gazans onboard could access medical care unavailable inthe territory. “We want the world to see thereality of the blockade and the suffering of thepeople of Gaza,” the organizers explained in astatement on 8/11, framing their efforts in thecontext of the ongoing Great March of Return.“We will not accept anything less than liftingthe blockade once and for all.” Each time theyset sail, Israeli naval forces intercepted the shipsand ferried them to the port of Ashdod. Otherthan their similar goals, these flotillas wereunrelated to the so-called freedom flotillas thatinternational solidarity activists have attemptedto sail to Gaza in recent years (see 7/22, 7/29,and 8/4 in Chronology for details on the mostrecent attempt).

MOVEMENT AND ACCESS

The punitive restrictions the Israeliauthorities imposed on imports to and exportsfrom the Gaza Strip this quarter had adevastating effect on the approximately twomillion people living in the territory.According to reports, the restrictions at the

Kerem Shalom border crossing, which wereimposed on 7/9 and lifted on 8/15, blocked3,500 trucks from delivering goods to Gaza,reportedly causing $100 million in damage toa local economy already suffering amid asevere electricity crisis, widespreadinfrastructure failures, and other blockade-related shortages. According to the IsraeliNGO Gisha, the number of truckloads

entering Gaza had averaged over 8,000 permonth between 8/2015 and 5/2018 beforeplummeting below 6,000 per month thisquarter (see Figure 1).The situation at the Rafah border crossing

was the complete opposite. After Egyptopened the crossing for five days around NakbaDay on 5/15 (5/13–17), President Abdel Fattahal-Sisi announced (5/17) that Rafah wouldremain open for the entire month of Ramadan,marking the first weeks-long opening of thecrossing since 2013. On 6/19, Egyptian sourcessaid that al-Sisi had decided to keep thecrossing open for at least another two months,through Eid al-Adha. With a few minorinterruptions, including the alleged technicalmalfunction on 7/16 (see “The Second Cease-Fire” above), the Egyptian authorities kept theirword for the entire quarter, allowing 12,736Palestinians to return to Gaza (up from 2,921)and 27,218 to exit (up from 5,818) between5/22 and 8/13, according to OCHA.Palestinian movement and access in the

West Bank and East Jerusalem remainedrelatively unchanged. Near-daily reports ofmobile checkpoints and Israeli army patrolsacross the region continued throughout thequarter. At the same time, however, the numberof Israeli army arrest raids and house searchesdecreased significantly. According to OCHA,there were 783 search and arrest operationsbetween 5/22 and 8/13 (down from 1,537 and1,126 in the previous two quarters).Furthermore, the Israeli authorities expanded(6/6) the operating hours at the AllenbyBridge border crossing, allowing more peopleto cross between the West Bank and Jordan,and they also released (8/14) 10 tons of lettersand packages addressed to Palestinians in theWest Bank that they had been holding, in somecases, since 2010 (see the Photos section in thisissue of the Journal). According to Palestinian


Autumn 2018 || 171

officials, the move was a one-off confidence-building measure the Israelis had agreed toin 2017.

SETTLEMENT GROWTH

Wary of provoking U.S. president Trump,Israeli PM Netanyahu imposed a few minorrestraints on the expansion of Israel’s illegalsettlements in the West Bank and EastJerusalem this quarter. He allowed the court-ordered evacuation and demolition of the“unauthorized” Netiv Ha’avot settlementoutpost to proceed on 6/12, despite calls fromthe settlers and their leaders for him to staythe order (see Chronology). He also decided(6/19) to postpone indefinitely the plannedevacuation and demolition of 7 buildings in thePalestinian village of Susiya near Hebron. It wasthe third delay in two years, and came one

month after 74 Democrats in the U.S. Houseof Representatives called on Netanyahu tohalt the demolition. As a result, one settlerleader accused (6/19) Netanyahu of givinginto international pressure, saying, “TheIsraeli government’s folly is indescribable.”Despite settler complaints about delays,

overall settlement growth continued apacethroughout the quarter in both the West Bankand East Jerusalem. On 5/30, the HigherPlanning Committee of Israel’s CivilAdministration advanced plans for 1,958 newhousing units in West Bank settlements. Theyalso approved the retroactive authorization of2 unauthorized settlement outposts. The nextday, Israel’s Housing Ministry published(5/31) tenders for the construction of 1,162additional housing units across the West Bank.Rounding out the quarter’s West Bank

0

2,000

7/2018

5/2018

3/2018

1/2018

11/2017

9/2017

7/2017

5/2017

3/2017

1/2017

11/2016

9/2016

7/2016

5/2016

3/2016

1/2016

11/2015

9/2015

7/2015

5/2015

3/2015

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

Impo

rts

in tr

uckl

oads

Date

source: Gisha - Legal Center for Freedom of Movement reports and data. See Gisha, “Entrance of Goods to Gaza from Israel,” 22 August 2018, http://gisha.org/graph/2387.

Figure 1. Imports to Gaza. The punitive Israeli restrictions on imports and exports at the Kerem Shalom bordercrossing led to a significant decrease in the amount of goods entering Gaza.



settlement announcements, the DefenseMinistry filed for public review a previouslyapproved plan for 325 new housing units inthe E1 corridor near Jerusalem. The Israeliauthorities also approved the construction of270 units in settlements near Bethlehem on7/24 and an NIS 10 million (approximately$2.74 million) expansion of an industrial zonein the Kiryat Arba settlement near Hebron.Finally, DM Lieberman pledged (7/27) toexpedite the construction of 400 previouslyplanned housing units in the Adam settlementnear Ramallah, explicitly framing his pledge asa punitive response to the Palestinian whoallegedly stabbed 3 settlers in Adam on 7/26(one of the settlers succumbed to his injuriesthat day). The “best response to terrorism isincreased settlement,” Lieberman tweeted.In East Jerusalem, the Israeli government filed

for public review in mid-6/2018 six plans for1,064 new housing units built in Pisgat Ze’ev,extending the settlement further into BaytHanina. The Israel Land Authority (ILA)published (8/15) tenders for the constructionof 603 new housing units in Ramat Shlomo,part of a broader plan dating back to 2010.That same day, the ILA reached an NIS 1.4billion (approximately $380 million) agreementwith the Jerusalem Municipality for a seriesof development projects across the city. Whilethe bulk of the projects were set for WestJerusalem, a number were slated for the EastJerusalem settlements of Pisgat Ze’ev, FrenchHill, and Atarot. The Jerusalem City Councilwas expected to approve the agreement inlate-8/2018.Pro-settlement MKs presented a number of

measures to strengthen the overall settlemententerprise and, in some cases, to advance theirgoal of extending Israeli sovereignty over theWest Bank—that is, annexation. Only two ofthose measures passed into law: The first,

which passed on 6/18, allowed settlement-basedchicken farmers to sell their eggs to farmersinside Israel, who have smaller egg-productionquotas. The second, which passed on 7/17,transferred jurisdiction over certain petitionsfiled by Palestinians in the West Bank fromthe High Court of Justice to the AdministrativeAffairs Court in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem courtwas given the authority to rule specifically oncases relating to freedom of information,planning and construction, entries and exits,and “restriction and supervision directives,”according to a 7/18 statement from theKnesset’s press office. “The festivitiessurrounding the petitions to the High Courtof Justice submitted by Palestinians and radicalleft organizations against settlement in Judeaand Samaria end today,” said Justice MinisterShaked (Jewish Home) on 7/17. Other right-wing MKs and ministers celebrated the factthat the High Court of Justice, long seen as abastion of the Israeli Left, would no longerbe hearing as many cases related to theoccupied West Bank.

JUDAIZATION OF JERUSALEM

As Israeli settlements expanded acrossEast Jerusalem, Netanyahu concurrently liftedhis ban on Israeli officials visiting Haramal-Sharif on 7/3. He had temporarily lifted theban in early 2017 after imposing it amid thehabba (the surge of Palestinian resistance,random attacks, and protests that began inJerusalem in 9/2015) across the occupiedPalestinian territories (oPt) in 10/2015 (seeJPS 45 [2]). In a letter to Knesset speakerEdelstein, Netanyahu explained (7/3) thatMKs and ministers would be allowed to visitthe sanctuary once every three months, aslong as they coordinated with the Israeli policein advance. Temple Mount activists, whowould prefer sole Israeli control over the


Autumn 2018 || 173

sanctuary, celebrated the move and called formore. “I congratulate the PM for ending theillegal and unreasonable ban,” said MKYehuda Glick (Likud), “and I call on him tomake a real change and allow MKs to go to[Haram al-Sharif] whenever they want.”Glick’s provocative visits to the compoundwere in part responsible for the initial ban. APA spokesperson called Netanyahu’s decision tolift the ban a “blatant and serious provocation”that “encourag[es] harm to one of Islam’sholiest sites.”Israeli elected officials visited the sanctuary

on a handful of occasions in the weeks followingNetanyahu’s decision, leading to a period ofheightened tensions in East Jerusalem (seeChronology). On 7/27, Israeli forces stormedthe compound in the early afternoon andforcibly cleared Muslim worshippers out ofthe sanctuary with sound bombs, tear gas, andother crowd control techniques; 7 Palestiniansand 4 Israeli police were injured in the ensuingclashes. The Israeli authorities justified theincursion, saying that Palestinian minors werethrowing firecrackers at the police. Afterward,the police shut down the entrances to thesanctuary for four hours, during which timethe Islamic Waqf organized a mass sit-inprotest in the streets of the Old City. Therewas a sense that the tensions could escalate intoa sustained conflict similar to that witnessedover Israel’s plan to install new securityinfrastructure at the sanctuary in 7/2017(JPS 47 [1]), but by the end of the quarter arelative calm had returned to Haram al-Sharif.

PALESTINIAN PRISONERS

The number of Palestinians in Israeli prisonshas been steadily declining in 2018, downfrom over 6,000 in 2017. According to theIsraeli human rights NGO B’Tselem,5,667 Palestinians were imprisoned in 6/2018,

down from 5,951 in 1/2018. Detentionconditions, however, remained grim. Israel’sPublic Security Minister Erdan barred (5/27)Hamas-affiliated prisoners from watching anyof the World Cup games on television in6/2018. The Israeli authorities also cancelledall family visits from Gaza to Hamas-affiliatedprisoners on 7/30, allegedly for technicalreasons. Finally, 1 Palestinian prisoner died on5/20, reportedly of complications related to aheart attack and severe hemorrhage caused bya beating at the hands of Israeli prison guardsat Eshel Prison in Beersheba on 5/2.There were rumblings throughout the quarter

about a possible mass hunger strike, similar tothose of 2015 and 2016. Earlier in the year, agroup of prisoners started (2/13) a boycott ofIsrael’s military courts to protest the use ofadministrative detention, which enables Israelto imprison Palestinians without trial forperiods of six months, which can then berenewed indefinitely. After the Israeliauthorities cracked down on the group andthreatened to punish their lawyers, the groupdecided to ramp up their protest and collectivelystopped accepting health care on 5/15. Only fiveof the prisoners ultimately went (7/6) on hungerstrike. The Israeli authorities cracked downimmediately, placing the five men in solitaryconfinement in an attempt to stop the protestfrom spreading.

SETTLER-RELATED VIOLENCE

Settler-related violence was on the rise for athird quarter in a row. According to OCHA,there were 74 incidents of settlers attackingPalestinians or their property in the West Bankand East Jerusalem between 5/11 and 8/13.Thirty-two of these led to Palestinian injuries(up from 21 last quarter), and 42 to thedestruction of Palestinian property (downfrom 47; see Figure 2 and Chronology).



DEMOLITIONS AND DISPLACEMENT

According to OCHA, Israeli forcesdemolished 90 Palestinian structures in theWest Bank (42) and East Jerusalem (48) thisquarter, marking a 25 percent drop from lastquarter’s 121. These demolitions displaced122 Palestinians (up from 103 last quarter):85 in the West Bank and 37 in East Jerusalem.The Israeli government’s decades-long

campaign to clear the roughly 25 Bedouincommunities from the E1 corridor area of theWest Bank adjacent to Jerusalem was again inthe spotlight, with the high-profile case of Khanal-Ahmar sparking protests across the WestBank and drawing criticism from theinternational community. By evacuating anddemolishing the village, the Israeli governmentwould have more space to expand the Ma’aleAdumim and Kefar Adumim settlements,

potentially connecting them to Jerusalem.The government cleared the final legal hurdlepreventing demolition on 5/24, when Israel’sHigh Court of Justice rejected two petitionschallenging the government’s proposal. TheIsraeli authorities then declared the village aclosed military zone on 7/3 and prepared fordemolitions to begin. Palestinians and solidarityactivists flooded the village on 7/4, clashingwith Israeli troops and obstructing demolitioncrews; 2 activists and 11 Palestinians werearrested, and at least 35 were injured. After asecond day of clashes on 7/5, the High Courtissued a temporary freeze on the demolitionorders following a last-minute appeal fromlawyers for Khan al-Ahmar. The High Courtthen issued (7/9) an injunction staying thedemolition and gave (7/12) the governmentuntil 7/16 to respond to the appeal, which

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

5/2–

5/15

5/16

–5/2

95/

30–6

/12

6/13

–6/1

96/

20–7

/37/

4–7/

177/

18–7

/31

8/1–

8/14

8/15

–8/2

88/

29–9

/11

9/12

–9/2

59/

26–1

0/9

10/1

0–10

/23

10/2

4–11

/611

/7–1

1/20

11/2

1–12

/412

/5–1

2/18

12/1

9–1/

11/

2–1/

151/

16–1

/29

1/30

–2/1

22/

13–2

/26

2/27

–3/1

23/

13–3

/26

3/27

–4/9

4/10

–4/2

34/

24–5

/75/

8–5/

215/

22–6

/46/

5–6/

186/

19–7

/27/

3–7/

167/

17–7

/30

7/31

–8/1

3

Num

bero

f att

acks

Date

Leading to Palestinian property/land damageLeading to Palestinian casualties

:source OCHA’s biweekly reports from 5/2017 to 8/2018. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Protection of Civilians,” 23 August 2018, https://www.ochaopt.org/reports/protection-of-civilians.

Figure 2. Israeli settler attacks. Settler-related violence has increased considerably in 2018, with no sign ofabating in the final third of the year.


Autumn 2018 || 175

argued that the government neglected toproperly address the residents’ plan to regulateconstruction in the village. (Lack of properauthorization was the official justification forthe demolitions—such authorization beingimpossible for Palestinians to obtain from theIsraeli authorities.) After a week of legal backand forth, the High Court put an extended holdon the demolition plan until at least 8/15 andcalled a hearing on 8/1. At that hearing, thejudges largely agreed that the demolition couldnot be avoided, but they also called on bothsides’ lawyers to reach a compromise on analternative relocation site. The residents ofKhan al-Ahmar had rejected the initialproposal, which would have seen them livingnear a garbage dump outside Abu Dis. Thegovernment submitted another proposal on 8/7,but the residents rejected (8/8) it, leaving thefate of Khan al-Ahmar and its residents inquestion at the end of the quarter.

INTRA-PALESTINIAN DYNAMICS

RECONCILIATION TROUBLES

With PA president Abbas’s health in declineand the Palestinian political arena dominatedby talk of the Great March of Return and theescalation of violence around Gaza, thePalestinian reconciliation process remained ata standstill for a second quarter in a row.Despite Egyptian mediators’ renewed efforts,Hamas and Fatah officials failed to agree on anew path forward, leaving both the immediatefuture of reconciliation and the long-termstatus of key Palestinian institutions, includingthe PA and PLO, in question.Soon after the quarter began, Abbas was

hospitalized on 5/20, with doctors and PAofficials close to him providing conflictingreports on the nature of his ailment. Some said

he was suffering from complications related toa recent ear surgery, while others alluded tounspecified “medical tests.” What was initiallydescribed as a brief visit stretched into aneight-day stay at Istishari Hospital in Ramallah.“I leave hospital today in good health,” Abbastold reporters on 5/28, pledging to “resume[his] work tomorrow.”However, questions aboutAbbas’s health lingered throughout the quarter,prompting renewed speculation about successionarrangements and reconciliation prospects.In a possible effort to consolidate power

ahead of a succession struggle, Abbas took anumber of steps to marginalize dissentingvoices and to secure his allies’ positions uponleaving the hospital. After approximately2,000 people gathered in Ramallah on 6/10 toprotest the PA’s recent sanctions on Gaza (seeJPS 47 [1] and [2]), Abbas ordered a temporarysuspension of permits for public protests(6/13). “In order to facilitate citizens’ normallife in this period, it is prohibited to grantpermits to organize marches or to establishgatherings that would disrupt the movement ofcitizens and disturb them,” a PA statement read(6/13). Following the ban, PA security forcesviolently dispersed (6/13) Palestinian protestersin central Ramallah who were demonstratingagainst the PA’s sanctions on Gaza. A fewweeks later, Asharq Al Awsat reported (7/2) thatAbbas was working to assemble a newPalestinian unity government, purportedly toprevent the Trump administration from creatingan administrative entity in Gaza. Abbas wentso far as to meet with former PA PM and rivalSalam Fayyad, an unpopular technocraticfigure who resigned from office in 2013, todiscuss the proposal (Asharq Al Awsat, 7/2).According to PLO secretary-general Erakat,Abbas also wanted to convene a nationalcommittee to make recommendations forresolving the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.



Abbas’s efforts were quickly overshadowedby a new Egyptian initiative to advance thereconciliation process through the ongoingbackchannel talks between Hamas and Israel ona possible long-term cease-fire. After a Hamasdelegation returned from a round of talks inCairo in mid-7/2018, Hamas leader Haniyehcalled (7/19) the head of Egypt’s GeneralIntelligence Directorate, Abbas Kamel, theofficial in charge of the talks, and acceptedthe most recent Egyptian proposal. “Thisproposal was the fruit of a thorough dialogue,”read a Hamas statement issued the same day.Palestinian sources said that the proposalcalled for the PA to lift all sanctions imposedon Gaza since the beginning of 2017, resumeadministrative duties there, and hire anunspecified number of the civil servants in theemploy of the Hamas-run government since2007. Additionally, Hamas would remain incharge of collecting taxes and tariffs, which itwould use to pay its own employees, includingsome security personnel. According to a seniorFatah official (7/21), the proposal was basedon the most recent reconciliation agreementbetween the two factions signed on 10/12/2017(see JPS 47 [2]). “[It is] a draft proposal formechanisms to implement the previousreconciliation agreements and not a finaldocument,” Haniyeh said.A Fatah delegation departed for Cairo on

7/29 for a round of talks on the proposal, butproblems quickly arose. Despite the statementby delegation head Azzam al-Ahmad saying(7/29) that Fatah was leaning towardsupporting the proposal, the delegationdelivered Fatah’s official rejection on 7/30.Fatah officials indicated (7/29) that the partyleadership had not wanted to appear to obstructthe proposal in order to remain involved inthe broader Egyptian mediation of a Hamas-Israel cease-fire.

As the talks on a long-term cease-fireadvanced (see “The Brink of War” above),Abbas increasingly disengaged from theprocess, however. According to reports on 8/5,Fatah officials repeatedly conveyed concernsto both Hamas and the Egyptian mediatorsthat a Hamas-Israel agreement that excludedAbbas would compromise Palestinian nationalunity. The Egyptians reportedly preferred aprocess that involved Abbas, fearing the long-term durability of the alternative, and pushedHamas to call a meeting of the variousPalestinian factions on 8/5. Fatah opted notto attend, however, and each faction took tothe press to accuse the other of ducking themost pressing issues. A Fatah spokespersondescribed (8/5) Hamas as participating in“shameful” talks with Israel that aimed to“separate Gaza from the homeland andestablish a rump state that would be the deathknell of our national project.” The next day,a Hamas official indicated that Palestinianreconciliation was not likely to be includedin the cease-fire talks going forward. “Gaza ison the verge of total collapse, [in part] becauseof the sanctions the PA has placed on theStrip,” he said. “Hamas wouldn’t think twicebefore accepting a proposal that wouldalleviate the population’s suffering . . . even ifthere was a political price to pay,” he added.By the end of the quarter, none of the key

issues had been resolved, and progress on anew reconciliation agreement appeared outof reach. At the 29th meeting of thePalestinian Central Council in Ramallah on8/15, Abbas was sharply critical of Hamas,which he alleged was ill intentioned withregard to reconciliation. In a speech kickingoff two days of meetings, the Palestinianpresident said he was keen to “talk abouthow we are going to make the reconciliationa success for our people and the unity of


Autumn 2018 || 177

their land under one government, one law,and one legal weapon without militiasrunning here and there.”

PALESTINIAN OPINION

The following data came from a pollconducted by the Palestinian Center forPolicy and Survey Research (PCPSR) between6/25–7/13/2018. The results are based on asurvey of 2,150 Palestinians from the WestBank (including East Jerusalem) and theGaza Strip. The complete poll, the 68th in aseries, can be found at www.pcpsr.org. (Thesurvey questions have been edited forgrammar/syntax.)

1. International reports indicate thateconomic and humanitarian conditionsin the Gaza Strip are worsening by theday and that the Strip is on the verge ofcollapse. Who, in your view, is the side(party) that is the most responsible forthe worsening of conditions in the GazaStrip?

2. When . . . Abbas was admitted to hospitalfor treatment in Ramallah, there was muchspeculation and discussion regardingsuccession and how it would eventually bedecided upon, and whether it wouldproceed in accordance with the State ofPalestine’s Basic Law, . . . meaning that thespeaker of the Palestinian LegislativeCouncil Aziz Dweik (Hamas) wouldbecome interim president for two monthsduring which preparations would be madefor presidential elections. Are you in favorof such arrangement in the case of asuccession?

3. If Hamas agreed to allow the election ofa parliamentary speaker who is not amember of Hamas or Fatah, for examplesomeone like Salam Fayyad or MustafaBarghouti, or someone else from amongthe members of the Palestinian LegislativeCouncil, would you be in favor or againstsuch an arrangement?

4. Are you worried that internal Palestinianconditions will deteriorate further and hitrock bottom in case of a presidential voidamid the lack of clarity or internalagreement as to the succession?

Total West Bank Gaza Strip

1) PA presidentMahmoud Abbas

25.7% 19.4% 36.1%

2) Fatah/Hamas 3.9% 5.4% 1.5%

3) Hamas 19.9% 17.2% 24.4%

4) Israel 34.2% 38.1% 27.7%

5) U.S. 1.6% 0.5% 3.5%

6) Egypt/Arabcountries

5.7% 7.1% 3.4%

7) Palestiniandivision

1.5% 1.5% 1.5%

8) Blockade 0.7% 1.1% 0.0%

9) Others 4.2% 5.5% 1.9%

10) Don’t know/Notapplicable

2.6% 4.2% 0.0%


1) In favor 60.3% 59.0% 62.6%

2) Not in favor 28.6% 27.8% 29.9%


11.0% 13.2% 7.5%


1) In favor 61.5% 60.8% 62.6%

2) Not in favor 29.0% 27.7% 31.1%


9.5% 11.5% 6.4%



5. In the case of the president’s resignation orincapacitation, do you think the Palestinianpolitical factions will be able to reach anagreement on the holding of elections inthe West Bank and the Gaza Strip to electhis successor?

FRONTLINE STATES

SYRIA

Following a series of increasingly deadlyskirmishes between Iranian-backed forces andIsraeli troops in southwest Syria last quarter(see JPS 47 [4]), the Iranian role in the ongoingSyrian civil war took center stage. As low-levelcross-border violence continued, the Israelisembarked on an inconclusive diplomaticinitiative to convince Iran’s allies in Russiato secure the removal of all Iranian forcesfrom Syria.Israel’s position had always been that “there

is no room for any Iranian military presence inany part of Syria,” Israeli PM Netanyahu toldthe Knesset on 5/28. Initially, the Russianshad remained neutral on the issue, but in amajor reversal, Russian FM Sergey Lavrovresponded on the same day saying that (5/28)

Syrian forces alone should have a presence onthe border with Israel. “All non-Syrian forcesshould be withdrawn on a reciprocal basis,”he added. Israeli security and diplomaticsources attributed the Russian reversal to theparticularly deadly Israeli attack in Syria on 5/10(Haaretz, 5/28).After Israeli DM Lieberman flew to Moscow

for a meeting with his Russian counterpart,Sergei Shoigu, on 5/31, there were reports thatthe two had found common ground. Accordingto Asharq Al Awsat, Shoigu gave Israel the“green light” to operate in Syria as long as theIsraeli army did not target Syrian armypositions (6/1). He reportedly also pledgedthat Iranian and Hezbollah troops would pullback at least 20 kilometers from Syria’s borderwith Israel, with the ultimate goal being toretreat at least 70 kilometers. The next day,Russia’s permanent representative to the UN,Vasily Nebenzya, confirmed that Russia andIsrael had reached some form of understanding.“At this point, I cannot answer if it is beingrealized, but as far as I understand, the partiesthat were involved in reaching an agreementare satisfied with what they have achieved,”he said.In 6/2018 and early 7/2018, the Syrian

army was in the final stages of a campaign toretake control of southwestern Syria from avariety of rebel groups. The Israeli armycarried out air strikes on anti-regime Iranian andHezbollah positions on at least five occasions(6/17, 6/25, 7/6, 7/8, and 7/11; see Chronology).With tensions rising along the Israel-Syria

border, Netanyahu met with Russian presidentVladimir Putin in Moscow on 7/11, markingtheir ninth meeting since Russia’s directmilitary involvement in Syria in 9/2015.Netanyahu claimed (7/12) that Putin hadcommitted to pulling Iranian, Hezbollah, andallied forces “tens of kilometers” away from


1) Worried 63.8% 66.9% 58.7%

2) Not worried 32.3% 28.4% 38.7%


3.9% 4.6% 2.6%


1) Yes 48.4% 48.6% 48.1%

2) No 41.1% 41.6% 40.4%


5.3% 7.3% 1.6%


Autumn 2018 || 179

the Syria-Israel border. Netanyahu added thathe had made it clear to Putin that Israel did“not object” to Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asadretaking control of Syria, a top Russian priorityin the region. “The heart of the matter ispreserving our freedom of action againstanyone who acts against us,” Netanyahu said(7/12). One senior Israeli official said that theNetanyahu-Putin meeting created a “realisticopportunity” to “push Iran out of Syria.”When Netanyahu met (7/23) with Lavrov in

Jerusalem a week later, an ancillary issue cameup. In addition to ground forces, the Israeliswanted Russia to secure the removal of allIranian weapons. “The removal of Iran mustinclude the removal of long-range weapons,halting the production of precision weaponsas well as the air defenses that protect themissiles, and the closure of border crossingsthat permit smuggling of this weaponry toLebanon and to Syria,” a senior Israeli officialsaid (7/23). The Russians, he added, definitelyhad the ability to do this, saying, “They are asignificant factor in Syria.”Finally, two days after the Syrian army

successfully regained control of southwesternSyria, including the region adjacent to theSyria-Israel border, Putin’s Special Envoy toSyria Alexander Lavrentiev said (8/1) that thebulk of the Iranian forces and all heavy weaponshad withdrawn to at least 85 kilometers fromthe Israel-Syria border. He indicated thatIranian military advisors remained embeddedwith Syrian troops in the area, “but there are nounits of heavy equipment and weapons thatcould pose a threat to Israel at a distance of85 kilometers from the line of demarcation.”The Israelis were apparently dissatisfied

with the new arrangement, and low-levelskirmishes continued through the end of thequarter (see Chronology). “What we have laiddown as a red line is military intervention and

entrenchment by Iran in Syria, and notnecessarily on our border,” said Israel’s RegionalCooperation Minister Tzachi Hanegbi (Reuters,8/1). “There’ll be no compromises norconcessions on this matter.”

Devastation in Yarmouk

In the context of the Syrian army’s campaignto regain control of southwestern Syria,government troops mounted a final assaultagainst the Damascus suburb of Yarmouk, oncehome to the largest population of Palestinianrefugees in Syria, on 5/21. The intensivebombardment that began on 4/19 (see JPS 47[4]), coming after seven years of siege, left thecamp in ruins, “with hardly a house untouchedby the conflict,” according to UNRWAspokesperson Chris Gunness on 5/21. “Thepublic health system, water, electricity, [and]basic services [necessary] for life are severelydamaged. The debris of this pitiless conflict iseverywhere. In that environment, it is hard tosee how people can go back,” he added.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

IRAN

After U.S. president Trump announced (5/8)that he was pulling the U.S. out of the 7/14/2015Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, orJCPOA, attention shifted to its three Europeansignatories—the UK, France, and Germany.The remaining two signatories—Russia andChina—were expected to maintain their post-agreement trade ties with Iran, but theEuropeans were in a more difficult position.It was unclear if the U.S. planned to imposesecondary sanctions on European companiesdoing business with Iran, thereby renderingcontinued European adherence to theagreement costly, or if the Europeans were



willing to accept sanctions in exchange forcontinued Iranian adherence. The head ofIran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali AkbarSalehi, put it differently after meeting with EUenergy commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete inTehran on 5/19: “The ball is in the court ofthe EU.”Several European companies, however, were

not willing to wait for the politicians to sortmatters out, and a number of them, includingFrance’s Total and the Dutch shipping firmMaersk, stated that they would likely pull outof Iran if the U.S. imposed sanctions. Accessto the Iranian market, where inflation andunemployment were growing, was not worthrisking in light of the much larger and morelucrative U.S. market, analysts explained. “Forsure there are clear difficulties with sanctions,”Cañete said after meeting with Salehi on 5/19.“We will have to ask [the U.S.] for waivers, forcarve-outs for the companies that makeinvestments [in Iran].” The Iranian governmentwas still in favor of maintaining the agreement,but according to FM Mohammad Javad Zarif(5/20), “European political support for the[agreement] is not sufficient.”As the Trump administration was preparing

to reimpose sanctions on Iran, the remainingsignatories of the 7/14/2015 JCPOA convenedat Iran’s request in Vienna on 5/25. “We arenegotiating . . . to see if they can provide us witha package which can give Iran the benefits ofsanctions lifting,” said Iran’s Deputy FM AbbasAraghchi (5/25). “The next step is to findguarantees for that package.” After that firstround of talks, France, Germany, the UK, andthe EU sent (6/6) a formal request to the U.S.requesting that European companies beexempted from any new sanctions. “As allies,we expect that the U.S. will refrain fromtaking action to harm Europe’s securityinterests,” the request read.

The Trump administration had other plans,however. According to a 6/18 report in Haaretz,the U.S. and Israel had formed a joint taskforce to help oversee and enforce sanctions onIran. On 6/26, a senior U.S. State Departmentofficial said that the Trump administrationexpected global imports of Iranian oil to ceasewhen the U.S. reimposed sanctions on Iran’senergy sector, set to go into effect on 11/4/2018.Although most of the rhetoric from the Trumpadministration was consistent with that position,another senior State Department officialspeculated (7/2) that some exceptions mightbe made. “We are prepared to workwith countries that are reducing their importson a case-by-case basis,” the official said (7/2),reportedly in an effort to ease fluctuations inthe international oil market. “Our policy is toget to zero [imports of Iranian oil] as soon aspossible.”Following several days of talks in Vienna,

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani deemed (7/5)the latest European offer of economic incentivesinsufficient. The world’s third-largest shippingcompany, CMA CGM, then announced (7/7)that it was halting service to Iran in directresponse to the threat of U.S. sanctions, andU.S. president Trump saw an opening toreengage. “I know they’re having a lot ofproblems and their economy is collapsing,”Trump said at a press conference in Brusselson 7/12. “But I will tell you this—at a certainpoint they’re going to call me and they’re goingto say, ‘let’s make a deal.’And we’ll make a deal.”Rouhani then called (7/22) on Trump to adoptless aggressive policies toward Iran andalluded to the possibility of armed conflict. Inresponse, Trump tweeted (7/22), “NEVER,EVER THREATEN THE U.S. AGAIN ORYOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THELIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUTHISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.”


Autumn 2018 || 181

As Trump and other U.S. officials vacillatedbetween threats and offers to negotiate, the U.S.reimposed (8/7) sanctions on Iran, excludingthe energy sector. The move worsened relationsbetween the U.S. and its European allies andincreased the pressure on negotiators at theEuropean-Iranian talks in Vienna. “These arethe most biting sanctions ever imposed,”Trump tweeted (8/7). “In [11/2018] they ratchetup to yet another level. Anyone doing businesswith Iran will NOT be doing business withthe U.S. I am asking for WORLD PEACE,nothing less!” EU foreign policy chief FedericaMogherini, along with the FMs of the UK,France, and Germany, issued a statement (8/7)expressing “deep” regret over the reimpositionof sanctions. “The remaining parties to theJCPOA have committed to work on, inter alia,the preservation and maintenance of effectivefinancial channels with Iran, and thecontinuation of Iran’s export of oil and gas,”their statement read. “These efforts will beintensified and reviewed at ministerial level inthe coming weeks.” Mogherini also encouragedEuropean companies to continue doingbusiness with Iran, despite the sanctions. “Weare doing our best to keep Iran in the deal, tokeep Iran benefiting from the economic benefitsthat the agreement brings to the people ofIran because we believe this is in the securityinterests of not only our region, but also of theworld,” she said (8/7).

SAUDI ARABIA

After Crown Prince Mohammed binSalman visited the U.S. last quarter and madestatements about the growing confluence ofinterests between Israel and Saudi Arabia, theSaudi relationship with the Palestinians, theSaudi role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, andthe Palestinian-Israeli conflict’s place in thepolitical dynamics of the Middle East all came

to the fore this quarter. King Salman hadattempted to ease Palestinian concerns on 4/3when he said that Riyadh remained “steadfast”in its dedication to “the Palestinian issue andthe legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”He went a step further this quarter. Aftermonths of intermittent reports that the Saudiswould likely accept whatever peace plan theTrump administration came up with, Salmanreportedly informed U.S. officials that he wouldnot be able to support the plan if it did notprovide for a Palestinian capital in EastJerusalem (Reuters, 7/29).

INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES

Facilitating the Slaughter in Gaza

While the Israeli army was launching near-daily air strikes across Gaza (see “The Brink ofWar” above), the Trump administration’sMiddle East team—Trump senior advisor andson-in-law Kushner, Special Representative forInternational Negotiations Greenblatt, andAmbassador to Israel Friedman—jointlypenned (7/19) an op-ed for the WashingtonPost, titled “Help Is at Hand for Palestinians.It’s All Up to Hamas.” Making no mention ofthe Israeli blockade of Gaza, they described theirefforts to raise money for humanitarian aid(see “The So-Called Trump Initiative” above),expressed sympathy for the Palestinian people,and blamed Hamas for the ongoing crisis.“International donors are conflicted,” theywrote. “Should they try to help the peopledirectly, at the certain risk of enrichingterrorists, or withhold funding to Hamas andwatch the people it is supposed to governsuffer?” Amid widespread Palestinian, andsome international indignation, a Hamasspokesperson described the editorial as



“adopting the Israeli narrative” and displayingthe “contempt of the American government.”

Legislative Crackdown on BDS

Louisiana governor John Bel Edwardssigned (5/22) an executive order barring thestate from contracting with entities thatparticipate in a boycott of Israel or “Israeli-controlled territories.” As a result, Louisianahas become the 25th state with legislation orexecutive orders targeting the BDSmovement. “The U.S., and by affiliation,Louisiana, have benefited in innumerableways from our deep friendship with Israel,”Edwards said (5/22), adding that “any effortto boycott Israel is an affront to thislongstanding relationship.” In a related move,South Carolina governor Henry McMastersigned into law a new definition of anti-Semitism on 7/6, requiring state universitiesto account for anti-Semitism when reviewingallegations of discrimination or bias.Palestine solidarity activists criticized themove because the new definition conflatedcriticism of Israel with anti-Semitism, andtherefore impinged on students’ free speechrights. Finally, after lawmakers in Kansasamended the anti-BDS law they passed inearly 2017, the ACLU withdrew (6/29) itslawsuit challenging the legislation. Thelawmakers adjusted the law, which requiredpotential state contractors to certify that theydo not participate in boycotts of Israel suchthat it would no longer apply to individuals orcontractors who conduct less than $100,000worth of business in the state. They alsoaltered the required certification enablingpotential contractors to assert only that theyare “not engaged in a boycott of goods orservices from Israel that constitute an integralpart of business conducted or sought to beconducted with the state.”

Aid to the Palestinians

Seven months after Trump slashed U.S. aidto UNRWA and ordered a review of all aid tothe Palestinians, National Public Radio (NPR)reported (8/2) that the Trump administrationwas releasing as much as $61 million in aidto the PA (some sources said the sum was closerto $35 million). One State Department officialsaid (8/2) that the money was intended tosupport ongoing coordination between PAsecurity forces and the Israeli army in the WestBank. “This decision does not in any wayprejudge the outcome of our review of otherfunding streams and programs,” one officialexplained (8/2). “It is simply the first decision toemerge from the review, which is ongoing.”

EUROPEAN UNION

With the EU scrambling to preserve theJCPOA and pushing for Israel to cancel itsplans to evacuate and demolish the Bedouinvillage of Khan al-Ahmar (see “Iran” and“Demolitions and Displacement” above),European-Israeli relations deteriorated thisquarter. After EU foreign policy chiefMogherini cancelled (6/8) her plannedappearance at a conference in Jerusalem on6/10, citing undisclosed “agenda reasons,” theIsraeli press reported that the real reason wasthat PM Netanyahu had refused her requestfor a meeting. “She was invited by the AmericanJewish Committee for their conference, and notby Israel,” one senior Israeli diplomatic officialexplained (6/8). “Her positions are very hostileto Israel.”

UNITED NATIONS

The U.S. tried and failed to stymie criticism ofIsrael’s assault on Gaza at the UN this quarter.After U.S. ambassador to the UN Nikki Haleyfailed (5/31) to gather enough support at theSecurity Council for a statement condemning


Autumn 2018 || 183

Hamas’s rocket attacks, she vetoed (6/1) aKuwaiti-backed resolution condemning Israel’suse of force against Palestinian civilians. TheUNGA then adopted (6/13) a similar,Palestinian-backed resolution condemningIsrael’s use of “excessive force” in quelling theongoing protests in Gaza, with 120 votes infavor, 45 abstaining, and 8 opposed. Beforethe UNGA vote, Haley circulated anamendment to the draft resolution that wouldhave condemned Hamas for its rocket fire andalleged diversion of humanitarian resources toits security apparatus, but again she failed togather enough support.

UNHRC

On 5/18, the UNHRC convened to debateIsrael’s assault on protesters gathering alongthe border fence on 5/14. Despite objectionsfrom the U.S. and Australia, the UNHRCapproved a Pakistani proposal to establish anindependent commission of inquiry to look intoIsrael’s use of deadly force to quell the protests,and to report back by 3/2019. Twenty-ninecountries voted in favor of the proposal, whichalso condemned the “indiscriminate anddisproportionate use of force,” while 14abstained and only the U.S. and Australiavoted against it.A month after the vote, at the 38th session

of the UNHRC in Geneva, UK foreignsecretary Boris Johnson announced (6/18) that,beginning in 2019, the UK planned to voteagainst all resolutions introduced under AgendaItem 7, the UNHRC’s dedicated and permanentmandate for issues relating to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. “We share the view that adedicated agenda item focused solely on Israeland the oPt is disproportionate and damagingto the cause of peace,” Johnson said, aligning theUK with the Trump administration’s positionon the UNHRC. The day after Johnson’s

comments, Haley announced (6/19) that theU.S. was going one step further and formallywithdrawing from the UNHRC. “Earlier thisyear, as it has in previous years, the UNHRCpassed five resolutions against Israel, more thanit passed against North Korea, Iran, and Syriacombined,” she said (see JPS 47 [4] for abreakdown of those five resolutions). “Thisdisproportionate focus and unending hostilitytoward Israel is clear proof that the [UNHRC]is motivated by political bias.”

UNESCO

The UN Educational, Scientific, andCultural Organization’s (UNESCO) WorldHeritage Committee postponed, for a secondtime, a vote on two resolutions related to theold cities of Jerusalem and Hebron on 6/26,prompting Israel’s ambassador to UNESCO,Carmel Shama-Hacohen, to suggest that theIsraeli government reconsider its pledge towithdraw from UNESCO by the end of 2018.“I was the first to recommend leaving theorganization after the U.S. announced itswithdrawal [on 10/12/2017], but now Israelmust not ignore the new spirit emanatingfrom UNESCO, and we need to reevaluate, infull coordination with the U.S., the questionof leaving,” he said. Netanyahu then calledUNESCO’s Director-General Audrey Azoulayto thank her for the postponement and praiseher for the fact that UNESCO had not passedany resolutions he deemed anti-Israel for ayear. According to a senior Israeli diplomat(8/8), Azoulay invited Netanyahu to meet atsome point in 9/2018 to discuss whether ornot Israel would consider delaying orreversing its plan to withdraw from UNESCO.“Obviously, we welcome any constructiveefforts in our foreign relations,” Shama-Hacohen said of the invitation. “But the issueis complicated.”



UNRWA

UNRWA was scrambling this quarter toaddress the massive budget shortfall caused byTrump’s 1/16/2018 decision to slash U.S.support for the agency. By 6/2018, the U.S.had only disbursed $60 million to UNRWA(compared with $364 million in 2017), andthe agency was “weeks away from painful cutsto its emergency assistance for Gaza andelsewhere in the region,” according to UNspecial coordinator Mladenov. UNRWAcommissioner general Pierre Krähenbühlattempted to raise the minimum $250 millionnecessary to maintain basic services at theagency’s annual donors conference in NewYork on 6/25, but he was unsuccessful.UNRWA then laid off (7/26) 145 employees inthe West Bank and 113 in Gaza. Another 584full-time employees were offered part-timepositions. Without any major new donorsupport, UN officials said (8/15) that it wasunlikely that UNRWA schools across theMiddle East would be able to open on time in9/2018. “We are running on empty,” said (8/15)an UNRWA spokesperson. “We simply don’thave enough money to pay 22,000 teachers whoin 711 schools provide a daily education forover half a million children.”Although UNRWA was unable to secure

enough new donor support to mitigate the$250 million shortfall, the agency did announcea number of new donations throughout thequarter. Most significantly, Qatar agreed topledge $50 million to sustain UNRWA’seducation services across the Middle East on5/16. “This agreement aims to ensure that theprovision of basic services to Palestinianrefugees is not interrupted,” explained thedirector-general of the Qatar Fund forDevelopment, Khalifa Bin Jassim Al-Kuwari.Separately, the Organization of Islamic

Cooperation decided to establish a “WaqfFund” to ensure “consistent and sustainablefunding” for UNRWA at its summit in Istanbulon 5/18. Islamic Relief USA contributed$2.4 million to support 3,000 refugees in Gazaon 5/24. The Big Heart Foundation, a UnitedArab Emirates-based charity, gave $100,000for UNRWA to provide health services in Gazaon 7/2. Austria contributed (8/10) €1 million(approximately $1.157 million) to supportUNRWA’s activities in the oPt. Finally, Chinaand Germany pledged (8/8) $2.35 million and€8.4 million (approximately $9.84 million),respectively, in additional funds for UNRWA’sfood aid program in Gaza.

DONORSOutside the context of UNRWA, there were

a number of new aid announcements for thePalestinians this quarter. The crisis in Gaza, inparticular, concerned European donors. The EUannounced a €3 million grant (approximately$3.57 million) to Palestinians in need of “criticalassistance” in Gaza on 5/18 and €306,000(approximately $353,712) to the PA to support81 farmers in Bayt Hanun on 6/12. On 5/29,the UK announced that it would be providingmedical supplies and equipment to 11 hospitalsand other medical centers in Gaza to helptreat Palestinians injured during Israel’s deadlycrackdown on the Great March of Return.On 8/9, PA officials announced a $13 millionpledge from Germany to supportreconstruction efforts in Gaza. Also, UN specialcoordinator Mladenov announced (7/25) thatthe World Bank had set aside $90 million in aidto the Palestinians in 2018, up from $55 millionin 2017, “in response to “the alarming economiccircumstances in the occupied Palestinianterritories.”


Autumn 2018 || 185

On top of these Gaza-specific donations, theWorld Bank transferred (5/22) $10.5 millionfrom Japan and France to the PA to coverurgent budget needs. The EU pledged (6/11)€15 million (approximately $17.38 million) tothe PA for social programs in the West Bankand Gaza and (8/3) another €10 million(approximately $11.5 million) to help pay thesalaries of current employees and pensioners.On 7/10, China’s President, Xi Jinping,announced a new $15 million pledge to supportPalestinian economic development in thecontext of a broader aid package for the MiddleEast. Germany pledged (7/23) €10 million(approximately $11.5 million) to fund awastewater reuse project in Nablus. Finally,Japan pledged (6/12 and 7/26) €1.6 million(approximately $1.84 million) to economicdevelopment projects in the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park.The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, the main

policy-level coordination mechanism fordevelopment assistance to the Palestinians,did not meet this quarter.

BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT,SANCTIONS

Over 170 Palestinian civil society groupslaunched the BDS movement in 2005. Its aimis to create an international campaign ofboycotts, divestments, and sanctions againstIsrael “until it complies with international lawand Palestinian rights.”

In a major win for the BDS movement,Grammy-winning Brazilian musician GilbertoGil cancelled a concert in Tel Aviv on 7/4 citingthe “conflict in the Gaza Strip,” according to areport in the Brazilian newspaper O Globo on5/21. The Palestinian Campaign for the

Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel(PACBI) celebrated (5/21) his decision: “Wethank Gil’s fans in Brazil and across LatinAmerica whose outrage over Israel’s latestmassacre in Gaza and support for Palestinianhuman rights seem to have played a decisiverole in his decision.” Joining Gil, Colombiansinger Shakira cancelled (5/29) a plannedconcert in Tel Aviv following pleas fromPalestinian solidarity activists around theworld. Also on 5/29, four guests cancelledtheir planned appearances at the Tel AvivInternational LGBT Film Fest (5/31–6/9). Linnda Quebrada, star of the Brazilian documentaryBixa Travesty, explained (5/29) their decisionon Facebook: “We decided to adhere to theboycott in disagreement with the Israeligovernment . . . and its occupation in theregion.”Israeli singer Netta Barzilai won the

Eurovision song contest in early 5/2018,garnering Israel the honor of hosting thecompetition in 2019. Soon after Barzilai’svictory, BDS activists launched a Eurovision2019 boycott campaign, which the Israeligovernment was angling to host in Jerusalem.As the campaign ramped up, Israel’s CultureMinister Miri Regev stated, “If [Eurovision]can’t be held in Jerusalem, [then Israel]shouldn’t host it.” Fearing the latter, the Israeliauthorities backed off the Jerusalem demand,according to Israel’s Kan public broadcastingcorporation on 6/10. “This marks a strikingfailure in Israel’s PR efforts to assert its illegalclaim over the city,” PACBI stated (6/27).“The BDS movement sees this as the firstmilestone in the campaign to boycottEurovision 2019.”BDS activists also celebrated a major victory

this quarter in the realm of sports. On 6/5,two months after BDS Argentina launched the#ArgentinaNoVayas campaign (see JPS 47 [4]),



the Argentina Football Association cancelledan upcoming friendly match between theArgentine and Israeli national soccer teams,which was planned as a warm-up before theWorld Cup in mid-6/2018. “It’s nothingagainst the Israeli community, it’s nothingagainst the Jewish community,” theassociation’s president, Claudio Tapia, said(6/5). “The last 72 hours led us to make thedecision not to travel.” The Israeli Embassy inArgentina further stated (6/6) that unspecified“threats and provocations” precipitated thecancellation, and the local media in Argentinareported on a series of threats allegedly madeagainst Argentine star player Lionel Messi andhis wife. As Israeli officials were spinning thecancellation as a safety issue, Argentina’s FMJorge Faurie said (6/7) that the root cause of thecancellation was the Israeli authorities’ decisionto change the venue to Jerusalem. “The gamewas supposed to take place in Haifa,” he said.“The noise around the game was createdbecause of the transfer to Jerusalem, and alsobecause of its proximity to the transfer of theU.S. embassy in Israel to the city.”The success of the #ArgentinaNoVayas

campaign wasn’t the only soccer-related BDSdevelopment of the quarter. Culminating ayears-long campaign, more than 16,000 peoplesigned a petition calling on Adidas to end itssponsorship of the Israel Football Association(IFA) in 6/2018. The global sportswearcompany did just that in early 8/2018. “Wehave raised with FIFA the need for them toadjudicate on the question of the Israelisettlement teams, by following the tenets ofinternational law and their human rightspolicy,” the company said in its response tothe petition. After the announcement, BDSactivists started a campaign calling on Puma,

the IFA’s new sponsor, to drop its contractwith Israel as well.There were many other boycott-related

developments this quarter. On 6/1, the Times ofIsrael reported that a major chain of Japanesedepartment stores, Daimaru, recently stoppedworking with an importer specializing in winesfrom the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.A Daimaru spokesperson explained that thedecision did not reflect the company’s politicalpositions, but that BDS activists’ complaintsabout importing wines from an occupiedterritory were taken into account. On 6/9, theStudents Federation of India, a group withapproximately four million members, passed aresolution calling for a boycott of HewlettPackard over the company’s complicity in theIsraeli occupation. On 6/22, the GeneralAssembly of Presbyterian Church (USA)adopted 11 resolutions opposing the Israelioccupation, including a number supportingvarious aspects of the BDS movement. On 7/11,the Irish Senate voted in favor of a bill thatwould block the import and sale of goods,services, and natural resources from Israelisettlements in the oPt. The bill still needed topass the parliament’s lower house in order tobecome law, and the Irish governmentreportedly opposed the measure, favoring aunified EU approach instead. Finally, on 7/13,the U.S. Episcopal Church adopted a humanrights investment resolution at its generalconvention in Austin, which called on thechurch’s Committee on Corporate SocialResponsibility “to develop criteria for Israel andPalestine based on a human rights’ investmentscreen” like the one implemented by theEvangelical Lutheran Church in America in2016, according to Episcopal Peace Fellowship(see JPS 46 [1]).


Autumn 2018 || 187

The Journal of Palestine Studies (ISSN 0377-919X, online ISSN 1533-8614) is published quarterly bythe , for theInstitute for Palestine Studies. See www.ucpressjournals.com/journal.php?j=jps for single issue andsubscription orders, and claims information. Periodicals postage paid at Oakland, CA, and additionalmailing o ffices.

Postmaster: Send all address changes to Journal of Palestine Studies, University of California Press,155 Grand Avenue, Suite 400, Oakland, CA 94612. Please direct all questions regarding subscriptionsto University of California Press at the address above or by email at [email protected] claims for non-receipt of issue must be made within 90 days of the mail date, overseasclaims within 180 days. Mail dates can be checked here: http://www.ucpressjournals.com/ucpress.asp?page=ReleaseSchedule

UC Press does not begin accepting claims for an issue until thirty (30) days after the mail date. CanadianGST 89626 2698 RT0001.

Correspondence with the editors should be directed to the Journal of Palestine Studies, 3501 M StreetNW, Washington, DC 20007, [email protected], (202) 342-3990. Opinions expressed in theJournal of Palestine Studies are solely those of their authors and do not reflect the opinions of the Institute for Palestine Studies. Quotations from articles and other passages from the Journal may not bereproduced for sales or advertising without the prior written permission of both author and publisher.

Copying notice: Permission to distribute electronically, republish, resell, license, or otherwise repur-pose material from JPS, as well as requests for offprints, reprints, or photocopies for classroom use maybe submitted through the University of California Press ebsite at www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm

Articles appearing in the Journal of Palestine Studies are abstracted and indexed in the following selectdatabases: Alternative Press Index; America: History and Life; Arts & Humanities Citation Index; CSAPolitical Science & Government; CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Current Contents; EthnicNewsWatch; Geographical Abstracts; Index to Jewish Periodicals; International Bibliography of the SocialSciences; International Development Abstracts; International Political Science Abstracts; Middle EastAbstracts; PAIS International; ProQuest Research Library; Social Sciences Citation Index; Social ServicesAbstracts; Sociological Abstracts. For complete abstracting and indexing information, please visit www.ucpress.edu/journals/jps.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Design: Orcada Media Group

Composition: iacriTech

Printing: Sheridan Press

Printed by The Sheridan Press on Forest Stewardship Council®–certified paper.

University of California Press, 155 Grand Avenue, Suite 400, Oakland, CA 94612-3764

.

.

d

-

w \

Documents

Update on Conflict and Diplomacy...COMPILED BY PAUL KAROLYI This update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting thePalestiniansandIsrael.Morethan100print